













Report From The Select  
Committee On The Affairs  
Of The East India  
Company

1802

  
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No. 9. The Affairs of The EAST INDIA COMPANY.

Appendix, No. 9.

Extract BENGAL Judicial Consultations, 22d April 1802.

(Civil.)

No. 6. ABSTRACT STATEMENT of Suits, depending in the Zillah and City Courts, on the 1st January 1802

Zillahs and Cities.	Before the Judge.	Before the Register.	Before the Native Commissioners.	TOTAL.
Bachourunge	177	315	1,274	1,766
Benares City	260	220	1,183	1,663
Dehar	1,200	2,041	337	3,578
Bachourunge	67	371	300	738
Patna	59	82	1,005	1,146
Chittur	191	1,303	7,615	9,109
Patna City	1,388	910	2,160	4,458
Patna Suburb	363	254	333	950
Dehar	955	815	4,452	6,222
Bachourunge	148	396	5,514	6,058
Patna	416	1,824	7,991	10,231
Jaunpur	1,378	1,738	10,887	14,003
Varanasi	207	272	566	1,045
Patna	197	253	3,371	3,821
Varanasi	200	232	1,050	1,502
Meershedabad City	528	565	8,014	9,107
Meershedabad Zillah	116	180	87	383
Buddha	27	1,762	16	1,805
Patna City	269	217	5,092	5,578
Patna	760	1,080	272	2,112
Patna	261	543	25,601	26,405
Patna	253	850	12,265	13,368
Patna	95	243	474	812
Patna	407	178	7,207	7,792
Patna	61	8	19,707	19,776
Patna	170	492	1,573	2,235
Patna	152	182	10,461	10,795
Patna	1,938	391	3,253	5,582
Patna Court of Appeal	-	-	-	52
Patna Court of Appeal	-	-	-	156
Patna Court of Appeal	-	-	-	568
Patna Court of Appeal	-	-	-	26
Patna Court of Appeal	-	-	-	106

(Signed)

JA. STUART, Register.

## Appendix, No. 10.

## REPORTS FROM JUDGES AND MAGISTRATES,

In Answer to Interrogatories circulated by Lord Wellesley, in 1801:—viz.

REPORT from Moorshedabad Court of Appeal and Circuit; of 26 January 1802  
 - - D<sup>o</sup> - - from Midnapore Zillah; - - - - - of 30 January 1802.  
 - - D<sup>o</sup> - - from Burdwan Zillah; - - - - - of 9 March 1802.  
 - - D<sup>o</sup> - - from Magistrate of 24 Pergunnahs; - - - - - of 1 July 1802.

To N. B. EDMONSTONE, Esq.

Secretary to Government, in the Political Department, Cawnpore

SIR,

Report from Moorshedabad Court of Appeal and Circuit, to Jan. 30.

IN obedience to the commands of the honourable the Vice President in Council, communicated to us, in a letter from Mr. Secretary Dowdeswell, of date the 31<sup>st</sup> ultimo, we have the honour to transmit to you, copy of Interrogatories sent to us, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of October, by the Secretary to the Judicial Department; with our Replies annexed to the several points noticed therein;—which we respectfully request may be submitted to his Excellency the Most Excellent the Governor General.

The dispersed situation of the members of these courts, on various official business, and the increased duties allotted to us, since we received the Interrogatories, has occasioned some delay in preparing a Report on a subject, which, embracing objects of weighty and serious consideration, required the deliberate attention and collective reflection of our several members:—and we trust that this explanatory excuse will be favourably received by his Excellency.

Moorshedabad, }  
 January 26, 1802. }

We have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very obedient servants,

(Signed) F. Paton.

INTERROGATORIES from Government to the Provincial Court of Appeal and Circuit at Moorshedabad; received in a Letter from the Secretary to the Judicial Department, dated 29<sup>th</sup> October 1801:—With the ANSWERS thereto, as submitted by the said Court.

Interrogatory 1. WHAT is the number of Appeals depending before your court?

A. 1.—Twenty-six.

Interrogatory 2.—What proportion does the number of Appeals now depending before your court, bear to the number of Appeals usually depending during the several years, commencing from the year 1793, to the present period?

A. 2.—On the 1<sup>st</sup> July 1801, the court of appeal submitted to the sudder dewanny adawlat, a progressive statement in detail, of causes filed and decided from the period of the court's institution in May 1793; continuing which statement to the present time, exhibits the following report, in answer to the 2<sup>d</sup> article of Interrogatories.

Filed from May 1793 to December 1794 inclusive	- 165
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - in the year - 1795	- 111
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1796	- 94
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1797	- 126
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1798	- 113
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1799	- 114
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1800	- 102
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1801	- 105

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Decisions from May 1793 to December 1794 inclusive

- - D <sup>o</sup> - - in the year - 1795	- 39
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1796	- 76
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1797	- 160
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1798	- 216
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1799	- 173
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1800	- 148
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - - - 1801	- 91

913

Depending at the end of -			
1794	-	-	- 1794
1795	-	-	- 1795
1796	-	-	- 1796
1797	-	-	- 1797
1798	-	-	- 1798
1799	-	-	- 1799
1800	-	-	- 1800
1801	-	-	- 1801

Report from the  
Court of Directors  
to the House of Commons  
in 1801

From the above, the inference deducible is, that the number now depending is in a very reduced proportion to the balance of causes, usually pending before the court; and but for contingent and unavoidable circumstances, the number now depending would have been reduced, at least one-half.

Inter<sup>r</sup> 3. What number of causes was decided in the past year, by your court?

A. 3. Ninety-one.

Inter<sup>r</sup> 4. What number of causes do you suppose must necessarily be depending before your court; and what is the reason that the number of causes depending before your tribunal, is not reduced as low as you think it might be reduced?

A. 4. We think, on the average of former years, about one hundred and ten causes will be filed annually, and that, barring unforeseen interruptions to the court's duties, not more than twenty will generally remain on file, not from inability on the part of the court to clear the whole off, but because, from the nature of the routine of the judicial business, all the papers will not be filed in such regular and rapid progression, as to admit of the whole being entirely cleared; and as we think, therefore, the number is now, and always will be, reduced as low as it can or ought to be, all circumstances considered, we do not feel ourselves called upon to show cause for non-reduction, under the position assumed in the query.

Inter<sup>r</sup> 5. Are you prepared to suggest the establishment of any rules which (consistently with the due administration of the laws) would expedite the decision of suits? Are you of opinion, that the object would be in any degree promoted, by leaving it optional to the different tribunals to commit the depositions of witnesses, in cases not appealable to a higher tribunal, to writing, or not, as the judges might think proper?

A. 5. We are not prepared to suggest the establishment of any rules, which, consistent with the due administration of the laws, would expedite the decision of suits; and from the state of the files, as exhibited by the half-yearly reports of the several adawlut in the division under our jurisdiction, it does not appear to us that any such rules are wanted. We are not of opinion that the object would be in any material degree promoted, by leaving it optional to the different tribunals to commit the depositions of witnesses in cases not appealable to a higher tribunal, to writing, or not, as the judge might think proper. All original causes, except such as should be entertained in a court of appeal, by especial direction of the sudder dewanny adawlut, for an amount not appealable to the sadder dewanny adawlut, are appealable to some higher tribunal.

Inter<sup>r</sup> 6. Are you of opinion that it would be advisable to extend the jurisdiction of the native commissioners, to suits for sums exceeding 50 R<sup>s</sup>. and that of the registers, to sums exceeding 200 R<sup>s</sup>? What is the amount to which you would recommend the courts of the commissioners, and of the registers, should be extended; and to what degree, would the general administration of justice, in the division subject to your jurisdiction, be expedited by the adoption of this arrangement?

A. 6. We are not of opinion that it would be advisable to extend the jurisdiction of the native commissioners to suits for sums exceeding 50 R<sup>s</sup>. The number of causes, usually depending before them, appears as great as they can be competent to decide, consistently with the due administration of justice. In some zillahs the number is already so great that the general administration of justice must be impeded, by adding thereto. We think that while the amount appealable to the sudder dewanny adawlut, continues fixed at 5,000 R<sup>s</sup>, the jurisdiction of the registers might be advantageously extended to 300 R<sup>s</sup>, with appeal to the judge; - not because we conceive that the general administration of justice would in any degree, be expedited, by the adoption of this arrangement; but because it would relieve the claimants to small debts from much personal trouble and vexation, by giving them the benefit of a local appeal to the judge's court, and preventing their being harrassed by appeals to a distant tribunal.

Inter<sup>r</sup> 7. Has litigation been checked by the establishment of the fee paid to government on the institution of suits, of the fees paid to the vakils, of the fees paid on exhibits in the courts of judicature, and of the stamp duties? Do you consider these several charges attending the institution of law suits, to be too considerable, or otherwise?

A. 7. The increased expense of law suits has never been found to check litigiousness. On the contrary, it has been generally observed, that litigiousness is encouraged thereby, in the hope that the certainty of the expense, added to the uncertainty of the result, might deter parties from defending, even just rights. On comparing the half-yearly reports of the several adawluts in this division, it does not appear that the number of suits filed since the establishment of the fee paid to government on the institution of suits, of the fee paid on exhibits in the courts of judicature, and of the stamp duties, differs much from the number filed, in a similar period previous thereto. As the fees paid to the vakils were established by the same code of regulations as our court, we have no records to show what was the previous



Report from Mr. Fisher,  
J. C. J. on the Trial of  
the Cause, 20. Jan.  
1802.

of litigation. We certainly consider these several charges attending the institution of law suits, to be sufficiently heavy in all cases; and in small suits, too considerable.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 8. Do the fees paid to the licensed vakels, on suits instituted or defended by them, constitute a sufficient inducement to men of character, and of proper qualifications, to undertake those situations? Are the vakels attached to your court, persons of the above description, and are they in general, well acquainted with the printed Regulations?

A. 8. From the numerous and earnest applications made to us, on every occasion of a vacancy among the licensed vakels, we are of opinion, that the fees paid to them on suits instituted or defended by them, constitute a sufficient inducement to men of character and proper qualifications to undertake those situations. The vakels attached to our court, are persons of the above description, and are in general, well acquainted with the printed Regulations.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 9. Has the establishment of licensed vakels contributed to expedite the decision of suits, by bringing more speedily and accurately before the court, the merits of the suits instituted?

A. 9. The establishment of licensed vakels can in no manner, expedite the decision of suits in appeal, nor can the vakels be of any assistance, in bringing before the Court the merits of any suit, either more speedily, or more accurately. Each suit is heard in its numerical order, and its merits come before the court in the record from the original tribunal.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 10. Do the vakels in general, discharge their duty to their clients, with honour and fidelity?

A. 10. The vakels attached to our court do, in general, appear to us to discharge their duty to their clients, with honour and fidelity.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 11. Are the principal inhabitants of your jurisdiction as well acquainted, as individuals in general, can be supposed to be informed of the laws of the country?

A. 11. If by the laws of the country be meant the Koran and Shaster, the principal inhabitants of our jurisdiction, are well acquainted with the codes of their respective religions; as individuals in general, can be supposed to be informed. If the Regulations of government be meant, we believe that they are known to few, except the vakels and ministerial officers of the courts, and some principal landholders.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 12. Are you prepared to state any alterations in the forms established for the trial of civil suits, which would expedite the decision of the suits, without endangering the due administration of the laws?

A. 12. We are not prepared to state any alterations in the forms established for the trial of civil suits. On a comparison of the date of institution, with the date of decision, in most suits in the several zillahs under our jurisdiction, the decision appears to be, as expeditious as is consistent with the due administration of the laws.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 13. Have you in your court-room any place allotted for the bench of the judges, for the public officers, for the parties or their vakels, for the witnesses, and for all persons who attend your court; and what forms and ceremonies do you observe in opening your court, or sitting in it?

A. 13. We have in our court-room, places regularly allotted for the bench of the judges, on a platform raised considerably; also a seat for the sheristadar, and the Company's vakel; stools for the pleaders to sit upon, when not concerned in the suit trying, and fixed places allotted for the parties, their vakels, the witnesses, and officers of court. The whole remaining space of the court-room is open to all persons who attend the court, either from business or curiosity. We observe no particular forms and ceremonies in opening the court, and sitting in it, except the ceremony of taking our seats on the bench, according to our respective ranks, and the form of calling on the business, in its regular rotation.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 14. Are there any private schools or seminaries in the division under your jurisdiction, in which the Mahomedan or Hindoo law is taught; and how are those institutions maintained?

A. 14. As we understand this interrogatory has been sent to the zillah judges (who are certainly, from fixed residence, more competent than we can be, from passing cursorily through the mofussil, to report what private schools and seminaries there may be in their several districts) we have not thought it necessary to require them to report to us for the purpose of forming an answer, but we beg leave to refer to the information they may give in reply.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 15. What is your opinion regarding the general moral character of the inhabitants of your division? Has the moral character of the inhabitants in general improved, or otherwise, by the system established by the British government for the administration of the laws, and for the conduct of the internal administration of the country?

A. 15. The general moral character of the inhabitants of our division seems, in our opinion, much the same, as we have always known the moral character of the natives in general. Ignorance, and its concomitant, gross superstition, an implicit faith in the efficacy of prayers, charms and magic, selfishness, low cunning, litigiousness, avarice, revenge, disregard to truth, and indolence, are the principal features to be traced. It does not strike us, that the system established by the British government for the administration of the laws, and for the conduct of the internal administration of the country, can have any influence on the moral character of the inhabitants in general, either by way of improvement or otherwise.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 16. Are you of opinion, that the inhabitants in general of the division under your jurisdiction, consider their private rights and property to be secured by the present constitution?

tion of the country, against infringement, either by the executive officers of government, or even by the supreme executive authority itself, or by individuals?

Report from A  
dahad Court of  
1801. Circumstances  
1802.

A. 16. From what comes under our observation, we are of opinion, that the inhabitants of this division, consider their private rights and property to be secured, by the present constitution of the country, against all infringement, either by individuals, or by the executive officers of government, and even by the supreme executive authority itself. But a question arises, whether this very security, and the ease with which they can prosecute the first executive officers of government, may not induce a contempt of the government itself. Individuals have now no other mode of encroaching on one another's rights, except by harrassing one another, through the forms of law, in our civil and criminal courts; and of this weapon of revenge, they seem to make a free use.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 17. Are you of opinion, that the division under your jurisdiction is in a state of improvement, or otherwise, with respect to its population, cultivation, and commerce, and its buildings, or other works of religious, domestic, or other purposes; and on what grounds do you form your opinion?

A. 17. The face of the country shows much improvement in population and cultivation. We see no trace of increased commerce, nor of improvement in buildings, and other works of religious or domestic or other purposes. Individuals may occasionally build a temple, or dig a tank for public use; but similar endowments of former days are, at the same time, going to decay. Opulence itself seldom tempts to any improvement, in domestic comforts. We form our opinion from what comes within our personal observation during our official circuits, and occasional journeys for business or recreation, and on the conversation of well informed natives.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 18. Are you of opinion, that the inhabitants of the division subject to your jurisdiction, are, in general, satisfied with the British government?

A. 18. From what we know of the general character of the natives, we are of opinion, that, however satisfied they must be, from the greater security which they now enjoy in their persons and property, than what they ever enjoyed under the former government, no reciprocal affection (correspondent attachment) is produced in them to the British government, or gratitude for such security; but they would see a revolution with apathy and indifference, and would submit to the tyranny of any future government, with perfect resignation. The descendants of the higher classes of Mussulmans, may be conceived dissatisfied with the government itself, as the cause of their losing all share in the executive administration.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 19. Is the present system of police well calculated to ensure the apprehension of offenders?

A. 19. From the great number of offenders brought annually to trial, it would appear that the present system of police is well calculated to ensure the apprehension of offenders. We would at least hope, for the honour of human nature, that when the black catalogue of offenders apprehended is so large, few have escaped apprehension.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 20. Are the police establishments, in the division subject to your jurisdiction, adequate to the duties required of them?

A. 20. Considering the prevention of crimes to be one of the objects of police, the police establishments in the division subject to our jurisdiction, are certainly not adequate to all the duties required of them; nor can much, in the line of prevention, be expected from 10 or 15 armed men in a jurisdiction ten cross square in extent, which comprizes upwards of four hundred square miles. In former addresses [A.] to the Nizamut adawlut, and to the committee of police, we have occasionally recommended an increase in these establishments; but no government ever did, or ever can defray the whole charge of police. Much gratuitous assistance is necessary, and is enforced, in all governments. By the old constitution of this country, many casts and classes were bound to co operate with the executive officers of police.

\* [A.] dated 17<sup>th</sup> A  
1801.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 21.—Are you of opinion, that the number of crimes committed annually in the division under your jurisdiction, has increased or diminished, since the year 1793, and to what cause do you ascribe the increase or diminution?

A. 21.—The criminal jurisprudence of these provinces, was assumed by the British Government in December 1790. The number of persons tried by the original court of circuit from that time, till the institution of our court in May 1793, was 2,181. This list included several persons already in custody, but untried during the Nab Nizam's administration. The following is the annual comparison of the prisoners tried by our court, from the 2d sessions of 1793, to the 1st session of 1801.

One year, including 2d Sessions 1793, and 1st Sessions 1794			
D°	-	D°	-
D°	-	D°	-
D°	-	D°	-
D°	-	D°	-
D°	-	D°	-
D°	-	D°	-
D°	-	D°	-
D°	-	D°	-
D°	-	D°	-

The number of crimes committed annually, in the division under our jurisdiction, appears, from this statement, to have increased since the year 1793. The causes to which we ascribe the increase, are the want of a preventive police, and the inefficacy of imprisonment, as a punishment for either reformation or example.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 22.

Court of Chancery, to Nizamut Adawlat, 7 Aug. 1798.  
 D<sup>y</sup> of D<sup>y</sup> to Secy. of State, 10 Oct. 1798.  
 D<sup>y</sup> of D<sup>y</sup> to Secy. of State, 11 Oct. 1799.  
 D<sup>y</sup> of D<sup>y</sup> to Secy. of State, 11 Feb. 1800.  
 D<sup>y</sup> of D<sup>y</sup> to Secy. of State, 14 May 1800.  
 D<sup>y</sup> of D<sup>y</sup> to Secy. of State, 14 July 1800.  
 D<sup>y</sup> of D<sup>y</sup> to Secy. of State, 17 Aug. 1801.  
 D<sup>y</sup> of D<sup>y</sup> to Secy. of State, 25 June 1796.

Inter<sup>y</sup>. 22.—What crimes of enmity are most prevalent in the districts under your authority; what is the cause of the prevalence of such crimes; and what are the means you would recommend to be adopted for their suppression?

A. 22.—Gang robbery is the only crime of enmity, prevalent in the division under our authority. The cause of its prevalence, and the means which we would recommend to be adopted for its suppression, are of too long detail to be introduced here, and may be found at full length,

in our joint and separate addresses to government, and to the Nizamut Adawlat, noted in the margin.

Inter<sup>y</sup>. 23. Do the inhabitants of the division under your jurisdiction, keep arms in their houses? What description of arms do they retain; and for what purposes are the arms retained?

A. 23. Few of the lower classes of natives keep any other arms in their houses than lathies, or long thick bamboo bludgeons; the purpose for which they allege these to be retained, is to defend themselves from wild animals in the fields. The droons and barroos keep spears of various shapes, for the declared purpose of destroying wild hogs; some of the richer munduls and the village watchmen have swords; these lathies and spears, and the telenta or fishing, which the fishermen keep, as an implement of their trade, are the usual weapons found on decoits. They seldom use swords or guns; sometimes the decoits arm themselves with only the royban e, a long tapering solid iron rod pointed at one end, and hardened by fire; and every hedge can thus in a moment, furnish a deadly weapon. The middle and higher classes keep swords and daggers, chiefly as an appendage of dress.

Inter<sup>y</sup>. 24. Are there any brick or mud forts in your division? In what state are the forts, and what is the nature of their construction?

Inter<sup>y</sup>. 25. What proportion to the Harloo bear to the Mahomedan inhabitants, in the division subject to your authority; and what do you suppose to be the number of the inhabitants of your division, of all descriptions?

Inter<sup>y</sup>. 26. What are the names of the persons possessing the highest rank and greatest opulence in the division subject to your jurisdiction? What number of followers, armed or otherwise, are they supposed to maintain in their service; and do they appear abroad with such followers armed?

A. 24, 25, and 26. As we find these interrogatories have been put to the several zillah and city judges, who are the only channel of information to whom we could refer on the points contained therein; we have not deemed it requisite to call upon them to report distinctly to our court, but beg to refer to their answers to government, for the detail called for in these three queries.

Inter<sup>y</sup>. 27. Are there any persons in the division subject to your authority, who are supposed to be disaffected to the British government? What are their names, and to what means do you resort for superintending their conduct? Have these persons, any influence in the division, and to what extent?

A. 27. We do not know of any persons in this division, who are supposed to be seriously disaffected to the British government. All the Mussulman remains of this former seat of government, are supposed to be more or less dissatisfied with a revolution, which annihilated their influence, and has shut them out from even subsistence; but we are not aware of any particular persons whose conduct requires to be superintended.

Inter<sup>y</sup>. 28. Are you of opinion, that it would contribute to strengthen the attachment of the natives to the British government in India, were that government to declare itself to be the sole source of honour within its territories, and to confer titles and other marks of distinction on its native subjects?

A. 28. Titles and other marks of distinction have in all governments, been found a cheap and effectual mode of rewarding merit, and of securing the attachment of subjects to their governments. At the early period of British influence in India, a mode was adopted for conferring titles on the natives; and we are unacquainted with the reasons of its discontinuance, or with any objection to its revival. The resident at the Durbar, by orders from the governor, used to obtain the patent of investiture from the nazim, which was afterwards bestowed, with a dress of honour by the governor, on the person to be ennobled. Though the honour was nominally conferred by the nazim, the natives felt and acknowledged, that it in fact came from the sole bounty of the head of the British government. While the natives consider the sovereign at Delhi to be the source of honour, we are not aware of any preferable mode of conferring marks of distinction on them, than through his nominal representative.

Inter<sup>y</sup>. 29. What is the state of the roads and bridges, or other public works in the division under your authority; and at whose expense are they kept in repair?

A. 29. We conceive that the zillah judges will report fully on the state of the roads, bridges, and other public works in their several districts. The high roads only which we travel on our circuit, can come within our observation. The high road of communication immediately through the city of Moorshedabad, is so completely out of condition, as to be absolutely impassable for carriages of every description, and calls loudly for us to report it on this occasion; it is entirely cut up and full of holes, and the encroachments of the buildings in all directions, hardly leave room in some places, for the passage of palanquins. Our report of the 5th July 1800, addressed to government through the medium of the secretary in the revenue and judicial departments, is very full on the subject of the present

state of the roads, bridges, &c. within the division under our administration, and to report from Mr. Roche, a considerable length on this subject, not only the present state of the roads, but also on that of keeping them in repair, and making new roads, as they are wanted. As it was already in answer to a query, to which we have already referred, that the roads are in a state of repair, we have not thought it necessary to report on the subject itself, for our sentiments are already on the subject of roads, bridges, &c. in our public works.

**Interrogatory 30.** How are the convicts usually employed? And is there any manner of employing them, which appears to you preferable to the manner in which they are now put to work?

**A. 30.** The convicts are at present generally, and with beneficial effect, employed on the public roads. We are of opinion that services might be useful in the building of embankment, where works of that description are carried on in the neighbourhood of the jails. Our addresses to the Nizamut Adawlut of the 23d June 1798, and 2d of April 1800, treat in very full and most particular detail, the subject of employing convicts in the neighbourhood of the jails. We take the liberty of referring thereto, for a full and complete answer, as the most appropriate mode of employing convicts, which we trust will be deemed preferable to swelling this report beyond all bounds, by making excuses which must (to embrace the subject sufficiently) be very voluminous.

**Interrogatory 31.** What is the state of the jails in your division?

**A. 31.** Our second judge (who is at present on circuit, holding the 2d sessions of 1801, and who has in his progress, visited the jail of Zillah Bhaugulpore, Purneah, Dinapore and Rungpore) reports, in answer to reference to him, that the state of the jails in all these places, is in every respect satisfactory,—that they are in good repair, kept clean, and generally well attended to; and as Mr. Roche had not yet reached the Nattore station, the acting magistrate was called upon to report the state of the jail of Zillah Rajeshahy, who states, in consequence, that he considers the building perfectly competent to all requisite purposes; that it at present, wants some trifling repairs, which may be made for about two hundred rupees; and that he has at present, 586 prisoners of various descriptions. The jail of Zillah and city Moorshedabad are all that remain further in our division: these, have been very recently visited by the senior judge, who on the 21st January reported fully on their state to the Nizamut Adawlut, describing the former, to be in the cleanest state, and best possible order, and that the prisoners appeared healthy and well governed, under rules and regulations of a salutary tendency, calculated to ensure order and regularity;—that the officers of the city jail were not equally attentive to their duty, or so careful as they might be to the preservation of the health of the prisoners, by due attention to the cleanliness of the jail; but the senior judge had reported, at the same time, that it appeared that the city jail was constructed on a very defective and objectionable plan, and had pointedly demonstrated the necessity that material alteration should immediately take place, and especially that drains to the different wards should be made to carry off filth of various descriptions, and to prevent the contagion of sickness (which had greatly prevailed) extending its baneful consequences. We do not think it necessary to particularize further his report on this jail, which, if it is thought necessary, may be referred to.

**Interrogatory 32.** What is your opinion of the expediency of granting to zemindars, farmers, and other persons of character in your division, commissions empowering them to act as justices of peace? Do you think that such a measure, would contribute to the suppression of crimes, and to facilitate the apprehension of offenders? By what rules, would you regulate the extent of the jurisdiction of such persons? Would you confine it, to the estates or farms of the persons to whom the commissions might be granted, or otherwise?

**A. 32.** We are decidedly of opinion, that it would be expedient to grant to zemindars commissions empowering them to act as justices of the peace, and that such a measure, would contribute to the suppression of crimes, and would facilitate the apprehension of offenders, by bringing to the assistance of police, all the zemindary establishment; whose cordial co-operation cannot now be expected under the orders of a tamedar, who at the head of 10 or 15 bukedars ex. pretends to an authority paramount to that of the landholder himself, in his own estate: some restrictions will at the same time, be necessary for preventing the zemindars from perverting their magisterial authority to the purposes of revenue. As farmers have no permanent interest in the prosperity of the country, we apprehend that no restrictions would be sufficient for preventing their using such authority, as a weapon of oppression and extortion, to their own temporary benefit. We do not think that natives of even the most respectable characters, are likely to be tempted to give their gratuitous labour, as justices of peace; the jurisdiction of the zemindars should, in our opinion, be limited by the extent of their estates.

**Interrogatory 33.** Are there any new rules or regulations which you would recommend to be adopted, as being calculated in your opinion, for the suppression of crimes in general?

**A. 33.** After our several addresses above quoted, we have nothing new to recommend as rules and regulations, calculated for the suppression of crimes in general.

**Interrogatory 34.** What has been the operation of the last regulations respecting the tax on spirituous liquors, with regard to the vice of drunkenness? Are you of opinion, that the establishment of the taxes now levied on spirituous liquors, have rendered the vice of drunkenness more prevalent than it was previously to the establishment of those taxes?

**A. 34.** We cannot conceive how the establishment of a tax on spirituous liquors, should render the vice of drunkenness more prevalent than it was, previously to the establishment of

from Moorshed-  
Court of Appeal  
Circuit, 26 Jan.

the tax. At the same time; we have ocular demonstration, that the vice has not decreased. In Bengal, however, this vice is far from general: it is confined almost entirely to a few castes and classes, and to populous towns. The bulk of the labouring poor, never touch liquor.

Interr' 35. Do any measures occur to you, the adoption of which, would in your opinion, contribute progressively to the improvement of the moral character of the inhabitants of the division?

A. 35. The moral character of a nation can be improved, by education only. All instruction is unattainable to the labouring poor, whose own necessities require the assistance of the children, as soon as their tender limbs are capable of the smallest labour. With the middle class of tradesmen, artificers and shop-keepers, education ends at ten years of age, and never reaches further than reading, writing (a scarcely legible hand) on a plantain leaf, and the simplest rules of arithmetic. We are not prepared to suggest any measures, the adoption of which, would, in our opinion, contribute progressively to the improvement of a people thus circumstanced.

Interr' 36. In your opinion, what has been the effect of the Regulation, which declares persons convicted of the crime of perjury, liable to be marked on the forehead?

A. 36. We do not perceive any effects from the Regulation which declares persons convicted of the crime of perjury, liable to be marked on the forehead. In the course of our judicial duties, we still meet with the same barefaced disregard of truth, which always characterized the natives of India; we are however of opinion, that the terror of this stigma, should be retained in our code.

Interr' 37. What has been the operation of the punishment of transportation, introduced by the British government?

A. 37. The punishment of transportation, introduced by the British government, falls chiefly on decoits; and yet the crime of decoity has not decreased, in the division under our authority. To judge therefore, of its operation by this result, it would follow, that the punishment is of no effect, and the terror of it, must daily diminish.

Interr' 38. Are you of opinion, that the Mahomedan criminal law, with the alterations of that law, made by the British government, is administered with too much lenity, or too much severity; and what do you suppose to be the consequences produced by the operation of the spirit, in which the criminal law is in your opinion, administered?

A. 38. We are of opinion, that from the discretionary mode in which the Mahomedan criminal law (with the alterations of that law, made by the British government) is administered, the administration of it, admits both of too much lenity and too much severity,—at any rate, of too much uncertainty. An offence, which to one law officer, may appear sufficiently punished by a month's imprisonment, shall from another law officer, incur a sentence of three or more years. Even in the heinous crime of gang robbery, our records will show sometimes a sentence of 14 years transportation, and sometimes a sentence of two years confinement. The consequences which we suppose to be produced by the operation of this spirit, in which the criminal law is in our opinion administered, are contempt of the law itself, and encouragement to offenders. Though every criminal code must leave some discretion of punishment to the courts, particularly in the smaller offences, and breaches of the peace; yet in crimes of enormity, we think that the punishment ought to be specific, at least, but some limit should be fixed to discretion. The English law fixes it in all cases in smaller offences, by marking the barrier, which the court's severity shall not exceed; in more serious crimes, by specifying the bounds of the court's lenity.

Interr' 39. In what period does the judge, who makes the half-yearly jail deliveries, usually complete the circuit?

A. 39. The half-yearly jail deliveries of the out-zillahs, usually occupy four months; but the completion of the circuit, after the judges return to the sudder station, depends upon necessity or otherwise of his giving any of his time to the business of the Court of Appeal.

Moorshedabad, Court of Appeal and Circuit,  
the 25th January 1802.

(Signed) T. Pattle.  
R. Rocke.

P. S. The completion of the Answers to the foregoing Interrogatories, has been, from a great pressure of business, the necessity of distant references, and other circumstances, delayed until the period of their date, and of consequence the signatures of only two members of the courts are annexed, as the third judge was on the 10th of December removed from this station; but it is proper and necessary to add, that the Answers generally were prepared whilst Mr. Colebrooke was a member of these courts, and that he contributed full co-operation and active assistance, in preparing them.

(Signed) T. Pattle, sen. Judge.

TO GEORGE DOWDESWELL, Esq.

Secretary to Government, in the Judicial Department.

SIR,

I HEREBY transmit, and request you will lay before Government, my Answers to the Interrogatories, received by me with your Letter of the 20th of October last.

I am, Sir, Your most obedient humble servant,

Zillah Midnapore,  
30 January 1802.

(Signed) H. Strachey,  
Judge, and Magistrate.

Answers from the  
and Magistrate of  
napore, to Inter-  
rogatories: 30 Jan.

ANSWERS to the INTERROGATORIES received by the Judge and Magistrate of Midnapore, from the Secretary to Government in the Judicial and Revenue Department.

Answer to Interrogatory 1.—THE number of causes depending before the judge register and native commissioners, on the 1st January 1802, was as follows:

Before the Judge	-	-	-	197.
the Register	-	-	-	253.
the Native Commissioners	-	-	-	3,317.

Interrogatory 2. The number of causes usually depending before the judge and register, has been gradually diminishing since 1794 or 1795. The number depending before, and decided by, the native commissioners, has been during the same period, gradually increasing.

Interrogatory 3. The number of causes decided in the year 1801, was as follows:

By the Judge	-	-	-	421.
By the Register	-	-	-	370.
By the Native Commissioners	-	-	-	14,559.

Interrogatory 4. I cannot say positively, that as many causes as are now depending, must necessarily be so always; because that, depends on a great variety of circumstances, with some of which I have no concern. But as the business is now very nearly kept up, that is to say, as suits are decided, almost as fast as they can be prepared for decision; I can say in general, that I have no expectation their number will be reduced. I am now deciding suits which were instituted, in the months of August and September last.

2. Many delays occur in delivering answers, replies, and rejoinders, owing to the expense of stamped paper.

Interrogatory 5. I am not prepared to suggest any rules (at least any, which I conjecture would be approved) by which the decision of suits would be expedited, consistently with a due administration of the laws.

2. From my answer to the last question, it will probably be thought no such rules are required here.

3. I doubt whether the object would be promoted, by leaving it optional with the judge, to take down in writing or not, the depositions of witnesses in suits not appealable to a higher tribunal. I think it might be attended with inconvenience, and possibly of dissatisfaction to the parties.

Interrogatory 6. I should not at all object to the plan of empowering the registers and native commissioners to decide causes for sums exceeding 200 R<sup>s</sup> and 50 R<sup>s</sup>; but not conceiving it necessary for expediting the administration of justice, or rather for clearing the file (the sole view here proposed by Government, I believe); I deem it superfluous to recommend it. I profess myself, on other grounds, a zealous advocate for enlarging the powers of the Munsiffs; and I may embrace some opportunity of attempting to set forth the benefits to be derived, from such an arrangement. Here I will only observe, that the expense of prosecution in the Munsiff courts, bears no proportion to that of the dewanny adawlut; and that it is my opinion, the nearer we approach to the rule of granting to all, speedy justice, without any expense whatever, the nearer we shall in our judicial system, approach perfection.

Interrogatory 7. Litigation may possibly have been checked by the fees and stamp duty; but I confess I consider the charges too high.

2. It will not, I imagine, be denied, that it is desirable the least tedious and least expensive mode of obtaining redress, should be open, where an injury has really been suffered. When a poor man has been oppressed, he should be freed from trouble and expense, and assisted and encouraged as far as possible, in prosecuting his complaint. He is not, in such a situation, a fair object for taxation. It does not become the ruling power, to add to his misfortune, by levying impositions upon him.

3. It is clear, that a ryot, from whom an increase of rent has been exacted, and instituting a suit for the same, must feel the charge of stamps and fees, to be a severe aggravation of his distress; nor can he console himself under the reflection, that the impositions are intended to check litigiousness; or that, for certain reasons of finance, it is expedient he should submit to new exactions.

4. The expense and delay to which ryots are subject in prosecuting their suits, are to my knowledge, excessive. For the truth of this, I would refer to the records of any register in Bengal. The duty of deciding revenue causes for a small amount, under the operation of the present regulations, has fallen chiefly on the registers. The rights of the inferior ryots, are seldom discussed in the superior courts.

5. The

Answers from the Judge  
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napore, to Interroga-  
tions: 30 Jan. 1802.

5. The welfare of those from whom all revenue and even subsistence, must be ultimately derived, who are the poorest, the weakest, and the most numerous, who constitute the bulk of the people, is a matter of importance, and not unworthy the notice of government. I have therefore thought it my duty, to dwell on this subject, with some minuteness.

6. If must, I am sure, constantly happen, that a ryot gives up his prosecution in despair, on finding the expense of continuing it, beyond his power to sustain.

7. Exaction of revenue is peculiarly difficult of proof. Either no engagements exist, and no accounts can be found, or they are extremely defective and perplexing. It is not the original fee on the institution of the suit, but the subsequent charges on exhibits and on witnesses, that appear to me intolerable. I have often seen a suitor, when stripped of his last rupee, and called upon for the fee on a document, produce in court a silver ring or other trinket, and beg that it might be received as a pledge; and after all, perhaps he was cast for want of money, to bring proof.

8. I confess, I think such scenes in a court of justice, unpleasant to those who are entrusted with the administration of the laws; and not very creditable to government.

9. Formerly in these provinces, and it is still the case almost throughout the east, the cultivators of the soil, when oppressed beyond endurance, were accustomed to assemble in a crowd, with ploughs and other implements, and demand justice with violent and outrageous clamour. They still sometimes resort to this practice; though, with us it can avail them nothing. They are unable to support themselves at the Sudder, during a procedure of two or three months. They cannot return to their houses, without submitting to their oppressor. They must have speedy justice or none. The complaints of these people, are seldom or never litigious. I have seen some false complaints, and some conspiracies supported by false evidence; but suits simply litigious, brought forward merely from the quarrelsome disposition of the prosecutor, are not common; neither, if they were common, would it in my opinion, be proper to take any measure, except that of fining the individual suitor.

10. The fact appears to me, this: When the business of the civil courts became too heavy for the judge, which very soon happened, instead of appointing more judges, it was resolved that, to prevent the accumulation of causes, it was necessary to check the spirit of litigiousness, which was supposed to produce it. Accordingly, heavy taxes have been laid upon prosecution. Out of 100 suits, perhaps five at the utmost, may be fairly pronounced litigious, and those five are probably instituted by men, well able to bear the expense.

11. If what I have understood is true, that suits in the dewanny adawlut are now prevented from accumulating as heretofore, it is not because the litigious only, are deterred from prosecuting; since a man is disabled from sustaining expense, in proportion as he is poor, and not, as he is litigious. Nothing else can be inferred from the fact, than that the charges of prosecution are so exactly calculated, and the fees and stamp duties so judiciously contrived, as to enable the courts to administer justice to all who can afford to pay for it.

12. Half the complainants in the dewanny adawlut of this zilla, appear as paupers, although these find much difficulty in complying with the regulation intended for the relief of paupers. No man can be admitted to prosecute as a pauper, under Regulation XLVI, 1793, till he brings two witnesses to attest his poverty, and two securities for his personal appearance; and no one, can well do this, without at least maintaining them and himself, during their absence from home. But the expense of such maintenance, must exceed that of the fees and stamp paper, for a suit of the nature I allude to; which aggregate sum, if the suitor has it in his power to pay, he is in strictness, no pauper.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 8. The pleaders are very amply paid. The best are always employed most. They are not ill qualified, though few are well acquainted with the Regulations.

2. The establishment of the pleaders, has much facilitated the attainment of justice to individuals.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 9. I think the establishment of licensed vakeels, has contributed greatly to expedite the decision of suits, by bringing more speedily and accurately before the courts, the merits of the suits.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 10. The vakeels in general discharge their duty, with honour and fidelity.—I have seen instances of negligence; but none of treachery to their clients.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 11. The inhabitants at large of Midnapore, are I imagine nearly as well acquainted with the laws, as the inhabitants of other parts of the country, that is to say, their knowledge is extremely limited.

2. None but the public officers, the pleaders, and those who are candidates for office, can be said to possess a general knowledge of the Regulations. The zemindars, talukdars, and farmers, and the userehauts, know such regulations as concern them respectively. The one, the revenue laws relating to the collections, attachments, &c. the other, the commercial Regulations respecting duties, rate of interest, &c. and among men of business, this knowledge of the Regulations immediately relating to their particular occupations, is no doubt increasing. But I believe the Regulations are very little studied, out of catcherry. I never met with, or heard of a native who possessed a full, distinct, comprehensive view of the Regulations, any more than of the civil or political state of the country. No learned man, except a candidate for office, regards our institutions, as a branch of knowledge, which it becomes him to pay attention to. Of the Shaster and Koran, all are equally ignorant, except the Mahomedans of education, whose learning extends to the quotation of a few scraps of the Koran, of little or no practical use. All Hindoos but Pundits, of whom there are not many in Midnapore, are entirely ignorant of the Shaster.



3. I should not omit, that it is my opinion, the most profound knowledge in the Koran and Shaster are of little service in the cutcherry.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 12.—I am not prepared to recommend alterations in forms, further than to offer my opinion, that as few as possible should be added, and that any opportunity should be taken, of diminishing those which exist. Fortunately for the natives, they are not many; perhaps not more, than are essential to regularity and expedition.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 13. The judge sits in a chair, and the moolavie, if he attends, which he seldom does, in another. All the rest, stand while in cutcherry; but there are rooms adjoining, where they sit on mats and carpets, according to their usage, converse with their clients, and, I believe, smoke hookas. I have introduced no forms or ceremonies whatever, in opening the court; nor did I ever hear of any such being used, either during the present government, or former governments. When the judge enters the court, all present make their obeisance. A criminal throws himself into a suppliant posture, and frequently a suitor likewise. These are the customs of the country, and happen of course; but no orders are given regarding them, and I know not how they could be settled by regulation. There is necessarily some little parade and constraint, where an European appears; but except in that respect, which is inevitable, I am not aware that we ever depart from the simplicity, so conspicuous, in the administration of justice all over the East.

2. I give myself no trouble respecting the adjustment of ceremonials, except as to maintaining silence, which is easily done, and keeping off the crowd. Any measures to preserve decorum, appear to me superfluous, for a breach of decorum never occurs.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 14. In Midnapore, I cannot discover any schools or seminaries where the Mahomedan or Hindoo laws are taught. There are schools in almost every village for teaching Bengally and accounts to children, in low circumstances. The teachers, though tolerably well qualified for what they undertake, are persons no way respectable. Their rank in life I take to be generally very low, and their emoluments exceedingly scanty; certainly, little superior to those of our lowest domestics. The schools are only day-schools. The children sit in the open air, or under a shed, and learn to read, write, and cast accounts, paying each perhaps one anna or two annas a month. I recollect it happened some time ago in the foudarry adawlut, that a man, charged with several thefts, when asked his occupation, said, it was the teaching of children; and on sending for some of his scholars, I found he was eminent, in his way. Nor did it seem to excite much surprise, that a man in his situation, should turn out a thief.

2. In opulent families, teachers are retained as servants. The children of respectable natives do not go to school.

3. Persian and Arabic are taught for the most part, by molavies. Most men of this description, have a few scholars in their houses, whom they support, as well as instruct. Thus Persian and Arabic students, though of respectable families, are considered as living on charity; and they are total strangers to extravagance and dissipation. There was formerly a Mussulman college in Midnapore, even yet the establishment exists; but no law is taught. There are a number of private individuals who teach pupils in the manner I have above described. And the students at the sudder station, living in the families of the amlah or of the pleaders, perhaps occasionally pick up a smattering of the Mahomedan law.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 15. It is not easy to say whether the moral character of the natives has improved, by means of the system established by us. In my opinion, the system has little direct influence on the morals of the people. They are, probably, somewhat more licentious than formerly. Chicanery, subornation, and fraud and perjury, are certainly more common. These, constantly occur among the suitors and witnesses; and the pleaders, through whom, it might be thought, the judge possessed some little power of check and controul, never I think exert themselves to prevent them. Intrigue and corruption in the amlah, so as to affect the actual administration of justice, seldom happen. Oppression, cruelty, violence of all sorts, except that of decoys and choars, are grown much less frequent. The ill-treatment of women, of servants, and slaves, has nearly ceased. The same may be said, of the corporal severities formerly exercised in collecting the revenues. The poor look up to the laws, and not as heretofore, to a patron, for protection. In some respect, therefore, the present mode of administering justice, may be deemed conducive to good morals.

2. Drunkenness, prostitution, indecorum, profligacy of manners, must increase under a system which, although it professes to administer the Mahomedan law, does not punish those immoralities. None of these, however, prevail to an alarming degree, in this district.

3. Midnapore contains no large towns. I beg leave here to offer it as my opinion, that little morality is learnt, in any court of justice. In Calcutta I have reason to believe the morals of the people are worse, in spite of the severity of the police and of the English laws. Nor do I attribute this solely to the size, population, and indiscriminate society of the capital; but, in part, to the supreme court. I scarcely ever knew a native connected with the supreme court, whose morals and manners were not contaminated by that connexion. In mentioning this evil, which I by no means attribute to individuals, I trust it will not be imagined I mean to speak generally with disrespect of the institution of the court itself.

The bulk of the inhabitants of Midnapore, appear to me to have very well preserved their original mild simplicity and innocence. They retain the characteristic features of Hindoos. They are less quarrelsome, and give less trouble than the natives of the neighbouring districts. They are little in the habit of engaging in law-suits; and it appears to me that but a small proportion of them, have opportunities of seeing the practices and learning the vices of the cutcherry.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 16. To answer this 16th interrogatory, is not easy. I cannot readily ascertain



Answers from the Judge and Magistrate of Midnapore, to Interrogatories; 30 Jan. 1802.

the opinion of individuals on these points. I have never observed any symptoms of distrust, and I should imagine the confidence reposed in the judicial officers, to whom the people look up as the safeguards of their persons and property, to be very general. The natives probably know the intention of government's officers to be good; but that their rights and property are, not in all instances, effectually secured, the lower orders must see. That the magistrate has always the wish, but very often not the power, to protect their lives and property from choars and decoits, they must know. The ryots are not, in my opinion, well protected by the revenue laws; nor can they often obtain effectual redress by prosecuting, particularly for exaction and dispossession. The delay and expense attending a lawsuit are intolerable, in cases where the suitor complains, which almost invariably happens, that he has been deprived of all his property. The cancelling of leases, after the sale of an estate for arrears, must frequently operate with extreme harshness and cruelty to the under tenants.

2. One species of distrust in the supreme power, is pretty generally known. The landholders are even yet apprehensive of the increase of their jumma; but this possibly less here, than in some other districts, on account of the lands having been greatly over assessed at the settlement, and since sold for arrears, and the old proprietors, for the most part, ruined. The Lakeraujdars are, I am told, but of this I am not sure, in constant dread of impositions; and the best informed commercial people believe new taxes will be levied, whenever they can be, with effect. In short, a general opinion, I presume, prevails, that government, in attending to the welfare of all, is studious of its own interest; and shows an anxiety about the general prosperity, chiefly with a view to increase the available pecuniary resources of the state.

3. There exists, doubtless, an universal impression, that property is not liable to confiscation or gross violation by the supreme authority. It was formerly customary to bury in the ground, treasure and valuable goods; and to conceal the acquisition of wealth. This is still done, but generally from the dread of decoits; never from any apprehension that the officers of government will lay violent hands on private property. I am informed there are hardly any instances of the zemindars or others, or the very few who possess wealth, lending it out to individuals on interest, or vesting it in the Company's funds. They prefer hiding it, as their ancestors have done. This, I conceive, proceeds from ignorance alone, and, certainly, not from any well-grounded distrust in the faith of government. From this remark should be excluded merchants, and all such as have correspondence or commercial transactions with Calcutta. Such persons frequently possess Company's paper, to a considerable amount.

4. It will probably be found on enquiry, that the natives do not ascribe the present wretched state of the old zemindars, to the unexpected difficulty of collecting their revenue under our Regulations, or to other causes of a similar kind, which are unquestionably the true ones. They imagine it, to be the result of a settled premeditated plan of policy in the government, to level and degrade its most powerful subjects.

5. On the whole, I do think the inhabitants of the district subject to my jurisdiction, must consider their property, as it manifestly is, entirely safe from violation by the officers of government, or by the supreme executive authority.

6. There is certainly now little or no dread of arbitrary fines and imprisonment to extort money, nor of cruelties exercised in the collection of the revenue: all of which abuses were as notorious in the old native governments, as they are still among the Marhattas, in the neighbourhood of this district.

7. With respect to rights, in the common acceptation of the word, I do not conceive that the natives ever possessed any. They know, because they feel, when they suffer oppression in their persons or property: but they must likewise perceive, if there are among them, any who possess a share of discernment, that their safety from lawless encroachments, is the result of the humane policy, the mercy and forbearance of their enlightened rulers, who agree to govern according to laws which shall bind even themselves, and not from any power residing in the people, which could enable them to resist such encroachments. Although, therefore, they are, with respect to their persons and property, entirely secure from violation by government and its officers, and though they may actually enjoy as much happiness, or nearly as much, as they ever did, properly speaking, they enjoy no rights and liberties. If they possess happiness and security, it is not because they have a right to them; but because the equity or the policy of their rulers is pleased to confer upon them those blessings, as valuable privileges and immunities.

Inter<sup>r</sup> 17.—I have no doubt Midnapore is rapidly improving in population and cultivation. With respect to commerce, except the internal trade in articles consumed by the inhabitants of the district, which of course increases with the population, I am inclined to think it nearly stationary, but certainly not declining. I must here, however, mention, that the Company's investment has during the war, dwindled away to almost nothing, and that numbers of weavers who depended for subsistence on the advances of the commercial agents, and who are less able than other descriptions of artisans to change their occupations, are reduced to very great distress.

2. I have not heard of any buildings worth mention erected by the natives, either for religious or domestic purposes; neither are there any works carried on for manufactures. I am not able to discover that in Midnapore any extensive commercial concern requires chiefly or substantially buildings or machinery was ever carried on, unless by Europeans; and the contrivances for abridging labour are here unknown. I do not perceive the least spirit of enterprise among either merchants or farmers.

3. In Midnapore there are no religious buildings of any consequence. The natives are sometimes, from motives of vanity or of piety, induced to dig a tank; and this, though the least ornamental, I conceive to be the most useful, of all public works; but the increasing poverty of the higher orders, and other causes, have contributed to make the digging and cleaning

cleaning of tanks very uncommon, except in towns, and a few other places where perhaps they are least wanted. In this district, there are very few new works of this nature; but the remains of old ones, attest the superior opulence of former times; at least, they show that property was more unequally divided among the natives than at present.

4. The private houses of zemindars and other men of note, consist either of forts in ruins, or of wretched huts, generally worse than the stable of an European gentleman.—It does not appear, however, that they were much better off for habitations, when more wealthy.—No vestiges of genius are visible in the ruins of the buildings and forts of Midnapore;—nothing, by which we could be led to suppose that the arts ever flourished.—It may seem surprising that the opulent and respectable natives are so seldom tempted to imitate, as far as their domestic habits permit, the decent and commodious, but not splendid edifices, which we are accustomed to build for our own residences, and that they have acquired no taste whatever for gardening. If the erection of buildings is to be reckoned a sign of prosperity, it is my opinion, that the district does not at all improve, in this instance.—But it is to the climate and manners of the people, rather than to any impression of the insecurity of property, that I attribute their perseverance in constructing for their own accommodation nothing but the slightest and most miserable huts.

5. The bulk of the people of Midnapore, like those of other parts of the country, and I presume of other countries, acquire by their labour what is barely necessary to their existence, and little more. They work,—not with a view to improve their situations, but merely to enable themselves and families to subsist. They scarcely ever think of saving money, or of procuring themselves better food, clothing, or habitations, than they have been accustomed to; yet labour is I think not ill rewarded. A ryot can with ease cultivate 16 beghas of rice; and supposing half the produce to go for rent, the remainder will afford food, for four or five persons. And this is only one crop, the labour required to produce which, cannot occupy half the year.

6. The coolies, or common labourers, frequently earn a rupee, or two rupees, which enable them to be idle for several days. It is usual for those who employ them, to keep them in arrears, because when they receive money, they are idle till it is spent; yet all but those who drink spirits are strangers to luxury and excess of every kind, unless it may be thought proper to except tobacco as a luxury.

7. The situation of the lower orders, is on the whole, somewhat improved by our system of administration; but their nature is not changed. They are always in debt, and borrow at enormous interest: They are not stimulated to any efforts of industry by the security they enjoy, but solely by the calls of hunger.

8. The country is improved by increased population and cultivation. There are in number, more ryots, but they are just what their fathers were; and hardly an instance can be found of a poor labourer becoming rich, by dint of industry and parsimony. To their few wants, the uniformity and extreme simplicity of their habits, their unsocial education, and the heat of the climate,—to these causes, and not to our laws, are in my opinion to be ascribed, the peculiarities of the people.

9. Cultivation is increased by increasing population; for the ryots must work to live. It is very little extended by plans for the improvement of agriculture, or by revenue regulations. Waste and jungle land, if low and fit for rice, may be brought into tillage in one season, and the poorest ryot can undertake it; but a man of substance seldom employs stock in farming, under the expectancy of a distant return.

10. The class of mere labourers who work for hire, is not numerous. Every ryot is a farmer, who tills the land for which he pays rent. Talookdars hold in their own hands little or no part of their own estates to cultivate, by means of servants. The poorest ryots are tenants, and by the custom of the country, they are considered as a sort of proprietors, entitled to a perpetual lease. They are attached in the strongest manner to the soil, never migrate but from necessity; and I think they ought to be recognized, as enjoying a right (they and their posterity) to their tenures.

11. Thus, the lowest class of the people, however wretched in appearance, and depressed in spirit, possess a sort of independence, though perhaps not a beneficial or satisfactory independence. On the failure of a crop of rice, very few are able to get employment; for there is no work to be done. They leave their houses, and being destitute of the means of procuring a livelihood by industry, are driven to subsist by begging, or by robbing.

12. The poor, the sick, and the aged, besides great multitudes of idle religious persons, Bramins, Fakeers, and Pilgrims, always depend on private charity alone. In times of plenty, the resource of begging is perhaps sufficient; for all the natives are impelled, by nature, habit, and religion, to assist each other with food when in distress. But in a famine, the poor soon perish.

13. A famine in this country is, of all calamities to which the earth is liable, the most dreadful. It ought to be considered, as perpetually impending. For that it has not occurred during several years, is not to be ascribed to any measures of ours. The country is perhaps, at present, as populous as it was, previous to the great famine in the year 1770; and if another scarcity, equal to that, should take place now, I do not suppose it would fall less heavy. Individuals in the Mofussil, are less able to assist each other, than they were formerly. Fewer private stores of grain are preserved; and I have been informed, perhaps without foundation, that government have come to doubt the utility of the establishment of the public granaries.

14. The people are, or at least would be, in the event of a famine, less domesticated, and less dependent on each other. It is to be recollected, that during a great famine, dependence, slavery, and captivity, are for the poor (that is for 99 in 100) highly enviable, and accordingly sought after with eagerness. Many hospitable families, where thousands might and would have been collected together and fed, are now entirely ruined. I trust I shall be

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be pardoned for adding, that I doubt, in spite of all the information that has been got, and all the plans that have been suggested and adopted, whether government are better enabled to apply effectual remedies than they were heretofore.

15. A great deal of rice was destroyed last rains by an inundation; and from the little information I have picked up respecting the neighbouring districts, I cannot help entertaining some suspicion, that distress will be felt before the next harvest.

16. The condition of the ryots is on the whole, I think, better; because their lives and limbs are safe from the zemindars and collectors of revenue. On the other hand, the dread of decoits, the expense of prosecution, and the spirit of prosecuting, the slowness of our legal proceedings, and the doubtfulness of the event of law-suits, on account of perjury and other causes: all these, are evils of the present day.

17. It is true, that every man who is injured, may prosecute; that he is considered as possessing a right to redress; and that justice is intended to be impartially administered: whereas in other states of Hindostan, for instance the neighbouring Mahratta country, there is no pretence of this. But perhaps in a few of the Mahratta estates, which are best taken care of, where no poor man conceives that he possesses any rights whatever, and where all are aware that, without the help of a patron, they have no power to obtain redress for injury, perhaps, I say, in these estates, less injustice is on the whole committed, and less misery felt, than in estates of the same size, under our government. In the Mahratta estate, there may probably occur one or two glaring instances of oppression, outrage, and cruelty, which are silently put up with, because there no inferior attempts to contend with his superior. In the Midnapore estate, a number of poor men may be seen to set up for themselves, and are ruined by ineffectual contests, often about trifles, with rich and powerful individuals.

18. I know not whether it will be thought, that some of these remarks indicate an attempt to undervalue the advantages of an equal and regular administration of justice. This is far from my intention. But it may be permitted me to consider, whether that justice is in reality, equal and regular; whether the poor can obtain it, as well as the rich; whether the state of the country, or the nature of things, will admit it. I am ready to confess my opinion, that many are apt to make up their minds on these points, from hasty and superficial views. It has always appeared to me a very great inconvenience and misfortune, in the constitution of the government of this country, that the rulers have it not in their power to attain a sufficient intimacy with the lower classes of their subjects, to enable them to judge with accuracy, of their condition.

19. When the cultivator of the earth lives under a dread of becoming the prey of extortioners, he cannot be considered secure of enjoying the fruit of his labour. Nothing can be more desirable than to attain a precise view of the situation of the natives, as connected with the collection of the revenue. On this topic, I could wish to enter at some length, but I am aware of the difficulty attending the investigation, and particularly of my inexperience in the detail of the collector's department. I therefore, in the outset, beg leave to disclaim any intention to pronounce positively, on revenue matters. The sentiments expressed in the following paragraph, will be the result of such views as occur to me, on a general and cursory collection of the subject.

20. In passing the 7th Regulation, 1799, it was I believe the design of government (a very reasonable and liberal design, in my opinion) to enable the zemindars to collect their just demands of rent, with punctuality, and without expense; and I think it would have been just and considerate, at the same time, to have facilitated to the ryots, the means of obtaining redress against extortioners.

21. But the fact is, the ruin of one zemindar, being more conspicuous at the sudder, than that of 10,000 ryots, his interests naturally attract the attention of the legislature first; and as, in the proposal of any plan connected with finance, it is required to set out with the maxim, that the sudder jumma can on no pretence be lowered, there remains no other resource for helping the zemindars, than the restoration of part of the power they possessed of old, to plunder their tenants.

22. Extortion of revenue, is now, I presume, and perhaps always was, the most prevailing crime throughout the country. It is probably an evil necessarily attending the civil state of the ryots. I think it rather unfortunate than otherwise, that it should be less shocking to humanity than some foudary crimes. I know not how it is that extortioners appear to us in any other light, than that of the worst and most pernicious species of robbers.

23. It will be found, I believe, that the condition of husbandmen in eastern countries, is incompatible with security, and that sort of independence which enables men to maintain themselves against oppression and violence. The public revenues, which are in reality the rent of land, are throughout the East, collected by a system of extortion, violence, and barbarity of every kind.

24. In these provinces, we of course endeavoured to put an end to this system, and with the greatest success; but before we had completely gained the object, we concluded the settlement, since made perpetual, forming it on an estimate of the resources of the lands. The resources were probably by the zemindars, when they acceded to the settlement, considered as permanent, and not liable to be affected materially, by further limitations of the authority they possessed over their tenants.

25. But owing to the natural operation of the Regulations, they soon found themselves unable to rob and plunder, as before. In consequence, most of them fell heavily in arrears, and lost the whole or great part of their estates, and many more were hastening to ruin, when Regulation 7th of 1799, was enacted for their relief. It was indeed expedient to do something extraordinary for the zemindars, since it became very probable, at least so I thought, that in proportion as equal justice was administered, many of them were deprived of means to collect from the ryots, sufficient to pay their sudder jumma.

26. The

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26. The effect of Regulation 7th, 1799, has been, to enable them, by means of attachments and sales, to realize their rents. But the frequency of these attachments and sales in the mofussil, would alone serve to prove, that the revenues are not collected without extreme misery to the ryots. And consideration of the expense, and delay of prosecution, on which subject I have before touched in reply to Interrogatory 7th, satisfies me, that the dewanny adawlut cannot afford the sufferers effectual redress against the abuse of the powers entrusted to the zemindars, by the 7th Regulation of 1799.

27. It is chiefly to be ascribed to the Regulation in question, I conceive, that the public balances are moderate, and that lands at the collector's sales fetch a tolerable price. Yet, as if the mode in which the rents are levied, and the condition of the ryots, were matters not necessary to be noticed, it is frequently pronounced at once as a position, admitting of no doubt, that these favourable sales afford a substantial proof of the lightness of the assessment, and of the flourishing state of the country.

28. Under the Mahomedan government, the revenues may surely be said to have been collected from the zemindars, by a system of boundless violence and rapine. Defaulters were liable to a cruel imprisonment, to be disgraced, scourged, and tortured. But the zemindars exercised the same severities over their tenants, or they could never have collected their rents. We have realized the revenues, by selling the patrimony of defaulters. The zemindars realize their rents, not by corporal severities, but by vexatious attachments and ruinous sales. I suspect that, till the zemindars are deprived of the power of distraining for arrears, the ryots must be liable to exaction. I am not, I confess, clear that it would be possible for zemindars to collect their just rents, without some power of the kind; for their rents are now enormously high. They cannot afford to spare their ryots; for government never spares them. It is generally known, that even the powers the zemindars possessed under Regulation 7th of 1799, were either insufficient or ill understood; and, in fact, they seldom exerted those powers, till they were confirmed and extended by Regulation 7th, 1799.

29. I think it would be worth while to make the experiment of prohibiting distraint, unless preceded by a legal judgment. A summary enquiry might, by means of mofussil cauzies and munsifs, be made of every demand; then, the zemindars would be necessitated to adduce some evidence of their claim, before they proceeded to enforce it, and would cease to be judges in their own cause.

30. The collector of this district, has entered into minute and laborious inquiries on this interesting subject, which falls more immediately within his province, and will speedily submit the result to government. I content myself with observing, that to the best of my knowledge, the laws regarding attachments are greatly abused, and are productive of extreme oppression.

31. I have ascertained the immense population of the district, by an actual enumeration of a great part of it. It amounts to at least one million and a half. I have been enabled to compare it, with one taken about 13 or 14 years ago, in a few pergunnahs. Two years after that enumeration, a famine destroyed many thousands in this zilla; and if I have not found the present number, when compared to the old one, to be very great, there can be no doubt whatever, that the cause is the famine alone. Increasing cultivation necessarily follows population, and is every where visible. To those who are tolerably acquainted with the internal state of the country, it is known that the population, unless checked by some great calamity, constantly increases very fast. It will be found that it is not the want of courts of justice, nor of a regular system of police, that prevents the prosperity of the provinces subject to the Mahrattas. Where no battles are fought, where the ryots remain unmolested by military exactions, where the zemindar or his agent are seldom changed, the lands of the Mahrattas in the neighbourhood of this district, are in a high state of cultivation, and the population is equal, frequently superior to ours. I say frequently superior to ours; not that the natural increase of population is by us, in the least obstructed, but because, in a well superintended Mahratta estate, there are, in addition to the natural increase, constant accessions to the numbers, by emigrants from the neighbouring country.

32. It is the interest of the proprietor of an estate, to take as much care of his ryots as a farmer does of his cattle; and that care, is sufficient to promote their increase.—The ryots of the Company's provinces enjoy that degree of security which is essential to their increase. This is not the case, with the far greater part of the Mahratta country: vast tracts of the Mahratta country are desolated, partial famines are frequent, and as population does not increase in those provinces, I conclude that the misery is extreme. Population can here, be very materially affected only, by war and famine.

33. Famine proceeds from drought or inundation, and sometimes from war. From the circumstance of increasing population alone, we cannot, as many pretend, draw an inference of very high prosperity and good government. England is certainly a country enjoying a good government, and great internal prosperity; but the population of the cultivated parts of Bengal surpasses that of England, and this population increases in Bengal, in a far greater proportion than in England, though I imagine the government of Bengal will be admitted to be inferior to that of England. The situation of almost all orders of people here, is highly favourable to the propagation of the species.

34. Every body marries; an unmarried man of 25, or an unmarried girl of 15, are hardly to be found. As soon as girls become marriageable, generally before, husbands are without difficulty provided for them; marriage is a thing which happens, of course—a necessary part of life.

35. The people live a regular, sober, domestic life, and seldom leave their houses, not being liable to be called upon for the performance of military service or public labour, or scrutiny, so common in most countries. Very few marriages are unproductive: the women becoming

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becoming prematurely debilitated and decrepid, do not perhaps bear so many children as those who marry at a riper age; but barrenness is extremely rare. Polygamy, prostitution, religious austerity, and the circumstance of young widows seldom marrying a second time, are the only obstacles I am at present able to recollect, to the increase of population; and all these, though in themselves evils of considerable magnitude, being productive of individual suffering and inconvenience, I do not consider, in their general effect upon the population of the country, as very important.—Among the causes of increase, are to be reckoned, the extreme facility of rearing children. Here, no infants perish of cold, of diseases proceeding from dirt and bad accommodation, nor, except in famines, of unwholesome food.—The small-pox sometimes carries off multitudes of children.—Inoculation, though it has been known for ages, is by no means universally practised; sickness, however, is very uncommon among children. As soon as a child is weaned, it lives on rice; like its parents, goes naked for two or three years; and requires no care whatever.—In years of plenty, poverty scarcely ever prevents a man, from rearing a family of children.

36. The political security afforded to this district, from the ravages of the Mahrattas, is the greatest blessing the natives could enjoy; but to imagine that the population has increased, solely in consequence of our system of internal administration, appears to me most erroneous. Under the native government, the population had reached its utmost height, or very near it. Thirty years ago, nearly half the people were swept away, by the greatest famine recorded in history. Ever since that period, except in 1790, when a partial famine happened, the numbers have been gradually increasing. I do not know that the increase has been more rapid, during the last ten years, than during the 20 preceding; although most of the abuses of the native governments, and many new abuses of our government, prevailed throughout the greater part of the last-mentioned period. Supposing the country to enjoy peace, I cannot easily conceive internal mismanagement so excessive, as to stop the increase of population.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 18. I have had no opportunity of hearing discontents and murmurs, if any exist. It is evident, the natives in general, have reason to be satisfied; because, compared with the old native governments, the English government is a good one, inasmuch as it secures the country from invasion, and on the whole, very well preserves the lower orders; that is to say, the main body of the community, from the tyranny of the higher orders.

2. It is scarcely possible that much real attachment and loyalty to the ruling power, can subsist among the higher classes. I do not however imagine that in Midnapore there is much disaffection. There are scarcely any Moguls in the district. The total want of energy and spirit, the poverty and ignorance of the people, compose, in my opinion, the strength of our government.

3. The natives have, I think, great personal confidence in the Company's servants:—They know it can only be, under the sanction of a law, that new impositions or oppression of any kind, can take place. Respecting the nature of the government, and of our external interests, they are all totally in the dark. In Calcutta, a degree of curiosity may sometimes be observed among a few natives, and a desire to converse on state affairs; but on such occasions, the best informed natives always betray an extreme ignorance: the most learned and intelligent have no knowledge of the law of nations:—I do not believe they suppose the political measures of the supreme power to be founded in equity and moderation.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 19. The present system of police cannot be said to be well calculated to ensure the apprehension of offenders, since of 100 decoits, hardly ten are taken, and perhaps not two convicted.

2. Two years ago a considerable part of this district, almost the whole of the jungle Mchals, was overrun by choars, who plundered and burnt several entire pergunnahs, and committed murders daily.—These choars, must have amounted in number to some thousands; and I do not recollect that half a dozen of them, were brought to justice.—The means taken to restore tranquillity were very simple, and I am confident the only ones which could have succeeded:—they were, merely investing the jungle zemindars with regular authority, to preserve the peace in their respective estates; and it is certain that the choars are for the most part, at present in the service of the zemindars, and execute their trust of guards, with fidelity and effect.

3. A short time ago I heard of an incursion of two or three hundred choars, who committed several outrages, and then retired to a distant part of the jungle: none of them were taken, and there is little probability of a single man being ever apprehended:—nor does this happen in the jungles only. If a darogah reports a decoity having taken place within his jurisdiction, although the gangs are in general numerous, amounting from 20 to 200, the chances are perhaps, against one being seized. If decoits are taken, it is either by mere chance, or by the help of goyendas, who are themselves almost always accomplices:—they are seldom or never taken in the fact, or pursued with success afterwards. Having long ago observed this, and conceiving that, to prevent the crime of decoity (the greatest evil in my opinion, existing in the country) it is highly advisable that the people should learn to defend themselves; I have frequently endeavoured to encourage the ryots to keep arms in their houses, and to learn to assemble on the slightest alarm of decoits, and assist each other.

4. In the district of Benares, there is, I have heard, little or no decoity; not, I conceive, on account of the police being in the hands of amils, but because the people, or a large proportion of them, carry arms, and are able to defend themselves. There, the ryots would assist each other, in the event of an attack. They do not, like the helpless inhabitants of this



this part of the country, trust entirely to chokedars, who so very frequently join the decoits, and sometimes head them.

5. In case it should be thought that the prevalence of the crime of decoity, or gang robbery, and the difficulty of apprehending and convicting the perpetrators, are here exaggerated, I shall take this opportunity of mentioning, that it is not from convictions before the court of circuit, far less from the cases referred to the Nizamut Adawlut, that this point can be ascertained: Let the number and the nature of the acquittals be observed; and not only them, but the reports of every decoity received from the police officers or others; then some judgment may be formed of the truth or fallacy of my opinion, when I say, that of 100 decoits, if 10 are apprehended and 2 convicted, it is a larger proportion than I should expect.

6. I presume to say, that those who are not aware of the enormous evil of decoity throughout Bengal, are those only, who have not happened to enquire deeply into, and meditate on the subject. It is literally true, that the lives and property of the ryots are insecure, and, according to the common expression among the natives, that they do not sleep in tranquillity.

7. In Midnapore the foudjarry business is, comparatively speaking, not very heavy. The convicts are very few, and the calendar seldom I believe contains so many trials, or crimes of such enormity, as those of the other districts in this division. Yet are these remarks regarding decoits, in my opinion, applicable to Midnapore; though less so, than to other parts of the country of which I have happened to acquire some information.

Interrogatory 20.—From my answer to the last Interrogatory, it may be inferred that I am of opinion, the police establishments are inefficient. But I do not mean to say they are inferior in Midnapore to those of other districts. When I say the police throughout Bengal appears to me bad, I rather speak in comparison with civilized European countries, than with any system known to exist in India. It is my opinion, too, that several of the defects, which I shall presently endeavour to point out, are inevitable, from the nature of our government, which is unlike all other governments.

Interrogatory 21.—Since the year 1793, crimes of all kinds are increased; and I think most crimes are still increasing. The present increase of crimes may perhaps be doubtful; but no one I think can deny, that immediately after 1793, during five or six years, it was most manifest and rapid, and that no considerable diminution has taken place.

2. Great population and poverty produce misery and crimes, particularly in a country where there is no public, and consequently no certain and regular provision for the poor; where there are, I may almost say, more poor than in any country; and where the ability and the disposition of private individuals to support them, are continually diminishing. Moreover, the detection and conviction of offenders, grow every day more difficult.

3. I ought to note here, that my experience does not reach, beyond the period alluded to in the question put to me. But as far as I have learnt of the state of the country previous to 1793, I conceive fewer crimes were committed; and it is certain that the foudjarry business in general was much lighter than at present.

4. The large gangs of decoits were formerly perhaps more common, and the sirdars more daring than now; but they did not rob so often. There are still large gangs of robbers who do not, except in the jungles, maintain themselves in a body: they disperse, mix in society, and appear at large. The darogah's system has, I think, contributed to break these numerous bodies, to prevent the formation of more, and to apprehend the sirdars, who were frequently supported by the connivance of zemindars or other persons who possessed authority. The darogahs are seldom or never in the pay of decoits, though they take nuzzers and petty bribes, and harass the poor in a variety of modes.

5. Decoits do not now often assemble in large bodies, and set the magistrate at defiance. They lie concealed, come about the court, intrigue with the lower officers, or with the jailor, ascertain the probability of detection, conviction and punishment, what sort of evidence may be requisite to disprove facts, and so on. In short, the country is infested with robbers and villains, who know how to elude the law.

6. That crimes have not increased, still more, is owing to the providential occurrence of a number of years of plenty. In any calamity of season, I have no doubt crimes would increase, to a most alarming degree. The ryots are now, though more independent, much worse protected from distress, than heretofore. They once looked up to their talookdars, who could assist them, and who did to the utmost of their power; for it was their interest. The ryots now, have no protector but the Regulations; and the Regulations, though they may serve to defend them in some measure from violence and barbarity, will not feed them.

7. Although antecedent to the year 1793, crimes were less numerous, the abuses which then prevailed in the administration of justice, were so great and various, as to constitute an evil perhaps greater, certainly more repugnant to our feelings, than the present increase of crimes. Some of the abuses I allude to, are these:—Rich and powerful individuals were accustomed to take justice into their own hands: innocent men were very frequently punished on suspicion: confessions were extorted by force and intimidation, even by the regular officers: trials were conducted, without much regard to fairness: the record of the trial was not kept, or made up complete: the prisoner was unable to make a defence.—In all these ways, and more might be pointed out, great injustice was done; but at the same time, the punishment of offenders, was less uncertain than it is at present.

8. I may here take the liberty to mention a few circumstances which have fallen under my observation, as operating to obstruct the conviction of delinquents, under the present system.

9. I think

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9. I think the delay which occurs between the apprehension and the trial, is too great.
10. The accused, have time and opportunity to fabricate a defence; and very little money will procure false witnesses to support it.
11. The extreme length and intricacy of trials, render the full and complete investigation of every case, impossible. I think the duty of a circuit judge in this division, especially in the hot weather, too laborious for one man to execute.
12. The objection of almost every Hindoo of credit and respectability, to swear by the Ganges' water, which is insisted upon in the criminal courts, prevents their appearing as prosecutors or witnesses; and forms another impediment to the conviction of offenders.
13. Another impediment, though of a very different nature from those I have mentioned, and much more difficult to remove, is to me, too palpable to be overlooked,—I mean that arising from Europeans, in our situation, being necessarily ill-qualified, in many points, to perform the duties required of us, as judges and magistrates. Nothing is more common, even after a minute and laborious examination of evidence on both sides, for the judge to be left in utter doubt, respecting the points at issue.
14. This proceeds chiefly, from our very imperfect connexion with the natives, and our scanty knowledge, after all our study, of their manners, customs, and languages. Within these few years, too, the natives have attained a sort of legal knowledge, as it is called, that is to say, a skill in the arts of collusion, intrigue, perjury, and subornation, which enables them to perplex and baffle us, with infinite facility.
15. Some apology may be necessary for general remarks of this nature, yet I cannot forbear offering one more observation, which has often struck me forcibly.
16. It appears to me, that we are extremely apt, owing perhaps to our being aware of the prevalence of deceit and perjury, to form unfavourable opinions of the veracity of the natives, while taking their evidence. We perhaps judge too much, by rule—we imagine things to be incredible; because they have not before fallen, within our experience. We constantly mistake extreme simplicity, for cunning; and we are, to the last degree, suspicious of our omrah. We make not sufficient allowance for the loose, vague, and inaccurate mode in which the natives tell a story, for their not comprehending, us, and our not comprehending, them. We hurry, terrify, and confound them, with our eagerness and impatience.
17. The judge of circuit, and even his omrah, are strangers, and quite unacquainted with the characters of the persons examined, and the credit due to them; and always, on that account, less competent to discover truth among volumes of contradictory evidence.
18. A rich man can seldom be convicted of a crime, at a gaol delivery. If committed on the strongest positive testimony before the magistrate, he, without difficulty, brings 20 witnesses on his trial, to swear an alibi, or any thing else that may suit his case: or he can bribe the prosecutor, or his material witnesses. He has, besides, a very good chance of escaping, by the mere contradictions of the witnesses against him, particularly if what they have to depose to, is long or intricate, or happened at a distant period, or was seen and heard by many witnesses of different descriptions and characters; or if many facts, names, and dates, are to be recollected. No falsehood is too extravagant or audacious to be advanced before the court of circuit.—No case, at least, no rich man's case, is too desperate for a defence, supported by counter evidence; and if once doubts are raised, no matter of what kind, the object of the accused is gained, and he is secure.
19. Perjury is extremely common; and though it occurs much more frequently on the part of the accused, than of the prosecutor; yet I have known several instances of conspiracies and false complaints supported by perjury. The judge who has once had experience of a case of this kind, is soon plunged into doubt and perplexity, continually awake to the possibility of the witnesses against the accused, being forsworn; and as he of course leans to the favourable side, the consequence must be, that the guilty frequently escape.
20. Instances have occurred of goyendas and witnesses being murdered by decoits, for appearing against them in a court of justice; and this has inspired a very general terror, which operates to prevent prosecutors and witnesses from coming forward. Sometimes I have reason to think false evidence is brought, to support a true story; lest the prisoner should escape, for want of the legal number of witnesses.
21. For my further sentiments on this head, I beg leave to refer to my reply to Interrogatory 38, relative to the administration of the criminal laws.

Interrogatory 22. I am not aware of any particular crime of enormity peculiar to this district, except that of plundering, committed by the inhabitants of the jungles, and of the Mahratta country. I have, on former occasions, as my duty required, stated to government the measures which appeared to me advisable to adopt, for the improvement of the police in this respect. This crime does not at present prevail, to very great extent.

2. The situation of Midnapore renders it liable to suffer from Mahratta robbers, who occasionally make expeditions for plunder, and immediately afterwards retire with their booty, out of our territory. I last year stated to government, that several of the Mahratta zemindars on the frontier, kept robbers in their pay, or were robbers themselves. I mentioned, too, that if I could be authorized to pursue them into their own territory, I should probably be able to apprehend them, or put a stop to their depredations. I further informed government, that knowing no other expedient, I had endeavoured to persuade some of the zemindars of this district, to arm and assemble their ryots, in case of any attack from the Mahrattas.

3. These Mahratta depredations, as well as those of the Midnapore jungles, called Choorée, are committed for the most part, by Pikes, that is to say, men whose province it is to guard the estates of different zemindars. When the pay and subsistence of these Pikes, become scanty

and precarious, they betake themselves to robbery, and if, instead of being checked, they are encouraged by their chiefs, they become extremely formidable. If the situation of the Mahratta Pikes could be rendered as easy as that of the Pikes of the Midnapore jungles, they would probably remain quiet.

4. But the zemindars whom they serve, are under no controul, being themselves magistrates with unlimited power; and at the same time, as I have before mentioned, very frequently robbers.

Interr' 23. Except in the jungles, where the zemindars maintain large bodies of men, few of the natives keep arms of any description. It would, in my opinion, be fortunate, if they did. The jungle Pikes are armed with bows and arrows, swords, spears, and sometimes matchlocks.

Interr' 24. There are several forts in Midnapore of stone and mud; but they are gone to decay. They were all, I believe, except the fort at the station, built long ago, and were well calculated to defend the inhabitants of the district from the incursions of Mahratta horse, but were otherwise useless. One contained lately, about 20 pieces of artillery of different sizes. The name of this fort is Batuw. It is situated in the jungle inland of Bugree, formerly much infested by choars. I thought it best to remove the guns, lest they should fall into the hands of banditti, who, on my first arrival at Midnapore, were very numerous in pergunnah Bugree. The guns are accordingly brought hither, but they appear to be unserviceable.

2. The slightest rumour of the likelihood of a Mahratta war, produces much alarm among the natives of this district. They have now no forts to retire to, capable of affording them shelter, and they justly dread the ravages of cavalry.

Interr' 25. The number of the inhabitants of this district, I compute at 1,500,000: about one-seventh may be Mahomedans; the rest are Hindoos.

Interr' 26. The names of the persons of greatest rank and opulence, are as follows:

Durpnarain Roy, late conongoe of Midnapore.

Chandersekur Ghose, a considerable talookdar, formerly dewan of Mr. Peirce, judge and collector of the district.

Luckechum Sutputtee, talookdar.

Conni Podar, a merchant in the town of Midnapore.

Chiton Podar, a merchant in the town of Midnapore.

Durpnarain Bose, a merchant residing at Baminboom.

Kishen Sing, a merchant at Baminboom.

Anund Laul, zemindar of Midnapore and Narajole.

Kishenbultub, zemindar of Narain Gur.

Ruggonaut Chowdry, zemindar of Amersee.

Anundnerain, zemindar of Tumlook.

Rannee Jaukee, zemindar of Misadul.

Numerain, zemindar of Hedgellee.

Gopaul Inder, zemindar of Soojamoota.

Beerpeshaud Chowdry, zemindar of Kurucpoor and Bulrampoor.

Juggunnaut Dole, zemindar of Gutsela.

Lutchminerooin, zemindar of Chutna.

Bidenaut Chowdry, a considerable merchant and zemindar of Coracpore.

None of these, entertain armed followers, except perhaps ten or a dozen Peons for state; but some of them, have Pikes in considerable numbers, to keep the peace in their estates. These Pikes, are under the magistrate's orders.

Interr' 27. I am not able to name any persons in the district as disaffected to the British government, having seen no symptoms of disaffection. There are a few zemindars on the borders connected by marriage, and consanguinity with their neighbours the Mahrattas; and I think it possible these zemindars would prefer the Mahrattas, as rulers. The jungle zemindars I look upon, as lawless, turbulent, quarrelsome chiefs; but not as wishing for a change in the government. The disaffected throughout the country, I imagine, consist for the most part, of ruined Mussulman families, residing chiefly in the large towns.

2. There is here, as elsewhere, a very numerous class of the lower orders, ready to serve under any standard, where they can get subsistence. These, have no idea of loyalty, or disloyalty, except to their masters who support them: They would readily enlist with a foreign power; but I do not call them disaffected, because custom and necessity lead them to hire themselves, to any master who may be able to maintain them. I here allude to the description of men commonly employed as Peons. They will not often enlist as Sepoys, on account of the constraint attending the European discipline, and in some instances, from religious scruples.

I think the natives in general do not look upon the crime of treason against the state, in the light we do. In fidelity and attachment to a master or a chief, whoever he may be, they are not surpassed by any people: but those who stand in the mere relation of subjects, without being in the service or pay of the supreme power, do not feel themselves bound by any very strong tie of allegiance.

Interr' 28. If government declares itself the sole source of honour, the natives will not, I think, comprehend the declaration, and therefore it can have little effect in strengthening their attachment. An institution or measure of government, founded merely on European customs, must be useless and unintelligible.



Answers from the Judge,  
and Magistrate of Mid-  
napore, to Interroga-  
tions: 30 Jan. 1802.

2. Our government, if I may presume to offer my opinion on the subject, appears to me very strong, and secure from serious internal commotion, although the natives can hardly be said to be attached to it; for none of them understand it. No government ever stood more independent of public opinion. I never knew one native, who had even a remote idea of the political state of the country. And can it possibly for a moment be supposed, that the people of Bengal dream of subverting the government? They are in this respect, the most ignorant of all people, and the most helpless; having no power to combine or enter into a league for their own interests. I am persuaded, no oppression exercised by the ruling power, supposing it the greatest possible,—for instance, general arbitrary requisitions made on the property of the inhabitants,—would in Midnapore produce any resistance. At all events, no mob could collect, sufficiently formidable to resist a company of Sepoys. I have no idea that the natives here ever consult or converse on political subjects.

3. The army is powerful, and certainly to be depended upon, as long as it is paid.—The Sepoys are, like the rest of the natives, entirely un instructed as to the form of the government, of the policy of their rulers, and of the justice of their wars. It is in this ignorance and apathy, that our strength consists. Nor do any precautions appear to me necessary for our security, against factious and cabals. I see no tendency whatsoever to improvement among the natives, except their increasing knowledge of the Regulations, which, in speaking of the progress of political philosophy, is scarcely worth mentioning.

4. With respect to the eligibility of conferring titles and honours on the natives, it might possibly, if practicable, be of use. It might serve to attach them to the government, and to hold themselves in estimation. But how such an arrangement is to be brought about, I have no conception. Between our ideas of honour and those of the natives, there is no principle of assimilation. In the European world, and even in those countries of Europe, where a despotism prevails, there still subsists between the sovereign and those who may be distinguished with honours, a perfect uniformity of sentiment: they possess faults and virtues, in common: their ideas run, in one current, and a sort of equality is preserved, in spite of the distinction of ranks.—But here, this is not the case. The spirit of a gentleman, in our sense, is unknown among the natives. They possess no feeling in common with the hakim. They move in a sphere, which a thousand moral and physical causes, prevent our coming in contact with.

5. On whom, I beg leave to ask, can titles be conferred, when none are placed in a situation, where it is possible to render themselves eminent or conspicuous? How can their merits be known, when their rulers have no connexion with them,—when there is no intermediate class between the sovereign power and the common people? Surely it will be recollected, that the distance between us and the natives is infinite. The greatest zemindar in this district, though possibly a proud man, would not refuse, for the promotion of his interest, to court the friendship of the lowest dependent of an European: And how is it possible to prevent this? We find it so, and may lament, but cannot help it. There is scarcely a native in this district, who thinks of sitting down, in the presence of an English gentleman.

6. The men of opulence now are the Hindoo Mahajens and Banyans of Calcutta, and they are all, men of yesterday,—what can they perform, to acquire titles? and if they had them, would not government probably make them ridiculous, instead of ennobling them?

7. The greatest men formerly were the Mussulman rulers, whose places we have taken, and the Hindoo zemindars:—These two classes are now ruined and destroyed.—The natives mostly looked up to, are our omrah and our domestics: these, are courted and respected: they necessarily must be the channel, through which every suitor and every candidate looks up for redress and preferment:—It is not, I imagine, proposed to ennoble them!

8. No native can greatly distinguish himself as a soldier, for he can never rise beyond the rank of a soubadar; and I understand it has rather been the policy to depress, than to raise them: that they are taught to humble themselves before Europeans, and, in short, that they have no opportunity of acquiring titles.

9. Men in the learned professions have, if possible, still less opportunity of recommending themselves to us; and if they had, could not, I conceive, be rewarded with titles. To bestow a title on a learned moolavy, or an able vakeel, would appear strange. Moreover, according to Oriental ideas of honours confirmed by the sovereign power, there must be a jagher and generally a military command to accompany the title, which in itself, is merely an appellation, of course attached to the acquisition of emolument or power;—no man can be made a rajah or munsudbar, without being invested with the profit or power attending the office.

10. It will not, I think, be easy to impress the minds of the natives, open, as they may be supposed, to every vain, absurd, and fantastical notion, with the value of a mere name. Their ideas are more simple and natural, than ours. If an unfit person received a patent for the title of an ameer or a rajah, he would not, I imagine, be able to retain it; for when a man has nothing left of his dignity but the name, it soon wears away. On the other hand, if a Hindoo should emerge from poverty and obscurity, and come to attain great wealth or celebrity, he would, I dare say, if he wished it, without a formal investiture, be saluted rajah. He would be considered as having acquired a claim to a title, in the same manner as other persons, by learning, acquire the appellation of moolavy and pundit, which becomes inseparably attached to their names.

11. The only cases in which titles can be given, are perhaps when zemindars or other natives of wealth or consideration embrace opportunities, in case of invasion or conspiracy, of evincing loyalty to government. But even then pensions or jagheers, should accompany the titles.

12. It may be proper to add, that my remarks on the general character of the natives, are the result of my own local enquiry and experience, which are confined to a small part of Bengal and Midnapore only. Of the character of the inhabitants of more distant parts of these provinces, I can pretend only to that general hearsay information, which is necessarily very imperfect.

Interr' 29. Respecting such roads and bridges as require repair, separate reports have been made, either by the collector or the magistrate. They have been hitherto kept in repair, at the expense of government.

Interr' 30. The convicts are very properly and advantageously employed in clearing the jungle in the vicinity of the station, and occasionally repairing roads, digging or cleaning tanks, and other labour of a similar kind, but chiefly in clearing jungle. The clearing of jungle, I look upon as a public benefit, not much with a view to cultivation, but to improve the salubrity of the air.

2. If the convicts were as numerous here, as at some other stations, I might perhaps propose a plan for attempting, by means of their labour, to extend cultivation. More than two thirds of this very extensive zillah, consists of a jungle, swarming with noxious animals, and exceedingly unhealthy; though the land is for the most part rich and fertile.

Interr' 31. Half the fort of Midnapore is used as a jail, and answers the purpose perfectly well. It is large and secure, but it wants repair; great part of the roof, which is not arched, and built of masonry, but flat, with beams, being damaged. The debtors' jail and hospital are thatched buildings, at a distance from the fort. The prisoners of all descriptions may be said to be well accommodated, according to the native ideas of accommodation.

Interr' 32. It is, my opinion, as I once before had occasion to mention to government, that the procuring the assistance of the men of property and influence in preserving the peace throughout the country, would lead to a system of police, the most efficient, the most economical, the most suitable to the habits and opinions of the people, and in all respects, the best calculated for their comfort and security.

2. My opinion has been confirmed on this head, by observing the good effect of the regulations of the police, which I was empowered last year to carry into execution, in the jungle melahs of this district.

3. At the same time, I should remark, that this arrangement could not well be adopted universally, but only in estates of a certain extent. I by no means recommend investing men of inconsiderable rank, or small estate, with magisterial power. But all might perhaps, without danger, be empowered to seize offenders on their own estates.

4. The lands are now divided into a number of small portions. More estates are superintended by agents than formerly; and the agents are frequently changed, and little respected by the ryots. I do not think it at this time, advisable, or practicable, at once to throw the whole duties of the darogahs, by a general regulation, into the hands of the landholders.

5. It is extremely difficult, I may I believe say it is not possible, to arrange an effectual plan of association and co-operation among the higher orders for purposes of police, or for any other purpose. We have few large towns, no societies exercising, or capable of exercising municipal authority. There are no gentlemen, in whose honour and probity, in whose spirit and activity, government can repose confidence. There exists not between the common people and the rulers, a middle order, who feel a common interest in the prosperity of the state, who love their countrymen, who respect their rulers, or are by them respected; who either could, or even if they could, would even in a case of the greatest exigency, exert themselves heartily and effectually, each in his own sphere, for the public good. Such a set of men in the society, is here unknown. Government is unable to direct, or in any way to make the use of the power of the individuals, composing the community. Hence our extreme ignorance of all that passes, our complete inability to detect and apprehend offenders, to explain to the public what we wish should be known, and persuade them what should be done. Hence the long continuance of enormous abuses, without its being possible for government, or for the magistrate, to prevent or to discover them.

6. To apply effectual remedies to radical evils of this sort, is hardly to be hoped for. It will not, I imagine, be expected from me, that I should suggest projects to this end. I do not forget that such evils are political, with which a magistrate has no concern: nor shall I be surprised if they are denied, to exist altogether. I content myself with observing, that any measure which would secure to government the services of a considerable number of the most respectable members of the community, must prove in many points of view, beneficial.

7. The zemindars, it will be recollected, possessed under the native governments a degree of power nearly proportionate to their property. Although that power was perhaps not formerly recognized, nor regularly executed; still they did possess a considerable degree of military, civil, and fiscal power. They kept their dependants in a state of union, and were by that means, enabled to protect them, and maintain themselves. At present, such as have survived the almost universal destruction of zemindars, are, in conformity to our notions, reduced to the same condition, and placed at an equal distance from us, with their lowest ryots. Any measure that has a tendency towards the restoration of this power (though I confess I have no distinct conception of the mode, in which it can be accomplished)

Answers from the Judge  
and Magistrate of Abd-  
ul-Malik, to Interroga-  
tures, 80 Jan. 1802.

lished) must, I think, advance a step towards the creation of a body of gentry, who, though they should never be actuated by the same motives as ourselves, nor possess any feeling in common with us; may yet perform great services to the public. Such a measure, would, in my opinion, bring the lower orders more distinctly under the eye of the Magistrate. It might enable us, in some slight degree, to excite, we, to impose restraint, to awaken national ardour, and love for the government. Our fatal impotence to produce any effect of this nature on the minds of the people, which is at present sufficiently apparent, might be, I think, if not removed, at least gradually diminished.

8. To the propriety of any plan that would invest the higher orders with a liberal authority that would encourage and enable them to act without fear, in concurrence with government's officers, for the public good, I beg leave to subscribe my humble opinion.

9. Among the natives there appears to prevail a general notion, that the Regulations are calculated to restrict the powers, and embarrass the operations of police officers, as well as of individuals, in their exertions for the detection and apprehension of offenders. This notion, whether founded in experience, or ignorance and error, can hardly fail to produce pernicious consequences.

Interr 33. It is my opinion, and I wish to express it on every opportunity, that we are not able to protect the ryots from decoits; that there is little prospect of our being able to do it; and that it is, in justice, humanity and policy, incumbent on us to exhort them to arm and assemble, when occasion requires; to the end that they may possess, as far as possible, the means of defending themselves.

2. For the more effectually suppressing of crimes, and improvement of the police, I would recommend increasing the power, the emolument, the respectability of the police officers.

3. The darogahs, I believe, it is generally confessed, do not perform the duty that was expected: they are clearly either unable or unwilling: they do not appear to be often guilty of gross criminal malversation, such as harbouring or conniving at, aiding and abetting decoits, receiving stolen goods, or releasing prisoners. Their insuliciency consists, I think, in a general neglect of duty, in petty rogueries, in a want of respectability, in being destitute of that energy and activity, and that delicate sensibility to character, which ought to characterize a police officer. A man whose entire duty consists in maintaining personal authority, should be conscious of his own importance, and competent to convince others of it.

4. In the duties of his office, a darogah is hardly occupied half an hour in a day; and he often becomes negligent, indolent, and in the end, corrupt. His dishonesty consists in taking bribes from poor people who have petty foudarry suits, in conniving at the absconding of persons summoned through him, in harassing ryots with threats or pretended complaints, creating vexatious delays in settling disputes, or preventing their being settled by razeenamah; and chiefly, in deceiving the poor and ignorant, with whom he has to deal.

5. The avowed allowances of a police darogah, are not sufficiently liberal to render the office worthy the acceptance of men, who are fit to perform the duty. It would be easy to make every darogah, a munsif within the limits of his tanna; and it strikes me that such an institution would be advantageous, in many respects. Some are of opinion that the more power the natives have, the more they abuse it—that they are utterly unfit for any, but the lowest employments; and that, however great their salaries, moderation and disinterestedness can never be expected from them. This appears to me a mere fallacy. A few objections may suggest themselves to my proposition of investing the darogahs with authority to decide civil suits; but no solid ones occur to me. If I thought the hint likely to be approved, I might attempt to discuss it at further length.

6. After all, the grand defect is, the want of that anxious solicitude, which a police darogah ought to feel in the discharge of his duty, particularly as he is almost invariably a stranger, possessing no personal interest in preserving the peace of his tanna. This is one of the situations which require something more than a mere methodical attention to official routine. A police darogah should feel himself a magistrate,—should be ready at all times, night and day, to go from place to place, to seek information, to pursue offenders, to oppose force to force, if necessary; and, in short, to exert himself in a thousand ways, wherein he might do good; but without which, he may obtain his object, viz. that of keeping out of scrapes, and maintaining a tolerable character.

Interr 34. No alteration, as to drunkenness or sobriety, has been remarked by me, since the establishment of the last tax on spirituous liquors. Probably drunkenness increases, not in consequence of the tax, but from the general cause of increasing population. Besides, the lower castes, who are almost the only drinkers of spirits, are, I think, getting rather more licentious in their manners, and less scrupulous on the score of religion. Among the higher castes, it is still held disgraceful, and though some are addicted to the vice, it is very rare, and always kept as secret as possible. There are many reasons for wishing, if it were practicable, which I hardly think it is, to abolish entirely the sale and manufacture of spirits. They are exceedingly injurious to the health of the lower orders of the community. They afford no comfort, as in other climates; all who drink, do it to excess, and scarcely ever leave it off.

2. One objection only occurs to me, which, though it may appear somewhat overstrained, and perhaps imaginary, I will, nevertheless, mention; because, if well founded, I consider it of the last importance.

3. The distillation of spirits occasions a large consumption of rice. Any diminution of quantity, in the regular annual demand for rice, I conceive to be pernicious to the country.

The more is required for any purpose, the more will be produced. The chief means of alleviating the horrors of famine, will be to increase the quantity of rice appropriated for food. By stopping the distilleries during a season of scarcity, which might be done by an exertion of the magistrate's authority, there would be found a very considerable resource. A quantity of the best necessary of life, instead of being converted into the vilest and most unwholesome liquor, might thus, with ease, be brought into the market for the sustenance of the people. But if these distilleries were abolished altogether, it strikes me that the demand for rice would immediately diminish; and that, in consequence, to the manifest detriment of the country, less would be produced.

Answers from the Judges and Magistrate of Madras, to Interrogatories: 30 Jan. 1802.

Interrogatory 35. To attempt any material improvement or alteration in the moral character of the natives, by the intervention of legislative measures, I look upon as vain.

1. They no longer consider the laws as a part of their religion. I do not even see that with us, law and morality have much connection. It is the province of the magistrate to quell disorders and preserve the people in good morals. I am not aware that, either by precept or example, we are capable of producing any effect whatever. The vices and the crimes of the people proceed from their poverty and ignorance; and I do not conceive they are likely to grow much better or wiser, while the present state of things exists.

2. This assertion, however, that the vices and crimes of the people proceed from their poverty and ignorance, I would wish to be understood, with limitations. Where considerable numbers are collected and associate together, especially if there happens to be much inequality of rank and fortune, the morals of the people are worst, though compared to the inhabitants of other parts of the same country, they may be said to be neither indigent nor uninformed; but in such situations, they are liable to fall into bad company, and to acquire new habits and new wants. The same may be observed, respecting such persons as have occasion to attend our cutcherries: they get into bad habits. It is not always, therefore, that the people are worse where they are the poorest and most ignorant. Nevertheless, the assertion is, in my opinion, generally speaking, true. It is certain that where labour is amply rewarded, where all can easily get employment, and where the poor are provided for, the people lead industrious and virtuous lives; and it will be observed, that in remote parts of the anjassil, where debauchery and dissipation are little known, very few resort to depredations on the public, except from necessity.

3. Most but not all decoits, begin their evil practices from necessity. A ryot finding some difficulty to subsist, either from his imprudence or his fortune—a peon or other servant losing his place, and unable to procure another—Coolies finding no employment:—Such persons, of which in this populous country there are always many thousands, often take to stealing, are corrupted by vicious companions, drink spirits, and are gradually led on, from impunity and habits of idleness, to become decoits, and depend on robbery alone for subsistence.

4. The people are, I presume, little different from what they were 1,000 years ago. The Mahommedan government had hardly any effect on the national character, and our government must have still less, because we do not, like the Mahommedans, coalesce with the body of the people. We cannot mix in their society—we have made no attempts to introduce European science and learning among them. They appear to me as far from adopting our customs, as we are from adopting theirs.

5. The power of the British government appears to me, of all governments, the most unquestionably despotic over its subjects. The submission of the natives is perfect and unqualified; so complete, as to render the necessity of coercion or intimidation of any kind. All appearance of military interference in the police is or may be kept out of sight. It is the principle of ignorance and awe of fear, that it preserves us; and I should imagine it will be only when European laws, religion, and manners, come to be disseminated in this country, that it will be necessary to show the subject, and to show, what we certainly at present possess, power irresistible to command obedience.

6. But this sort of power, the want of police and justice on the one hand, and utter ignorance and wretchedness on the other, does not suppose any influence whatever over the hearts of the natives. In fact, it changes but little in their habits and tastes since they became subject to our dominion: any change may very well be termed accidental; but I am not myself sensible of any very material change.

7. It is in Calcutta alone that the effect of the intercourse between Europeans and natives is, in any degree visible; there and there alone an imperfect link may be discerned between the rulers and the people; but how extremely false and imperfect this link is, must be well known. The lowest and poorest Europeans and the native-born christians and Portuguese, between whom and us, it is scarcely necessary to say, there subsists little connexion or similarity of pursuit, do in some slight degree mix with the natives in their ordinary concerns and their amusements, sufficient to produce an inconsiderable change in their manners and character. The circumstances of the jurisdiction of the supreme court, too, and the intercourse between the natives and the lowest officers of that court, must be considered, as another cause of the same nature. But I ask, whether the morals of the people are in any respect improved, by these means?—whether they have not learnt all the low arts of chicanery, imposture, and dissimulation peculiar to an English court of justice, without a particle of plain dealing, firmness, independence of spirit, or useful knowledge of any kind?—whether they do not regard the evil and non-evils of the good?—whether they do not imbibe those principles of the European character which tend only to impair the mildness and simplicity of their own?—The proposition upon these questions is, I fear, not very difficult.

10. Moreover, I would appeal to those who, from their situation or habits, are accustomed to consider these matters with attention, whether there have not of late years been introduced, and extensively established, professions heretofore almost unknown, namely, those of informers, sharpen, intriguers, snobners and false witnesses: whose sole occupation is that of preying on their fellow creatures, and whose long careers of impunity, convince them that honesty is the worst policy.

11. And if such is the case, can we doubt to whom we ought to attribute this change of character?—To me it is most manifest, that our municipal courts of justice have produced some evil as well as much good, and perhaps it may not be wholly useless to point out the circumstances.

12. Whenever I observe in the behaviour of the natives, symptoms of insolence, ill-mature, brutality, liguiousness and drunkenness, which I confess I very seldom do, knowing these qualities to form no part of the national character, I cannot help entertaining a suspicion that they have either contracted them by their intercourse with low Europeans, which in most situations can hardly happen, or that our system, more than any other, has a tendency to produce and encourage them.

13. The natives are certainly in disposition, not brutal and inexorable: they are mild, humane, and placable: but in rule, without an exception. It must be admitted that the criminal records of this country will furnish such instances of cruelty and ferocity in decoits, as perhaps no country in Europe, can equal.

Interrogatory 36. The punishment of marking the forehead of perjurers, which I do not recollect to have ever known inflicted, has, I suppose, little effect good or bad. Perjury has increased greatly, and is increasing. I question whether any man is deterred by his being aware (and few are aware) that he will be liable, in addition to the old punishments, to the new punishment of being branded on the forehead.

14. I take this opportunity of remarking, that to render generally known any penal law, is extremely difficult, particularly among the lower orders of the people: Till they see the effect of it, they remain ignorant of it, and this in spite of advertisements and proclamations. News and information of all kinds are in Bengal, very slowly and inaccurately transmitted from one to another. Among us, events obtain publicity, through the means of periodical prints, of epistolary correspondence, and of verbal communication. Among the natives there is nothing of the two first; and even of the other, hardly any.

Interrogatory 37. The punishment of transportation has, I should imagine, as good an effect as severity of punishment, can have. It is not in my power to say, that the dread of it, has ever operated to the prevention of a crime; but as it is much dreaded, and well known, because frequently executed, there is every reason to believe that it has.

Interrogatory 38. I am not, on the whole, of opinion that the Mahomedan law is administered with too much lenity, though I think the punishment of decoits is frequently too light.—Many a felon is hanged in Calcutta by the supreme court, for a crime which, on conviction in the mofussil, would incur the penalty of only a short term of imprisonment.

15. The alterations introduced by us are, in general, obviously reasonable and proper; and such alteration may possibly have a good effect on the minds of the natives. But I must observe, that though the criminal law administered here, is supposed to be the Mahomedan, either the facility of interpretation to which that code is liable in other causes, operate in most cases, to prevent any thing peculiar to the Koran from operating either in the sentence, or in the mode of conducting the trial. In effect, our Mahomedan law, as far as I can learn, bears no resemblance to that of Turkey, Arabia, Persia, or other Mahomedan countries, and very little to that which was administered here, by the native governments.

16. 3. The Mahomedan criminal law was administered by the Native Nazim, before the British government took possession of that department, yet a very great change is introduced. I do not here allude solely to the alterations, enacted by special regulations, such as the abolition of the punishments of amputation, refusing a pardon to the accused, although the heir may forbear to prosecute, and others. The bare laws of the Koran against drunkards, and the absurd ones, against the use of tobacco, and the like, never executed. They have fallen into disuse of themselves, and a special regulation is requisite to prevent their revival.

17. 4. Many cases do not occur, which strictly speaking, the Mahomedan law provides for. When kassas or retaliation is required, it is generally by assuming some fiction or other respecting the witnesses or the prosecutors. And the laws of Haddood, which, according to the received doctrine of Islam, are not permitted to be, in any case to remit or alter, since they constitute the essence of the criminal code, and of the practical religion of the Mahomedans. These laws are, through the necessary operation of various causes, I believe, entirely disused, and virtually abrogated. But as the mission of the Mahomedan law, though not perhaps of the Mahomedan religion, that attributes, the cognizance and punishment of which, are not provided for by laws of Haddood, shall be left to the discretion of the ruler of the country. The most severe sentences that, or should pass, by scut or fuzet.

18. 5. The most material change effected by us, is not in the punishments fixed for particular crimes. It is less, I think, in the laws themselves, than in the mode of executing them. It is a common saying, with the natives, that the punishment requires so much evidence, that it is scarcely possible to convict a criminal of his crime, and the way was very different. The accused almost always confessed, and the mode of confession, but the most simple and uninformed, I have seen several old records of trials, and I observed, that almost the whole of those con-



Answers from the Judges  
and Magistrates of the  
Munshis, to the questions  
put by Jan. 30 1802.

violated had confessed. They had no assistance in making a defence. Witnesses seldom or never were examined, for the prisoner: they confessed, because they knew it would be useless to deny. When evidence appeared against them, they gave themselves up in despair, and never thought of a defence. Moreover, they were generally beaten, till they confessed. An old fondlar, with whom I have frequently conversed, has told me, that his rule was to inflict so many stripes for denying such a crime, after the prosecutor had sworn to it, and, if I mistake not, this was pretty general. One would think, no man would now confess, but a fool or a madman; yet, the Lannah confessions are still common; and even in court, rude and illiterate men from the jungles, sometimes confess. They do it, I imagine, only from despair. I can see no other motive. They imagine, the hakim has detected them; and that to tell a falsehood, would only make their case worse. They have no conception of a custom, which, not only tolerates falsehood in the mouth of the accused, but absolutely encourages and dictates it.

6. It will not, I trust, be supposed, that I wish to recommend the extorting of confessions; and then, making those confessions a ground of conviction. I merely remark, that, as a circumstance, in the administration of the laws, which appears to me to have had a considerable effect, in ensuring the conviction of offenders. It is probable that the innocent sometimes suffered; but I have no doubt the guilty seldom escaped, except by collusion, when once upon their trial. On the ground of notoriety of bad character, it was usual to detain persons in custody for an indefinite period.

7. Without doubt, the present mode of conducting trials is more regular, satisfactory, and decorous. The record is properly kept and made up, and every thing is conducted with fairness and humanity towards the prisoner; nor could we reconcile it to ourselves, to treat in any degree, to the native mode of trial; yet I am inclined to think, that an intelligent native is better qualified to preside at a trial, than we can ever be ourselves; and a few very simple rules would perhaps suffice to correct the abuses of former times.

8. The Mussulman law officer of a court of circuit, though he may occasionally assist in the examination of witnesses, and though he writes the *fatwa*, is not the person who conducts and presides at the trial. The opinion and influence of the judge must predominate; nor can the natives act, as our colleagues.

9. With respect to civil suits, all to the amount of 500 rupees, that is to say, more than nine-tenths of the causes throughout the country, are decided by the native commissioners and registers. The labouring class of people, whose monthly subsistence may amount to two rupees at most, can scarcely ever become suitors, for a greater sum than 200 rupees. The decision of their causes is therefore, in the first instance, in the hands of the registers and native commissioners. It is hardly necessary to mention, that the native commissioners, at least those of them who are Hindoos, have no knowledge whatever of the Mahomedan law; nor I imagine, would the parties in a suit, though they might happen to be Mahomedans, object to the competence of the judge, on the ground of this ignorance of the Mahomedan law.

10. I have before mentioned, that the pleaders in the civil courts, are very ignorant of the Mahomedan code: they are mostly Hindoos. Should learned men ever come in practice, as pleaders, it is to me doubtful whether much advantage could be derived to the public, by their labours. Whatever knowledge the pleaders might possess, it is not very likely that the judges should attain a large portion, and till they do, they will probably look upon the refined and subtle distinctions of Mahomedan law doctors, as ill calculated to accelerate the administration of justice.

11. I take the liberty to mention here a few more observations on the establishment of the native commissioners for the trial of civil suits, under Regulation XI., 1793.

12. When a native commissioner is tolerably qualified, and, in consequence, no great knowledge of the Regulations is requisite: he decides with the greatest ease, a vast number of causes. He is perfectly acquainted with the language, the usages, and even the persons and characters of almost all who come before him. His authority is very uncommon in his court. To us, his proceedings may appear frequently to be trivial, and generally irregular and informal; but we are very apt to judge from a false standard. I am fully convinced, that a native of common capacity will, in the discharge of his duties, examine witnesses and investigate the most intricate cases, with more sagacity and perseverance, with more ability and effect, than almost any European. The native commissioners decide only petty causes, and their emoluments are but scanty. They are, however, and especially in maintaining their authority, but they should always be regarded as men of consequence. Their procedure, as far as I have had occasion to observe it, with few exceptions, is just what it ought to be:—they hear and write down, almost whatever the parties say, and it is not a small advantage, that they are able to do so, without being incommoded by heat or crowds, that they do not, as we are apt to imagine, and that they are seldom provoked either by their omish, or by the parties, to lose their temper. They sit from morning till night on a mat, under a shed, or in the open air, and attend to every petty dispute of the ryots with a degree of patience, which we have no idea, till they develop the merits, and decide the suit. I cannot but remark, that their situations were more respectable in a pecuniary view, and that they were empowered to decide causes, to almost any amount. At present, in this establishment, the native commissioners can earn more than a bare subsistence; and therefore it cannot be expected, that the best qualified and most respectable men, should undertake the office.

13. When a suit is filed in a native court, and the defendant does not appear immediately, there is no time or opportunity, for the suggestion of a charge of perjury. The munshi, as it were, in the society of the parties, and the court, may receive him. But if that

Answers from the Judge  
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napore, 17 Interrogato-  
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cause comes before the zillah judge, besides the inevitable delay and expense at the outset, the case is probably entirely changed; intrigue and counter complaints occur, the most imprudent falsehoods are advanced with impunity, and in the end perhaps, an erroneous decision is passed.

14. Should it here occur, that very few, if any natives are qualified, from habit and education, to pronounce a decision, or to comprehend a complicated judicial case; that the range of their ideas is too narrow,—that their minds are cramped, and that they possess not that vigour and perseverance, and those enlarged views, which would enable them to perform the duty of judges:—if there is any one of this opinion, I would take the liberty to ask, how it is possible the natives in general should, in the miserably subordinate and servile employments to which they are confined, have qualified themselves better? I would observe, how very easily they all acquire the requisite qualifications for the duties which we are pleased to entrust to them.—I would ask, who can doubt that they would very shortly, if not depressed and dispirited, become at least equal to the functions they performed, before we came among them?

15. In considering the mental qualifications of such of the natives as are not wholly illiterate, though their education must be admitted to be deplorably imperfect, though they are the victims of gross prejudice, superstition and ignorance; yet I by no means, look upon them, as incompetent to perform the duty of judges.

16. They very frequently pay implicit credit to events in themselves, improbable. When they read or hear a story, they seem to believe it, as a matter of course; and the more extraordinary the facts, perhaps the less inclination do they feel to doubt or disbelieve them. But this excessive credulity, and this apparent incapacity to judge of truth and falsehood, does not I think, prevent their distinguishing, with considerable sagacity, between the probable and improbable, in the common affairs of life, where prodigies and miracles have no place.

17. I confess it is my wish, though possibly I may be blamed for expressing it, not only to have the authority of the natives as judges extended, but to see them, if possible, enjoy important and confidential situations, in other departments of the state.

18. Though my reply to this interrogatory, like several of my other replies, has swelled to an immoderate length, I am well aware of its being by no means, complete and satisfactory. A thorough discussion of the subject, would require more leisure and consideration than I have been able to bestow, and a great deal of Mahomedan law learning; a branch of knowledge, in which I can pretend to no proficiency.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 39. There are no Europeans out of the service, constantly residing in this district.—A few indigo manufacturers and cloth merchants, have or rather had, considerable dealings in Midnapore, and occasionally come to look after their concerns.—The cloth and indigo trade have very much fallen off, within these few years.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 40. The condition of the weavers commercially connected with the Company, or with European traders, is here, as every where, I should imagine, greatly ameliorated.

2. The system with regard to them, has by degrees, almost totally changed. They are now treated with fairness and liberality; and oppression, which prevailed formerly to a great extent, is no more. I know not one instance in which the advantages of the present system are more conspicuous, than this,—the stop which has been put to the abuses which used to prevail in the commercial department.

3. It does not appear to me that the officers of government, or even individual Europeans, have any reason to complain.—I have indeed frequently heard complaints; but I always thought them groundless.

4. Europeans have still advantages, and ever must have. When a native fails to perform his engagements, I think it will generally be found to proceed from inability. Individual Europeans have no regular means of compelling him, without resorting to a court of justice. But the commercial and salt agents possess some effectual means of coercion; and such powers being in themselves, rather unfair, and hardly compatible with that equality which ought to subsist in commercial concerns, must necessarily sometimes produce discontent.

5. No European can be sued by a native for a greater sum than 500 rupees, in the dewanny adawlut; whereas a native is liable to be sued, to any amount by the European.

6. I know not any good reason for this; and there ought I conceive, to be a very good reason to justify such an inequality. No instance however of inconvenience, or hardship resulting from this inequitable law, has fallen within my knowledge in this district.

I here close my Replies.

Some of the Interrogatories appear to me to involve discussions of a general and political nature, not immediately connected with my duty, as judge and magistrate of this district. On all such, I could for several reasons, have wished to be silent. Finding myself called upon however, on this occasion, to deliver opinions, and to furnish such information as I might possess on a variety of subjects, which it cannot be supposed I should be master of. I have attempted it accordingly; and have in some instances, been induced to enter upon certain topics, more amply than is perhaps expected.

I beg leave to offer an apology for trespassing on the patience of government, with discussions so much more prolix, than the subjects may be thought to demand.

Having

Having been led to advance certain opinions on the state of the country, and the conditions of the natives, which opinions I became fearful might appear extravagant, and sometimes unintelligible, I have endeavoured to explain and illustrate them, without very strictly applying my answers to the terms of the interrogatories.

Answers from the Judge and Magistrate of Bidnapore, to Interrogatories: 30 Jan. 1802.

If in my eyes, these matters have elicited to bear a different aspect from those of many other people, it should not excite surprise. Infinite diversity of opinions on these subjects is to be expected, because we are all liable to false impressions,—because the circumstances to be taken into consideration, are too numerous and complicated for any one mind to perceive or comprehend them all,—because we necessarily infer and in fact guess a hundred things, for one thing which we see or come to the actual knowledge of.

A conviction of the uncertainty, to which discussions of this nature are for ever liable, while it serves as a caution against too readily lending an ear to plausible speculations, may teach us to consider with attention and willingness, every new attempt at investigation; to listen, without scorn and prejudice, to what at first may strike us as singular or improbable, and never to reject opinions solely on account of their novelty.

I have not been deterred by the apprehension of falling into error, which I know to be inevitable, nor of having my principles and intentions mistaken, from delivering with freedom such opinions as my understanding teaches me to be just, after the best attention I am able to bestow, and this even on political subjects, which are, to me purely speculative. In so doing, I trust I have not deviated from the wishes of government.

I have now only to express my hope, that nothing I have said will give offence; and that as my sentiments are offered with diffidence, they will obtain a candid and indulgent reception.

(Signed) H. STRACHEY, Judge and Magistrate.

ANSWERS of the Judge and Magistrate of Zillah Burdwan, dated 9<sup>th</sup> March 1802, to the INTERROGATORIES of Government, of 29<sup>th</sup> October 1801.

Interrogatory 1. WHAT is the number of causes now depending before you, before your register, and before the native commissioners?

Answers of the Judge and Magistrate of Burdwan, of 9 March 1802.

Answer 1. The causes now depending before each of these tribunals, stand in number as follows:—

Before the Judge	-	-	-	191
the Register	-	-	-	1,303
the N. Commissioners	-	-	-	7,605
Total	-	-	-	<u>9,099</u>

Interrogatory 2. What proportion does the number of causes now depending before the three tribunals of the judge, the register, and native commissioners, bear to the number of causes usually depending during the several years commencing from the year 1793, to the present period?

Ans. 2. Previous to the year 1797, the causes depending before these tribunals in this zillah, appear to have been so numerous, that it was found impracticable to keep any regular register of them; but since that period, they have annually decreased; in the two first, the number now depending in the judge's court, bearing a proportion of one in six of the average number depending, in the four preceding years; and in the register's, the number has been reduced in the proportion of one half, on the same average calculation. In the courts of the native commissioners there appears an increase; but this is merely temporary, arising from the numerous revenue suits recently instituted in the present season of the heavy collections; nor can the number now depending before them be deemed great, when the number of these courts (thirty-two), the description of the suits, and the average number decided in them monthly, is taken into consideration.

Interrogatory 3. What number of causes was decided in the past year by you, by your register, and by your native commissioners?

Ans. 3. As follows:

By the Judge	-	-	-	588.
Register	-	-	-	2,086.
Native Commissioners	-	-	-	10,351.

Interrogatory 4. What number of causes do you suppose must necessarily be depending before your court, and that of your register, and before the native commissioners; and what is the reason that the number of causes depending before those tribunals respectively, is not reduced as low as you think it might be reduced.

Ans. 4. From the answer given to the 2d interrogatory, it is seen that the number of causes depending, compared with preceding years, has been reduced in a very considerable proportion, both in the judge's and the register's court: and I have no doubt, that a further considerable reduction will be made; and that in the course of a very short time, they will not exceed, if they now do, the number depending before the same tribunals, in other zillahs, though I believe it will be admitted that, in extent and population, this exceeds the generality of them.

It is less, however, to the extent and population, that any excess is to be ascribed, than to local evils, which, by prolonging investigation, retard decision: and these, I shall beg leave to explain.



Answers of the Judge  
and Magistrate of Burd-  
wan, of 9 March 1802.

The generality of the suits brought before these tribunals in this zillah, may be comprized under two classes :

1st. Suits instituted for the resumption of lands, alleged to have been fraudulently alienated, subsequent to the decennial settlement, and held under antedated grants ; and those of the same description, instituted by holders of grants for illegal resumptions, under Section 40th of Regulation XIX. of 1793.

2d. Suits instituted by farmers, for the recovery of arrears of rent ; and those against them for alleged exactions.

The suits of the 1st class are numerous, and it is not to be doubted, that the fraud has been committed to a very considerable extent, and that it continues to prevail, every farmer making himself a rent-free land-holder during the period of his farm ; but the fraud is not easily detected, where there is no record either in the zemindarry or in the offices of government, whereby it can be ascertained, what grants did exist, prior to the period stated. The zemindarry accounts produced by the succeeding farmer, to prove the alienation posterior, are not to be depended upon ; as little, are those produced by his predecessor, or the defendant, to prove the anterior alienation, for each has fabricated them, to answer his own purpose, and thus is the court left without any other guide for its decision, than the evidence of numerous witnesses, brought on both sides, to prove opposite and contradictory assertions ; and this, I am sorry to say, in many instances, is as doubtful and unsatisfactory, as the documents and vouchers, being procured with the same ease, as the latter are fabricated for the purpose.

The above observations are equally applicable to the suits included in the same class for illegal resumptions, and those of the 2d class are not less numerous, nor less intricate.

The interchange of engagements between the parties, with few exceptions, extends no farther than to the zemindar's farmer, who is here termed the sudder farmer, and to those amongst whom he subdivides his farm, in portions. An engagement between the latter and the cultivator, or heads of a village, is scarcely known, except the general one, mutually understood to receive and pay, agreeably to past and preceding years ; and for ascertaining this, the accounts of the farm are no guide.

The zemindar himself, seeing that no confidence is to be placed in the accounts rendered him of the rent roll of the farm, from the practice which has so long prevailed, of fabrications and rendering false accounts, never attempts to call for them, at the expiration of the lease ; and instead of applying a corrective to the evil, increases it, by farming out the lands literally by auction ; and the same mode is adopted, in almost every subdivision of the farm.

The consequences of such a system, must be obvious ; needy rapacious farmers and fraudulent tenants become friends ; and collusively agree, at the expiration of the lease, to defraud the succeeding farmer. A trifling donceur from the ryot, or the ryots of a whole village, is sufficient to procure a fabrication of the accounts, and a receipt to correspond with them, for a sum much below that actually paid on the revenue demand for the year ; and these are the valid and incontrovertible vouchers, held out to the successor in the farm, for his guide.

The practice is, however, too universal, and too well known to deceive him ; but he is without an alternative, and acts his predecessor's part, in the repetition of it ; for if honestly disposed (which is rarely the case) he has not time to have recourse to a measurement for ascertaining the quantity and quality of lands in the occupancy of the cultivator, with a view to a fair and equitable assessment ; and the ryots finding their benefit in the confusion, and despairing of honest dealing towards them whilst the present system exists, would oppose it, so as to make him a sufferer for the attempt.

These are local evils, originating in the great extent of the zemindarry, and the bad management of the proprietor ; and are less worthy of notice, as they affect the speedy decision of suits, than in their effects upon the public revenue, which cannot fail ultimately to suffer from the abuses I have mentioned.

It will, however, be evident, that they must occasion considerable delay in passing decisions ; but notwithstanding these difficulties which the courts of this zillah labour under, and the great portion of time necessarily given both by myself and the register to the foudarry department ; I trust it will not be found that the number of causes depending, greatly exceeds the number depending before the same tribunals, in other zillahs ; and I can pledge our exertions to reduce them, as low as may be found practicable.

In the courts of the native commissioners, the number will ever be great ; and I have always been averse to the institution of these courts on the present system, from a real belief that they are hurtful to the country ; and sure I am, that the purposes of their institution would better be answered, in this zillah, I will add, in all Bengal, by the establishment of a few courts at the sudder station, immediately under the eye of the judge, for the cognizance of the suits now cognizable by these native commissioners. It is universally admitted, that the natives of Bengal are litigious ; and the number of the courts dispersed throughout the country, opens a wide field to them, to indulge this disposition ; nor is it to be doubted that the commissioners themselves, with their train of vakeels and peons, encourage it, for their own interest. The majority of the suits instituted in them, are vexatious ; and I am persuaded, that the administration of justice would not be affected by their abolition, and the establishment of those above suggested in lieu.

The jurisdiction of the new courts suggested, might also be extended to all suits not exceeding in amount one hundred rupees, whereby a relief would be afforded to the registers, that it much requires ; and all should be assessed with a charge at least equivalent to defray the expense of the establishments, which should be fixed, and payable from the treasury of government.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 5. Are you prepared to suggest the establishment of any rules, which, consistently with a due administration of the laws, would expedite the decision of suits? Are you of opinion that this object would be in any degree promoted, by leaving it optional in the different tribunals to commit the depositions of witnesses in causes not appealable, to a higher tribunal?

Ans. 5. An accurate record of the rent-free grants, and of the revenue lands, and the execution of regular engagements by the farmers and under renters, would do much towards the object proposed, in this interrogatory; and little more would be found requisite. I am not of opinion that it would be promoted in any great degree, or that any expedition would be obtained, by the omission suggested; nor do I think it advisable, as it would be productive of complaints to the superior courts; and the intention of it, would, in my opinion, better be answered, by the attachment of a few officers to the court, whose duty it should be to tally the evidence of the witnesses in the presence of the parties, or their vakeels, to the points contained in their pleadings. These officers, might also be very usefully employed to inspect the pleadings when filed, to see that they are conformable to the Regulations, and that there is no delay in the delivery of them,—an assistance the courts of this zillah, stand much in need of; and I see not why the pleadings may not be limited to plaint, and answer for the others, if conformable to the Regulations, are of little use, but they are now generally, if not the principal, made the longest. The vouchers referred to, as also lists of witnesses, might be filed with them; and the whole be prepared, so as to enable the court to pass judgment on the suit, at one sitting. At present, frequent adjournments are unavoidable for the filing of these necessary vouchers, in the delivery of which, there is always considerable delay; and the court is in doubt, whether the vakeels or their clients, are blameable for it.—There is certainly a mutual want of confidence, or an indifference on the part of the vakeels, with respect to the issue of the suit, that proves a great interruption to the dispatch of business, for neither will trust, the other;—the client, his vakeel, with the vouchers and the fees payable on the filing of them; nor the latter, the former, with making an advance for him, and from this want of confidence between the employer and the employed, together with the doubt which the court entertains, whether the latter has done his duty towards the former, in giving the necessary information, repeated adjournments of the suit are made.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 6. Are you of opinion that it would be advisable to extend the jurisdiction of the native commissioners to suits for sums exceeding 50 rupees, and that of the registers to sums exceeding S<sup>r</sup> R<sup>s</sup> 200? What is the amount to which you would recommend the jurisdiction of the courts of the commissioners and of the registers should be extended; and to what degree, would the general administration of justice, in the district subject to your jurisdiction, be expedited, by the adoption of this arrangement?

Ans. 6. The abolition of these numerous courts is recommended in my answer to the 4th interrogatory; and if my objection to them had not been so strong, I should have been against any extension of their jurisdiction, in respect to the amount of the suits cognizable by them. And with regard to the register's court, it rather requires relief; and I have proposed the relief advisable to be afforded to it, in the establishment and extension of the jurisdiction of the new courts suggested in lieu of those of the present native commissioners, recommended to be abolished.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 7. Has litigation been checked by the establishment of the fee paid to government on the institution of suits; of the fees paid to the vakeels; of the fees paid on exhibits in the courts of judicature, and of the stamp duties? Do you consider these several charges attending the institution of law suits, to be too considerable, or otherwise?

Ans. 7. It certainly has been considerably checked by the establishment of these charges, and I am less against the aggregate amount of the expense to which law suits are now subject, than to the number and variety of heads under which it is made payable:—these, occasion delay, as before observed; and from not being intelligible, or known to the generality of suitors, may partly produce that want of confidence noticed in their vakeels.

The simplification of them, by consolidation, and the establishment of a per-centage, would be advisable; and I think the amount might be lessened, on the smaller suits; for, in addition to these charges, it should be considered, that the generality of suitors are subject to the further expense of a private agent, to attend on the vakeel.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 8. Do the fees paid to the licensed vakeels, on suits instituted or defended by them, constitute a sufficient inducement to men of character, and of proper qualifications, to undertake those situations? Are the vakeels attached to your court, persons of the above-mentioned description; and are they in general, well acquainted with the printed Regulations?

Ans. 8. I am of opinion that the fees are fully ample for the purpose; but the situation seems not yet to be sufficiently known, and hitherto few have offered, or been found willing to undertake it, excepting those who before acted in the capacity, under the former system; and this description, affords few of character and of proper qualifications for the office. Hence few men of character and ability are to be found amongst the number at present holding the situations, at least, it is the case in this court; for of the number (forty-eight) at present attached to it, there are not more than ten or twelve, who I think favourably of, or who appear to me to possess an adequate knowledge of the Regulations, to qualify them for discharging the duties of their situations.

The limitation of the number to twenty, which I think fully sufficient for the business of the court; would, I am of opinion, have a good effect, in increasing their emoluments and making the situations more desirable: this would induce good conduct and attention to improve themselves; and men of character and of proper qualifications, would soon be found soliciting the succession to the stations, as vacancies occurred.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 9.

Answers of the Judge  
and Magistrate of Burd-  
wan, of 9 March 1802.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 9. Has the establishment of licensed vakeels contributed to expedite the decision of suits, by bringing more speedily and accurately before the court, the merits of the suits instituted?

Ans. 9. I was partial to the establishment at first, from a real belief that this good effect would have been produced by it; but it may be inferred, from what I have above said, that my expectations, in this respect, have been disappointed, and I am sorry to say, that it has not been produced, in any sensible degree; the failure, however, is not wholly to be attributed to the vakeel, but partly to their employers, who withhold the necessary information from them.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 10. Do the vakeels in general, discharge their duty to their clients, with honour and fidelity?

Ans. 10. I have had no complaint made against them, by their clients; but have before observed that, in many instances, an indifference is shown by them, in regard to the issue of the suits upon which they are employed; and I am afraid that they do not always discharge their duty, with honour and fidelity.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 11. Are the principal inhabitants of your jurisdiction, as well acquainted, as individuals in general can be supposed to be informed, of the laws of the country?

Ans. 11. I have found some zemindars, and principal farmers and merchants, tolerably well acquainted with those laws which chiefly concern them, but few seek the information; and, from this cause, I am afraid that the knowledge of the Regulations is much confined to the sudder station.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 12. Are you prepared to state any alterations in the forms established for the trial of civil suits, which would contribute to expedite the decision of the suits, without endangering the due administration of the laws?

Ans. 12. I am not aware that any alteration in the forms established for the trial of civil suits, is necessary for the object proposed in this interrogatory, or that any thing further for it, is necessary than what I have suggested in my answer to the 5<sup>th</sup>. With that assistance, I can venture to promise, that there will be few suits in arrear, in the courts of this zillah.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 13. Have you in your court-room, any place allotted for the bench of the judge, for the public officers, for the parties or their vakeels, for the witnesses, and for all persons who attend your court? and what forms or ceremonies do you observe, in opening your court, or sitting in it?

Ans. 13. The court-room at this station, has the accommodations mentioned in the interrogatory. No other form or ceremony is observed, than the proclamation of the opening and sitting; and after going through the causes notified for the day, all petitions and applications by motion, are received and heard, and orders passed upon them.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 14. Are there any private schools or seminaries in the district under your jurisdiction, in which the Mahomedan or Hindoo law is taught; and how are those institutions maintained?

Ans. 14. There are few villages of any note, in which there is not a school, but the instruction in them, is confined to the teaching of children to read and write; and I know not, nor have heard of any within this jurisdiction, in which the law, either Mahomedan or Hindoo, is taught; the most learned in the latter, are found in the neighbouring district of Nuddea, from whence, and Benares, the other stations are supplied; and the Mahomedans bear but an inconsiderable proportion of the inhabitants of this zillah, receiving their education, in the common branches, from the village schoolmasters above mentioned, or from their friends.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 15. What is your opinion regarding the general moral character of the inhabitants of your district? Has the moral character of the inhabitants in general, been improved or otherwise, by the system established by the British government for the administration of the laws, and for the conduct of the internal administration of the country?

Ans. 15. I am sorry that I cannot report favourably of it, or give it as my opinion, that the lenity and humanity introduced by the British system, has tended to improve either the Mahomedan or Hindoo moral character; certain it is, that much profligacy, vice and depravity, are to be found amongst the higher class; and the crimes committed by the lower, will I think be found more prevailing, and in greater number, than under the Mahomedan jurisprudence; at least, as far as a comparison of the records of the two periods, can be made the criterion of judgment, this is found to be the case, in this district: But it may be proper to observe, that all crimes and offences are now reported to the magistrate, and that few of the offenders escape; the increase may, therefore, in a great measure, be only apparent; but I am of opinion, that the number actually committed, has increased; and having observed, that few of the offenders escape, I cannot assign any other reasons for the increase, than that the punishment on conviction is inadequate to deter, and that the police establishments are inadequate to prevent, the commission of crimes. The increase may be ascribed, to the inadequacy of both for their purposes.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 16. Are you of opinion that the inhabitants in general, of the district under your jurisdiction, consider their private rights and property to be secured, by the present constitution of the country, against infringement, either by the executive officers of government, or even by the supreme executive authority itself, or by individuals?

Ans. 16. They certainly do consider their rights and property fully secured, by the present constitution of the country, against infringement; and sure I am, that none have reason

reason to entertain a contrary opinion, or that, where the infringement may be made, either by the executive officers of government, or by individuals, the fullest redress will not be afforded them:—They have the most perfect confidence that the government itself will not infringe the laws which it has enacted for their security; and that it will protect them, from the infringement by others.

Answers of the Judge  
and Magistrate of Baid-  
wan, of 9 March 1804.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 17. Are you of opinion that the district under your jurisdiction is in a state of improvement or otherwise, with respect to its population, cultivation and commerce, and its buildings, or other works for religious, domestic or other purposes; and on what grounds, do you form your opinion?

Ans. 17. Notwithstanding what I have noticed in my answer to the 4th interrogatory, of the disadvantage which this district labours under, from the farming system, I have no hesitation in saying, that it is in a state of very considerable improvement, and that this is shown, in an evident increase of cultivation; in a number of new raised villages, whereby an increase of population may be inferred; an increased and daily increasing number of brick buildings, both for religious and domestic purposes.—The commerce has also been both much facilitated and extended, by the opening of the three grand roads leading to Hooghly, Culna and Cutwa, which have lately been put into a good state of repair, by the labour of the convicts; and nothing can more forward the commerce of this district, which has not the advantage of inland navigation, or more conduce to the general convenience of the inhabitants, than good roads.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 18. Are you of opinion that the inhabitants of the district subject to your jurisdiction, are in general, satisfied with the British government?

Ans. 18. They certainly are satisfied with it; and living happy, and prospering under its mild and equitable laws, and the protection afforded them, I am sure are well affected to it.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 19. Is the present system of police well calculated to insure the apprehension of offenders?

Ans. 19. In the answer to the 14th interrogatory, I have noticed that few escape, and it may therefore be inferred that it is well calculated for the purpose, in this district.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 20. Are the police establishments in the district subject to your jurisdiction, adequate to the duties required of them?

Ans. 20. They are certainly not adequate; the tannahs are too few, and the establishments will not admit of the necessary detachments, for the performance of those duties in the numerous populous villages under them, and little assistance can be expected from the zemindarry Pikes, and village watchmen, as these, are generally found to be the offenders.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 21. Are you of opinion that the number of crimes committed annually in the district under your jurisdiction, has increased or diminished, since the year 1793; and to what cause, do you ascribe the increase or diminution?

Ans. 21. I cannot assert that they have increased, since the year 1793; but a reference to the calendars, and the result of the trials, will evince that they have been lamentably numerous, in each subsequent year. There is, however, every prospect that they will be less frequent henceforward, from the number of offenders who have been punished on conviction, by transportation, amounting in the two last years to upwards of two hundred; and I may fairly hope a good effect, from having brought many of the most notorious sirdars or heads of gangs to justice.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 22. What crimes of enormity are most prevalent in the district under your authority; what is the cause of the prevalence of such crimes; and what are the means you would recommend to be adopted, for their suppression?

Ans. 22. The crime the most prevalent in this district is decoity or gang robbery, and the calendars exhibit few other crimes; this however is frequently accompanied with murder; and if I had not experienced it, to be equally prevalent in other districts far less populous, and indeed where the population did not afford hands sufficient for the purposes of tillage and agriculture, I should have ascribed its frequency in this jurisdiction, to the excess of population, in the lower order; but I am persuaded, that it is a calling, and hereditary with them, the same as any other trade followed by the lower classes of Hindoos.—It is the most certain mode of robbery, from their going in large gangs, for the acquisition of booty, and the most difficult of conviction, and therefore is preferred. An increased number of tannahs would certainly prove serviceable for checking the frequency of this crime; and I am of opinion that the transportation of all convicted of it, whether principals or accessaries, would have a good effect.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 23. Do the inhabitants in general, of the district subject to your jurisdiction, keep arms in their houses; what description of arms do they retain, and for what purposes are the arms, retained?

Ans. 23. They do in general, and I may say without exception; for scarcely a person is to be seen, without a tulwar and shield. The higher and middling order have these and matchlocks, some as appendages of state, others for their own defence and protection; and the arms retained by the lower order, either for their own protection, or for purposes of robbery, are of every description—matchlocks, tulwars, spears, long swords, hatchets, axes, bows and arrows, &c.

Interr<sup>y</sup> 24. Are there any brick or mud forts in your district; in what state are the forts, and what is the nature of their construction?

Answers of the Judge  
and Magistrate of Burd-  
wan, of 9 March 1802.

Ans. 24. There are no brick forts that I am informed of, in this district, but the remains of several mud, are visible. These were originally constructed for the security and protection of the inhabitants against the Mahirattas, who frequently harassed it, with incursions of horse; and when the internal government of the country experienced frequent convulsions from changes. Since the accession of the Company, and the protection afforded by the establishment of the military station at Midnapore, they have been neglected, as useless; and nothing now remains of them, but the ditches, and the bastions covered with jungle.

Interr. 25. What proportion do the Hindoo bear to the Mahomedan inhabitants, in the district subject to your authority; and what do you suppose to be the number of the inhabitants of your district, of all descriptions?

Ans. 25. I have no data to guide me in the answer to this interrogatory, but the number of villages, and the number of houses in each village; and supposing each house, on an average, to contain four persons, which I consider a low average, the number of inhabitants would amount to one million seven hundred and eighty thousand; and I think the number may be computed at two millions. Of the number, I suppose 1-16 to be the proportion of the Mahomedans.

Interr. 26. What are the names of the persons possessing the highest rank, and the greatest opulence, in the district subject to your jurisdiction; what number of followers, armed or otherwise, are they supposed to maintain in their service; and do they appear abroad, with such followers armed?

Ans. 26. The only persons possessing rank in this district, are the Rajahs of Burdwan and Bissenpore: the name of the former, Tajee Chund, and of the latter, Chytou Sing; but neither of these, maintain any followers in their service, hiring a retinue for the purpose of state, when they appear abroad, either on visits of ceremony or other occasions. The former, is not supposed to possess much wealth, nor do I believe that he has any, exclusive of his zemindarry; and the latter, has the title only left; the greater part of the lands which composed his zemindarry having been sold for arrears of rent, and the rest, now, under attachment, preparatory to the sale.

The other zemindars are of no considerable rank; and many of the most principal, have their concerns managed by an agent, having their own residence in Calcutta, or in that part of the district comprehended in the Hooghly jurisdiction. There are several very considerable merchants, who carry on an extensive trade in salt, tobacco, grain and cloth; such are the following: Takore Doss, Nundee, Gocul Chund Koond, Freym Chund Goocoy, Sarluoh Syne, with several others; and most of the principal shroffs and banking houses in the country have their agents for conducting their concerns in the district.

Interr. 27. Are there any persons in the district subject to your authority, supposed to be disaffected to the British government; and what are their names; and to what means do you resort for superintending their conduct? Have these persons any influence in the district, and to what extent?

Ans. 27. I know not of any, in the least disaffected to the British government; and am very certain there are none, possessing any influence to disturb it.

Interr. 28. Are you of opinion, that it would contribute to strengthen the attachment of the natives to the British government in India, were that government to declare itself to be the sole source of honour within its territories, and to confer titles and other marks of distinction on its native subjects?

Ans. 28. The natives of Bengal, and of the provinces generally, I believe, are not famed for possessing gratitude, in any eminent degree; but it cannot be supposed that the adoption of the measure suggested in this interrogatory, will make them less grateful; and I am of opinion that it will contribute to strengthen their attachment to the British government, and prove serviceable, as encouraging to acts of good conduct, to merit the mark of distinction proposed to be conferred.

Interr. 29. What is the state of the roads, bridges, and other public works in the district under your authority; and at whose expense are they kept in repair?

Ans. 29. In as far as the information required by this interrogatory respects the roads, I have great satisfaction in stating, that the authority given me by his excellency the most noble the Governor General in Council, to employ the convicts upon them, has enabled me to put them into a state of repair, in which they were never before known, and that this has been done, without any other expense than that necessarily incurred and paid by government, for the implements of the work. The three grand and most useful roads leading to Hooghly, Culna, and Cutwa, which may properly be termed the ports of the district, have been completely re-made. A fourth leading to Beerbhoom, is in a considerable state of forwardness; and I propose, in the course of a few days, to commence another to join the military road leading to Midnapore. Besides those mentioned, and which include an extent of more than fifty coss, a variety of others equally useful to the inhabitants, have been made, in the town and its vicinity; and I beg leave, in farther answer to this part of the interrogatory, to subjoin the flattering testimony given by the acting third judge of the court of circuit, in a paragraph of his letter to me at the close of the last sessions held at this station; observing, that Mr. Bruce was formerly a resident at it for many years, and consequently, the improvements were visible to him.

"The roads in this district, are peculiarly deserving the attention of government; and the manner in which you have employed the convicts, have been attended, with the best success.—I need only instance the Cutwa, Culna, and Hooghly roads, independent of others which

"which you had made, to prove to the Nizamut adawlat, the benefit the public has derived from your judicious application of the labour of the felons."

Some improvement has also been made, in bridges. The new one, constructed by his lordship's orders across the Panka, Nulla, from its extent, and the superior manner in which it has been executed, is really a magnificent work, the admiration of the inhabitants, and of every person who sees it; and its usefulness, I trust is satisfactorily proved in the report which accompanied my letter to Mr. Secretary Dowdeswell, under date the 13th November last, showing that the number of persons who crossed it, in one month amounted to 180,000.

The expense incurred in the construction of the above bridge, amounting to about 20,000 rupees, with the exception of a small part, has been defrayed, at my recommendation, from the fine and forfeiture levied from the rajah and his vakeels;—the rest, by government: And a few others have been built, but these are inconsiderable works, and the expense of them been defrayed, partly by government, and partly by the voluntary contributions of private individuals. The roads, however, in this district, are still very defective in bridges, many more new ones, being requisite, and the old, requiring repair; and I regret exceedingly that I have not the means of improving and making them more useful and beneficial to the country; but, without the aid of government, or a tax being levied for the purpose, the intercourse must continue subject to much difficulty, from this defect in the roads; and it is the more to be regretted, from the district, as I have before observed, being destitute of the convenience and advantage of an inland navigation.

Interr? 30. How are the convicts in the district usually employed, and is there any manner of employing them which?

Ans. 30. In reply to the preceding interrogatory, I have mentioned the convicts to be employed in the repairs of the public roads through the district, in the town and its vicinity, and I hope it will be admitted, that they cannot be more usefully or beneficially employed; and that the public has already derived considerable advantage, from this application of their labour. The security of the employment also, in as far as apprehension of escapes might have been an objection to it, is proved, from my not having lost a man from the time they have been upon the duty, now two years; and that the labour and exercise have been conducive to their health, is clearly shown, from the few deaths that have occurred among them.

Interr? 31. What is the state of the jail in your zillah?

Ans. 31. The jail in this zillah is a very extensive brick building, and with the others of mud, constructed for the accommodation of the increased number of prisoners, very secure, and in very good condition; the former, requiring merely white-washing annually, and the latter, new thatching.

The number of prisoners confined in them is 1,327, of which 115 are dewannee or debtors, who are in a large spacious house, affording them every accommodation, separate from the building allotted for the convicts; and the others, confined in the soujdarry department.

Interr? 32. What is your opinion of the expediency of granting to zemindars, farmers, and other persons of character in your zillah, commissions empowering them to act as justices of the peace? Do you think that such a measure, will contribute to the suppression of crimes, and to facilitate the apprehension of offenders? By what rules, would you regulate the extent of the jurisdiction of such persons—would you confine it, to the estates or farms of the persons to whom the commissions might be granted, or otherwise?

Ans. 32. From what I have mentioned, in the course of my replies to the preceding interrogatories, of the zemindars, and of their farmers in this district, it must be seen that the adoption of the measures suggested in this interrogatory, if it is not impracticable, is not advisable in this zillah; and I am persuaded that to vest them with the powers proposed, would not only prove nugatory for the objects intended, but be highly detrimental to the country, and destructive of the peace of the inhabitants. Few of the zemindars and farmers of any respectability, reside on their estates and farms; to exercise it with effect for the purposes, and to allow them to delegate the power, or to vest their agents or under farmers with it, the worst and most mischievous consequences are to be apprehended, from their abuse of it. In other zillahs, the same objections to the adoption of the measure, may not exist, and where it can be adopted, it certainly would materially contribute to the suppression of crimes, and to facilitate the apprehension of offenders; but in any, I should deem it advisable to confine the extent of the jurisdictions to the estates or farms of the persons to whom the commissions were granted.

Interr? 33. Are there any new rules or regulations, which you would recommend to be adopted, as being calculated in your opinion for the suppression of crimes in general?

Ans. 33. I am not aware that any rules or regulations are necessary for the purpose, but an increased number of tannahs, as suggested in my answer to the 22d interrogatory, would be useful.

Interr? 34. What has been the operation of the last regulation, respecting the tax on spirituous liquors, with regard to the vice of drunkenness? Are you of opinion that the establishment of the taxes now levied on spirituous liquors, have rendered the vice of drunkenness more prevalent?

Ans. 34. I am sorry to say that the regulation has not operated to lessen the vice in any sensible degree; but that it has not had this effect in this district, is much to be ascribed to the great extent of the police tannah jurisdiction, and to the insufficiency of the establishments to perform the duties required from them by the regulation, in addition to the other duties which they have to perform. Whether from this or whatever other cause, it is certain that both the regulation and the taxes, have proved inadequate to check the vice, and I



Answers of the Judge  
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am doubtful whether it is not more prevalent, than it was before the establishment of those taxes.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 35. Do any measures occur to you, the adoption of which would in your opinion, contribute progressively to the improvement of the moral character of the inhabitants of the district?

Ans. 35. The institution of schools for the instruction of the young rising generation, Mussomedans and Hindoos, with examiners appointed to see that attention is paid to their education, and books printed and distributed at the public expense among the young children attending the schools, would doubtlessly have a good effect upon the character of both. The establishment of some English schools would also, I am of opinion, prove useful, and be attended with good effects, in time; but the education in these, should be gratis; and the progress of the children be inspected, by the magistrate of the district: and I am persuaded that the most beneficial consequences will result from the late institution at the presidency by the present administration, and that it will be found to contribute more to the improvement of the moral character of the natives, than any thing done for the purpose, by any former administration.

It is also much to be wished that government could employ the poor in any kind of labour, that their own industry could produce a subsistence, as this would lessen the number of thieves, whose frequency makes them be considered, in a less odious light than they would, if they seldom occurred. And vice being progressive, the institution of some courts in the interior of the country, for the cognizance of all petty offences against morality and good order, would prove useful, for checking its progress.

The establishments I have suggested will doubtless be attended with expense; but where the objects in view are of so much real importance, the expense should not be considered; and surely, something more than protection is due from government.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 36. In your opinion, what has been the effect of the regulation which declares persons convicted of the crime of perjury, liable to be marked in the forehead?

Ans. 36. I have not known an instance where the punishment has been inflicted, and therefore cannot speak of its effects.—The persons generally suspected of the crime, are the low and illiterate, and to prove it wilful against them, is difficult; nor is it my opinion that this punishment for the crime can be attended with any good effect.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 37. What has been the operation of the punishment of transportation, introduced by the British government?

Ans. 37. I am sorry to say that although the most sensibly felt of any, yet has not operated in any perceptible degree, to deter from the commission of the crimes exposing the offenders to it; but from the effect it has, upon the individuals who suffer it, extending to their families and connexions, I can entertain but little doubt that this very desirable object of the punishment will be answered, in the course of time; and I am happy to add that some instances have recently occurred in this zillah, wherein I have experienced it to have a very good effect, by inducing those who have been sentenced to it, with a view to procure its mitigation, to impeach their accomplices, whereby I have been enabled to bring a number of offenders to justice; nor has the benefit been confined to this, for it has bred distrust amongst them, and this, in its consequences, I may fairly hope, will do much towards destroying the gangs.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 38. Are you of opinion that the Mahomedan criminal law, with the alterations of that law made by the British Government, is administered with too much lenity, or with too much severity; and what do you suppose to be the consequences produced, by the operation of the spirit in which the criminal law is in your opinion, administered?

Ans. 38. The punishment of mutilation formerly inflicted, certainly operated with more effect to deter from crimes, than that substituted by the British government, in lieu of it, has hitherto been found to have done; but I am far from being an advocate for the re-introduction of that cruel punishment, nor is it in my opinion, necessary.

The law, with the alterations made in it, by the British government, does not appear to me to be administered, either with too much severity, or with too much lenity, but in a proper mean; though I could wish the punishment of transportation to be inflicted more frequently, from a persuasion of its efficacy; and where it cannot take place, I would suggest the removal of offenders from the scene of their depredations, and from their connexions, to the jail of some remote zillah, as likely to be attended with good effects.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 39. What is the nature of the general conduct of the Europeans not in the service of the Company, who reside within your jurisdiction?

Ans. 39. I am happy to have it in my power to say, that it has been such, as to meet with my approbation,—correct, regular, and moral; and it is a justice I owe them to observe, that I have not known an instance of complaint against any of them, since I have been at the station, now three years.

Inter<sup>y</sup> 40. What is the general condition of the weavers and other manufacturers in your jurisdiction? Are the existing laws and regulations well calculated for ensuring justice to the weavers and manufacturers, in their dealings with the officers of the Company, and with private European merchants; and also for enabling the officers of the Company, and the individual European merchants, to obtain from the weavers and manufacturers, the punctual performance of their engagements for the provision of goods?

Ans. 40. I am really incompetent to speak to the general condition of the weavers and other manufacturers in this zillah, having little or no intercourse with them; but from every information

information I can obtain from the merchants, both European and native, I understand it to be good, and I believe it is equal to what it will be found in any other district; and with respect to the laws and regulations, I can only observe, that I have had no complaints, nor am I aware that they are defective, for the purposes mentioned in the Interrogatory.

Answers of the Judge and Magistrate of Burdwan, of 9 March 1802.

Zillah Burdwan,  
9th March 1802.

(Signed) E. THOMPSON,  
Judge and Magistrate.

To GEORGE DOWDESWELL, Esq.  
Secretary to the Government.

SIR,

ACCOMPANYING, we have the honour to transmit our Replies to the Interrogatories forwarded with your Letter of the 29th of October last.

Answers of the Magistrates of the 24 Pargunnahs: 1 July 1802.

We are, Sir, your most obedient humble Servants,

(Signed) *Chas. F. Martyn.*  
*W. C. Blaquiere.*  
*A. Macklew.*  
*E. Thoroton.*

Zillah 24 Pargunnahs,  
Fouzdarry Adawlut,  
1 July 1802.

ANSWERS to INTERROGATORIES received by the Magistrates of the 24 Pargunnahs and Districts adjacent to Calcutta, from the Secretary to Government, under date the 29th October 1801.

PARA. 1st.—THE thirteen first Interrogatories applying expressly to the administration of the civil law; and the dewanny adawlut, with all its records, having been removed to Hooghly previous to our taking charge of the foujdarry duties of the 24 Pargunnahs and districts adjacent to Calcutta, we are unable to furnish the information required by Government, on the several points noticed therein: WE commence therefore, with the 14th INTERROGATORY, as the first in the paper, that does not immediately apply to the dewanny department.

14th Interrogatory—para. 2.—There are 190 seminaries, in which the Hindoo law, grammar and metaphysics are taught in the districts subject to our jurisdiction. These institutions are maintained, from the produce of certain birmooter or charity lands, and by the voluntary contributions of opulent Hindoos residing in their respective neighbourhoods. The annual expense of these seminaries, is estimated at 15,500 rupees.

Para. 3.—We find only one madrassah or seminary in which the Mahomedan law is taught, in the 24 purgunnahs and districts adjacent to Calcutta. It is supported from the produce of certain lackrajee lands, and superintended by a moolavie, named Amsah ul dien.

15th Interrogatory—para. 4.—We are sorry that we cannot make any favourable report respecting the moral character of the inhabitants of the districts, subject to our jurisdiction. The lower classes are in general, profligate and depraved. The moral duties are little attended to, by the higher ones. All are litigious in the extreme, and the crime of perjury was never, we believe, more practised amongst all ranks, than at present.

Para. 5.—The system introduced by the British government for the administration of the law, and for the conduct of the internal administration of the country, does not therefore appear to have improved the moral character of its inhabitants. The mildness and lenity which pervades that system, is not, we think, by any means adapted to the general character of the people, whose vices and crimes can only be controuled, by vigilant superintendence and severe example.

Para. 6.—The depravity of the native character may also, we think, be in great measure attributed, to the total want of attention shown to the maxims and discipline inculcated by the Hindoo religion. These maxims were either made the source of emoluments, or were wholly neglected, under the Mahomedan government; and under the British one, they do not appear to have been considered, as a requisite part of the system introduced by that government, for the administration of the laws, and for the internal regulation of the country.

Para. 7.—Outward forms of religion are the only ones, at present observed; and the use of spirituous liquors, debauchery, and numberless other vices, which formerly met with the severest checks and punishments, are now practised with impunity, amongst all classes.

Para. 8.—Under the ancient Hindoo government, the conduct of individuals was carefully watched by the perramanuks and heads of classes, and when reprehensible, met with severe public censure and excommunication from the class to which the offender belonged, and to which he could not be restored, without the rajah's permission.

Para. 9.—The persons thus excommunicated, became entire outcasts; no person could associate with them, under pain of excommunication; no washerman or barber could officiate for them, under pain of fine and imprisonment; nor were they allowed to return to society, till they were supposed to have made due atonement for the offences they had committed.

Para. 10.—We are of opinion that the renewal of this system, with some modifications under the controul of the magistrate, would tend to improve very considerably the moral character of the inhabitants throughout the country.

16th Interrogatory—para. 11.—The inhabitants of the 24 purgunnahs and the adjacent districts, do, we believe, consider their private rights and property as secure, from infringement, either by the executive officer of government, or by the supreme executive authority itself, under the present constitution of the country, as they could possibly be, under any form of government whatsoever.



Answers of the Magistrates of the 24 Pergunnahs: 4 July 1802.

17th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 12.—We have reason to believe that the 24 pergunnahs and adjacent districts subject to our jurisdiction, are in a state of improvement, with respect to population, cultivation, commerce, &c. Our opinion is founded (and we have no doubt but it will be confirmed, by the report of the collector, and the records of his office) on the quantity of waste ground and jungle that appears to have been brought into cultivation, and the number of gauts, religious temples, and other buildings, that have lately been constructed by the inhabitants.

18th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 13.—We are of opinion that the inhabitants of the districts subject to our jurisdiction, are in general satisfied with the British government, and with the protection and security they enjoy, under its influence.\*

19th and 20th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 14.—The present system of police is not, in our opinion, well calculated to secure the apprehension of offenders, or to answer the chief and principal object of all police institutions—that of preventing the commission of crimes, by a constant and vigilant watch over the conduct of such of the inhabitants as, from their general habits and character, may be supposed most likely to engage in them; nor are the police establishments in the 24 pergunnahs and adjacent districts, adequate, in our opinion, to the duties required of them.

Para. 15.—The increase of these establishments, would in some measure, remedy the evil noticed in the first part of the preceding paragraphs, and enable the darogahs to keep a more effectual watch over the conduct of the inhabitants of their respective jurisdictions, than they can possibly be expected to do, with the present establishment.

Para. 16.—The burkundazes now employed under the darogahs, are neither sufficient in number, or calculated, from their character and occupation, to be useful officers of police, any further than relates to the seizure of such offenders as may be pointed out to them, and of conducting them, when apprehended, to the magistrate's catcherry. To the more important business of police, that of preventing the commission of crimes, and tracing out the perpetrators, they are wholly inadequate.

Para. 17.—We would therefore recommend, that instead of increasing the establishment of burkundazes, a certain number of choukeydars be employed under each of the darogahs. The duties of these choukeydars should be, to ascertain the character, connexions, and occupation of the inhabitants of those parts of the district in which they are respectively stationed, and to report the same to the darogah. The tracing-out of offenders should be left chiefly to the choukeydars; and the burkundazes, whose numbers are sufficient for the purpose, might be employed in securing and conducting them to the magistrate's catcherry.

Para. 18.—We would also recommend, with a view to secure the immediate attention of the darogahs to the more important business of the police under their respective jurisdictions, and to stop, what we have reason to believe is at present made the source of very improper emolument; that the authority vested in them by Section 12, Regulation X A.D. of 1793, of receiving razeenamahs, and discharging the parties executing the same, be withdrawn; and that in all cases where the darogah is now authorized to receive razeenamahs, he do in future take security for the appearance of the parties before the magistrate, or, in the event of their refusing, or being unable to give such security, that he forward them forthwith to the magistrate's catcherry. The subject of complaint, in which the darogahs have the power of receiving razeenamahs, are in all instances so trifling, and in general so groundless, that were the plaintiff assured, when instituting his charge, that he must substantiate the same before the magistrate, he would we conceive, in very few instances proceed; and probably the ends of justice and the purposes of police would be more effectually answered, by discouraging, as far as possible, complaints of so frivolous a nature as those which the darogahs are authorized to settle.

21st Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 19.—The records of our office do not enable us to report, with any degree of accuracy, the number of crimes committed annually in the 24 pergunnahs and adjacent districts, from the year 1793 to the period of our taking charge. We have reason to believe that the police darogahs were by no means regular in reporting the crimes committed within their respective jurisdictions, and that numbers were perpetrated, which never came to the knowledge of the magistrate. We are happy, however, in observing, that capital crimes of all descriptions, and that of decoity in particular, have decreased considerably during the last two years, in the districts under our charge.

Para. 20. The following are the causes to which the frequent commission of crimes in general, and that of decoity in particular, may we think be, in great measure attributed.

First: The removal of responsibility in matters of police, from the zemindars.

Second: The want of power in the magistrates to try all criminal cases, and to punish all offenders convicted of crimes, that are not of a capital nature.

Third: The delay attending the administration of criminal justice, and the length of time that elapses, before criminal prosecutions are brought to a conclusion.

Fourth: The want of a house of correction for the commitment of vagabonds and idle and disorderly persons of all descriptions, the good effects of which, are very evident in the town of Calcutta.

Fifth: The want of additional regulations to prevent the sale and purchase of stolen property.

Sixth: The inadequate punishment inflicted on offenders, when convicted of the crimes laid to their charge.

Seventh: The difficulty with which prosecutors and witnesses can be prevailed upon to come forward.

Answers of the Magistrates of the 24 Pergunnahs: 1 July 1802.

22d Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 31.—The crime of decoity appears to have been more frequent than any other in the 24 pergunnahs and adjacent districts, since the year 1793. Its prevalence may we think be attributed, in addition to the causes set forth in our reply to the 19th and 20th interrogatories, to the number (if we may be allowed the expression) of hereditary decoits, by whom, when we took charge of our office, we found these districts infested. Decoity was their profession, the one which their ancestors had probably for generations followed, and which profligacy, united with indolence, prevented them from relinquishing.

23d Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 22.—Arms are not in general kept by the inhabitants of the district subject to our jurisdiction; birjebaussies, armed with tulwars, are however retained, though not in any great number, by some of the zemindars and talookdars residing within our jurisdiction, for the purpose of guarding their property against the depredations of decoits, and in some instances, we believe, to assist in collecting their rents, and to overawe the adjoining zemindars, with whom they are frequently at variance. They are also occasionally used as hircarras, to run before their master's palanquins in Calcutta, as well as in the Mofussil.

Para. 23.—The number of attendants of this description, ought we think to be limited, at the discretion of the magistrate. Their names should be registered at the cutcherry, and the zemindars, talookdars and others should be obliged to give notice to the darogah, or at the magistrate's cutcherry, whenever they change or discharge any of their armed attendants.

24th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 24.—There are no brick or mud forts belonging to individuals in the districts subject to our jurisdiction, but such as are extremely old and entirely in ruins; so much so, as to render it impossible for us to give any accurate account respecting them.

25th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 25. We reckon the Hindoo inhabitants of the 24 pergunnahs, and the adjacent districts subject to our jurisdiction, to be in the proportion of 12 to 4 to the Mahomedan; and the number of inhabitants of all descriptions, taken on the actual enumeration of the talooks in the 24 pergunnahs, may be estimated at one million six hundred and twenty-five thousand. To these, if we add the inhabitants of Calcutta, estimated at six hundred thousand, the population of the 24 pergunnahs, the town of Calcutta, and the adjacent districts within twenty miles, will amount to two millions two hundred and twenty-five thousand.

26th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 26.—The Nawab Dilawar Jung, and Rajah Culliah Sing, are the only persons of real rank residing in the districts subject to our jurisdiction.

Para. 27.—The number of their followers, armed and otherwise, are as follows:

The Nawab Delawar Jung	-	-	32.
Rajah Cullian Sing	-	-	136.

Para. 28.—Both these persons appear abroad, with a considerable number of their armed attendants.

Para. 29.—None of the zemindars in the 24 pergunnahs and districts adjacent to Calcutta, possess any real rank; and few of them, are opulent.

Para. 30.—The number of their armed attendants seldom exceeds four or five, one or two of whom, are generally employed to run with their master's palanquins.

27th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 31.—We have reason to believe that the inhabitants of the district subject to our jurisdiction, are well affected towards the British government; and we in consequence, have not thought it requisite to adopt any extraordinary measures for superintending their conduct.

28th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 32.—We are of opinion that the conferring of titles and other marks of distinction by the British government in India, would tend considerably to increase the attachment of its native subjects.

29th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 33.—There are 124 roads in the 24 pergunnahs and districts adjacent to Calcutta. The principal ones, are repaired at the expense of government, and in the dry season, are kept in tolerable good order. During the rains, however, with the exception of the Barrackpore, Baligaut and Aduapore roads, they are in many parts, almost impassable. The inferior roads are repaired, by the zemindars and other inhabitants.

Para. 34.—Most of the bridges are greatly out of repair; and a number of new ones, are requisite. The bunds also appear to require considerable repairs.

30th Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 35.—A number of the convicts at this station, are employed in repairing some of the public roads in the vicinity of Calcutta, in digging a tank near the jail at Russapuglah, and in making bricks for the roads.

Para. 36.—The number of guards requisite to superintend and watch the convicts thus employed, prevents our keeping so many of them to work, as we could wish, and as the preservation of their health seems to require.

Para. 37.—The construction of a house of correction in the vicinity of the jail, where all the convicts who are capable of work, might be kept to constant labour, with a very small addition to the present establishment of guards, would remedy the evil noticed in the preceding paragraph, and appears to us to be a preferable mode of employing them.

31st Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 38.—In reply to this interrogatory, we beg leave to submit the following extract from the Judge of Circuit's Letter to the Magistrate, under date the 9th March 1802,—"Your Jail is in excellent order, and your prisoners, well employed, are in good health."

32d Inter<sup>y</sup>—para. 39.—From the general character of the zemindars, farmers, and other inhabitants of these districts, we do not think that it would be advisable to vest any of them, with the powers of justices of the peace; on the contrary, we are of opinion that such a measure,

Answers of the Magistrates of the 24 Pergunnahs: 1 July 1802.

measure, so far from being in any way beneficial to the police of the district, would be a source of great oppression to the lower class of the inhabitants, and of innumerable complaints to the magistrate.

33d Interp.—para. 40.—We submit, with deference to the consideration of government, the following rules and regulations, as calculated in our opinion, to amend the present system of police, and to check the commission of crimes in general.

• Para. 41.—First, to hold the zemindars in some degree, responsible for the conduct of persons in their employ, and others residing on their respective estates.

Para. 42.—At present, we have reason to believe, though it is difficult to establish proof against them, that the zemindars not only in many instances, encourage and harbour decoits, but frequently partake of the property plundered by them.

Para. 43.—The choukeydars and pykcs employed by them, are concerned in almost every decoity committed in the districts subject to our jurisdiction; and we have no doubt, were the zemindars held in some degree responsible, for the conduct of their choukeydars, and for that of others residing under their protection, that robberies and thefts would be much less frequent than at present.

Para. 44.—With this view, therefore, we beg leave to recommend, that the zemindars be called upon to enter into muchelkas, and forfeit a certain sum of money in every instance where it shall be proved that they have entertained any person of notorious bad character in their service, or allowed any such to reside on their respective estates.

Para. 45.—Second, to authorize the magistrates, assisted by law officers, to try all criminal causes, and to punish all offenders convicted of crimes, that are not of a capital nature.

Para. 46.—To ensure the speedy administration of justice, and to render the magistrates more efficient in their respective jurisdictions, it appears to us particularly advisable, that they should have the power of trying offences of all descriptions, and inflicting punishment, subject, in capital cases only, or when the criminals are sentenced to be transported, to the confirmation of the Nizamut adawlut.

Para. 47.—The trouble, loss of time and expense that attends a criminal prosecution on the present system, is, in our opinion, a serious evil; and not only induces many who have been robbed, to put up with the loss they sustain, rather than apply to the police officers for redress, but prevents numbers from coming forward with informations that would be highly beneficial to the community, and which we have no doubt would in numberless instances be preferred, were the administration of justice more prompt and speedy, than at present.

Para. 48.—We have now had charge of the fouzdarry duties of the 24 pergunnahs and adjacent districts for upwards of two years; and during that period, only three jail deliveries have taken place. The consequence of this delay has been, that numbers of criminals of the most daring description, against whom, when committed for trial, there was the most full and complete evidence, have escaped, and been again let loose on society; owing to the death or illness of some of the principal witnesses, to their being kept collusively out of the way at the trial, or not being correct in their evidence before the court of circuit, as when the case was fresh in their memory before the magistrate.

Para. 49.—The depredations of decoits within this jurisdiction have been, during the last two years, in general confined to houses of the lower classes of natives, from whence they could expect little or no opposition; and the value of the property stolen, has in few instances, exceeded 30 or 40 rupees. A man therefore, who has been robbed of property to that amount, and who resides probably at the distance of 20 or 30 miles from the magistrate's cutcherry, must in the first instance, after making his application to the police darogah, attend with his witness before the magistrate: further evidence may be requisite, and it is probably twelve or fourteen days, before the investigation can be brought to a conclusion. The magistrate then, with the fullest conviction of the guilt of the prisoners, commit them for trial before the court of circuit; and at the expiration of six, or as it may be two or three months, the prosecutor and his witnesses must again attend, and are probably again detained for some weeks, before the trial comes on. After this long attendance, loss of time, and, notwithstanding the allowance made to poor and indigent witnesses, some expense to themselves, they have too often the mortification to see the prisoner, whose guilt was fully established before the magistrate, escape with impunity.

Para. 50.—The prosecutor is also in many instances, more indifferent as to the event of the trial, when it comes forward, than he was, at the time of his appearance before the magistrate; threats have probably been conveyed, in a circuitous mode, both to himself and his witnesses, and they in consequence think it more politic, on their appearance before the court of circuit, to soften, than to urge what they have stated before the magistrate. Persons who have families and property, deem it extremely rash and dangerous to prosecute, or appear as witnesses against men of such desperate character, as the decoits of this country. Indeed, it is with the utmost difficulty that they can be prevailed upon, to come forward, even in cases where they have received personal injury, and when they have not to speak to the persons of the prisoners, but merely to identify the property found in their possession.

Para. 51.—The evils which we have here noticed would, we conceive, be in a great measure, done away, the prosecutors and witnesses be induced to come forward, with more alacrity, the ends of justice be more effectually answered, and a considerable saving arise to government, if the magistrates were nominated judges in the fouzdarry, as well as in the dewanee department.

Para. 52.—To enable the judges thus nominated, to act with energy and effect, they should, we conceive, be invested with the same powers, as are now exercised by the courts of circuit. They should be assisted by law officers, and a monthly statement of their proceedings should be transmitted to the nizamut adawlut.

Para. 53.—If so material an alteration as the one which we have now ventured to suggest in the judicial system, should not be deemed expedient or advisable, we submit, with deference to the consideration of government, the necessity of increasing the powers which the magistrates are at present allowed to exercise, and of authorizing them, in addition to the corporal punishment which they are now allowed to inflict, to imprison offenders, according to the circumstances of the case, for a period not exceeding one year.

Para. 54.—We further beg leave to submit to the consideration of government, the expediency of placing the subordinate officers of police entirely under the controul of the magistrate; at present the police darogahs, aware that they cannot be dismissed from office without a representation to government, consider themselves in some degree independent of their immediate superior, and many instances must occur where, though the magistrate has not what he conceives to be a charge of sufficient magnitude to prefer to government, he still finds the darogah wholly incompetent to the duties committed to his charge. We beg leave, therefore, to recommend, that clause 6, Regulation II, of 1793, be rescinded; and that the removal of the police darogahs be left to the discretion of the magistrate.

Para. 55.—The reward of ten rupees for the apprehension of every decoit, authorized by Section 18, Regulation XXII, of 1793, does not appear to us a sufficient recompense for the hazard that must be run, and the expense that must frequently be incurred, in tracing out, apprehending, and prosecuting to conviction, offenders of so daring and dangerous a description.

Para. 56.—We would therefore recommend, that instead of the reward authorized by the section above noticed, the magistrates be allowed, in all instances where any notorious robber or thief shall be apprehended and prosecuted to conviction, to confer a reward not exceeding one hundred rupees; that they be also authorized to confer rewards for the apprehension of offenders of an inferior description, suited to the circumstances of the case, and to the hazard that may have been run in apprehending them.

Para. 57.—Third. To establish certain regulations for preventing the sale and purchase of stolen property.

Para. 58.—The facility with which stolen articles of all descriptions are at present disposed of, encourages robbery and theft, and renders detection extremely difficult.

Para. 59.—Itinerant purchasers of gold and silver ornaments, and brass and copper utensils, which generally form the greater part of the booty in a decoity, are allowed to perambulate every district, and to purchase every article offered for sale at half its value, without asking a single question, and without giving any notice whatsoever to the police officers.

Para. 60.—These purchasers are in general in the employ of principal moneyed men at the metropolis or the foreign settlements, and brass-beaters, who have considerable manufactories at Cutwa and other places.

Para. 61.—The gold and silver articles are either melted on the spot, or sent for that purpose to Calcutta, where the metal is refined, brought to the government standard, and sold to the mint.

Para. 62.—We have reason to believe, that several natives, apparently of great respectability, both in the Mofussil and in Calcutta, have made considerable sums of money by this nefarious traffic.

Para. 63.—Brass and copper utensils are purchased, in the same manner, taken to the manufactories, and melted down.

Para. 64.—Besides the itinerant purchasers, numbers of sonars and brass-beaters are established, in most parts of the different districts. These sonars and brass-beaters purchase indiscriminately, from all descriptions of persons, whatsoever articles they offer for sale, and melt them down, or deface them, in such a manner as to render it impossible for the owners, to recognize their property.

Para. 65.—We are of opinion that itinerant dealers should be strictly prohibited, from going about the country; that established sonars and brass-beaters should be put, under certain restrictions, and that all persons purchasing for less than their real value, any articles that may afterwards prove to have been stolen, shall be prosecuted, not merely as receivers of stolen goods, but as accessories to the robbery or theft, and punished accordingly.

Para. 66.—Brass and copper utensils, should be marked with the initials of the proprietors name, or the name at full length, together with that of the village in which they reside.

Para. 67.—This might be easily done, at the time of purchase by the brass-beaters, who should be subject to penalty, if they sell any utensils without marking them with the initials or name of the purchaser.

Para. 68.—The established sonars and brass-beaters should be registered, and caused to make an entry of all articles brought to them to work up or melt down, with the head man of the village in which they reside, who should forward the same every week to the magistrate.

Para. 69.—Persons in the habit of lending money on pledges, should also be obliged to make an entry of them with the principal man of the village.

Para. 70.—Fourth, To punish the commission of crimes in general, and those of decoity, and perjury in particular, with more severity.

Para. 71.—The punishment by mutilation, has been humanely abolished by the British government, and that of imprisonment or transportation substituted in its place:—The former, unless attended with extreme hard labour, is considered by the natives of this country as little or no punishment; the latter, is however dreaded, and would still be more so, were it passed for a longer period, and more frequently than at present.—It seems also expedient

ers of the Magis-  
trates of the 24 Pergun-  
nahs, 1 July 1802.

dient that the convicts ordered for transportation, should be embarked immediately, or as soon as possible after the confirmation of the sentence, for the place of their destination.

Para. 72.—At present, they are allowed to remain for years in the jail of the 24 pergunnahs, and some instances have occurred, where the periods for which they were transported have expired, during their confinement in the jail.

Para. 73.—The sentences passed at the jail deliveries, which have taken place in these districts, since they were entrusted to our charge, have seldom, even in instances of decoity, exceeded seven years; and very few, considering the numbers tried, have been recommended for transportation.—In several instances, where the facts have been so fully established before the magistrates, as to make them conclude that the punishment could not be less than that of transportation for life, so different have those facts appeared before the court of circuit, or in so different a light has the court considered them, that the offenders have seldom been sentenced to more than five or six years imprisonment.

Para. 74.—Punishments so inadequate to the crime of which the offenders are convicted, must we conceive, and indeed it has in several instances come under our observation, considerably lessen that degree of awe with which persons brought before the courts of circuit ought to look up to their decisions. Several notorious decoits now in the jail at Russahpuglah, under sentences of four and seven years imprisonment, have ridiculed their punishment, and told the prosecutors to beware when they should be released.

Para. 75.—Convinced that unless some severe examples are made, no effectual check can be given to the commission of decoities, we submit, with deference to the consideration of government, the expediency of sentencing to death the perpetrators of every decoity in which murder, wounding, or any cruel treatment whatsoever shall have been inflicted on the persons whose houses may have been attacked, or others; and that in all instances when decoity shall not have been attended with any of these circumstances, the perpetrators be transported for life.

Para. 76.—The crime of perjury, with exception to the town of Calcutta, appears to have risen to an alarming height throughout the Company's territories, and to call most loudly for a much severer degree of punishment, than the existing Regulations direct.

Para. 77.—In addition therefore to the corporal punishment, public exposure and godena inscription, prescribed by Regulation XVII. of 1797, we beg leave to recommend, that all offenders convicted of the crime of perjury, be transported for a period of not less than seven years.

Para. 78.—Since the arrival of the judges, now presiding in the supreme court of judicature, the crime of perjury, which was formerly as prevalent at the Presidency as it now is in the Mossussil, has by the deservedly severe sentences passed by the court on all offenders of this description, been almost effectually checked; and scarce an instance of perjury appears for some time past to have, occurred in the supreme court.

34th Interrogatory—para. 70.—The operation of the last regulation respecting the tax on spirituous liquors, has, we think, been beneficial; in the districts subject to our jurisdiction. We have reason to believe that the vice of drunkenness is not so prevalent, as formerly; and we are of opinion that it would be less so, if the tax were levied in its fullest extent, throughout the 24 pergunnahs and districts adjacent to Calcutta.

35th Interrogatory—para. 80.—We are not at present aware of any measures, beyond those which we have already suggested, that would particularly conduce towards the improvement of the moral character of the inhabitants of our jurisdiction.

36th Interrogatory—para. 81. We are unable to speak as to the effect of the Regulation which declares persons convicted of the crime of perjury, liable to be marked on the forehead; no instances having yet come under our observation, in which the mark has been inscribed.

37th Interrogatory—para. 82.—We are of opinion that the punishment of transportation has been attended with good effect, and that it would still be more beneficial to the police of the country, if the sentence was passed more frequently, and the convicts embarked immediately, or as soon as possible after its confirmation, for the place of their destination.

38th Interrogatory—para. 83.—We have stated our opinion on the subjects noticed in this Interrogatory, in the 5th, 71st, and 73d preceding paragraphs.

39th Interrogatory—para. 84.—The general conduct of the Europeans not in the service of the Company, who reside within our jurisdiction, is correct; and very few instances have occurred, of any complaint whatsoever having been preferred against them.

40th Interrogatory—para. 85.—We believe the weavers and other manufacturers in our jurisdiction, to be well satisfied with their condition; and that the existing laws and regulations are well calculated, both for ensuring justice to them, and for obtaining the punctual performance of their engagements with the officers of the Company, and the individual European merchants.

Zillah, 24 Pergunnahs, &c. •  
Fouzdarry Adawlut,  
1st July 1802.

(Signed)

C. F. MARTYN,  
W. C. BLACQUIERE,  
A. MACKLEW,  
E. THOROTON,


} Magistrates.

## Appendix, No. 11.

REPORTS OF JUDGES OF CIRCUIT, ON TERMINATION  
OF THEIR SESSIONS.

To JAMES STUART, Esq.

Register to the Nizamut Adawlut, Fort William.



SIR,

I BEG leave to report, that in conformity to the orders of government, I have proceeded to the several stations in the Calcutta division, and held the sessions at each station, except the last, that of Zillah, 24 pergunnahs; which duty Mr. Ramus has, with the sanction of government, undertaken to perform himself.

No. 1—Calcutta Court  
of Circuit, 2d Session  
1801.

2. The judge of circuit is required, by the Regulations, to transmit to the Nizamut Adawlut, a report respecting the jails; the treatment or employment of the prisoners; the effect of the administration of the present system of laws; and such other matters as may appear to him deserving of notice. Accordingly, I now proceed to submit to the court such observations as occur to me on those subjects.

3. The greatest part of the trials which have come before me were for robbery; and, as far as I have had an opportunity of looking into the records of former years, this appears to have been always the case.

4. The whole number of persons tried at the six stations, where I have held the sessions, is about 1,000; the number convicted, and sentenced to different punishments, is 446.

5. On considering the number tried, and the number convicted, during the present circuit, when compared with the number tried, and convicted, of former circuits, I do not perceive any material difference. They are rather diminished; but not so much so, in my opinion, as to warrant any decisive conclusion in favour of the present system of police, or administration of justice. On this subject I shall, in a subsequent part of this report, trouble the court with a few remarks.

6. At Burdwan, Nuddea, and Jessore, substantial jails have been erected by government, on the same plan, and appear to be well-calculated for the purpose. But, from the progressive increase of the number of convicts at all those zillas, I conceive it will not be possible long to accommodate them.

7. Indeed these three jails would have been full before this time, had not some of the convicts been removed from Nuddea and Jessore, to Midnapore; and at Burdwan it has been usual to keep many hundreds constantly on the roads, where they sleep in tents or huts, provided for the purpose. This plan seems to succeed, and I see no objection to it.

8. The port at Midnapore forms a very spacious and excellent jail, but it requires some repairs; at present, half of it, is appropriated to military purposes; and it is divided in the center by a wall. The whole would contain about two thousand prisoners, without inconvenience.

9. The jail of Hooghly was, formerly, the private dwelling-house of a native. The situation is not good; but, on the whole, I think the building answers the purpose tolerably well.

10. The jail at Beerbhoom is bad, being constructed of mud and straw, and situated on the worst spot that could well be chosen: at no station probably is a new jail so much wanted as at Beerbhoom.

11. It may be inconvenient to government to build a new jail at present; but the two grand objects of security from fire, and from escape, may be accomplished at a very small expense, without any other building than a pukka wall of four sides, and slight chappars erected in the inside, for the accommodation of the prisoners.

12. I would propose, that a good spot be fixed upon by the magistrate, and a substantial wall erected, ten or twelve feet high, such as will bear beams or arches, in case it should hereafter be determined to have a complete pukka jail.

13. I think that, at all events, a square wall of two or three hundred feet each side, with arches, and Syrian roofs in the inside, would answer every purpose of a jail, in this country. I do not clearly see the necessity of large apartments and cells, in the style of a European jail, such as have been erected, at a great expense to government, in many parts of the country.

14. The matter however has, doubtless, been considered long ago; and the opinions of professional men must have been taken, previously to the adoption of the plan on which government thought proper to build so many expensive jails.



25. Nevertheless, it is my duty at present to offer such observations as occur to me on the subject; and I submit the above suggestion for such consideration as the court may think it deserves.

16. The convicts are employed, more or less, at every station of this division which I have visited; but I doubt whether their work is every where of much public utility, and whether it is laborious, as it ought to be.

17. The convicts are fed, clothed and accommodated, I think, better than the common labouring class of people, and their situation ensures them constant subsistence, even in a year of scarcity; but they do not, generally speaking, work so hard as coolies.

18. I beg leave to suggest, that at each zillah some officer be entrusted with the superintendence of the labouring convicts; that such officer be held responsible for their being regularly employed in any particular species of public work to be recommended by the magistrate, and that monthly reports be made of the progress of the work.

19. I conceive the judges of circuit might, without impropriety, be empowered to banish convicts, from one zillah to another. This might prove of service, both as public benefit, in directing their labour to objects of the greatest utility, and likewise as holding out a new punishment, heavier than simple imprisonment, and lighter than transportation beyond sea.

20. I take the liberty here to offer my opinion, that section 5. of Regulation 2d, 1799, rendering such convicts as escape, and are re-taken, liable to transportation, beyond sea, is a law which sometimes operates with great severity; particularly if, as I understand, no measures are taken by government to enable the convicts to return to Bengal, at the expiration of the term of their sentences; although it must be well known, that hardly any native possesses the means of procuring a passage for himself.

21. It is a duty lately imposed on the Judge of circuit to report upon the state of the Embankments. I beg leave to mention, that I had no opportunity of personally inspecting them, and that all the information I am able to furnish respecting their condition, is the result of enquiries made by me, of the collectors and other persons, in the several districts which I have visited in the course of the circuit.

22. The bunds of Zillah, and particularly those of Mundulgaut, received much damage last year, owing to an extraordinary inundation; a regular investigation was made into the cause of their failure; at present I learn that such measures have been taken to repair all the bunds of Burdwan which require it, as will afford the best prospect of their preservation in future.

23. It is intended, I believe, to abandon several of the Mundulgaut bunds, and never to repair them again. I conclude that such a measure has not been hastily resolved upon. I have not myself sufficient knowledge of the country, to form an opinion on the subject.

24. Of the Nuddea bunds, I learnt that they suffered very little injury last rains, and that the zemindars, by whom they are kept in repair, in consideration of a deduction allowed them in their jumma, have been directed to commence the repairs. I think it unnecessary to make any further remark, than, that to the best of my judgment, there is no danger of their being neglected.

25. The bunds of Midnapore, immediately under the superintendence of the collector of that zillah, were very well secured from damage, during the last rainy season; and if the measures lately recommended by the collector be approved, and carried into execution, I have no doubt the state of the bunds, will be perfectly substantial next year. The collector of Midnapore has directed his attention to the subject of the poolbund, and in a very ample report to the board of revenue, has described certain abuses and oppressions, consisting chiefly of pressing ryots to work in the pools, which call aloud for a remedy.

26. The bunds in the vicinity of Tumlook were last year put in a state of substantial repair, and suffered no material damage from inundation; but towards the end of the rains, a considerable extent of bund near the Roopnarain river was washed away, with the bank on which it stood, by the violence of the freshes from the hills. By the immediate construction of a new bund further inland, the greater part of pergunnah Tumlook was saved from destruction, with the loss of only a large tract of land to the zemindar, and a few houses of the ryots.

27. The repairs of the bunds necessary for the protection of the country near Tumlook, against inundation in the ensuing rains, are now going on, under the superintendence of the salt agent, and promise to be fully adequate to the purpose. But it is proper to mention, that if the customary bunds in the adjoining pergunnahs of Mina and Cossijura be discontinued (and it is reported their relinquishment, is in agitation) it is the opinion of the salt agent of Tumlook, that a large portion of the lands in that division, and those the most productive in salt, will be greatly endangered.

28. The bunds of Zillah Jessore sustained less injury last year, than for many years preceding. The acting collector has lately, personally inspected, several of them; and I understood from him, that the expense of the repairs for the next year will be less by about one-third, than the amount usually laid out.

29. I know not whether it would be practicable, in some parts of the country, to employ convicts in the bunds, with advantage. Whenever a quantity of simple work, consisting chiefly of digging earth, is performed, and a considerable number of workmen is required on a small extent of ground, the plan might perhaps answer.

30. It being expected on this occasion, that I should submit to the Nizamut Adawlut, what occurs to me on the subject of the police, and the administration of criminal justice, I shall endeavour to state my sentiments on those subjects; premising only, the local experience and information I possess, being by no means extensive; I shall possibly, in the little of novelty I have to offer, be very liable to fall into error.

31. I shall confine my remarks, chiefly to the subject of decoity, because I do not recollect that any other crime of magnitude, affecting the persons and property of the community (except perhaps perjury) has attained a very alarming height in this division, or appears to require from me any observations; because any effectual measures taken to suppress decoity, would at the same time contribute, to put an end to all other breaches of the peace, and because decoity is in itself, in my opinion, the greatest evil existing in the country.

The crime of decoity, or robbery in gangs, consisting of from ten or fifty, sometimes above a hundred, prevails throughout this division, and I imagine throughout Bengal, to an enormous extent.

33. The crime of decoity has, I believe, increased greatly since the British administration of justice, and I know not that it has yet diminished.

34. In a year of plenty, like the present, when few are in want of food or employment, decoity will certainly prevail less, than in a year of scarcity. But generally speaking, taking one year with another, I doubt much whether decoity is less frequent than heretofore.

35. In spite of the great difficulty of proof, numbers are convicted at every session, and still greater number detained in custody as suspicious characters, till they give security for their good behaviour.

36. The numbers of convicts confined at the six stations of this division, under sentence of imprisonment (independent of Zillah, 24 pergunnahs) is about 4,000; of them, probably nine-tenths are decoits: besides these, some hundreds have of late years been transported. The growing expense of the maintenance of such numbers of convicts, will probably soon excite the attention of government.

37. The number of persons convicted of decoity, however great it may appear, is certainly small, in proportion to those who are guilty of the crime. This will be evident, if we consider the number who escape on trial, for want of satisfactory evidence, and the few brought to trial, in each case, in proportion to the numbers which it appears belonged to the gang.

38. Moreover, many robberies are committed that are never heard of by the judge of Circuit; some perhaps, that never reached the ears of the zillah magistrate.

39. At Midnapore I find, by the reports of the police darogas, that in the year 1802, a period of peace and tranquillity, they sent intelligence of no less than ninety-three robberies, most of them, as usual, committed by large gangs: with respect to fifty-one of these ninety-three robberies or decoities, nothing more was heard of them, than that they happened; not a man was taken:—of the remaining forty-two, a very few, frequently only one or two in each gang, were taken, and one hundred and thirty-eight, have been convicted.

40. It must not be supposed that decoity prevails in the district of Midnapore to a greater extent, than in other districts of this division; on the contrary, I think there is less, except perhaps in Beerbhoom. In Burdwan, there is certainly three or four times as much. The Midnapore reports I mention, only, because they were made under my own eye, and I am satisfied of their accuracy.

41. Moreover, they agree with my own observation at Jessore, and other places. If it is suspected that the reports are incorrect, or if they are admitted to be correct, and the prevalence of decoity is denied to be so general in other zillahs, as I would suggest, inquiries may be made, and further proof, I conceive, furnished without difficulty.

42. It is unnecessary to describe the shocking cruelty and ferocity of decoits, or the terror they inspire, among the most valuable classes of the community. I will just mention, that it is the usage of the country for those who have amassed a small sum of money, to conceal or keep it, in their houses; and that the case of a man robbed of all he possessed, the earnings of laborious industry for many years, is, to the best of my belief, not uncommon.

43. The Nizamut Adawlut know very well the nature of decoity, and must be aware of the misery of the individuals, whose persons and property are attacked by them. This the court know, since the worst cases are submitted to their revision. But I am not sure that they have an adequate idea of the extent, to which decoity prevails.

44. At all events, what I have already said is, I imagine, sufficient for my present purpose; that is, susceptible of a remedy. It will be proper to consider, shortly, the causes of the frequency of the crime of robbery.

49. The causes generally assigned, are, the want of co-operation in guards and heads of villages; the too great extent of darogas jurisdictions; the too small numbers of police officers; dishonesty of chokedars; dread of the vengeance of decoits; cowardice in not resisting decoits; facility of disposing of goods robbed; the general fear among the people, of killing decoits; the low pay given to darogas; the great ease, with which burglary is committed; the repugnance in Hindoos to take the oath, and thereby contribute to the conviction of delinquents.

50. Besides these causes, which appear to me sufficiently to account for the fact, there is a general complaint that the laws are too lenient; hence, the most common and obvious remedy is, increasing the severity of punishment.



51. If the crime of decoity increases, it is proposed to condemn all decoits to transportation, which it is known the natives dread, and very justly, as the heaviest penalty next to death; and if decoity should still prevail, it will perhaps be thought proper, to punish capitally all such as may be convicted of the crime.

52. I am by no means sure of the necessity or propriety of such remedies. Before I can form a judgment of their efficacy, I must be certain that the punishment reaches the offenders; at present, the punishment does not reach them; they elude conviction: they elude apprehension. We have no right, therefore, to say that the punishments awarded by the present laws, are too light. We cannot say that men become decoits because the punishments are too lenient; they become so, because their chance of escaping altogether, is so good.

53. A robber, even in Bengal, is I presume a man of courage and enterprize, who, though he roughly estimates the risk he is to run, by continuing his depredations on the public, is rather apt to under-rate that risk, small as it is, in reality.

54. Each individual, in a gang of fifty decoits, perhaps calculates the chance of his being brought to justice, and imprisoned for seven or eight years, as ten to one in his favour. If by an efficient police, we could bring the chance to ten to one against his escaping, and leave the punishment the same, he would, I apprehend, be more effectually deterred from committing robberies, than by leaving the chance the same, and applying a capital punishment, in case of conviction.

55. It is, by enquiring how many decoits are convicted, and how many escape, that we may be enabled to ascertain, in some degree, to what proportion of them, the increasing the rigour of the punishment can be applicable.

56. It is true that multitudes have been already transported, but a much greater multitude has escaped; and if the offence is as common, or nearly so, as before the increased penalty, then, we have only obtained one more example to illustrate, what was well known before, that heavy punishments, unless certain and expeditious, produce little effect in deterring from the commission of crimes.

57. The punishments at present inflicted, or intended to be inflicted on decoits, are sufficiently rigorous; when murder is perpetrated, the whole gang is liable to the penalty of death. When great violence or cruelty is exercised by decoits, and clearly proved, transportation ought to be, and I believe is, almost invariably recommended; and transportation is a most dreadful punishment to the natives: moreover, the sentence operates, if I am not misinformed, in all cases during life.

58. To punish burglary in general with death or with transportation, would, in my opinion, be unnecessarily severe. Simple burglary is, in this country, very easily committed; the temptation to commit it, is great. The crime called nunkub zunnec, or making holes in the wall, and taking goods out of the house, would, in England, be held to be a burglary; but the evil or loss suffered, and the danger or alarm incurred, by the person whose house is robbed in this manner, are in few instances, very serious. To punish such a crime capitally, would surely be inflicting a penalty, entirely disproportioned to the offence.

59. In Benares it is said that the crime of robbery is, comparatively speaking, uncommon; and if so, how happens it that the same laws are sufficiently rigorous for the inhabitants of Benares, which are not, for those of Bengal? There is nothing, I presume, in the character of the inhabitants of the Upper Provinces, which can lead us to infer that they are more easily deterred from violence, than the mild and timorous Bengalies.

60. On the whole, I should be sorry to see the penal laws altered. It may be thought that they are, as at present, administered, in some degree arbitrary and uncertain; and they may be so; but I think them not the worse for that, nor do the well informed natives. I am sure, if we appoint specific punishments for every crime, we should feel the inconvenience of it.

61. I admit, as a true and wholesome general maxim, that no distinctions should be made, but that all should know they have a certain punishment to expect, if convicted of a specific crime. Yet in this country, it will be found that the injury suffered is frequently very different, from the commission of crimes of the same denomination; and that it is hardly possible for us, accurately to define particular crimes.

62. I see not why we should despair of preventing crimes by any other method, than that of holding out the fear of punishment.

63. I think that by classing and numbering the villages and the inhabitants; rendering the rannahs more compact; subdividing them, and nominating sirdars, over each division; something might be gained. The object should be, to obtain the co-operation of the people. The ignorance of the police officers respecting the persons and character of individuals residing within the limits of their jurisdiction, is notorious and inevitable.

64. The zemindars, pykes, and village chokedars, can hardly be deemed public servants; they are ill paid; and their pay, does not depend on government or its officers. They occasionally attend the tanno, and give information of a robbery committed by some other chokedars, their rivals: but as to any effectual resistance to decoits, or any previous steps taken to prevent their depredations, little can be expected from this description of persons.

65. It is to the darega then, and ten or a dozen subordinate officers, each in all respects inferior to a parish constable in England, that we commit the care of preserving the peace of a district 2 or 300 square miles in extent, and often containing 100,000 inhabitants.

66. The

66. The darogah is generally unfit, possessing no spirit, vigour, or address; he is a stranger too, not interested, or possessing property in the district. He is often negligent and corrupt; sometimes, little respected, being ill paid, and unable to maintain any dignity of character; and his only care is, to make a show of vigilance and activity, lest he should create displeasure in the magistrate.

67. It should be the study of government, in my opinion, to form, if possible, a body of gentry, such as exists in other countries; an intermediate order between the governors and the governed, to whom the one might look down, and the other might look up. At present, no such order exists. Most of the men who once possessed rank and wealth, are gone to ruin. The men of property who do exist, are, for the most part, such as have lately risen.

68. That the magistrate can maintain the peace over a million or more of persons, without the help of a considerable number, whose interest, or sense of duty, shall induce them to assist him, is plainly impossible. It is equally impossible, that a million or more of individuals, comprising the lower classes of the community, can be prevented from preying upon each other, unless there is constantly in their sight, a sufficient number of men deriving competent authority from government, to compose a superintending power, capable of keeping them in awe, and, in some degree, of affording them protection.

69. The lower classes, indeed the whole people, are removed to a distance from the magistrates; and individuals are lost and confounded, in the immense mass of the population of this country. The natural operation of our system, does not appear to me to diminish the distance between the people and the magistrate; neither our regulations nor our habits have, I think, any tendency to correct the evil.

70. The terror of decoits among the ryots is excessive; they cannot be persuaded to enter into a league, for their own safety. They are the most timid spiritless race in the world, and will not, though ever so numerous, make the least effort to defend themselves and families, from a handful of decoits.

71. I would endeavour to arm, and in some degree, embody and discipline the inhabitants of every village, for the special purpose of opposing decoits. I would have explained to all of them, that government wished them to defend themselves, and with that view, invite them to accustom themselves to assemble at the sound of a drum, or on the first alarm or signal to be agreed upon, that they should repair to the spot, unite and support each other, and do their utmost, to seize or destroy the decoits.

72. I would cause them clearly to understand, that to wound or kill a decoit, while committing an act of violence, was no crime, but on the contrary meritorious; and would assure them, that, in the event of any of themselves being killed or disabled in such a service, government would grant a provision for their families.

73. If this should prove effectual, a step would be gained, towards emancipating the ryots of Bengal from their present most deplorable and degraded state. They would no longer tamely deliver themselves up, to the wanton and desperate attacks of decoits; they would no longer resort to the expedient of retaining, as checkers, well-known decoits, paying them rather for their forbearance to do mischief, than for acting as guards.

74. Neither would they, after a robbery, be harassed by the vexatious visits and outrage, and the plunder of govtendas and zamindars, who constantly, when supported by the least colour of authority from the magistrate, intimidate, extort, suborn, and rob, under pretence of bringing offenders to justice.

75. In the course of trials, the guilty very often, according to the best of my observation, escape conviction.

76. Sometimes an atrocious robbery or murder is sworn to, and in all appearance clearly established, by the evidence on the part of the prosecutors, but when we come to the defence, an alibi is set up; and though we are inclined to disbelieve it, if two or three witnesses swear consistently to such alibi, and elude every attempt to catch them in prevarication or contradiction, we are thrown into doubt, and the prisoners escape.

77. Very frequently, the witnesses on the part of the prosecution, swear to facts in themselves utterly incredible, for the purpose of fully convicting the accused, when, if they had simply stated what they saw and knew, their testimony would have been sufficient; they frequently, under an idea that the proof may be thought defective by those who judge according to the regulations, and that the accused will escape and wreak their vengeance upon the witnesses who appear against them, exaggerate the facts, in such a manner, that their credit is utterly destroyed.

78. Witnesses have generally a long story to tell (they are seldom few in number, and often differ widely, in character, cast, habits, and education) trifle over; namely, to the daroga, the magistrate, and the court of circuits they relate tediously and minutely, but not accurately, a variety of things done and said; numerous variations and contradictions occur, and are regarded with cautious jealousy; though in reality, they perhaps seldom furnish a reasonable presumption of falsehood.

79. But who shall distinguish between justice and imposture? what judge can distinguish the exact truth, among the numerous inconsistencies of the natives he examines? how often do those inconsistencies proceed from causes very different from those suspected by us; how often, from simplicity, fear, embarrassment, in the witness; how often, from our own ignorance and impatience?

80. We cannot wonder that the natives are aware of our suspicious and incredulous tempers: they see how difficult it is to persuade us, to believe a true story, and accordingly endeavour to suit our taste, with a false one.

81. I have no doubt that, previously to their examination as witnesses, they frequently compare notes together, and consult upon the best mode of making their story appear probable to the gentleman; whose wisdom, it cannot be expected, should be satisfied with an artless tale; whose sagacity is so apt to imagine snares of deception, in the most perfect candour and simplicity.

82. We cannot but observe, that a story, before it reaches us, often acquires the strongest features of artifice and fabrication. There is almost always something kept back, as unfit for us to hear, lest we should form an opinion, unfavourable to the veracity of the witness. It is most painful to reflect how very often witnesses are afraid to speak the truth, in our cutcherries.

83. We cannot study the genius of the people, in its own sphere of action. We know little of their domestic life, their knowledge, conversation, amusements, their trades and casts, or any of those national and individual characteristics, which are essential to a complete knowledge of them. Every day affords us examples of something new and surprising; and we have no principle to guide us, in the investigation of facts, except an extreme diffidence of our opinion, a consciousness of inability to judge of what is probable or improbable.

84. Sometimes we see the most unfair means taken, by informers and thief-takers, to detect and apprehend the accused. We find confessions extorted, and witnesses suborned: at the same time, we think the accused guilty, and the prosecution fails, merely because the unfair play used against them, leads us to suspect more.

85. Twice or thrice during my circuit, prisoners have escaped, in spite of strong evidence against them of decoity, because it appeared that the prosecutors and witnesses had long concealed, what they afterwards pretended to know; and this concealment, gave an appearance of the story being afterwards trumped up against the accused.

86. One case of this kind,—the trial of Radakant Sirdar and others for robbery and murder, I had occasion to refer to the Nizamut Adawlut from Hooghly. Another of the same kind, occurred at Nudden, where the evidence was strong, but where the witnesses had failed to come forward, during a month and more; and it is very possible that, in both these cases, the concealment arose from the causes assigned, namely, in the one case, the dread of decoits; and in the other, the aversion to take the oath.

87. When we recollect the extreme uncertainty to us, of every fact which depends on the credit of the natives to support it, who can wonder that a very slight circumstance should turn the scale in the prisoner's favour; and that while, we think innocence possible, we hesitate to condemn to death or transportation.

88. I do not speak of these things, with any view of proposing a remedy. If the mind is not convinced of guilt, an acquittal must follow; and we have nothing left to do, but to lament that a robbery or a murder took place, and that justice has failed to overtake the offenders.

89. I have no new rules to propose for the conduct of trials, in the criminal courts, or for admitting or believing evidence. I am inclined to think no rules of evidence can serve any purpose, but to embarrass the courts, and create new obstacles to the conviction of the guilty.

90. The evil I complain of is extensive, and I fear, irreparable. The difficulty we experience in discerning truth and falsehood among the natives, may be ascribed, I think, chiefly to our want of connexion and intercourse with them; to the peculiarity of their manners and habits, their excessive ignorance of our characters, and our almost equal ignorance, of theirs.

91. Prosecutions are often instigated, or carried on, by the agency of persons at enmity, or in rivalry, with the culprits; this is frequently the case, when the accused are village chokedars; yet most of the decoits, in some zillahs, are these chokedars; and few dare appear against them, but those who are of the same description with themselves.

92. From all the above causes, proceed the numerous acquittals of prisoners, at every jail delivery. The calendars, the darogah's reports, the evidence on every trial, and the information of all, convince us, that innumerable robberies and murders, that atrocities of the worst conceivable kind, are committed; and that very often, the perpetrators are before us; yet do we find ourselves, from causes of the nature above described, constrained to let them loose again, to prey on society; or, at the utmost, to direct that they be discharged, on giving security for their good behaviour.

93. And this giving of security, it may be observed, is no pledge whatever of future good behaviour; since whoever has a few rupees, whether a man of the best or worst character, can procure security; and whoever has nothing, can seldom or never procure it.

94. The judge of circuit is from day to day, engaged in trying large gangs for robbery and murder, and letting them go; and the country continues to be overrun with them, to a degree truly deplorable. After wading through a mass of contradictory evidence, he is left unsatisfied respecting the reality of the facts under investigation, very strongly inclined to believe the guilt of the prisoners; it may nevertheless be easily conceived, that in the double change of the folly, and the villainy on the part of the prosecution, and the fabrication of a defence by the accused, the evidence is deemed imperfect; and the result is, that the culprits are discharged altogether, or perhaps, ordered to give security.

95. Indeed,

95. Indeed, considering all the obstacles, I am rather surprized at the number who are convicted, though so many do escape.

96. We are, in every stage, presented with complicated difficulties; we cannot prevent decoity, by holding out the dread of penal laws; we cannot prevail upon the ryots, to resist the decoits; and they are backward, in giving information, or deposing against them. Our efforts, whether directed to deter, to resist, to detect, or convict, are all frustrated.

97. I think the judges and magistrates should be entrusted with the power of pronouncing final judgment, and carrying the sentence into execution, without reference to the court of circuit, in all cases where they might be of opinion that imprisonment for a year, or even two or three, was sufficient for the crime.

98. By this, the business of the circuit would be much diminished; fewer false defences, would be fabricated; fewer witnesses would be harrassed, with two journies to the sudder, and government would be subjected to less expense, for the subsistence of the witnesses and prosecutors.

99. I was happy to hear, in reply to my reference respecting the corporal oath administered by us, to Hindoos, that government have it in contemplation to enact a regulation which may provide for the inconvenience, which I took the liberty to state to the Nizamut Adawlut.

100. I have mentioned the number of robberies, accounts of which were received last year, by the magistrate of Midnapore. Of these robberies, it is remarkable, that two or three only, out of the ninety-three, were committed in the Jungle Mehal; where, a few years ago, nothing but anarchy and depredation prevailed; but where, at present, the police is committed to the zemindar, and is attended with little, or no expense to government.

101. The reason of this appears to me, that the jungle zemindars are able to avail themselves, of the assistance of the body of the people, in maintaining the peace. Their ryots, or a great number of them, are now engaged to act as pykes, or guards, when occasion requires.

102. Whenever this is not the case, the police will probably be found to be bad. Whenever the state of the community is such, that a great part of the individuals composing it, cannot be made use of to preserve order, insecurity must subsist, in one shape or other.

103. To imagine that a darogah and ten burcandaze, can maintain the peace throughout a tanna, is, I fear, a vain delusion: whenever the police is good, it cannot, I am inclined to suspect, be justly ascribed to that establishment, but to the operation of other causes.

104. It is possibly to the influence possessed by the inhabitants of a particular pergunnah, by a particular zemindar, or by aumils and gomastahs, of men of courage or wealth, or to some other interior local cause, and not to the general plan of the establishment of a darogah and his officers, that we are indebted for the preservation of the peace, whenever the peace is preserved.

105. I take the liberty to suggest, that if reports were made of the number of decoities committed; and if the local circumstances which might be supposed to affect the police were pointed out; if such reports were regularly procured from different parts of the country, in my opinion, much valuable information would be gained.

106. My experience does not extend far; and I am unable to form an accurate opinion upon the effect of the different systems which exist in different parts of the country.

107. I hear from common report, that in parts of Behar, Benares, and the Upper Provinces, there is less decoity than in Bengal; and I should conceive there would be little difficulty in ascertaining, whether this is the fact or not.

108. I should suppose too, that it would not be impossible to discover to what it is owing that decoity prevails, less in one part of the country, than in another: whether to the general character of the people, the incentives or discouragements to idleness and profligacy, the vigilance or negligence of magistrates, the face of the country, the general system of the police establishment, and the officers in the pay of government, or the subordinate arrangement of village chokedars; whether in any of these, or other circumstances, we are to search for the increase and decrease of crimes, might I presume, be ascertained by carefully comparing the state of one part of the country, with another; and till the defects shall be clearly ascertained, it is vain to hope that adequate remedies will be applied to repair them.

109. It may not be amiss to say a few words upon a question which has been much agitated of late, whether to invest the proprietors of land with the police in their several estates, would be an advisable measure?

110. I have mentioned the success of this plan, in the jungle mehals of Midnapore, when I was empowered by government three years ago, to carry it into execution. I have observed too, that our object ought to be, in my opinion, to procure the assistance of a large portion of the ryots; and this it may be concluded, can best be effected, by the influence of their landholders.

111. Wherever the zemindars do possess the same kind of influence over their ryots, that is employed by the jungle zemindars of Midnapore, I think they might with advantage be authorised to exert it. But I do not know what this influence is now, any where to be found, but in the jungles.

112. Nor would it be safe or easy, or perhaps practicable at present, to create anew this sort of influence. It prevailed, I apprehend, heretofore, very much throughout the country; but owing to our system of laws, and to the sale of almost all the large estates, which are still

# REPORTS

Judges of Circuit,  
on termination of their  
Sessions.

No. 1.—Calcutta Court  
of Circuit, 4<sup>th</sup> Session  
1803.

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Appendix to V<sup>th</sup> REPORT from The Select Committee on

[No. 1.]

still every day changing proprietors, it is much diminished every where, and in some places, nearly extinguished.

113. For by us, all is silently changed. The ryot and the zemindar, and the gomastah, are, by the levelling power of the Regulations, very much reduced to an equality. The protecting, but often oppressive and tyrannical power of the zemindar, and the servitude of the ryot, are at an end. All the lower classes, the poorest, I fear, often, in vain now look to the regulations only, for preserving them against extortion and rapacity.

114. The operation of our system, has gradually loosened that intimate connection between the ryots and the zemindars, which subsisted heretofore. The ryots were once the vassals of their zemindar. Their dependance on the zemindar, and their attachment to him, have ceased. They are now often at open variance with him, and though they cannot contend with him, on equal terms, they not infrequently engage, in law suits with him, and set him at defiance.

115. The zemindar formerly, like his ancestors, resided on his estate. He was regarded as the chief and the father of his tenants, from whom all expected protection, but against whose oppressions there was no redress.

116. At present, the estates are often possessed by Calcutta purchasers, who never see them, whose agents have little intercourse with the tenants, except to collect the rents, and in that business, they proceed strictly and coldly by the Regulations.

117. I believe that in general, the ryots are not ill-treated by this description of persons, but it is obvious that gomastahs cannot generally be entrusted with the police.

118. I have been led to enlarge upon these topics more than I at first proposed to myself; and perhaps, in an unusual manner. The subject is important and interesting, and it would, I conceive, be a breach of duty in me, to neglect this opportunity of delivering my sentiments as fully as I am able.

Calcutta,  
24th March 1803.

I am, Sir,  
Your most obedient humble servant,  
(Signed) H. STRACHEY.

To S. T. GOAD, Esq.

Register to the Nizamut Adawlut.

Sir,

No. 2.  
Bareilly Division.  
1803.

I beg leave to inform the court of Nizamut Adawlut, that shortly after my return from the last circuit of the United Provinces, I was engaged in another public duty at Futtchgur, which occupied me till within these few days. I have now left Futtchgur, and am proceeding down the river as expeditiously as I can towards Calcutta, with a view to embark for Europe this season.

2. Although I have thus put off writing the said report after the circuit till I am so situated as to be unable I fear, to furnish any useful information on the subject of the police of the Upper Provinces, I pressed, in conformity to the regulations, to submit what occurs to me; and have only to lament that my communication must necessarily prove somewhat defective.

3. On my return last year from that part of the circuit which fell to my share, viz. the jail deliveries of Allahabad and Gorakhpore, I furnished the court with a few observations on the state of the police of those zillahs.

4. I stated that robberies were much less frequent, than in those parts of the Lower Provinces with which I happened to have any knowledge; and I attributed this chiefly, to the habits of the people which lead them to defend themselves from violence.

5. This remark, appears to me to be applicable to the other districts of these provinces. The natives trusting to their own prowess, and being accustomed to stand by each other, in the hour of danger, are seldom molested by the attack of robbers. The grand object of law and police, security of person and property, is better accomplished here, by the spirit of the people themselves, than in Bengal, by the regulations, which are not I believe, in spite of the incessant labours of the officers of the Amildary department to render them effectual, found adequate to the ends of preventing the crime of decoity, or bringing the decoits to justice.

6. There may be some other causes which prevent the formation of bands of robbers, in these provinces: which, taken from idleness, or seduced to distress for subsistence, the same opportunities and facilities of joining bands of decoits, are not open to him here, as in Bengal. Therefore, I imagine, few or no persons whose sole occupation is robbing; the country contains fewer navigable rivers than Bengal. These, while they contribute to the abundance and prosperity of that country, at the same time, afford encouragement to decoits, by presenting them with the means of easy retreat and concealment.

7. The character of the people here, is certainly different, owing possibly in some degree, to the climate, which is less moist and relaxing to the body; and to their food, which is somewhat more substantial and invigorating, than that of the natives of the Lower Provinces. I chiefly, however, ascribe their superior energy and courage, to active military habits, acquired under the loose government they have been accustomed to.

8. I ascertained



8. I ascertained, to the best of my power, at the several stations I visited, what number of offences had been reported to the magistrates, in the course of the preceding six months. I have not with me the memorandums I took on this subject, but I remember the result to be uniform. The number of crimes reported is small, and the number of offenders taken and brought to justice, when compared with the number of cases reported, is greater than I should expect to have found it.

9. In future, abstract statements will be submitted to the Nizamut Adawlut, agreeably to the court's orders of the of which I did not receive till I had finished the circuit.

10. I think it proper, however, to declare my opinion, that no certain conclusions respecting the number of crimes committed, and the security enjoyed by the natives, can be drawn from these reports. If in Bengal, many crimes are committed, information of which never reaches the ears of the magistrate, as I believe to be the fact, the case must be more so, here; because our police officers are more ignorant of, and inattentive to, their duty, than the darogahs in the Lower Provinces; and because the people are, I think, less in the habit of conveying public information, and more averse to appear in court, and prosecute those who have injured them. Attendance on the court, whether as a prosecutor or witness, is generally regarded as a heavy misfortune, to avoid which, many leave their homes, and submit to infinite inconvenience and vexation; and many more, I presume, pay handsomely to the Nazir or his people, for permission to keep out of the way. Hence crimes are perpetrated; and no records remain of them. This last remark, however, I do not suppose to be exclusively applicable to this division.

11. The calendar at each Zillah exhibited a few cases of robbery, and not very many of theft or of fraud. It is only the crime of homicide that appears to me to require notice, as prevalent.

12. It is known to the Nizamut Adawlut, from the references I have had occasion to make, that homicide, in all its gradations of guilt, is frequent. The number of persons convicted of wilful murder is certainly great. The introduction of a regular administration of justice is so recent, that the minds of the people can hardly yet be fully impressed with the apprehension of being brought to trial and punishment for crimes; but, I have learnt, that the examples made of murderers, and more particularly the exposure of the bodies of malefactors after their execution, has inspired a very general terror, and therefore produced a most salutary effect. I still hope and expect that this division will not long remain marked for the frequency of the most heinous of crimes.

13. The cases of murder are easy of detection and proof; and I imagine those guilty of this crime, seldom escape. They are, for the most part, cases of revenge, jealousy, wounded pride, and sudden violence, committed by a single individual, without the concert or confederacy of others. Few murders are perpetrated, in prosecution of a plan of robbery. No general alarm is, by the prevalence of this crime, spread among the people for their safety, as by gangs of decoits. The instances of murder which occur are, in themselves, shocking; but this crime is not attended with those extensive mischiefs to society, which the violent invasion of property by plunderers, produces.

14. The murdering of children for the sake of their ornaments is, I am sorry to say, common; so much so, that I submit whether it might not be advisable to strike at the root of the evil, by taking away, if possible, the temptation to commit the act: I mean, adopting measures to prevent children, from wearing gold and silver ornaments.

15. For my own part, being convinced that we have no other means of putting an end to the frequent perpetration of this crime, I could wish to see the practice of adorning children with valuable trinkets, altogether prohibited. I would, at all events, prevent the practice, by rendering the ornaments liable, on information, to forfeiture; or by any other expedient that may be thought preferable, to that of denouncing such a penalty.

16. The exertion of authority in a matter of this sort will probably be deemed objectionable, but it would not be really oppressive. It would not excite discontent: It would not, at least, offend the feelings of any well informed individual.

17. If it is thought that such measure, would encroach upon any one's natural rights and established customs, I might urge, that these helpless infants, have rights also. They have claims to protection. Their parents are found, after long experience and innumerable warnings, so heedless and infatuated, as to expose them to perils, from which the existing laws cannot defend them. Such being the case, in my opinion, it becomes the duty of the magistrate, or the ruling power, to interfere, even in an unusual mode, to save their lives.

18. The objections to legislative interference, seem to me to rest, on the score of convenience and regularity, and cannot weigh much with those, who have present to their minds, the horror of a single case of child murder. I therefore beg leave to recommend, that effectual steps be taken to prevent the wearing of valuable ornaments by children.

19. A want of tenderness and regard for life is very general, I think, throughout the country; and may, perhaps, like most of the crimes and excesses of the natives, be ascribed, in a great degree, to the influence of fatalism, the maxims of which, universally pervade their minds.

20. The defence, or rather the confession of a person accused of the crime of homicide, is very frequently expressed, in such terms as these:—"I was provoked—I was impelled

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by fate, to kill the deceased—All must die, at the hour appointed—No one can struggle against destiny—It was written, his time was come; and mine, may now be come."

21. Such is the train of thought on these occasions, among the learned as well as the unlearned, and every change of fortune and variety of event, strengthens and confirms it. Exemptions, they say, are ineffectual to contend with a power, in whose hands, man is a mere instrument. It is the part of mortals to resign themselves, and abstain from useless attempts to alter the established course of things.

22. Thus reasoning, in action they surrender themselves to the first impulse; and in guilt or misfortune exonerate their minds, from moral demerit, and console themselves, in the conviction of a natural impotence to resist temptation.

23. These doctrines, have their full operation here; but homicide being, if I mistake not, more frequent in these provinces than elsewhere, there must be some other cause, which produces the difference. This cause is, I suppose, the natives being very generally armed, and their having been long unrestrained in the practice of gratifying revenge, and settling the slightest quarrels by the sword. Though by no means a ferocious race, we meet with many instances of their spilling each others blood with that sort of thoughtlessness and unconcern, which might be expected from barbarians accustomed to scenes of slaughter.

24. In spite of the frequency of homicide, which I have thought it my duty to notice, I think myself warranted, from the information I have been able to gather respecting the number and the nature of crimes of all sorts committed in this division, to say, that in my judgment, the security of the natives and their property is not ill insured in these provinces, from outrage and depredation; and that though for the most part, very poor, the condition of the people, may be deemed flourishing.

25. I do not assert that this is entirely owing to the regular administration of law, and to the system introduced by us, but it must be ascribed to those causes, in some degree; at all events, the fact of, the welfare and security of the inhabitants, must be satisfactory to the Nizamut Adawlut.

26. I am further enabled to state that the tehsildars are becoming more attentive to their duty, and that regularity begins to appear in their proceedings. I think the police tolerably vigorous and efficient; and that it is, in a state of improvement.

27. I proceed to mention the state of the jails in this division. The jail of zillah Etawah is not at all adapted to the purpose, being a private house in the town, much too small for the number of prisoners it contained, when I visited it; constructed chiefly of mud, and having no water to which the prisoners can have access. I wrote to the magistrate, and I imagine he has addressed government upon the expediency of removing the prisoners to a place better suited to them.

28. The jail of Furruckabad is likewise in the town; but the accommodation it affords is spacious and tolerably convenient. The prisoners seemed healthy, and comfortably lodged. The jail is, however, situated four or five miles from the catcherry. The one or the other, therefore, ought I think to be removed. The prisoners are brought from the jail to the catcherry, and taken back in hackeries.

29. On the day when the Mahrattas encamped near the town of Furruckabad, the guards at the gate, proved negligent, or treacherous; and though the enemy did not enter the town, nor cause any tumult therein, all the prisoners were allowed to escape. The guards, I understand, have not made their appearance since.

30. The Cawnpore jail, situated near the catcherry, appears to me well contrived for accommodation and security; a mud wall encloses a large square, in which are two or three buildings, where the persons sleep. There are also good wells of water within the square. I beg leave to mention, that the health and comfort of a native, cannot be insured, in my opinion, unless he has constant access to water.

31. In this jail, the chief objection is, that the women are confined in the same enclosure, and cannot be kept completely separate, from the men. But this defect, the magistrate will be able and was preparing to remedy, by erecting a small building and wall, for the women alone.

32. The magistrate of Cawnpore was also taking measures to remove the debtors, who certainly ought not to be imprisoned, with convicts.

33. The jail of Allahabad is, in all respects, bad; I last year described it to the Nizamut Adawlut; and it is needless for me to say more upon the subject now. The prisoners did not appear to me, to be unhealthy; but I strongly recommend that another place, as soon as practicable, be provided for their accommodation. I am informed, that government have resolved upon erecting a new jail at Allahabad, which zillah is now annexed to the provincial court of Benares.

34. The jail of Bareilly is a pukka building, constructed by government, upon an approved plan. The plan is not so complete and extensive, nor is the work so substantial, as that of the jails constructed some time ago, in many districts of Bengal; but I think it answers the purpose tolerably well, affording sufficient accommodation and security from escape. The foudary court is, at present, held at the distance of about 4 miles from the jail.

35. The jail of Moradabad is similar, in its plan and construction, to that of Bareilly; but the catcherry is close to it.

36. The convicts are not yet numerous, at any of the stations of this division; they are employed, for the most part, on the roads.

37. I have

37. I have nothing further to say on these subjects. That our administration of justice affects all it pretends to do, I do not believe; that all crimes are punished, no one, I presume, can expect; that all wrongs are redressed, or even a great proportion of them, is probably not the case. The delay and expense of prosecuting, are intolerable to the lower classes; of this, however, I am confident, that sufficient security is maintained to ensure the prosperity of the body of the people; that the country is rapidly improving, and that its improvement is promoted, by our system.

River Ganges, }  
25th Jan. 1805. }

I am, &c.  
(Signed) H. STRACHEY,  
3<sup>d</sup> Judge.

To S. T. GOAD, Esq.

Register to the Nizamut Adawlut, Fort William.

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour to transmit you, a Report on the last circuit of the Ceded Provinces, bearing date the 25th January; which report, I presume, you have laid before the Nizamut Adawlut. It has since struck me, that there are certain questions, intimately connected with the internal peace of these remote provinces, which are highly interesting; viz. How far the system we are introducing is, in itself, just? and, how far it is adapted to the actual state of the country, or congenial to the minds of the several ranks and classes of the natives? how far our system is calculated to prevent disaffection, or to quell commotions? These questions, although I cannot undertake to discuss them thoroughly, strike me as so important, that, scanty as my information is, and crude and insignificant as the opinions I have formed, must appear to the Nizamut Adawlut, I am nevertheless unwilling to close this, my last task, without soliciting the attention of the court, to such additional observations, as I may be able to recollect; and I beg to be permitted to offer them, by way of supplement to my report.

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2. Rumours, it seems, have prevailed, that our government is extremely unpopular in the Ceded and conquered Provinces; and that the country has been, during some time, in a state of much commotion and disorder. This is not precisely the fact: no alarming disorders exist to my knowledge; nor is the system, I think, obnoxious to the main body of the people.

3. It appears to me further perfectly clear, that none of the classes of our subjects have the means of resisting the authority of government, with any prospect of success. Besides, if we consider the nature and degree of mischief which can be done to the population and agriculture, to the trade, or to the land revenue of the country, by the disaffected; I fancy all will agree, that it is not likely to prove very serious. A rebel may raise disturbances in his neighbourhood, and create alarm, during a short time; but, unless assisted by a foreign power, able to cope with our whole military force, his speedy ruin or expulsion, are inevitable.

4. I should imagine, that few of the zemindars would, from the mere spirit of loyalty, support the government, in a doubtful contest. They cannot feel attached to us, because we have deprived them of their power and importance.

5. With respect to the ryots, their security and happiness, are, as far as I can learn, better maintained by our system, than they were, during the most prosperous periods of the native governments. They are, I think, in general, sensible of their situation being improved; but still the influence of a chief, is sufficient to induce his ryots to follow him; and, on occasion, to take up arms for him, even against a government which promotes their interest.

6. A zemindar, possessing the means of paying his people, finds little difficulty in procuring followers: not merely his ryots and immediate dependants and connexions, strangers in great numbers will assemble round him. Let his case be what it will, either that of a wretched outlaw, or of a defaulter, driven by misfortune or injustice from his paternal estate, if he thinks proper to erect his standard, and defy the ruling power of the country, he will find brave and faithful adherents, as many as he can maintain. But it is my opinion that the equalizing nature of the Regulations will gradually correct this. Hitherto, that sort of influence which enables a man to retain troops, is not much diminished.

7. The dread of our criminal law, exercised in all its rigour, or even of our military law, affords, in my opinion, an insufficient remedy to this evil. In case of a serious insurrection of our subjects, of which I have no apprehension, except on the occasion of their being assisted by a foreign power, I do not think that the proclamation and exercise of martial law, would prove of the least use.

8. Rohilcund, Furruckabad, and the upper part of the Douab, abound with a warlike race of Mahomeddars, ready to join any leader. Some thousands of this description, I mean the Patans, are now said to be serving with Holkar, and with their countryman Meer Khan. They dislike us; not because our government is oppressive and unjust, which their own probably would be, but because there is no employment open to them; and they are left inactive, without distinction, and almost without subsistence.

9. Few of these men enlist in our military service, because they cannot bring themselves to submit to the strictness of our discipline. The Patans in general, are reduced to much distress: they are idle; and with difficulty and great reluctance apply to any profession but that



that of arms. The whole race, with a very few exceptions of servants and chiefs pensioned by us, and probably all these cannot be excepted, wish for a change of government.

10. I take the liberty further to express my opinion, founded on the best information I can obtain, that the better part of the inhabitants of the Conquered Provinces, who are not yet completely subject to our dominion, regard our political power with much jealousy and dread. That we or any other rulers, should be restrained by a sense of justice and forbearance, from conquest and encroachment, they have no idea. Hence is bred in the minds of aspiring and high spirited people, a hatred to the English. The most learned, intelligent, and liberal-minded of the natives, suppose, that the business of a state, with a powerful army, is to make encroachments on its neighbours. These are the sentiments which operate to our prejudice, among most men of spirit and independence.

11. But the chief cause of our unpopularity with the higher classes, I believe to be that which I have already mentioned, namely, that they consider themselves reduced to a degrading subjection, by the introduction of a practical system of justice; of the only system, perhaps, which could restrain them from rapine and cruelty.

12. The influence of a rebellious or disaffected chief over his people is wonderfully great, and is not founded in the popularity or supposed justice of his cause, and very little, on the probability of his success. Though he be a mere robber, and his situation quite desperate, still his people will adhere to him to the last, and never betray or forsake him. They may be bad subjects; but they are excellent servants.

13. The influence of our government, in securing the allegiance and attachment of its subjects, I conceive to be most inconsiderable. Such persons as we take into our service, may be depended upon, as long as we pay them regularly, and treat them well; but our influence, reaches no further.

14. The discontents or tumults, excited by zemindars, afford no certain evidence of grievance or oppression proceeding from our system. The rebellious zemindars, who have appeared in the Upper Provinces, are by no means numerous. They consist, if I may take not, of men who have fallen in arrears to government, through misfortune or imprudence; who were ruined, and then began to plunder their neighbours, and defy the magistrate.

15. There may be a few men of another description, who, during the late irruption of the enemy, showed a disposition to join him. I imagine that the greater number of the zemindars would join even a Mahratta invader, if they had any opinion of the stability of his power. They wish for a change, by which they conceive that they would regain their importance.

16. The minds of the zemindars in general, I believe to be alienated and estranged from us; and if they forbear to rise against us, or join our enemies, it is I conceive only because they see that our army is irresistible, and our power firmly established.

17. The ryots have every reason to dread the prevalence of the Mahratta power; of that power which yields them up to the tyranny and oppression of their chiefs, which affords no protection to its subjects, which is perpetually at war with its neighbours, which has in effect, laid waste the greatest part of Hindostan.

18. Yet could many of the zemindars of the Doab prevail on their ryots to contribute to expel us, and establish the Mahratta power. The invasion of the country by Holkar, probably caused a few disturbances, which ceased when he retired. It is generally said that he was well received, wherever he came. I do not hear of any strict inquiries into the conduct of the zemindars, on this occasion; nor do I believe that such inquiries, would serve any useful purpose. If the enemy should re-appear, the people will not join him, unless their leaders, the zemindars, should entertain expectations of his expelling us the country, and thereby rescuing them from subjection.

19. It should not be supposed, that it is oppression and unpopular measures that produce resistance and revolt. The people are never stirred up to sedition, by popular acts: reason has nothing to do, with the matter. The salt monopoly was till lately, exceedingly oppressive. It affected the poor, and the great body of the people; but they were totally helpless. Their discontents, their sufferings, produced no rebellions. Disorders are raised, by the rich and powerful; and no person of that description, was materially affected, by dearness of salt.

20. Deprive the ryots of a necessary of life, and they sit silent; nobody cares for them, and they cannot help themselves. But take from their chief, the management of the police, which he exercised only to oppress them; restrain him, from disturbing the peace of the country, and he will prevail upon them to take up arms in his cause, and contend in a hopeless desperate enterprize against all the powers of government, civil and military. Such are our subjects. They resist authority, without pretence of right, or hope of success. Their disorders, afford no signs of grievance, or even of discontent.

21. With respect to the possibility of restraining men from joining rebellious chiefs, who can pay them, or prevailing upon dependants to detach themselves from their masters, I think it out of the question. Neither the hope of reward, nor the fear of punishment, as held out by government, have much effect. Our influence scarcely extends, to induce the servants and connexions of the most worthless outcast of a decoit or assassin, to betray or desert him.

22. It is my opinion that disorders may exist, as I believe they do, which ought by no means, to be ascribed to the government, or to the system of laws introduced by us. Disturbances

disturbances and rebellions are frequent, in all the native governments: they arise, I imagine, usually from the resistance made by the zemindars to the demands of the ruling power.

23. It is generally understood that our judicial regulations are much disliked by the natives of the Upper Provinces. Perhaps a clamour has been raised against them, by persons ignorant or interested. Certain it is, however, that many persons of credit and respectability join, in condemning the judicial Regulations. Military men and commercial men, seem to dislike them; so do, the higher orders of the natives.

24. When we come to enquire particularly, into this matter; when we ask a native of the Upper Provinces, which part of the regulations is obnoxious to him? he replies, as they would reply, in the Lower, "That which reduces me, to a level with my domestics and labourers."

25. A man of rank, cast and wealth, conceiving that he possesses superior rights and privileges, thinks himself disgraced, by being called into court upon any occasion. He has an aversion also, to be examined publicly, as a witness. "Is my testimony," says he, "rated no higher than that of my servants and coolies, and I, to stand on an equality with them, and reply as a criminal, to their petty complaints for an assault or abusive language?"

26. I do think that much allowance should be made for the prejudices and long habits of the people; and as far as I have observed, the magistrates are tender and cautious on these occasions, not to outrage the feelings of a man of rank. But the treatment of these men, should not depend upon the temper of the magistrate.

27. The complaint is very general; and it might be better to relax still more, for a time at least something of what we are apt to conceive to be, the strict equality of justice. It is sufficient if we attain the object of protecting the weak from the cruelty and oppression of the strong. This may perhaps be effected, and at the same time, the minds of the higher classes upon this head, might be quieted, by enjoining the magistrates to abstain from requiring the personal appearance of a superior in court, on the complaint of an inferior, for a bailable offence.

28. A regulation might be passed for this purpose, or if objections should occur to the enacting of such a regulation, I am of opinion, that a proclamation or declaratory resolution of government might be published with good effect, in these provinces. The proclamation might be expressed, in terms to this purport:—That, in consequence of misconceptions having gone abroad respecting our system of laws, government thought proper to declare, that it was their intention to secure to every individual, the just privileges of his cast and station, according to the laws, religion, and established usage of the country; that the prevalent principle in our administration of justice was, that of affording to every one, as far as was practicable, redress for injuries sustained in his person, his property, or his reputation; that we were perfectly aware, that without subordination and a due distinction of rank in the several classes of society, peace and good order would not be maintained; and that so far from its being in contemplation to encourage the lower orders in disrespectful or insolent conduct, whether in word or action, towards their superiors, it was perfectly consistent with our maxims, and the anxious wish of government, that every native of consequence should, upon all occasions, be treated with the respect due to his rank and cast: that in the event of any complaint upon this subject, being preferred to the courts of justice, the Judge or Magistrate would be required to consult the Hindoo or Mahomedan law-officers (according as the case might relate to Hindoos or Mahomedans), and found his decision, upon their written opinion.

29. A proclamation of this nature, I do not, by any means, think necessary for preserving the country from serious discontents, but I think it would be pleasing to the better part of the natives, as evincing an attention to their opinions, customs, and prejudices; that it would be productive of no material inconvenience; and in short, seeing no objection to the measure, I recommend it for consideration.

30. I do not recollect to have heard any other distinct objection made to our courts of justice, except the expense and delay which attend the procuring of redress. Upon this subject I do not wish to make many observations. The expense I have always thought too heavy; but the objections arising to the system, from the expense and delay in procuring justice, are not exclusively applicable to these provinces.

31. Supposing it to be true, that these evils exist to a great degree, such evils should not be charged to the introduction of our system, as its most characteristic marks. Let not the present, be compared to a state of things never known here, when justice was cheap and expeditious, but with that state, which certainly did heretofore exist; viz. one, in which there was no justice at all, to be got; where the important, the sacred duty of redressing injuries, and punishing crimes, depended upon the tyranny and caprice of a revenue officer, who either entirely disregarded the duty, or by corruption and abuse, made it a source of profit.

32. It is indeed extraordinary, that it should with any one, ever become doubtful, whether the country actually derives benefit, from such a change as has taken place:

33. When, for rapacity and injustice, is substituted a system of mildness, humanity, liberality; in a word, of justice;—of justice, the acknowledged source of moral relations, the only solid basis of legitimate government.

34. Is it to no purpose that our government, at an immense expense, maintains its judicial establishments, that so large a portion of its servants is occupied in diligently and conscientiously enquiring into, and redressing, the wrongs of individuals.

Judges of Circuit,  
on termination of their  
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35. The same people, heretofore accustomed to look for extortion and violence at the hands of their rulers, without appeal or hope of remedy, may now see public officers, the most respectable for rank and station, and connections, if accused of malversation, undergo a strict, impartial, open trial. When they see such things, I cannot but believe that they acknowledge the blessings conferred upon them, by their new rulers. They will not at least deny, that our intentions are good, and that we appear to be guided by principles of equity and justice, and to have their welfare at heart, more than their old rulers, had.

36. It is scarcely possible for an unprejudiced mind to doubt the superiority of our government, when firmly established, to the native governments. To do so, is to compare anarchy, oppression, and wretchedness, with justice, moderation, peace, and security.

37. I cannot help repeating, because I am convinced of the fact, and think it important that an impression almost universal prevails, of its being our policy and practice to destroy the independence of the zemindars; of those who had heretofore, power and address to maintain themselves. Hence our extreme unpopularity with these persons. They seem to forget, or value not, the advantages they derive from our system of justice and general security. They remember only the power which most of them, made a bad use of. To protect the ryots from violence and extortions, within, and from the depredations of hostile and barbarous enemies, without, gains us the good will of the weak and helpless only; of those whose voice is not heard, of those who have ever been led or driven by a master.

38. It is not possible that a system which tends to diminish the importance of the leading men of the country, and does in fact, encroach on their just, and long established privileges, can be introduced, without extreme dissatisfaction. That dissatisfaction, however, I do not mean to state, as universal among the zemindars. The weak, the moderate, and the peaceable, who were unable to maintain a degree of independence, under the old government, probably like the change.

39. The great advantage, and it cannot be over-rated, of government, is that of securing the country, from foreign incursion. Failing in that, every other benefit is comparatively slight, and indeed nugatory; for without security, no benefit can be enjoyed. It so happens that this object, has not been fully accomplished. The inhabitants of the upper parts of the Doab had not seen a foreign enemy, during many years. They cannot fail to remark, that shortly after becoming subject to our dominion, they have been invaded by the Marhattas; and ignorant as all are, of our political views and quarrels, and of those of our enemies, they probably conceive themselves, still exposed to danger.

40. I beg leave here to state a few circumstances regarding a trial which occurred at Minpoory. The case appears to me not wholly unconnected with the present subject. It may serve to illustrate some of my remarks on the state of the country.

41. Mr. Birch, a very decent respectable English gentleman, considerably advanced in years, had long been settled at Shekoabad, a town between Minpoory and Agra. He was a farmer of a considerable quantity of land, and had large concerns in trade. Under the old government he was effectually protected, and his affairs prospered. The government of the country being assumed by us, Mr. Birch's farm is taken from him immediately by the collector, because our laws allow no English settlers. Soon afterwards, a war breaks out between us and the Marhattas, and a body of predatory horse having crossed the Jumna and advanced to Shekoabad, Mr. Birch's house and property are plundered and burnt, either by the invaders, or our subjects, several of whom are said to have joined them.

42. Some of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood were, at the instance of Mr. Birch, apprehended and tried at the last sessions of Etawa, but acquitted. In spite of the acquittal, however, there is no doubt of the fact, that Mr. Birch's property was burnt and plundered. The evidence did not appear to the court sufficient to convict the persons accused, but it is certain that either they, or others, committed the crime, and that it was produced solely, by the incursion of our enemies the Marattas.

43. This is not a fit place to set forth the hardship and losses suffered by Mr. Birch, with a view to his indemnification; nor is it my province to come forward and solicit justice or other liberality of government. But it will not, I hope, be deemed irregular in me to state my opinion, that his case, as far as it came under my notice, is a hard one; and that though the offenders have not been brought to punishment, there can be no doubt that he has suffered a great injury.

44. Mr. Birch, who attended during the whole of a long trial in the court of circuit, must feel heavily the trouble and delay of procuring justice under the new system, and the difficulty of proving, in our cutcherries, facts notorious elsewhere. Heretofore, when robbed or otherwise injured, the aumil allowed him to take the law into his own hands, which Mr. Birch stated to have answered his purpose at all times. He used to seize the culprits, or those whom he conceived to be the culprits, confine and punish them, and seldom failed to obtain restitution of his property.

45. Mr. Birch's case is, in some respects, similar to that of many a native zemindar who complains of our laws; they are deprived of some rights and privileges, and influence, which a few of them, may have exercised to good purpose. Some injuries may have been committed with impunity, under us, which would have been redressed, by the old system; but how many instances must occur, in which the innocent are, by our courts, protected from their prosecutors. The strong exclaim against laws, which enable the weak to contend against them.

46. A regulation has passed lately, and been promulgated, from which it appears to be the intention of government to proclaim martial law, and execute it, in all its rigour, on the

the first appearance of rebellion in our territories. I have already taken the liberty to suggest that some objections occur to me to the adoption of this measure, and I beg to be permitted here to introduce a few more observations on the same subject.

REPORTS  
OF  
Judges of Circuit,  
on termination of their  
Sessions.

No. 3.  
Barristers Division.  
1805.

47. It is my opinion that the greatest caution ought to be observed by all officers, civil and military, in having recourse to arms for the suppression of tumults and disturbances raised by refractory chiefs. No case is likely to occur, in which delay and conciliation might not be attended with good effect. Whereas the resorting to violent measures is, itself, an evil of the greatest magnitude, producing immediate loss of lives and property, and confusion and distress, in every shape.

48. I would moreover submit, that some considerations arise in my mind, which lead me to think that the proclamation and exercise of martial law, according to the English mode, can seldom or never be advisable, even during the existence of open warfare, between our troops and our subjects.

49. There are, I believe, in different parts of our territories, zemindars, in some degree independent; that is to say, chiefs who have never been brought under complete obedience, and who being unused to control, would infallibly, if they possess the means, resist any force that could be sent against them. As our conquests extend, more of these persons, I conclude, become subject to us.

50. There are persons of this description residing in fortresses, or in hills and jungles, who, with their followers, can hardly be called subjects, though situated within our frontier. I should imagine, it will never be thought degrading or inconsistent with the honour of government, so far to yield to circumstances, as to conciliate the good will of these persons, and to avoid innovations and encroachments on their rights and long established usages.

51. I am particularly encouraged to hope that these principles, and this practice, will not be discountenanced; because on a former occasion, when I held the office of judge and magistrate of Midnapore, my conduct towards the inhabitants of the jungles was founded very much on these principles: experience has proved them to be just and politic, and government have not withheld, their approbation of them. Now there are, or have been, refractory zemindars in these provinces, who may be considered, in some respects similar to those inhabitants of the jungles. I fear the anxiety of government to introduce the Regulations among such people, may have given rise to much discontent and disorder.

52. It may be proper, with a view to point out how far the persons to whom I allude may really be considered rebels and traitors, to enter into some little detail of the state of the country.

53. The only efficient government, both under the Nabob vizier and under the Marhattas, did in fact, reside in the aumil, who, as long as he paid the revenue, was in no danger of being called to account for abuses.

54. In like manner, when the zemindar paid his revenue to the aumil, or to the tehsildar, with punctuality, he was not troubled with enquiries into the mode of collecting it, or into the general state of the police.

55. The aumil maintained order, not by means of courts of justice, which were scarcely known, but by a military force; and the zemindars, as already observed, were deemed loyal or disloyal, in proportion to their punctuality, in paying their revenue.

56. Many of the chiefs of these provinces, yielded a very imperfect obedience to the ruling power; that is to say, to the aumil. There were, I am told, refractory chiefs of several descriptions; but all of them had fortresses, or some military force, otherwise they would soon have been reduced to submission by the aumil. I may mention as instances, the zemindar of Tutta, and, I believe, that of Sasnee; the reduction of whose forts cost us so many valuable lives.

57. It would not be difficult, perhaps, for the magistrates or collectors, to procure lists and descriptions of these persons, if any still remain; and it seems to me, that without some information on these points, we must, in forming revenue and police arrangements, act very much at random. My information is very limited; but I have learnt, that although some of these chiefs might properly be styled robbers, others possessed hereditary and prescriptive rights of sovereignty within their estates; of this I am certain, that there were many, with whom the aumil had no alternative, but to tolerate their turbulent habits, or enter into a bloody and expensive contest with them: nor did it by any means, till our time, follow, that he who once drew the sword, and erected the standard of rebellion, was inevitably ruined. With more than one zemindar, Almas Ally Khan, after a doubtful contest, has been treated with as an equal, and come to a compromise of disputes.

58. If the chiefs were thus disobedient, and could scarcely be called subjects, it will easily be believed, that their roots and dependants, invariably and necessarily followed their example; and this, I conceive, must still be so, for some time. The soldiers and domestics of the turbulent chief, who serve him for pay, will fight his battles, and will look up to him alone as their sovereign; since it is he alone, who affords them protection and subsistence.

59. Before we introduce new laws, I conceive, that we ought to look to the condition of the people. We should consider how far it may be consistent with humanity or policy, to apply the principles of the English law, in all its rigour, to a people, among whom the zeal and spirit of loyalty were never diffused or understood; whose ignorance of our laws and customs is complete; and whose acts never, in the slightest degree, endangered the existing government.

60. For that point, although not immediately in question, at present, I must maintain, whatever others may have thought on the subject of sedition or conspiracies, I am convinced the state was never in danger from internal disorders.

61. Had there existed any spark of a rebellious spirit, capable of injuring us, would it not probably have broken out in a flame, on the first appearance of a system, which materially affected every man of power, influence and consideration, throughout the country?

62. For such, I conceive, was the sudden and immediate effect of the change of government, that the chief persons, under the late governments, must look upon themselves as the victims of our acquisitions and conquests; yet how few rebel! how few are so infatuated! they know the force of our army, and that rebellion against us, must produce their speedy ruin. Our new subjects are transferred to our dominion, without the least trouble. Nobody enquires whether the change is agreeable to them, or not; those who have never been subject to any law, come suddenly, under all the laws we may judge it expedient to promulgate, few of which they will ever fully comprehend.

63. The cases of disaffected persons, except those of mere robbers are, generally speaking, I believe, somewhat of this nature. Some misunderstanding or quarrel arises on questions of revenue or police. The zemindar commits illegal acts, to which he has possibly been provoked by our officers. Complaints are made, and a warrant issues, according to the usual form of process. The chief, feeling himself insulted, or perhaps apprehending danger and indignity, resists, first the peon, and afterwards, the scapoys sent against him.

64. He is then, having opposed lawful authority, though probably he is ignorant of its nature, considered as having forfeited his allegiance; and is termed a rebel and traitor. He is perhaps outlawed, a price set on his head, martial law proclaimed, and he and all his followers caught in arms, are liable to be punished with immediate death, by any military officer who happens to be sent against him, in command of a detachment. These measures do not appear to me to be necessary for the maintenance of the peace and good order of the country.

65. I beg leave to explain, that I am not here alluding to events, which have actually happened within my own official knowledge. I am not aware that the extreme case, has ever occurred; but I humbly apprehend, that it is liable to occur.

66. The case of a zemindar, forcibly opposing lawful authority, is however, one which frequently happens; and on that occasion, vigorous measures must be resorted to, always recollecting, that such cases are neither alarming to the government, nor indeed of any very great consequence to the permanent tranquillity of the district. But I would, to the last, make every allowance for the lower orders. I hardly know that I would, in any case, proceed against them, with a view to bring them to legal punishment. To put them to death, as rebels and traitors, I think manifestly useless, unjust, contrary to the custom of Hindostan, founded entirely on notions and rules brought from the other side of the globe, and totally inapplicable to this country. It cannot be necessary to point out, that the case of rebellion and treason in England, and in this country, must be entirely dissimilar.

67. We every day find our native subjects serving against us, as soldiers; but our officers have not thought proper to put in execution, against men found in this situation, the rules of English military law. For this forbearance, there are doubtless, good reasons: one reason is, I presume, that of our being aware, that the natives look upon their master, as their sovereign; and that no degree of severity could produce the certain effect, of detaching them from their chiefs.

68. Supposing, for a moment, what is, in my opinion, impossible, that the dependants of a rebellious chief, in a distant province, could have been well informed regarding the duties of allegiance to the ruling power, still it would remain to be ascertained, whether they possessed the means of deserting their chief, without probable destruction to themselves, or their families.

69. But it is evident that there are, or were lately, followers of chiefs, who had not yet learned to look up to us, for justice and protection. If we never interposed to defend them from the cruelty and rapacity of their chief; if they did not obtain from us, the means of security from oppression, or of the peaceful possession of their property, they could not, in fairness and equity, be held to owe us allegiance.

70. I am very far from wishing to justify resistance to the sovereign power, or its officers. It is not my intention to question the wisdom and equity of the acts of government, or to advance principles derogatory to the honour and dignity of the state, or disrespectful to its members. It is our business to support the established government.

71. I know, that our subjects are bound to a punctual and faithful obedience; and I believe, that it is the resolution of government, to act upon principles of moderation and humanity: which principles teach us, that the obligations of protection and obedience are reciprocal.

72. With respect to the followers of refractory chiefs; I think it may naturally be expected, from the very circumstance of their attachment, an abject submission to a bad master, that when a more just and liberal authority shall come to be substituted over them, they will be found tractable, orderly, and dutiful subjects. Having trespassed too long on the time of the Nizamut Adawlut, I here close this address.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) H. STRACHEY,

3d Judge.

River Ganges, }  
10th Feb. 1805. }

To W. B. BAYLEY, Esq.

Register to the Nizamut Adawlut, Fort William.

Sir,

Para. 1. IN the Letter which I had the honour to address to the Nizamut Adawlut, under date the 5th February, I intimated that I had been preparing a Report on the Judicial arrangements in the Provinces, but was prevented from completing it, by want of leisure. Having since revised that portion of my observations which relate to the police, I now venture to submit it to the consideration of the court, and the right honourable the Governor General in council, and to beg that it may be considered, as the sequel of the address mentioned above.

2. I am the more encouraged to take this step, by finding that I am not singular in my sentiments; but that several gentlemen, whose talents and local experience entitle their opinions to the greatest weight, have countenanced my views on this part of the subject.

3. Mr. Crisp, the Chief Judge of the provincial Court of Appeal and Circuit for the division of Bareilly, I am informed, has deprecated the measure of confiding the police to darogahs. It would be superfluous to speak of the merits and services of this gentleman, which, I hear, are about to place him, in the court which I am addressing.

4. I derive particular gratification from feeling myself authorized to say, that my sentiments, in general, are also sanctioned by the concurrence of Messrs. Cox and Tucker, the members of the late commission for the Ceded and Conquered territory, who, by the extensive circuit they made over the country, have possessed peculiar advantages, in forming their judgment.

5. I need hardly mention that one of these gentlemen, Mr. Tucker, has likewise had long experience in the judicial department. I am persuaded that the zeal and ability with which he filled the important office of Judicial Secretary to the government, are not yet forgotten.

6. To the authority which I have already mentioned, I may also add, the recommendation lately made to government by the present board of commissioners, for suspending the new arrangements indefinitely, in the large district of Bundelcund. This recommendation cannot but throw doubt on the accuracy of the information which induced the government to introduce the arrangements in question, into that country; and the doubt, in this instance, must be allowed to afford presumption in favour of the opinion, that the same arrangements have been prematurely introduced, into the whole of the new territory.

7. The preceding considerations, I venture to flatter myself, may produce an effect which I certainly should not have been presumptuous enough to expect, from my own humble efforts; and the destruction of the tehsildarry system be at least suspended, till government have had time to weigh the additional information and arguments which have been, and may be submitted to them on the question.

8. Should that resolution be adopted, and the deliberations of government, end in the determination to give the system a further trial, means might, in my opinion, be without difficulty found, to bring the controul nearer, to guard against gross abuses in the patronage, and to prevent the powers confided to the tehsildars, being perverted to serious oppression.

9. In submitting the accompanying paper, I do not know whether I have any apologies to make for the freedom, with which I have discussed the topics to which it refers. I will only say on that head, that I have not intentionally violated the respect due to the authority which I have addressed. If, in my anxiety to state my reasoning forcibly, any expressions have escaped me which can bear a different construction, I am persuaded they will be candidly considered with a reference to this declaration.

Benares,  
6th May 1808. }

I am, &amp;c.

(Signed) J. STUART,  
3d Judge.

(A true copy.)

(Signed) W. B. Bayley,  
Register.

## ALLAHABAD.

Para. 1. THE calendar and reports, submitted by the magistrate of this zillah, exhibit a very small number of crimes; so small, indeed, that it proves too much for the police, and compels suspicion that many offences are committed, which do not come to the knowledge of the magistrate. The contrary supposition would imply a degree of perfection, by no means credible.

2. On one point these papers afford matter for pleasing reflection. They do not show, a single case of gang-robbery:—All the private information which I have been able to procure, leads to the same conclusion; and it is indeed obvious, that gang-robbery will not admit of concealment. I am also told, that the observation is generally applicable to the Ceded Provinces.

3. This



3. This fact, compared with what happens in other parts of the Company's dominions, appears highly deserving of attention. We have but recently received these provinces from the hands of a prince, to whose internal government, we are accustomed to ascribe all that is reproachful; and they are free from gang-robbery. Bengal has now, for a long series of years, been subject to a system, which was the fruit of the deliberate wisdom of the British government; yet gang-robbery, in that province, is a scourge to the inhabitants.

4. Reasoning upon these singular circumstances, some of the judicial officers have been disposed to entertain the belief, that they must be connected with some peculiarity in our management. This inference must be allowed to be, at least plausible; and many reasons occur to me, in its favour.

5. According to every account which I have heard of the Nawaub's government, its only object was the collection of money; all care of justice, civil or criminal, was utterly abandoned. To its efforts, therefore, I do not mean to ascribe this advantage enjoyed by its subjects. Its internal arrangements, and the principles of its management seemed, notwithstanding, favourable to the prevention of gang-robbery.

6. An aumil, or naib aumil, was stationed in each pergunnah, with a body of troops, which he could make use of, at his own discretion. This officer, whatever oppression he might be guilty of himself, had a sufficient interest in his pergunnah, to incite him to secure it from the ravages of banditti, and the celerity and promptness with which he could act, ensured success to his efforts.

7. But the principal circumstance which produced the effect, was, the authority maintained, in estates. These were always kept in a few hands, to guard against the obvious difficulty of forming frequent settlements, and collecting the revenues from a multitude of persons. Then, while the landholder or farmer paid his revenue, little attention was paid by the government or its officers, to what passed within the estate. The power of these men was consequently great. It enabled them, to preserve order internally, among their dependants. It also enabled them, to call forth, at pleasure, the strength of their estates or farms, and it was their manifest interest to guard them, from external violence.

8. There were, indeed, circumstances which prevented the neighbouring villages from being liable to attack, from their respective inhabitants. The chief persons in them, are frequently united by the ties of common descent, or family alliance. This connexion preserved a good understanding between them, which their inferiors durst not violate. Even when no bond of this sort existed, a consciousness of mutual strength, and of the danger of retaliation, often produced the same observance. The powerful zemindars quarrelled and attacked one another; the petty zemindars had their boundary disputes and feuds; but robberies between village and village, were, I believe, and are to this day, almost unknown.

9. Of late years, the injustice and feebleness of the Oude government, had suffered the evils which I have mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, to reach a dreadful height. They are, however, very different in kind, from the disorders which exist in Bengal; and, I think, are far more easily remedied, by a wise and vigorous government. The strength of such a government, bears down all resistance, and the cure of open violence is simple and expeditious.

10. Here, we behold a society, which, for internal protection, was thrown in a great measure, upon its own resources; a greater contrast than is presented by the police administration of Bengal, can hardly be imagined. That system, if I may be allowed the expression, has no root in the native soil of the community. It is purely artificial, with so little adaptation to local peculiarities, that it would equally suit any country on the globe. British magistrates are placed over the districts. Each district is arbitrarily divided into square proportions of ten *cohs*, and these subdivisions, are guarded by small establishments of peons, headed by native officers of our own creation, called police darogahs; in the selection of whom, no attention is required to any local fitness. The magistrate, in his endeavours to protect the community, must place his sole reliance on these establishments. The arrangement is not interwoven with any institutions, that previously existed, in the country; and it rigidly excludes the co-operation of all persons who possess any natural influence over the people.

11. In this last observation, I particularly refer to the landholders and other persons, having power and authority in landed estates. Nor is the exclusion of these persons from any direct share in the police; all their weight, if it had continued unimpaired, might still have had, indirectly and imperceptibly, a salutary effect in repressing disorders. But our system has also powerfully operated, to extirpate their influence. Much of the ancient proprietary has disappeared before the operation of selling estates for revenue balances, and has carried away with it, the authority attached in all countries, and in none more, than this, to birth and hereditary possession generally; the subdivision of landed property which it has been a great object of the system to promote, and the admission of numerous sharers to equal rights, have been in the highest degree unfavourable, to the consequence of the landholders.

12. This is the first point which I have chosen to select for comparison and discussion, as appearing to me, one principal cause of that weakness which is the chief feature of the system.

13. In maintaining this opinion, unless I greatly deceive myself, I may appeal to the general practice of almost all nations, originating, doubtless, in circumstances and feelings common to all mankind. The natural mode of managing men, is to employ the agency of those who, from the relation in which they stand to them, they regard with sentiments of respect

respect and confidence. Accordingly, all governments seem to have made the authority of these native leaders, the basis of their police; and any hired police establishment which they maintain, are not intended to supersede the native police, but to superintend, watch over, and aid its efforts.

14. To take an example, with which we are all familiar. In our own country, we all know what services the society contributes to its own protection. We know how much vigour is conferred on its police, by the support which it receives from native gentry, from respectable landholders, from the corporations in towns, and from substantial persons of the middle class in the villages. We can form some conception of the mischief which must ensue, if that support should be withdrawn, and an attempt made to compensate it, by positive laws and artificial institutions.

15. It is not indeed necessary to travel beyond the territory of this government, in quest of examples to establish the principle. These limits, afford us some striking instances of the advantages which may be reaped, by attending to it, and the evils which arise, when it is neglected.

16. At an early period of the British administration, that tract of hilly country lying between Beerbhoom and Bhauglepore was, in a state of extreme disorder. The inhabitants were in open arms against the government and its other subjects. A perpetual savage warfare was maintained by them, against the inhabitants of the plains, and they were proscribed and hunted down, like wild beasts; so that I have been informed by a gentleman who was at the time, collector of Beerbhoom, their heads were brought to him by basket loads. Such a state of things, must naturally have excited the attention of government, and have called forth all the ordinary means of prevention. Detachments were undoubtedly sent out; police establishments formed, revised and corrected; instructions issued, and reports called for; but all, without any effectual improvement, till some sagacious mind saw that the only chance of managing the hill people, was, by the influence of the hill chiefs. They were accordingly negotiated with; their confidence acquired; their interests engaged to us, by stipends; the charge of their hills, confided to them; and that wild country has ever since, been one of the quietest portions of our dominions.

17. We have a more recent instance of the same policy, attended with the same success. Within the district of Midnapore, there existed a considerable extent of forest country; called the Jungle Mehals; the inhabitants of these wilds, are little better than savages; and their only principle of obedience seems to be, their devotion to their native chiefs: without sufficient attention to their peculiar character, this people had been included in the general system of internal administration. The immediate authority over them, was given to police darogahs, and by the operation of selling estates for revenue balances, many of their zemindars had been dispossessed. The effects of this violence on the habits of the people, were felt by degrees. They sided with the discarded zemindars, contemned the authority of the police officers, and were frequently guilty of great disorders. The mischief, however, had excited no particular attention, and might long have escaped observation, when at last, some more than ordinary mismanagement drove them into open insurrection. Fortunately, at this critical juncture, Mr. Henry Strachey was selected to take charge of the district. His discernment and activity quickly discovered, and efficaciously applied, the proper remedy; many of the zemindars were brought back, and secured in their estates; their confidence was acquired, and their influence employed, to manage the inhabitants. The fruit of these judicious measures, was soon seen, in reviving tranquillity; and I have since heard of no serious disturbances.

18. These are the most proper cases for illustrating the principle; because the peculiar character of the society showed the effect of the system, in a manner that forced itself upon the attention. The symptoms were so strongly marked, that the disorder could not be mistaken. The people were so rude that they could be made to comprehend nothing but the authority of their chiefs; that, withdrawn, they immediately fell into confusion. In those parts of our dominions, where the inhabitants are more improved, the same cause will naturally operate with less violence, because partially counteracted, by milder manners and more rational habits; its consequences, therefore, will be less distinctly observed. But to conclude for that reason, that it does not operate at all, would be a great error. In my judgment, it may be traced throughout the country, as one principal source of the disorders which prevail.

19. But the system of police darogahs requires to be examined, in another point of view: I have explained the importance of these officers: I have shown, that with the British magistrate, they constitute all of the police; which is not mere physical strength; all, which it possesses, of superintendence and authority. Are then the general circumstance of these men, their character, their qualifications, their estimation in the eyes of the people, such as to compensate to the police for its other deficiencies?

20. This question, I fear, must be answered in the negative; their office is not, on a liberal footing; their salary is trifling, being only 25 rupees per mensem; their duty is confined to the apprehension of criminals: from a necessity which arises out of their situation, they are often treated with rigour, and not unfrequently subjected to disgraceful punishments. After this account of the office, I need scarcely add, that it is not filled by men of education or respectability: the darogahs, in fact, possess generally little consideration with the people; and by their qualifications, are unequal to any, but the most ordinary functions of the police.

21. How great must be the tendency of such a system to weakness will, I think, be evident, on the slightest consideration. The inability of the magistrate, from the multiplicity



of his business and the extent of his district, to controul his officers, will aggravate the mischief; within a small circle round his station, the peace may be tolerably maintained, and the darogahs restrained from mal-practices; but as this distance increases, his power will be less and less felt, till, in the remote parts of the district, it will become almost nugatory, and the darogahs be, in a manner independent. Then, many of them, will inevitably yield to the temptations to which they will be exposed, by such a situation. They will not only neglect their duties, and oppress the people, but even be emboldened to collude with criminals, and the strength of the police, will be turned against itself.

22. This is so natural a result of the arrangement which I have been stating, that it might have been presumed, without the authority of experience. But it does not rest on speculation. From the preamble to Regulation III. 1805, I observe, that the existence of this evil has excited the attention of government.

23. With the subject which I have just concluded, is closely connected another source of the defects, in our internal management. I refer to the want of a due support and encouragement to ancient and respectable families, not being landholders: this cause is indeed equally connected with the topic of natural authority, for it is obvious, such families form a portion of the natural authority of every country.

24. When the British first acquired the dominion of these provinces, they found a considerable body of what might be called, native gentry. These persons, were principally either the officers of the old government, or, if not immediately in office, the descendants of ancestors who had acquired distinction and property, in the service of the state. Taken as a body, they were not deficient in the acquaintance with men and business, the knowledge and elevation of sentiment, which in a certain degree, seems always attached to the long possession of power and affluence.

25. To exclude these men from offices of trust and power, was a necessary effect of the British ascendancy; and from this exclusion, the decline and ruin of the majority of these families would soon follow, as a secondary consequence.

26. Completely to guard against this consequence, was obviously impracticable; but it would undoubtedly have admitted of great palliation. Without too much burthening our government, we might have reserved a considerable number of offices for natives, upon a liberal footing of confidence and emolument. These, would have been a resource to many of these families; would have maintained them, in a decent state of respect and competency; and have enabled them to give their children an education, which would have preserved them, from falling below the place which their parents had held in society.

27. But our government has not appeared to think this object worthy their attention. I have shown the nature of the offices assigned to natives, in the police department. The same principle, runs generally through all the arrangements for the Lower Provinces; as far as respects natives. It is a system of petty agency; it consequently offers no adequate encouragement to men of respectability. If therefore not the policy of the government, it has at least been the tendency of their internal measures, to hasten the extinction of this class of men. Accordingly, the greatest part of these families have sunk under neglect and poverty; and their descendants have become confounded with the mass of the people.

28. To me, it has been always a subject of deep regret, that this course should have been pursued. Since I have been at this place, I have had opportunities to judge of some of the last of the race; and the very able assistance which I have received from them, has given me a high sense, of the advantages our administration might have derived, had means been taken to preserve the stock, and to make a proper use of their services.

29. The preceding observations refer to the general frame of our police, and to the persons in whose hands it is trusted. Other causes of inefficiency may be pointed out, in the distribution of the powers confided to those officers, and the regulations under which they act; causes honourable indeed to the government, and to the national character, as they originate in the mildness and humanity of our administration.

30. The native government, in its best times, was stern and severe, like all other despotic governments; more awake to the necessity of public order, than alive to the feelings of humanity. The state was, all; the subject, nothing. No anxious consideration for individuals restraining them from trusting their agents, with almost unlimited powers. Their officers were enabled to act, with celerity and effect. They held in their hands, all the means of prevention. As no scrupulous apprehensions of oppressing innocence, embarrassed their proceedings, they were tolerably secure of reaching the guilty; rapid executions impressing the imagination with terror, and connecting the ideas of the crime and the punishment, completed a system well adapted to overawe men's minds, and to maintain the public tranquillity.

31. Upon what opposite principles the British government acts, is well known. Their constant aim is to reconcile the support of public order, with a due attention to the honour, the lives, and the fortunes of individuals. Out of this tenderness, for the people, arises a jealous anxiety that the powers given for their protection, shall not be perverted to oppress them. Hence the authority of their officers is contracted, within narrow limits; hence numerous checks, multiplied formalities, and inevitable delays. The humane maxim, that the safety of the innocent is of far superior importance, to the punishment of the guilty, being the corner stone of our criminal system, many offenders must escape, and their impunity will naturally operate to increase crimes.

32. Even in our own country, these beneficent and lenient principles are thought to render our police, weak, though supported by all the strength of society, by the intelligence and public

public spirit of, perhaps, the most enlightened and public spirited nation of the globe. Can we then be surprized that the same maxims have been attended with great disorders, when introduced among a people whose habits have been formed, under despotism, who hardly possess the name of public principle, and who have been absolved, as I have observed, from the authority of their native leaders.

33. Such are the prominent reasons to which I ascribe the weakness of our police, and the disorders which prevail in the Lower Provinces. On subjects of this nature, however, unanimity of sentiment cannot be expected; and I am aware that my opinion will have to encounter respectable authority.

34. Gang-robbery, it is alledged, exists chiefly in Bengal; and is to be ascribed, not to any defects in our system, but to the local circumstances of the country, and the peculiar character of its inhabitants.

35. The first cause assigned is the nature of the country, in which labyrinths of forests and rivers afford refuge and shelter to banditti, offer favourable opportunities to attack passengers, and enable them to elude pursuit. This is certainly a very sufficient cause, as far as it goes; but it seems much too partial, to account for the general effect, since it cannot be denied that decoity prevails in several of the districts, the local circumstances of which, offer no such advantages.

36. The second and only other cause advanced, is of a nature to rob the unfortunate sufferers of all claim to sympathy, by casting the whole blame on themselves. The inhabitants of the other provinces, Behar for instance, it is said, owe their safety to the manliness of their character, which defies assault. The natives of Bengal are paying the natural penalties of cowardice. Their villages are fired, their property pillaged, their women ravished, and themselves tortured and assassinated, simply because they are poltroons.

37. This hypothesis, as it implies a sort of moral dispensation, is captivating; but I conceive, will not stand the test of deliberate examination. If indeed the decoits of Bengal, were always foreign invaders; or, though not foreigners, were (as sometimes happens) a peculiar class of men, reared in woods and deserts apart from the rest of mankind, and inured from youth to their savage occupation, it might be argued, speciously enough, that their success arose, from the pusillanimity of the people. But it is very well known, that in many of the districts, the banditti spring up from the very bosom of the community. In these cases, I must think the theory, plainly inadequate to the solution of the facts. For how can it be explained, that the selfsame people, who supply spirit for the assault, should be so miserably deficient, in resolution for the defence? Cowards, as they are represented, they might still, it should seem, take heart against their brother cowards. In truth, they do not appear to merit the imputation. They have often made, a very brave defence; and if the instances are not more numerous, it is not surprizing that their spirits have sunk, under the long pressure of so grievous a calamity. They who think so meanly of the Bengalese, surely forget, that, at an early period of our military history, they almost entirely formed several of our battalions, and distinguished themselves as brave and active soldiers.

38. In addition to those internal presumptions, there exists external evidence against the solidity of this account. Gang-robbery is certainly much less frequent in Behar, than in Bengal. But the explanation, which I am opposing, assumes, that it is hardly known in the former province. Now I beg leave to appeal, both to the actual state of the province, and to the records of the court of circuit, and Nizamut Adawlut, as affording abundant matter to disprove this notion. A very remarkable instance occurs to my recollection, which happened a few years back, in the district of Tirhoot. A party of banditti established themselves, and reigned, without controul, in the populous town of Hagypore, close to Patna, and not far distant from the magistrate's station; to such a pitch had their audacity, and the subjection of the people, arisen, that their chief, on the occasion of a marriage in his family, actually sat in state, and compelled the respectable inhabitants to attend, and offer him their congratulations. These men, were at length seized and brought to justice; their trial is to be found among the records of the Nizamut Adawlut, and may serve for a multitude of proofs, that whatever privilege the men of Behar possess, over their less fortunate neighbours of Bengal, cannot be ascribed to their personal qualities.

39. All parties however agree, that the same system has been attended with very different results, in the two provinces. There must, therefore, be some way of accounting for the difference; and as I reject the explanation commonly given, I may be expected to offer one, more satisfactory. But it is one thing to refute an erroneous account; and another, to give the true one. The arguments which I have urged, against the causes which have been assigned, will lose nothing of their validity, though I myself should be unable to point out more adequate causes. To the public officers, who have local experience, I must leave the task, of explaining the circumstances which have enabled Behar so much more successfully to resist the disorganizing principles which appear to me to have done the mischief in Bengal; only venturing to suggest, that the reason may be, perhaps, found in the different state of the landed property.

40. But even Behar, it is said, is running the same course with Bengal; the influence of all, who were respectable, dying away; the people not dissolving into a dispersed, unconnected multitude, without any points of union, any sufficient power to embody them for self defence; the vicious and disorderly, encouraged by these advantages, forming combinations to prey on the rest of the community.

41. What may be thought of the weight of the preceding reasoning, I know not. A very few years back, I should have been afraid, in advancing the arguments which I have offered,

offered, of exposing myself to the imputation of singularity. I have now the satisfaction to find, that some of my conclusions, at least, are sanctioned by the highest authority. The preamble to Regulation 12. 1807, declares, that the police establishments, in the provinces, those establishments on which we have relied for 16 years, are inefficient; and the intention of that regulation is, to strengthen the police, by engaging in its service, persons whose character and situation give them authority among the people.

42. How far, indeed, the means adopted, are likely to effect so desirable an end, is, I fear, very questionable. On the one side, I observe great sacrifices. On the other, no adequate inducements. Pecuniary indemnification the regulation does not promise generally; and in proportion as this resolution is deviated from, the plan will become costly. In addition to expense, the police aumeens will be called on for no inconsiderable sacrifices of time, ease; and, in many situations, where gang-robbery is formidable, of personal safety. But the responsibility, I imagine, will be the great objection the foudarry adawlut, and the court of circuit; things, the contrast of which, unless impelled by very powerful motives, it is the aim of every respectable native during life to avoid. On the other hand, what are the inducements? Public spirit, I think, will not be mentioned. And I see nothing else, but the temptation of being raised to the same level of dignity, with petty police officers; not quite that indeed, for the aumeens will be, to a certain degree, subordinate to the darogahs. The event, I sincerely hope, will be contrary to my expectation; but I think it impossible that many natives of character will be brought to accept the new office: some respectable men may, perhaps, undertake it, from deference to the wishes of government; but, in that case, they will take good care not to commit themselves, by an over officious zeal.

43. If I have been at all successful in explaining my sentiments, it will readily be collected, from what I have said, that I must entertain great doubts, on the expediency of the innovations which have lately taken place in these provinces. But, as connected with the immediate object of my consideration: the police, they present themselves to me, in a light peculiarly unfavourable.

44. The police in these provinces, before the late changes, rested upon the zemindars and tehsildars.

45. In a former part of this Report, speaking of the zemindars of the Ceded Provinces, I have attempted to explain the causes which operate to make the influence of these men, favourable to the tranquillity of the country at large. The same cause, to a certain degree, still exists in Benares, and ensures a very reasonable portion of security, to the fixed inhabitants; at the same time, it will be easily understood that this protection does not extend, to strangers, travellers, and passengers. We find, in fact, that these persons are the chief objects of crimes committed for the sake of lucre. There is no doubt that the zemindars are frequently the instigators; and even when that does not happen, if left to themselves, they regard with indifference, the sufferings of men who are without the pale of their domestic ties.

46. A state of things, however, which offers to our hand the security of the great body of fixed inhabitants, is an admirable basis upon which to build a police. All that was, in my judgment, required in addition, would have been to preserve that foundation, the zemindarry system itself, from decay, and rapid changes; and next, by instituting a vigorous controul over the zemindars, to compel them to extend their protection to strangers.

47. The present zemindarry propriety is menaced with destruction, from various causes. The first and principal is, the minute division of estates by the Mahomedan and Hindoo laws of inheritance. The operation of this cause, is already so visible in the Benares province, that petty estates will be found with 50, 100, and even more co-sharers. It would be foreign from my present purpose to enlarge on the ruinous consequences of such a state of property, to the owners, the inconvenience from it, to the revenue, its effects, to overwhelm the courts of justice with a multiplicity of suits relative to scarcely tangible interests, or the injurious influence of the litigiousness which it unavoidably breeds, on the morals and happiness of the people. But it is evident, that in estates where such anarchy prevails, no persons can have sufficient weight to perform any service for the police.

48. As landed property in this province, was virtually a boon from the British government to the present possessors, they would gladly have received it, on any conditions which the public welfare made desirable: I cannot, therefore; but lament, that at the time the gift was conferred, the consequences I have stated were not foreseen and guarded against, by limiting the partibility of estates. Even now, the government, I think, should interfere, in its legislative capacity. The mode and extent of the interference are, indeed, questions of delicacy; but the interference itself, is plainly made necessary for the public welfare, and would be justified by that necessity. If the sacrifice of rights be objected, I answer, that I should propose to sacrifice no rights that were not mere shadows; unprofitably engrossing the attention of the wretched claimant; involving him, in unavailing litigation, and diverting his time and industry, from a more advantageous channel. Lawyers act without scruple on the maxim "*de minimis non curat lex*;" and I do not see why the same licence, may not be taken by the lawgiver.

49. As far as the revenue is concerned, government, I am aware, have applied a partial remedy by Regulation 6, 1807, which provides, that no share of a zemindarry shall be separated, and erected into a distinct estate, unless it will bear a jumma of not less than 500 rupees. But this regulation does nothing to remedy the internal confusion to which the multiplicity of shares give occasion. The right to separation, however, is very important; and the shares to which it is denied, must lose much of their value by the measure. It therefore

fore assumes the principle, that the interests of the zemindars, must give way to those of the public; and after going so far, there seems no good reason for not going as much further, as the same end may require.

50. If this great evil could be corrected, the principal remaining danger which menaces the proprietary, is an incapable or unfaithful administration of the revenue. Whenever this cause unhappily exists, and oppressive exactions are added to the heavy demands of government, many of the zemindars necessarily sink under the burden, and lose their estates, for public sale.

51. It is also obvious, that the pecuniary embarrassments which these causes create, will often terminate in private alienations, or in what amounts to the same thing, judicial sales. Abstracted from them, private alienations, I imagine, would not be numerous; the people clinging to their estates, with tenacious fondness. Various accidental events, indeed, must be expected occasionally to involve the proprietors in pecuniary distress; but there seemed no reason to apprehend, from the operation of these causes, any such rapid changes, as would seriously have affected the zemindary police agency.

52. The necessity of putting bounds to this discussion, restrains me from entering into the specific remedies which I should have suggested for the mischiefs, actual and possible, which I have enumerated; I must therefore assume that proper means would have been adopted, to keep up some authority in estates, and the body of proprietors guarded, against violent change. The next object would have been to compel, the proprietors to render faithful services to the police, not only by protecting their dependents, and abstaining from injuring their neighbours, but by watching over the safety of the traveller and stranger.

53. To state all the measures I should have proposed with this view, would lead me into too much detail. The control is the great point; and for that, I should have despaired of making any more effectual provision than existed in the superintendence of the old tehsildars. From the liberal footing on which these officers were placed, they derived weight and authority with the people; their revenue transactions with the zemindars, gave them a strong hold on that class of men, made them intimately acquainted with their characters and conduct, and put in their power opportunities, peculiarly favourable, of acquiring the local information essential to good police. How comparatively destitute the new darogahs must be of all these advantages, it would be waste of time to demonstrate.

54. But if the union of police and revenue powers was favourable to the strength of the police, as far as the tehsildars were concerned, I must acknowledge that in another important point, the controul of the magistrate, it was liable to objection. The revenue is of such primary consequence, that any objects that come in competition with it, will necessarily give way. On this ground, probably, the nomination of the tehsildars was, in the collector, who, on the same principle, if he had secured the revenue by his choice, would be apt to think that he had done enough. Then the two duties would occasionally clash; and the police of course, suffer in the conflict. Often too, the duty of the revenue would be made a plausible plea to the magistrate, for neglect and inattention to the other duty. He would thus frequently find himself without any person to send him regular information, and duly execute his orders.

55. A situation in which the magistrates made so little figure, would naturally disgust many of them with the system, and dispose them to undervalue the good it contained, which indeed lay somewhat deep, while the evil was on the surface. Zealous men of business inclined to over-rate the advantages of order and precision, and the formalities and machinery of office, would be peculiarly impatient, at the obstructions and irregularities which they experienced.

56. An obvious and effectual mode of surmounting the difficulty, and of powerfully strengthening the magistrate's arm, would be to place the tehsildars under his sole authority, by giving him the collection of the revenue; such an arrangement would indeed be inconsistent with what is deemed, a fundamental maxim of our code, that judicial and revenue functions shall not be united. How far this principle ought rigorously and invariably to be observed, in all situations, and under all circumstances, is a very serious, and in my judgment, by no means, a clear question; but without proposing what might perhaps be generally thought so violent a cure, the inconvenience did not strike me in so formidable a light, that it would have induced me to change the tehsildars for police darogahs. A measure recently adopted, which compelled the tehsildars to maintain a regular establishment for the sole purpose of police, with a darogah to be approved by the magistrate, went far to remedy one part of the inconvenience. To remedy the other defect, and to secure some attention to police, in the appointment of tehsildars, the judicial officers should have been allowed, some voice in their selection; their nomination, for instance, might have passed through the Court of Appeal and Circuit; and here I may be permitted to observe incidentally, that the proper choice of a tehsildar would almost always have secured, a good police darogah.

57. But the new arrangements have struck at the root of all such views. They have totally changed the condition of the tehsildars and zemindars, and trust to police darogahs, as the main support of the police.

Here, perhaps, I shall be reminded that the new system continues the responsibility of the zemindars. I see indeed that it is so declared; but I do not perceive that any means have been adopted, to effectuate this intention.

58. The original Regulations for Benares were framed by a gentleman who had a long and intimate knowledge of the province. Both his rules, and the traces of his sentiments left

left on them, show us his opinion, on these subjects.. He could not fail to perceive, that the good order of the province mainly depended, on guarding against violent changes in the body of the landed proprietors. He was also aware, that the ignorance of the zemindars; their improvidence and turbulent character, would long require their subjection to a vigorous controul, equally with a view to their own welfare, and the interest of the public. Accordingly, he placed them generally, under the authority of the tehsildars. At the same time, he held out to them, the prospect of independence from this restraint; but not, as a gratuitous gift. He instituted a test for determining the fitness of those who might claim the privilege, which made it, in some sort, the reward of prudence and good conduct; and by that very precaution, he took care that emancipation, should be a gradual process. Before a zemindar could be made huzzoory, he exacted security from him, for the punctual payment of this revenue, and the faithful discharge of his police duties. Those who could not give this pledge that their liberty would not be abused, to their own and the public detriment, Mr. Duncan thought, ought to be left, under guardianship. As this scheme was well suited to the habits and condition of the zemindars, so it was also calculated to restrain the zemindars from oppression. Any severity on their part would naturally prompt the zemindars to struggle to release themselves from a controul, under which, if well treated, they would be contented to remain: and every instance of emancipation operated on the tehsildar, as a diminution both of his profits and his consequence. As an encouragement to zemindars who might raise their views to independence, and to assist them in providing the required securities, Mr. Duncan allowed them a moiety of the tehsildars per-centage on their revenue, which was taken from the tehsildar.

59. In the late arrangements, the policy dictated by Mr. Duncan's plan, has been wholly abandoned. The zemindars have been stimulated to claim their independence, but the pecuniary allowance annexed to it, has been withdrawn; and, as a kind of indemnification, they have been exonerated from the securities which were originally made the condition of the privilege. The regulation which introduces this measure, observes, that, for the revenue, the estate is sufficient security; which is tantamount to a declaration, that, provided the rent be paid, who may be zemindar, is considered a matter of indifference. On the security, with relation to good conduct, the regulation proceeds to remark, that the zemindars are of course amenable to the laws: now that consideration, I beg permission to remark, could not have escaped Mr. Duncan. Let me solicit justice to that gentleman's views. The letter and the spirit of his rules evidently show that the personal deportment of the zemindar was not the intention of the security, but his conduct as a police officer; and for that object I think he must be allowed to have judged rightly, that somewhat more was requisite than a responsibility common to him, with every individual of the community.

60. From these observations I have purposely excluded all mention of the pecuniary liability of zemindars for thefts and robbers. It is universally acknowledged to be a dead letter.

61. But I may be thought guilty of a more important omission, should I neglect to notice that the new system also includes the tehsildar, who is to act as a police aumeen, and possesses, concurrent authority with the darogah. I must confess, however, that I augur no good, from this co-operation. To place officers, almost independent of each other, to perform active duties of the same nature, within the same limits, is, in my humble opinion, a contrivance ill suited to the native character. I perceive no rule by which the darogah and the aumeen are to adjust the balance of their respective powers; and I see much reason to apprehend that they will either unite in a collusive agreement, or by their contention, when those motives may not influence them, harrass the people, and impede the public service.

62. I must at the same time, observe, that this arrangement, whatever may be its merits or defects otherwise, is liable to an objection, much urged by many who were adverse to the old system. It unites police and revenue powers, in the same hands. It may, indeed, be observed, that the police is not to be confided to the tehsildars indiscriminately, but to those alone, whose superior character and good qualities will warrant the trust; still, as I am happy to perceive, enough is done, in spite of the qualification to explode the maxim, that the union of these two ingredients of revenue and police must necessarily form a deadly compound. But I venture to say further on this point, that no man ought to be appointed a tehsildar, who is not fit to be trusted with the power of a police darogah. A discreet collector, in chusing his tehsildars, would never have lost sight of this principle; and when any collector did, the authority placed to superintend him, ought to have corrected his error. Now, if the power of government was adequate to compel such a selection, it might have been applied to the tehsildars of the old system; and then, as far as respected police, there would have been no urgent need of change. If, on the other hand, all the power of government was inadequate to that object, where is the security for a better choice of police darogahs? in the magistrate's sense of duty?—And are magistrates, more than collectors, inviolably governed by a sense of duty. Are they so much easier to be controuled?

63. But the tehsildars, to whom the functions of police are now to be trusted, it may also be said, are very different from the old tehsildars. They will be reduced in authority, in consequence, in emolument. They will thus be disarmed of the power to do harm: and what, in my turn, I must be permitted to ask, will become of their power or inclination to do good? Will they escape, unimpaired from the process? I have always been taught to think, that in reasonable degrees, and under proper limitations, distinction, authority and affluence, are some of the most powerful instruments of good, and afford some of the strongest excitements to upright conduct.

64. To the British European officers, this reasoning has been wisely and liberally applied. They have been placed, in circumstances so advantageous, that prudence and virtue unite to secure them from the influence of base and sordid motives. Are the natives of Hindostan a different order of beings, that they are to be stunted into honesty, and degraded into principle?

65. And this consideration, leads me to the abolition of the former tehsildary system, to which, in fact, these police arrangements are subordinate. Simply, with a view to the police, the new arrangements I presume, would never have been adopted. Discarding theories on either side, and judging by the solid test of experience, the Benares police was clearly more effectual to its end, than the police of the provinces below. To say all in one word, we had hardly any decoity, and the little which did take place, happened principally on the Nawaub's frontier. Accordingly, the Nizamut Adawlut, in their letter to the Vice-President in Council, dated the 27th December 1805, speaking of the proposed change, do not seem to expect that it will be attended, with any positive advantages to the police; all they say of the Bengal police, is, that it does not increase crimes, and all they promise themselves, from its introduction into Benares, is, that it will not be attended with ill consequences.

66. Now it is obvious the Nizamut Adawlut and the government would never have acted, on such negative views. We must therefore look for some ulterior motives, in the innovation; and this undoubtedly was the resolution to abolish the old tehsildary system. The former police, rested on the system, and was involved, in its fall.

67. They who regret the loss of the police, and think as I do, that the change is likely to be followed by many evils, must endeavour to find their consolation, in the general benefits of the measure to which it has been sacrificed. But this is a consolation which I cannot reap; thinking the principal measure, open to a still more powerful objection than those which I have made, to the accessory one; and notwithstanding the discredit into which the tehsildary system has fallen, professing myself to be its friend and advocate.

68. The motives which led government to this great measure, I have not been able to learn, from any authority. The preamble to the regulation which introduces it, observes a silence on the reasons, not usual on matters of far less importance. But I hear vaguely, that the system was attended with great abuses, and that by its abolition, government will ensure a considerable saving.

69. No where perhaps has the argument from the abuse against the use, led to so many errors, as in this country; yet nobody I trust, carries this reasoning so far as to maintain, that every system must be destroyed, which is not free from abuse. Proceeding with that rigour, none of the institutions of government would escape. I am told that corruption is not unknown, in the revenue administration of the Lower provinces; and in all the provinces, I am sure, that if gross abuses could be a reason for the downfall of the present judicial establishments, they would not stand another hour.

70. To justify the overthrow of institutions which have long existed, and have tolerably answered the purposes of their institution, a general vague charge of abuse, is not enough. It seems reasonable to require that the abuses, should be accurately stated; that it should be seen, whether they are inherent in the accused system, or merely accidental and casual; whether they do not admit of palliation and amendment; what may be the good, by which they are compensated; finally, and above all, what is to come in place of the system proposed to be abolished?—A sober dispassionate discussion of the Benares tehsildary system, upon these principles, I have yet to see. Meantime, without pretending to deny that the system, like all human systems, carried within it the seeds of evil, I could perceive that many of the alledged abuses were accidental, others, gross deviations from the system; that those most clearly connected with it, admitted of palliations; that on the whole, the good predominated; and, lastly, that there exists no security against greater evils in the system, which is to come in its place.

71. On the points stated in the preceding paragraph, I propose to make some observations. I must, however, previously notice the disadvantage which I lie under, in this part of the discussion. Had the Benares tehsildary system been extended, like the arrangements in the provinces below, over a great tract of country, divided among a number of officers, all reference to individual character would have been superfluous; because in that case, the great number of officers, would have afforded room for a balance and compensation of their different personal qualities. But the Benares province, in which alone the police tehsildary system has been tried for any length of time, it must be remembered, has constituted one single office, and has been, in very few hands. To form therefore a fair estimate of the abuses which have existed, reference must be had to the character of individuals; and delicacy and propriety forbid my entering upon such an examination; what weight is to be allowed to this consideration in the argument, I must leave in silence to the prudence of the Nizamut Adawlut and the government.

72. This same circumstance, the whole province being committed to the charge of one individual, may however be mentioned as one source of abuse, not having any natural connexion with the tehsildary system. To show the magnitude of the trust, it is enough to say, that the collection amounts to half a million sterling. This, upon general principles, was a greater temptation than it was prudent to offer, to any individual. But this is not the only, nor the chief point of view, in which this fact deserves to be considered. They who are at all acquainted with the native character, can judge of the difficulty which the collector of so great a district must find, in restraining his native agents from abuses. I am

persuaded



persuaded that no union of intelligence, activity and integrity, would prevent numerous abuses, in such a situation. What must happen, when there is a failure of any of these qualities, may easily be conceived.

73. Another cause is, the distance and consequent weakness of the controuling power. If government are unable to prevent abuse, in the districts below, and almost under their own eyes; greater abuses must have been expected *a fortiori*, at this distance, even if the system had been the same. In appreciating the abuses charged against the system, great allowance is evidently due to this most important consideration.

74. But I must acknowledge that some abuses have been alledged, which I cannot account for, by any of the causes which I have mentioned. It has been said, that almost all the tehsildarries in the province, have been monopolized by two or three opulent individuals. If this took place, as I fear to a great degree cannot be denied, it was certainly a great evil, and a most gross deviation from the whole principle and spirit of the system. But I cannot concede that it proves the tehsildary system itself, to be a bad one; my sole inference from it, would have been, that government should have exerted its wisdom, to effect a more vigorous controul.

75. How indeed, so glaring an abuse should have so long escaped the vigilance and correction of the board of revenue, and the government, it is not easy to understand. I can only explain the fact, by a circumstance which I have before adverted to; the disposition to consider the tehsildars office merely as connected with the revenue, without sufficient reference to it, as a police trust, much less, as a fund for respectable men. The circumstances which have happened to a very respectable tehsildar in this province, are so well calculated to support this conjecture, that I cannot forbear giving a short history of his case.

76. This person's name is Akbarally Khan, nephew to the historian Ghollaum Hossain, and tehsildar of Sheopore, one of the smallest pergunnahs in the province. His pergunnah adjoins the city; and on the occasion of Vizier Ally's insurrection, he conducted himself in a manner that gave the highest satisfaction to Mr. Davis, the magistrate. That gentleman, in consequence, warmly recommended him to government; and suggested, that he should be promoted, on the first vacancy, to a larger pergunnah. The government fully concurred in Mr. Davis's sentiments on the merit of Akbar Ally Khan, and directed Mr. Davis to give him a public written testimonial of their sense of his services. But they did not think proper to adopt Mr. Davis's recommendation, that they would order him to be promoted; observing that, by the Regulations, the appointment of tehsildars was vested in the collectors.

77. Many years had elapsed from this event, when the strong representations made by Mr. Deane, then magistrate of Juanpore, on the abuses in the patronage of the tehsildary office, and the fatal consequences of it, to the police of his district, forced the subject upon the attention of government.

78. Mr. Deane had represented that many of the pergunnahs were held in the names of the servants and dependants of one person, who was in fact the tehsildar, and enjoyed all the authority and emoluments of the station. Instructions were in consequence, transmitted to the collectors and the magistrates, to ascertain and report the real holders of the tehsildaries. Their answer showed that Mr. Deane's complaint was too well founded; and strict orders were accordingly issued to correct the abuse.

79. But among the persons who had thus irregularly ingrossed many of the tehsildaries, was Rajah Odismarrain, the Rajah of Benares; and the peculiar claims this person possesses to the indulgence and consideration of government, induced them to exempt him from their general orders, and to direct that his pergunnahs should not be taken from him, but allowed to drop in; at the same time, it was explained, that the Rajah was not to be permitted to continue this system.

80. A few months after these orders had been issued, a person named Deharam, one of the Rajah's dependants, who had been appointed to the large pergunnah of Mohommedabad, died; Mr. Morrieson was at that time acting, as collector. As register to the city court, he was well acquainted with the character of Akbar Ally, and thought this, a proper opportunity to do justice to his merits. Mr. Morrieson accordingly recommended him to the board of revenue for the vacant situation; stating his claims, and acquainting the board, that, notwithstanding the honourable testimonial which he possessed of his services, he had during so many years, remained unrewarded, and in the smallest pergunnah of the province. Mr. Morrieson might have added the collector's opinion of Akbar Ally's character, contained in his report to the board of revenue on the tehsildars, dated 20th October 1804. I transcribe it verbatim. "Syed Akbar Ally Khan, who is the tehsildar of the pergunnah Havelly Sheopore, which yields a jumma of 1<sup>l</sup> 35,991. 12 A<sup>s</sup> per annum, is a very able and respectable man; is punctual, in the discharge of the revenue of his tehsildary; is perfectly correct, in the duties of his office; always resides in his pergunnah, and is fully competent for the trust he holds."

81. The board of revenue were pleased to adopt Mr. Morrieson's recommendation, and Akbar Ally was accordingly appointed; and the orders of the board containing his appointment, dispatched to Benares. Before they had arrived however, Mr. Morrieson had resigned the charge; subsequently, the Rajah preferred a petition, which was forwarded to the board of revenue, stating, that not having been able to dispense with the attendance of Deharam near his person, another of his dependants, by name Sheolof Chobey, had been some time in charge of the pergunnah; and praying that this man might be appointed tehsildar. His representation was successful; and Akbar Ally's appointment was cancelled.



82. In communicating these new orders, the board were pleased to direct that attention should be paid to Akbar Ally's merits, on some future occasion. But after what he had experienced, this mark of the board's attention could have afforded him very slender consolation. In fact, he continues to this hour, tehsildar of the petty pergunnah of Sheopore.

83. Will it however be urged, that the abuses I have stated as extensive, are an evil inherent in the system; since they prove that the temptation to abuse was so powerful, that it baffled all controul. This objection I have already partially anticipated, by observing, that the whole province, need not have been given to one man. If the objection be applied to the tehsildary system, under any distribution of the province, I must observe, that it proves too much: for in that case, let the real meaning of this argument be considered, it amounts to this; that generally speaking, the government have so little confidence in their servants, and are so little able to controul them, that they cannot venture to have any offices for natives, on a liberal footing, lest they should become venal. But, in this view of the case, I do not see how any arrangement is to cure the evil: after all, we must have native agents, and we must trust them with power, which, upon the very facts assumed by the objection, will be perverted to the purposes of exactions. The new office, therefore, however humble in appearance, will bear a value proportioned to the facility of abuse. There will always be unprincipled men, determined to take illicit advantages, and indifferent about the means. There will always be weak men, who will allow the officers about them, to convert their patronage into profit. There will be thus, as much corruption, under the new, as under the old system; with this difference, that this new corruption, will be more sordid and disgraceful, and its consequences, more pernicious. What has taken place of late years, in the provinces below, where business, as I have before observed, is chiefly conducted by petty native agents, would, I fear, afford sufficient evidence that these observations, are not mere theory.

84. The tehsildary office was so respectable and so liberally rewarded, that it by no means followed, because a person paid a consideration for it, he looked to illegal profits; but admitting that, in many cases, those who purchased, would indemnify themselves in that way, their station and their advantages, upon the ordinary principles of human nature, were a sort of security that they would observe a certain moderation and decency, in their misconduct. In the case of petty officers, there is no such restraint; they have nothing at stake but a bare subsistence; they are exposed to great temptation; and if they once give way to it, the fear of detection will only stimulate their rapacity. They will descend to the vilest exactions, and their gains will often be wrung, from the poorest and most helpless of the community. It would be curious to know how much is annually levied by police darogahs, commissioners of petty causes, commissioners of distraint, and the various retainers to the courts; much more, I am persuaded, than government are at all aware. The corruption of a collector, and the oppressions of tehsildars, make a noise, and excite scandal: petty officers fleece the people rupee by rupee, and little attention is attracted: the items are trifling, and we are apt to forget that the total amount, may be enormous.

85. In making these remarks, I am not afraid that I shall be suspected of any sympathy for the abuses attached to the system, which I have been defending. Sensibility shrinks from the name of corruption; the indignation that would sweep away, without further question, every system in which it lurks, may be amiable; but to perform solid service, public men must look at these things, odious as they are, with cooler feelings.

86. The abuses which I have hitherto mentioned, were, in a great measure, foreign to the tehsildary system: but the oppression of the tehsildars themselves, has been much insisted on. In forming a judgment on this point, it is proper to take into consideration the accidental causes which I have mentioned, particularly the great extent of country placed under one collector, and the distance of the controul: after allowing for the operation of those causes, I see no reason why the tehsildars should have had power to practise greater abuses than the other native officers attached to the revenue and judicial departments. One of the abuses alleged against the tehsildars however, on account of its magnitude, deserves to be specially noticed. They have been charged with contriving to defraud the zemindars, of their estates: a notion of this sort, undoubtedly prevails; but I have not been able to ascertain with any precision, the extent of the alleged grievance, or the means by which the fraud was supposed to be accomplished. If, indeed, such things have commonly happened, since the province was settled, and the revenue of the zemindars fixed in perpetuity, it is a fact pregnant with very melancholy inferences. The tehsildar was a receiver of revenue, and an officer of police; and in both characters, had very limited powers. The tehsildars were controuled by the collector; the collector, by the board of revenue; the board of revenue, by the government; then, to check the executive officers, came the judicial authorities, the judge of the district, the provincial court of appeal and circuit; and last, the high court of the sudder dewanny and nizamut. Are we to believe that the result of this costly and elaborate organization was, that persons, in the situation of revenue receivers and police agents, could not be prevented from defrauding people of their estates?—They who credit this conclusion, ought not to be very sanguine about the effects of any new arrangement.

87. A jealousy has been entertained by some gentlemen, of the tehsildars keeping the people, at a distance from the British officers. This evil must have happened, in two ways; either from the dread of their power, or from the influence of their character. On the first head, I must repeat what I have already hinted, that if government cannot devise an effectual controul over officers in the circumstances of the tehsildars, there can be no rational hope of improvement from any new system. The cause is desperate. On the weight which the tehsildars might possess, by their character and respectability, I must

contend, that though, like every thing human, it was liable to abuse, that influence on the whole, was beneficial and salutary; no country in the world, as I have repeatedly observed, can be well governed, without this natural authority; and if the people are disposed to depend on it, too servilely, the evil can only be effectually cured, by ameliorating the general condition of the society. Now this, in my humble judgment, cannot be a hasty operation, nor be accomplished by rules formed, on abstract reasoning; however benevolent, in the intention. To improve the general condition of the people, we must secure some hold, on them; our plans must be built, on the existing basis of their ancient institutions, and adapted to their habits and manners; and we must engage in the execution of them, those whom they can understand, and to whom they will look up, with confidence and respect. By degrees, proportioned to the capacity and uprightness of the British officers, what might appear too harsh, in the authority of these native leaders, and unreasonable and injurious, in the customs of the country, would be mitigated, and the people led to know, and to assert their rights. If we attempt to reverse this order; if we begin, by destroying all that is known and respected, we shall inevitably introduce a thousand more evils, than we correct; society will be thrown into anarchy, and all our efforts wasted, in a vain contest with its vices and disorders.

88. Petty officers, it is thought, will not over-awe the people; will not prevent their reaching the British officers, with their grievances. Granted that it may be so, at first, what will be the conclusion? The people, unfortunately, will not only, not fear, but they will despise such officers; they will be discontented, with all they do, right or wrong. Feeling themselves emancipated from all restraint, a spirit of litigiousness will go forth, among them, and vent itself in complaints, till the channels of justice become choked. Then, by the sure course of things, one extreme will terminate, in the other. Redress will be impracticable. The officers will perceive their strength; they who complain against officers will become rare; and the people will be subjected to the odious harrassing oppression, of a multitude of petty tyrants.

89. And is it not at length, time to consider what may be the influence of these principles on the character and morals of the community. As we proceed, these provinces will soon present the singular spectacle of a great empire, the government of which, rigidly excludes its subjects from every object of fair ambition, which, in the pursuit, could stimulate men to cultivate their faculties, or, in the possession, enlarge their understandings and elevate their minds. The natives may accumulate wealth, as merchants; they may be proprietors of land; but these occupations, as they are managed in this country, have no great tendency to raise the character. Beyond them, with the rarest exceptions, there is nothing to which the people can aspire, higher than the command of a platoon of seapoys, or the possession of some petty civil office, insignificant in its functions, and paid with a salary, hardly adequate to a bare subsistence. My speculations may have perhaps misled me, but I am persuaded that very unfavourable effects from these causes, may already be traced, in the habits of our native subjects; and their long continuance, must, I think, infallibly end, in reducing the whole population to one ignorant, grovelling, litigious, and profligate herd.

90. But I may be charged with exaggerating the consequences, of the late arrangement; I may be reminded, that the tehsildary office has not been abolished; and that tehsildars will still be maintained, on a liberal footing. I must be permitted to answer, that my experience of the past, gives me no confidence in such assurances. Should such declarations be made by government, it would be superfluous to profess my implicit reliance on them. I am convinced that they would be perfectly sincere, at the time. But new necessities will arise; motives for economy will again press; the roll of establishments will undergo future revisions; no reasons will occur why the tehsildars may not perform their duties, on less salaries; and at length perhaps, the abolition of the office may be resolved on;—even now, rumours are abroad, that these officers are to be altogether discontinued in Behar. The per-centage allowed to the tehsildars, in this and the Upper Provinces, was a fixed fund, which I had hoped would have been kept sacred, for the encouragement and support of respectable natives. Now, that its integrity has been violated, it will soon melt away. The salaries proposed to be substituted, will gradually dwindle, by retrenchments; and the abolition of the office itself, will probably not be long postponed;—then, after the lapse of a few years, a native of education and character, will be a phenomenon; and if afterwards, this consequence should be regretted, that which might easily have been prevented, will never be retrieved.

91. The economy of the measure, is yet to be touched on; a motive of government, which I can never think, much less speak of, but with respect; yet I take the liberty of observing that economy has no connection, with the merits or defects of the different systems under examination. If improvements can be made in the interior management of the country, and a saving accrue to government, at the same time, that, would be a fortunate secondary result of the new measures, but ought not to be regarded, as the motive. On the other hand, if an imperious state necessity, enforce the adoption of a worse, but cheaper system, let that, be understood as the ground of the measure, and whatever regret may prevail, all objections must cease. But when these considerations are suffered to mingle, there will always be danger that the merits of the opposing plans, will not be steadily weighed; and that economy, which ever side it may embrace, will have too powerful a voice, in silencing scruples and overruling difficulties.

92. Waving this reasoning however, and examining the new arrangements, by the test of economy, I am of opinion that its expediency is by no means, clearly ascertained. There may

REPORTS  
OF  
Judges of Circuit,  
on termination of their  
Sessions.

No. 4.  
Benart's Division.  
1808.

may indeed, be a considerable immediate saving; but to say nothing of possible loss of revenue by the change, the establishments below, are very costly, and seem to have a constant tendency to increase. I have already observed, that the police establishments have been declared inefficient. I now observe, from the report of the Nizamut Adawlut to government, on the police establishments of this province, dated the 18th of December 1807, that they have a plan in contemplation for strengthening the police, by stationing armed peons throughout the country, in every town or considerable village. I think I am within bounds when I say, that the execution of this plan, will double the present charge on account of police. The judicial contingencies below, in the articles of jails, guards, cost of banishment and transportation, rewards for the apprehension of criminals, diet of prisoners and witnesses, are already very heavy; and as there seems reason to dread that crimes, and delinquency in particular, are increasing, may be expected to augment daily. Should there be any weight in the arguments which I have presumed to advance, the system will by degrees, be attended with the same effects in the Upper Provinces, the first saving will insensibly be absorbed, in these charges; and there will be superadded an expenditure, still more to be deplored, of the blood and happiness of the people.

93. I have already exceeded all ordinary bounds; and there yet remains a topic, so important in itself, and so closely connected with all my former reasoning, that I cannot pass it over in silence, though my observations on it, must necessarily be very brief.

94. Within a few years back, by cessions and conquest, the territory under the immediate superintendence of the government general, has been doubled, for I believe I may say double, without any exaggeration. The plan adopted for the management of these extensive acquisitions, has been to appoint a temporary commission for the settlement of them, which on executing its task, is to be withdrawn; and afterwards, the whole detail of revenue, justice and police, is to be placed under the cognizance of the boards and great officers, at the presidency of Fort William, who already exercised the superintendence of these objects, in the old territory. With great submission, I take the liberty of expressing my firm conviction, that this system is defective, in the very important point of control, and consequently, that it will be found inadequate to maintain the internal peace, justice, and good order of these remote possessions.

95. The superintendence of revenue details, and of the appointment of the native revenue officers, is vested in the board of revenue. The superintendence of the judicial and police establishments is the duty of the court, called the Sudder Dewanay and Nizamut Adawlut. The superintending powers of the provincial court of appeal and circuit are too insignificant to be taken into the account.

96. In the course of this report, I have had occasion to notice strong symptoms of inefficiency, in the controul of the board of revenue and government, over the revenue affairs, even of this province. After this experience, what can reasonably be expected of the same controuling powers from the province upwards, in Bundelcund, the Doab, and Rohilcund to Banda, Saharumpore, and Moradabad. The same reasoning may be extended, with equal, perhaps superior force, to the superintendence of the court of Sudder Dewanay and Nizamut Adawlut, in proportion as its duties are more extensive, arduous and important, and exact a more thorough knowledge of every local peculiarity.

97. Rumours very generally prevail, that the abuses charged against the tehsildary system in the province of Benares, have also existed, in the provinces above. If the fact be so, can any person who has duly weighed the preceding considerations, deem it a subject for surprise, or derive any inference from it, unfavourable to the particular system.

98. To resume the immediate object of my attention, the great distance of the seat of controul is not the only mischief. The new country, has already, and will every day, still more pour into the boards and offices of the presidency, an increase of business, to which they are totally unequal. Those boards and offices had certainly, not too little to do previously, and thence their present burthen may be conceived. But the extension of territory, is not the sole cause of this increase of business. When that extension took place, and the resolution was adopted, to administer the affairs of the new country, by the offices at the presidency, an arrangement seemed absolutely necessary, to shift on some local authorities, a portion of the details which now centre in those offices. So little however, has this temperament been resorted to, that a practice prevails, and every day gains ground, of drawing down to the presidency, every species of minute detail. To show how far this practice has been carried, I shall content myself with quoting the provisions of Regulation 5, 1804; by which none of the British officers, judicial, revenue or commercial, in the immense extent of country immediately dependent on the government general, can remove any native officer receiving a salary of more than 100 rupees per annum, (that is, in English money, £. 15. per annum) without first bringing forward a regular trial, and submitting the proceedings, to some, of the superior authorities at the presidency. Nor is this formality required merely in cases of guilt and misconduct, when the ground of the dismission would involve a stain upon character. It is necessary, even to say, so difficult to prove, and to embody on a record; has been committed to some officer, and subjected to the same process.

99. It is worth while to attend to these rules, in reference to the courts of circuit and appeal. These courts are composed of three members, who must all be of long standing in the service, in their civil capacity, for such considerable power and property, as criminal judges, they possess singly, every individual jurisdiction over person, liberty, and reputation; yet to leave them, the regulation of their own ministerial officers, has been thought too much;

the united voice of all the three judges will not suffice, to remove the lowest of the classes of their clerks.

100. To trace the future effects of these two causes, the remoteness and consequent weakness of the superintending powers, and the overwhelming multiplicity of business, would be almost superfluous. All affairs that relate to the internal management, must be hastily dispatched. The want of leisure, and difficulty of procuring accurate information, will render impracticable a patient discriminating attention to local peculiarities, and will generate a disposition to cut short all troublesome questions, by uniform arrangements and sweeping general rules. The real inefficiency of controul, in spite of the shew of minute and rigorous superintendence, will be felt and abused; evils and disorders will multiply; new rules and forms will be resorted to, as the remedy. The remedy will, in turn, increase the load of business; and these causes will continue to operate on each other, in a perpetual circle of action and re-action, till a pressure arises, that will endanger the stoppage of the whole system.

101. Political objects may perhaps be thought beyond my province; but in the new territory, they are, and must for some time be, intimately blended with revenue and judicial affairs. The wars of Sonshee and Beejee Ghur, and more recently of Kamonah and Gonowry, arose out of revenue and judicial matters. I have no intention to insinuate that these unpleasant events were owing to any mismanagement of our public officers, or to any defects of our regulations; for I am really not particularly informed of the circumstances, in which they originated. But they shew that such causes, might produce such effects, and in my humble judgment, concur, with a thousand other considerations, to prove that a subordinate government is as necessary in the new territories, as at Madras or Bombay.

102. I will not, for the present, longer encroach on the time of the Nizamut Adawlut and government, though I cannot but regret that want of leisure has compelled me to lay my reflections before them, in so imperfect a shape. To complete the subject, a review of the administration of civil justice, was required; which, if I do not flatter myself, would have afforded, many powerful arguments for the opinions which I have advanced. This, I may perhaps undertake hereafter; but I must now return to my ordinary duties, and leave these great questions, to the wisdom of my superiors.

(Signed)

JA<sup>S</sup> STUART,

3d Judge.

Benares, }  
5th Feb. 1868. }

To W. B. BAYLEY, Esq.

Register to the Nizamut Adawlut.

Sir,

No. 5.  
Rajeshahy Division.

Para. 1. IT is with much diffidence that I address the Nizamut Adawlut on the present occasion, for I have to propose measures, the nature of which they are, I know, generally averse to.

2. As the Nizamut Adawlut, the government, and the people of the country, look to the judges of circuit, as well as to the magistrates, for the establishment of an efficient police, I consider it to be my duty to call the attention of the superior court to this subject.

3. I do not wait till the end of the circuit, when, in the course of official routine, I should have to make a report to the court; because the evil which I complain of is great and increasing, and every instant of delay, serves only to furnish new victims to the atrocities which are daily practised.

4. That decoity is very prevalent in Rajeshahye, has been often stated; but if its vast extent were known, if the scenes of horror, the murders, the burnings, the excessive cruelties which are continually perpetrated here, were properly represented to government, I am confident that some measures would be adopted, to remedy the evil; certainly there is not an individual belonging to the government who does not anxiously wish to save the people from robbery and massacre, yet the situation of the people, is not sufficiently attended to. It cannot be denied that, in point of fact, there is no protection for persons or property; and that the present wretched, mechanical, inefficient system of police, is a mere mockery.

5. The decons know much better than we, how to preserve their power; they have with great success, established a respect for their order, by speedy, certain, and severe punishments, and by judicious arrangements for removing obstacles and for facilitating the execution of their plans.

6. Such is the state of things which prevails, in most of the zillahs in Bengal; but in this, it is much worse than, in any other I have seen. I am fully persuaded that no civilized country ever had so bad a police, as that which Rajeshahye has at present.

7. It is not many years since the people about Govindgunge, on the northern frontier of this district, finding that they could get no protection from us, and that their condition was become quite intolerable, rose in a mass, and executed a great number of decoits. One or two happy instances of successful opposition to robbery might possibly excite the same spirit here; in the present state of things, it is perhaps desirable that such an insurrection should take place here, and probably it will happen sooner or later; for things cannot

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continue much longer, as they are. I trust, however, that government will rather administer relief, in a proper manner, than suffer the application of so violent a remedy.

8. There are two grand points for the decoits to effect; first, to prevent apprehension; second, to prevent conviction. For the first, they bribe the zemindary and police officers; and for the second, they torture and murder the informers, prosecutors and witnesses, who appear against them.

9. The progress of this system is dreadful; the decoits become every thing, and the police and the criminal judicature, nothing.

10. I do not speak of these evils, merely to add that I lament their existence; but to propose a remedy, and to entreat that steps may be taken without delay, to save some of the lives which are every day exposed to the decoits.

11. I am at this time, oppressed with business; near 1,700 witnesses are kept from their homes, and three or four hundred prisoners remain untried. I cannot keep these people waiting, while I am reading papers to procure information, digesting plans, and writing letters. I have no leisure, but on Sundays and at night; so, I must be excused from going minutely into things now; and I shall only beg, for the present, at least, I may have the credit of giving no overcharged statement, but simply describing things, as they appear to me, from the most accurate observations I can make, and the best information I can procure; and I have only to recommend that relief be soon granted to the unfortunate people of this district.

12. On my way through the northern parts of this zillah, I had some conversation with a zemindar and a police darogah, who have distinguished themselves, by their exertions to apprehend decoits. I exhorted them to use every effort for the seizure of Pundita and Cartica, two notorious sirdars, whose gangs have long infested that part of the country. They told me that it was impossible to get any information about the great decoits; that the houses of all the principal inhabitants were open to them; yet, that nobody dared mention their names, for fear of being murdered. The darogah told me that orders issued by the police, were immediately communicated to Pundita. They attributed the success of the decoits to the same cause, that everybody else does; namely, the protection given them by the zemindars and police officers, and other people of power and influence in the country. Every thing I hear and see, and read on this subject, serves to convince me of the truth of this statement.

13. The principal persons who have lands or farms in the northern parts of this district, where there are most decoits, are the foudary serishtadar; Unoopinder Narain, and the peshcar Ruheem oodeen Kishen Sindial, a dewanny mohrir, and Domeen Geer Goseyn and Anoop Moonshee, who hold no offices under government.

14. There is evidently a connexion of interests between Domeen Geer Goseyn, and the two foudary officers who farm lands together, and mutually support each other. Anoop Moonshee again, is connected with Kishen Sindial, and with one Radamohun Ghose, a serishte vakeel, who appears to be a very considerable person here. Most of the police darogahs seem to be, under the influence of Ruheem oodeen; Anoop Moonshee and Domeen Geer accuse each other, of harbouring decoits, and there is every reason to believe they are both guilty; for a great many notorious decoits, and harbourers of decoits, live on their estates, as well on Ruheem oodeen's, and Unoopinder Narain's, and Kishen Sindial's, although it is not easy to apprehend them; or if they are apprehended, to convict them.

15. The magistrate here, has so much to do, that a great deal of important business is necessarily left to the principal officers; that is to say, to the serishtadar and Ruheem oodeen. It rests with them, to bring forward whatever appears to be most pressing, and the magistrate always allows them, to give their opinions on the cases before him. Now it appears to me, that if matters of consequence are unfavourably kept back, and if criminals are improperly released, great responsibility should attach to these officers; for it is quite out of the question to suppose, that as far as the magistrate is concerned, these errors proceed from any thing but inadvertency.

16. But if there are very serious charges against these men and their dependants, for all sorts of oppression and violence, and for using the power and influence of their official stations to tyrannize with impunity, and to suppress complaints and prevent their being brought to decision; I think it must be admitted, that they ought not to be allowed to retain their situations.

17. I have lately sent an order to the magistrate to bring to decision without delay, seven complaints of this nature, all very serious, and most of them, bearing the strongest appearance of truth. The complaints had been twice to the court of circuit, and once to the Nizamut Adawlut, and the magistrate, whenever they came, ordered the cases to be brought forward; yet they were not brought forward; and it is plain, that as far as regards the magistrate, the only reason for this neglect, was the multiplicity of business which compelled him to trust to his own, for a proper selection of the most important cases.

18. I mention this, to introduce a more glaring instance of their interference, which, with the fact of their intussusception with decoits, leave no doubt in my mind, that these two men are the chief causes of the decoity here, and the chief obstacles to its suppression. Anoop Moonshee, who is not friendly to Ruheem oodeen, or the serishtadar, seized Ata, a notorious decoit, of Pundita's gang, an inhabitant of Sonadiggoo, which belongs to the serishtadar and Ruheem oodeen, and appears to be a nest of decoits. Ata confessed to the darogah, three decoities, two of which attended with burning; and he was sent to the magistrate



trate, who took evidence of his confession, and, instead of committing the prisoner, as he usually does in such cases, ordered the proceedings to be kept with those of Jhaupra and others. The magistrate does not know why they were joined with Jhaupra's; probably it was, because Ata was of the same gang as Jhaupra; this happened in February. Among the proceedings held in April, in the case of Phuttoo and others, notorious decoits, it is said in the examination of some of the witnesses, "the witness then looking at Ata, who was apprehended on another charge, said, This Ata is a notorious decoit." In fact, there was but one charge against Ata, that had been joined with Jhaupra's case, and the magistrate can give no account of the introduction of Ata, among the prisoners in Phuttoo's.

19. On the 2d of May, without any further evidence for or against Ata, is an order on Jhaupra's case, in the record of which, was the confession of Ata, stating that there was nothing proved against Ata; but that as there was another charge against him, he must not be released till that should be decided. On the 4th of May the case of Phuttoo was brought on, and among the prisoners was Ata, placed there, I suppose, by a trick of the omia, that he might be regularly discharged; for there was nothing against him;—then an order was passed for the commitment of Phuttoo and others, and for the release of the other prisoners; so, Ata escaped.

20. Hearing of this, I called for the proceedings on the 2d June, and after exclaiming much and publicly against the atrocity of releasing a decoit, I gave notice that I should enquire into the affair next day; but, owing to great pressure of business, I was obliged to put it off, till the day after. Among the papers, I found an order of the magistrate, dated 4th of May, directing that Ghausee and Chamareah should give security, or be imprisoned a month. From the proceedings, I suspected that they were both notorious decoits: and there was evidence of Ghausee harbouring Jeetoo, a notorious sirdar decoit and murderer, who had robbed and murdered with Pundita's gang for many years. These were all ryots of Domun Geer, Ruheem oodeen's friend. As that day, the 4th June, was the term of their imprisonment, I sent instantly to the jail, to prevent their discharge; but they had been released, the day before. One of the mohrirs, Nundomar, admitted that he had written out the order for their release, and taken it to the magistrate to sign, telling him the period for their imprisonment, was expired. When I attempted to make enquiry into this affair, I found Mahomed Tuckee, the mohurir of the jail, whose particular business it was to prevent the release of persons in their circumstances, trying to thwart my enquiring, by threatening another mohrir, whom I was questioning on the subject. I directed the magistrate to suspend Mahomed Tuckee, and I hope the Nizamut Adawlut will dismiss him.

21. The foudaree scriishtadar, with his 60 rupees a month, and the peshcar, with his 40, have contrived to possess themselves of great landed property in this district; from their connexions with zemindars, and their official situations, they have acquired a degree of power and influence which they turn, to the worst purposes. I am persuaded that they derive a revenue from the decoits, and give them protection; and that they suppress complaints, which are brought against themselves or their dependants.

22. I will not venture to say, that the dismissal of these two men, will be followed by an immediate cessation of decoity; but it is very plain that, as long as they retain their power and influence, decoity will increase; and that it is extremely difficult for any man to obtain justice here, if they are disposed to prevent it.

23. If the court do not think proper to dismiss the scriishtadar and peshcar, I recommend that they be suspended, till all the criminal cases now pending against them, or any of their officers or dependants, be finally settled.

24. I further beg leave to recommend, that the magistrate be permitted immediately to suspend any police darogah, in whose jurisdiction decoity may be very seriously prevalent, or where notorious decoits reside.

I have, &c.

Natore, 13th June, 1808,

(Signed) E. STRACHEY,

3d Judge.

Calcutta Court of Circuit.

(Signed)

W. B. Bayley,

Register.

To W. B. BAYLEY, Esq.

Register to the Nizamut Adawlut, Fort William.

Sir,

I MUST again entreat the attention of the Court to some suggestions with respect to the Police, and to the operation of the more immediate causes of decoity; and to a consideration of the reasons, why the sanction of the criminal law is become inefficient in the way of example, and can no longer deter from the commission of crimes, or afflict any criminals, except those who, in justice are not deserving of severe punishment.

I consider it as out of the question, to improve the moral and religious principle of the people, by direct positive institutions. We are too ignorant of the natives, to attempt any thing so artificial, without imminent risk. We do not understand the operation of such institutions on their minds, or their tendency, with respect to the frame of the society. As for the criminal law, I believe the impolicy and inefficiency, even the mischief of very severe punishments, is generally acknowledged, as well as the injustice of inflicting punishment, where other remedies might have been used, with equal effect. With respect to increasing the severity of the criminal law, we have before our eyes, an admirable example.

In

In 1803, and again, in 1805, this principle was expected to prove a remedy for decoity. It has been tried, and it has utterly failed. As it is impossible to conceive a case more directly in point, or a more full, simple, convincing proof of the insufficiency of the means to the end; I trust no increase in the security of the criminal law, will ever be again resorted to.

As punishments are more severe, stricter proof of the crime is required; and consequently a proportionally greater number of criminals, escape conviction. Besides, the terror of the severer punishment, makes the criminal more careful to guard against being taken; and as it has no tendency to increase the activity of the police, but the contrary, the number of offenders apprehended, will, of course, be less than before. The decoits now guard against the danger of apprehension and conviction, by corruption and terror. They would give more bribes, and commit more murders, if they thought more precaution necessary; and the consequence would be, that the difficulties of apprehending and convicting decoits would increase, and people who had been robbed and tortured, would still be compelled to perjure themselves, that they might not be murdered.

And with respect to the administration of the laws, are not the Judges now entrusted with as much power as is proper? and if the law was made more severe, would it not be necessary to extend their power still further? And are we all fit persons, to be entrusted with discretionary power to inflict punishments, which are by many considered, to be worse than death? Persons who are entrusted with such power, ought to be appointed from no other consideration whatever, but that of the fitness of the man for the place. But I would ask, whether all our appointments have ever been so filled? and whether it is probable, from the nature of our service, that they ever will be? We may all be judges, learned, and unlearned.

With respect to myself, I must candidly confess, that every day's experience and reflection on the nature of our courts, and of the minds and manners of the natives, as far as I can see, serve to increase my doubts about our capacity to discover truth among them. It appears to me, that there is a very great deal of perjury, of many different shades, in our judicial proceedings; and that many common rules of evidence here, would be inapplicable and absurd. Even the honest men, as well as the rogues, are perjured. The most simple, and the most cunning, alike make assertions that are incredible, or that are certainly false. If the prosecutor in cases of decoity was to be disbelieved in all cases, because there was perjury; scarce a decoit would be convicted. By cross-examination, you may draw an honest witness into as many absurdities and contradictions as you please; but it is not easy to detect the persons who come forward, as eye-witnesses in cases of decoity;—their story is all true, but one point, the identity of the persons whom they accuse; and how can you discover whether this is true or false?—Some witnesses are loquacious, some taciturn; some frigid, some over zealous; some willing, some unwilling; some bold, some timid, some scrupulous; some come to give false evidence, in favour of a friend or a master; some to ruin an enemy; and the signs of the different modes that disguise truth, are so very equivocal, and often so unintelligible, that nothing can be depended on. There is not one witness in a dozen, on whom you can implicitly rely for a purely true story. It has very often happened, that a story which, by attending only to the plain direct course of things, I believe to be true, has, by examining into matters apparently connected in a very distant degree, with the case, turned out to be entirely false. I am afraid that the evidence of witnesses in our courts is, for the most part, an instrument in the hands of men, and not an independent, untouched source of truth. With these impressions, it is natural that I should at least, entertain some doubts of the propriety of extending the powers of the court. What can be more absurd than some of the futwas of the law officers? And is it not very bad to subject such futwas to the confirmation of men, who are not capable of forming a rational opinion concerning them?

I rather wish that our power of inflicting severe punishments were more confined, and that there were more distinctions and modifications in the now existing laws against decoity; for it is dreadful to confound, in one undistinguished mass, infinite shades of criminality; to blend even innocence and misfortune, with guilt the most atrocious.

What does a gang of decoits consist of? There is the sirdar; the leader of the party, when he is present, and their director, when he is absent. He is a professed robber and murderer. He is not only the conductor of the atrocities that are committed, but he is the point of union of many inferior criminals. He finds recruits for his party, not only by accepting the services of wretches like himself, but he has recourse to persuasion, to force, and to terror: some of his party, are pressed to carry bundles or torches; some are severely beat; some threatened, with death; some, with decoity, if they refuse to join. Many, thus initiated against their inclination, are gradually corrupted, till the greatest crimes are familiar to them, and they become, at last, hardened decoits. A gang of decoits, then, does not consist entirely of professed robbers: many of the party, are poor, honest, industrious people, who are seized for the service of the night: some assist willingly, but not actively; and some, are regularly established robbers. Is it right that so heterogeneous a set as this, should be jumbled together, and be all liable to the same punishment?—It is the duty of the legislature to protect those ignorant and helpless creatures, who cannot protect themselves:—One part of the system, should not denounce against an unfortunate wretch, death or other exceedingly severe punishment, for a crime which, owing to the defects of another part of the system, he is compelled to commit. If you refuse him protection, and leave him to the uncontrolled power of robbers and murderers, will you inflict severe punishment on him, after the offence has been forced upon him? If you could not check that power, how could he resist it?—But the duty of the legislator is not confined to this coarser sort of protection:

## REPORTS

OF  
Judges of Circuit,  
on termination of their  
Sessions.

No. 6.

Rajeshwari Division.



We must consider that this is a weak and ignorant race, and it is a duty to save them from temptation, to prevent corruption from spreading round them; and if this duty is neglected, and crimes are generated in consequence, with what justice can the criminal be punished?

Such are the considerations from which I think it is repugnant to all good principle, to neglect the means of prevention, and to punish for decoity indiscriminately. If it is now admitted that to increase the severity of the criminal law, and to enlarge the powers of the courts, is exceptionable in every point of view; let it be considered whether good preventive measures could not be contrived. In proposing such measures, I am aware no infringement on our political principles can be allowed; no changes, in our fundamental institutions; no additional expense; no serious innovation of any kind. I do not want to create any new power; to establish any new office; to rescind any regulation, or to proceed on any principles, but those which are already admitted.

What I purpose generally, is this: to turn the existing power and influence of the country, to the assistance of the police.

I assume as a fact ascertained beyond all doubt, as far as my sphere of observation extends, that is to say, the Calcutta and Moorshedabad divisions (of the Dacca part, I am wholly ignorant) that decoits inhabit populous countries. Where there is power and influence, of course there are few exceptions; but I speak generally. If any person demands proof of this, I refer to the reports of the darogahs, and the records of the criminal courts; and I ask, in what sort of places decoits are apprehended, and what appear to have been the ordinary habits of their lives. I am not afraid that this will be contradicted; and I am convinced that the more detail is gone into, to ascertain the fact, the more fully will it be confirmed. Indeed, a little attention to the circumstances of decoity, to the prisons of whom the gangs are found to be composed, the nature of our government, and the state of society, would, without any actual knowledge of the fact, render it highly improbable that decoits should be other, than what I have stated. In short, I take for granted that decoits are not the solitary inhabitants of woods and deserts, and secret places; but that they live in the neighbourhood and society of men.

It seems to be a prevailing opinion, that the state of society in Bengal, owing to the reduction of the great families, and the division of estates, is now such, as to be unable to afford assistance to the police. That this opinion is erroneous I entertain not the smallest doubt. Consider who are the chief persons of power and influence in the country, and how perfectly they are, at the mercy of government; how closely within its reach. These persons, are the principal native officers of government; and the zemindars and farmers, under their immediate authority, are the inferior native officers of government; and their dependants, and the tribes of the zemindars and farmers, under them again, are the gomastahs and tannadars, and different officers belonging to the cutcherry and the mundals, peramanicks and pykes of villages. Large estates are managed chiefly by naibs in the Mofussil, and the very small estates are managed by the proprietors themselves. Large towns which are, I believe, very seldom the residence of decoits, are the only places where there are many independent men. Throughout the rest of the country, the great body of the people are subject to the power and influence, of a few individuals; no objection can arise, from the vast number of independent talookdars. I know that the decoits, generally, do not live on their estates. Indeed, he who carries desolation into the neighbouring lands, cannot expect to hold an undisturbed residence, on the estate of a man who is unable to protect him. I should have no concern about the estates of petty talookdars; decoits may be there, sometimes, but not often; and if they can be rooted out of the great estates, there will soon be an end of them. The connection of dependance from the zemindars and the officers of government, to the lower of the people, is as general and as perfect, as can be conceived. Government, and natural authority, is strong throughout; the superior is, in the daily exercise of authority over the inferior, by calls on his personal services or his property. If this authority is exercised in moderation, and according to usage, we hear nothing of it; when it is excessive, it frequently appears in our courts. When a darogah gives a detailed account of his proceedings to apprehend decoits, he almost invariably speaks of his demanding assistance from the zemindar; when he or his omrah go to a village, they immediately apply to the chief officer of the zemindar; when they find it necessary to apologize for the bad state of the police, they blame the zemindar and his officers. I scarcely know an instance of any other reason being assigned. Again, every zemindar has at the tannah, a wakeel or a pyke, or some sort of agent. This man, generally acts as a gomdah also; he is often the confidential agent of the zemindar, of the police officers, and of the decoits. The effects of this soon appear, that is to say, decoity begins; but if the first appearance of the evil, was a signal for the punishment of the zemindar and the darogah, and the dismissal of the latter; we should soon find, that instead of uniting against the police, they would see that their immediate and obvious interests required them, to unite for its support. The zemindars are bound by their engagements, and by the Regulations, to assist the police. Let that part of their duty be explained; let it be taken in rather an enlarged sense; and let it so have the sanction of law. I would not require of the zemindars any acts which they are not themselves, occasionally in the habit of performing, and to which they are not generally bound; but instead of making them apprehend notorious decoits as they do now, whenever they think fit, or whenever they are specifically called on by the magistrate, or the police darogah, I would declare it to be their duty to apprehend notorious decoits, at all times. I would subject them to fine and imprisonment for neglect; and if any notorious decoit lived

lived on their estate, the presumption should be, that it was by their neglect, and the burden of proof that it was not, should be upon them. I would declare, that the fact being proved of any notorious decoit holding undisturbed residence on their estate, should render that estate liable to forfeiture, and the inferior officers of the zemindar, to be liable to fine and imprisonment. I would not allow the naib of a non-resident zemindar to act, without security from his principal to a large amount, which should be forfeited, if he neglected his police duties; officers of government guilty of offences against this rule should be liable to immediate dismissal, should never be allowed to serve again, and their estates should be liable to be forfeited.

I think it is impossible to doubt that the decoits are protected by the zemindars or their dependants, by the police officers and their agents at their tannahs, and by the persons who have power and influence at the magistrate's cutcherry. When I speak of protection, I mean to include in the expression every sort of connivance and neglect by which decoits are enabled to live unmolested, and carry on their profession.

I beg leave to remind the court, that some suggestions about the harbouring of decoits, which I made last year in my report on the Calcutta circuit, were generally approved; and I understood that what I then proposed would be carried into effect; and though as yet nothing has been done, I can with some confidence again address the court on the subject, knowing that my first principle has been admitted. I am aware it may be urged, that what is true in Rajeshahy may not apply elsewhere. I must however, beg leave to say, that when the causes of decoity are hidden, our best hope of discovering them, is to be found in attention to these districts, where the evil is so intolerable as to force itself into public notice, in most points of view. Such was the state of Nudda last year, till it was reformed by Mr. Macan; and such is the state of Rajeshahy. Now my opinion respecting the great causes of decoity was chiefly founded on what I saw at Nuddea; and it is most fully confirmed, by what I have seen here.

I trust that the importance of the subject, and the nature of my troubling the court with so very long a letter; I have however more to add, relating more particularly to this district.

It is ascertained that a great number of murders, and of decoities attended with murder and with dreadful cruelty, have been committed, in the northern parts of this district; many of these offences are so alike, in the circumstances attending them, that, *prima facie*, it is evident that they are not entirely unconnected, but that they are directed, by the same persons or on the same principles, or follow, from some common cause. The most exact mode of ascertaining the truth is doubtless, by the proceedings of a court of justice, when that is practicable; but if causes do exist to prevent the truth from being so ascertained, other modes must be resorted to. We must in this, as in other cases, take the best evidence that can be had.

We know that certain persons who have been murdered, were objects of vengeance to certain individuals; we know that those individuals, are the terror of the country; so that a common and almost universal belief prevails of their always murdering their accusers, which is founded on the fact, that many of their accusers have been murdered, and an opinion that they were the murderers. We know that many of the crimes imputed to these offenders, are committed in open day, in the most public manner; and therefore we cannot doubt that ample evidence against the criminals, does exist; although from the operation of a pre-established terror, it does not appear in the courts, such evidence is certainly whispered about in the country: hence it is, that public opinion or common report and notoriety, is in the present state of things, intitled to a particular degree of credit.

It happens sometimes that persons connected with some of the individuals above alluded to, are apprehended by the police officers, and the darogah of the tannah sends to the magistrate a full confession of crimes, which the prisoner is said to have made, with a disclosure of the circumstances connected with them, and of his accomplices. This confession is seldom successfully employed, as a ground for ascertaining truth; but it is considered as in itself authentic, and is sent to the magistrate, who commits the accused to be tried by the court of circuit. A confession sent by a police darogah is liable to such strong objections, that it is impossible to believe it, without some further confirmation than the oaths of the attesting witnesses; for it is not improbable that the darogahs or their dependants or goeyudahs very commonly intimidate or ill treat the accused, till his spirit is broken, and he agrees to confess; then, his examination is taken, and to the attesting witnesses, it seems to be voluntary. Notwithstanding this, if many of the circumstances stated in the confession are certainly true, and the rest of it, corresponds with public notoriety, it is impossible to withhold our belief from it entirely; although such evidence is not enough to convict the person said to have confessed, much less those who are accused by him. When the confession is confirmed, so far as to convict the person confessing, some additional weight is due to the accusation of his accomplices. It is admitted that the terror of a sirdar decoit prevents people from giving evidence against him; a witness is sometimes persuaded by the police darogah to give information, and when he comes to the sudder, he denies it all. How is it possible to ascertain whether this difference is owing to the roguery of the darogah, or the timidity of the witness?—But this we know, that a sirdar decoit has generally the means of saving himself from conviction; and that, although all the world say he is a notorious robber and murderer, not an individual can be found, who will give evidence against him. This is a dreadful state of things; and so it must remain, till confidence is restored to the people, by removing their well grounded fears, by extirpating the sirdars, and giving a real efficiency and vigour to the police.

From

From what I have said, the court will perceive that the trial and the disposal of the sirdar decoits is of the most serious importance. If these persons are condemned to imprisonment for a term of years, or to be confined till they give security, they are soon mixed with a host of convicts, and they are not distinguished from the rest; yet the release or escape of one sirdar decoit, is of more evil consequence to the community, than that of a thousand inferior criminals. Pundita, who has been the cause of so many robberies and murders, escaped from the Rungpore jail. The sirdar decoit among the Fakerees, north of Dinagpore and Purneah, was released from prison, a few years ago; so was Anianut Khan, a sirdar lately taken here; so was Sootka. I don't remember any other instances at present; but I dare say the Nizamut Adawlut must know many of the same kind.

Pundita and Kartica have long been the scourge of the northern part of this district. The extent and boldness of their depredations; the many murders, burning, and other cruelties which they commit; their discipline and secrecy, and the terror which they have established, are well known. Pundita and Kartica are supposed not to rob often, in person; they are known to the ordinary decoits, only by name; no account whatever is to be had of them; it is from notoriety only, that they are believed to be the heads of the robbers. Their subordinate sirdars, however, are well known, and several of them have been apprehended: Jhapra, Bheeka, Sookta, Jeetoo Phuttoo, and a few others of inferior importance, are now under trial. I think it is pretty certain, that the three first, have been principals, in at least 10 or 12 deliberate murders; the two others, may not have committed, quite so many perhaps. As to the persons who have been burnt by them and their gangs, so as to survive but a short time, they may be hundreds.

I now enclose several papers, from which the court will be enabled to judge of the state of the northern parts of this district. The court will observe, that many of the events mentioned, are not of very recent date, and several sirdars have been since apprehended; but I cannot consider the evil to be cured, till there is reason to believe, not only that decoity is reduced, and that the fears of the people are removed, but that the causes of the evil are destroyed; that is to say, all the sirdars are taken, and till the police is rendered efficient, and the power and influence of the county, is actually employed for its support.

I have now further to recommend, that the trials of all sirdar decoits may be sent to the Nizamut Adawlut; my reason for this is, that the disposal of these greatest of all criminals is of very high importance to the community, and it is proper that such cases should be brought under the highest authority in the fullest manner.

I have the honour to be,

Moorshedabad Zillah  
Rajeshahye,  
the 19th August 1808.

Sir,  
Your most obedient humble servant,  
(Signed) E. STRACHEY,  
Ct of Ct. 3d Judge.

#### CONTENTS of the Arzees of the Darogah of Sheerpore, which are enclosed; dated

9 Phagan.—The darogah speaks of Jainpra, a sirdar decoit, being taken, and his confessing that he carried off Baroe Paramanik's wife; of his being accused, by several confessing prisoners, of the murder of Nizamooddeen and Rubeca, and Becakoolce, and Barob Paramanik and Ruhmut Mundul, and Ram Kaunt Mundul, and Manik sircar, and Wuzera, and Khuttea:

16 Chyt.—The darogah sends in Ata, with his confession of robbing with Busa, Nusra Dak, Jeetoo Phuttoo Jainpra, &c.; 25 sirdar decoits, of robbing and burning Dotcea Koonar, Gorachund, and Lalchund:

11 Phagan.—The darogah gives an account of his expedition to apprehend a number of decoits; of his apprehending Jeetoo, and others; of Jeetoo's confession; that he robbed at Kishen Kaunt's and Anundecram's; of his account of the wounding of Mohunchung, the murder of Ruhum and Mondce, and the evidence of these persons' heirs, that Jeetoo, Phuttoo, and others had murdered them. The darogah gives an account of the decoity at Mohuns; of the rescue and supposed murder of Hureca, and seven other decoits, at which three people were murdered, said to have been committed by Jeetoo Phuttoo, and others. The darogah speaks of the neglect and connivance of the zemindar, and of the neighbouring darogah, and mentions the haunts of the decoits:

26 Jeyt.—The darogah complains of the dreadful consequences of the release of notorious decoits, who, for want of evidence, have been acquitted by the court of circuit:

9 Aszar.—The darogah points out how impracticable it is to give efficiency to the police, without the assistance of the zemindars:

1st Bysak.—The darogah reports the notoriety of Jeetoo Phuttoo and others, and their committing murders, and terrifying the witnesses.

(Signed) E. STRACHEY,  
3d Judge.

## NOTES.

REPORTS  
OF  
A day of Circuit,  
on termination of the  
Sessions.  
No. 6.  
Rajeshahy Division.

BAROO PURAMANIK, of Amun, was robbed and murdered by decoits in August 1213. Jampira is supposed to have been of this party. In Assin 1214, Jampira carried off his widow Poosee and her young child, and kept them at Kyogataee in Mymensing, till Poosee died. Such was the terror at Amun, that Poosee could get no protection, and was under the necessity of going with Jampira, who threatened to kill her and her child, and every body who interfered. The child, who appears to be about seven years old, is terrified to the greatest degree, at the sight of Jampira. The people of Amun, whether from fear or from collusion (they say from fear) neglected to report to the tannah the murder of Baroo, and the rape of his wife.

NIZAMOODDEEN and KURBEA were two goyendahs, who were made away with. It is supposed that Jampira, Hureca, Bheeka, and some others, murdered them only because they were goyendahs.

RUHMAT MUNDUL lived at Tulasore, where the decoits frequented his house. At last, he gave some information about Sookta and Bheeka. In Mang 1213, he was carried away from his village in open day, in the most public manner, by six men dressed and armed like tannah chuprassees. The villagers assembled, and made some feeble attempts to rescue him: at night, the decoits brought him back to his own house; completely plundered it, and carried him off again. It is said, by confessing decoits, that he was murdered that night, by Jampira, Bheeka, Sookta, and others.

WUZEERA and KHUTTEAH were goyendahs employed by the darogah of Sheerpore, in Chyet 1213, to apprehend Sookta and Bheeka. The decoits heard of this, and murdered them. Several of the gang confessed at the tannah, and pointed out the bodies of the goyendahs. Six men were executed for these murders. In their mofussil confessions they said Bheeka and Sookta were the persons who killed Wuzeera and Khutta; several other goyendahs, who have given information about Sookta and Bheeka have been murdered by the decoits. In 1803, Kunkye, goindah, accused Sookta and Bheeka, and his two associates, Dewannoo and Buharoo, gave evidence in the case for which Sookta was apprehended. Sookta was released by the court of circuit. Kunkye, and his companion, Ashik Mahomed, soon after were missing, and it is supposed that they were murdered by the decoits; as for Dewannoo and Buharoo they were murdered in 1805. They were sent with two other goyendahs, by the darogah, to procure information of Pundita's party, and they went to a house near the place where the gang was assembled; but the decoits got intelligence, seized and carried them off, and of course murdered them. The morning after this business happened, Moolca, who was a sirdar like Sookta and Bheeka, under Pundita and Kartica, came to the village. Several persons described him as coming forward with an earthen pot in his hand, and addressing the villagers:—"If any body tells that, the four goyendahs were taken off last night, I will tie this pot round his neck and drown him; I will cut him and his wives and children to pieces. I am Moolca; you know me; and you know that I will be as good as my word." Moolca was afterwards taken by Asudzooman, zemindar of Silburees, was tried and acquitted; but the Nizamut Adawlut ordered that he should not be released without security. A great many more goyendahs have been murdered. I shall relate one more case. In August 1213, Mungla, who had acted as a goyendah at Khurna, was carried off by several men, very near the tannah, in open day, and was never heard of again. A woman, named Phulehuree, told the darogah that she had seen Mungla taken away; she returned to her village, and two days after she and her husband were missing, and have never been heard of since. A man who is now committed for this murder, is believed to be of Pundita's gang, and to have murdered another goyendah some time before.

Mohun Chung, a goyendah, who lived near the tannah at Sheerpore, had been instrumental in seizing one of Pundita's gang. In Jeyte 1214, his house was robbed, and he received several very severe sword-wounds from the decoits, who left him for dead.

Hureca was not apprehended till he had separated himself from the decoits, and become goyendah; then the darogah of Kurna sent him to Nattore, in charge of two burkundazes, about two coss from the tannah; he was taken from them in open day, by 20 or 25 men, armed and dressed like tannah burkundazes. The two men who were in charge of Hureca swear, that they saw in this gang, his old enemy Jectoo, on whose account he left the gang.

Almost all the decoities, mentioned in these papers, were attended with murder or burning, chiefly of women. It is unnecessary to go into any further detail on the subject.

(Signed)

E. STRACHEY,

3d Judge.

REPORTS  
OF  
Judges of Circuit,  
on termination of their  
Sessions.

No. 7.—24 Pergunnahs.

2<sup>d</sup> Session 1810<sup>a</sup>

Calendar—N<sup>o</sup>.

3. Vakeel of Government,

4. Hurry Nye;

Contumacy.

7. Raj Chunder Bose,

10. Ram Soonder Kybert;

Decoity.

10. Vakeel of Government,

14. Bhowanny Singh,  
alias  
Bechoo Singh;

Murder.

Supp<sup>r</sup> Calendar.

14. Nazir Mussulman,

25. Rutton Kybert,

26. Chidaum Sirdar,

27. Chidaum Moochee,  
and others;  
(rest acquitted)

Decoity.

16. Gocul Maul,

The same 3 prisoners,  
(25. 26. & 27)  
and others;  
(rest acquitted)

Decoity.

To W. C. BLAQUIERE, Esq.

Magistrate 24 Pergunnahs.

Sir,

Par. 1. I HAVE completed the second session of jail delivery at your station for the current year. Warrants for carrying into execution the sentences passed in all the trials brought before the court, were delivered during the session to your officers, with exception to those cited in the margin, which were referable to the Nizamut Adawlut.

2. In the case of Hurry Nye, N<sup>o</sup> 3 of your Calendar, who was brought before me for contumacy, under Regulation 9. of 1808, it appeared that the proclamation for the prisoner's appearance was not issued in the manner prescribed by section 3. of that Regulation, viz. by affixing it at the magistrate's cutcherry, and at the several police tannahs, and publishing it by beat of drum at the towns in which they are situated, and by transmitting copies of it, for publication to other districts; in which the magistrate might have considered it probable that the proclaimed person had concealed himself\*. But the most reprehensible point in this case is, that, notwithstanding the prisoner's usual abode was actually known to the officers of police; still the proclamation was not published by beat of drum on the spot, or other public notice given of his appearance being required. Where the penalty for non-appearance is so great as imprisonment for life; the due publication of the proclamation is not a matter of mere form. It is essential to the ends of justice, that a person accused of decoity should not be tricked into a conviction without trial, and rendered liable to the punishment prescribed for that crime. The Regulation is highly penal, and its provisions must be strictly and literally observed. The culpable and apparently wilful neglect of the tanalidar to whom the proclamation was sent, and the phaundeedar to whom he delivered it, in omitting to publish it, in the prescribed manner at the place which the phaundeedar knew to be the prisoner's usual abode, deprives them, in my opinion, of all title to the reward offered for his apprehension. Under what pretence can a claim be made to reward, when the phaundeedar, who suppressed the proclamation, was the very man who seized the prisoner, as soon as the lapse of time debarred him of his right to be heard in defence of the

charges brought against him? What construction can be put upon such conduct, but that the police knew, that if he was seized or surrendered earlier, he must be acquitted for want of proof; or that the crimes of which he was accused, existed only in idea? To reward, under such circumstances, would be to pay the police for false charges of decoity, with the option of convicting without trial.

3. In illustration of my letter to the acting magistrate of the 7th July last, I should wish it to be understood, that a prisoner proceeded against, for contumacy under the provisions of Regulation 9, 1808, is (according to my construction of that Regulation, and of the circular orders of the Nizamut Adawlut †) not to be brought to trial on the specific charge for which he has been proclaimed, till the charge of contumacy is disposed of; unless (as in the present case) the nature of the crime is such as to render him liable to a greater degree of

† Dated 25 June  
1810.

‡ By sections 3, 6, 7, & 8, Regulation 9, 1808, an outlawry in decoity, amounts to a conviction of the crime charged in the proclamation, as much as if the offender had been tried and found guilty; and he is liable to the same punishment, viz. imprisonment and transportation for life. But I hold this rule to be superseded, where the prisoner may have been proclaimed on a charge incurring capital punishment, under the provisions of clauses 1 & 2, section 4, Regulation 53, 1803, as was the case in the present instance.

(Signed) E. W.

punishment under the Regulations, than is specified in the proclamation; in which case he is to be put on his trial on such charge, as soon as possible ‡. But whenever a specific charge of any other crime or offence (not being that, for which he has been proclaimed) may be preferred, the nature of which may be such as to render him liable to an equal or a greater degree of punishment under the Regulations, the prisoner in such event, whether the charge be preferred before or subsequently to his apprehension (provided there appear to the magistrate, sufficient grounds for commitment) is to be brought to trial on such specific charge, as soon as may be practicable after his apprehension or surrender.

4. The sentence and orders passed on the 16th ultimo by the Nizamut Adawlut on N<sup>o</sup> 7<sup>a</sup> of your Calendar, have been already communicated to you, through the regular channel. Pursuant to the 6th and 12th paragraphs of those Orders, you will herewith receive, in the form of a roobacarrce, particular instructions, as well with respect to the evidence by which the charge of conspiracy and perjury is to be supported against the prisoners whom the Nizamut Adawlut have ordered to be prosecuted on the part of government for those offences, as in regard to the local inquiry which you are directed to institute by the 12th paragraph.

\* Note.—No notice is taken of the circular orders of the Nizamut Adawlut of the 24th July 1810, as they were not in force till some months after the prisoner's apprehension.

(Signed) E. W.

paragraph. You will hereafter receive the sentences which the Nizamut Adawlut may pass on N<sup>o</sup> 10. of your Calendar, and on the three prisoners in N<sup>o</sup> 14. and 16. of your Supplementary Calendar; and in the mean time you will be pleased to retain those prisoners in confinement.

5. Your predecessor and yourself have been furnished from time to time, during the session, with directions for the magistrates guidance, on such points as appeared to require the interposition of the court. The prohibition against demanding security from accused persons on their discharge, is of course only meant to prohibit the requiring security when nothing may appear in evidence unfavourable to the general character of the accused, as expressed in the order; and is not meant to restrict the magistrate from demanding security previous to release, if during the enquiry into a specific charge, the accused should appear to be a person of general bad and dangerous character.

6. The nefarious practice, so prevalent in the mofussil, of extorting and fabricating confessions, cannot be too severely reprehended, and requires your most serious attention. You will be pleased to pay the strictest observance to the various orders issued during the session, for the prevention of this atrocious offence, by introducing checks and restrictions\*, which will render the fraud more difficult of execution, and more easy to detect. A proper attention to the precautions directed by the court, will at least render the abuse, less uniform and systematic than heretofore; and the inquiries which you have been ordered to institute into the general conduct of the police, touching confessions (commencing with the principal thannah of Manick Tulla) will, if the people see you are in earnest, and that such things cannot be tolerated, put a final stop to this system of iniquity. I remarked, with much concern, that in every case of decoity brought before me, the proof rested on a written mofussil confession, given in evidence at the trial; and regret to add, that all those confessions, bear the marks of fabrication. In one of these cases (N<sup>o</sup> 7. of your Calendar) a prisoner, who was perfectly innocent, confirmed, before the magistrate, under the influence of improper means previously made use of towards him, a confession before a police darogah, which was proved on the trial, to be false; and which had, in fact, been extorted by intimidation and violence. It is hardly necessary to remind you, that confessions made before yourself, are to be received and acted upon, with the utmost circumspection.

7. An erroneous idea prevails in the mofussil, that a confession is the strongest proof of guilt; and that all that is requisite is to obtain one, and, if possible, to get it confirmed before the magistrate. This false notion, perhaps first gave rise to the custom of fabricating them; and the practice appears to have increased, till it has become general and systematic. You are yourself of course aware, and it should be impressed on the minds of your officers, that a bare uncorroborated confession previous to trial, is the weakest and most suspicious testimony that can be adduced against a prisoner. From the ease with which it is obtained, and the readiness with which, in the alarm of danger, a falsehood or a truth is indiscriminately acknowledged, it is intitled to little credit as evidence, unless strongly corroborated, by other circumstances; and where facts go to disprove the truth of such confession, or even to cast suspicion thereon, it becomes as inadmissible, as evidence against the prisoner (whether confirmed before the magistrate or not) as it would be, if positive proof was adduced of its having been obtained, by the flattery of hope, or extorted by the impressions of fear. The magistrates are in consequence strictly enjoined by section 6th, Regulation 9, 1793, "notwithstanding such confessions, invariably to bind over the witnesses to the commission of the crime alleged against the prisoner, that they may be examined before the court of circuit, in the same manner as if the prisoner had denied the charge." I had occasion, in the course of the session, to call the acting magistrates attention to this rule; and trust that in future it will be strictly adhered to. In all the cases of decoity before me, I was obliged to call for evidence to facts, having been furnished only with evidence to confessions.

8. In a trial for decoity and murder (No. 13. of your Supplementary Calendar) I found two witnesses illegally confined, for not testifying on oath, to the truth of a fabricated mofussil confession. These men had been in jail for seven months, and were in close custody when the trial came on, though no inquiry had been instituted, nor was meant to be instituted against them, for perjury, and they had, in point of fact, deposed to what was true; namely, that the confession sent in by the police darogah, did not correspond, in any one circumstance, with what the prisoner had said; that the prisoner had said one thing, and that the buckshee, had written another: the testimony of these two men was corroborated before me, by other evi-

\* They chiefly consisted of the following general Rules:

1<sup>st</sup>. Where a prisoner can read and write, a confession invariably to be in his own handwriting, and not that of any other person.

Note.—Though one of the prisoners in N<sup>o</sup> 1 could write and read Bengallee, and the fact was perfectly known to the police at the time, at his akessed confession was taken down in Persia under the pretence that there was no Bengallee writer at hand; as if he could not have written it himself, had it not been fabricated.

2<sup>d</sup>. Whether he can read and write or not the confession to be witnessed by one or more persons, who can sign their names, and are no tools of the police.

3<sup>d</sup>. The paper to which original signature may be affixed, to be sent to the magistrate and not a real or pretended copy; as any other document than the original is perfectly inadmissible, as evidence.

Note.—In N<sup>o</sup> 17. the paper deposed to, was signed by one witness in his own hand, and marked, by another, &c. that there could be no mistaking it; but neither the paper sent in to the magistrate by the darogha Mahomed Nukee, nor another, which he afterwards produced before me as the original, had such signature, or mark; and it was positively sworn by all the witnesses, that the size of the paper, was not the same. The motive in changing the confession is of no moment; it is sufficient that the thing tendered in lieu of it, was inadmissible as evidence.

4<sup>th</sup>. Daroghas of police to state, at the foot of every confession, the hour at which it was taken, with the date and hour of its being witnessed.

5<sup>th</sup>. Where it may have been taken at night (which was the case in almost all the confessions given in evidence at the before me) the special reason for its having been so taken, to be stated in the daroghas' report, with a note of the date and hour at which the prisoner was apprehended, and date and time of taking the confession.

6<sup>th</sup>. The magistrate to be careful in examining the witness, to satisfy himself that the signature to a confession, is not obtained by misrepresenting the contents of the paper (as was the case in trial 13. and 15.) or other fraud.

(Signed) E. H.



dence at the trial, and the darogah was accused by his jemadar, of attempting to support the fabrication by subornation of perjury. As soon as he found that the persons whose signatures were affixed as witnesses to the paper, would not swear to a falsehood. It does not at all affect the merits of the case, whether this charge (which you have been directed to enquire into) is true or not. The ground on which the two witnesses were kept in confinement, viz. their inability to give security for their appearance, which had been demanded, in consequence of their testimony before the magistrate, was altogether illegal. The subordinate officers of police in the mofussil, are already sufficiently expert in the art of preparing proofs, without this fresh incitement to their industry: and, I trust, that the court will not again hear of witnesses being put in jail, on such grounds.

9. It would be endless entering into a detail of the different modes, in which confessions are fabricated and proved. The usual course appears to be, first, to apprehend as many people as caprice may dictate, and then to select from the number, those individuals who are to confess, and determine on the purport of their confessions. The preliminaries being thus arranged, the victims are made over to the subordinate agents or instruments of police, to be dealt with according to circumstances; and the rest are discharged. It sometimes happens, that they meet with a man whom they are able to deceive, by assurances of immediate pardon, and false promises of future favour and indulgence: in such case, he is usually told, that, by signing a paper prepared by the buckshee for that purpose, or repeating before witnesses what he is instructed to say, he will not only escape hanging, or at least perpetual imprisonment, but become one of the chosen of the police, and make his fortune as a goyendah; that all he has to do, is to pretend that he was concerned in the decoity, and say, that the gang was composed of particular individuals who are named to him, and leave the rest to the darogah; that there can be no harm in this, because all the world know they are the real decoits; and, in short, the alternative is offered him, either of making a friend or an enemy of the police; either of suffering an ignominious death through their power, or of raising himself to a post of honourable ambition and profit, by their favour. By these, and similar artifices, they catch a dupe, who suffers for his credulity; but when these means fail, which they generally do, they have recourse to compulsion. In this event, the prisoners are taken out singly, at night, and subjected to every species of maltreatment, till they consent to subscribe before witnesses, to the contents of a confession, drawn up for their signature by the buckshee, or to learn it, by heart, and repeat it, in their presence. When the prisoner is thus prepared, if there appears no danger of his retracting before morning, he is left at peace, for a few hours: but if any apprehension of that sort is entertained, a burkundaz is sent for three or four people of the village to witness the confession instantly, and they are aroused from their sleep, at all hours of the night for that purpose. It is to be observed, however, that the sending for impartial witnesses does not often occur, except where the darogah has not sufficient weight or talent to keep his place, and the same time set appearances at defiance. A darogah who is sure of his post, will, with the utmost impudence, send in a confession, witnessed only by a few pykes, or other police dependants, who were perhaps the very instruments by whose means it was extorted. Sometimes a broken pot, an old rag, or some other article of little or no value, belonging to the person robbed, is procured by a goyendah or other inferior agent of police, and deposited in a half dry tank or ditch, to which the prisoner is afterwards taken, for the purpose of bringing it out with great formality, in the presence of witnesses. Trash of this sort is sometimes thrown into the compound of a man's house, or other part of his dwelling, in the hurry and confusion of a sham search for stolen property, and brought out with his own things, by way of corroborating a confession. A case came under my observation, in which a goyendah was caught, in the very act of disposing of property in this way.

In No. 12, of your Supplementary Calendar, the darogah of Maniktula, in his capacity of thanah ameen, with the aid of his subordinate, had prepared all the proofs which were to corroborate a confession, long before the confession itself, was pretended to have been openly made. Even his first report to the acting magistrate, that the decoits were apprehended with the property (which I found amongst the miscellaneous records of your office) bears a date prior to the confession, by which the property was subsequently pretended by him, to have been discovered. All that is asserted to have been ascertained, was known to him before he brought the prisoners to the thanah of Bydebattee; and yet they were confined there, for some time after their arrival, for the sole purpose of preparing sham confessions, in direct violation of section 17. Regulation 9. 1807; by the provisions of which, he was prohibited, on pain of immediate dismissal from office, from detaining the prisoners beyond the time indispensably requisite for the enquiry which had already been made. I shall not enlarge on this unpleasant topic. In regard to the individual darogah, and the vacancy occasioned by his suspension, you will, of course, conform strictly to the instructions which I have separately given you, and the confirmation of them which you have received from the court at large. In correcting the general abuses which have been pointed out to you, the court expect your most earnest and zealous co-operation.

10. Another point to which the notice of the acting magistrate was directed, and which cannot be too often repeated, is the shameful practice which prevails, of suppressing all the evidence on the part of the prisoner; especially where the proof of guilt rests, on a mofussil confession. It will, of course, sometimes occur, that a particular witness, named by a prisoner, is not forthcoming; but where several are summoned from different villages, and not one, or at least any material one, is to be found (as was the case, in all the trials at the present



sent session) the only construction which can be put on a general and repeated return to that effect by your officers, is, that such return is false.

11. A practice has been adopted in the magistrate's office, which must tend to increase the difficulty (if any exists) of procuring the attendance of material witnesses, namely, the subpoenaing for attendance before the court of circuit, all the witnesses to character, who have put their names to the sooruthaul. Now, a sooruthaul to character is sometimes signed by three fourths of the residents, in a village; and these persons receive intelligence from phandadar, that a police peon, or burkundaze, is come amongst them to carry them off from their ordinary occupations; it is not at all surprizing or improbable that most of those who are unable to pay for exemptions, should desert the villages, till he is gone; and that even two or three material witnesses to facts, should be amongst the group who absent themselves for the time. But their absence is but temporary: and it would be as difficult to satisfy me, that those who are material cannot be sent in singly on their return, as it would be, to assign a fair reason, why witnesses to facts, should be more difficult to discover, than witnesses to confessions. It would be far better, however, that the proof of general bad character (which is quite a secondary consideration) should be dispensed with altogether, than that the mode of obtaining it, should afford to the darogahs a plea for suppressing all the evidence to facts, which would tend to a discovery of the truth, and all the proofs of innocence adduced by the accused. Where it is meant to be shown that the prisoner bears a general bad character, the selection of a few of the most creditable of the witnesses who have put their names to the sooruthaul (of course, including those who may have been examined before the magistrate) would be sufficient, without summoning every individual who may have signed the paper; and where the prisoner's general character is found, on inquiry by the magistrate, to be good, or unobjectionable, I cannot see what end is proposed to be answered, by establishing that fact on the part of the prosecution, instead of leaving it, as it ought to be, to the prisoner. No. 14. of your Supplementary Calendar exhibited the names of upwards of a hundred witnesses to character, on the part of the prosecution, most of them entirely unnecessary; whilst, on the other hand, the character of the prisoner Lummol, on whose alleged confession, the other prisoners in that trial were apprehended, and who is represented by the police as the leader of the gang, was altogether overlooked. I beg that the useless and objectionable practice adverted to in this paragraph, may (as directed during the session) be discontinued.

12. Several petitions were presented to me, in the course of the session. Those of the greatest public importance, complain of the rapacity, oppression, and gross and daring acts of illegal violence and rapine committed by goyendahs, and strong disinclination evinced on the part of the magistrate, to redress grievances of that description. I regret that the acting magistrate's proceedings, in the case of Ram Mohun Bakkal and Ramjee, goyendah, should give a colour to the latter part of the charge. It is with concern I observe, that the censure passed on those proceedings, was attended with no effect; and that the court's instructions of the 4th July last, respecting an inquiry into the merits of the complaints, should have been totally disregarded. I am aware of the pressure of other business, and of the unusual number of persons in actual custody for examination, whose cases ought, generally speaking, to be taken up, in preference to those of persons who are at large on bail; but I cannot admit this, as a sufficient plea for neglecting the court's orders, in a case of so much importance as the present; nor can I wink so hard, as not to see that the accused, from the nature of the charge, ought not, in strictness, to be at large on security. But if this unmerited indulgence to a man, accused on oath of the most daring acts of outrage, and open robbery, with a tender of ample proof, is to operate as a bar to inquiry, it becomes incumbent on me to order that his bail be withdrawn, till the investigation, which I directed in vain three months ago, is completed. The charges are of too serious a complexion to be lightly treated, or to be longer neglected; and I am urgently impelled, by a sense of duty, peremptorily to direct that no farther time be lost, in conforming to the instructions communicated to the acting magistrate on the 4th July last, in preference to other business; and that, as soon as the pre-scribed investigation may be brought to a close, you submit the whole of your proceedings (as already directed), together with my roobacartee of the foregoing date to the court of circuit. You will not omit to examine the whole of the witnesses whose names are mentioned in the above order, to the points therein directed; besides receiving the evidence of such other persons as you may deem material. You will also be careful to ascertain whether any part of the 400 rupees, of which the complainant swears he was pilaged, was corruptly received by the police darogah of Nohuzzatee, or his subordinates; and take the most effectual means in your power, for the recovery of the stolen cash, to whoever hands it may be traced.

13. The case of Mahomed Sadhokhan requires the immediate interposition of the court. The accusation against the goyendahs named in his petition, amounts to an unqualified charge of robbery by open violence, and should be treated, as such. His house is alleged to have been broken into at night, during his absence from home, by a gang of about 25 persons with torches, who compelled his wife by force and menaces, to disclose where his money was deposited, and did not quit her, till they had thus obtained 305 rupees in cash, besides all the gold and silver trinkets of the women and children of his family, and several articles of household property.

It appears from the Magistrate's report in return to a precept from this Court, that on the 3th September there were no less than 200 prisoners in the hajat tugwar jail, some of whom had been in confinement from the 20th April.

(Signed) E. W.

property which they took as spoil. She raised the neighbourhood, he says, by her cries; but they could only pity, not assist her, for the chiefs of the gang, disclosed to the terror of them all, that they were goindabs. They then took possession of his house, and after rhyoting therein at his expense, for a complete day and night, quitted it with threats and imprecations; but not till they had extorted 14 rupees more from his wife. You will be pleased to lay the information required, on the 8th instant, in regard to this case, before the court at large, without delay.

14. In one of the cases complained of, your assistant had demanded excessive bail in the sum of 5,000 rupees from the principal party accused, and 500 from each of his people, on charge of a common assault. He was prohibited from exercising this arbitrary discretion in future, and was informed that in all cases which appeared to him of sufficient magnitude to require more than ordinary bail pending the enquiry, he must submit the whole of the proceedings to the magistrate, for his information and orders.

15. The other petitions do not require particular notice. Orders were passed on all, which I conclude have been conformed to.

16. Under the powers vested in the court by Regulation 9, 1807, I inspected the magistrates proceedings in the cases of all the persons in confinement under requisition of security by him for good behaviour, and passed such order, with my reasons at large in such case, as appeared just and proper. I was sorry to observe, that many of these people, had been confined for a very long period, some for upwards of two years, on insufficient grounds. The cases with which I was most dissatisfied, were those of persons doomed to the ignominy of a gaol, without any enquiry whatever having been made, into their general character; or whose character, habits, and means of livelihood, had been found on enquiry, to be good or unexceptionable, merely because their names were thrust into thanah confessions. This is a complete perversion, both of the letter and spirit of section 10. Regulation 22, 1793; which authorizes and directs the magistrates to examine, on oath, vagrants and suspected persons, and also any persons who may have a knowledge of their usual place of residence, occupation, or mode of obtaining their livelihood; and if there shall appear to him, grounds for supposing that they are disorderly or ill disposed people, he shall employ them, in repairing the public roads, &c. until they find security for their good behaviour, &c. or the magistrate shall be satisfied that they will of themselves, take to some service or employment, so as to obtain an honest livelihood. Even supposing the confession, not to have been fabricated, or obtained by improper means, and admitting it, to be evidence against others, which it is not; you would still have no authority as magistrate, to punish the specific offence, by condemning the offender to the public roads, till he finds security for his good behaviour. I cannot too strongly animadvert on a practice which, in its operation tears the bonds of society asunder; degrades and vilifies all ranks and classes, without distinction, and subjects every honest man to infamy and penury, by treating him as a rogue and vagabond. In requiring security for behaviour, you must look to general character; and by that, and that alone, you must be guided. If from the evidence before you, during an investigation into a specific charge, or otherwise, there should be grounds for supposing that the persons accused are disorderly or ill disposed people, or of general bad or dangerous character, it would then be your duty, in conformity with the section quoted, not to release them until they enter into sufficient security for their good behaviour, in such sum as you may deem it expedient to exact; under the particular circumstances of the case; observing it, as an invariable rule, to state the amount in your proceedings. But where nothing appears unfavourable to the general character of a person accused of a specific offence, you possess no power whatever to demand from him security for good behaviour; but he must either be committed for trial before the court of circuit, punished, or discharged, according to the evidence before you under the general Regulations. Your report exhibited several instances of persons improperly confined for security, on suspicion of specific crimes.

17. I found several prisoners in jail, under requisition of security; not for their good behaviour, but simply for their appearance, chiefly on the ground of their having been named in mofussil confessions. One of them (N<sup>o</sup> 2. of your list) had been in jail, from the second of May 1808. This illegal and objectionable practice of demanding bazir zamencee security from accused persons, previous to their discharge, appears to have been almost generally exercised where there was no ground, either to commit for trial, or to punish, or even to object to character. It attracted my attention, at an early period of the session, and I prohibited it in future.

18. The acting magistrate, in his report of prisoners in confinement for security, by order of the court of circuit, omitted to state under the provisions of section 11. Regulation 53, 1803, whether the accusation of a muchelka by any of the persons who had been confined for a year or upwards, under inability to give the security required, would, in his opinion, be sufficient to provide for the object intended. I nevertheless deemed it proper to call the whole of the prisoners before me, and examine the proceedings held by this court on their respective trials, as far as was necessary to ascertain the grounds on which they were required to find security. This was done with a view of determining, 1st. What prisoners, on consideration of the circumstances of their respective cases (of which circumstances, the magistrate must necessarily be ignorant) were proper objects of release on their muchelka, without security; leaving it to the magistrate to show cause to the court at large, why the prisoners should not be released on muchelka, either in consequence of misbehaviour during their confinement, or on other grounds unconnected with the trial.—2dly. What security in cases where the prisoners are not released on their muchelka, should, under the provisions of

of section 9, Regulation 8, 1808, be deemed substantial to the satisfaction of the court. After duly considering the whole matter, you were furnished with detailed instructions on each of these points, and directed to report to the court at large, your objections at length to the release of any of the prisoners, whom the court do not consider it necessary, under the facts in evidence at the trial, to detain longer in jail.

19. In respect to the prisoners confined for security by order of the Nizamut Adawlut, who were reported *pro forma*, I had no correct means of forming a judgment\*; I contented myself therefore with hearing, what they respectively had to allege; and, directing that those who had tendered before me substantial security for their future good conduct, at the different thanahs, should be sent to the several darogahs of police, for the purpose of furnishing it. From this general rule, I except Muddun Roy (N<sup>o</sup> 30) who stated, that he had tendered security, in vain. It is unnecessary to remind you, that the two goyendahs, by whom he was accused, were tried by order of the Nizamut Adawlut, and convicted at the present session, of conspiracy and perjury in this very case, and sentenced in conformity to Regulation 2, 1807. You have accordingly been directed to discharge Muddun Roy, on the security tendered by him, or immediately assign your reasons to the court at large, why you do not.

\* These persons (some of whom have been confined for the last six years) are not to be set at large, with substantial security for their future good behaviour, as the amount is not specified, I take the liberty of submitting to the consideration of the Nizamut Adawlut whether an arbitrary discretion is not thereby left in the breast of the magistrate, to imprison indefinitely, or release at pleasure. The frequent change of magistrates has necessary effect of precluding local and personal knowledge, in cases of this description; and they have not means of exercising a sound discretion, in fixing amount (especially where the order for detention grounded, on suspicion of gang-robbery) because they have not heard both sides of the question. In some instances excessive security will be demanded; in others, it will unwarrantably low.

(Signed) F H

20. On looking over the calendars of persons apprehended and discharged, or punished, which were submitted to the court under section 17, Regulation 9, 1793, and section 22, Regulation 9, 1807, and reviewing your proceedings, I observed a few trifling irregularities, which have been pointed out to you; but there are two cases amongst them, which require particular notice. The one, is a case in which three travellers are stated to have been stripped of their property on the road, by a man who had given them poison; which was irregularly decided by your assistant, and does not appear to have been, sufficiently investigated. A farther inquiry is now, impracticable; but it is my duty to remind you, that in cases of such magnitude as this, your assistant (if referred to him at all) should be instructed under the provision of section 21, Regulation 9, 1807, to submit the proceedings held upon the examination, for the magistrate's decision, and not determine the matter himself. The other, is an instance of corporal punishment, inflicted by your assistant on a woman, for preferring a groundless complaint. This offence, as well as all others, which the magistrates are empowered to hear and determine, without reference to the court of circuit, (except theft) is punishable by fine, imprisonment, under sections 8 and 16, Regulation 9, 1793; and it is only in cases of petty thefts, which may not have been attended with aggravating circumstances, or committed by persons of notorious bad character, that the magistrates and other assistants are authorized to inflict corporal punishment, not exceeding thirty rattans. You will be careful that no deviation is made from this salutary rule in future, either by yourself or your assistant.

21. These are the only points to which it appears necessary for me to revert in this letter. For details of every description, I must refer you to the separate instructions, you have received at various periods, during the session.

22. I was much gratified, on visiting your jail, in observing the cleanly appearance of the different wards, and the care and attention which is evidently paid to the health and comfort of the prisoners. It is incumbent on me, also, to notice, in favourable terms, the conduct of that portion of your Amnah who attended me, during the session; and my thanks are, at the same time, due for the facility of access to the foudarry records, so obligingly afforded by yourself.

Allypore, }  
11th Sept. 1810. }

I am,  
Sir, &c.  
(Signed)

E. WATSON,  
A. J. C.

To GEORGE DOWDESWELL, Esq.

\* Secretary to the Judicial Department, Fort William.

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit an abstract Statement of the cases of a heinous nature, which were brought before me, at the second quarterly session of jail delivery for the 24 Peshgunnahs for the present year, according to the prescribed form.

2. The proof in all the cases of decoity, rested on confessions sent into the magistrate by the police darogahs, which were given in evidence against the prisoners, at their respective trials. An uncorroborated confession before trial, especially when taken by a native officer, is by far the weakest and most suspicious species of testimony which can be adduced, even where there is no proof of its having been obtained, by improper means; but in all the trials before me for decoity, there were grounds to suspect, that the confessions brought against the prisoners had either been obtained, by false hopes and promises, or extorted, by the impressions of fear, or fabricated; recourse was seldom had to collateral circumstances, to strengthen

strengthen a confession, and whenever the attempt was made, it failed. Only one instance occurred, of a prisoner having confirmed before the magistrate, a confession received from a thanah; and in this case, there was not merely sufficient evidence to warrant a belief that the confession was false, and afford ground to suspect that it had been confirmed by the prisoner, under the influence of improper means previously made use of towards him; but the Nizamut Adawlut, to whom the trial was referred, and by whom the prisoner was acquitted, thought proper, under all the circumstances, to direct a public prosecution to be instituted against the police darogah and others, on a charge of conspiracy and perjury against the prisoner and others, named in the confession.

3. The offence of accusing or threatening to accuse innocent persons of crimes punishable with death or transportation, especially of the crime of decoity, with a view to extort money or chattels, or for other criminal purposes, and conspiring to convict them, by fraud and perjury, has, I apprehend, materially increased; but whether I am right or not, in this conjecture, it no doubt prevails, to a very serious extent. I had three cases of conspiracy and perjury touching decoities before me, at the session just concluded. In two of them, the prisoners were convicted and sentenced under the provisions of Regulation 2, 1807. The third ended in an acquittal, for want of legal proof, though strong suspicion existed of the guilt of the accused.

4. I take this opportunity of soliciting the instructions of government, in regard to my return to my station. At this season of the year, the only practicable mode of proceeding to Benares is by water, which will delay the period of my arrival, towards the middle of November. I propose therefore, with the permission of government, to defer my departure till the weather will admit of my travelling by land, so as to reach my station, about the close of the dusseyya vacation.

Calcutta Court of Circuit, }  
19th September 1810. }

I have the honour to be, &c.  
(Signed) E. WATSON,  
A. J. C.

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of Cases of a heinous nature, tried by the Court of Circuit for the division of Calcutta, at the Jail Delivery for Zillah 24 Pergunnahs, in the second quarterly session of 1810.

DECOITY.		MURDER.		ARSON.		HIGHWAY ROBBERY.	
N <sup>o</sup> of Trials.	N <sup>o</sup> of Prisoners.	N <sup>o</sup> of Trials.	N <sup>o</sup> of Prisoners.	N <sup>o</sup> of Trials.	N <sup>o</sup> of Prisoners.	N <sup>o</sup> of Trials.	N <sup>o</sup> of Prisoners.
8.	31.	2.	4.	—	—	—	—

Calcutta Court of Circuit, }  
19th September 1810. }

To E. WATSON, Esq.  
Acting Judge of Circuit for the division of Calcutta.  
Judicial Department.

Sir,

Para. 1. I AM directed by the right honourable the Governor General in council to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from you, dated the 19th instant, with its enclosure; and to transmit to you for your information, the enclosed copy of an Order, which has been issued to the superintendent of police, on the subject of your address.

2. In reply to the last paragraph of your letter, I am directed to acquaint you, that the Governor General in council authorizes you to postpone your return to your station, until the period noticed by you.

Council chamber,  
29th September 1810.

I am, &c  
(Signed) G. DOWDESWELL,  
Secy to Gov<sup>r</sup>.

To W. BLUNT, Esq.  
Superintendent of Police,  
Judicial Department.

Sir,

Para. 1. I am directed by the right honourable the Governor General in council to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter, and its enclosure, from the acting judge of circuit in the division of Calcutta.

2. In that letter, Mr. Watson observes as follows: "The offence of accusing, or threatening to accuse, innocent persons of crimes punishable with death or transportation, especially of the crime of decoity, with a view to extort money or chattels, or for other

“other criminal purposes; and conspiring to convict them, by fraud and perjury, has, “I apprehend, materially increased.”

3. The offence noticed by Mr. Watson, being of the most serious nature, and pregnant with the worst evils to society, the Governor General in council desires that you will communicate with the officiating magistrate of the 24 Pergunnahs, with the view of ascertaining whether it be still prevalent in the zillah; and if so, of devising the best means for the suppression of it.

4. His Lordship in council likewise desires that you will avail yourself of such opportunities as may occur, of communicating on the subject, with the other magistrates, with the view of ascertaining whether the offence in question exists in other parts of the country; and in case there shall be ground to suppose that it does exist, that you will submit to government such suggestions, as may appear to you best calculated for the extinction of the evil.

• Council chamber, }  
29th September 1810. }  
I am, &c.  
(Signed) G. DOWDESWELL,  
Secy to Govt.

To J. SHAKESPEARE, Esq.  
Register to the Nizamut Adawlut.  
Calcutta first circuit.

Sir,  
Para. 1. In continuation of my address of the 10th instant, I beg you will do me the favour to lay before the court of Nizamut Adawlut, the inclosed copy of a letter which I wrote to the magistrate of the 24 Pergunnahs, at the close of the second quarterly session of jail delivery, at that station, for the present year.

2. As it expresses my sentiments at large on all the points to which it appears to me necessary to advert, I shall not trouble the court, with any separate remarks in this report, but merely subjoin an abstract of the calendar, and a statement (drawn out in the prescribed form) of the prisoners convicted and sentenced by the court of circuit, without reference to the Nizamut Adawlut.

3. It is in my mind, however, of so much importance, that the Nizamut Adawlut should be fully apprized of the nature of the cases of all the persons whom I found in jail, under requisition of security, that I must beg leave to trouble them, in this instance, with details; and accordingly inclose copies of my proceedings in the cases noticed in the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th paragraphs of my letter to Mr. Blaquiere.

30th September 1810.      I am, Sir, &c.  
(Signed) E. WATSON,  
A. J. C.

PS. Since the foregoing was written, I have received a letter from the secretary to government in the judicial department, under date the 29th instant, with enclosure, on the subject of an address from me of the 19th; copy of which, and of the address referred to, I have the honour to forward; and beg you will submit them to the court.

(Signed) E. W.  
A. J. C.

ABSTRACT of the Calendar, at the second quarterly Session of Jail Delivery for the 24 Pergunnahs.

C R I M E S.	N <sup>o</sup> of Trials.	N <sup>o</sup> of Prisoners.	Prisoners convicted and sentenced by the Court of Circuit.	Prisoners acquitted.	Referred to the Nizamut Adawlut:	
					Trials.	Prisoners.
Murder - - - - -	2	4	- -	3	1	1
Decoity - - - - -	8	31	- -	27	3	4
Contumacy, under Regulation 9, 1808 - - - - -	1	1	- -	- -	1	1
Conspiracy and perjury - - -	3	6	3	3	—	—
Burglary - - - - -	1	2	1	1	—	—
Theft - - - - - and receiving stolen property - -	2	{ 2 } 1	3	—	—	—
Mayhem - - - - -	1	1	1	—	—	—
Assault - - - - -	1	1	- 2	1	—	—
Bad character, and suspicion of decoity - - - - -	1	1	- -	1	—	—
	20	50	8	36	5	6

ABSTRACT STATEMENT of Prisoners punished, without reference to the Nizamut Adawlut, by the Court of Circuit for the division of Calcutta, at the jail delivery for Zillah 24 Pergunnahs, in the second quarterly session of 1810.

N <sup>o</sup> of Prisoners.	NAMES.	Sex.	Age.	Religion, and Cast.	Profession.	Crime established.	Sentence of the Court of Circuit.
1.	Sartuch	Male	33	Hindoo of the Bangdy cast.	Goindeh	Conspiracy and perjury.	5 years imprisonment, with hard labour, ignominious punishment of tusheer, branded by the process of godena, and corporal punishment.
2.	Thakoor Doss	D <sup>o</sup>	31	D <sup>o</sup> cast Kybert	(Spices)		
3.	Seeboo Missre	D <sup>o</sup>	25	Brahmin	Mendicant	Theft	20 stripes with the corah, and imprisonment and hard labour for 2 years.
4.	Ram Tunnoo Ghose	D <sup>o</sup>	24	Hindoo of the Gevallah cast.	Labourer	Maliciously wounding the prosecutor.	Imprisonment, with hard labour, for 3 years.
5.	Mooktaran Kybert	D <sup>o</sup>	30	Hindoo of the Kybert cast.	Servant	N <sup>o</sup> 3. Theft	N <sup>o</sup> 3. thirty stripes with the corah, and imprisonment, with hard labour, for 4 years.
6.	Gocul Purramaniyah	D <sup>o</sup>	33	Hindoo of the Gunbunriah.	Shopkeeper	N <sup>o</sup> 6. Receiving property knowing it to be stolen.	N <sup>o</sup> 6. twenty stripes with the corah, and imprisonment, with hard labour, for 3 years.
7.	Ram Jemum Purreaul	D <sup>o</sup>	30	Brahmin	Mendicant	Burglary	20 stripes with the corah, and imprisonment, with hard labour, for 5 years.
8.	Rydonauth	D <sup>o</sup>	25	Hindoo Bangdy cast.	Pyke	Perjury	Branded by the process of godena, ignominious punishment of tusheer, corporal punishment, and 4 years imprisonment, with hard labour.

(Signed) E. W.  
A. J. C.

## Appendix, No. 12.

## MR. SECRETARY DOWDESWELL'S REPORT ON THE GENERAL STATE OF THE POLICE OF BENGAL.

Extract BENGAL Judicial Consultations, 29th September 1809.

## Secretary's Report.—Introductory Observations.

IT cannot be unknown to government, that I have for some time past, given a good deal of attention to the state of the police throughout the territories dependent on this presidency: and that I have sought for information on the subject, not only from the official reports which have passed through my hands, as secretary in the judicial department, but likewise, by private and personal communications with several of the officers of that department. The enquiry into which I have been led, has appeared to me more interesting, every step that I have advanced, from a contemplation of the magnitude of the evils which exist, or at least did very recently exist, in the country; and from the acknowledged and obvious importance of an efficient police, to the peace and happiness of society.

In the consideration of this question, I have had occasion to observe, that those evils were in some instances, to be ascribed to the supineness of the local magistrates; but that they were much more generally imputable, to the defects of the existing system. I trust, therefore, that this report will be suppressed, and consigned to oblivion, in the outset; or that the foregoing avowal of my sentiments will be taken, once for all, as an apology for any freedom of remark which may be found on any of the existing Regulations, in the following discussion.

Were this report intended solely for the consideration of the local government of this country, it would be superfluous to enter into details regarding the evils arising from the inefficiency of the police, as, unhappily, occasions have too frequently arisen to arrest their attention on this important subject; but as the arrangements suggested may possibly attract the attention of the honourable the court of directors, to whom those evils may not be so familiar, a brief exposition of them, must be deemed a necessary introduction to any plan which may be suggested for the general improvement of the police.

Were I to enumerate only a thousandth part of the atrocities of the decoits, and of the consequent sufferings of the people, and were I to soften that recital, in every mode which language would permit, I should still despair of obtaining credit, solely on my own authority, for the accuracy of the narrative.

In order, therefore, not to be suspected of detailing fictitious and imaginary horrors, I shall state little on this subject which has not already received in some sort, the stamp of public authority, either at the hands of government, or of the highest criminal tribunal in this country, beyond the limits of the supreme court of judicature.

In the former report which I had the honour to submit to government on this subject, and which is recorded on the proceedings of the 13th June last, in speaking of the evils attendant on the crime of decoity or gang robbery, it was observed as follows:—"But robbery, rape, and even murder itself, are not the worst figures in this hideous and disgusting picture. An expedient of common occurrence with the decoits, merely to induce a confession of property supposed to be concealed, is to burn the proprietor with straw or torches, until he discloses the property, or perishes in the flames; and when they are actuated by a spirit of revenge against individuals, worse cruelties (if worse, can be) are perpetrated by those remorseless criminals. If the information obtained is not extremely erroneous, the offender\*, hereafter noticed, who was apprehended, through the agency of Mr. Blaquier's goyendas, at Patua, himself committed fifteen murders, in nineteen days; and volumes might be filled, with the recital of the atrocities of the decoits, every line of which, would make the blood run cold with horror."

On this point, Mr. Lumsden, in a Minute recorded on the same day as the report, observes as follows:—"That the existing system of police, has entirely failed in its object, and that the detestable crimes of gang robbery and murder are now equally prevalent, in every part of Bengal (the division of Dacca, perhaps excepted) as at any former period, are truths of too much notoriety to admit of dispute. The details of the enormities which are still committed with impunity, in the immediate vicinity of the capital of British India, as described in the report, are not too highly coloured."

To

\* Gangaram Doss. He has been since convicted and executed. See within Title, No. 2.



Mr. Dowdeswell's  
Report  
on the Police of  
Bengal.

To develope, however, more particularly the nature of the evils to which these remarks refer, I beg leave to insert the following abstract of three trials recently adjudged by the court of Nizamut adawlut.

Trial, No. 1.  
Government against  
Bishonaut et al.

No. 1.—Zillah Nuddea—R. Roocke, senior judge, Calcutta Court of Circuit.

Nizamut Adawlut, } before { J. H. Harrington, Esq.  
3d May, 1809. } and  
John Fombelle, Esq.

Prosecutor, - - - The Vakeel of Government.

Prisoners,	1. Bishonaut Sirdar	-	-	choke-dar.
	2. Budden-siras	}	-	ditto
	Budderuddien			
	3. Shamdass	-	-	beggar.
	4. Gohuck Sirdar	-	-	lime seller.
	5. Dokowrie	-	-	cultivator.
	6. Sannasse	-	-	bearer.
	7. Teetoleah	-	-	cultivator.
	8. Gopaldasolceah	-	-	ditto
9. Jumal	-	-	beggar.	

Charge - - - Gang robbery, arson, murder, and wounding.

THE prisoners were charged, with being part of a gang of decoits, who committed a robbery at the residence and factory of Mr. Faddy, an indigo planter in the Nuddea district; on which occasion, Ghowssee (a servant of Mr. Faddy) was murdered. Mr. Faddy and Mr. Lediard (who was on a visit to Mr. Faddy) and others, were wounded, and property to a considerable amount, was carried off by the robbers.

This attack upon Mr. Faddy appears to have been instigated, by the following circumstances:—The prisoners, Bishonaut, Budden, Shamdass, and another person named Petumber, were convicted criminals, who had been banished under a sentence of imprisonment to Dinagapore, from whence they effected their escape, and returned to Nuddea, where they again assembled a very numerous and powerful gang, and committed the most daring robberies and acts of cruelty, and created the greatest terror to the inhabitants. Mr. Faddy had been very active, in communicating to the magistrate such information as he could procure, for the detection and seizure of the principals of the gang, and at length, Panneh Cowne, his head Pyke, having obtained accurate information of the retreat of Petumber before mentioned, he, in conjunction with two of his relations, Meghye and Hisaboodeen, succeeded in seizing the offender, who, however, was severely wounded, in resisting his seizure, and died shortly after. This appears to have instigated the robbery and murder charged against the prisoners.

From the evidence in this case, it appeared that between 3 and 4 o'clock in the morning of the 27th September 1808, Mr. Faddy and Mr. Lediard were alarmed by the report of a gun, and on rising, found the house surrounded by decoits, who, in despite of all resistance (in which one of the gang was shot dead) forced their way into the bungalow, from all sides, and four of them, seized Mr. Faddy, after a considerable struggle, in which he was nearly strangled. Two of the prisoners wrested the gun from his hands. Mr. Lediard's gun having repeatedly missed fire, and he having received a severe spear-wound in his breast, was also disabled from further resistance; both gentlemen, remained entirely in the power of the decoits. During these transactions, the prisoner Bishonaut repeatedly required Mr. Faddy to deliver up Panneh Cowne Pyke, who appeared to be the immediate object of their vengeance, and to point out, where his own money was. The decoits several times dragged Messrs. Faddy and Lediard to a short distance from the house, treating them with great insult and indignity; some, proposing to put them to death, and others, to cut off their ears and nose; the prisoner Budden in particular, having discovered that one of their gang had been shot, held a drawn sword over Mr. Faddy, and was on the point of striking, but was restrained, by the authority of Bishonaut. At the approach of day, the decoits retired, carrying off all the arms in the house, about 700 rupees in cash, and other property, to a considerable amount. On their return from Mr. Faddy's house, they set fire to the house of Panneh Cowne, and murdered his two relations, Meghye and Hisaboodeen, the head of the former being found on the following day, suspended on a tree near the house.

The court of Nizamut adawlut, after a full consideration of all the circumstances and proceedings held on the trial, were fully satisfied of the guilt of the prisoners 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7 and 8, in having been concerned in robbery, murder, and other acts of aggravation; and accordingly, under the discretion given by the futwa of their law officers, sentenced each of the said eight prisoners to suffer death.

The prisoner Jumal not being convicted, but he lying under strong suspicion of being one of the gang, the court directed that he should not be released, without substantial security for his future good conduct, and appearance, when required.

No. 2.—Zillah Nuddca—D. Campbell, third judge, Calcutta Court of Circuit.

Nizamut Adawlut, } before { J. H. Harrington, Esq.  
Sept. 4, 1809. } and  
J. Fombelle, Esq.

Prosecutors { Premchund, } Inhabitants of  
Kalipaul, } Gadpokheria.  
Sheobiswas,

Prisoners { 1. Koraur Sirdar - - - - - chokedar.  
2. Para Sirdar - - - - - cultivator.  
3. Ramsoonderkussali - - - ditto  
4. Gungarem Das - - - - - ditto  
5. Sumbhow Cunnea - - - watchman.

Charge - - - Decoity and murder.

THE prisoners were charged with being the principals of a gang of decoits, who, on the night of the 20th October 1808, attacked the village of Gadpokheria, in the district of Nuddca, and committed the following crimes:—1st. A robbery at the house of Premchund, and the murder of Bhyrob, his brother.—2d. A robbery at the house of Kalipaul, and the murder of Pydahuth, his brother, and Mussumut Cheetra, his wife, by burning them to death.—3d. A robbery at the house of Sheobiswas, and burning to death, his mother Mussumut Tegee.—4th. A robbery at the house of Mussumut Kalendee, attended with her murder.

From the evidence in this case, it appeared that the crimes charged against the prisoners, originated chiefly in motives of revenge, for evidence given by some inhabitants of the village, against some of the gang, on a late trial at Kishenagur. The evidence, among other matter, established the following facts:—That about 50 decoits attacked Kalipaul's house, when they found Bhyrob, and tied him to a stake before the house, when the prisoners Koraur Sirdar and Secuebhoo Dunace, (telling Bhyrob that they "would teach him how to give evidence, against them again,") gave him several mortal wounds, by thrusting a spear through different parts of his body, and cutting him with a sword:—That a party of the robbers, then proceeded towards Premchund's house, whilst others, taking straw from the thatch of Kalipaul's house and lighting it, went into the house, from whence were immediately heard the screams of Kalipaul's brother and wife, for some time without intermission, crying out that they were burned and tortured, and imploring the robbers for mercy:—That the robbers next went to the house of Sheobiswas, from whence also cries were heard:—That after midnight, when the robbers had departed, the body of Bhyrob was found near the stake, with several wounds on different parts:—That in the house of Kalipaul, were found the bodies of his brother and wife, apparently burnt to death, by the application of torches and lighted straw to different parts:—That the house of Premchund was found plundered:—That in the house, Sheobiswas his mother was found burnt to death, and in that of Mussumut Kalindce, she was found killed, by the thrust of a spear.

The futwah of the law officers of the Nizamut adawlut, declared the whole of the prisoners convicted of being concerned, either as principals or accomplices, in all the robberies and murders laid to their charge, and liable to discretionary punishment, by sentence extending to death; and the Court having no doubt of the guilt of the prisoners, condemned them accordingly to suffer death.

No. 3.—Zillah Nuddca—D. Campbell, third judge, Calcutta Court of Circuit.

Nizamut Adawlut, } present { J. H. Harrington  
Sept. 16, 1809. } and  
John Fombelle.

Prosecutor - - - Jugnath Ghose.

Prisoners { 1. Bulram Sirdar - - - - - chokedar.  
2. Balka Sirdar - - - - - ditto  
3. Gholamee Sirdar - - - cultivator.  
4. Docoa Sirdar - - - - - labourer.  
5. Sheekoor - - - - - peada.  
6. Mudary - - - - - ditto  
7. Caliemurn Ghose - - - cultivator.  
8. Nubboo Sirdar - - - - - chokedar.  
9. Casimath-bagdy - - - labourer.  
10. Gudda Barooge - - - beetle seller.  
11. Gopul Mussulman - - - cultivator.  
12. Babockhan - - - - - peada.  
13. Nubbye Khan - - - - - ditto  
14. Subdui Sirdar - - - - - labourer.  
15. Malookchund - - - - - thatcher.  
16. Herry Ghose - - - - - ditto  
17. Roghonaath das Sirdar - - - cultivator.  
18. Ram Comar barooge - - - beetle seller.  
19. Kunkye Kopalay - - - cultivator.

Charges - - - Gang-robbery and murder.

THE prisoners were charged with being the principal persons of a gang of robbers, who, on the night of the 27th August 1808, attacked and murdered at

Mr. Dowdeswell  
Report  
on the Police of  
Bengal.

Trial, No. 2.  
Inhabitants of Gad-  
pokheria against Kor-  
Sirdar et al.

Trial, No. 3.  
Jugnath Ghose, against  
Bulram Sirdar et al.

Mr. Dowdswell's  
Report  
on the Police of  
Tamil.

Trial, No. 3  
Jacobath Ghose against  
Balam Sirdar et al.

secutors' father, at Madhobpore, a village in the Nudda district, and murdered the above-mentioned Loharam, together with Musseent Goomoona, the prosecutor's mother.

The Prisoners pleaded Not Guilty.

From the evidence on the trial, the murder of these persons appears to have been attended with unexampled cruelty. The prosecutor related the circumstances, as follows:—That about 12 o'clock on the night on which the robbery and murders took place, he was sleeping in a house at a short distance from that of his father, and being awake by the noise of robbers, went out, and saw that a party of about 50 decoits had attacked his father's house; that from fear, he concealed himself, in a plantain garden within 50 yards of the spot, from whence he saw the robbers drag out from the house, his father and mother, and after binding their hands and feet, apply lighted straw and torches to their bodies, demanding of them, at the same time, to point out where their money was concealed; that the unfortunate people assured them, they had none; but that the robbers, proving inexorable, went into the house and brought from it, a quantity of hemp, which they twisted round the body of Loharam, and after pouring on it ghee, or clarified butter, to render it more inflammable, set fire to it:—That they then procured a quilt from the house, which they also moistened with ghee, and rolled round the body of Loharam:—That the prisoners <sup>1</sup> Bulka Sirdar, <sup>2</sup> Nubboo Sirdar, and <sup>3</sup> Kunkye Cupally, at the direction of the prisoner <sup>4</sup> Balam Sirdar, threw the prosecutor's father on the ground, and keeping him down, with a bamboo which they held over his breast, set fire to the quilt:—That at this time, the cries of the unfortunate man were most shocking, the robbers continually calling on him to tell where his money was, and he assuring them that he had none, and imploring them to take his cows, or any thing they might find in his house:—That the robbers, however, still proceeded to further cruelty, having procured some mustard seed, and torn up the flesh of Loharam's breast, by drawing a large bamboo several times, across it, pounded the mustard seed on the sores, with a view to make the torment more excruciating:—That, at the same time, the mother of the prosecutor was tortured nearly in the same manner, by the robbers tying hemp round her body, and setting fire to it, and dragging her about from place to place, by the hair of her head, calling on her all the while, to tell them where her husband's money was concealed; and also calling out on the prosecutor by name, to come and witness the state of his father and mother:—That these cruelties, together with the plunder of the house of Loharam and other ones adjacent, continued until between 3 and 4 o'clock in the morning, at which time, the robbers departed; and that the prosecutor, on going up to his father and mother, found them most dreadfully mangled, but still alive; that his father expired about noon, and his mother, not till the following morning. The prisoners whom the prosecutor swore to have recognized, at the murder of his parents, in addition to <sup>1</sup> Balam Sirdar, <sup>2</sup> Bulka Sirdar, <sup>3</sup> Nubboo Sirdar and <sup>4</sup> Kunkye Cupally, before mentioned, were:—<sup>5</sup> Dacooa Sirdar, <sup>6</sup> Shookoor Peada, <sup>7</sup> Mudary Peada, <sup>8</sup> Calichurn Ghose and <sup>9</sup> Nubboo Sirdar; and he also specified <sup>10</sup> Casinauth Bagdy and <sup>11</sup> Gudda Barooge.

Several witnesses on the part of the prosecution (inhabitants of the village) confirmed the circumstance related by the prosecutor.

The court in consequence, sentenced the prisoners convicted, nine in number, to suffer death.

AN accurate judgment of the nature of the evils in question, may be formed from the foregoing documents. It is not so easy to judge of their extent. The state of the police has been very different, in different zillahs; and in the same zillah, at different periods of time. Even the various parts of one and the same district, may not always be equally infested with the crime of gang robbery.—In transcribing therefore the following extract from the orders passed by government on the 30th June last, upon an enquiry made by Mr. H. Shakespear into the prevalence of gang robbery in the tannah of Beenipore, that is, in about the 12th part of the district of Hooghly, it is proper to remark that there is substantial reason to believe that the crime in question, was not by any means, so prevalent in other parts of that district. On the other hand, there are grounds to apprehend that in the district of Nudda and Rajeshmhee generally, the crime of decoity had at one period, become still more prevalent than it was in Beenipore, at the time to which Mr. Shakespear's report refers. The following is an extract from the orders passed by government on that report.

"The following appears to be the result of Mr. Shakespear's enquiries respecting the public offences committed within those parts of the tannah of Beenipore, to which his investigation extended, from the month of Bysaack 1215, to the month of Tye 1216," (13 months.)

" Houses robbed	-	-	-	-	-	-	104.
" Attended with the wounding of	-	-	-	-	-	8	} Persons.
" The torture of	-	-	-	-	-	3	
" And the murder of	-	-	-	-	-	5	

After the foregoing exposition, which I have rendered as brief as the nature of the case would permit, I presume that any augmentation of expense which may be required for the suppression of a crime, so pregnant with evils, so fatal to the peace and happiness of society, will not for a moment, be thought an object. By augmentation of expense, I mean the immediate increase of establishments; for it appears to me demonstrable, that if the money appropriated to this purpose be productive of the end desired, that is, the reform of the police, it will ultimately be attended, even with pecuniary benefit to government.

had Genl Letter to the  
Comt of Directors.

On this question, the following observations of the Governor General in Council, appear to be perfectly in point: with this difference, that what is there stated with respect

"We apprehend, that a plan of that nature can never be duly appreciated, solely from the immediate expense attending it: considered only in that point of view, an argument may always be drawn, against the adoption of it. In order, however, to form a proper judgment on the question, it is to be considered, whether the more regular and certain collection of the public revenue, the prevention of disturbances, and consequently, of the expense with which the suppression of them is ever attended, the saving of rewards for the apprehension of criminals; the prevention of loss by the robbery of remittances of public treasure, &c. do not in the aggregate, counterbalance the immediate expense, with which any such plan is attended."

Mr. Dowdeswell's  
Report  
on the Police of  
Bengal.

The foregoing remarks premised; I now proceed to the immediate subject of this Report, which will be considered, under the following heads:

Office of Superintendent of Police,	Zemindars and others,
Office of Magistrate,	Secret Service,
Darogahs of Police,	Office of Superintendent of Police.

#### OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE.

This office, considered as an active and efficient establishment, has only existed since the enactments of Regulation IX, 1808, or from 4th November of that year. Previously to that period, it seems to have been supposed, contrarily I imagine to the practice of every well-governed state, that a local police, that is, the appointment of a magistrate in each district, with the aid of one or two European assistants, and of establishments of native officers, was adequate to the difficult task of discovering the haunts of gangs of decoits, of watching their movements, of forming plans for their apprehension, and of carrying those plans into execution. Had the depredations of this kind of criminals, been confined to particular districts, the principle of those arrangements would not have been so very erroneous; it is evident, however, that persons addicted to predatory habits, will wander from district to district, according as local and temporary circumstances may invite them: the consequence is, that after a magistrate may have watched the movements of gangs of decoits, and may have nearly matured his plans for their apprehension, those plans are entirely defeated by the emigration of the offenders to another district, where the darogahs, zemindars and others, whose aid may be eventually required, are not subject to his orders; where his immediate officers, instead of obtaining assistance and co-operation, would experience every possible obstruction from these classes of people; where, in other words, he has no efficient power; and where all further efforts on his part, to apprehend the offenders, must almost, without exception, be fruitless and unavailing.

We have frequently seen, that in consequence of the energy and activity of a particular magistrate, the district under his immediate charge, has been nearly freed from the depredations of decoits. In effecting that object, some of their number have, doubtless, been apprehended. By far the greater part of them have, however, on all such occasions, only emigrated to other districts, where the qualities above noticed, did not exist in the same degree, in the local magistrates. The consequence has been, that the best directed efforts of those praiseworthy officers, have rather tended to relieve particular districts from the effects of decoity, than to free the country at large, from this intolerable evil.

The justness of the foregoing observations, may be established, by facts of very recent occurrence. The measures taken to relieve the districts of Nuddeah from the alarming height to which gang robbery had risen in that district, have been noticed in my former report, and are of course too well known to government, to require any recital in this place. In consequence of those measures, all the principal decoits, who were not immediately apprehended, retired; some, to the district of Hooghly; some, to the district of Burdwan; and some, as far as Backergunge. It is evident, therefore, that whatever relief the exertions made, might have afforded to the district of Nuddeah, the rest of the country would have been far from benefiting by them, had not the suppression of gang robbery been pursued in those districts also, in the same spirit in which it had been commenced in Nuddeah. The superintendent of police directed his particular attention to the apprehension of the gangs which had retired to Hooghly and to Burdwan; Mr. Blaquiere was invested with powers correspondent to those of the superintendent in Backergunge; and the magistrate of Nuddeah was invested with similar powers in Burdwan, with a view to the more effectual protection of the eastern part of that district. The experience hitherto obtained respecting the success of the exertions of those officers, justify the conclusion, that the most substantial benefits may be derived from the labours of the superintendent of police, combined with other arrangements, which will be submitted, under different heads of this report.

It is not, however, by a fixed residence in the vicinity of the city of Calcutta, that the important objects of the superintendent's appointment, can be accomplished. It is by proceeding, as often as his own discretion may suggest, or the wisdom of government may direct, to any part of his extensive jurisdiction, where his services may be required. It is, by visiting the cities of Moorshedabad and Dacca, and collecting at those places information respecting the state of the police, in all the circumjacent districts; it is, by visiting the northern frontier of the province of Bengal, or the southern extremity of Orissa, as occasion may require. It is, by these and similar means that the principal object of his appointment, the suppression of gang robbery throughout the lower provinces, can alone be effected.

It is stated in the letter to the Nizamut adawlut, dated 13th June last, "that the principal cause why the measures hitherto adopted for protection of the public against robbery by open violence, have been ineffectual, is the very defective information which government and the principal authorities under government possessed, respecting the actual state of the police."

The defect here noticed, may arise either from the want of perfect information, or from the want of perfect execution.

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local magistrates themselves possess, respecting the state of the police, or from an ill-judged, but not an unnatural solicitude, to represent the districts, in the most favourable state possible. In either case, it appears quite impossible, that with the existence of such an office as that of Superintendent of Police, whose duty it will be, whether at the presidency, or in the interior of the country, to obtain every possible information respecting the state of the police of the different districts, government should remain long unapprized, of the prevalence of gang robbery, or of any public offence, in any part of the country, within the limits of the superintendent's jurisdiction.

\* On the grounds above noticed, it appears essential that the superintendent of police should be relieved, from the local duties of magistrate of the 24 pergunnahs. The superintendent,

even when resident at the presidency, will find ample occupation, in considering and digesting the reports of the local magistrates; in collecting information from the zemindars, farmers, or their vakeels resident at Calcutta, and in forming and executing plans for the apprehension of public offenders. But a considerable part of the superintendent's time must be passed, as already noticed, at the other stations; and on all such occasions, it is of course impossible that he should discharge the duties of magistrate of the 24 pergunnahs.

If the observations above stated, be well founded, they will apply with still greater force to the upper provinces, that is, Behar, Benares, and the ceded and conquered provinces. On advertng to the great extent of those territories, it might, at first view, appear advisable to appoint different superintendents; one, for the provinces of Behar and Benares, and another, for the ceded and conquered provinces. Such an arrangement, however, would be at variance with the leading principle on which it is proposed to constitute the office of superintendent, whether in the lower or western provinces, viz. that of affording to him the means of watching the movements of public offenders, in any part of the country to which they are likely to resort, either with a view to commit robberies, or to elude the pursuit of justice.

In speaking of the province of Bengal, it has been observed, that the deroits do not confine their depredations to particular parts of the country; but that they wander from district to district, as local and temporary circumstances may invite them. This remark will be found applicable, in a still more extended sense, to the banditti in the upper provinces.

If there be any truth in the evidence noticed in the margin, and the accuracy of it, might be confirmed by a variety of circumstances, there are grounds to apprehend, that some of the sirdars of banditti, who reside ordinarily, in some of our most western provinces, or perhaps beyond those territories, organize gangs for the commission of robberies so far as the province of Benares, or possibly the province of Behar. It is only, therefore, by the appointment of an officer, who can watch the movements of such offenders, through the whole sphere of their depredations, that any reasonable expectation can be entertained of their speedy apprehension; at all events, it is quite impossible that the exertions of the local magistrates, whose respective influence and power do not extend

#### REMARKS.

Extract of Orders to the Magistrates, dated 24th June 1809.

"I am directed to transmit to you the enclosed extract of a letter from the superintendent of police, together with the fore-mentioned, to accompany it in the Persian language; and to acquaint you that the right honourable the Governor General in Council desires that you will transmit punctually to the office of the superintendent, in the proposed form, the substance of all information obtained by you either from the darogahs or the zemindars or farmers, respecting the commission of any decoity, murder, arson, or highway robbery."

2. "You are desired to encourage the zemindars and farmers to furnish you with immediate intelligence of any occurrences of that nature, which may take place within the limits of their respective estates and farms. You will observe, that separate reports are to be transmitted to the superintendent, of intelligence obtained through their means, and of the information furnished by the darogahs of police."

3. "In the letter accompanying those reports, you will of course state to the superintendent, any observations which may appear to you calculated to facilitate the apprehension of public offenders."

Copy of Orders to the Acting President of the Board of Revenue, and Persian Secretary, dated 24th June 1809.

"I am directed to transmit to you the enclosed extract of a letter from the superintendent of police, and to acquaint you that the right honourable the Governor General in Council desires that you will encourage the zemindars and farmers, or their vakeels, who may be in attendance at your office, to wait upon the superintendent from time to time, for the purpose of furnishing him with any information in their power, respecting the general state of the police in that part of the country from which they come, or which may be otherwise known to them."

Extract of the Evidence of Gungeea, submitted by the Magistrate of Agra on 29th May 1809.

Question. What is your name?—Answer. Gungeea.

Q. Are you of the Budhick cast?—A. I am.

Q. What relation are you to Tara Budhick, who was confined in the jail at this station?—A. I am his sister.

Q. What mode of life did Tara pursue?—A. He was a professed robber.

Q. How do you know?—A. The whole of the cast of Budhicks are robbers.

Q. Where used Tara generally to reside?—A. He used to reside in the Nawaub Vizier's territory, but I do not know the name of the village.

Q. Had

## REMARKS.

Q. Had Tara a gang of his own, or did he act under some other sirdar?—A. He acted under Seeva Budhick, who resides at Hattrass.

Q. How many men, has Seeva under him?—A. Upwards of one hundred.

Q. Do these men always go out in a body, for the purpose of plunder, or do they separate, into small parties?—A. They go out in one body.

Q. In what direction, do they usually plunder?—A. In all directions. They sometimes travel 200 and 300 coss.

Q. Used you generally, to live with your brother?—A. When I was young I used to live with him; but since I have married, I have lived separate.

Q. How long is it since you were married? A. I was married about 25 years ago.

Q. Where is your husband, and where do you now live?—A. My husband died five years ago, and I now live in the territory of Dholeporé.

Q. Does Seeva always go out with his gang, or does he remain at Hattrass?—A. He has resided at Hattrass for 10 years, and is in the habit of going out himself to plunder.

Extract from Bundelcund Magistrate's Letter of the 21st July 1809.

"The inhabitants of the village Murkah are and have long been, notorious for their refractory spirit; and are said to live by expeditions of plunder into the Vizier's dominions, the possessions of the surrounding chiefs, and even into the Company's dominions in the Doab."

Extract of a Letter from the Magistrate of Liawah, dated 4th July, 1809.

"I beg leave to acquaint you, for the information of the right honourable the Governor General in Council, that the notorious rebel Khianai, accompanied by about six hundred armed followers, attacked the village of Hauberbarry dependent on the Fyre Buddereah in Pergunnah Kas Gunge, on the morning of the 25th ultimo; and having burnt and plundered the village and killed six men and wounded eight others severely, he effected his escape into a jungle called koorhar, in the district of Ally Gheer, contiguous to Pergunnah Kas Gunge; and I have just received information from the officers of the police at that place, that he has now concentrated his force there, and threatens to plunder the whole of the Pergunnah, unless immediate measures are taken to prevent him.

"As the officers of police are by no means able to contend with, and much less able to protect the inhabitants from, the atrocious acts of violence of this powerful marauder; &c."

country, and possessing the information which, by the means noticed in a subsequent part of this report, it will not be difficult for him to obtain, would frequently be able to form plans with success, for the apprehension of persons engaged in such offences.

Government has already ordered a corps of irregular horse to be raised for the more effectual support of the police, in the ceded and conquered provinces; which corps is to be quartered at Furruckabad. This circumstance, combined with the geographical situation of Furruckabad, naturally suggests this place, as the proper station for the ordinary residence of the superintendent. In such case, it may be advisable that the duty at present entrusted to the local magistrate of Furruckabad, with respect to that corps, should be transferred to the superintendent. It is scarcely credible, that if proper means are employed by that officer, to obtain information respecting the designs and movements of banditti, with so powerful an engine as a corps of irregular horse at his disposal, he should not be able speedily to suppress the commission of robbery by open violence.—At all events, government by this arrangement will obtain, as in the lower provinces, accurate information respecting the state of the police in the different districts, which will enable them to adopt, from time to time, such measures for the protection of the public, as may appear necessary.

It is not however, in my judgment, sufficient to appoint a superintendent of police on the footing above stated, in the lower provinces, and another in the western provinces.—It also appears extremely desirable that government should possess the power of nominating joint superintendents, whenever circumstances may require it, in each of these divisions of the country. The permanent superintendents may be equal to the discharge of the ordinary duties of those stations. It is evident, however, that disorders may arise in different parts of the country, which may require the personal exertions of two or more officers, to suppress them.—As the latter officers, will be only temporary, the arrangement will be attended with

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extend through a tenth part of that space, should be adequate to the accomplishment of that important object.

little expense to government. Whenever such nominations may take place, the occasional superintendents should be invested with the same powers, as the permanent superintendent.

It appears essential that government should also possess the power of determining whenever the superintendent or his temporary colleague may proceed in person into any of the districts, whether the local magistrate should continue to discharge the duties of that office, or otherwise. In ordinary cases, it may be most convenient that the zillah or city magistrate should continue to perform those functions. In other instances however, it may be essential that he should be divested of the discharge of them, and that the duties of the magistrate should be committed exclusively to the superintendent.

It remains to offer a few observations on the powers which should be exercised by the superintendent and his officers, relative to the local authorities of the different districts comprized within his jurisdiction. It must be evident to government, that the superintendent and his officers will be liable to great counteractions from the local police, and that consequently, the best concerted plans for the apprehension of criminals may be frustrated, unless they are armed with such authority as shall render all such attempts abortive.—For that reason, I would propose that the superintendent be invested with a certain controul over all the zillah and city magistrates within his jurisdiction; and that his officers be declared in a great degree, independent of the native local officers of police. The following are the principal rules, which I would recommend to be established with respect to this point:—

First,—That the zillah and city magistrates be required to conform to all orders which may be issued to them by the superintendent, in matters connected directly or indirectly with the discharge of his own official duties.

Secondly,—That the officers of the superintendent of police, be rendered independent, except in case of great enormity, of the local police authorities, and that the former be only held responsible for any acts of misconduct to the superintendent himself, whose duty it will of course be, to take cognizance of any cases of that nature.

Of course, some more specific provisions will be requisite on the latter point, should the principles of the present arrangement be adopted and carried into effect.

#### OFFICE OF MAGISTRATE.

No objections occur to the principles on which the office of magistrate, in the different cities and zillahs, has been constituted. The error was (as already noted) in supposing that this office was of itself, adequate to the suppression of public offences.

In the preceding section of this report, I have detailed the means which appear to me best calculated to obviate the inconveniences arising from the circumscribed jurisdiction of the local magistrates; and under the present head, I shall state the aids which may, I conceive, be obtained, in support of the local police, by means of such other European agency as we possess in the country.

One of the most efficient and (it might have been supposed) the most obvious, of those aids, is to invest the person in charge of one district with the ordinary powers of magistrate in the adjoining district.

The different zillahs being divided from each other, in many cases only, by an imaginary and frequently, a very ill-defined boundary, it is evident that great facilities of escape must be afforded to criminals, by retiring from one zillah to another, as may suit their convenience,—from the zillah in which they have committed offences, and where their crimes must necessarily have attracted the attention of the magistrate, to a district where the local authorities may have little or no knowledge, either of the offenders or the offences, or (which is too frequently the case) where they may find protection from some of the native officers of police. If, however, the magistrate of the first-mentioned zillah, could act with effect in the latter, the means of escape to such criminals, must necessarily be materially contracted.

I am aware of only one objection, which could be urged to a general application of this principle, which is, that it might occasionally create a collision of authority between the two magistrates. That it would be productive of that effect, when persons were actuated more by a puerile jealousy than by a real zeal for the public good, I cannot doubt; but that it necessarily leads to any such consequences, putting all personal considerations out of the question, is what I cannot discern. On the whole, however, it may be expedient that the arrangement in question, should only be adopted, according as circumstances may require it, and at the discretion, in each case, of the Governor General in Council. So long as the local magistrates shall perform the duties of their stations with effect, there can be little occasion for the interference of the magistrate of the adjoining district, or even of the superintendent of police; but whenever public crimes become prevalent in any district, it appears to me that both those aids may be resorted to, with great benefit and effect.

It is not solely on any general reasoning, that the arrangement here noticed is recommended. The benefits experienced from Mr. Blaquiere's co-operation in the districts of Nuddea, Jessore and Backergunge; the successful exertions made by Mr. Elliot (magistrate of Nuddea) in the district of Burdwan; and of Mr. Pattle (magistrate of Rajshaye in Mymensing) are all practical proofs of the substantial advantages, with which this plan is likely to be attended.

Another aid, which may be employed with considerable effect, is the deputation of assistants to those parts of a district, in which public crimes, especially gang robbery, may at any time, become prevalent. The principal causes of the prevalence of such crimes, are the supineness, and in some cases, the connivance, not only of the zemindars, farmers, and others, but of the police darogahs themselves. Considering the great extent of the different districts, it may be frequently difficult and sometimes impracticable, for a magistrate residing at the principal station, to adopt any effectual measures for the apprehension of public offenders, and still more, for the detection of the abuses on the part of his police officers or others, by which the evil may have been prevented. This duty would however be easily performed by a capable



a capable assistant on the spot, and in all such cases, it may be advisable that the assistant should be invested with the powers of magistrate, to enable him to act with greater effect.

It may be observed on this point, as has been done with respect to the preceding question, that the benefits which may be anticipated from the frequent deputation of assistants on the footing above described, do not rest solely on opinion. Very considerable benefit was recently derived from the deputation of Mr. Ewer into the interior of the district of Rajshahy; and the magistrates themselves, appear so sensible of the advantages with which it may be attended, that the magistrate of that district recently again recommended, that his assistant should be deputed into the interior of the district on the public service; and the magistrate of Etawah submitted a similar recommendation for the deputation of his assistants into certain parts of that district.

I cannot conclude this branch of the subject without observing, that whatever arrangements be adopted, it is indispensably necessary that the magistrates should exert a much greater degree of personal activity than what, with very few exceptions, they do at present. By this remark, I do not mean to impute any intentional neglect of duty to the magistrates. On the contrary, I believe that they think that they have fully discharged the obligations of their public duty, in passing orders on the reports of the police darogahs, and in investigating charges which may be preferred by individuals. It cannot, however, in my judgment, be too often or too strongly inculcated, that there can be no police in this country, unless the magistrates will from time to time, visit the different tannahs, listen with their own ears, and see with their own eyes, instead of depending on the reports of officers, entirely unworthy of confidence or credit. By this suggestion, I do not mean that the magistrates should make regular circuits of their districts at stated periods, but that they should proceed instantly to any quarter of their jurisdiction, where they may have reason to believe that public offences are prevalent, or that abuses are committed by the darogahs, and above all, when they are least expected by those officers. An objection has, I believe, been sometimes made to such visits, grounded on the interruption which it might occasion in the conduct of the business of the civil court; but surely if the police, or the trial of civil causes, must experience interruption and injury, it is much better that the latter should suffer, than the former. It seems, however, to be a mistake, to suppose that either will ultimately suffer from that cause. It is, in fact, only by establishing an efficient and well regulated police, that the judge and magistrate (united as those offices are, in the same person) can never find time for the duties of the civil court. When public offences at any time, become prevalent in a district, the business of the criminal department is multiplied to such a degree, that it requires not only the undivided attention of one, but in many cases, of three or four persons to transact it.

#### DAROGAHS OF POLICE.

The zillah and city magistrates, like the justice of the peace in England, or in the city of Calcutta, are properly invested with considerable powers, being persons of education and character, and possessing some knowledge of the general principles of law. But the darogahs of police form a class of officers, to whom, if we consider their extensive powers, on the one side, and their general character and situation in life, on the other, I can find nothing in the smallest degree analogous, under our own constitution.

The darogahs are not only authorized to apprehend persons in the actual commission of public offences; to make immediate pursuit after such offenders; and to seize persons detected with the stolen goods in their possession (duties to which all subordinate officers of police are confined, under our laws); they are likewise empowered to receive charges and information respecting the commission of all crimes, public offences and misdemeanors, of whatever description, without any limitation as to the time when they may have been committed; to determine whether such charges or information shall be received on oath, or under a solemn declaration (a point of material importance, considering the prejudices of the natives with respect to an oath); whether it be proper to proceed against the party accused, by the immediate arrest of his person, or only by summons; or whether a previous reference should be made on the subject, to the magistrate, to determine whether the case be bailable or otherwise, &c.; to fix the amount of the bail; to hold inquests on the bodies of persons, supposed to have died an unnatural death; to make or cause to be made, at their discretion, a local enquiry respecting the commission of any recent robbery or other violent crime; and finally, to apprehend, and send to the magistrates, individuals coming under the vague denomination of "vagrants and suspected persons."

The foregoing is, I believe, a tolerably accurate review of the general powers vested in the darogahs of police,—powers, which are of almost equal extent with those of a single justice of the peace under our laws, which never have been confided to any subordinate peace officers in England; and which indeed would not be tolerated for a moment, in that country.

To judge of the expediency of continuing to vest such extensive powers in the darogahs of police, it is of importance to enquire, how far the persons ordinarily appointed to fill those situations, are qualified for the discharge of the duties entrusted to them.

The darogahs of police are not chosen from any particular class of people, and consequently seldom, if ever, possess any previous instruction, as to the nature and extent of their duties, nor any habits of life calculated to enable them to perform those duties with effect. A brahmin\*, a sirdar, a moonshy, or even a mehal sarrar, is each in his turn, a candidate for this

Extract of a Report from the 2d Judge of the Provincial Court for the division of Patna.

\* "A Bengally brahmin, it will generally be admitted, is of all human beings the least qualified

situation. It is easy to conceive the degree of knowledge possessed by such persons. It is equally easy to judge, from their former habits of life, of their fitness for a situation, requiring on all occasions great activity, and

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"qualified for the office of a police darogah, and yet I understand that the thanadars of Mozufferpore, and of two or three other police stations, are persons of this description," &c. &c.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Ernst, dated 14th June 1809.

"Thus it will be seen, that in the accompanying statement the number of dacoities in Benneepore, reported by the police officers, amount to 10; whereas, according to Mr. Blaquier's mode of computation, it would be 33, being the number of houses or persons robbed."

in many, a very considerable share of personal courage.

Their agency, even in furnishing information respecting the commission of public offences; a duty which requires no particular exertions or capacity, is totally ineffectual. In the tannah of Benneepore, in the district of Hooghly, only 33 decoities had been reported to have taken place, from Bysaack 1215, to Jeytc 1216, a period of thirteen months; whereas it appeared from a local inquiry made by Mr. H. Shakespear, that in those parts only of the tannah to which his investigation extended, 104 houses had been robbed during the above-mentioned period of time, attended with the wounding of - 8  
torture of - - 3 } Persons.  
murder of - - 5 }

Happy, however, it would be, if the defects already noticed were the greatest, to be found in the character of the police darogahs. The vices which render them a pest to the country, are their avarice, and addiction to every species of extortion.

In speaking of this class of officers, the late magistrate of Hooghly (as noticed in my former report) observes as follows:

"All descriptions of police officers require to be narrowly watched; and it is only by this means, and by making severe examples among them, when they are guilty of misconduct, that they can be kept to their duty. During three years that I was at Burdwan, I punished several police officers myself; and I committed for trial no less than eleven darogahs, who were all convicted before the court of circuit, and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment, from three months to three years. Since I have been at Hooghly, four darogahs have been punished and dismissed from their offices, and four more, will be tried before the court of circuit in the present sessions. I have found the good effects of these measures of severity; and situated as the police officers are, it cannot be expected that any better sentiment than that of fear, should keep alive a sense of duty, amidst all the temptations which surround them."

By an abstract which I caused to be prepared from the records of my office, it appears that 84 darogahs were dismissed from their offices for misconduct, between the periods of the 1st January 1808, and the 31st August 1809; and that seven of those persons, were ordered to be tried before the criminal courts, on account of the aggravating circumstances with which the offences committed by them were attended.

The number of persons so punished, will doubtless appear considerable; but great as it is, I believe it bears no more proportion to the number of offences actually committed by the darogahs, than the number of crimes reported by them, bears to the number of crimes actually perpetrated within the limits of the different tannahs.

The natural remedy for this evil is to simplify the duties of the darogahs, and to confine them to the exercise of such functions, as are essential to the immediate maintenance of the peace of the country.

The offences of which the darogahs in some form or other take cognizance, may be reduced to four heads,—1st. Petty offences, such as inconsiderable assaults, abusive language, &c. which are punishable by the magistrates.—2d. Bailable offences, such as forgery, adultery, &c.—3d. Actual breaches of the peace and serious affrays; and, 4thly, the more heinous crimes, as murder, robbery by open violence, &c.

With the impression which I have, respecting the general character of the darogahs, and the intolerable vexations with which their interposition is attended, I cannot hesitate in recommending, that they be precluded from all interference whatever in future, in any of the cases appertaining either to the 1st or 2d class of offences above noticed, except under a special warrant in each case, from the magistrate; and that individuals having charges or complaints to prefer of that nature, institute them in the first instance, at the magistrate's cutcherry. I am aware that persons may sometimes experience inconvenience, from the necessity of proceeding to the magistrate's cutcherry to prefer a complaint; but I am not certain on the whole, that this may not prove a very salutary check to litigation. Confident I am, that if it be an evil, it is a much smaller one, than that which arises from the exactions and oppressions of all kind at present committed by the darogahs.

The third and fourth classes of offences comprehend actual breaches of the peace and serious affrays,—theft, arson, counterfeiting the coin, house-breaking, robbery, and murder; in which cases, no restrictions can, consistently with the peace of the country, be imposed on the agency of the darogahs, who should on the contrary be encouraged, and required to make every exertion for the apprehension of offenders, either *flagrante delicto*, or on formal complaints preferred by individuals.

The darogahs, however, at present possess by far too great a latitude of action, in cases of homicide, or their powers are very ill defined by the existing Regulations. It appears to me that in cases of murder and manslaughter, they should uniformly send the party accused under safe custody to the magistrate, and that in cases of accidental and justifiable homicide, they should as regularly admit the party to bail.

On this branch of the subject, I have only to add, that from the enquiries which I have made, it appears to me indispensably necessary, that the course of proceeding prescribed for

for the guidance of the darogahs by Section 18, Regulation IX, 1807, should be considerably modified. I do not mean with respect to the inquests on dead bodies; but with respect to robberies, and the consequences with which they have been attended. These investigations are almost uniformly, I believe, a source of exaction. That, however, is not the greatest evil with which they are attended. In the confusion and alarm incident to a recent robbery, attended frequently, as has been seen from the above reports on trials, with murder and the most horrid cruelties, the inhabitants of a village are required to give information respecting those atrocities. Some of them, intimidated by the spirit of revenge by which they know that the decoits are usually actuated, deny all knowledge on the subject; others, in the agitation and alarm naturally occasioned by the perpetration of such offences, give inaccurate and inconsistent accounts of the circumstances attending them;—brought, in cooler moments of reflection, before the courts of judicature, all those persons, may be capable of giving (and frequently do give) clear and consistent accounts of the circumstances attending the robbery. Their evidence is however then, contrasted with their former declaration, rejected as fabricated, and the witnesses themselves perhaps committed for perjury.

To remedy this inconvenience, I would propose that on the commission of any recent robbery, the darogah should be required (as at present) to proceed to the spot, and furnish a report under his own signature, of the nature and circumstances of the case; but that it be left entirely optional with the villagers to attest a soorut haal, or not, as they may deem proper. In cases in which no apprehensions may exist of future consequences, it is natural to conclude that they will have no hesitation in signing such instrument. When such impressions may prevail in their minds, the soorut haals may lead to error; but cannot be productive of any beneficial effects. If I am not greatly deceived, the rule, as it at present stands, has obstructed very materially the course of criminal justice.

#### ZEMINDARS AND OTHERS.

Different opinions have been entertained respecting the services which should be rendered by the zemindars, farmers, and by other proprietors and managers of land, in support of the police. Some persons have contended,

Extract from the preamble of Regulation XXII. 1793.

The clause in the engagements of the land-holders and farmers of land, by which they were bound to keep the peace, and in the event of any robbery being committed in their respective estates or farms, to produce both the robbers and the property plundered, having not only been found nugatory, but in numerous instances proved the means of multiplying robberies and other disorders, from collusion which subsisted between the perpetrators of them and the police officers entertained by the land-holders and farmers of land, in virtue of the clause above mentioned, the Governor General in Council, with a view to afford that protection to the persons and property of the people, which is so necessary to their happiness and to the public welfare, was pleased to pass certain Regulations on the 7th December 1792. Those Regulations are now re-enacted with alterations and amendments.

in defiance I think of the known character of the people, and certainly, in opposition to all the experience obtained of their conduct previously to the establishment of the system of 1793, that the above classes of our subjects ought to be rendered the principal, if not the sole instruments, in the maintenance of the public peace. Others, again, are of opinion, that if the zemindars and others be invested with any share of power with respect to the police, they will not only abuse it as peace officers, but likewise render it an engine of oppression, in the collection of their rents. In the latter sense, I would not give them a particle of power more than they already possess with respect to the police, but I would render them accountable, under very severe penalties, for the communication of information of all heinous offences both to the magistrate and to the police darogah. It would be idle to suppose that the zemindars, farmers, and others, when they reside on the spot, and in their absence, their local agents, do not possess full information of every occurrence of that nature within the limits of the villages or places of which they collect the rents; considering therefore the obligations imposed by our own laws on

every individual, to aid, according to the extent of his means, in the apprehension of public offenders, I do not conceive that any natural right would be infringed by rendering the different classes of people above noticed, especially responsible for the immediate communication of intelligence of all serious offences to the proper officers.—This principle is in fact already recognized in Sections 12, 13 and 14, Regulation IX, 1808, with respect to proclaimed decoits; and all that seems to be required is, the extension of it, to all murders, robberies, and other heinous crimes. By these means, without investing the zemindars and others with any actual power respecting the police, we should obtain full information respecting the commission of public offences. It is to the defect of that information, more than to any other cause, that the present imperfect state of the police is to be attributed.

By the existing Regulations, the zemindars and others in the province of Bengal, are declared responsible for all robberies which may have been committed "with their connivance, or in which they may have received any part of the property stolen or plundered, or harboured the offenders, aided, or refused to give effectual assistance to prevent their escape, or omitted to afford every assistance in their power to the officers of government for their apprehension;" and in the province of Benares, and in the Ceded and Conquered provinces it appears to have been intended to render the zemindars and others, in a more especial manner responsible for all such offences. But in both cases,

Section III. Regul  
XXII. 1793.

Section III. Regul  
XVII. 1793.

Section III. Regul  
XXXV. 1803.

the rules are clogged with so many provisos, that I doubt whether a single instance can be adduced, (notwithstanding the suspected connivance and acknowledged negligence of the zemindars and others, in all matters respecting the police) of the penalties prescribed, for such misconduct being enforced against them. It consequently follows, that the rules in question, may be rescinded without inconvenience.

Under the present head, I must beg leave to advert to Regulation XII, 1707, for the appointment of police aumeens in the province of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, extended to Benares, and to the Ceded and Conquered provinces by Regulation XIV, 1807 :—Those rules have likewise, with the exception of the district of Moradabad, proved a mere nullity; and if I may be permitted to express myself freely, this is the best consequence with which they would have been attended.

In the foregoing remarks, I have drawn what appears to me to be a just character both of the zemindars and the darogahs.—I have at the same time, endeavoured to show the inexpediency of vesting any share of actual power, in the former, and the absolute necessity of circumscribing materially, the authority of the latter. By the appointment of police aumeens, it was proposed to unite the influence of the zemindars with the power of the darogahs. The persons acting in that capacity, were not to receive any salary, nor even the pay of their establishments: consequently, they would have been entirely free from the ordinary checks arising from the apprehension of the loss of authorized emoluments, in the event of their dismissal from office.

Other reasons might I think, be urged against the provisions of the Regulation. Scarcely any persons have been found willing to accept the office on the prescribed terms, and the Regulation has consequently proved nugatory. It cannot require further argument to recommend that it be rescinded *in toto*.

It would be an omission, not to notice in this place, the village or zemindarry pikes, to whom should be added, the pikes and burkundosses in the service of merchants and others. The character and situations of these people, rendered it extremely difficult to convert them into faithful and efficient instruments of police. With respect to their character, they are watchmen and robbers alternately. In regard to their situation in life, selected and paid as they are, by individuals, it must of course be difficult to render them subservient in the proper degree, to the controul and authority of the magistrates. Instances however are not wanted, in which this class of people have rendered very beneficial services, in the apprehension of public offenders. If they possessed the will, in the same degree as they possess the means for that purpose, they might become a most powerful instrument of police, from their personal courage and local knowledge. The best means of rendering this class of people efficient are, I think, stated in section 13, Regulation XXII. 1793, except that the

Section 13, Regulation XXII, 1793.

All pykes, chokedars, pansbauns, dusades, negabauns, harecs, and other descriptions of village watchmen, are declared subject to the orders of the darogah: he shall keep a register of their names, &c. &c.

register ordered to be made of their names, should be submitted to a very different authority than that of the darogahs.

I am afraid, likewise, that the rule, as it now stands, is imperfectly attended to in practice. To remedy this inconvenience, and to render this class of people, including, as above noticed, the pykes and burkundosses of individuals, as efficient as the nature of the

case will permit; I beg leave to submit the following suggestions, which will be found to be nearly conformable in substance, to an existing provision in the Regulation for the support of the police in the district of Cuttack.—1st. That the collectors be required to form complete registers of the lands at present assigned for the support of pykes, and other village watchmen under the superintendence of the board of revenue and board of commissioners, and to transmit copies of those registers to those boards respectively.—2d. That the magistrates be required to obtain annually from the zemindars, farmers, merchants and others, a correct register, specifying the names of all pykes and other village watchmen for the time being, and to transmit copies of them to the superintendent of police.—3d. That the magistrates be required to make the best disposition which the nature of the case will admit with respect to those persons, by subjecting them to the controul of the darogahs within whose jurisdiction they reside; by ascertaining, and as far as depends upon the magistrate, by regulating their place of residence; and by nominating, in cases appearing to require it, a jemidar or sirdar, to be paid by government, for the more immediate superintendence of the conduct of this class of people.

Sec 8. Reg. XIII.  
1805.

#### SECRET SERVICE.

In matters of police, it is I believe much more common to employ spies, than to acknowledge the use of those powerful but dangerous instruments.—Under these circumstances, I should be disposed to pass the question over in silence, did it not appear to me that a general declaration of the sentiments of government was indispensably necessary with respect to that point. Those sentiments have indeed been to a certain degree, already explained to the court of Nizamat adawlut. Opinions, however diametrically the contrary, are both entertained and avowed by some of the judicial authorities, especially by the court of circuit for the division of Moorsshedabad.

A formal decision on this point, consequently appears to me requisite, in order that the employment of spies may at once be prohibited, or that the opinions of a few individuals, may not be suffered to clash with the general system of the government. Situated as the courts of circuit are, the expediency or expediency of employing spies, and the good or ill use which may be made of those instruments, must be brought under their consideration

consideration, in not less perhaps than one-half of the trials which may come before them. It is consequently essential that they should not only be apprized of the sentiments of government on this point, but that they should be compelled to sacrifice any preconceived opinions to the general system, which may be established. Without uniformity in the leading principles of the police, it would be in vain to expect permanent or substantial benefit from any new arrangements. The following observations may have some tendency to show the advantages which may be drawn from this species of agency.

About twelve months have now elapsed, since the disturbed state of the district of Nuddea began to attract the particular attention of the Governor General in Council. Since that time, many sirdar decoits have been apprehended by means of spies; some in the district of Nuddea, some in Jessore, some in Backergunge, and one, in the city of Patna, at the distance of 500 miles from the presidency. It is in the highest degree probable, that many of those offenders would never have been apprehended, without the agency of hired informers. Certain it is, that they could not have been taken so soon, as they have been by these means.

Turning our eyes to those countries in which the police has attained any considerable degree of improvement, it appears to me that this end has been accomplished almost solely by espionage, and that the improvement, has almost universally been proportioned to the skill with which this powerful engine has been employed.

Negative as well as positive proofs may be adduced, with respect to this point, in the district almost under our immediate inspection.

The person, who has manifested the strongest dislike to the employment of spies, is Mr. Ernst, the late magistrate of Hooghly.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Ernst, of the 20th May 1809.

Para. 12. "It will be found that the number of decoits who have been apprehended and committed for trial during this last period, exceeds in proportion the result of the preceding year; some of the decoits appear to have come from Nuddea, and I am of opinion that the emigration of decoits from that district, in consequence of the extraordinary measures which have been adopted to apprehend them, presents the most formidable obstacle that I have to encounter in my endeavours to suppress the crime of gang robbery in Hooghly. There is a very general impression among the natives, and I have found reason to believe, that many of the decoits of Nuddea have escaped from that district, and are now infesting the neighbouring jurisdiction."

Extract of a letter from Mr. Ernst, of 4th June 1809.

"If, after all, there has been an increase of decoity in this district in the past year, it is probably to be ascribed to the same causes, whatever they may be, which produced so much decoity in Nuddea;—to the relative situation of Hooghly, which is only separated from Nuddea by the river; to the seizure of many of the principal decoits in Nuddea, and to the dispersion of their gangs in the time of Mr. Macan; and to the emigration of many decoits from that district, in consequence of the extraordinary measures which were taken against them some months ago by Mr. Blaquiere and Mr. Leyden, and by their agents and goyendas. This supposition is not merely a conjecture; several decoits who were apprehended at different times in the course of last year, having been ascertained to have absconded from Nuddea."

The consequence was, that while Mr. Elot, Mr. Blaquiere, and Mr. Patton were freeing, chiefly by those means, the districts of Nuddea, Jessore, and the 24 pergunnahs, from the ravages of decoits, the district of Hooghly was becoming more and more, the resort of those criminals, as Mr. Ernst has himself been compelled to acknowledge in two different letters.

On the whole, I have no idea of a solid efficient system of police, of which espionage is not the basis. At the same time, I am perfectly aware that this species of agency ought to be employed with great circumspection, and that otherwise, it may be productive of serious mischief.

Among other precautions, one worthy of being noticed is, that the magistrates should always communicate directly with that class of people, and never through the medium of their native officers. The spies themselves, are justly suspicious of the native officers, and consequently will not undertake many services, which they are ready to perform when they communicate directly and solely with the magistrates. The connexion likewise of the amulah with the zemindars and others, and sometimes, I am afraid, with the decoits themselves, their avarice and restless spirit of low intrigue, render them, of all people in the world, the most unfit to be entrusted with a knowledge of any duty requiring secrecy, fidelity and address. The proper performance of this duty by the magistrates in the lower provinces, of course requires a knowledge of the Bengal language. I am, indeed, aware that a few only of the magistrates understand that language; but this circumstance needs not prevent me from stating a point so essential to the success of the new arrangements of police, in the hope that the difficulty may be gradually removed. Every part indeed of the duties of the magistrates would be better performed, with a competent knowledge of the Bengal language.

With respect to espionage, three questions occur:—1st. As to the persons who should be employed as goyendas or spies;—2d. The mode in which they should be remunerated; and, 3d. The mode in which their services may be rendered useful, without danger of abuse.

In regard to the first-mentioned point, at every jail delivery some of the persons concerned in robberies, escape legal conviction, but are ordinarily detained in confinement, on account of their bad character, until they can give security for their future behaviour. These persons are almost uniformly willing to engage, as spies in the service of the magistrates.

gistrates. They know the haunts of all the principal gangs of decoits in a district, and the persons of the sirdars; and, if properly remunerated, are both willing and able to effect their apprehension.

The proper mode of remunerating them is, by a small monthly allowance for their immediate subsistence, and the payment of a sum of money (suppose from 100 to 300 rupees), for their agency, in the seizure of any criminals whom the magistrate, on the grounds of public notoriety, or of specific charges preferred, or information lodged by individuals, or on any other authorized ground, may have deemed it his duty to order to be apprehended. Those rewards should uniformly be paid on the apprehension of the accused or suspected person, and not on their conviction before our criminal tribunals;—a mode which is sanctioned, indeed, by the existing Regulations, but which appears calculated to lead, in many cases, to the oppression of innocence and the perversion of justice.

With regard to the other point above noticed, that is, the mode in which spies should be employed, I imagine that it must be clearly understood, after the discussion which the question has already undergone, that they should never be invested with a particle of power, and that their character as spies, should never be confounded with that of the ordinary officers of police, whose principal duty of course is to apprehend offenders. I am not aware that the course which should be observed in cases of this nature, can be stated in clearer terms, than in the following extract of a letter from the register of the Nizamut adawlut:—

“The established duty of the goyendas, is to discover the haunts of the decoits, to watch their movements; to mix with them occasionally, with the view of obtaining accurate intelligence respecting their operations and designs for their employer; to communicate to him the result of their observations and enquiries; and, finally, to point out to the goyendas, who are usually regular police officers, the persons of the individuals whom the magistrate, in the discharge of his public functions, may order to be apprehended.”

At the same time, it seems essential to distinguish between informants, in the first instance, before a magistrate, and prosecutors in a subsequent stage of the business, whether before the magistrate or the court of circuit. However circumspect a magistrate ought to be in admitting or acting upon information lodged by persons of bad or suspicious characters, such information cannot, I think, consistently with the maintenance of an efficient police, be generally nor indeed often rejected. In all such cases, it must depend upon the discretion of the magistrate to follow up the information so lodged, until he shall have obtained satisfactory and legal evidence of the facts alleged, or shall deem the charge groundless, and to dispose of the case accordingly. In cases, however, in which the informants, whether hired spies or others, may not be themselves the persons aggrieved, it cannot be necessary or proper that they should appear in the characters of prosecutors, in a more mature state of the business, either before the magistrate or the court of circuit. On all such occasions, the prosecutors should of course be either the individuals who may have themselves been robbed, or the relations of persons murdered, or the vakeel of government, under the directions of the magistrate. With that course of proceeding, I am at a loss to conceive how any ill consequences can arise from the agency of spies or secret informers.

Extracts of three Letters from the 2d Judge of Calcutta Court of Circuit, on the close of the Sessions in Jessore, Nuddea, and Hooghly, dated in July and August 1809.

“As far as I could learn whilst there (Jessore), the crime of decoity had previously been mostly confined to those parts of the zillah bordering on the Nuddea, Rajeshahye, Dacca, and 24 Pergunnahs districts. But the statement itself, is a satisfactory proof that the commission of this crime has diminished considerably, since last sessions of that district; and I have no doubt that the operation of Regulations VIII and IX, 1808, aided by the activity and vigilance of the magistrates, will in a short time suppress the crimes of decoity and highway robbery;—indeed, such has already been the exertions of the magistrate of that district, that of late decoity has hardly been heard of; and during the time I was at that station, no person was sent in to him, charged with that offence.”

“(Nuddeah.)—I am happy to state, that owing to the operation of Regulations VIII and IX of 1808, and the activity and vigilance of the magistrate, the crimes of decoity and highway robbery have been nearly suppressed, at least at present; as there does not appear (as far as I could learn) to have been a single offence of those descriptions committed

The foregoing are the principal rules which should I think be observed, in the employment of spies; and under those restrictions, and with only common circumspection on the part of the magistrates, it does not appear to me that the agents can ever commit any great abuse: of their efficiency, no doubt can be entertained. If the principal sirdars, who with their gangs lately infested the districts of Jessore, Nuddea, and Hooghly, and not unfrequently extended their depredations to other places, have been apprehended;—if several of them, have been tried and executed;—if a state of security and exemption from public robbery, has at length been happily established in those districts; that end has, in a great degree, been accomplished through the agency of secret informers.

It may be the boast of others, to be tremblingly alive to the dangers of an affray, or of an act of extortion on the part of informers. Of such offences, one solitary instance is known to have occurred, in the last twelve months; a period during which they have been employed to a greater extent, than they ever before were in the country. To that species of philanthropy, I must profess myself to be, in a considerable degree, a stranger. But if I can be instrumental by this report, and by the means which it proposes to employ, to the suppression of the heinous crimes of robbery, rape, arson, torture, and murder,



committed in that district in the month of June."

"(Hooghly.)—Even the greater part of the recent commitments in this district, may be attributed to the active measures lately pursued in the Nuddeah and Jessore districts, which naturally induced many desperate fellows to cross over the river into the Hooghly and Burdwan zillahs, to avoid being apprehended; where they continue to pursue their depredations on the public, until seized by the latter magistrates; there are many of this description who have been lately tried, included in the statement.

"I am happy to add, that during my stay at Hooghly, which was almost a month, not more than one decoity had been heard of in that district."

murder, and to the extinction of the constant alarms in which the people have been accustomed to live, from the prevalence of those atrocities, it will be a source of solid and permanent satisfaction to my mind. As I do not look for perfection in any system of things, I shall be content to obtain the above advantages, even to the expense of some partial evil; confident, as I am, that if only ordinary circumspection be observed in the employment of spies, they may be rendered most efficient instruments of police, without any serious risk from the usual depravity of their own personal characters.

Mr. Dowdeswell's  
Report  
on the Police of  
Bengal.

#### CONCLUSION.

I HAVE now stated all the measures which suggest themselves to my mind, for the improvement of the police, without entering into minute details, or deviating into a course which might be thought foreign to the subject. I am satisfied, that if those measures be adopted, they will be attended with considerable benefit, in the suppression of the crimes most injurious to the peace and happiness of society; an opinion which I express with the greatest confidence, as it is founded on practical experience of the system now recommended, so far as the existing regulations would permit. I am at the same time sensible, that a great deal more must be done, in order to eradicate the seeds of those crimes: the real sources of the evil lies in the corrupt morals of the people. Under these circumstances, the best laws can only have a partial operation.

If we would apply a lasting remedy to the evil, we must adopt means of instruction for the different classes of the community; by which they may be restrained, not only from the commission of public crimes, but also from acts of immorality, by a dread of the punishments denounced both in this world and in a future state, by their respective religious opinions. The task would not perhaps be so difficult, as it may at first sight appear to be. Some remains of the old system of Hindoo discipline still exist. The institutions of Mahomedanism of that description, are still better known. Both might be revived and gradually moulded into a regular system of instruction, for both those great classes of the community; but I pretend not to have formed any digested plan of that nature, and at all events, it would be foreign, as above noticed, to the immediate object of my present report.

It affords to me sensible satisfaction, amidst the want of support which the present plan has experienced on the part of some of the judicial authorities, and the direct opposition of others (a fate which experience has already shown, that it did not merit) to be able to bear testimony to the ardent zeal and operation of some gentlemen in that department.

Among those persons, I deem it incumbent on me to name Mr. Guthrie, Mr. Eliot, Mr. James Pattle, and Mr. C. Patton, to whose services government appears to me greatly indebted for the present tranquil state of the districts of Nuddea, Jessore, Rajeshahye, Hooghly, and the 24 Pergunnahs.

It would likewise be an act of injustice, not to notice the very useful services of Mr. P. Andrews, by whose zealous exertions several of the principal offenders have been apprehended, and have suffered the penalties due to their atrocious crimes.

I feel myself still more particularly bound to mention Mr. Blaquiere. If a state of peace, tranquillity and confidence, has succeeded in most of the districts contiguous to Calcutta, to the most dreadful outrages and unprecedented cruelties; and if the foundation has been laid of a general system of police, which shall afford effectual protection to the lives and property of the community;—those advantages are in a very great degree to be ascribed, to the unwearied exertions and uncommon skill manifested by Mr. Blaquiere, in the discharge of the public duties entrusted to him.

(Signed) G. Dowdeswell,  
Secy to Govt.

Sept. 22, 1809.

THE foregoing Report having been read on the 26th instant, the Secretary was directed to write the following Letters on that date, to Mr. Blaquiere and Mr. P. Andrews.

N<sup>o</sup> 2.—To W. C. Blaquiere, Esq. Acting Magistrate of Nuddea, Jessore, Hooghly, and Backergunge.

Sir,

GOVERNMENT having recently had under its consideration, the present state of the police in the lower provinces, I am directed to acquaint you, that the hon. the Vice-President in Council considers it only an act of justice, to record on the public proceedings, and to communicate to you, the high sense which he entertains of your services, in the suppression of



the heinous crime of gang robbery, and in the amelioration of the general state of the police in those districts in which you were appointed to officiate as magistrate, especially in the district of Nuddea, where that crime was most prevalent, and attended with the most fatal consequences.

2. Under the supposition that some expenses may have been incurred by you, in the performance of the above-mentioned duties, the Vice-President in Council has directed the Sub-Treasurer to pay to you the sum of 6,000 R<sup>s</sup> on that account.

The Vice-President in Council has been pleased to authorize you to draw, in addition to your established allowances, an extra allowance of 500 R<sup>s</sup> per month, to defray any additional personal expense to which you may be subject, so long as you may continue to officiate as a magistrate in the above or in any other districts in which your services may be eventually required.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

G. Dowdeswell,

Secretary to Government—Judicial Department

Council Chamber, Sept. 26, 1809.

N<sup>o</sup> 3.—To Mr. P. Andrews.

Sir,

GOVERNMENT having recently had under its consideration, the present state of the police in the lower provinces, I am directed to acquaint you, that the hon. the Vice-President in Council considers it an act of justice, to communicate to you the high sense which he entertains of the services rendered by you, in co-operation with Mr. Blaquiere, in the suppression of the heinous crime of gang robbery, especially in the district of Nuddea.

2. Being solicitous to continue to the public the benefit of your services, and to add to your meritorious exertions the weight of an official character, I am directed to acquaint you that the Vice-President in Council has been pleased to appoint you assistant under the general Regulations to Mr. Blaquiere, in his capacity of magistrate of the 24 Pergunnahs, and of acting magistrate of the zillahs of Nuddea, Jessore, Hooghly, and Backergunge, with a salary of 500 R<sup>s</sup> per month, to take effect from the 1st instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

G. Dowdeswell,

Secretary to Government—Judicial Department.

Council Chamber, Sept. 26, 1809.

The Vice-President in Council observes, that orders will hereafter be passed by government, upon the important suggestions contained in the foregoing Report.

Ordered, That the Report, in the meantime, lie for consideration.

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## Appendix, No. 13.

## POLITICAL SURVEY OF THE NORTHERN CIRCARS,

By JAMES GORDON, Esquire;

Transmitted by the Bengal Government, in the year 1785, to the Court of Directors.

To the Honourable WARREN HASTINGS, Esq.

Governor General, &amp;c. Council, in their Secret Political Department, Fort William.

Hon<sup>ble</sup> Sir and Sirs,

CONCEIVING it to be one of the primary duties implied by the tenor of my commission as public minister to the Nizam's court, to learn the political situation of the different independent states of the Deccan, with which we were or might eventually be, at enmity or in alliance, as well as to ascertain the value and relative circumstances of the British territorial dependencies in the neighbourhood, to the end, that if the fortune of war, (always precarious), should, contrary to the experienced judgment of intelligent rulers vindicate the gloomy apprehensions of his multitude, previous to the battle of Porto Novo, and become so far unpropitious to the national cause, as to authorize or impel a sacrifice to be made for the attainment of peace, we might be at least enabled to enter on the business of negotiation, with some sort of precise knowledge in political arithmetic.

But the more immediate particular objects of enquiry seemed to be: first, to determine the actual power, with the inclinations, of Nizam Ali, to espouse the interests of the English against the Mysoreans; and secondly, to ascertain the true territorial worth of our possessions adjacent to Hyderabad, called the Northern Circars, of which the re-annexation to the Nizam has been very naturally the favorite ambition, with of his highness, from the moment of necessary and rightful disengagement of these provinces in favour of the Company. This Nizam's power, estimated on a superficial view of his extensive dominion, with an annexed revenue, or from recorded public information, appeared as formidable as his inclinations were interpreted to be favourable on the present occasion; while on the other hand, according to the accounts laid before Parliament in 1772, or subsequently in private circulation, and verified by farther committee investigations in 1775, it did not appear that such great advantages, either financial, commercial, or military, were derived from the Circars, for fifteen successive years of company, with local tranquillity and abundant territorial produce as might render continued possession, with the utmost expected benefits, in future, grounded on experience of the past, an object of any political importance, to be set against either the entire loss of the Carnatic, or the further expense of a ruinous war in that quarter, under circumstances of unavoidable or lacituous distress, perhaps unparalleled in the history of a powerful empire, not rigidly arrived at the period of final dissolution. The materials however to form the estimate required, in order to be prepared rather against possible than any probable contingencies (though the best to be prepared in the time, and sufficient at least to justify the least measures of prudence and responsibility), carried with them such marks of imperfection and incertitude, as are ever inseparable from the infant state of every branch of experimental knowledge, and must have left an impression of doubt on the least enlightened minds.

To learn therefore something more circumstantial and certain, on matters so important, and which might eventually come under discussion within the scope of further negotiations, engaged my earli<sup>est</sup> attention, when arrived at the place of my destination, or afterwards more conveniently situated in the neighbourhood. Such informations as I could procure under the vigilant jealousy of a Mussulman court on the first mentioned topics of investigation, touching the Nizam's power and inclinations, I transmitted to the Governor General in his private capacity; and though in substance and form, these communications were unfit for the public eye, or in proof insufficient to authorize active measures, yet it seems possible they might in some degree, have influenced the continued suspension of a fruitless negotiation during the whole period of my own residency, and while the posture of affairs was less in reality, than apparently, unfavourable to the national cause. With respect to the second branch of enquiry relative to the true value of the Circars, I flatter myself that my endeavours have been more successful, and it is therefore as well as from an idea of the importance of the subject itself, as connected with the duties of my office, that I presume to offer the following sheets, which contain the result of my observations on the former topics in the abstract, on the latter in detail, for the inspection or consideration of the honourable board; hoping, if not new or beneficial lights should be communicated to those for whose use my labours are for the present exclusively intended, that yet they may bear some testimony of the

the zealous desire I feel, for the prosperity and constitutional aggrandisement of that great political body, which I have the honour humbly to serve.

The actual complexion of affairs in England is a powerful additional motive for bringing forward, without delay, some observations which occurred to me in the prosecution of my inquiry, touching the general financial system of India; for notwithstanding the patriotic successful opposition to the late attempt made to deprive the Company of their chartered rights, it is to be feared, that it was altogether from an apprehension of the influence the proposed arrangements might have on the constitution at home, and not to avert the avowed purpose, or indirect tendency of party to introduce one ill founded, if not wholly erroneous belief, of a most unwarrantable dangerous alteration of a fundamental principle in the interior government of this country, respecting the civil rights of persons and things universally, but more especially the nature of zemindary tenures.

If what I have advanced on this subject, should in the least operate to suspend still dreaded measures, as founded on a too prevalent mistake, and specious reasoning on the necessity of reformation, the present disquisition may be of greater importance to the public interests than if it prove the means of realizing a pecuniary increase of half a crore in yearly revenue, held out as a consequence of adhering to the equitable established laws or usages of the country.

I am extremely sensible of the hazard I incur of discovering a very limited defective knowledge, by a performance that may come in competition with that of a committee of circuit instituted a twelvemonth since, and whose Report will be founded on more minute, authoritative, and extensive researches into the actual state of these provinces, than can reasonably be expected from any private individual; but as I am not conscious of writing, either from mercenary motives, or any impulse of vanity; seeing that my labours are not designed, more than they are proper, for publication, it will be sufficient satisfaction for me, in fulfilling what, at any rate, I only consider my duty, unaccompanied with any extraordinary public expense, if I should, by anticipation, throw a glimmering of light upon what may hereafter appear in the full blaze of truth; or if, by general hints, on a connected view of many distinct considerations necessary to estimate the political importance of the circars, I can in any degree elucidate the minuter details of more accurate, but perhaps less general inquiry, on a subject apparently important for the controlling representative of the British sovereignty in this country, to be fully informed of, as intimately connected with the prosperity of the Company, and the national interests at large.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your faithful and most

obedient humble servant,

(Signed) JAMES GRANT.

Calcutta,  
20th December 1784. }

## OF THE NORTHERN CIRCARS, FROM A POLITICAL SURVEY OF THE DECCAN.

### DESCRIPTION GEOGRAPHICAL, PHYSICAL, AND MORAL.

Mr. J. Grant's  
Political Survey of the  
Northern Circars.  
Extent and Boundary.

THAT portion of the British dominion on the Coromandel coast, commonly called the Northern Circars, from its relative situation to Fort St. George; at the distance of 200 English miles, is a narrow slip of maritime country extending from  $15^{\circ} 2'$  to the  $20^{\text{th}}$  degree of northern latitude, and from  $75^{\circ} 2'$  to  $85^{\circ} 2'$  east longitude from Greenwich. The sea bounds it to the east, in a direct course N. E. along a coast 470 measured miles in length from the port of Mootapillee, dependent on Ganjcoor, near its southern extremity, to the town of Moland in Orissa, on the borders of the Chilca lake. In almost a parallel direction on the west from 50 to 70 miles in land, it is divided from the interior provinces of the soubah of Hyderabad, by a range of small detached hills extending to the banks of the Godavari, and in like manner separated from Berar to the north of that river, by a great continued ridge of mountains impassable every where hitherto explored, for horse or wheel carriage, excepting in the middle near Salourgant, quite to the northern extremity of the circars at Goomsur. From this last place, the same unbroken chain curves to the eastward, and together with the Chilca lake, form an almost impenetrable barrier of 50 miles to the north on the side of the Marhattas of Cuttack, excepting a tongue of land between that lake and the sea, a mile in breadth at Moland, and intersected by the deep water communication of Manickpatam, at all times unfordable. Towards the south, the small river Gondwana which empties itself at Mootapillee, separates the territory we are describing, from the districts of Ongole, and formeth on that side, the most distinguishable modern frontier to the Carnatic Payenghaut.

The area or superficial contents of the circars, taken in their greatest extent of accessible productive land, may be computed at 17,000 square geographic miles; of which perhaps only 1-5th is in cultivation or fallow; twice that portion, in pasture; and the remainder, under woods, water, towns, barren hills, or a sandy waste three miles in breadth, bordering the whole

whole extent of the coast. By another division, 3<sup>d</sup> of this area may be considered a plain\*, rising no where more than 25 feet above the level of the sea, and stretching on a medium 35 miles inland, with only two remarkable interruptions in its greatest length, along the shore, by as many crop or rather inclined ridges of hills; the one, a few miles north of the river Sittearera, which forms the southern boundary of Cicacole, and the other, parting unequally that province at the river of Poondy, into its present subdivisions dependent on Vizagapatam and Ganjam. The remaining fourth proportion parallel to this plain, and farther inland about 15 miles, is much more elevated, is agreeably variegated with hills and vales, easy of access, and superabundantly fertile. But beyond both these tracts of plain and hilly ground, to the north of the Godaveri, a still higher region extends close to the great ridge of mountains on the confines of Berar. This comprehends at least 6,000 square miles additional; but being poor, unhealthy, and thinly inhabited, pays so slender a tribute that it is scarcely made any account of, unless as a frontier towards the Marhatta dominions on the N. W. almost wholly inaccessible.

The grand divisions of this whole territory, are naturally and properly five, being so many portions of its length, principally marked by rivers running across from the hills on the west to the sea. But besides these, a sixth district has been formed from the maritime border of the four southerly circars or provinces, to serve as an appendage to, and secure the salt made, or customs collected at the ports of Nizampatam, on a southern outlet of the Kistna, and of Masulipatam on one of its northern branches, as well as at their respective dependencies along the coast. 1<sup>st</sup>. Guntoor or Moortizunagur, the most southerly province, is of a circular form, comprehending an area of about 5,500 square miles. The river Kistna, after running a course of 600 miles nearly on the parallel of 16° latitude, from its source to the Balagaut hills near the coast of Malhar, forms the northern boundaries of this circar and separates it, on its greatest extent on that side, from the province of Mustafanagur, to the west and south; the districts of Palnaced and Ongole, formerly dependent on the fowjedary of Kirpa, but some time since, incorporated with the Carnatic, lay against its limits; and on the east, Nizampatam with its dependencies, intervene every where between it and the sea, excepting a narrow communication with the small port of Mootapillee, which in the confusion of frequent revolutions has been dismembered from its proper maritime capital, and annexed to the interior country. This province, therefore, geographically speaking, is entirely surrounded by the other dominions of Britain, and absolutely detached from all the rightful territory still claimed and held formerly by the nababdar of the Deccan under the crown of Delhi. 2<sup>d</sup>. Condapillee, or Mustafanagur, and 3<sup>d</sup>. Ellore, adjacent to each other, as well as to the circar just described, in a north-easterly direction, occupy the whole space lying between the Kistna and Godaveri, the districts of Masulipatam towards the sea, and the inland province of Coimbatet on the west; and the keel or lake of Colare, chiefly formed by the overflowings of those two rivers, with a parallel stream running through its centre to the sea coast at Gollapattam, would nearly divide the circars under consideration into two equal parts or squares of about 33 miles on every side, allowing for some inequalities, which however ought not to escape notice. Condapillee along the north bank of the Kistna, stretches some of its straggling pergunnahs in the west through Coimbatet, as far as Mongal, 120 miles from Masulipatam, and rather more than half way to Hyderabad, comprehending an area in the whole, of about 2,500 square miles. On the other hand, the river Godaveri, which describes the limits of Ellore to the north, curves so much in its greater branch to the south on approaching the sea, as to describe considerably the east side of the square of this province; and though the district of Rajemundry dependent on Rajemundry, among the hills on the southern bank of the same river, is a further encroachment on the regular bounds of Ellore, yet still its superficial contents may justly be estimated at less than 2,700 square miles.

4<sup>th</sup>. Rajemundry, towards the south, is with the exception above mentioned, separated from Ellore, in its greatest breadth, by the Godaveri. The river, after receiving many lesser ones from its sources among the Balagaut mountains near Bombay on the Malabar coast, and running a course east, southerly from thence about 700 miles, divides itself into two great branches 35 miles from the sea, within which is formed the island of Nagar, a triangular space comprehending only 500 square miles, but of greater value in proportion to its extent than perhaps any other spot in the East, without excepting the famed Delta of Egypt. From the district of Polaveram on the west, the great ridge of hills towards Berar, limits this province; and the small river of Setteveram, running from thence to the sea, describes its northern boundary with Cicacole, including in all an area of 1,700 miles of accessible country.

5<sup>th</sup>. The districts of Masulipatam, form the coast of the grand division of the circars, and, as hath been observed, are only portions of the maritime border, dismembered for certain use, from the four provinces already described. Nizampatam, formerly a separate jurisdiction on the south of the Kistna, extending along a coast of 60 miles from point Dive, near the great mouth of that river, to Mootapillee south, and about 5 in breadth, on a medium, to the territory of Guntoor, constitutes the southern portion of this division, and from the same head land, including the Island of Dive, to Matsipore on the southern arm of the Godaveri; and from thence to Nigera on its northern branch just beyond the point formed by and deriving its name from the river, lie several pergunnahs detached from Condapillee, and some lesser sea ports, situated on the shores of Ellore and Rajemundry.

Mr. J. Grant's  
Political survey of the  
Northern Circars.

## DESCRIPTION.

Six Provincial  
Divisions.

\* To this the province of Cicacole may be considered an exception, as being interspersed in its whole area, with a number of south mountainous hills, rising abruptly from the common level at considerable distances from each other.

Mr. J. Grant's  
Political History of the  
Southern Circars.

## DESCRIPTION.

together comprising the northern subdivision, and extending along a coast of 105 miles, between the mouths of the Sittaveram, and boundary of Cicacole. Both these portions united, may contain 780 square miles of land immediately dependent on Masulipatam, which is not only the capital of these districts, but also the seat of a subordinate government, ruling the different provinces described, except Guntour, and is the principal port and harbour of all the Northern circars.

6th. Cicacole, anciently Kaling, the most northerly and last in order of the grand division, is also subdivided into two districts, of which, one deriving its name from that of the province, is dependent on Vissagapatam; the other, called Johappour, is placed under the chief and council of Ganjam.

The former lies between the rivers of Sittaveram on the south, and of Poondy north. From the cross hills approaching the sea near those extremities, it forms a kind of amphitheatre, or semicircular territory, of which the diameter along the coast extends 180 miles; and its greatest dimensions inland to the high mountainous region on the west, about one third of the same distance, comprising an area not less than 4,400 square miles. The latter subdivision of this province is of a triangular figure, stretching its longest side along the shore about 80 miles from Poondy to Moland, the southern frontier of Cuttack, and its shortest, to the angle at Goomsur; 50 miles in a west northerly direction towards Berar, containing near 1,600 miles of superficial measure, exclusive of that portion of country which in this district, as well as in all the others southward to the Godaveri, we have assigned to the high inaccessible region, extending to the great ridge of boundary mountains on the west, in variable breadths. The climate of the Northern circars, with a general conformity to what is observable in the other parts of Hindostan, north of the Kistna, has yet, from latitudinal extent of country, maritime situation, and position of the inland hills, some peculiarities, in each of the three seasons of the year, worthy of remark. The periodical rain, called by the natives *Burassit*, usually sets in about the middle of June, with a westerly wind, in moderate showers, until the latter end of August, which month concludes the pooda or fusul, or small grain harvest, and continues from this period, in greater abundance to the beginning of November, when it generally breaks up with violence, and ushers in the *zennessiam* with a strong north-easterly wind, greatly tempered, however, in its coldness, by the mild influence of the sea over which it flows. The middle of this latter and delightful season early in January, finishes the *fusul* thereof for rice and bajary, which are the great productions of the country north of the Godaveri; and in like manner its close at the vernal equinox, terminates the third *fusul* or *rabi* harvest; the grand one for *zorry* or *zambloo*, as well as for all the different species of grain, or pulse south of that river. This coincides with the *habassit*, or hot season, which is always extremely moderate towards the northern extremity of the circars, near Ganjam, by reason of constant simindinal breezes from the sea; and the position of the high towering hills from south to west, contrary to the ordinary direction of the wind about Masulipatam. On the south, for the first two months, strong southerly gales along the shore, together with the sea breezes, moderate the heat, but the baleful influence of the former, in blowing over salt stagnant marshes on the coast is injurious to animal life, and absolutely destructive of vegetation; and during the succeeding month, until the rains, the wind coming from the west over a parched loose soil of great extent, uninterrupted by any continued chain of hills, but particularly in passing along the broad, and at this time of the year almost dry sandy bed of the Kistna, becomes so intolerably hot near the mouth of that river, as to raise the thermometer, sometimes for a week entire, to 110 degrees within the house, and seldom under 105, during the first part of the *habassit*. Another peculiarity of climate, too often and fatally experienced in this country, is the dangerous state of the air in all the hilly regions, throughout the different seasons of vegetation, which occasions the distemper called the hill fever. This general mortal disorder, has been sometimes ascribed to the water, impregnated perhaps with the poisonous quality of copper ore, in passing over the mountains; or with unwholesome mineral earths, in issuing through springs; and sometimes, with equal probability it has been attributed to the corrupt juice of vegetable washed down by torrents into the public reservoirs; but the great operative cause is doubtless the grossness of the atmosphere, charged and contaminated with the exhalation of a luxuriant soil pent up in valleys, as seems to be clearly evinced by the prevalence of the same distemper, even in the plains, where the richer crops of *zambloo* are cultivated, and a free circulation of the air impeded by the luxuriance of the proper growth of this plant, or by surrounding trees and villages.

## Land Rivers.

In all these provinces along the coast, the soil is chiefly sandy, improving gradually towards the hills. The *zambloo* grows therefore seldom, if ever, yields more than a single crop of grain annually; but there being everywhere an abundant supply of water, the one produced is generally extremely rich, besides the boundary rivers already mentioned, which fertilize the country on either side; there are many lesser ones within each of the circars, running into the sea, or divided artificially into canals, and afterwards conducted into the tanks and great reservoirs; such are the streams passing through Guntour, and which, for the most part collected near *Uppetta*, together with the overflowings of the Kistna, water the lands of *Nizamapatam*; such also, are the rivulets drawn from this great river and the Godaveri, which uniting in the *Colare*, between the provinces of Condapillee and

\* *Torry* and *Pelajury*, the former white, the other yellow and coarser, and a species of *Mame*, with a long brassy top, in contradistinction to the *Alcea Torry* or *Indian*

can, which has its grain growing on one instance of a conic form as both in like manner the *Bajary* or *Millet*, on a large and slenderer *Eubia* or *Bar*.



## DESCRIPTION.

and Ellore, are from thence diverted into numberless channels, to water the circumjacent territory. In Rajemundry the Yel-eric or Yalore, running parallel to, and not far south of the Settiavaram is, with uncommon intelligence and industry subdivided, to answer the purposes of cultivation within the two principal zemindaries of Peddapore and Pettapore, on its opposite banks, while the island of Nagur or Nagurum, enclosed chiefly by the two greater branches of the Godaveri, and intersected by five others (lesser ones) is made wonderfully productive, not only by a constant and plentiful supply of the great element of vegetation, but from the acquisition of an extraordinary rich soil, in being thus, from situation, the grand receptacle of all the slimy mould carried down by the greatest river in the Deccan. The southern subdivisions of Chicacole, with a better soil than is found in other parts of the circars, is sufficiently watered by four interior rivers, which have their outlets at the respective ports of Vizigapatam, Binlipatam, Maphus Bunder or Chicacole, and Calingapatam, besides many lesser streams in the seasons of the rains; in advancing to the northward, and in the territory of Jehapore, the river of Gangam, uniting different branches from the valleys of Vizianagur, Burragur, and Govinsur, in the very center of the whole district, in its greatest breadth, as Aska makes this portion of the province equally fruitful with the other, comparatively to its extent.

## Natural Produce:

From the many advantages which we have already enumerated, as common to the circars, it may be expected, that their natural produce will appear proportionate; nevertheless, the more useful classes of animals are found in greater abundance than variety, being almost wholly reducible to sheep and the larger species of horned cattle; but the neighbouring sea, and its numerous inlets, abound with every kind of Indian fish, a few excepted, together with some that are common to Europe, such as mullet, soal, and poinlet; the latter, resembling most the turbot, if it be not exactly the same in miniature, is most peculiarly attached to this coast, and is turned to no inconsiderable benefit when salted, for the inland markets. It is, however, in the grand and most necessary articles of vegetable production, that this territory is particularly famous. In grain, the different sorts of which we have already had occasion to mention, it is properly the granary of the Carnatic during the north-east monsoon, in like manner as Tanjore is reckoned on, for the other season of the periodical winds from the opposite point of the compass. Fruits, roots, and greens are scarce, or reared with difficulty, to the south of the Godaveri, and even to the north of that river; owing, no doubt, to the influence of the sea air, are neither so excellent in kind, nor are they to be met with in such plenty or variety as in other parts of the Deccan. It may farther be observed, that some of the articles of second necessity, such as sugar and cotton, are also too scantily produced in Rajemundry and Jehapoor, for the general consumption of all the provinces, while on the other hand, bay salt and tobacco, the latter from the vicinity of Masulipatam, known everywhere for superior excellence, have exceeded, of late years, in quantity, the home and foreign demand for both. But, in the estimation of a commercial people, all the partial disadvantages we have named would be more than counterbalanced by a single uncultivated production of the greatest utility, if proper use were made of the forests of Rajemundry, which, from the commencement of the hills along the banks of the Godaveri to Palouncha, on the frontiers of Commamet, yield a superabundance of the best and largest teak timbers, so generally thought superior in quality even to oak, for the ship-building and navigation of the Indian seas. At present, the cocoa and palmyra, or in the more northerly province, the toomecara\*, form the principal materials for constructing, in the different ports of the circars, 500 of those unwieldy vessels called doonies† of various burthens, from 60 to 300 tons each. The diamond mines of Guntoor and Condapillee, reserved by treaty to the Nizam, deserve barely to be mentioned as a rarity; not to be considered as of any great political consequence.

Manufactures  
useful Arts

In regard to Manufactures, the staple produce of the country worked from cotton is of two different sorts and fineness. Plain long cloth, so valuable at foreign markets, is chiefly wrought in the island of Nagur and its vicinity, where the manufacturers have always found a sure asylum from the ravages of war; it forms the ground-work of the best printed calicoes in Europe, and of those inimitable painted ones called palampores, in the districts of Masulipatam. The coarser plain cloths made to the north and south of the Godaveri, or coloured with clay root, which is the madder of the East, and growing in most perfection in the pure sands annually overflowed by the Kistna, are equally articles in vast demand abroad, or for interior consumption. But the muslins of Chicacole; the beautiful woollen carpets of Ellore, and silks of Burrampore in Jehapoor, wrought from raw materials imported from Bengal or China, are rather objects of curiosity and meriting encouragement, than considerable in quantity or benefit. Of this nature also is the art of painting, or inlaying ivory and black wood, in the cabinet work made at Vizagapatam; but the facility, convenience, and cheapness, with which ships of war or of burthen, not exceeding 500 tons, have been, and might in greater number be constructed, in the ports of Coringa and Narsapoor, at the two principal mouths of the Godaveri, are considerations of the utmost importance to a maritime state; nor should the extensive branch of ship-building at present in use, though with so much imperfections and improvidence in supplying 50,000 tons in small craft for the coasting trade, be forgotten, in stating the more useful arts, which at once favour the proprietary and local interests of the country.

## Coast.

The several objects of natural or artificial produce, when united, form the grand resources of commerce, which in the circars may be classed, under three different heads. The trade to Europe,

\* This seems to be a species of the tree which produces the gum arabic.

† Coasting vessels of one or two masts, managed by native

lascars or seamen, having a convex upper deck, with the view of resisting more effectually any incumbent waves.

Mr. J. Grant's  
Political Survey of the  
Northern Circars.

DESCRIPTION.

Population.

Europe, to neighbouring Indian ports, and the inland provinces of the Deccan. The first confined entirely to the fine cotton manufactures exported by European nations which have establishments on this coast, or purchased by other foreign adventurers, may amount in the whole, at prime cost, to thirty lacks of rupees, of which one-half seldom finds its way to England, though a much greater quantity would be productive of a certain benefit, of upwards of 100 per cent. The 2d, or coasting trade, carried on almost entirely with Madras, since the late prohibition against importing bay salt into Bengal, consists either of grain, amounting annually to half a million of bags, and valued on a medium, at twenty-five lacks of rupees including freight and other charges, which return to the country; or for the most part, in the coarser cloths proper for the eastern markets, and which may be estimated at ten lacks more.—The 3d branch, or interior commerce, in salt and piece goods of native production, or copper, and raw salt; the latter, chiefly from Bengal, leaves a balance of ten lacks, after deducting half that amount for returns of cotton and wheat received in barter from the Lomballies\*, or inland carriers, and consumed within the circars;—and these are the various commercial benefits computed in the gross at 75 lacks of rupees, which, in a flourishing period of 17 years back, and most so under the late distractions in the Carnatic, have annually increased the hidden treasure, or languid circulation of the parsimonious Indians, excepting an overplus never exceeding 15 lacks, saved from a very disproportionate revenue, to liquidate the yearly gratuity paid to the Nizam by treaty, or be remitted in specie to the presidency of Fort St. George.

The native inhabitants of all these provinces, exclusive of a few thousand Mahomedans dispersed in the principal towns, and among the more regular infantry and militia, are wholly Hindoos, and may, with great moderation, be numbered at two million and a half, under all denominations. They are composed, or rather they are parts, of the two nations of Telinga and Oris, Woris, or Orissa, formerly divided from each other by the Godeveri, but since their union under the same government, a good deal mixed among themselves, as well as with some of the neighbouring tribes; still, however, under a general religious conformity to the doctrines of the Bedes, as received in the Deccan. They speak and write different dialects, apparently of the Shanscrit language, and have rites, customs, and characteristical traits, perfectly distinguishable from each other. The four great casts or divisions of the people, as founded on spiritual authority, are therefore common to both countries; but with less deviation from the original institutions in Oris, where brahminical abstinence from animal food, excepting fish, contrary to the practice of all the other Deccanes, is pretty generally observed by the higher tribes of every class. Farther, as these distinctions had equally a reference to the temporal, as well as religious state, so, even where the ancient rule, prohibitory of intermarriage, has been once or oftener infringed, and the tendency consequently greatest to confound the different orders, yet they have been, in a manner, wholly preserved; and sometimes most tenaciously adhered to, in civil occurrences among the Sunker, mixed or bastard descendants of the primitive inhabitants. Thus, the Bramins continue to enjoy their pre-eminence and consideration among the other tribes, though always in proportion to the purity of their lives, or outward sanctity. In like manner, the Rachewars, Row-wars, and Velmas†, of which denominations the principal zemindars in the circars are actually composed, affect the warlike character and manners of Rajepoots, to entitle themselves to be ranked with the more genuine offspring of the Chesteres, or second class. But the commewar conbies, or husbandmen; golawer-ahere, or cowherds; saliwar-julhai, or weavers, together with the twelve bullootedars or artificers, maintained by the greater villages, and taxed by government, though all incorporated in the sooder, last, or fourth great casts, have yet sometimes claimed the degree, immediately above them; and from their utility, have as often been allowed by a foreign magistrate, to rank with the compte banias, or retail merchants, which are properly of the third or class assimilated with that of Bice‡.

REVOLUTIONS AND HISTORICAL EVENTS.

IT was not until the year 1471 of the Christian era, or 876 of the Hejirah, that the Mahomedans of the Deccan extended their arms to the Northern circars. At this time, Oriah, the rajah of the country of the same name, separated from the rest of Orissa on the north by the Chilca lake, having died without issue, a dispute arose for the succession between Mungul-rai, the adopted son, and Humer, the cousin of the deceased. The latter, had recourse for assistance to Mahomed Shah Lushery, who then ruled over the Bramineah empire in Beder, and long wished for such an opportunity of extending his conquests on that side of his dominions; in consequence of which, the claimant was not only put in possession of the family estates, but through the aid of his great ally, acquired the new conquests of Condapillee, including all the intervening districts, to Rajemundry, on condition of becoming tributary

\* Lomballies, Lombardies, or Bayarabs, are a wandering tribe of carriers or camp followers: the descendants of those who, with their cattle, accompanied the emperors Shah-jehan and Allum Gier, in their wars in the Deccan. They are a tribe of Sicks subdivided into about 18 lesser ones, all followers of Nane Shah.

† Rachewars, Row-wars, Telinga corruptions of Rajah, or of its diminutive Rai, joined with the personal or local appellation, war, to express the people or descendants of chiefs of foreign extracts, or of modern upstart race. The Velmas among the Telugumars, are equivalent to the Samas of Malabar, Nages of Canara, and are the native

gentry or military of the country, claiming descent from, or adopted into, the families sprung from the ancient princes of Worungel.

‡ N.B.—What further regards the character, customs, manners and religion of these Deccanee Hindoos, is the subject of a more ample description, in another part of our Political Survey, which treats generally of all the six Indian nations inhabiting the Peninsula, giving their names to, or denominated from, the grand divisions of country, Malabar, Canara, Mercha, Telinga, Oris and Gondwannah, into which the Deccan is naturally and properly distributed.



butary for the whole to the Mussulman empire; but the ambitious projects of Mahomed Shah were not accomplished until nine years afterwards, in subjugating more completely to his authority, the districts of Masulipatam, with the important province of Guntour. These formed part of a principality lately established by Narsingh, who was probably descended from the conquered Telinga rajahs of Worungaul; and being driven from the family inheritance, took advantage of the distractions which prevailed in the Carnatic, to make himself master of the sea-coast of Coromandel, from the Kistna south, to Kanje, or Conjeeveram; fixing his chief residence at Chudergeery Narsinga, and so often confounded by European travellers or historians with Bejenagur, the capital of the greatest Indian empire of Canara, from which it had been dismembered, entered largely into the political views of the court of Bedar; so the possession of Guntour in particular, as lying on the south side of the Kistna, and in other respects, from situation, justly considered the master-key of the Carnatic towards the north, appeared of the greatest relative importance.

In the year 1512, the Kootubshahy, or second dynasty of Decanny Mussulman kings, dismembered, as turretdars or governors, in right of power, the eastern division of the Bami-neah empire, called Telinga, but in afterwards, more generally denominated, from its capital and principal fortress indiscriminately, the state of Hydrabad or of Golconda; and in proportion to the limited sway of this new sovereignty, so the complete reduction of all the tributary dependencies, especially those on the sea-coast, which are now the subject of consideration, became more an object of policy with the ruling administration. The countries south of the Godavari to the river Gondagama, were entirely subdued, reduced nearly into their present form of provinces as described, and otherwise modelled almost on the same principles of interior government, as prevailed to the period of the last revolution, when they were annexed to the British dominions in India: but at that time, Wistna Deo or Gajepetty, a powerful prince of Orissa, having united under his sceptre all the ancient family domains, from the confines of Bengal to those of Telinga on the south, no impression could be made on Rajemundry, or the more northerly province, formerly tributary to the Mahomedans, while possessed by the descendants of Oria, until the year 1571, under the reign of Ibrahim Kootub Shah. Then, a new participation of this Indian principality lessened the power of defence, and facilitated the reduction of the Rheddy, or proprietary chief of the race of Gajepetty, to whose lot the southern division, along the banks of the Godavari, descended as an inheritance. The treason of Vachevoy Mussalee, ancestor to the present zemindar of Peddapore, and renter or manager for the Rheddywars, furthered the ambitious projects of the sultan, while it procured for himself, the farm of Kimmoordeta, which served as a foundation to more extensive acquisitions. But the conquest of Rajemundry was still far from being complete. The island of Nagur was wholly inaccessible to Mussulman troops; nor could the interior of the province be sufficiently protected from the ravages of the ejected proprietors, who were driven to their unwholesome fastnesses among the hills, without a standing militia and feudatory force; which, besides the ordinary estimated revenue of the circar, subsisted on lands exempted from taxation, undue exactions from inferior subjects of the state, or plunder taken from neighbouring independent inhabitants, who were possessed of greater wealth than courage to defend it. In like manner, Cicacole was but imperfectly reduced; and reckoning only its first valuation, according to the public records, rated at an assessment greatly short of the actual collections made from the people, and the necessary military disbursements of a frontier Province\*.

Such, however, was the state in which all the Northern circars, together with the other dominions of Ahril Hussien, the last of the race of the Kootubshahy, fell in the year 1687, to the victorious arms of Allem Geer, the great Mogul emperor of Hindostan. But, during the remaining twenty years of his reign, this monarch was too busily employed in conquering the larger provinces of the Deccan, and curbing the upstart Marhattah power, to inspect or render as productive as they ought to have been to the treasury, either of the two maritime dependencies of Hydrabad, henceforth termed a soubah, lying north of the Godavari; and in the period which immediately followed his death, successive wars or contention for empire precluded every where, the possibility of a reform, having introduced anarchy and usurpation in some places, or in general occasioned a total suspension of all regular governments, throughout the whole extent of Hindostan.

At length, the memorable battle of Shuckerkerd, A.D. 1724, gave a transient repose to the Deccan, while it transferred in fact, though not in form, the sovereignty of this great limb of the Mogul empire, from the house of Tineer to that of Assiphean, in the person of the first and famous Nizam ul Moolk; self constituted, as well by sunnuds from Mahomed Shah the reigning emperor, viceroy of all the six soubahdarries south of the Nerbudda, one of the great ancient and modern boundaries of proper Hindostan. The wisdom and vigour of this new ruler, were immediately felt in the circar of Cicacole, by the appointment of Anweer ud dien Khan Gopamovee to the post of aumildar, or controller of that province; but we are not to estimate the public benefits derived from an able administration of fifteen years successively, by the criterion of a rent-roll, under the best constituted Mussulman government. The pride, the advantage of a great military establishment, though often nominal,

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\* About the year 1592, Rajah Marhing, the emperor Akbar's delegate in Bengal, having partially subdued the northern provinces of Orissa, including in the list of his conquests, the southerly dependencies of Kulling or Cicacole, and Rajemundry, valuing the former of 27 mohals, at rupees 250,000, and the latter of 16 mohals, at rupees 1,25,000;

but in truth, the Mogul arms did not penetrate beyond the Chilka lake, and the assessment of those two districts annexed to, or making part of the original Toonar Jamma of Tiorul Mull, as exhibited in the Aygen Akbary, serves only to evince the imperfection of that famous rent-roll, with respect to the soubah of Bengal.

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nominal, must be taken into consideration; and if the policy and passion of princes did not so powerfully incline them to the system of purchasing personal attachments by conferring individual favours, yet it is so much the interest of ministers and other courtiers present, thus to promote the wealth and influence of provincial delegates, perhaps originally recommended by themselves, that full credit ought always to be given to public management, for every acquisition of private fortune authorized by unqualified despotism, written positive laws, or a conscientious implication of their reason and true spirit: nor will such liberality appear so great, when it is considered that death legally gave to the prince, entire and unconditionally, whatever portion of the riches of his subjects, the forbearance of his arbitrary will, left to their enjoyment in life, only, perhaps, in the hope of future reversion. To judge, therefore, impartially of Anweer udien Khan's progress in reducing to proper obedience, or in ascertaining and realizing the full revenue of those districts, so long placed under his management, we must take into the account his ample private emoluments, of which a skilful application probably paved the way to further preferment, until finally rewarded by the foujedary of the Carnatic. That the remains of his fortune, escaped the grasping hand of his immediate superior, the soubahdar of Hyderabad, at the period of his death, must be attributed to the inability of even the great viceroy himself, their common ruler, to assert the more undoubted rights of sovereignty in any part of the Deccan, under the terror of the then prevailing power of the Marhattas. And it may not be unworthy of remark, that even nineteen years afterwards, it required the irresistible influence of the British government to obtain for Mahommed Ali, the successor of Anweer ud Dien, a full discharge of the arrears, or pretended defalcations in the revenue of Cicacole. But if such were the advantages resulting from the ability and good fortune of the Ommilden, deputed by the great Asiph Jah to one of the maritime circars; greater still were the benefits derived from the vigour and integrity of his contemporary, Rustum Kkan, who, from 1732, for seven successive years, ruled with the most ample delegated sway, Rajemundry, with the other four more southerly provinces. There the zemindars, or Indian farmers generally had availed themselves of the surrounding distractions of the death of Alem Geer, to usurp the rights and feeble authority of their corrupt Mussulman superintendents. To correct these dangerous abuses, and restore the ancient legal of necessary forms of interior administration, were the arduous task assigned to this new zelahdar or provincial governor next in subordinate degree to, though on the present occasion, vested in the plenary powers of a foujedar; and the conduct of the man so fully justifies the Nizam's choice, that even to this day it is held up and considered by the inhabitants in general, as an example worthy of imitation for necessary policy, considerate humanity, rigid and universal justice. At the same time that these zemindars, defrauded the public treasury, they squeezed, with the iron-hand of oppression, the industrious husbandmen and manufacturers. The first objects, therefore, of Rustum Khan's government, was the total extirpation of such merciless tyrants. Those who escaped the sword were proclaimed as traitors, and a reward being offered for their own, with adherents heads, a sufficient number was soon collected, to erect two of those shocking pyramidal monuments, called Khulla-minar, near each of the provincial capitals; for one of which kind, though in a larger scale, the cruelty of Nadir Shah is held in Europe, so justly in abhorrence. The remains of one of those singular proofs of Eastern depravity, the cause or effect of the most violent despotism, are still to be seen in the neighbourhood of Masulipatam, and might be supposed to serve as a lesson of useful instruction to the natives, to contrast and revere the lenity of their actual government. But the legislator will assuredly be disappointed who expects, to find in Hindostan the operation of free enlarged reason and reflection; and the characteristic traits of the people, as sketched by the great Tamerlane, in his celebrated institutions, would not have been so long and universally admitted by his imperial successors, as making the true unchangeable features of their subjects, as well as indicating the infallible standard of practical rule in politics, if they had not been drawn with exact similitude by a superior discerning genius and the hand of a master. Accordingly, the severe administration of Rustum Khan, which he now farther distinguished, by substituting amecus, supervisors or temporary collectors, in the room of the annihilated refractory zemindars, as proverbial for exemplary excellence in the circars as that of Jaffier Khan, who devised the famous loathsome torture of the by-kunta or paradise, to extort from similar delinquents in Bengal the settled revenue of the soubah, collected from the ryots. Still, however, the jumma kaumil, or original assessment, continued at an under rate on the Khalsah records; and the benefits derived by the state from superior management were always temporary, depending on the personal ability of the individual employed, and for the most part flowing in, through the private channels of corruption. Mussulman depravity, indolence and ignorance, soon made it necessary to recur to the ancient system of finance, through the agency of Hindoo farmers general, who, to remedy the evils of a fluctuating government, were made to have a permanent interest in the soil and general prosperity of the country, by certain local privileges which were so invariably continued in the same family by successive atmidars, that they were often mistaken by the possessors for hereditary rights; proper always to be enlarged in anarchy, or under the authority of natural law, when civil restraints lost all controuling influence; and thus the creation of new zemindars was, in a few years, productive of fresh disorders under similar circumstances, throughout the whole extent of the Northern circars,

For when these provinces, A.D. 1753, were annexed to the French dominions in India, under the nizamat of Salabut Jung, who owed his elevation and future support chiefly to the great address and military conduct of the famous Bussy, so this able politician and commander, appointed to rule the Ceded Territories, found himself under the necessity, but

always

always with true measured civilized humanity, of going over the same ground with the best of his Mussulman predecessors, in re-establishing order, and the indispensable indubitable rights of Eastern sovereignty. Zemindars were as usual dismissed from their employments, but generally permitted to enjoy, under French sunnuds, their rissooms and savorums, or conditional hereditary privileges, amounting to from eight to twelve per cent. on the net revenue collected; and excepting in the circar of Chicacole, there are more instances of new creations than total extirpation of the necessary officers of government. Here indeed the reform was not complete, a number of petty Indian superintendents divided the whole province betwixt them and family; new internal usurpations, together with multiplied abuses, for ever disturbed the tranquillity, while they lessened the receipts greatly below the dues of the exchequer. The union or annexation of these several possessions under one head, appeared the most eligible system of administration, and Vizieram Rauze, the predecessor, not ancestor of the present zemindar of the same name, who then only held the four pergunnahs or lesser districts about Vizianagram, rendered himself the most useful and acceptable man to act in the capacity of chief. It is not our province to trace the progressive execution of the plan projected; and we could wish to forget such bloody scenes as occurred, in the acquisition of Bobilee;—suffice it to observe, that success crowned the enterprize, and raised the favourite Vizieram to that unrivalled power and consideration which the adopted representative of his family still is permitted to enjoy among a multitude of other official landholders dispersed throughout the circars, some of higher pretensions from birth, but all of inferior territorial consequence. At length, a complete survey and hustabood, or detailed account of the gross collections of the whole country, infinitely more accurate and useful than the famous Domesday book of England, were formed, and put Mr. Bussy in the knowledge of resources entirely beyond the reach of his Mussulman predecessors, and greatly exceeding perhaps the general belief of modern financiers. But moderation was necessary, under a recent foreign administration; the regular troops to be supported by the revenue were to be employed in distant service, and the great director general himself, whose presence might frequently be requisite to enforce his decrees, was almost constantly obliged to reside at the Nizam's court, to keep in order and set in motion that wonderful political machinery, which was at once the basis of his own grandeur, and made his nation the arbiters of the Deccan. The jumma bundy or annual settlement, therefore, was only doubled in Chicacole and Rajemundry, and brought somewhat nearer the kham wosool, or gross receipts, in the other provinces. Besides which, as a temporary expedient, the zemindars were bound to maintain the public peace, defray all charges of collections, and keep on foot a scanty corps or militia of twelve thousand infantry, which, over and above the ordinary service of preserving the three yearly crops, or enforcing their equal division between government and cultivators, were liable to be called on for a very small daily allowance, to repel any invading force. All this, however, we believe to have been only the first step towards establishing a more equitable jumma karnail, or standard revenue, which a future prospect of stability was to make progressive, until arrived at that equitable medium of rent or taxation that leaves abundance to the husbandmen, with a sufficient spur to industry; that supplies the exigencies of the state in the necessary means for general system of defence, or to diffuse with returning increase, through the channels of commerce or other public disbursements, the enlivening benefits of provincial circulation, and after all, afford to indispensable intermediate agents, not princely fortunes to feed idleness, or pamper useless luxury; not hoards of wealth to be secreted in the earth, for the purposes of superstition or chicanery, and thus set at nought the deadly labour of man in the acquisition; not enormous defalcations, from the indisputable rights of royalty to purchase remissions, privileges, and influence by corruption, to maintain a formidable military retinue, whose only virtue is personal attachment, to the master that pays them, chiefly in alienated lands, on the footing of those territorial benefices, which, with equal impropriety or ignorance, are sometimes suffered to be given away to gain the partial favour of Bramins; until at length the king's conquered domains are rendered of no account, or wholly parcelled out to support meditated rebellion, and be again re-united under refractory subjects, in the form of hereditary independent possessions; no, not any such dangerous, superfluities or embezzlements would probably have been allowed to zemindars; those necessary servile links in Eastern despotism to connect the distant extremes of prince and ryot. Nothing beyond a splendid family subsistence, with just such an overplus of income as might serve to support official dignity, consequential appearance, personal pre-eminence, and gentility. This we believe would have been the equitable political result of Mr. Bussy's scheme of finance, if he had been allowed to complete it, though the ignorant calumniators of that great man, without attending to the other inexhaustible sources of private wealth, which he possessed in commanding the entire ministerial influence of the Nizamut, do not give his disinterestedness all the credit due in the adjustments in the mean time concluded, for the annual revenues of the circars.

But in April 1750, by the conquest of the fortress of Masulipatam, that great commanding bulwark, the virtual sovereignty of all the maritime provinces on either side, from the river Goddegama to the Chilca lake, was absolutely and necessarily transferred from the French to the British government. The gallant officer, however, under whose command this new and amazing revolution had been effected, could not conceive the possibility of maintaining, under the rule of mercantile establishment, territorial acquisitions of such vast extent. He contented himself, and still more fully his employers, in obtaining a formal grant for those districts only, which have since constituted the immediate dependencies of the conquered capital from Salabut Jung, the supposed rightful renter of the Deccan set up by

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Bussy, and left the viceroy in nominal possession of the remainder, lost in wonder at the generosity and moderation of the English, though utterly incapable from court distractions, or the local circumstances of the country itself, thus dismembered from its head, to realize the predicted boon. In consequence of which, for seven succeeding years, the completest anarchy reigned in the history of Hindostan, prevailed over all the five greater Northern circars. The forms, nay even the remembrance of civil government, seemed to be wholly lost; lands became vassals, renters were called proprietors, and amildars changed condition with the inferior officers, by accepting zemindary rissooms, or yearly acknowledgments to lessen the value and standing revenue of the lands. In 1761, an unconstitutional reform was attempted by the sanction of illegitimate authority. Nizam Ali, the brother of Salabut Jung, the actual viceroy, having some time before usurped the general administration of affairs in the Deccan, was unfortunate in his transaction with the Mathattas, as to be obliged to cede for ever to the British, territories of the yearly value of one crore of rupees. The aspiring minister, regardless of the consequent enfeebled state of the Nizamut rather as the effect of his brother's weakness, and unworthiness to rule, than of his own misconduct, began to entertain thoughts of the Mahal, and to anticipate the princely honours to which he had already been declared apparent heir. In this design, he the more readily yielded his inferior charge to a new court faction, which rose on the decline of his own popularity, on being permitted to levy contributions from the eastern refractory provinces, which were to constitute a fund of corruption to assist him in his elevation. At that time, Hussein Ali Cawn acted in the capacity of amildar in the circars. This man had in vain instigated the English government to assert its rights; at the same time he found his authority curtailed in the exercise of his office by the protection given to the zemindars. Among numberless instances of this kind, one Codant Ram, of Deonacotah, a small but compact fruitful and highly cultivated pergunah, lying 15 miles south of Masulipatam on the banks of the Kistna, had been invariably assessed in the books of the circar of Condapillee, for a revenue of rupees, two lakhs and ten thousand four hundred and fifty-seven and six annas (2,10,457 6.); the gross Mofussil receipts exceeded this amount in the sum of sixty thousand rupees which defrayed the expense of internal management, such as subandy, with the rissooms and savcrans of the zemindar, and other lesser officers of government. Codant Ram, a sensible intelligent man, and at this day, without exception, the most skilful farmer in any of the provinces according to popular estimation, availed himself of the prevailing distraction, on reinstatement in the zemindary management, from which he had been suspended by the French, to obtain an annual diminution of his usual rent on the plea of predatory and other losses sustained by the inhabitants of the district, in the period of his suspension. He was seconded by the then chief of Masulipatam, who undoubtedly conceiving him aggrieved, interceded so powerfully in his behalf, that for the small additional consideration of nine thousand pagodas paid to the amildar, the zemindary, in the first instance, was only rated at forty-eight thousand rupees on the general rent-roll, though afterwards increased to 18,000 pagodas, or seventy-two thousand rupees, but with a continuation of the same douceur, on settling the jummahundy. In this situation of affairs, curtailed in power and emolument, Hussein Ali solicited strongly the known ambitious Nizam Ali, who had already set out in quest of his pecuniary object, to visit and reform his own distracted jurisdiction. The invitation was gladly accepted, nor was the expedition fruitless. Titles and sunnuds were lavishly bestowed on the zemindars, for paying up arrears of revenue, or attaching them to the personal fortunes of the discarded minister, who was meditating rebellion against his brother, the immediate sovereign. These favours, illegal, unsubstantial in themselves, did not even in form, transfer any of the rights of Mogul royalty, and were only a temporary confirmation of ancient grants to new usurping landholders; every telsecdar, or petty Mussulman, and French collector, held and exercised the same prerogative on their first accession or yearly settlement of arrears, and the fees admitted of on such occasions, were no inconsiderable benefit to all the officers of government, nevertheless the privileges conferred in this period of confusion, a corrupt local superior authority, and flattering to the vanity of upstart pretenders, became a powerful instrument in such a republic, that forgeries of them were common; twenty rupees could purchase an impression of the court's seal, and eight annas more might have alienated half the regiments of Hindostan, as far as they were, at the disposal of an adroit Persian museddy or writer. But now a new revolution was preparing from abroad to rectify these glaring absurdities, and substitute constitutional rule, in the room of the most licentious disorders, oppression, and tyrannical anarchy, which had actually reduced the Nizam's receipts from all the provinces north of the Kistna on a medium of five successive years, to some long less than three lakhs of rupees annually. This was no other than the grand political change gloriously began ten years before, and finally executed in 1766, by the more fortunate achievement or under the auspices of the immortal Clive, which increased the British empire, not so particularly in the East perhaps, as universally, to its greatest splendour and magnitude; though, at the same time, with respect to the circars, it could only be considered, as adding territorial possession under written forms, to previous conquered right. Sunnuds, the most ample and legal, were procured from the actual rightful acknowledged emperor of Hindostan, transferring in perpetuity to the great India Company, the entire, free, and unconditional sovereignty of that portion of his hereditary dominions, the present object of consideration, and then nominally under the weak factious administration of his delegate, or rather the self-constituted viceroy of the Deccan. An army of about 3,000 seapoys at once enforced the grant, and terrified the Nizam into a solemn confirmation of it by treaty, but with a voluntary acknowledgment on the part of the English, which, though of longer duration than originally expected, must be allowed sufficiently to support the national claim

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generosity and moderation. An insidious combination and war commenced a twelve-month afterwards, in return for such substantial favour, soon gloriously terminated, however, by the battle of Tricomalee, served only to strengthen and give permanency to the tenure of these important recent acquisitions, with rather a diminution of the pecuniary gratuity erroneously called a Peshcush, or tribute paid yearly on certain conditions, to the Soubah, in consequence of the former negotiation; nor will it seem a matter of so much surprise, that an incumbrance so large, dangerous, and; as it afterwards appeared, so ill bestowed, should have at all entered into the original agreement, or that an entire permission of it, should not have formed an article of the second, when it is considered, that in both cases, concessions the most mortifying, and infinitely of greater estimation, were obtained in addition, for the nabab of the Carnatic, the mortal enemy and declared rival of his superior the Nizam; that a variety of other circumstances, and political combinations, opposed a more advantageous settlement; such as, that the sphere of British government in the East was but recently enlarged by the acquisition of extensive territory; that mens. minds, formed only to the contracted scale of mercantile policy, were consequently unprepared instantaneously to embrace objects so various, complicated, and of so vast a scope; or that, if a few individuals of superior genius could be found, who comprehended the theory, yet still experience was wanting, in the practice: that on the other hand, the highest and most formidable ideas were then entertained of the power, pretensions, and rights of the viceroy of the Deccan; that in proportion as the glare of these, was to vanish from popular sight, so the gratuitous tribute it commanded, was to be of that short duration, subject to many future contingencies, and, at all events, agreeably to the law of nations, as universally understood in the East, as well as to the spirit, and not contrary to the letter of subsisting treaties, was absolutely and finally to cease on the death or removal of the actual incumbent. Neither is it to be wondered, even at this day, after a lapse of full seventeen years of the most profound tranquillity, abundant produce, and commercial benefits, enjoyed, perhaps, for the first time for ages past in all the circars, if the East India Company have not as yet, entirely entered into their last equivocal and more undoubted proprietary rights. Their servants in this country are placed under the most embarrassing, unreasonable circumstances. The pursuit of fortune can be the only private object, to suffer probable death, and certain loss of health, in a foreign climate, destitute of all natural or social pleasures, according to the bent of a tolerably well finished European education. Not only the most rigid restraints, formally are opposed to the gratification of a ruling desire, originating from a fictitious necessity, but likewise, all visible means of subsistence are actually denied; at the same time, the temptations of ministerial offers are strong, but not so much in the pride of holding these, as in their attendant emoluments. The virtue of the present age is weak; while refinements of the understanding are capable of finding out and reconciling evasions of the civil, only to obey the more powerful law of natural reason. Prejudices are consequently entertained at home, against Indian administration in general. These, create disgust abroad: no incitements are held out for industry, improvement, or disinterested conduct. The evil becomes extreme; it is found to be deeply rooted in the original constitution of government; and if at all to be rectified, it can only be, through the lenient, wise, and powerful interposition of the British legislature. The task is begun, with some hopes of completion; yet, if it should appear, in course of a vigorous prosecution, that millions have been lost to the public, in lieu of thousands pocketed by individuals, it by no means follows, that more penal laws, rigidly enforced by the most virtuous administration in the universe, will prove effectual, when due attention is not paid to the local circumstances and craving private interests of agents, necessarily employed at the distance of near half the globe from the high controuling power, in large discretionary confidential trusts; or rather, perhaps, according to a former observation, it may happen, that "should restricted laws be written in blood, and Minos himself the judge, "unaccompanied by reason, they would be as the dead letter of tyranny, opposed by bold "necessity, or eluded by the timid craft and villainy of slavery."—But to return from this digression, to the subject of our historical detail: it is necessary to remark, that even after the formal cession of the circars, so liberally paid for by the Company, their arms had still to subdue, at a great expense, the zemindars of Cicacole and Rajemundry, instigated to be refractory through the former weakness and present machinations of their rejected Mussulman rulers, while the farming landholders of Ellore and Condapillee more readily submitted, under a written promise from the military commander, of the continuation of their privileges under certain conditions; which, of course, were never voluntarily to be fulfilled by a people who, the first time in the tradition of ages, had heard of stipulations proposed by conquerors.

The fate of Guntoor was singular; nor doth the possession of it, yet complete the conquered granted right of sovereignty. A seven years lease of this province, granted to Bazarat Jung by his brother Salabat Jung, the viceroy, to enable the former to entertain the party of Frenchmen to be expelled from the limits of the Deccan, ignorantly described by the river Kistna on the south; and thus virtually set aside the agreement entered into by the latter in 1759, with the English government, was just expired at the period of concluding the treaty of Hyderabad in 1766; and though Nizam Ali, the successor of Salabat Jung, at this time would have considered the extermination of his brother the lessee, a more desirable circumstance than the renewal of his holding, and soon afterwards actually proposed the alternative; yet, as the latter proceeding entailed the advantages of a more formidable natural enemy, and left great room for future contingencies, so the farm of Guntoor was continued to Bazarat Jung, but under the erroneous description of a jagheer, on conditions acknowledged to have been broken on his part in 1768, and always depending on the good will



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will and pleasure of his immediate proprietary superiors, who, at the same time, enjoyed the most rightful, extensive, and powerful sovereignty actually existing in Hindostan. But, strange to relate, in 1770, we find the local representatives of this mighty government change conditions with a petty vassal, and put themselves on a footing with the little proprietor of the circar of Adoni, to obtain the rental of Guntoor, that they might have the honour of sub-letting to the lately constituted subadar of the Carnatic, their great enfeudatory nawaub or deputy, as in propriety he must be called, since there are no treaties, or circumstances of equality, to authorize his being distinguished as a federate ally, or otherwise, such a reversal of the natural order of things could not have been of long duration. Ignorant, ambitious, neighbouring rulers, construed a total dereliction of dignity, right, and power, into a conscious incapacity of governing, unless through the vain medium of their own flattered ability and supremacy. And as an earnest of greater acquisitions, the Nizam, in November 1780, seized the province in question, which was now ordered to be evacuated by the English troops; and has, from a series of (to him) fortunate circumstances, continued in his possession even beyond the period of its final absolute reversion to the Company, on the 5th October 1782, when death put an end to all and singular pretensions of Bazalut Jung.

#### GOVERNMENT.

Despotic form.

WERE we to judge of political events from partial experience, it might be concluded on a superficial view of the preceding account of Revolutions, that the system of government in the circars has undergone the same variety of change. But as limited monarchy and freedom peculiarly distinguish Europe, so despotism and slavery seem to be the universal indelible character, in which nature has stamped the state of civil society in Asia; and if any one local division in this quarter of the globe can be said to bear the first and strongest impression, it is undoubtedly Hindostan. From the remotest antiquity, this country has not only been subject to the single arbitrary will of native rulers, in patriarchal feudatory subordination to one or more superior chiefs, but it hath constantly, in whole or in part, been held in a state of double vassalage or tributary dependance on foreigners, until its final absolute conquest by the Mussulman arms at the close of the 13th century. This revolution, indeed, having effected the total subversion of the ancient inferior empire of the Hindoos, introduced the most violent unnatural tyranny, as being engrafted on a new and sanguinary religion. The rights of persons and things universally, as understood in free states, had, it is true, at all times concentrated in the prince, or flowed from him as the focus of royalty, to such of his servile subjects as came within the reflected rays of his temporary benevolence; but at this period, a spirit of enthusiastic intolerance made a daring and successful attempt on the divine and indefeasible right of mental freedom. Thousands of the Indian youth were carried into captivity, chiefly for the purpose of being educated in the slavish detested principles of Mahomedanism, and death or conversion was the usual alternative held out to the mild, though stubborn adherents of the Bedes; grown old under the scriptural rules of Braminical jurisprudence. Yet, even in this horrible oppressive state of society, might have been long endured, through the extreme passive indifference of the conquered, if the evil itself did not carry with it in the depravity, licentiousness and mutual disagreement of their tyrants, the better seeds of reformation, and prepare the land for that memorable change which at length brought the whole empire of Hindostan, under the more qualified despotism of the race of Timur.

tical

Although the small portion of country at present under consideration, experienced in a greater or less degree, the effect of these various revolutions, and ought still to enjoy the desirable constitutional benefit of the last mentioned, yet it will not be expected that we should here trace any of the outlines of general administration, even as laid down in the Mogul code; our scope is too limited, for such a design; and it must be remembered, that notwithstanding the more universal political maxims of Tamerlane, deduced from his own practice, and recommended to his posterity, have been invariably adopted by the best of his imperial successors, and only enlarged, methodized, and brought into more extensive use by the celebrated institutions of Akbar; yet every prince or delegate had his own دستور or special rule of government, sometimes reduced to a form in writing, but for the most part, depending on his single capricious will: and that, therefore, to define a system of the mildest despotism, would be no less a task, than to analyze the various compound of the human mind, in the same man, or discover all the intricate mazes of deceit, inconsistency and folly, in the actions of thousands. This is properly the province of oriental philosophy, general and particular history. We have to lament that the knowledge to be derived from such sources, should be locked up in the difficulties of a foreign language, or confined perhaps to the scanty manuscript records of one accessible library, and which is the more to be regretted, that some palpably erroneous and dangerous doctrines, subversive of one of the first, most essential, and best ascertained principles of Eastern legislation, by which the proprietary right of the soil is constitutional, and solely vested in the sovereign ruler, should of late have gone forth, and received not only the sanction of speculative writers, misled by the misrepresentations of ignorant travellers, or by partial analagous reasoning from an imperfect understanding of local and local circumstances, but also be adopted and strenuously urged by men of influence and experimental knowledge, equally eminent for ability and

and integrity; though it seems evident in this instance, that a close attention to public avocations, or their private pursuits, left them not sufficient leisure to investigate or discuss with due consideration, the true theory of their own practice.\* For that such is the foundation of the revenue system, in all parts of Asia, is not only deducible from the nature and spirit of despotic governments, as universally established there, and manifested in a manner, in every page of the genuine particular histories of each country, but absolutely ascertained to be so in Hindostan, in form and fact, by written positive laws; not indeed declaratory of a right which never was or could not be disputed, nor otherwise understood than as instituting and enforcing a practical scheme of finance over the whole landed property of the empire, and calculated to draw the greatest possible rent into the royal treasury, after deduction of the necessary expense of agency, and having exercised the highest proprietary authority in obtaining the legal sources, personal management, and amount of revenue, according to an exact measurement, and proportional assessment of the land, on an equitable valuation of the annual territorial produce, to be equally divided between government and its ryots, or the immediate cultivator of the soil; neither is it to be expected that we should in this place, describe all the higher gradations of delegated power, the standing forms of office, or the functions of superior agents, however necessary it may seem for the more perfect comprehension of the relative subordinate administration of the Northern circars, depending also on discretionary individual rule. Such information will best be collected from the *finans*, *sunnuds*, or commissions of the respective officers employed, connected with an historical detail of executive management, throughout all the various departments of the state. We shall therefore now confine ourselves, to a cursory view only of those provincial arrangements respecting the civil jurisdiction of the territory at present under consideration, which occur, in describing in very general terms, the formal authority of the lowest class of arbitrary delegates, beginning with the *amildar* as the immediate representative of government.

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This officer, though greatly below the degree of the *foujedars* of the Carnatic Payenghaut and Kerpah, held his appointment in like manner, directly under the *soubadar* of Hyderabad, but most commonly by patent, from the universal superior, the Nizam or great ruler of all the six *soubahs* of the Deccan, including the whole peninsula or southern promontory of Hindostan, from Cape Cormorin in 8° North latitude, to the river Nerbuddah, almost under the tropic of Cancer. His local jurisdiction also, when extending over all the northern maritime provinces between the Gondwana and the Chilca Lake, was no wise inferior in magnitude or relative importance, to that of either of his two southerly colleagues, and he was absolutely vested in the same undivided plenary powers of *zalahdarry*, *foujedarry*, and *shahdarry*, which may be defined provincial civil magistracy, military command, and controul of finance; though with this difference however, in latter times, that he continued in fact, as well as in form, subject to a superior; whereas the others had effected or were supported, in a state of virtual independence.

Amildar, the  
provincial delegate.

In the first capacity of Nizam, or ruling magistrate, he was guardian of the rights of sovereignty; prevented or chastised foreign encroachments and interior disorders; declared what should be construed into rebellion or treason, and punished such delinquency at discretion. Arbitrator in all cases of life and death, he presided personally, or by *naib* or deputy, in the *sudder cutcherie adawlut*, or chief court of justice. The *darogha* or principal clerk, prepared the indictment, summoned the evidences, and went through the forms of examination, as directed from the bench. The *munfi* or *molavi*, doctors learned in the law, expounded the text or numerous orthodox commentaries of the Koran; the *cazi*, or supreme judge, pronounced the sentence, and the *cutwal* or lieutenant of police, executed it; but only at the special command of the *amildar*. In like manner, this high representative of royalty took cognizance of, ultimately, and solely determined, the more consequential civil disputes or causes of considerable private property; but left the decision of such as were of little moment or unproductive of heavy fines, and the usual forfeiture of one fourth of the amount litigated claimed by government, to the *cazi*, who was also public notary in the attestation of deeds of grant or contract, and writings in general. Thus the Mussulman code was the universal established law of the land in crimes and punishments, and regulated the forms in all cases of judicial administration, though the virtual exercise of it depending on the single arbitrary will of an individual; and, considering the mixture and common depravity of inhabitants, the crafty pusillanimity or inoffensive bloodless disposition of the greater part, the propensity of the stronger few or slaves in power, to tyrannize over the weaker and more dependant classes of the people, it must be confessed that a system of jurisprudence summary, severe, and despotic in the execution, seemed the best calculated to preserve the distant, feeble supremacy of the prince with the internal tranquillity and order of society. But in mere civil cases or personal differences, the genuine parsimony and bigotted Hindoos seldom, if ever, had recourse to a foreign tribunal so expensive, uncertain, and violent in its decisions. The simple, amicable mode of arbitration by reference to the heads of casts and tribes, to native superiors, or mutual friends, was universally followed by those who formed the bulk of the community; and from its convenience, never opposed by their slothful, proud, selfish rulers, since the commencement of English administration. We know not on what principle there has been a total suspension of the long-established Mussulman law and high court of judicature, without substituting

His powers—Civil

\* Also, Reports of a Committee of the House of Commons, 1781-2; and a Plan for the Settlement of the Revenues of Bengal, &c. 1776.



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- others in their room, yet incurring the usual expense of all the requisite officers. That no very great public inconvenience hath as yet been experienced or made visible from such extraordinary deficiencies, may be a good argument to prove the habitually pacific submissive character of the natives, or the strong impression of ancient forms of rigorous justice over timid minds; but will scarcely vindicate the continuance of the same negative course of government; or indeed recurring to any other than the former, under milder and better regulations, unless it be admitted that the experience of ages and reasoning of the best statesmen of Hindostan can be controverted; that the nature of man is changed, and requires not the checks of a legal despotic authority; or that civil society can long exist in a state of judicial anarchy, under the forced dominion of a handful of foreigners, removed at the distance of a six months voyage from their mother country.

Military.

In the second capacity of *Sirdar fougé*, or head of the troops, the amildar himself held the principal jagheer or military fief, which was denominated tatic or personal, mushroot or conditional; imposing, in either case, an obligation to maintain a certain number of cavalry and infantry for the protection of the province, and follow the superior's standard in times of foreign war. In like manner, all lesser jagheerdars and munsibdars, with their respective quotas of sepoy or soldiers, were immediately under the command of this provincial nazim, who was further vested with the power of making additional temporary levies for apparent and useful services, annexed, as usual, to the post of buckshe or paymaster, which always gives the highest official designation or title to the commander in chief of the imperial forces, and places him next to the vizier in rank and consequence.

and Financial.

But it was chiefly in the third capacity of *shaukdar*, or dewanny-delegate, that the amildar exercised the most important functions of his office. This department had always, during the vigour of the Mogul government, continued separate from the two former, held by the scoubadar and his nawabs, or deputies; but on the resolution in favour of Nizam ul Mulek, was, in the first instance, in fact united in his own person, and became so, of course, throughout all the inferior gradations of the sovereign authority. The ordering, management, and collection of the revenues, the amount, ways and means, and personal agency, in raising the supplies, the confirmation of former grants, the suspension of any provincial sunnuds to new men, were the high powers annexed to the post of even provincial controller of finance. He was virtually restrained in nothing, except alienation of land. Remissions of the annual assessment on an increase of expense, the least encroachment on the more consequential prerogatives of the crown, could not be tolerated; but in the extension of imperial advantages, and at all times to authorize it in any shape, the different tedious and complex formalities attending the royal or viceregal approbation, under the seals and signatures of all the ministers of state, were indispensably necessary. It is true, indeed, that the proper sources of revenue were ascertained by law and custom, as also the government share of the yearly territorial produce, whether in kind or in specie, and which constituted at least nine-tenths of the public income; but in the latter case, the proportion has only been struck for such lands, as were completely valued by measurement and actual rent, and even then, a latitude was left for greater exactions, on account of further improvement; and in all cases whatsoever, under the most vigorous administration, the amildar not only could, and generally did, by means of bribery, justify a deviation from any standing regulations touching private interests, but with respect to the receipts of the treasury, was expressly required by his commission, to increase them as much as possible, and by every expedient ingenuity could devise, consistently with the political safety, or temporary views of despotism. In this department also, the Sudder dewanny adawlut, or principal court of exchequer, was under the immediate superintendence of this president of all the other superior provincial tribunals, and the nazer, or supervisor, enforced his decrees through the agency of the hazary, or commander of a thousand peons, of seduwar or head of the jumindar chief, any inferior indefinite number of the sebuntly fassulla, or revenue troops, entertained every where originally on stated monthly wages, but latterly, from abuse in great certain allotments of land throughout the different pergunnahs, fraudulently sequestered from the circar, to increase the private emolument of one or all of the officers employed in the collections, who were comprized under the following denominations, and divided into two classes; viz. such of the natives as held their appointments, rights, and privileges, by sunnuds from the reigning sovereign, with the good-will of the ryots, or such as were merely temporary, more immediately dependent on the amildar.

Among the former, the *Deemook Zemindar Chordry*, or chief of a district consisting of one or more pergunnahs, held the first rank or consideration, for he was at once, the agent of government, the head farmer, and natural representative of the people. This office was originally instituted in 1582, under the name of *Crory*, by the Mogul emperor Akbar, and during the second administration of the famous financier, Tuder, or Toorel Mull. It was intended to remedy those necessary evils in despotism, frequent changes of the provincial delegate, and the distant remove of the protecting hand of this sovereign representative from the helpless indigent peasantry; as well as to reconcile the conquered multitude of opposite religious tenets, laws, habits, languages, and characters, to the unnatural oppressive dominion of a few intruding Mussulman barbarians; therefore the occupant, though holding his grant only during the life and pleasure of every succeeding prince, or any of his more powerful deputies, was considered as permanent officer, the intermediate agent of government to superintend a certain portion of the country, redress the petty grievances of the Hindoo inhabitants, furnish the husbandmen with the necessary advances for agriculture, and collect or become responsible for their annual rent, to the circar of state; his *nuncar*, or Persian derivation,

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tion, or according to the usage, *Decan sayerum*, from the Turkish word, with the common Telinga termination of *um*, signifying in both cases, a subsistence in bread, or a livelihood being to arise from small allotments of land freed from any public incumbrances, and conveniently dispersed throughout the district, so as to make his presence necessary every where, gave him local attachment and greater effect to general superintendence, in attending to his own private interest. At the same time, his *mussooms*, customs, a commission on the gross revenue collected, invariably fixed at 5 per cent. in addition to nearly the like income from his territorial property, were supposed to quicken his endeavours in the exercise of the public receipt by improvements, or greater economy in the mofussil or detailed rural expenses, and in general, bias his inclination to promote the peaceful prosperity of the country. From the first institution of the crory, until the death of Alemgeer in 1707, the person employed in that office, properly speaking, was the only subject under the crown of Delhi who held any thing like a free tenure in lands, to the extent of a family subsistence; for such holdings did not, in form, confer hereditary right, yet they were generally continued, except in cases of delinquency, to the posterity of the original grantee, who was usually chosen, in the progress of Mogul conquest, from among the agents of the ejected and former proprietors, or the most experienced farmers and managers to be found in the country. Nevertheless, his freehold was but a very inconsiderable portion of his zemindarry, or territorial jurisdiction, it might justly be considered the price of securing a local attachment, influencing the welfare and happiness of the inferior inhabitants, in like manner, as his *mussooms* were intended to compensate, as well as stimulate, the laudable endeavour of realizing the public revenue, when he himself acted on the part of government, as the immediate receiver or farmer general of his whole district. But about the period we have just mentioned, from the unsubdued state of the more difficult and distant parts of the kingdoms of Hydrabad and Bajepoor, then recently formed into soubahs or provinces of the Mogul empire, a variety of native landholders, either wholly independent, or in different degrees of subordination to the new muslim conquerors, became first known in Hindostan, and distinguished in the records of the khalsah shereefa, or ryot exchequer. Such were all the former class, entirely free, the petty rajahs of Malabar, in the southern extremity of the peninsula, and those of Rumpu and Bustar, among the high unhealthy ranges of mountains which separate the maritime circars, north of the Godavery from the soubah of Berar; and such were of the latter designation, imperfectly reduced, or subject to a certain tribute, the rannies of Bednore, with the rajahs of Mysore and Tanjore, which served as barriers to the unconquered countries of Malabar, in like manner as the nearest hilly districts of Poleveram, Cottapillee, and Totapillee, under the Rheddewar of Rajemundry, or those of Tarpoor, &c. dependant on another branch of the royal family of Orissa settled in Cicacole, being only partially subdued, ensured the perfect freedom of the more interior mountainous regions of Rumpu and Bustar, ruled by the Coywar and Gōddwannah rajahs. In process of time, and during the latter convulsions of the empire after the invasion of Nadir Shah, in 1739, not only some of the principal Hindoos, Jagheerdars, and farmers general, but even inconsiderable enaumdars or charity landholders, hoisted the standard of rebellion, and in different provinces of Hindostan, under distracted feeble governments, actually acquired a greater or lesser degree of independence. All those territorial proprietors therefore, in general, whether free or tributary rajahs, crories, desmooks, or chowdries, acting in their different capacities, or self-dignified with Hindoo titles, usurping the real property of their Mahomedan masters, or mere feudatory or simple pensioners for life, yet claiming, and on the *ipse dixit* weakly or ignorantly acknowledged lawful inheritors of their conditional temporary benefices were ultimately confounded with each other, and classed under the same common well known appellation of zemindar or landholder, and from which proceed those gross mistakes of late occurrence, and doubts entertained, respecting the rights and privileges annexed to a patent office, originally and constitutionally of Mogul creation, under the forms, limitations, and controul already specified. But there is not throughout the Northern circars, more than within the rest of the wide circle of the British or subordinate allied dominions in India, excepting the few instances we have mentioned, a single individual or set of men among the native Hindoos, calling themselves, or acknowledged, rajahs and zemindars, who have the smallest pretension in form, right, or fact, to an inch of territorial property, beyond the extent of their nancars or sayerums, or who can be considered in any other light, than as mere renters, with stated local privileges, depending on their own good behaviour, and the bounty of the proprietary lords of the soil; unless the English East India Company, in the latter capacity, have, since the date of their territorial acquisitions in 1765-6, formally alienated or transferred, which we believe they have not, any of their indubitable, necessary, possessory rights of Mogul royalty, under the crown and parliament of Great Britain.

The next revenue officer of rank, and of the same class with the desmook, though of greater utility, and sometimes of more extensive local jurisdiction, was the *despandeah canongee*, or provincial register; this employment, for the most part exercised by Bramins, is the only one in its nature hereditary, to be found in the whole system of Mussulman government: it was an exception to the general rule, from necessity; but policy, convenience, and universal use, gave to the person holding it a greater degree of consideration at court, and in the public estimation, than could be acquired in any of the highest incorporeal rights and privileges. All firman annuities, grants of every kind, rules, ordinances, regulations of interior police, judicial decrees, from each of the three departments, the *jumma kumil toomar*, or original more perfect rent-roll of the lands in detail, serving as a standard and gross valuation, or political calculations of the revenue, and to fix the amount of jaggars, as well

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as of religious or charitable endowments; the *hustabood*, or actual sources of the collector made from the ryots; the *jumma wassel hqukey*, or annual account of the assessments, receipts and balances of the country, as settled in behalf of government, with its intermediate agents; the divisions, measurement, quality, and produce of the lands, enumeration of villages, farms, husbandmen, manufacturers, or artificers, liable to taxation; and in general all donations, arrangements, and circumstances affecting real or personal property, but more particularly touching the proprietary interest of the state, were necessarily made matters of record in the duffer or office of the desbandah or canongoe, as they could only be properly authenticated, and acquire validity after passing through such form of registration, to render still more efficacious this great intended check, not only on the zemindars and lesser native superintendants, but also on the amildar himself, and all his immediate agents, in affairs of civil administration or finance; private interest and hereditary independence were the powerful incentives, added to personal honours, consideration, and influence. To ensure the honest full discharge of a very important trust, a rissoom of two and a half per cent. on the revenue, ascertained by his own vouchers to have been collected throughout the country, was assigned to the public register, his heirs, and deputies in perpetuity. In lieu of this commission, however, at present there are a number of inferior depandahs, claiming a right to free merassy, hereditary villages, or to others held by a tenure called bilmokta or tatoo, darry, at a low unalterable rent; but all these, we apprehend to be improper, unauthorized alienations, made by the desmooks or other officers of government in power, to purchase greater defalcations in their own favour, from the stated dues of the exchequer.

Puttel and Koolcurry.

Thirdly, the *Puttel mucudim* or chief ryot of a *deh-gam* or village, was precisely, within his narrower precincts, what the desmook was in the pergunah or zemindari, as in like manner the *koolkurny*, *curnum*, *putwarry*, or accomptant, held the next inferior gradation to the desbandah. These were the principal and more permanent officers of the revenue, in a regular chain of subordination to each other, when acting under their native head; but serving as mutual checks during the suspended authority of the zemindar, either from in-sufficiency or mal-administration, and while the interior management devolved on the secondary class of agents before described as temporary and immediately dependent on the amildar himself, in the following order; 1st. The *ameen* vested with inquisitorial and controlling powers in general, became security for the rents of the district committed to his charge.—2. The *sheristadar* or *mujumadar*, keepers of official forms or annual adjustments of the revenue, though they did not supersede or exonerate the canongoe, found it of advantage, and were always permitted, to interfere in scrutinizing his conduct, as well as in ascertaining the actual resources of the country, to satisfy the private enormous exactions of corrupt agency, rather than increase inadequate public supplies. In the circar of Rajemundry, at the period of the last change in its government, one of the most remarkable instances on record, perhaps, occurs in proof of the vast individual benefits to be derived with ordinary address and knowledge, from the union of the two offices now in contemplation, in the same person, under the necessary ignorance of new rulers.—3. *Tahseeldars*, or collectors of different denominations and rank, with their moherries, or writers of accounts, assumed the inferior departments, usually assigned to the *muccuddim* and *putwarry*, as far as the interests of the state was concerned.

Thus, then, it appears the amildar, in his several capacities of *zeldahdar*, *sojedar*, and *shackdar*, united in himself almost all the executive powers of sovereignty, if not virtually; the whole legislative authority is exercised under despotism, though dependant on the will of a regular gradation of superior officers; yet, like them, he was substantially the representative of the prince, within the limits of his inferior government, executed a greater variety of trusts than constitutionally ought to have fallen to the share of any of them, and were in fact the lot of few, and yielded to them in nothing but extent of local jurisdiction, with its relative influence. Nevertheless his province, such as was in boundary, might justly be termed an independent state in its interior administration, *imperium in imperio*, precariously attached to a distant crown, in proportion to the power, the dread, the awe of the reigning sovereign, and the virtue of that chain of delegated authority on which was suspended the necessary insulated dependencies of a vast despotic empire. But we are of such frail securities of allegiance, as rested merely on the invisible influence of fear or opinion; there was some immediate personal checks on this lowest representative of royalty within the circle of his proper government, and these complete the list of all the independent officers in succession of rank or consequence, from the amildar himself giving to the *killadar* a commandant of either of the principal forts, such as Masulipatam or Condapilla, the second place. This important post has been usually held for life, under approved conduct, and the form of temporary sunnuds from the actual ruler. A portion of the *havillee*, or household lands of the circar, was set apart for the maintenance of the garrison, and repairs of the fortifications, a certain stock of provisions and warlike stores were to be kept up; the allowance was invariable, unless to make up the losses sustained from a siege, no accounts of ordinary expenditure were required, and then the jagheer or tenure was denominated *mushaool*, or conditional. When the pay of the king's troops was, in like manner, included in the grant, it was called *Ashkain*, and returns of the men were annually made to the *Men Antisty*, a grand master of artillery. But when the lands adjoining to the fort were held, *belia shirrit*, or unconditionally, nothing was required of the *killadar* besides simple fealty to the sovereign, and he was in all respects independent of intermediate authority.—3. The *Savah nah negar*, or news-writer, was a political intelligence, or spy upon the conduct of the amildar and all the other officers of government employed on the part of the *soubadar*, or *Nazim*, as the *Watch negar* was properly a remembrancer of transactions in the *dewanny* department.

Ameen  
and Mujumadar.

deparment, particularly in receipt of revenue; both these officers maintained a weekly correspondence openly with their respective principals, whether at Hyderabad or Delhi; they were the instruments which set in motion the great springs of discontent, fear and suspicion, and were dressed by the provincial delegates or reinforced by the ruler, in proportion to their ability and integrity. Nor were there religious or caste prejudices wanting to curb the suggestions of unlawful ambition or selfishness; then, under the common application of *Mulla*, whose duty it was to instruct youth and regulate, among others, the doctrine of passive obedience to the prince, were dispersed throughout the services with competent enauna or gifts of land. But these, with all the other constitutional checks on Mogul government, prove more or less efficient only in proportion to the vigour of the hands which hold the reins of government.

Concerning only the length of time which has been established in the circuit, the peaceable industrial population of a country so accessible, inhabited by a race of people so intelligent, or not to be rendered in so long a period the extreme of ignorance, and the adoption of a new system of a judicial administration, that the Government has been able to deprive all the country of its rights and privileges of the most efficient means of instruction, added to a literary, social, and acquired mental environment in the whole range of scientific knowledge, is a matter far superior to what the Moguls could have done. In Hindostan, the facts were apparently such extraordinary opportunities for information in every branch of science, and a true theory to its source, through the agency of persons of experience, it may seem wonderful that, at this day, so little should be known, a subject of such vast and necessary importance, as the ways and means, modes of management, in raising the public supplies, and the amount of revenue collected on behalf of the State, as to encourage any individual desire of official local intelligence through other than the usual practice, to participate in the ambitious hope of being able to say something new and interesting on a subject which at present so deeply engages the attention and the common powers of the nation, to hazard the imputation of prostitution to a subject generally considered on the almost concurring testimony of experience of respectable persons, and persons of rank, which may have influenced even a parliamentary decision; and finally, to incur the danger of shame, without any expected private benefit, should it appear that the most groundless assertions have been substituted for facts, and vain speculations, and conjectures on the world, for the more useful deductions of true philosophy.

But to a well-informed person, it is not a matter wonderful, that so little progress should have been made in the knowledge of Indian finance, when the rapidity of British conquests, and the peculiar circumstances of the Company's affairs in India, are taken into consideration; that it is remarkable, that, notwithstanding the constant fluctuation in the government of India, and the frequent acquisitions, and loss of territory, the struggle for the actual possession of the country, and the contest between the crown and the Company's interests, the representation of the people, or rather of the people of whom, in what forms, the rights of sovereignty, and such other objects are required; that all public accounts of the revenue and its disposal, and the state of the treasury of Hindostan, are locked up in the treasuries, sealed and secured, and yet none of the Persian manuscript writings; that to the ordinary notions of acquiring a foreign language, a remarkable difference of character in the events which adds to the difficulty of that being learnt by Europeans; that, notwithstanding the inducements to have the country to encourage a painful and irksome, generally speaking, an unprofitable study, yet it is necessary to develop the talents and acquirements of a system of political economy, professedly serving as a basis for the conduct of public measures; that among the few individuals, who rather than in direct personal satisfaction, would be induced to be employed in their studies, Eastern literature, scarcely one is to be found, who has gone through a course of general original history, which has brought to perhaps the best of those dry, incorrect, and tedious narratives, which contain the particulars of Hindostan in detail, and which, though they mortify to the pride of Europe, in instances of the most servile flattery, are not only false, but also as well as hostile to Christian humanity in exhibiting the most atrocious, the most savage, the most cruel, and tyrannical of Mahomedanism, and yet, of some utility, in conveying a true knowledge of facts more or less important to the interests of the nation, and are indispensably necessary to the public knowledge of the past and present state of the administration, or forming a new, more accurate view of the future; that, when it is known how few, if any of the Company's civil servants, the churchmen, who are required to learn the Persian language, differ from what is the management of the treasury, the revenue, Hindoo interpreters, who, with the knowledge of the English, might be supposed capable of transacting the business of the treasury, and as the medium of their native officers; that in consequence, all original more accurate knowledge of the revenue, the state of management, and light into the actual forms of government, the rights and privileges of the prince or people, by a critical examination of the laws, customs, usages, tenures, or hereditary tenure, were absolutely and necessarily wanting, and that in the intervening agents of finance; that further, that the few, who were employed in the inferior intermediate native officers employed, who were not only for the most part illiterate, who were not endowed with sufficient running business, or sufficient information, and who were not liable to be imposed on themselves, through credulous flattery, generally, and more so, that on the first acquisition

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acquisition of these provinces, necessity perhaps threw the whole executive administration, for the three following years, into the hands of an unprincipled intriguing Mussulman amildar, formerly in office under the Nizam, in conjunction with an artful intelligent Hindoo, elevated on that occasion, rather informally, to the high incompatible lucrative trusts of dewan, public interpreter, and of scribnadar, or actual chief canongoe; that in consequence of a combination so powerful to veil the mysteries of finance, or rather the defalcations of immediate agency, under the pretended forms of ancient practice, continued by the most experienced men, an example and routine of management was established, which necessarily shackled all future superintendence; we repeat, when these various circumstances are known, it may seem more surprizing that so much should have been ascertained, and brought to public credit under the head of revenue, than that so little should yet be generally understood of affairs enveloped in difficulties and obscurity; at least, equal to their importance.

As to the pretensions of an individual, a mere sojourner in the country; of his observations as to any thing new and interesting, whatever they may be, he claims no particular merit from them. The office of public minister to the Nizam's court necessarily requires some knowledge of the Eastern language, and the proper discharge of its most ordinary functions, implies a general acquaintance with every branch of politics; at the same time, a private intercourse, founded on a very trifling obligation, with the first statesman in point of station and rank in the Deccan, perhaps the greatest that has appeared of high birth in Hindostan during the present age, in universal learning and experienced ability, accidentally opened a way to uncommon sources of information from an extensive library, and the most useful public records of the highest authority; the neglect of which, would have argued the greatest demerit, considering the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of an European's meeting with the like favourable opportunity of gaining political instruction through the best native channels, always shut up with the most cautious jealousy against foreign inquiry.

In regard to apprehension of incurring the imputation of presumption in relating received opinions, however far they may have had the sanction of the most respectable personages, such an individual, conceiving the general belief to be founded in error, and of dangerous tendency, must be shielded either by a sense of public duty, or the conscious rectitude of his own intentions; but with respect to the consequent shame of detection in wilful misrepresentation, rather than shelter himself under the uncertainty of private motives, he must wish to rest his defence on the truth of facts and justness of observation on the subject of finance, within the large scope of present consideration, which may be divided into the four following heads, viz. 1st. The nature and sources of the Revenue of the Circars proportioned to the total produce of the country.—2d. The mode of settling the Zamnabandy, or raising the annual supplies of Government.—3d. The gross and net Receipts of the public Treasury.—4thly. An account of current charges, involving a proposed Scheme of future expenditure.

First. It is well known that throughout the whole of Hindostan, the ordinary revenue of government is comprised under the two general denominations of *Mahl* and *Sair*; the latter, arising from a variety of imposts chiefly on personal property, fluctuating and uncertain in its amount; is therefore of an unsettled precarious nature, ascertainable only at the close of the year, and including almost the whole system of taxation in Europe. The *mahsool*, or customs in exports and imports, were fixed by the Moguls at 5 per cent. from Hindoos, or half that proportion from merchants of their own persuasion, or favoured foreigners; but this distinction of persons, under English administration, has of course been laid aside. The *rahdarry* is an inland toll, collected at different chowkies or stations on the roads from passengers, or on account of merchandize, grain, and all the necessaries of life, carried to market, and being exacted at an indefinite rate, according to the usual indiscretion of zemindars, or other officers of government, is intolerably burthensome to the lower class of people, without producing any adequate benefits to the state. The *Pandery*, or tax on the shops of workmen and retail merchants in towns, or, under a different denomination, on the temporary stalls erected during the fairs held annually at places of Mussulman pilgrimage, or Hindoo worship, formed also a considerable branch of the *sair*, together with licences to the makers and sellers of spirituous liquors, or to the keepers of brothels; in like manner, in many places were included a tax on houses in general, on marriage, on looms, on the cloth manufactured, and the *mhaterrefia* or poll tax, on artificers and manufacturers, continues every where a great discouragement to industry. The *jizea*, or tribute imposed upon the Hindoos or idolaters, was, perhaps, for the last time collected in the beginning of the present century, by Anweer o Deen, the father of the nabob Mahommed Ali, when acting as superintendant of this branch of the revenue, in the town of Surat; but what may appear strange, the personal exactions, under the Mussulman government, from Indian pilgrims resorting to Jaggeruaut, or other famous pagodas, are still rigorously enforced by the freest native rulers, successors to the tyrannical dominion of Islamism, yet superstitious adherents of brahminical faith. The *ferroay*, *foujedarry*, or produce of fines, confiscations, and the *chout*, or fourth of sums litigated in the civil courts, made no inconsiderable part of the variable uncertain sources of public supply; and to these may be added within the Northern Circars, the profits on salt farms, estimated at a lack and a half of rupees, or about two-thirds of the prime cost of near ten lacks of maunds, exclusive of half that quantity exported annually to Bengal before the late prohibition there, on a medium of 25 rupees per 9,0 maunds, likewise the yearly rent of cocoa nut and palmyra trees in the neighbourhood of the sea ports most frequented by lascars and fishermen, and chiefly near the mouths of the Godavari; properly dependant on the port of Masulipatam, though sometime since included in the zemindaries of Muggalore and Puddapore, and which, at one rupee each tree, may be rated at least two lacks and a half



half rupees additional, as arising from barren unappropriated lands; yet the total of all these abwabs or imposts, levied on the general head of sum, either in the circars, or any other part of Hindostan, never exceeded one-tenth, and now falls rather short of that portion of the stated public income: and they were thought of such little account to the state, so oppressive in their nature, for the most part, to the poor, consequently so repugnant to the principles of the established, as well as any other system of religion, that the wise and politic Alem-Gheer, the last great emperor of the Hindostany race of Timoor, abolished, by edict, seventy of these several articles of taxation; though the selfish lenity of the prince, more than the selfreticence of foudedars and jagheerders, whose fiefs continued to be valued without abatement, according to the *jumma kaimil*, or old standard assessment, which included the recently prohibited abwabs, together with the future disorders of the empire, virtually prevented then and ever since, the carrying into effect the royal mandate, left now an historical record, rather of what ought to be done in policy and humanity, than at any time could be expected from the equivoal benevolence of an Eastern despot.

It is therefore the *malik*, or landed property, the first mentioned general distinctive term of revenue, which constitutes the grand, the permanent, ascertainable pre-existent source of finance over the whole of Hindostan, and indeed, all the rest of Asia, under one universal rule, perhaps peculiar to this quarter of the world, though admitting of many subordinate variations in its several divisions; and to this important branch, we shall confine our future disquisitions on the subject before us. Nothing can be more erroneous than the public opinion entertained of the nature of our territorial income throughout the British dominions in India. In Bengal, where most progress hath been made in ascertaining the true original principles of the actual system of revenue, it is generally considered under the denomination and common idea of a land tax imposed on certain classes of native and supposed hereditary proprietors called Zemindars, from a compound in the Persian language, signifying literally, tenants, or holders of land. In the circars, it has acquired the more dignified appellation of tribute; and the petty farming landholders from whom it is collected, have been sometimes honoured with the title of feudatory lords; but most commonly with that of *raja*, or hereditary Hindoo princes. It would be no very difficult matter to show the foundation of these mistakes, and their influence in determining the opinions of those, who have only European ideas. To comprehend the state of things in Asia, conveyed in general terms of the English language, seems at once obvious and necessary: but it is our present task rather to exhibit the truth of a different, and what we conceive to be the only proper definition, of Indian revenue; viz. not a tax of 1-5th, as in England, on the proprietary income of freehold estates, far less a fee duty, or fixed perpetual quit rent, on such as are in vassalage, and by the ancient military tenures known in other parts of Europe, but in fact, the landlord's proportion settled on a mediant at one-fourth; the *rekba*, or *chout* \* of the original gross produce of the land, shared with the tenantry, or rather a yearly rent, variable according to the circumstances of the country at the period of adjustment, paid to *goyas* and it, as the sole, legal, known territorial proprietor, as generally understood by the ryots or immediate cultivators of the soil, through the agency of the most part of a certain class of Hindoos, nominated on behalf of the state, with suitable appointments in land and salary, to the office of zemindar, or superintendant of a local provincial subdivision; and who, collectively, to the greater satisfaction of the people, as native guardians of the public peace and private rights, as well as receivers, or rather farmers general of the revenue, relieved their ignorant voluptuous Mussulman rulers from the intricate troublesome detail of internal police, and the management of molassil collection. That this was, and continues to be, the true nature of the territorial income of the circars, under the Company's or former administrations, can only be fully illustrated by taking a short general review of the original institution and progress in Hindostan, of the Mogul system of finance, which is still regarded in fact, or by legal construction, as the only genuine source and support of every actual established mode of raising the supplies, throughout one and all of the dismembered members of this once great empire.

Much hath been said of the *asil toomar jumma*, or original roll of the rent, agreeable to the first general assessment of the twelve subahs of Hindostan, north of the Nerbuddah; undertaken and imperfectly accomplished through the superior agency of the famous Hindoo-rajah Toomell Mull, in the reign of Akbar, one of the greatest Mogul emperors; but of the performance little more seems to be known in Europe, than the total amount for which the several districts were rated, or of its author, any thing further than that he was an able financier. The following short Analysis therefore of a work so celebrated, commented with as much as may be necessary of the history of the man, may be equally new, as it appears essential to the more perfect understanding of the subject under consideration.

Toorel Mull, of the Kehery cast, from Lahore, and at length raised to the munsub, or dignity of four thousand, began his political career in the province of Gujerat, both as a military commander and intendant of the revenue, in one thousand seven hundred and fifty-three of the Christian era. The two following years he acted in the same capacities in Bengal, with greater reputation, during the viceroyalty of Khanjehan. He was afterwards deputed a second time to Gujerat, and on his return to Delhi in 1577, having resumed the

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IN—NORTH—CIRCARS.  
—COUNTRIES.

Roll of territorial  
income.

\* Hence the derivation of the modern claim of the Marhattas, who in gaining the ascendancy over, and in imitation of the moguls, exacted from foudedars and jagheerders of the latter, the same proportion of their income, that these levied from the ryots or inferior tenants

of the soil, and at first with the more ready concurrence of the sovereign, because the demand did not come home immediately to himself, but only lessened the power of many indirectly subjects.



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1. Nature and  
Sources.

Rchba or  
Jummaabundy Nckdy.

ai, or division  
the crops.

office of peshcar, or chief assistant to the vizier Shah Munsoor, which he held in the intervals of his residence at the capital, had no doubt a great share in the regulations of that year, such as the division of the empire into twelve subahs, the appointment of eight principal officers, with distinct independent powers to each, and a fixed jummaabundy or annual settlement of the revenue, formed on a medium of the ten preceding years' actual receipts, according to the best information which could be obtained from the local investigations of a number of skilful ameen's distributed throughout the several provinces. But it was not till 1582, when he received for the second time investiture of the vizieret A-bruf Dewan, or post of high treasurer of the empire, that he projected his famous scheme of finance, so servilely adopted since, by succeeding administrations as a model of perfection, and serving as a basis for the actual collections in every part of Hindostan, without any variation in the principle, or much increase in the amount of assessment to the present time, excepting in the maritime countries, since so prodigiously enriched by an enlarged direct commerce with Europe, or in such other places, as were not then completely subdued; or of which the valued rent could not with sufficient accuracy be ascertained in the other period of this great man's administration, finally terminated with his life in the year 1589. That system of political economy which he introduced, and left to immortalize his name in future ages, embraced the three great objects of Eastern government: regulations of finance chiefly for the support of a feudal military establishment, through the medium of a gold and silver currency; as best calculated to maintain the power, the dignity, and supply the necessary profusion in expense of a despotic prince.

The ultimate point of perfection, aimed at in the revenue department, was to form a rent-roll on an actual measurement of the lands, of exactly one fourth of their full annual produce, shared with the husbandmen, to be paid into the royal treasury in specie, according to the number of begias or extent of ground in cultivation, distributed into four classes, expressive of the nature of the soil, and to be invariably rated by a medium then struck of the real value of the several productions throughout the year, as ascertained on the spot: this was called the *Jummaabundy neckdy*, or money settlement, and the farms so rented were denominated *Rachbah*, an Arabic term, signifying possession held by a slavish tenure, though probably introduced in Hindostan, from the more ancient custom of assessing the country, by the estimated labour of a yoke of oxen. But such a scheme of finance was only applicable to, and intended for, places where circumstances of soil, population, commerce, and general civilization, admitted of the more improved state of agriculture in its various branches, arising from the superfluities, as well as the necessities of life; accordingly, it prevailed chiefly in the subahs of Delhi, Agra, Gujerat, and Behar; Bengal being at that time, as little known, as imperfectly reduced, and its climate held in such dispute, as to impress the idea of banishment on the minds of those, who afterwards earned thither, in multitudes, all the enriching arts of luxury, and acquiesced in the propriety of bestowing the epithet "Paradise of Regions," on a place of residence, before considered with dread, and resorted to only from necessity.

In the other provinces, therefore, the public revenue was levied by a different rule, technically understood under the Hindoo word *Buttai*, signifying division, which was better adapted to the scanty resources of an indigent ignorant peasantry, deriving their subsistence chiefly from pasture lands exempted from taxation\*, or who contenting themselves with the luxuriant growths of a single harvest, where two might be produced with a little additional labour, required that spur to industry given by a judicious increase of the demands of government, and who, as yet generally unused to a gold or silver currency, were for the most part obliged to pay their rent in kind. Agreeable to this mode, it was ordained, that the great natural productions in all sorts of grain and pulse, depending on the periodical rains, and reaped in either of the two seasons *kharerf* or *rabbi*, being wholly ascertained, and accurately estimated on the spot by the mokeem, or skilful appointed appraisers, should be equally divided, share and share alike, between government and its ryots or husbandmen; nor will such appear an inequitable participation, though the expense of seed, with the whole of the labour, fell on the latter, when we consider the facility of the simplest culture; the general forty-fold returns of a quick spontaneous vegetation; together with the peculiar advantages to a Hindoo, of a free unbounded common pasturage. When the like corn and green crops were produced out of season, or by the increased toil and charge of watering them artificially from wells, public reservoirs, or by means of drains from rivers, then the state was only to be entitled to one-third proportion, as sole proprietor of the soil, of the gross original product; but with respect to articles of greater value thus brought fourth, such as opium, sugar cane, vines, plantains, mulberry and cotton plants, the share claimed from the immediate cultivators, through the agency of zemindars, or farmers general, by a lenient, wise, beneficent government, varied from one fourth to one eighth of the entire yearly crop, according to the additional expense and labour of culture, the length of time required in bringing such productions to maturity; and the distance, the hazard, or trouble of carrying them for sale. Moreover, in countries where this rule of buttai, or division of the ordinary and extraordinary harvests between the prince and his farming subjects was established, yet it was always in the option of the latter, as it may be said to have been the terminating ultimate view of the former, as landlord, when the agriculture was in its improved state of new and various cultivation, to commute the larger proportions

\* Excepting the trifling tax of three danms annually for every head of oxen, and six for Hindoos, pastured on improvable uncultivated ground, to serve as a stimulus to agriculture.

proportions of rent, as paid in kind, for the rebba, or pecuniary assessment of one fourth, as settled in other places, on a measurement of the lands, together with a medium valuation of their whole and mixed produce annually. There were still, however, very extensive tracts of the Mogul dominion, either totally unexplored, difficult of access, or imperfectly subdued, which neither of the foregoing modes, could bring into a general computation of the revenue. These districts were, therefore, estimated according to the best informations possible to be obtained for the present, subject to future alterations; and thus were completed the foundations of that famous original system of finance, involved in the *Toomah jumma* of Toorai Mull, intended to sustain the vast fabric of the Mogul empire.

The means of realizing the new-formed universal rent-roll, were made subserviently relative to the support of the imperial household, together with the civil and military establishments; the economical reform of which, particularly the latter, was the next grand object of the minister's general plan. Accordingly the whole kingdom, as now assessed, was distributed into lands immediately dependant on the *kahsa shereefi*, or royal exchequer, or such as were assigned over to the greater or lesser officers of government, for the maintenance of troops and personal dignities, by a feudal temporary tenure, at first called *atka*, then *jageer*, signifying territorial possessions so alienated, at the will and during the precarious favour of a despotic monarch. The former division, including the capital town, with its dependant circar, or province of a soubah, or vice-royalty; and the principal pergunnah or district of all the other circars, under the subordinate rule of nabobs, foudedars, or amils, constituting together the whole *havillee* or household lands of the emperor, set apart to defray his personal and court expenses, those of his guards, state garrisons, as well as the similar establishments of all his delegate representatives throughout the empire, including also in general, every where the largest, the richest and best ascertained portion of the country, was, besides its geographical juridical subdivisions, parcelled out into others, depending on the amount of revenue, being one crore of daams, or two and a half lack of rupees per annum; these were denominated *Chucklas*; and the immediate superintendence, internal management and collectorship of each, were conferred on the wealthiest, most skilful trusty Hindoo farmers which could be found in the district, with an allowance of 5 per cent. on the net receipts of the treasury from their collections, in addition to small freehold possessions in land for family subsistence, already described under the appellations *Nancar sazeram*; and the officers thus employed, were at first distinguished by the name of *Crony*, afterwards more familiarly known as *zemindars*, though the original designation is still made use of in all the Mussulman capitals, but with a total change in the nature and forms of the public charge from whence derived.

The other grand division of the country, assigned over at the new valuation to the several military commanders, for the maintenance of their respective troops, included, for the most part, the least productive unsettled districts with a view to further improvement, and more perfect subjection, under the advantages of a local, joined to the vigour of a species of feudal administration. The lands thus distributed in all the twelve soubahs of the empire, as best calculated for the purposes of finance, as well as to insure the stability of recent conquests, under an unnatural foreign yoke, though generally distinguished by the Arabic term *Atka*, or the synonymous Persian word, *jageer*, yet received various, more particular denominations from the nature of the different tenures on which they were held. According to the more precise and proper signification of the general term for such possessions, nothing more was understood than a simple allotment of an extensive territory, with its jurisdiction and revenue, to a foudedar, or military commander for a limited or indefinite period, under an express obligation of maintaining a certain body of troops to attend the king in person, or any of his lieutenants in the field. Such were in modern times, the foudedarries of Kerpah, and the Carnatic Payenghaut dependant on the soubah of Hyderabad; but the lesser grant of *Tycul*, most commonly confined to a single circar, was considered of a more permanent nature, and besides the expense of a standing force, was sometimes, as Kurnool in the beginning of the present century, burthened with particular services, or a small quit rent. The *Sycurghat* again, was an assignment usually for life, on certain lands for the whole or part of their assessed revenue, without any local jurisdiction, similar to that bestowed on Lord Clive in the Company's zemindarry of Calcutta, which though denominated *billa sherit*, or an unconditional hief, answers exactly to the *zatee* or personal *jageer* of the moderns, in like manner as the preceding tenure of *Tycul*, being also of Mogul or Turkish derivation, corresponds with that now in use under the terms *mushroot*, or conditional, and *aksham sepahy*, or military *jageers*, appropriated either for the support of garrisons or provincial troops. Under the division of assigned country, were also classed, those petty alienations, consisting of a few beghas of ground made over by the prince, in the manner of a religious, chargeable, or gratuitous donation for the maintenance of individuals, singly or in community, thus an *Ayda* was granted to professors of learning, and the Mussulman faith, as well as to public foundations or seminaries, such as *Gopamah* in the soubah of Oude, and *Pundua* in Bengal. *Bnaums* were the meanest and more general gifts of land as bestowed on mendicants, whether Hindoo or Mahomeddan, the common singers, bramins, and likewise on zemindars, under the more particular denomination of *Nancar*, or means of subsistence, though the arrogance of some of the usurping rulers of the present age has imputed the same word, as descriptive of the highest, most extensive grants, on the ignorance in such matters of form of those who had the power or influence to command the greatest real favours;\* but an *altumgha*, according

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1st.—Native and  
Sources.

Two-fold distribution  
of the lands.

Kahsa portions.

Jageer territory,  
subdivided into—

Military tenure  
foudedary.

Tycul, and

Sycurghat.

Civil grants of Ay

\* Vide the Nizam's Sanads to the East India Company, for the Sovereignty of the Northern circars, in conformity to the tenor of Mogul's firmans.

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North in Circars.

REVENUE:  
1st.—Nature and  
Sources.

see in orig.

Inferior holding of  
Fogahdary.

Zemindary or  
Finance.

Choudrahly.

Regulations of  
Coinage.

to the literal signification of the two Arabic terms of which this technical one, is composed, conveyed gratuitously from the sovereign to a few of the most favoured of his servants, a small heritable grant of territorial property, perhaps then, and since, the only one of the kind in the whole system of Mussulman jurisprudence. Sometimes the same jagreedar held all the principal subordinate tenures within the limits of his atka, or more extensive jurisdiction, the other was contrary to Eastern policy; as in those days, the Nabob Zuffar ul Dowlah enjoyed in his turfeddary or division of the Nizam's dominions, the tyeul of the circars of Commammet and Worangole, the sycurchal of many lesser districts, together with atumgha of Niermul. Nor were such holdings, entirely confined to Mahomedan amceers; for we find even in Akbar's reign, that the great Hindoo rajahs of Mauvar and Iacpour, after being conquered, and wholly deprived of their ancient possessions among the hills of Agmere, received them back, as military fiefs, subject to the new regulations of the Mogul empire; and when the same princes were afterwards so far humbled, as to submit to the mortifying, though intended conciliatory requisition of the emperor, to send their daughters to the royal haram to be espoused under a rule the most repugnant to their natural principles, their assigned territories were enlarged beyond the usual extent of the most considerable jagcers.

It must further be remembered, that one and all of the superior and lesser tenures which we have enumerated, could only legally and formally be obtained, directly from the sovereign ruler, under his proper seal and signature, though often through the recommendation of ministers or favourites; and therefore, when in later times of actual usurpation, yet outward respect for the old imperial rights, any self-created soubahdar, in imitation of the lord paramount, conferred such feudal possessions on the individual *verant in*, and claiming rank with consequence from the ancient forms of Mogul royalty, the grant could only be received under the base tenure of *Touhbedy*, a contract, or *Ejarah*, a farm for years; thus, in the nizamat of Salabut Jung, when the circar of Guntoor was made over to his brother, Bazaket Jung, who also derived his honours and vice-royalty of Benjapour nominally from the crown of Delhi, as the common source of legitimate authority or grandeur, the transfer was made in the manner of a lease, which having just expired at the period of the Company's taking possession of the other circars, was continued by treaty with Nizam Ali, on the same footing of occupancy during the life of the incumbent, under the denomination of a jagcer; moreover, it is to be understood of the division of atka, or alienated lands in general, as well as of that portion of the empire immediately dependant on the khalsa, that the inferior mofussil administration, in matters simply of interior police, or affecting the public revenue, was, with a few exceptions, vested universally in Hindoo zemindars, chowdries, talookdars, mocuddims, and the lesser ryots or peasantry, sometimes acting in a chain of subordination to each other in the rank we have placed them, sometimes separately; and there are instances where rights, jurisdictions, and privileges, annexed to the higher of all these subsidiary official distinctions, expressive of a landholding or tenancy in the soil, were united in the same persons, in like manner as hath been remarked, with respect to the lordly feudal tenures of the Mogul amceers, the forms of which may have given rise to analogous ideas in the management of the finances. Accordingly we find, in the zemindary granted to the Company of the lands about Calcutta, investiture given not only under the general more comprehensive, but also under the special subordinate ones of *chowdrahly* and *talookdarry*, the one more particularly signifying in the Hindoo language, an inferior civil jurisdiction; the latter in the Arabic or Persian, a dependant tenement or farm, usually assessed in Hindostan, at a fixed annual rent.

But though Toorel Mull, by these regulations, ascertained the legal sources, together with the amount of revenue proportioned to the gross yearly produce of the country, and made the means of collection subservient to another object of government, which was the support of a feudal military establishment; yet a gold and silver currency was still wanting to facilitate the operation of either department, involving the receipts or disbursements of the royal treasury. Strange as it may appear, before this period, the only coin in common use, in the supposed rich commercial empire of Hindostan, was on copper, under the nomination of pull, saih, or teloo, sixteen of which were reckoned equal to a tanka of base silver; these were sometimes struck, but solely for the king's use, in making the usual presents to foreign ambassadors, rewarding singers, or the particular services of any of his nobles. Trade must therefore have been carried on, chiefly by barter, the rents for the most part paid in kind, or subject to the same tedious details which might have been found less inexpedient, in the issues of money for defraying the public expenses. To remedy such inconveniences, and enlarge the circulation of specie a new coin of the finer metals was introduced, and from thenceforth gold mohurs, each 11 masha weight, worth 9 sicca rupees of 11½ masha, or about 7 dwts. 11 grains, pure silver, each of these to be valued at 40 dawns or telooos of copper, every one of which to weigh agreeable to the former standard, 21 masha, were substituted as the universal medium of exchange in all financial accounts and pecuniary transactions of the state. These different arrangements considered, severally or as relative to the simple object of revenue, comprehended the whole scope of that system of political economy, as celebrated among the wise institutions of Akbar, as being the most equitable and perfect for the government of a foreign conquest, and still constituting, after a lapse of 200 years, the ground work of the actual legislation of Omice throughout the whole of Hindostan, or esteemed the best model to be adopted in future.

In the Deccan, although considerable progress had been made by the Mogul arms, in the reduction of the four nearer soubahs, from the very beginning of the seventeenth century; it was not until the year 1654, in the reign of Shah Jehan, and under the auspices of Moorsheed

Koole

Kooli Khan, then dewan of these southern countries, that Toorel Mull's regulations were there introduced, and became thenceforward the standing immutable law of the land: The original scheme was so servilely copied on this occasion, that the only difference lieth in some nominal distinctions, which are however worthy of notice, to prevent mistakes, in tracing the genuine source of the revenue system established in this great limb of the Mogul empire. The Persian terms, *dustoor ul umul*, applied to the first institutions, are changed for the Hindoo word, *deharah*, of the same signification, to express the ordinations promulgated for the government of the *Deccan jumma kaimil*, complete or more perfect assessment, is substituted for the *assil toomar jumma*, of proper Hindostan; *baghat*, or gardening, is applied to the finer more laborious culture depending on the artificial supply of water; and the provincial dialect of the South afforded the personal titles, *desmook*, chief of a district, or *despan-deah*, its bramin, recorder, and accountant, instead of the more universal ones of *zemindar* or *craiy*, and *canongoe*, or public registers. A silver and gold currency has been already long established among the Deccanee Hindoos. This advantage, perhaps, was derived from the early extensive intercourse in trade, between that people and the Persians, or more recently the Arabians, to whom the use of a national coin had been known, near a thousand years before: but whether it was borrowed from others, or originated in the country, it had been found inconvenient, under the preceding Mussulman governments, to attempt innovations, and this may be the reason why Toorel Mull's regulation of the coinage was left out in his system, as revived by Moorshed Kooli Khan.

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REVENUE:  
1st.—Nature and  
Sources.

Established in the  
Northern Circars 1687.

But it hath been already observed, it was not before the year 1687, that the Northern circars, forming part of the soubah of Hyderabad, fell under the Mogul yoke. It doth not appear that any alteration, either in the amount of rent, or mode of assessing these districts, was introduced at the period of this revolution; the old valuation, or standard of revenue, as fixed, we have reason to believe, on the first establishment of the Kootel Shahy, was transferred to the imperial rent-roll of Alemgier, and the rule of battar, or equal division of the crop between government and its ryots, is continued exclusively and universally down to the present time, except in places where the unnatural, unrestrained oppression of zemindars, has increased the moiety, demanded in behalf of the public, from the peasantry, solely for private advantage. This simple mode of rating lands for half their yearly produce, is derived from the remotest antiquity in different parts of Hindostan, and still invariably prevails in such countries as were left unsubdued by the Mahomedans; like Tanjore, where the antient Indian forms of administration are for the most part preserved entire; it will not, therefore, be thought extraordinary, that the same custom should thus be the ground-work of one system of finance, and enter largely into the formation of another, established under two cotemporary or successive dynasties of foreign princes, obliged to conform, through ignorance, policy, or necessity, to the former usage of the same unconquered people. Such, however, is the fact; either the circars were subject, in the reign of the Hoortal Shahy, to similar regulations as had been instituted by Toorel Mull, or his copyist, in the Deccan, for the management of the Mogul revenue, or when they were annexed to the crown of Delhi, they necessarily and immediately fell under the general laws of the empire, which, to this day, authoritatively ascertain the nature and sources of the public supplies to be conformable to the definition which we have endeavoured to support in discussing this first general head of the subject of present consideration.

SECOND. The mode of settling the jummalabundy by annual agreements, is derived from the highest antiquity in all parts of Hindostan; and arises necessarily from the local circumstances of the country, joined to the character of its inhabitants. The frequency of revolutions in government; variations in the state of population, from the too often experienced calamities of war, pestilence, or famine, and perpetual changes in the produce of agriculture occasioned by inundations, drought, or any irregularity of the seasons, must influence inevitably a periodical valuation of the lands; while the poverty of a people of the fewest possible wants, whose nature is fast, profuse in yielding all the necessaries of life, their fictitious simplicity in diet under the severest rules of a stubborn faith, which still further reduces the prices of labour, and extremes of course the indigence of the peasantry, added to the policy of keeping poor the zemindars or intermediate agents of the state, whose sole use in society is confined to the exercise of their civil employments; who are taught through the superstition or chicantry of their priests, to consider the concealment of wealth, as the first of religious duties; whose fortunes, therefore, could not be brought into circulation, unless in the execution of schemes of ambition, either by direct treason or corruption for the destruction of that government, from which they derive their political existence. While we repeat the universal irretrievable poverty of such a people, partially and very moderately favoured by commercial benefits, passive in their natures, unindustrious from circumstances of situation or the charms of a pastoral life, which eludes contribution for the support of civil society, renders a yearly settlement of the revenue, however inconvenient it may be, in extensive dominions ruled by a few individuals, unavoidable, and highly expedient, as the shortest term that can be imagined. The only source of Indian wealth in general, excepting the confined, though daily increasing trade with Europe, exclusively enjoyed within the circle of the British possessions, is territorial property, of which the value is low, in proportion as the natural fertility of the soil, and general influence of climate, are greater than in other countries; but local circumstances originating in the religion, government, genius and habits of the natives, depreciate so far this single revolving fund

2d.—Mode of  
Settlement.

Expediency of  
annual settlement.

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fund of riches, that even indigenous states, deriving from it alone their means, of support, have been forced to exclude intermediate property. Interests found so essential to freedom and individual civil prosperity, in places where these effects are supposed so promote the welfare of society, or increase the portion of human felicity; and instead of raising the public supplies by an European system of taxation, were necessitated to claim the landlord's proportion of the yearly harvests, and enter into all the troublesome detail of immediate interior management, on the variable foundations of a temporary settlement, of territorial rent. Foreign rulers, possessing by the violent right of conquest and country under such circumstances, and whose wants are not limited to the simple exigencies of internal defence, but relative to the vast complex operations of a distant mighty empire, involving an universal system of politics, and the very reverse of Hindostan in opulence, power, civilization, or particular interests, may find themselves compelled, as lords of the land, to exact a larger share of its yearly produce from the tenantry; but it is impossible they can relax in the established demands of their predecessors, or substitute any other adequate source of revenue, without supposing an alteration in the state of affairs, greatly beyond the perception of human foresight. The stock of existing productive wealth, together with the public supplies derived from it, depending on and being thus limited to the pecuniary returns of a single revolution of the harvest seasons, all operations in finance must have the same temporary bounds, subject to general principles reduced into a system, of which the superior excellence will rest, on the efficiency of mutual checks on personal agency or simplification of forms, accounts, and interior management. Having already described the functions and relative powers of the different officers of Mogul government within the circars, to determine the important question which now arises from the subject before us, the next progressive enquiry leads to a short recital of the established mode of proceeding, in fixing and realizing the Jaminabundy, or annual assessment of the lands.

Fussilee year.

The Fussilee or harvest year in the soubah of Hydrabad, to the north of the Kistnah, and in the circar of Guntoor to the south, commences on the 25th September, and is of course solar, though founded on a lunar epoch through Mussulman bigotry or ignorance. From the time of Akbar, it had been customary forcibly to introduce the Hegirah, wherever the Mogul arms could command a tributary acknowledgment of superiority, without reflecting, perhaps, on the almost immediate deviation of style which must ensue from the necessity of computing time agreeable to the invariable periods of the seasons. Accordingly, when Shah Jehan, in the year 1045 of the Mahomedan era, enforced the reading of the khotbah in his own name throughout the dominions of Abdullah Kootub Shah, that lunar period was then established; but having been since continued by solar calculation, a difference of near five years has already arisen between the two methods of reckoning, so that the beginning of the present Fussilee 1193, falls in the 10th month of the Hegirah 1797, or corresponds with the autumnal equinox A.D. 1783, from whence is to be dated the eighteenth annual settlement of the revenue, supposed to be concluded agreeable to the ancient and usual forms, until others are established in their room under the Company's administration. Previous to this period, and generally at the setting in of the rains in June, a cowle or assurance of being continued another year in the collection of the public rents, is sent to the zemindars, as head farmers, to secure their influence in promoting and quickening the ordinary process of calculation. It seems impossible for government to enter into a minute detail of management, than through the immediate agency of these native officers. To obviate such a difficulty, was one of the chief ends proposed by their original appointment, or from the confirmation of successive rules, of local rights and privileges, which so eminently distinguish them among the lower classes of peasantry, and raise them so near the level of the landholders of other countries, as it will be found now, or whenever it is thought necessary to discuss the merits of the actual system, to be the only good purpose answered by adopting so much of the Mogul policy, notwithstanding the practice which hath so long prevailed of letting out to temporary farmers, these lands denominated Havillee, and supposed to comprehend the whole right of territory appertaining to the state. However this may be at seed-time, the koulourees or village accountants are, in the next place, directed to ascertain the quantity of ground in tillage, with either the real amount or estimate of the grain sown, and which Tookhemrees, they do with a minute exactness, though rather in the view of preventing any fallacious representations for claims of remission, on the plea of casualties, than to value the future harvest. This grand preparatory operation is performed in consequence of another special writ to the same inferior officers, distinguished in Telinga by the word *Anchumna*, which seems to be a corruption of two Persian adverbs, signifying "there" "is" "so" "much;" but in proper Hindostan it is better understood by the Arabic term *koot*, applied to ripened corn, when about the month of November such valuation is ordered to be made of the two great crops in the ground, constituting the *thareef* and *rubb* harvests.

preparatory account.

Tookhemreezi.

Anchumna.

At this important crisis, the zemindars, when most impatient to reap the fruits of their industry or ambitious care, are summoned to renew their agreements with government. It is a mistaken notion that the business of the season must be impeded, by the absence of these people; the very reverse is often the case; they are for the most part all over Hindostan, and in the circars, with the exception of one or two individuals, wholly incapable of transacting affairs of such magnitude, as of late years have been left to their management, and are therefore in a state of talage to some crafty, designing, inferior agents, who forward their own selfish views, or maintain their consequence by feeding the vanity of their ignorant employers with ideas of princely grant, and too frequently with schemes of independence, under the pretence of inability or negligence of any ruling administration,

added



added to the certainty of incurring no responsibility while they hold no ostensible office, and are personally unknown; accordingly the zemindars, of whom and of minors, have always been found the best regulated internally, and the most profitable to the public, simply because the agency is united with responsibility in the same individuals, who are subject to control in proportion to the inferiority of their pretensions, and who moreover, from the general depravity of manners in Hindostan, may be emulous of recommending themselves to the favour of government in the sinister view of being continued in the management, to the prejudice of, or with the end perhaps to the utter exclusion of their former principals. Whether then a jumma bundy be concluded on the spot, or elsewhere, by the removal of zemindars to any indefinite distance from their respective residences, exclusive of the small personal expense, which it is possible for Hindoos to incur beyond the hire of a pageant retinue, the mock resemblance of an army only when capacity fails in sending the ever constant inclination to command, and intimidate with the reality, is a matter of very little consequence to popular interests, and those of the prince can only be affected more or less in proportion to the degree of intelligence, vigour or probity, with which his delegates are now supposed to proceed, in thus bringing the revenue settlement to a close.

All the superior officers of government, and more especially the despandeahs, being assembled in the dewanny cutcherry, the first most important indispensable account called for by the amildar or president, is the jumma kaamil, or complete assessment of the Deccan. The principles on which this original rent-roll, to give a more precise idea of it, was formed, have already been explained, as in like manner have its intended uses, which were in the beginning to regulate the two grand divisions of the country, in khalsa and jagher lands by ascertaining the gross value of either, for the immediate purposes of finance or political arithmetic, and ultimately, by gradual systematical progress, in estimating accurately the full dues of the exchequer, as proportioned to the whole amount of territorial produce, to form an invariable standard of revenue, which should be at once an effectual check on the most corrupt intermediate agency, as well to prevent public defalcations, as any encroachment on the private rights of the ryots. But such progressive improvement was contrary to the genius of Eastern governments, and never could be effected under the rule of arbitrary distant delegation; nevertheless, the ancient rental of the Kootub Shany, incorporated with the jumma kaamil near a century since, imperfect as it is when compared to the present circumstances of the country, is yet absolutely necessary in the formation of a settlement in the circars, particularly to the South of the Godaveri, as exhibiting the only authoritative account extant and in use, made from an actual survey of the local sub-divisions, number of villages, quantity of ground in or capable of cultivation, together with the estimated territorial produce in money, according to the established rule of Duttal.

To remedy the defects of this antiquated rent-roll, the despandeahs are next called upon for the hustabood jumma, or comparative account of the former and actual sources of revenue, shewing the total increased valuation of the lands, whether real, by improvements, or fictitious, by a reduction in the price of specie, the variations produced by casualties in the state of the country, new appropriations or extinction of jagheers, affecting more or less the khalsa portion of territory, together with the amount of new imposts, such as the Marhatta Chout\* established in the same places, less frequently from the tyranny of rulers, than the fraudulent practices of zemindars, in withholding their stated collections made in behalf of government. Had the profits arising from such contingent sources of supply, in a long series of yearly agreements, been applied as originally intended to accumulate or really complete the standing rent-roll, which fell so short of perfection, under the delusive Persian epithet of Kaamil, little now would remain to be learnt on the subject of Indian finance; and the business of settlement being reduced almost to a simple form, might, without any material prejudice, be transacted in Leadenhall-street, as well as at Masulipatam, through the superior agency of English collectors, under suitable appointments and regulations. But here lay the grand defect of Mussulman administration; deeply rooted in the constitution of unchecked violent despotism, and in the singular depraved natures of the native inhabitants of Hindostan, the knowledge derived from the hustabood was generally perverted to selfish purposes, and in consideration of a nuzzerannah, or present, greater or smaller in proportion to the intelligence or power of the amildars, comparatively with the value of the returning favour, remained in petto, the future productive source of private benefit.

In compliance however, to the customary forms the zemindar is now ordered to produce the *Doul bundobust*, or an account of his particular agreements with inferior farmers of the district, attested by the canongoes. This sub-rent-roll should be the counterpart, or rather a verification of the *hat-hackent*, or present state of revenue, as exhibited in the hustabood formed from the actual subordinate settlements of the current year or collections of the last for the whole zemindary, inclusive of khalsa and alienated lands; and which, with the tookhem rezi or account of seed sown, the koot, the hustabood, and jumma kaamil, might be supposed sufficient to ascertain the gross receipts or government's share of the full produce

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Hustabood.

Doul Bundobust

\* The Marhattah Chout, or fourth demanded by these people from countries to which they could extend their predatory empire, in imitation of the *Rebba* of the Moguls, was some times levied by the Mussulman government from their Jagherdars, to indemnify the public for real or pretended exactions, paid in gross, and at once to the Marhattas, in lieu of such

a proportional tax on the revenue as in the *Soubah* of Hyderabad, where the Nizam assesses all his Jagherdars for the full chout of their territorial income, though the whole sum stipulated to be paid to the Marhattas annually on this account, for the province entire, has been invariably fixed at one lakh of rupees from the time of the 1st Nizam.



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Settlement.

Khairidge Jumma.

of the country, were it not for the baleful influence of Mahomedan administration, in corrupting the whole chain of intermediate agency, and invalidating the necessary checks on the universal moral depravity of the natives. *Khairidge jumma*, or excluded territorial appropriations in jagher, alrumga, and charitable donations to Bramins, &c. with the *khurcha mufussil*, or expense of interior management, were still wanting to form the *reck khus*, or net jumma bundy of the rents actually to be paid into the public treasury; the former of these accounts would, since the commencement of British rule in the circars, be reduced to a very small compass, if such enormous fraudulent sequestrations as of late years have taken place by the collusion of zemindars and despondahs, were, as in right they ought, to be resumed; and the latter, including the *russooms* and *savarnas* of the superior native officers, with the petty allowances to the *chakeram* or inferior servants, was little more than a simple memorandum of about 14 per cent. to be deducted from the amount of their actual collections, though the prodigious defalcations of modern times, particularly under the new, dangerous, and unwarrantable article of *schandy*, when allowed to the zemindars, in derogation of the prince's most essential exclusive right to command and pay the whole armed force of the country, will be found to make this account of charges the most voluminous and important to be examined, as stating, literally and truly, the sinking fund of near one-half the stipulated known dues of the public exchequer, perverted in the application to the intended destruction of, instead of relief to, that state within which it is annually formed.

Concluding forms.

Dumbalah Deron.

On a short review of these various materials for forming an adequate jumma bundy, and which, though more hidden or dissipated, must still exist, and may be found as well under an English government, as that of a French, or Moorish, the work might be supposed quickly terminated, with no less justice than facility; but whether from the innate chicanery of the people, or that a propensity to evasion was the necessary consequence of undue exactions under the tyranny of one administration, or received encouragement from the insufficiency of public demands through the ignorance of another; it generally happened that the zemindars, by various concealed arts and specious pretences, retarded the conclusion of the settlement a whole month, in adopting the usual cant of farmers of being over-rated in their rents, and never failing to urge a diminution, however low the assessment might be proposed, when once it fell short of the equitable medium due; and so betrayed a want of knowledge in the agent of government, respecting the value of the territory now to let. If in the mean time the proper season for reaping the harvest was likely to expire, then the *Dumbalah Deron*, or ultimate order to that effect, was issued to the ryots; but if, while without prejudice the crop might be permitted to lie on the ground, the zemindars could not be brought to an agreement, then the only alternative left was to suspend their authority, and to depute *numeens* or *tahsildars*, being the proper and more immediate officers of the state, to supply the vacancies in the minute interior management of the collections. It was on such extraordinary occasions that the benefit, the political expediency, was best understood, of training up in the knowledge of the country languages, of the finances, and above all the characters of the people, to be acquired only by local experience on the exercise of provincial employments, a certain number of individuals making part thereof attached to the interests, and subject to the whole effective control of the actual government, in whom might safely be confided trust of such high responsibility and importance, as the general superintendence with the collectorship of an extensive district; but under Mussulman despotism, if these requisite qualifications were readily found among a race of men now barbarously ignorant, yet the superior universal depravity of their natures, when compared with the Hindoos, together with a slavish dependance on the delegated chief, rendered them always wholly unfit, for public disinterested purposes, to act in the capacity of supervisors; and, during the former more enlightened administration of the French, though it be admitted that national virtue would have induced the gentlemen in power, even while expectants themselves for the united subordinate rule of all the circars, thus to countenance a system which must necessarily lessen the authority and emoluments of any one man inclined to follow the established practices of his predecessors, by diffusing local knowledge and participating influence among intelligent independent patriotic agents, instead of employing the more servile mercenary natives of the country, who are only faithfully secret in the business of corruption when favourable to their own private interests; yet a transitory dominion of six years did not admit of much experimental proof, in the advantages of a multiplied European superintendence. Accordingly, it very rarely happened that zemindars were deprived of the management of the current revenue of their districts, when their offers did not fall greatly short of the ascertained valuation of annual produce; and when they could give *teeps*, or the promissory notes of Soucar bankers, or other substantial monied men, in advance for about two-thirds of the net jumma bundy at which they might be rated, and are now supposed to acquiesce in, on or before the 1st of January, being the utmost time, that can according to custom, or with safety, be admitted of, for the final adjustment of such periodical settlements; these *teeps* are the best collateral security which can be obtained by government, for the payment of the public rents. When collected by native officers from the ryots, they may farther be considered a pre-existent source of supply, as well as affording to the state a necessary and political control over the monied and mercantile interests, in case of interior or foreign commotions; indeed, the natural influence which such pecuniary obligations give the *soucars*, in directing the conduct of zemindars, joined to the dread of private losses from the casualties of civil war, have often been the means of preserving inward tranquillity, where all other restraints on a daring rebellious spirit, might have proved ineffectual. At the same time, the acceptance of *teeps* is founded in necessity. The real or fictitious poverty

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poverty of the Hindoo peasantry is, and must ever be such, under the influence of their own peculiar rights and habits, that, in order to carry on the common operations of husbandry, in places where the culture is simple, and of the meanest kind, as in the circars, they find it expedient, at the different seasons, to borrow money at high interest, in proportion to the risk incurred by the lender, and never under 2 per cent. per ann. agreeable to the institutions of Akbar; and by one known general rule over the whole Mogul empire, expressed by the Arabic term *Tuckair*. The zemindars through whom this aid is usually obtained, have still greater occasion, on their own accounts as merchants, rather than in their proper capacity of principal farming landholders, to make use of, and extend a credit with their Hindoo bankers. As agents for the state, they are put in possession of the public share of the annual produce of the country, divided with the ryots, at a very moderate pecuniary valuation; but that stubborn propensity to parsimony, chicanery, and refractoriness, which so notoriously characterizes them, would render it extremely unsafe to trust to their hands so much property, without some previous security; and the most favourable consequences to be expected would be, a secretious or collusive dissipation of the revenue, which nothing but personal fear, imprisonment, or torture, could bring into the treasury; at the same time, to touch a deposit of hidden wealth, though with the manifest advantage of saving an exorbitant interest for money borrowed, would be deemed sacrilegious. That hoard must be eternally increasing, and cannot admit even of the temporary diminution in making profitable loans. To enjoy the full recompence of meritorious conduct in the short probationary life of man, it becomes, therefore, necessary, first to mortgage the current crop of the season to such persons as have given the collateral security of their teeps to governments, and then to participate with them in the benefit arising from the sales, as an indemnification for the risk of staking their credit, or the inconvenience of making the stipulated advances to the state. It is chiefly this intricate, though necessary mercantile operation, which would render a minuter detail of management, than by the permanent intermediate agency of zemindars, if not impossible without loss, at least incligible, to any ruling administration. Yet, it must be confessed, that the power which it gives to these petty tyrants to oppress the poor, establish monopolies, or withhold the requisite supplies of grain from the provincial troops when on service, most frequently in the view of being better enabled to furnish the enemy, is often productive of the greatest inconveniences; but as a local vigorous superintendence might, in a great measure, correct this evil, it is only principally to be regretted, that some share of the enormous profits derived from the transfer and sale of the annual territorial produce by the zemindars in their mercantile capacities, cannot be brought into circulation, or by any means be rendered beneficial to the public.

Having thus brought the *Jummabundy* to a close, and secured the payment of two-thirds of the amount, by kists or monthly instalments, let us follow the usual process of the year, in realizing the remainder of the stated revenue to the final adjustment of accounts. The 30th of April, corresponding nearly with the termination of the most general civil year of the Hindoos, and concluding the periodical season, in which the returning dispatches for Europe may be made with convenience, has been, with great propriety fixed, on balancing the books of the circars; but it is from the 31st of August to the end of the *Fussulor*, that the accounts are ultimately settled with the farmers general of the government lands. In the latter of these periods, the poonass or small-grain harvest, the third and last being reaped, enables the ryots to fulfil their engagements with the superior renters, who are therefore, at this time, debited with the remaining portion of their *jummabundy*, and required finally to liquidate their balances; at length, on the 24th of September, the expiration of the revenue year, a general statement, called the *Jumma Wassil Bawky*, shewing the amount, receipts, and balances for or on account of the current settlement, is drawn out by the head accountant, from the *mofussil* or similar detailed provincial documents, signed by the zemindars, attested and recorded by the *canongoe*, and after having gone through the critical examination of many different auditors, is deposited in the *khalsa duffer*, to serve as a basis for the *jummabundy* of the succeeding year. It was usual, at the same time, under the Moorish administration, for the *amildar* or collector general, as well in his own justification as to remove every possible pretence for future deficiencies, to produce a writing under the denomination of a *Muchelka in darud*, signed jointly by the *desmooks* and *despaudeals*, and purporting that they have not, in the way of bribery or otherwise, paid a single daum to the agent of government, besides what is specified in the public account of receipts; after which, the only care left, though often imposing a very arduous task, was the recovery of such balances as appeared to be due, on the ultimate adjustment of the year. For this purpose, it might be necessary to scrutinize the transactions of the zemindars, both with the inferior tenants in the participation, and with the merchants in the sale of the annual crops, because the debts which could be ascertained to be due from the two latter classes of people to the former, together with the amount of *rassooms* and *saverums*, constituted the sole fund of indemnification within reach of the sovereign *dewanny* authority, to make good defalcations in the revenue, proceeding from negligent or corrupt intermediate agency; seeing the uncertainty, if not impossibility, of ever being able to touch the secret treasure of a Hindoo.

To avoid the detail, and lessen the other public inconveniences of such a system of management as we have described, though principally defective in the latitude its periodical renewals may give to speculation, or the insufficiency of a variable administration, it has been imagined, that to fix the yearly assessment unalterable at a moderate quit rent, and so put the zemindars of India on a footing with the copyholders of England, would be no less effectual,

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vinces:

effectual, in accomplishing the desired immediate purposes, than ultimately beneficial in a more extensive view of general political consequences. This involves a question of the utmost importance to the British nation at large, and more particularly interesting to the Company. A local knowledge of the country, of the people, practical experience, or theoretical instruction, deduced from the recorded wisdom of native statement, may determine the judgment of those who partake of such partial lights, to pronounce with truth and confidence, the danger, inexpediency, or absurdity of innovations in the financial policy of Hindostan; that to lessen or fix the exactions, from the actually farming intermediate landholders, would soon be fruitless to themselves, rather add to the burthen of the peasantry, and prove doubly injurious to a ruling foreign state, in reducing for ever the already too scanty sources of supply, even when considered in all their hitherto unrevealed plenitude, or as paving the way to a refractory independence; that in proportion to the decrease of public demands, so would the restive presumption of enfranchized slaves grow excessive, and become most ungovernable, under the feudal acknowledgment of a barley corn, which, in freer countries, best ensures tranquillity. But to impress conviction on the mind of those who, from situation, are precluded the benefit of such contingent aids, to draw a right conclusion in what regards persons and things, differently circumstanced to what they appear to be in Europe, may require the evidence of some ascertainable facts. It is therefore we adduce the following, as applicable to the subject under consideration.

In the circars immediately dependent on Masulipatam, we suppose it generally known, that the zemindars, since, and not before the establishment of the English government, have been considered no matter how erroneously, as hereditary proprietors of the lands included in their respective jurisdictions, and that, agreeable to the mistaken idea of possessing feudal tenures, they were subject to military services, together with a certain tribute in proportion to the valued rent of the countries. We know not whether any enquiries were ever set on foot to ascertain these different positions, or that they have been admitted on any other ground than simple surmise, the *ipse dixit* of the farming landholders themselves, or at best the information of the Company's Hindoo interpreter, who, in the capacity of serishtedar, enjoyed an annual income of near forty thousand pagodas from the zemindars of Rajemundry acquiesced in about the 13th of February, 1767; but such is the fact; the assessment of these several districts for seventeen years back, has been rated extremely low. We shall venture to say, in anticipation of what we have further to add on the subject, that at least *one half* of the rents collected from the ryots in behalf of government has been remitted to its intermediate agents, under the head of expense, on an idea of their being the rightful constitutional proprietors of the soil. Moreover, the portion demanded by the public, has been invariably limited to the amount, according to the received notion of a tribute; for though an increase of 12½ per cent. is supposed to have been put in the last five years settlement, on what is termed the Mahmool, or customary jumabundy; yet the total amount of that addition, together with the 10,000 pagodas per annum salary to the interpreter, and 5,724 to be paid into the treasury for his meerassy, did but barely counterbalance the afore-mentioned serishtedary appropriations, added to an unaccounted portion of Hussain Ali's jagheer, and which then were reannexed to the Rajemundry zemindars, as equivalent only to the aggregate of the two last sums specified:—on the other hand, the stated military services, however much wanted of late, have neither been required, nor commuted for in money. The most profound tranquillity, an increasing commerce, the free secure enjoyment of private property, have peculiarly distinguished the circars for a long series of years past, amidst surrounding distractions, anarchy, or barbarity; and so far have these provinces been, from experiencing the calamities of a neighbouring war in the Carnatic, or been burthened with new consequent imposts, that they have rather in the mean time received a prodigious increase of wealth, through the extraordinary profits derived from the exported produce of the country, at least twenty-five per cent. above the usual price. Under a government so lenient, admitting of such uncommon privileges and individual advantage, it might naturally be supposed, that the zemindars, as being the superior class of Hindoo subjects, and most benefited by the powerful beneficent protection of the sovereign authority, would be found constitutionally submissive, grateful and liberal in proportion to their own prosperity, compared with the embarrassments, and the exigencies of the public. But the expectation would be politically unreasonable, and only betray a total ignorance of national character; the very reverse must always be the case, and has been more especially manifested in latter times within the dependencies of Masulipatam, as may be sufficiently proved by a reference to such recorded facts at large, as we shall here only generally touch upon.

The annual jumabundy of these districts, on a medium of the last seventeen years, may be reckoned seven lacks of current pagodas, on which the total balances incurred at the end of the 11th Fussillee year 1186, by zemindars and renters, did not exceed two lacks and a half, exclusive of five lacks more due on soucar teeps, or bills receivable. In the beginning of 1187, corresponding with the year 1778 of the Christian era, computed from the date of the first payment of revenue, it was imagined that the current and future collections might best be insured, by calling up the farmers to the principal seat of government at Madras, and concluding a settlement with them there, for five years. That period expired the 24th September 1783, and the balances were increased to twenty-two lacks eighteen thousand two hundred and ninety-three current pagodas, including only 1,76,411. in bills receivable; of this sum, the four principal zemindars, under circumstances which we shall briefly mention, stand indebted as follows; viz. Jaggapaty Rauze, of Poddapore, in Rajamundry, a vain timid voluptuary, who is allowed to control 2,000 sebandy peons, the constitutional militia of the

the district, chiefly maintained by unauthorized alienations of land, and who, with that extravagance which characterizes a spendthrift leech, incurs an annual personal expense of near 24,000 pagodas, rather exceeding the income of his savery, or proper landed estate, to acquire the epithet of *liberal* among his parsimonious countrymen, on a revenue of a lack and forty thousand \* from actual collections made by him, of two lacks sixty thousand, owed nothing at the commencement of the last six years, but is now in arrears 3,56,876. notwithstanding the effect of repeated military persuasions.

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REVENUE:  
2d — Mode of  
Settlement.

Trippetty Rauze, of Magletore, in Ellore, a sensible man, but infirm and indolent, a greater economist, with nearly the same private fortune and number of peons as the preceding zemindar, on a jummaundy of 98,000, from mofussil collections of two lacks thirty-two thousand, owed at the former period, only thirty thousand; but at the latter, 6,51,050 current pagodas, including the revenue of neighbouring districts, for which he became security, and received, by himself or his agents, a rent of at least two-thirds exceeding the amount of the public assessment.

Opparow, of Noozed, a stubborn refractory subject, entertains 3,000 schundy peons, many of them of the Velma cast; the only one of his degree in the circars that even affects a warlike character, and which he supports, not by opposition to the smallest regular force, but by sheltering himself, when pressed, in the neighbouring woods of independent zemindars, and instigating his scattered peons to commit depredations, until government is distressed into forgiveness from the hazard of incurring inquisitorial notice for the small temporary deficiencies which might attend the prosecution of more vigorous measures, on a jummaundy of 92,000, from the gross receipts of the country, amounting to about one lack eighty-five thousand, was indebted, at the beginning of 1187, not more than 35,000; and owed, the latter end of 1192, current pagodas, 1,41,798, his family and personal charges not exceeding twelve thousand, being amply defrayed from his private landed estate.

Mahputty Row, the uncle and guardian of the young zemindar of Pettapore, and therefore on his good behaviour; on a revenue demanded by the public of sixty-two thousand, collected from the lands actually assessed, and paying in the gross one lack fifteen thousand, owed nothing at the first period, and fell only 1,58,435 in arrears at the close of the last year. His private expenses are about 12,000, but the schundy peons entertained in his district, mostly on fraudulent alienations of territory, cannot be numbered at more than 1,500.

Twenty-seven petty zemindars, besides the foregoing, with others in the capacity of simple renters, are answerable for the remainder of the balances due the 24th September, 1783, making almost one half of the whole.

Thus, in a short period of six years, the jummaundy so low, the receipts from the country so ample, and the private necessary disbursements of the zemindars so trifling, a debt upwards of two years ordinary revenue, has been incurred; and that too, on a settlement on the enlarged plan of a five years lease. But the truth is, that no public advantage whatever can be derived from such an extension of time, as the annual adjustment and collections from the crop always have, and must ever be continued. Nor would this minutiae of management be either difficult, inconvenient, or liable to abuse, if the established dewanny forms of government were practically observed; if the native officers were called on, as they must wish, to execute their more consequential functions, and for which they are already so liberally paid for, in money or in lands; and if under the auspices of intelligent well appointed provincial superintendants, chosen from the body of the Company's civil servants, means were taken to ascertain with all possible accuracy, a true jumma kaamil of the lands, and restrain within necessary constitutional bounds, the dangerous and lately usurped authority of farming landholders.

3d. — Amount collected.

Third.—The gross amount of collections, though at once the simplest, and most indispensable branch of knowledge in the whole science of finance, is generally the least understood, or most difficult to be ascertained. In despotic states, where forms of government are the best, and the administration usually the worst; where the superior energy, order, and subordination incident to individual rule, assist every political operation and enquiry, in return for the infinitely greater disadvantages of popular slavery, it very seldom happens that the actual resources of the country are fully investigated or estimated in the view of proportioning, with moderation and policy, an adequate revenue to answer all public exigencies; when done, it has been usually at the period of foreign conquest, or some great revolution, which throws the most arbitrary executive power into the hands of one of those rare superior geniuses, endowed with all the virtues, vigour and ability, peculiar to the founders of well regulated, mighty, and permanent empires. But however just the principles of the original plan may be, a work so new, of such extent, depending on variable unskilful agency, and limited in the execution, to the short busy life of a conqueror, must necessarily be extremely imperfect; while the daily changes introduced by native and extraneous causes in every thing of human production, may in a period of years lessen the practical utility of, or absolutely set at nought, all the advantages derived from primitive institutions, excellent in themselves perhaps, though easily perverted by ignorant deviations from their true spirit, or rather through the corruption, the base chicanery of ministers and inferior officers, acting under the degrading sway of despotism. In such cases, particularly applicable to Hindostan, the knowledge of individuals, ever partial or confined to the narrow circle of their own experience,

\* The Jummaundy and gross Mofussil Collections of the zemindars, are here put down in Madras, or three image pagodas, valued in the Company's account at ten per cent.

more than current pagodas, rated at 350 ruppees the hundred, or at eight shillings sterling each; but of late, the exchange has run 400 Arcot ruppees per hundred current pagodas.

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## REVENUE:

3d.—Amount collected.

experience, is reserved exclusively for private interested purposes. The financier who has bought the excess of provincial collections made in behalf of the state from the ryots, beyond the amount of an antiquated valuation, obtains the disposal of the district at the usual rate, confers it on the highest bidder for the secret productive favour, or shares more largely the concealed emoluments of superintendence, through the channel of immediate agents. It is seldom, however, this lucrative arcanum of the revenue departments extends further than the delegate himself, who, by dexterous management in his employment; by altering and intermixing local divisions; conniving at fraudulent alienations of land for private temporary benefits; seconding from similar motives, the most frequently groundless pleas of farmers for remissions of rent, or increased allowance for seed and other mofussil expenses; deranging the settled order and forms of accounts; avoiding detail, and exhibiting only general or broken statements of the collections, may so involve the finances of his district in mystery and obscurity, as to render his own particular services necessary, if he be not altogether deficient in address, and at all events, prevent the transmission of local knowledge to a distant superior; while the means of information are despotically confined to a few servile dependents on his private bounty. To make amends for the consequent defalcations of corrupt agency, instead of a reform, or recurring to first principles of the established system of taxation, new contributions are levied, and without, or arbitrary assessments, are imposed on a whole pergunnah without sufficient intelligence of its present state, and circumstances of the people; by which a latitude is given to zemindars to oppress the peasantry, while they themselves, with the other intermediate officers of government, continue their wonted peculations, and absorb a current revenue, which, if faithfully administered, might fairly answer every demand of public exigency. Such more especially, were the conspicuous defects and disorders incident to the system of policy pursued throughout the Northern circars, from the period of their being first subjugated, to the Mogul yoke in 1687, to their final virtual dismemberment in 1753;—as we shall endeavour to prove by induction, from the following facts.

Standard assessment of  
the Mootabshahy, 1582.

THE JUMMA KAUMIL, or complete assessment of these Provinces, as originally settled for those south of the Godavari, probably in 1512, and with more certainty sixty years later, for the two, extending north of that river, under the dynasty of the Kootub Shahy, ascertained by a general statement in 1633, when the Princes of that line became tributary to Shah Jehan, and finally enrolled on the Imperial Khalsa Records of Alem-geer, on the entire reduction of the kingdom of Hyderabad; continued thenceforth, with a small addition, as the standard of Revenue, down to the establishment of the French government, at the commencement of the Nizam of Salabut Jung;—stood thus:

GUNTOOR, or Moortezanagar, agreeable to its present boundaries, divided into five pergunnabs and 39 villages, composing a limit sturrah, mootah or kessinutt, all Persian or Hindoo words, indiscriminately used as expressive of lesser division of territory, assessed for	Rupees	21,67,709 4; of which the havillee, or household portion, was	Rupees	6,79,945 12
CONDAPILLEE, or Mustafanagar, in its modern extent, including Gonaor and Achulminar, divided into 24 pergunnabs, of which the havillee, for the most part, at present composeth the zemindarry of Mylaveram	11,64,463 2; of this was set apart for the expense of the royal garrison, &c.			70,512 6
ELLORE; comprehending the twelve pergunnabs, into which it is still divided, though in more early times, these were imperfectly ascertained, or were less productive, being overrated including an havillee, for the saddle or circar establishment, of	5,63,247 2; in-			1,41,034 —
MASULIPATAM; exclusive of its late annexations of Guntoor and Achulminar, but adding the pergunnah circar of Nizampatam, rated, with its salt and customs, at two lacks and forty-six thousand rupees, to eight others, being the ancient number of pergunnabs, attached as they still are to the capital seaport, and of which the island of Divia, rated at rupees, 91,070. 14½ forms one; in all assessed	7,85,928 10½; of which the havillee chiefly arising from the ground-rent of the fort and pettah, with their vicinities; also from the sayer or sea, river, and land customs, mint duties, and above all the profits on salt, with the rent of the palmyra or toddy trees; the whole to support the shabundery or royal maritime establishment, amounted to			3,39,855 ½
Total -- South of the Godavari	R	36,31,348 2½		
RAJEMUNDRI; very imperfectly reduced or known by the Mahomedans; divided into seventeen pergunnabs, of which few of the names correspond with those of the more modern divisions, originally assessed at	Rupees	4,19,439 5; but afterwards, in 1732, increased by Rautah Khan to		6,85,529 10; of which havillee, rents, for defraying the circar-expenses, were
				50,341 6½
CICACOLE;				



**CICACOLE**; the most distant frontier province to the north, only explored along the sea-coast; divided into two pergunnahs, and 115 villages, and rated at - - - - - 8,40,822 12; of which the whole, excepting a peshcush of 35,000 rupees, paid by the ancient princes of the country of the race of Gajaputy, then resident at Pootnour, and since banished to the hills of Jaepoor and Havillee, and collected from the farms of Cossim Cotah and the capital, to maintain chiefly the paga, or household cavalry, a considerable body of which was always stationed there, in like manner as in the southern frontier circar of Guntoor, before the conquest of the Carnatic, in the year 1652; therefore, the appropriations were proportionally great in each of these provinces, being in Cicacole - - - - - 1,073,000 12

8,40,822 12; of

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3d — Amount collected.

The total assessment, then, of all the foregoing maritime circars, including the havillee lands, set apart for the special maintenance of the royal garrisons, sea ports, the civil and military establishments, amounting to rupees 20,87,481. 6. did not exceed, in the sixteenth century, or, to be more precise for the sake of analogical illustration, we shall assume the date of Toord Mull's financial regulations for the rest of Hindostan, A. D. 1582, being exactly 200 years before the present, the sum of rupees, 52,07,700. 84. but as this was only the jummaabundy of the khalsa and jagbeer lands at the first period of settlement, and necessarily excluded, such appropriations were thenceforward to be considered permanently attached to the officers, not the families, of certain Hindoos; as we may allow by estimation 10 per cent. on the revenue for the ruzooms and savorums of the zemindars and despandeahs originally appointed, besides enaums to the value of one hundred rupees annually for the support of two brahmins in each village, reckoning the number of the latter, then ascertained, to be 3,000, making together 8,20,770 rupees, in addition to the public income. The aggregate of these two sums paid by the whole body of the people, and amounting to, rupees 60,28,470, or, Madras pagodas 15,07,117, it should be here remembered, including the sayer, or variable imposts, with the full territorial rent, or royal proprietary share of the gross annual produce of a tract of country, which at that time might have comprised about *two-thirds*, or something more than eleven thousand square miles, of the better ascertained dimensions, since of local divisions generally known under the same denominations.

Now however sufficient in itself to answer the demands of government, or justly proportioned to the state of agriculture and manufactures, such a pecuniary assessment might have been at the period of its first establishment; we believe it must be deemed wholly inadequate and disproportionate a century afterwards, about the era of the Mogul conquest, considering the prodigious change which, in the mean time, was gradually brought about all over the world, in the relative value of specie, and nature of commerce, in consequence of the two grand discoveries of America, and a passage round the Cape of Good Hope. These memorable events were antecedent even to the earliest date that can be assigned to the settlement of the revenues, now under consideration, made by Kootub Shahy; but it would seem their influence began only to be sensibly felt in proper Hindostan, towards the latter period we have fixed on, when a gold and silver currency was first introduced as the universal medium of exchange; or perhaps somewhat sooner in the Deccan. To account for the tardy circulation of the treasures of the West, in thus proceeding to onliveu, and at length, as is supposed, overwhelm with riches the opposite hemisphere, we are to recollect that the conquest of Mexico was not completed until the year 1525; and that 40 years more was not completed, before the communication with Manilla could have opened a direct channel to the continent of India, for pouring thither the annual sum of near half a million sterling in silver, since paid by the Spaniards from the produce of their Northerly American mines, in exchange for Eastern luxuries; that Peru was unknown until 1532, and the famous mines of Potosi undiscovered for thirteen years more; then the united wealth flowing into Europe from these great extraneous sources, did for the first white but replenish the exhausted veins of circulation, or supply the increased and quick demands of reviving industry; that though the passage round the Cape facilitated the communication with India, to drain thither the growing superfluity of specie in the West, yet the most natural and only effectual channels of commerce were in a great measure neglected, or altogether in the power of a nation whose trade was chiefly warfare, and whose barter with the petty states of Malabar has been considered, even by neutral barbarians, as unqualified piracy.

Continued by  
Moguls, but inadequate  
in 1687.

Discovery of America  
since

Enlarged commerce  
of Europe around  
Cape.

But when towards the close of the sixteenth century, the empire of the Portuguese in Asia, was in a manner dissolved; when the descendants of Tamerlane had firmly established their sway over the greater part of Hindostan, and by the influence of the mildest despotism, founded on the best political institutes, drew a great portion of the riches of the new world within the circle of their dominion through Surat, the grand emporium of both the Arabian and Persian gulphs; when the industrious Hollanders shook off the yoke of tyranny, and in 1602 laid the foundation of their fortune with subsequent ruin, in paving the way, and exhibiting a model for the numerous mercantile establishments of other European nations, which soon afterwards, by mutual rivalry and rapid circulation of the signs of wealth, so prodigiously increased the demand, with the price of Eastern productions; and when, instead of a precarious transit over deserts, infested by a powerful unconquerable race of plunderers, to be afterwards transported on the unwieldy coasting hulks of the Indian seas, capable only of making a triennial voyage to and from their destined ports, the merchandize of either hemisphere



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## REVENUE.

3d. Amount collected.

Analogical illustration.

hemisphere, found a much safer and speedier passage through multiplied channels round the Cape, then it was that the commerce of Hindostan may be said to have flourished; the quantity and value of its natural or artificial commodities increased in due proportion to the greater influx and consequent diminution of the value of the precious metals, considered relatively as the common medium of exchange. It is difficult now to ascertain with accuracy, the amount of bullion imported throughout this extensive region, in return for the whole export trade of the country, in the course of the century succeeding the year 1582; but we think it may be moderately estimated on an average, at a crore of rupees, or a million sterling annually, of which Mr. Orme, who had access to the cotemporary records of the Company, assigns to Surat, in his historical fragments, one half, we may give to Bengal for its opium and manufactures with those of Coromandel, distributed to the Eastward in the China seas, twenty-lacs out of the Manilla treasure, and surely *thirty* more may be thought rather a scanty allowance for the direct commerce with Europe, though at that period, it was confined for the most part to the coast of Malabar. This sum, if it had entirely been thrown into the general circulation, must certainly have more than tripled the existing stock of gold and silver currency, but a considerable portion was undoubtedly secreted, in conformity to the usage of the Hindoo inhabitants. Still, however, the necessities and luxuries of life acquired a high nominal value, ancient revenues, paid in money by a fixed disproportionate standard, became insufficient, and should have been increasing, agreeably to the change of actual circumstances.

Accordingly in the year 1687, in the reign of Alemgeer, we find a large addition had been made to the original assessment of Akbar, over the whole of the old Mogul domains, with the exception of some particular countries singularly situated, or bestowed mostly in jagher, on favoured individuals:—thus, as stated in our manuscript of an ancient official common-place book on which we only rely for the fairness of local comparison, or the relative accuracy of the sums of both periods, in 1582 the Assil toomar of

HINDOSTAN, exclusive of Bengal, Panjab and Moultan, was - - - 4,20,45,82,000 daams;

And the ezaffa, or increase in 1687 on the revenues of the same divisions of territory, besides the new annexations made in the intermediate space of time, by conquest - - -

98,00,11,653; being

little short of one-fourth of the original assessment.—In like manner in

THE DECCAN, the Sonbah of Berah Proper, including the rents of the Khalsa lands, as well as of those alienated in jagher by various military tenures of the Moguls, was rated in the beginning of Akbar, at - - - 59,38,90,000; but in the year specified, when Alemgeer held, unparticipated, the sceptre of all India west of the Birmahpote, an increase of one half had taken place, on the first jumma, or - - -

30,24,70,962 daams.

Another circumstance which further marks the influence of the American mines, or the discerning policy of the Emperors of Hindostan throughout the seventeenth century, in proportioning their finances to an extraordinary influx of specie is, that the relative value of silver with the other metals in currency, underwent such a change as might be expected, and soon became universal, in consequence of there being a greater quantity of the former, comparatively with the latter, thrown into the general circulation. We have no certain data for determining the proportion of gold to silver, either at the beginning or close of the period now in question; but from such loose informations as can be collected from cotemporary historians, we are led to suppose that it might have been as *one to ten* in the time of Akbar, and as *one to fifteen* in the reign of Alemgeer, which last, may still be deemed nearly the par of exchange as the discovery of the gold mines of Brazil, in the year 1695 has since in a great measure, maintained the equilibrium. In regard to the relative worth of silver and copper, which appears the best criterion to ascertain the truth of our present position, we are furnished with precise recorded facts from the imperial edicts. It hath already been observed, that the sicca rupee, according to the standard of *Soorel Mast* invariably adhered to since, and at first rated for 40 daams of teloo of copper, each weighing 21 mashch; but towards the close of the 17th century, the same coin was reduced by legal valuation, to 48 daams of fourteen mashch, which lowered the proportion from one to ten, to something near one to eight, as may be still the case, on account of the increased importation of the less valuable metal from that time forward.

Yet however far the two extraneous events we have noticed, might in their necessary consequences have authorized a considerable increase of the original revenue over all parts of the Mogul empire at the memorable conquest of the kingdom of Hyderabad; the subsequent neglect of such an operation, more especially with respect to the finances of the Northern circars, would have appeared quite inexplicable if the causes were not manifest, in reviewing the history and system of Mussulman administration there, considering the influence of a still more important though domestic occurrence which is sufficiently known, as it illustrates the annals of the Deccan, when the victorious arms of Alemgeer were led thither by himself in person, to crush the upstart destructive power of the Marhattas. The rise of this famous Hindoo aristocracy, on the ruins of the great monarchical state of Bejapoor, and the rapid progress of its elevation, soon after the accession of Bahadar Shah in 1707 to the imperial throne of Delhi, were productive of such local effects, as might be expected from the establishment of a government founded on principles the most barbarous and repugnant to every idea of civilized society. The enriching arts, manufactures and foreign

foreign commerce, in a manner exclusively confined to, or peculiarly distinguishing the Western coast of the Peninsula, while under the protecting sway of the Mahomedan princes of the race of Adilshahy, were, when subject to the violence, rapine, and predatory policy of the Marhattahs, driven thence to find an asylum on the shores of Coromandel and in Bengal, where they have continued since to flourish with increasing prosperity; and in no place more remarkably, than within that portion of territory, the present object of consideration; though it required all the virtue and superior intelligence of a free European administration, to draw adequate public supplies from the new current of wealth thus flowing in from three such copious sources as we have named; and which, during the Mogul government, was turned solely to private advantage, fed the ambition, with the pernicious luxury of intermediate agents, or could only be made beneficial to the state, through the dangerous channels of corruption.

But to estimate with more precision, the progressive improvement of the revenues of the circars, in consequence of the revolution of 1753, we shall here exhibit a statement of the French Jummabundy, five years later, and one immediately prior to their expulsion, when the influence of the recent change may be supposed greatest; in doing which, for the sake of a just comparison with the original assessment fixed in 1582, we shall follow the order observed in the latter, and consider the relative circumstances of both, premising, that for the districts south of the Godaveri, we are not furnished with an account of the particular settlements made with the zemindars by those Mussulmen or Hindoo agents with whom the French concluded general agreements, exclusive of all disbursements; and that therefore, we must substitute the ascertained collections of later times, made from the farming landholders, under the immediate sanction of sovereignty.

French Jummabundy, 1753.

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REVENUE:  
3d. Amount collected.

GUNTOOR, according to the Nabob Mahommed Ali's bundobust and receipts for this circar, in the Fussillee year 1189, after allowing for the enormous charges of sebundy, &c. claimed by the zemindars to support their peons - - - - - Madras Pag<sup>a</sup>

2,41,950

MUSTAFANAGUR, with Ellore, reckoned of equal value, according to the medium of Hussein Ali's and Jogre Pundit's 3 years settlement in 1176/7 and 1178, immediately on the establishment of the English, exclusive of Guntour and Ackulminar attached to Masulipatam, and rated in the Juma Kaumil, the former, Rupees 44,615. 14  $\frac{1}{2}$ ; the latter, 26,447. 15  $\frac{1}{2}$ ; - both circars

3,21,684

MASULIPATAM, including the two pergunnahs of Guntour, &c. with the sea, river, and land customs, for the year 1178, under the English government, but, exclusive of Walloor and Doss, the one annexed to Mustafanagur, at Madras pagodas, 6,000; the other, to Ellore, at 4,000; and, supposing that the pernicious system of farming was also adopted by the French, and immediately followed by fraudulent alienations of land, cutting down of the toddy trees, with all the various abuses which so prodigiously decreased the revenue of the sea port duties below the old assessment - - - - -

1,25,465

TOTAL South of the Godaveri - - - - - Rup<sup>a</sup> 27,56,396, or at 4 ea<sup>s</sup> Pag.

6,89,099 M<sup>a</sup> P.

RAJEMUNDRY, completely subjugated by M. Bussy, particularly the rich manufacturing island of Nagrum, hitherto unexplored, put under European management, and in 1167 Fussillee, or 1758 A. D. moderately assessed, exclusive of all mofussil expenses of sebundy, for near double the ancient rental, being, Rupees, 13,51,420; or, at 4 rup<sup>a</sup> each Mad<sup>a</sup> pag<sup>a</sup>; of these - - - - -

3,37,855

CICACOLE, in like manner, almost entirely reduced, and countries to the value of rupees 13,56,000, conquered from a number of independent zemindars, were conferred, we know not for what public considerations, in tenancy on Vizieram Rauze, intitled by Salabut Jung in derision, though, at the request of M. Bussy, Munniur Sultan or King of the Jungles; these annexations being, in addition to the old possessions of Potnoor, Boglepoot, &c. four pergunnahs, now constituting the zemindary of Vizianagrum, valued at rupees two lacs ninety thousand, which, as it was gradually dismembered from the ancient havillee or government lands, by the Mussulman deputies from Hyderabad, was bestowed on the predecessors of the actual possessors between the years 1655 and 1741, when the ambitious Vizieram, having acquired the whole district by the usual tenure of Hindoo landholders, began to extend his jurisdiction over the reduced proprietary lands of petty talookdars in the neighbourhood, through the corruption of Jaffer Ali Khan, then the deputy of Nizam ul Moolk, from whom he obtained Singricotah, until the joar or murderous scene of Bobilee, in 1756, terrified ten more of these little proprietors into submission, under the controul of the same Vizieram, now appointed farmer-general of the whole province of Cicacole south of the river Poondy. Accordingly, in 1758, the jummabundy of this circar, exclusive of sebundy and other charges, as appears by an original Abstract Statement, stood as follows:

VIZIANAGRUM, with eleven other zemindaries, including a muzzeranah paid to Asmeer U'dien Khan, and future zemindars, of, rupees 2,38,768; were now rated, in behalf of the public, for - - - - - Rupees 4,56,886

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## REVENUE:

34. Amount collected.

The Havillce of Chicacole and Cossim Cotah, &c. including the Mujinadary villages, were	
let for - - - - -	3,39,509
Worota, &c. pergunnah of Jaggaputty Rauze, for	1,43,000
Sittivaram, &c. of Poycarow - - - - -	82,734
And 500 candies of rice, paid by the two last zemindarries - - - - -	20,000
	<u>10,35,129</u>
ICHAPPOOR, including the Havillce farms of that pergunnah, as well as of Ganjam, &c. to the amount of, R <sup>1</sup> 1,76,141, with eighteen petty zemindarries, all under the controul of Narraindos of Kymedey, in like manner as those to the south were under Gajeputty Rauze of Vizianagram, to- gether assessed - - - - -	<u>7,91,298</u>

Making, in all, a Total of - Rupees 18,17,427; or,  
at 4 p<sup>1</sup> pagoda -

4.54.356 M<sup>1</sup> P.

Thus then the general assessment of all the Northern circars, while under the French government, was augmented to pagodas of 3 images, 14,81,310 and a fraction, or to rupees 59,25,243, clear of every Mofussil expense; but as charges of sebandy or revenue troops were very considerable in the time of the Moguls, and always to be deducted from the jumma kaunil of the provinces, we must, in order to draw a just comparison, make an allowance accordingly, and give credit for the amount to modern settlements, made in exclusion of such expenditure; then the difference will be merely political, that is to say, the native militia corps, which did and still continues the great efficient power of the Mahomedans in Hindostan, notwithstanding the recent practice of maintaining standing armies in imitation of Europeans, introduced by a few aspiring rulers, when considered with respect to the French government, were a proportional diminution of its strength, in as much as the ancient military force of the country, thus kept up more especially to secure the revenue, fell entirely under the controul of upstart zemindars, whose possessions, natural interest, and late usurpations, influenced irresistibly a disposition hostile in the extreme to a foreign establishment, though perhaps the very source of their own political existence, as was evinced in 1759, in the innovation of the circars by the English, when Gajeputty Rauze of Vizianagram, whose predecessor had been the most favoured landholder of M. Bussy's creation or aggrandizement, appeared the foremost to rebel against the actual sovereign, and join the standard of the foe with the sebandies of his district, which undoubtedly he would have done thereafter on any similar occasion, to oppose his new friends, agreeable to the universal Hindostanny maxim, that every revolution in the state, must be favourable to the lawless ambition of subjects, either in consolidating the rights acquired under the dispossessed party, with the additional concessions obtained by stipulation from the one succeeding, or at any rate, establishing former pretensions, as coeval with the date of the last conquest.

There never was however, any certain invariable rule for the militia establishment of a single district, perhaps for two years successively; the expense being estimated at one fourth, sometimes a smaller proportion, diminishing to one twelfth at other times; and always more or less, according to the influence of the provincial delegate, whose grand private emoluments arose from the abuse of this necessary institution. To ascertain, therefore, with any degree of accuracy, the amount of sebandy sepoy charges in all the circars, to be added to the French bundobust, in order to compare it with the original assessment of the Mahomedans, we must have recourse to the accounts of a later period than the era of either, though the numerary of individuals entertained in this service has, without doubt, been on the increase since the commencement of the English administration. Accordingly, the committee of circuit in 1777, found that the military force of the zemindar of Vizianagram alone exceeded 11,000 peons under every denomination, to which might be added, 5,000 auxiliaries from dependent landholders of Chicacole, exclusive of those of Ichapoor, to whom we may moderately assign 7,000 more, for all the provinces subordinate to Masulipatam. A pretty exact calculation makes the number 12,000, and a still better authenticated computation, allows 6,000 to the circar of Guuntoor; the whole forming a total of forty-one thousand armed men, entirely under the control of about seventy zemindars, and which, though collectively, not equal to the regular battalions of sepoys in the face of an enemy, would yet be of prodigious importance in the moment of an invasion, are the great support of the refractory spirit so notorious among the superior class of Hindoo landholders, while they are the bugbear of feeble unintelligent Mussulman administrations; incurring an annual expense to the state, now indeed partly defrayed from fraudulently sequestered lands, at the rate of four rupees monthly each man, of nineteen lac sixty-eight thousand rupees, though one half of this sum, would be fully sufficient to maintain, even on the European establishment, the requisite body of militia for the business of the collections, as well as to answer every purpose of internal defence against the enterprize of any of the neighbouring country powers.

The gross assessment of the circars then, with this addition under the French government, will amount to rupees 78,93,243, exclusive of mussooms, saycerums, and ennuma to brainins; forming an increase of nearly one half of the original settlement concluded in the sixteenth century, and in proportion to the augmentation of the revenue of Herar, an inland soubah of the Deccan, little benefited by commerce, seventy years earlier. Now, if we take into consi-  
deration,

deration, that the world had in the mean time been enriched, upwards of two thousand million sterling in specie, from all the American mines; that of this treasure, if we only allow one-twelfth, or a million annually, to have been brought into Hindostan through all the old and newly discovered inlets of trade, the currency of the empire circulating it on the largest scale, must have accumulated four-fold since the year 1582, and, consequently the pecuniary value of lands proportionably risen; that the Northern circars more especially have been benefited by the great revolution in the commerce of India, from the rise of the Marhatta aristocracy on the opposite coast; and above all, that nearly one-third of the whole territory of these provinces has been recently explored, conquered, and annexed to Rajemundry and Cicacole, where the increase of the old jumma kaumil is most remarkable, perhaps it will appear, that the French assessment in 1758, was less adequate to the circumstances of the country at that period, than we endeavoured to prove the antiquated settlement of the Kootub Shahy to have been, when in 1687, the amount was transferred to the Mogul records as the standard of future revenue, to mark the value of so much of the then conquered kingdom of Hydrabad.

To decide with greater certainty on this subject; let us draw a comparative view of what passed nearly in the same interval of time, with respect to the Finances of Bengal, which, though differing in importance, afford almost an exact parallel in other relative circumstances, except in the article of augmentation. There the assil toomar jumma of Toorel Mull, for reasons which have been assigned, or are self-evident in the depravity of Mussulman government, had undergone no variation in the way of improvement, from the days of Akbar to the death of Alemgeer; nor then, until the gradual subversion of the Mogul empire produced provincial independence, and made it the interest of Soubahdarry usurpers to bring into the public coffers of dismembered states, what they had before embezzled, when acting under the delegated authority of the kings of Delhi, virtually, as well as in form. In like manner Bengal, rich in manufactures, peculiarly so, in some natural productions required for foreign luxury, happy in its situation, and many concomitant local advantages, derived the same successive mercantile benefits from the discovery of America, of the passage round the Cape, and from the revolution of Bejapoor, than the circars had done, on a smaller scale, within the same period of time. Thus, agreeable to an authentic statement before us,

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## REVENUE:

3d. Amount collected.

Illustrated by comparison with the Revenue of Bengal.

BENGAL, in its modern state, exclusive of Midnapoor, with the other provinces of Orissa formerly annexed, and of some later continued annexations, which we shall particularize, was assessed in the gross, in 1582, for daums 50,96,36,280, or - - - Rupees 1,27,40,907

COOCH BEHAR, conquered by Alemgeer in 1660-1; divided into five chueklas, and 89 pergunnahs; was rated, from that time, for - - - Rupees 10,80,000

ISLAMABAD, or Chittagong, acquired in 1665-6; divided into 65 pergunnahs - - - 3,75,000

13,75,000

Making the Total of the original Settlement of Bengal -

1,41,15,907

The ABWABS, or recent Imposts added to this united sum, and registered in the Duster Dewanny, were as follow; viz.

In the government of Jaffier Khan, who had been dewan of the province from the death of Alemgeer, and by the pecuniary aid of Jaggut Seat, purchased the Soubahdarry from the ministry of Furrokhseer in 1713, and powerfully retained it until his death in 1725; a general tax, under the head Khass Noveessy, was established to defray the extraordinary batta, or agis, on the gold and silver coin brought up to be remitted to Delhi; in all, per annum - - 2,56,607½

In the succeeding and more independent administration of Sujah ul Dowla, until his death in 1739, a mothoot or arbitrary tax had taken place, of - - - 1,34,900

Nuzzeranah moocurrery, or fixed presents - - - 5,66,653½

Mathoot Feel Khanna, elephant charges - - - 2,88,702½

Abwab, Foujedarrys, Confiscations, &c. farmed - - - 6,17,820½

16,08,877

In the vigorous unqualified usurpation of Alivirdy Khan, commencing in 1740, and ending with his life in 1756, a chout or fourth, to be paid to the Marhattahs, was levied, and continued though the cause had ceased - - - 15,33,911½

Nuzzeranah for the expense of Munsor Gunje - - - 4,20,075½

Akiuc, Khesht, Gor, &c. partial taxes - - - 1,59,815½

21,13,752½

In the short, ambitious, needy government of Cassim Ali Khan, he brought into the public treasury the kiffayet, or profits of Shaumut Jung, Soulet Jung, &c. in Darra Purneah, and Dinajepoor,

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## REVENUE:

Amount collected.

poor, &c. being the private defalcations or increased revenue of  
Peelaks and Jageers of these soubjedars on a hustabood 51,46,833  
Besides a serf or expense of certain collections,  $\frac{1}{2}$  annas  
levied from the ryots - - - - - 4,53,488

56,00,326

95,78,763

TOTAL of the Assil Toomar Jumma of Toorel Mull in 1582, with  
Fazafa, or increase by conquest, Improvement or Taxes, to the year  
1763 - - - - - Rupees

2,36,94,670\*

But as it appears by a settlement made in 1728, in the government of Sujah ul Dowlah, that the assessment of Islamabad and Cooch Behar was reduced below the original valuation stated in the preceding account; so we are to observe, that the sum total of the increase accumulated to the year 1763, was only on the amount of the assil jummaundy of Toorel Mull, and makes, therefore, rather more than three-fourth parts of that ancient rental fixed in the reign of Akbar. It is further to be remarked, that since the commencement of the immediate financial administration of the English in 1772, over the whole soubah of Bengal, it had been discovered, and if not already, will soon be made manifest to the public, that the net actual revenue of the country due to the exchequer, and levied from the ryots with great moderation and equity, agreeable to the original proportion or political principles established in 1582, and invariably adhered to since, in assessing all and every part of the Mogul empire in Hindostan, exceeds three crore of rupees, including fraudulent or unconstitutional alienations of landed property to Bramins and others, under the denomination of hazzee zemeen; and that therefore the true pecuniary increase arising in this most valuable portion of the British dominions in India, comprising an area of 72,000 square miles, being nearly the extent of Great Britain itself, instead of seventy-five per cent. as before specified, has been really one hundred and twenty-five per cent. on the old assessment, in the same period of time, generally understood that the French government were enabled to realize only fifty per cent. in addition to the jumma kaumil of the Northern circars, which being equally favoured with the neighbouring territory of Bengal, in local or extraneous circumstances, might be supposed capable of yielding a similar increase, in proportion to the ancient revenue; and still with respect to either country the public income thus raised, which only in the same ratio with the fall in the value of specie, would be but on a par, with the first regular assessment; and what appears an extraordinary exaction, must be considered as merely nominal, without imposing the smallest additional burthen in the way of taxation, or servitude, on any of the more useful classes of the people employed in agriculture, manufactures, or commerce.

It is a disagreeable task to expose our own proper defects; but the knowledge is necessary to induce an effectual reform. We have freely animadverted on the deficiencies of the French and Mussulman governments, in regulating the finances of the circars; and impartiality, with the natural order of our subject, leads us now to a comparative view of English administration, as far as it relates to the amount of revenue collections. All the indulgence we have any right to expect, is, that public judgment may be suspended until respective merits are fairly stated, and the conduct, joined to the circumstances of either nation, properly understood, compared and discussed. Deeming our materials sufficiently correct and ample, we shall here exhibit a general abstract Statement of the annual assessment of the Northern circars, under the immediate sovereignty of the Company, formed, not on the partial settlement of a single year, nor from former or future agreements of rent for the same provinces, but from the jummaundies actually concluded, since the establishment of British authority down to the present time, extracted from the public records already for the most part published, and including a period of seventeen successive years from the Fussullee 1176 to that of 1193, both inclusive, or from 25th September 1766, soon after the formal annexation of this valuable territory to the empire of Great Britain, with all the despotic rights and royalties claimed or exercised by the great Mogul, or his viceroy of the Deccan, without even accepting the arrears of balances then due from the several zemindars, and still more largely from Hussien Ali Khan, the last Mussulman aumildar, though never claimed to the 24th September A. D. 1783.

\* The financial occurrences of Egypt might also be cited in 1516. When Sultan Selim conquered this country from the Mamlukes, he fixed the rent of the lands capable of cultivation, then ascertained by measurement (and which from the physical circumstances of the country, confined from its southern limits, under as far as Cairo, in lat. 30° North, to a narrow valley of 10 to 20 miles in breadth on either side of the Nile, and thence to the sea, circumscribed by a desert bordering the two branches of that river forming the Delta, could never have exceeded 14,203 British square miles in its greatest extent, or of local measure 68,75,768 Thedans,\* of which perhaps only  $\frac{1}{2}$  arable, each of 20 square cubits of 14 English feet every side, or nearly one acre and a third) at 40 mydens or parats, equal to a Turkish piastre, or 2/6 sterling per Thedan,\* including a miri or tribute only of 25 mydens to the Pasha, and the remainder to defray the expense of the civil and military establishments, being together thought equivalent to half the yearly produce of so much land, about the year 1684. When the value of specie had considerably diminished, and the governing Days

were advancing to independence, the rental of a Thedan\* was generally increased to one mahboob, 1,200 parats, equal to  $\frac{1}{2}$  German crowns; but in 1779 the ordinary proportionated exactions of the old Timar proprietors, for the same square measure, had risen to  $\frac{3}{4}$  German crowns, or seven and a half times the original assessment of Sultan Selim; and when the Beys settled by a valuation of the crop, with yearly measurement of the lands actually in cultivation, within their own immediate domains, then the price of a Thedan\* varied from 5 to 10 German crowns, according to the quality of culture; the revolution in the relative worth of money and territorial produce throughout all the kingdoms and states of Europe in the same period of time, and through the same causes, discovery of the American mines, with increased commerce, is too well known to be here noticed; the change is comparatively great, as the distance of situation with respect to the source of riches is lessened, and as the custom of secreting treasure is peculiar to India.

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REVENUE:  
3d. Amount collected.

GUNTTOOR, being only one full year under the management of the English, in the whole period now under consideration; we must confine our estimate to accounts of the same temporary limits, and we are fortunately furnished with the jumma of this identical year, being the Fussulce 1180, or A.D. 1779, when Mahomed Ally rented this circar from the presidency of Fort St. George, the produce of which, to do the greater justice to the financial administration of the French, we have already passed to the credit of their settlement, in like manner as we now state it, in its more proper place - - Madras pagodas 2,41,950\*.

MUSTAFANAGUR, with Ellore, as will appear in the French Statement, yielded

Anno 1176 to 1178, to Hussein Ali and Tongie Pundit, on a medium of three years settlement, made on their own account with the zemindars, Madras pagodas, 3,21,684, of which they only agreed to give the English, one year with another, for the same period of time, being the three first years of the Company's administration, inclusive of 40,000 Madras pagodas, in lieu of one-half of the annual pay of regular troops employed in behalf of government, chiefly in the Rajemundry circar, as will be hereafter specified, and stipulated to be paid by these renters, over and above the amount of the jumma (the whole making the sum of) - - -

1,78,836

In 1179, immediately on the expiration of Hussein Ali's lease, it was discovered, that advantage had been taken of the inexperience of new rulers in the three circars, rented to the amount of Madras pagodas 1,56,533, of which the proportion assigned to Mustafanagur and Ellore, from thenceforward brought on as an increase on the first jumma - - - is

90,339

Total Jumma, A.D. 1769/70, - - - was

2,70,175

In 1181 to 1187, a further increase, proceeding from the resumption of the Havillee farms of Dooa and Walloor, which had been included in Hussein Ali's jagger, and soon afterwards from the forfeiture of Jaffier Beg's grant of the Condapillee havillee, together with some other estimated advantages† - in all

22,200

Total Settlement 1777/8 - - -

2,92,375

In 1188 to 1192 inclusive, a new settlement made at Madras for five successive years, stating an increase, on the former jumma, of 12½ per cent. or as it is expressed on the mamool, or customary jumma of the Moguls, an equivalent for which, however, in resumed lands, denominated the Meraasy, or inheritance of Vencatoroytoo, will be found in the account of the Rajamundry circar, in all - - -

16,691

Total Jumma, 24th Sept. 1783 - - -

3,09,066

The annual medium of these four different settlements, which include the net jumma of both circars, with every article of increase, in a period of 17 years, appears therefore to be - - - Madras pagodas

2,74,636

MASULIPATAM, including Nizampatam, with all the other districts, stated in the French settlement before exhibited, on the medium of the last 17 years jumma annually, with little variation - - - 1,01,409 and including also sea and land customs, mint duties, and licences for arrack, &c. variable taxes - - - 13,043

being together, one year with another - - -

1,14,462

Total South of the Godavari - - Rupees, 25,24,152; or }  
at 4 each pagoda - - - - - }

6,31,038

RAJAMUNDY underwent the same changes as the circars of Ellore and Mustafanagur:

Anno 1176/78, it yielded to Tongee Pundit and Hussein Ali, as very accurately stated in the Madras jumma of 1778, inclusive of the havillee, and the valuable territorial grants which these men obtained under a certain irregular form of sunnud from the Nizam, but in fact through the bounty of the Company, under whose government the right of possession, at least, was first established, on a medium of the three years, Madras pagodas 2,99,940, of which Tongee Pundit, appointed public interpreter or dewan, while he held the high responsible trust of serishtadar or canongoe being also in the present case, the immediate farmer of Rajemundry, agreed to pay yearly into the exchequer of his employers, including 40,000 pagodas for half the expense of regular troops employed in reducing to proper obedience the zemindars of this province, and particularly to

\* This was the Jumma settled with the zemindars, including a Nuzzeranah of pagodas 25,300, and a certain portion of schundy charges, amounting to 13,500 pagodas, but exclusive of the Havillee or Jagger lands of Gunttoor and Condavaree, rented for Madras pagodas 19,200, which, if added, constitutes the Jumma 2,61,150 Madras pagodas.

† We have discovered that in the amount of the increase, Madras pagodas 22,200, here assigned to the circars of Mustafanagur and Ellore is included the valued rent of the Havillee of Rajemundry, being pagodas 2,310, which should have been placed in the accounts of that circar, for the sake of a just comparison.



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REVENUE:  
A. Amount collected.

to put himself and Hussein Ali in possession of their recent landed acquisitions, under the good-will of their new masters - - - - - in all 1,67,830

In 1179, the proportion of Tongee's secret profits brought to light, and thenceforward included in the annual settlement of this circar, stated for the three provinces, as before, at pagodas 1,50,533, exclusive of the two jagher appropriations, and expense of 7,093 pagodas, which, being the charge incurred by the Company's immediate management, instead of intermediate agency with the zemindars, though deducted in the estimate of net profits, should, and did make part of the new bundobust, and it is therefore now included. It is proper, however, to remark, that according to the jummaundy of Hussein Ali and his colleague, made in their own behalf, the real defalcation of revenue, after deducting Madras pagodas 71,055, being the yearly amount allowed to them, under the denomination of jagher and merassy lands, as valued on the records of the Company, instead of 1,56,533, amounted actually to 1,96,810; but the proportion of profits, at this period, discovered and brought to future account, was only - - - - - 71,287

Total Jummaundy, A. D. 1769/70, was - - -

2,40,117

In 1181, or more precisely in August 1771, Hussein Ali died, and the grant made to him, of the pergunnahs of Tattapar, Peroor, &c. in the nature of a jagher, valued together at Madras pagodas 56,055, was of course resumed, and the lands re-annexed to the zemindaries from which they had been dismembered, subject, however, to the aforementioned rent, from henceforth to be paid into the Company's treasury, but as a provision for Hussein Ali's family, thus deprived of their jagher, a yearly allowance of 25,000 pagodas, or a lack of rupees, was generously assigned to them out of the public receipts on this amount, to the Mussilce 1187: however, we only find the jummaundy increased - - - 27,535

Total Settlement, 1777/8 - - - - Madras pagodas

2,67,652

In 1188, the five years settlement made at Madras, stating an increase of 12½ per-cent. on the ancient jumma of the Moguls, in lieu of which, however, the zemindars were now fully indemnified in the reversionary possession of Tongee Pundit's merassy, valued by themselves at Madras pagodas 35,000 per annum, even after allowing for the salary of 10,000 pagodas, for which they stand accountable, exclusive of their jummaundy, and which, in the meantime, has been paid to the heritable successors of Tongee out of the Company's treasury, to make amends for the deprivation of what might well be considered, because denominated, an inheritance of right belonging to this bramin family, servants of the public; the augmentation thus brought to the debt of Rajemundry in September 1778, was - - - - - 18,588

to the year 1192, or September 1783, when the Total Jumma was - - -

2,86,240

But the medium of these four settlements, concluded for a period of seventeen years, does not exceed what we here state it at, being - Madras pagodas which, added to the jummaundies of Ellore, Mustafanagur, and Masulipatam, shows the total estimated revenue of all the dependencies of Masulipatam government to be, on a medium of seventeen years, Madras pagodas 6,41,332, or current pagodas 7,05,487; or to be more exact, on a medium of the actual settlements of each year, including the real collections of duties and variable rents, current pagodas 7,02,738; though at the same time it may be proper to observe, that the whole of the actual receipts for the same period, on account of such medium settlement, and collections, one year with another, throughout the seventeen, do not exceed the sum of current pagodas 5,72,251, and that consequently there has been an annual balance incurred of current pagodas 1,30,487, of the aggregate of which, however, current pagodas 14,68,293, being rather more than the total of two years revenue, as we have already had occasion to remark, must be placed to the account of the last six years.

CICACOLE, including all the districts stated in the French jummaundy, together with many other more recent conquests annexed to the zemindary of Vizianagrum, by virtue of the Company's arms, or civil authority, and worth in the gross about five lacks of rupees annually, stood nearly as follows:

VIZIANAGRUM, assessed with little variation for these 17 years past, excepting the five last; when there was an increase stipulated, but not yet realized, of one lack of rupees on a medium - - - - Madras pagodas 1,82,045

JAHARPOOR, in like manner, on a medium of 15 years from 1768 - - - 1,58,270

Total of Cicacole Rupees, 13,61,260, or, at 4 per pagoda - - -

3,40,315

Total Jummaundy of all the Northern Circars, Rupees 48,94,468, }  
of Madras pagodas - - - - -

12,23,617

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## REVENUE:

3d. Amount collected.

• It is true, indeed, that in the seventeen years of English administration, it may be urged a balance has been incurred on the jummabundy of the Masulipatam dependencies, together with those of Vizagapatam and Ganjam, of twenty-five and one half lacks of Madras pagodas, or on a medium, one and a half lacks annually, which might therefore be deducted from the sum total of revenue assigned in the preceding account to the Northern circars collectively, in order to draw a fair comparison with the Mogul and French settlements, the amount of which, though perhaps not fully paid into the public treasury, was some way or other, unquestionably raised from the country in behalf, or with the knowledge of government, and consequently, *in modo*, realized to the state. But on the other hand, one chief of Masulipatam has published to the world, under the sanction of an oath, and it has been verbally acknowledged, before the great tribunal of the nation, by another, that a certain *nuzzarana*, or yearly present, had or might have been received from the zemindars and renters, over and above their stated jummabundies, by the superior agent in the management of the collections, on behalf of the Company. And truly, these gentlemen seem not to have revealed any very great secret, in this their united testimony; for as it appears that no adequate appointments in the nature of commission or salary were annexed to the chiefship in question, at the same time that it hath been notoriously distinguished, both at home and abroad, for many years back, as the most desirable, the genteel employment in point of emolument, under the government of Fort St. George; so we may reasonably conclude, that large private advantages must always have been reckoned on, though perhaps the amount might not have been so generally understood before. We are still, however, at an uncertainty on this head. The account sworn to, as having been delivered by the Company's *serikstedar dewan*, or public interpreter, states in one instance, for a three years settlement, a secret benefit of Madras pagodas 1,92,261, and a further posterior emolument of Madras pagodas 63,073, derived by different agents on the same collections, both with respect to time and place. According to this calculation, then, the annual *douccar* would be pagodas 86,078; which, on a revenue, as before ascertained, of Madras pagodas 6,41,352, makes rather more than thirteen per cent. Now, if on principles of the hypothetical reasoning pursued by the very able, disinterested, and learned president of a late Committee of the House of Commons, the public should adopt the belief of a double private advantage, under circumstances of a charge of agony, or, which is the same thing, when the profits usually annexed to the actual, responsible, troublesome station of chief collector, have been, in whole or part, anticipated by the others, in a two, three, or five years settlement; if, further, it should acquiesce in the speculative opinions of some philosophers, and concluding, that under similar circumstances, mankind think and act alike, extend the idea of secret emoluments to all places of great trust, with insufficient or unsuitable appointments, particularly to such as are exposed to the temptations incident to the established system of Indian finance, then our task would be light in accounting for the deficiencies of revenue which occur in the foregoing statement, and fixing the national right, at least, on a comparison with the Mogul and French jummabundies, to the sum total of what we have assigned to that concluded under the administration of the English: But we cannot assume, on such foundations, however solid they may appear, a fact involving the interests and reputation of a number of worthy individuals, so singularly situated as the Company's servants abroad in general have been, since the acquisition of their immense territorial possessions in Hindostan. And moreover, with respect to the balances due on account of the revenues of the circars, they are in a certain train of payment: the zemindars acknowledge their validity, as in truth and moderation, they well may; and the slightest imputation of undue exactions has not yet, we believe, been thrown by any of these farming landholders on their superiors employed in the collections. Nevertheless, we are free to admit, that perquisites (and where are the offices of trust, in which none are received?) have been realized by all the higher and lower agents of government, under every denomination, not in the receipt of adequate fixed salaries, from the countries let out at yearly rent, exclusive of the stipulated jummabundy, even to the full amount of the deficiencies now in question, or something about twelve and a quarter per cent. on the gross medium rental of all the circars, as ascertained for these seventeen years past; though we hope, and are firmly persuaded, that the same sum, in an equal period of time to come, will not exceed five per cent. on the revenue, which may, with political certainty, be realized, if the Company, as its dignity, its interests, and the reason of the thing seem more especially to require, can be induced to allow, voluntarily and avowedly, such a recompence to be made, not indeed to two or three individuals, but to a greater number of covenanted servants, trained up in the knowledge of the country languages, and appointed to superintend the collections, under the immediate controul of one or more receivers general, whose functions might be further extended to provincial civil government universally, so far as to be able to enforce the execution of any established system of municipal law or regulations, whether respecting the finances, or any other branch of interior administration.

Deducing then from a fact thus gratuitously admitted, a reform so important; and having already confidently supposed the complete liquidation of the balances at present due from the circars, instead of a diminution on this account from what the English jummabundy has been stated at, in our Comparative Estimate, we hope to be allowed in justice, to add the whole amount to our seventeen years settlement, in lieu of what it heretofore exclusively levied, may from henceforth be incorporated with the ordinary annual demands of the public exchequer to this augmentation, of one and a half lacks of Madras pagodas. We have further a national right to four lacks ninety-two thousand, or ruyees nineteen lacks sixty-eight thousand, being the term assigned to the French bundobust for the maintenance of the militia

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\* 3d Amount collected.

militia or subsidiary establishment, which always had been considered, as indeed common policy and the safety of the state required it should be, in forming the original jumma kaamil, as well as in every temporary succeeding assessment, established by their predecessors the Moguls. But besides the pecuniary increase thus annexed to our settlement, and constituting thereby its amount, Madras pagodas 18,65,617, or rupees 74,62,468, we must be allowed to state the Company's donations in land, lately resumed in favour of Hussein Ali and Tongee Pundit; also the value of still greater appropriations yet continued to the whole body of zemindars or Indian landholders, on the erroneous, inpolitic, unconstitutional idea, of their being the original, natural, or rightful proprietors of the soil; an idea perfectly novel in the financial legislation of Hindostan; and being equally unknown, in the Mussulman and French systems established in the Northern circars, could only have originated from the enlarged, humane, and generous principles acquired under a free constitution of government, and may therefore be exclusively ascribed to the English; and on the foundation of which, we now presume to give their benevolence credit for the past, and their treasury in future; for just such an increase, of revenue, to be within moderate bounds, as will make the net sum of a crore of rupees, or a million sterling per annum, being nearly double the amount of the ancient Mogul settlement, and one third in addition to that much boasted one of modern date, concluded by our rivals in Europe, while in possession of this most valuable portion of the present empire of Britain in the Deccan.

Propriety of recovering  
detractions.

Nor in this, do we derogate from the national character of liberality, more than violate the private right of individuals; seeing that the same laws, privileges, and form of administration, instituted by the civil authority of a small insulated nation, as peculiarly adapted to its own genius and local circumstances, were not ordained for all countries, and all mankind differently situated, disposed, or ruled. That with respect to the natives of Hindostan, it would be a most dangerous innovation, diametrically opposite to the letter and spirit of all Oriental legislation, ancient and modern, devised by conquerors, to admit, either in theory or practice, the doctrine of private individual landed property by inheritance, free or feudal tenures, extending beyond the period of a single life; but above all, seeing that the great law of society, public expediency, requires the full aid of established financial resources, justly proportioned to the gross annual produce of the soil, equitably moderate with respect to the natural wants or ability of the peasantry, and only barely sufficient, on the most economical scale, to supply the absolute exigencies of the lenient protecting sovereign state, under the dominion of which such rare peculiar advantages are enjoyed, amidst the despotism, tyranny, and oppression, common to almost all the other countries of Asia. Neither do we go beyond the bounds of moral certainty, as to the actual rental of the circars, belonging always of right, exclusively and unalienably, as we hope in future it will be so in fact, to the established government, in thus enhancing the current revenue of the Company, (even without touching the fraudulent appropriations of land made in favour of Bramins or others, and necessary now to be resumed, so greatly above the present jumma bundy or demands of the exchequer, by supposing and bringing on a virtual increase of rupees 51,05,532, being rather more than equal to the amount of the assessment itself, calculated on a medium of the last 17 years, according to our settlement, at 48,94,468 rupees. We are supported in our belief by documents, which cannot readily be procured through any other channel, and which, if we be not too presumptuous, though difficult now to be invalidated, even should they prove in the end fallacious, may with the greatest facility be authenticated, if founded in truth; for they not only bring forth a subject of investigation, point out the order and proper mode of enquiry, and state positive facts, with all the written formalities of legal evidence, which at least remove the difficulty of proving a negative, but exhibit such a minute detail of the finances, however new to the public, or to others more immediately concerned in them, as seems best calculated, if not to incur instantaneous detection in error, at any rate, to meet the corroborating testimony of more authoritative vouchers. All the indulgent favour we claim individually to ourselves is, that the following more true and perfect statement of the actual revenues of the Northern circars, extracted from and carefully collated with these our original papers, corrected by a variety of experienced personal informations, local enquiries, and analogical reasoning, may be substituted in the room, as it should in right, of the deficient inadequate jumma bundy before assigned to the English be set against, and eclipse; for it will not admit of comparison with any former settlement, and henceforth be regarded as the true criterion of national merit, in estimating the respective integrity, ability, and intelligence of financial administration.

Doul bundohust, or gross sub-rental of the mhal and sayre of the khalsa or government lands throughout the Northern circars, as concluded annually by the zemindars and temporary renters on their own proper accounts, with the ryots or inferior husbandmen; but by virtue of a previous yearly agreement with the state, according to which the full amount thus collected from the peasantry, is supposed to be paid in or accounted for with the public exchequer, after deducting unavoidable specified losses and charges incurred in the management, as well as exclusive of landed property and privileges allowed to the several zemindarry agents employed in the collections, as an ample reward for their services, under the denomination of Enaums and Severums: The whole taken from a variety of authentic original accounts, as will be hereafter set forth; but chiefly from a statement formed on a medium of ten years of the gross revenues of the country, agreeably to the rule of Buttai or Seri, extracted from the mofussil or village records, under the auspices of Hussein Ali Khan; who, in the capacity of amildar, almost uninterruptedly and universally superintended the finances of all these provinces, from the year 1759 to that of 1769.

## C I R C A R

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## REVENUE:

3d. Amount collected.

**GUNTOUR**, of which the capital is 55 miles W.E.N.  $\frac{1}{2}$  N. from Masulipatam Port, 15 miles south of the Kistna, which is three farther in the same direction, from the fort of Condapillee, anciently composed of five pergunnahs; and a portion subdivided since into 25 mootahs, containing 888 villages, exclusive of their pollams, or small detached dependencies, distributed under the five following *Desmookees*, or patent territorial jurisdictions; viz.

1st. **CHINTAPILLE**, the zemindarry of Vassreddy Rasmanah, of the Combewar cast, situated on the south bank of the Kistna, chief town of the same name, 20 coss N.W. from its capital of Guntour; containing 300 villages, comprized in one-half of the great havillee pergunnah of the circar, the derobust or whole of Raipoondy, and a kismut or part of Venicoonda; together yielding, on a moderate valuation of half its produce, being the Circar's share - - - - - Madras Pagodas 1,32,000

2d. **RAIPILLE** and Raichore, inconsiderable forts near the south bank of the Kistna; 18 coss easterly from Guntour, giving name to a zemindarry, held separately or in copartnership, formed of a fourth dismembered portion of the old havillee pergunnah; containing 180 villages under Manick Row and Tuppetty Row Jungannah, brothers or cousins of the Velmaur cast, yielding, exclusive of enaums, &c. - - - - - Madras Pagodas 75,000

3d. **CHITTCOM-PAY**, Chilcoloorpoodoo, the jurisdiction of Manoor Narsina, bramin mynuadon of the province, 14 coss south of the capital; another fourth of the havillee, containing 150 villages, and rated on a medium at - - - - - Madras Pagodas 68,000

4th. **VENICONDA**, or Innaconda, with the neighbouring hill-fort and pergunnahs of Bellam or Vellumconda, constituting the zemindarry of Gondarow of the Velma cast, 26 coss south of Guntour, containing 230 villages - - - - - 70,000

5th. **KOLOOR**, on the south bank of the Kistna, 16 coss N.W. of Guntour, formerly of greater value on account of its diamond mine, now reduced to the rental of eight villages, forming the talook of Opparow; zemindar of Noozed - - - - - 6,000

**TOTAL** of Guntour Districts - - - - - Madras Pagodas 3,51,000

## C I R C A R

**BUNDER**, or sea-ports of Masulipatam, formerly consisting of the eight following Mehals, forming a semicircle from two to 20 coss round the fort, situated in the pergunnahs of,

1st. **HAVILLEE**, which included the grounds and gardens of 12 pettnahs, with their circumjacent six pollams, the salt-pans of Masulipatam and Pernanco, some lacks of toddy trees, farmed to the distillers of arrack, and together with the sayer or variable taxes on houses, the mohterefer, the sea, land, and river customs, yielded, according to the jumma kaumil, an annual revenue of - - - - - Rupees 3,39,855. 1 $\frac{1}{2}$

But by reasons of these rents and taxes being for the most part discontinued, though we know not from what considerations they are levied every where else within the Company's jurisdiction, that a great number of palmyra trees have been cut down, through the avidity of temporary farmers, or negligence of superintendants, and that the produce of salt, has been reduced one-half by recent prohibition of its importation in Bengal, the actual receipts under this head may be estimated, one year with another, 60,000 rupees: for Mint Duties, Sea, Land and River Customs, at 3 per cent. on exports and imports, exclusive of indulgencies to the factors of foreign nations, &c. 40,000 rupees; being the profits on salt, and 20,000 more arising on the arrack farms; the whole making an object of gross revenue - - - - - Madras Pagodas 30,000

2d. **DIVI**, with its six lesser tunkces or islands, eight coss S.E. anciently rated at rupees 91,070. 14 $\frac{1}{2}$  \*. and now yielding - Madras Pag. 30,000

3d. **MOLOOR**, or Mololl, formerly 15,528. 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ . now incorporated with Guntour, or entirely struck out of the rent-roll.

4th. **ENGOODU**, or Innogoodoo, formerly rupees 19,675. 12. now Madras Pagodas - - - - - 3,000

5th. **PERUNNAH** or Peddanah, before, rupees 17,109. 13. now, Madras Pagodas - - - - - 3,000; 10 villages.

6th. **JOOMERY**, or Jumedee, anciently, rupees 22,508. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ . now Madras Pagodas - - - - - 6,000; 24 villag.

7th. **BONDARA**,

\* All the sums here specified in rupees, with reference to a former settlement, are extracted from the Jumma Kaumil.

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Ed. Amount collected.

7th. BONDARA, in the time of the Kootub Shahy, rupees 16,757, and now - - - - -	Madras Pagodas	4,000
8th. NARSARON, town and district, with sayer, rupees 17,453, once, and still - - - - -	Madras Pagodas	5,000
		81,000

Besides which, in 1759, when these districts were conquered by, and formally transferred to, the English, the following annexations were made to the former dependencies of the fort of Masulipatam; viz.

9th. NIZAMPATAM, formerly a circar of one pergunnah, subdivided into 36 districts south of the Kistna, on the sea-coast, and 20 coss from Masulipatam, the zemindary of Velunki Mullarow Velmawar, who, though possessing his official emoluments, has been exonerated from the important duties of landholder; consequently, this pergunnah has shared the fate of the havillee of Masulipatam, being heretofore rated at rupees 2,46,000, and now barely yielding, with its salt - - - - - Madras Pag<sup>s</sup> 25,000

10th. GUNTOOR, a large pergunnah detached from Condapillee circar, two coss west of Masulipatam, containing 52 villages, the russooms and sayerums levied by Codantram as zemindar, but without exercising the functions of one, formerly assessed for rupees 41,615. 14½. and still valued at - - - - - Madras Pag<sup>s</sup> 11,000

11th. AUCHILMINAR, of 15 villages, detached from the same circar, under the same zemindar, and rated, rupees 26,447. 15½. now Madras Pag<sup>s</sup> - - - - - 3,500

12th. TONDAWA, from Ellore, and zemindary of Mungletore - Mad<sup>s</sup> Pag<sup>s</sup> - - - - - 14,000

13th. The Towns and Dependencies of Nettapillee, Bandermahanka, Sakunapillee, and Ramisserum, Gouganapillee, Antravidee, &c. on the sea-coast of Rajemundry on different branches of the Godaveri, and together valued at - - - - - Madras Pagodas 10,000

63,500

TOTAL of Masulipatam Districts - - - Madras Pagodas - 1,44,500

#### CIRCAR

CONDAPILLEE, consisting of 24 mehals, into which it is still divided under the following ten zemindariets, excepting the dismembered pergunnahs of Guntour and Auchilminar.

1st. CHAHUR MHAL, or Cancole, its capital, 10 coss north of Masulipatam, the desmooney jurisdiction of Candana Paupia and Soubyah Row Velmawar, first established under kunnuds from Salabut Juug 1759, and confirmed by similar, but more irregular grants from the French governor of Masulipatam, and future Mussulman amildars, not formally vested in the zemindary by the English government, though virtually so, as being included in the Convention of 1766, of late years exonerated from official duties; but in receipt of the annexed emoluments of russooms and sayerums, which have been doubled in favour of Opparow, who, without any pretensions of right, claims what we understand by a superiority. The district extremely fertile, compact, and advantageously situated; bounded by the Colair lake, on the north; divided on the east, from the zemindary of Muggletore, by the river of Calipatam, and encircled on the south and west, by the pergunnahs of Auchilminar Guntour, with Voyoor and Medoor, in Opparow's zemindary, forms nearly a square of about 20 miles each side, and comprehends 260 villages, in the four following Mehals or Pergunnahs; viz.

- (1.) VENICOTAH, 84 villages anciently rated for R<sup>s</sup> 37,152, actually yielding to that amount; but in our Doul bundobust only - - - - - Madras pagodas 17,000
- (2.) GOODEVARRI, 64 villages: formerly rupees 84,674, now Madras pagodas 16,000
- (3.) BINTERSELY, within or overflowed by the lake; contains 66 villages, of which 44 lunkas or islands, extremely rich in paddy, about 16,000 candies yearly produced from one thousand catties of ground, being 1/10th of the whole land of the pergunnah, should therefore yield as it does actually to the circar, or rather its farmer, near 20,000 pagodas; was valued in the jumma kaumil at 34,328 rupees, but in the Doul bundobust is set down at - - - - - Mad<sup>s</sup> pag<sup>s</sup> 10,000
- (4.) CALDINDER, containing 57 villages, of which 11 have been annexed to Muggletore: assessed in the jumma kaumil, rupees 20,404, yielding now - - - - - Madras pagodas 7,000

50,000

2. DEVARCOTAH, 15 miles south of Masulipatam on the north bank of the Kistna, adjoining to Divi on the west, fertile in rice and ioary, and well managed pergunnah zemindary of Ezlagudda Codant Ram of the Combewar cast; the family first settled here as combies

conbics or husbandmen, in the year 1580, are supposed to have got their first sunnuds for Desmooky jurisdiction from Abdallah Kootub Shah in 1640, though not constantly confirmed in the possession of it, by future rulers. In 1726, one of the family obtained the zemindarry of Guntoor and Auchilmimar; but in 1732, being involved in the general proscription of Rustum Khan, lost all territorial jurisdiction, rights, and privileges, in the confusion of future revolutions, have by some means or other, regained possession, and were numbered in the Convention of 1766, paid formerly rupees 2,10,455. are supposed actually to collect pagodas 70,000. exclusive of saverams, &c. but by the Doul bundobust only - - - - - 60,000.

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3d. **NUJERE, or NOOZED**, the capital at the distance of 60 miles N. westerly from Masulipatam, and about 16 coss northerly from Condapillee, of the extensive desmooky, supposed to appertain by right of sunnuds, to Macca Narraya Opparow, of the Velma cast. Macca Venkiah, the first of this family, came from the Carnatic, and rented 5 or 6 villages of Golapillee or Nujere in 1652; twelve years after, the next in succession obtained a lease of the whole pergunnah, and took the name of Opparow, in addition to the local patronimic of Macca. In the beginning of the present century the 5th descendant, by the actual zemindarry grants of aumildars, was for a time in possession of the several districts which actually compose this territorial jurisdiction, but under the government of Rustum Khan, the whole family were expelled, and the lands put under the immediate management of tehseeldars for twelve successive years afterwards. However, on a change of the provincial ruler, an upstart of the name of Venkiah was produced, under the patronage of the Condana family, who were the acting farming superintendents, and then of considerable influence with Ali Kuli Khan, the aumildar, as the heir of line to Opparow, and in that capacity, was reinstated in 1738, in part of the zemindarry jurisdiction. Juggiah, the brother of this pretender, who succeeded, died a prisoner in Bussy's camp before Khalburga, in 1755-6; from this time forward, Vencatari Opparow, another pretender, through the management of Condana, and influence of Hussein Ali Khan, was put in possession, in virtue of aumildarry sunnuds, but participated the management of his desmooky, with his brother Naraya, until the year 1772; when dying, the latter assumed the zemindarry by sufferance of the English, without any other right, and under the same authority, was expelled as a rebel in the present year 1783. The district extends from the Kistna to the Godavari, and is pretty equally divided between the Circars of Ellore and Condapillee, comprising near 2,000 square miles, of which the six following pergunnahs, depend on Condapillee; viz.

- (1.) **MEDOOR**, on the banks of the Kistna, 30 miles north-westerly from Masulipatam, adjoining on the west of Devarcotah, assessed in the jumma kaamil for rupees 94,083. yielding now - - - - - Madras Pagodas 25,000
- (2.) **VOYOOR**, adjoining to the preceding pergunnah on the north, anciently rated at Rupees 63,855. now - - - - - Madras Pagodas 20,000
- (3.) **NONASTALLUM** further to the west and north, but united to the two former melahs, contains the diamond mine of Mulleyilly, still annexed to the Nizamur, in all, formerly, rupees 63,746. now - - - - - Madras pagodas 25,000
- (4.) **GOLAPILLEE**, in which pergunnah is situated the capital town Nujere, assessed anciently for rupees 36,693. but in the Doul bundobust, - - - - - Madras pagodas 10,000
- (5.) **CHAITRAL**, adjoining to the former on the north, surrounded by small hills, chiefly alienated in unauthorized grants to peons of the Velma cast, valued anciently at 14,000. rupees, actually worth 10,000 pagodas, and exclusive of these fraudulent tenums, set down in the Doul bundobust at - - - - - 6,000
- (6.) **VEJERAI**, another hilly pergunnah, disposed of in like manner as the former, to which it adjoins, worth 8,000 pagodas, and exclusive of enaums - - - - - 4,000

90,000.

4th. **BEJIVARIA or BEZOAR**, on the banks of the Kistna, 39 miles N.W. by W. from Masulipatam, adjoining to the pergunnah of Medoor, and forming what was anciently considered an important pass, through a small broken range of hills, which terminate here. The first or lowest region of the maritime provinces, constitutes the zemindarry of Trinmarow, and Ramarow, Velmawars of the Calwa Collee family, first obtained in the beginning of the present century, and fell to the ancestors of the present occupants, who are not heirs of line, in the year 1731. Of late years, this jurisdiction, though small, was suffered impolitically, to be subdivided into three kismuts or shares; viz. Bezoara proper, Tejoor, and Chimulpur, worth, separately, 10,000 pagodas, 6,000, and 2,000. were together rated in the jumma kaamil at rupees 58,301. but now - - - - - Madras pagodas 18,000.

5th. **MYLAVERAM**, on the confines of the former district, about 50 miles N.W. of Masulipatam, and 3 coss from Condapillee, is the name given to a zemindarry formed of the greater part of the havillee pergunnah of Condapillee, assigned informally to Vencata Row and Narsinva Row, Velmawars, of the family called from the place of their origin Sooranany, who first settled in the district about the year 1670, in the capacity of simple farmers, and obtained, as it is supposed, their earliest zemindarry sunnuds, from the killahdar of Condapillee, at the commencement of the present century - - - - - 15,000.

6th. **HAVILLEE**.—Of this circar, and immediately around the capital and fort of Condapillee, 48 miles N.W. ½ W. from Masulipatam, is the remainder of the old pergunnah Havillee, and worth 5,000 pagodas for its 11 villages; but to this should be added, the Siant Walloor.



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Walloor, or as called, Walloor Samah, dismembered from the pergunnah Medoor, and now annexed to the Havillee, composed of 10<sup>6</sup> tillages, and valued in Dool bundobust for 8,000. 13,000.

7th. VARAGONDA about 50 coss N.W. from Masulipatam, beyond Mylaveram, and on the frontiers of the circar of Commamet, is the principal town of a zemindarry jurisdiction, allowed to be vested in the Velunki family, Velmawars, whose ancestors first settled in Trivoor, in 1675; but of late years, has very unconstitutionally been suffered to be divided between several brothers, and still more improperly, to be participated with the despunderals, or public registers of the district. The principal persons exercising the desmooky functions are Mulla Row, Sinjeva Row, Vencata Row, Raina Row, Visseram Rowze, and Romann. The district united is extensive, but hilly, jungly; and barren, composed of the two following pergunnahs, of 63 villages:

- |   |                      |
|---|----------------------|
| (1.) JENLAUOV, valued anciently 24,284 rupees, in the jumma kaumil of Kootub Shally, now barely |                      |
| Madras pagodas  | 8,000                |
| (2.) MEDOOR GETT, so called from a mound to contain its waters, formerly 23,829                 |                      |
| rupees, now   | Madras pagodas 7,000 |
|   | 15,000.              |

8th. MUDIGAMA, about 78 miles N.W. by W. from Masulipatam, and 22 in the same direction from Condapillee, is a portion of the zemindarry of Vassreddy Ramana, in this circar, on the north bank of the Kistna, opposite to the larger jurisdiction of Chintapillee, in the province of Guntoor. The ancestors of the present family settled here about 1670; but did not acquire the desmooky before the commencement of the 18th century. In 1760, the possessory rights were transferred to a younger branch of this family in Chintapillee, who being afterwards expelled by M' Bon-enfant, Bazalut Jung's managers, were acknowledged by the English in 1772, zemindars of Nundegamah, and were also re-established in Chintapillee. The portion now under consideration, extends far into the Commamet circar, extremely fertile, and includes the diamond mines of Pertyal, Abtcoor, &c. five villages annexed to the Nizamut, and is composed of the three following pergunnahs; viz.

- |   |                |         |
|---|----------------|---------|
| (1.) NUNDIGONG, formerly 87,125 rupees, valued now at | Madras pagodas | 25,000  |
| (2.) PENGUKEROL, 45,201 rupees, and now               |                | 13,000  |
| (3.) DEATAVOLA, anciently 9,493 rupees, and now       |                | 7,000   |
|   |                | 45,000. |

9th. MONGAL, about 120 miles N.W. by W. from Masulipatam, is a detached desmooky, on the distant frontier of Commamet, and bordering on the circar of Doverknounda and Nelconda, assigned to the family of Kissa Vencalum, who settled here in 1680 - 10,000.

10th. LINGAGERRY, a small pergunnah zemindarry dependant on this circar, though insulated in that of Commamet, between Nuudegong and Mongal, near the Kistna, claimed by Codant Han, of Devarcotah, and Narrashurry, as despunderah, jointly formerly 7,546 rupees, now - Madras pagodas 2,000

TOTAL of Condapillee	Madras pagodas	3,18,000
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#### CIRCAR

ELLORE, consists, as anciently, of 12 pergunnahs, included in the havillee, and the four following zemindarries, with the lands held in vassalage by the Dutch.

1st. MUGGLETORE, about 45 miles E. N. E. from Masulipatam, 12 from the sea shore, and five miles from the English factory of Muddapollam and Nassapore, on the banks of the Washicesta, the great southern branch of the Godaveri, is the square mud fort and capital of the desmooky jurisdiction of Culdinder Trippety Rauze Rachewar, whose ancestors obtained the first sunnuds for holding the pergunnah of Canje culva, or Muggle-tore, as it is now called, as early as the year 1624. Ranga Vauze, the 5th in descent, by his good management and fidelity to government, was rewarded with the zemindarry rights of all the other mehals, which at present compose the district, in 1703; but thirty years afterwards, under the government of Rustum Khan, the whole family were expelled as rebels, and forfeited their territorial grants. On this occasion, the immediate heirs of line are supposed to have perished among the unhealthy hills of Tontapille, where they took refuge; but Vencatran Vauze, a distant descendant and father of the present occupant, escaped to and received the protection of the Poosaputty family of Vizianagram; and in 1751, through the intercession of old Vizieram Rauze, is said to have been formerly established by the usual temporary sunnuds, in the zemindarry held once by his forefathers. Trippety, the actual possessor, probably was created desmook on the death of his predecessor in 1764; at any rate, he has been admitted in the convention with General Caillaud, in the year 1766; and though his pretensions might not then or since have been known, or enquired into, they have been tacitly acknowledged by the English government, which, however, in common course, will have the re-disposal of one of the richest territorial grants in the Company's gift within the circar, as the present occupant is turned of fifty, and the race of Culdindee is likely to be in him extinct. The district is extremely compact, containing

taining about 800 square miles in its six pergunnahs, most advantageously situated between the sea, the rivers Godaveri and Calipatam, and in the neighbourhood of the ill managed desmooky of Opparow, abounding in manufactures, and yielding in some places, what is very uncommon in the circars, a double harvest.

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## REVENUE:

3d. Amount collected:

(1.) ATTILLEE, the largest pergunnah, 84 villages, 7 coss from Muggletore west-northerly; worth	49,000
(2.) ASSINTA, adjoining to the former, towards the Godaveri, 44 villages, valued at	31,000
(3.) CANJA-CALVA, or Muggletore, on the sea coast, yielding	30,000
(4.) OUDER, 54 villages, adjoining on the south-west to Attillee Assinta, exclusive of fraudulent enaums to peons, amounting to Pag <sup>s</sup> 3,500; worth	25,000
(5.) DOODIPOTTA, on the Godaveri, a small distance from Muggletore	10,000
(6.) COVOOR, or Cohere, on the Godaveri, towards Rajahmundry, 18 coss	12,000
To which must be added, the 11 villages of Calindoe, dismembered from that pergunnah in the Condapillee Circar, and worth annually	5,000
And the produce of cocoa-nut and palmyra trees, let separately, or annually cut down and sold, for	30,000
Also the salt farms of Canja-Calva, worth about	20,000
	50,000
TOTAL of Muggletore, exclusive of Peroon, &c. in Rajahmundry, } Madras pag <sup>s</sup> 2,12,000 <sup>3</sup> worth 20,000 pagodas more	

2d. NUGERE, that portion of Opparow's zemindarry, situated in this circar, partook of the great commercial advantages derived from the fall of the empire of Bejapoor, which enhanced so prodigiously the value of the neighbouring lands of Muggletore; but of late years, it has been greatly impoverished through the treasonable designs of its desmook, in establishing an independent military power, and by the ruinous system of letting out some of the richest pergunnahs in farm, under the name of security, to Trippety Rauze, the neighbouring zemindar, whose policy of course it has been to enrich what he may consider his more permanent holding, at the expense of the temporary one, which, by depopulating, he might further hope, agreeable to the ordinary views of Indian landholders, of bringing under his proper jurisdiction, through the temptation of a larger rent to government, than it may be worth to any yearly farmer, as it has been successfully practised in other parts of the Company's territories, such as the jagher in the Carnatic, rated by Mahomed Ali, and the havillee lands of Chicaate, farmed to Sitteram Rauze, while virtual zemindar of Vizianagrum. The whole district may contain about 1,200 square miles, being more than one half of the zemindarry in extent, though scarcely exceeding the moiety of its value, when reckoned in all, Madras pagodas 1,85,000, (exclusive of savorums, enaums, &c.) and is composed of the following pergunnahs:

(1.) GONDAGOT, near Ellore, on the north side of the Colair Lake, worth 10,000 pagodas, together with the mootah of Amberpet, consisting of 42 villages, dismembered from the Havillee pergunnah by Hussein Ali Khan in 1764, and valued at 15,000 pagodas more, being together rated at	25,000
(2.) BAHRETTY, as being without the Lake, and adjoining to Bilherjety on the north-east, 13 coss from Masulipatam, 56 villages	30,000
(3.) PENTAPAR, 8 coss farther in the same direction, containing 44 villages	15,000
(4.) NIRDOL, 3 coss still farther on the road to Rajahmundry, 56 villages. The three last pergunnahs, are those which border on the zemindarry of Muggletore, and are managed by Trippety Rauze	25,000
	95,000

3d. CHINTTALAPOONDY, at the distance of 17 coss northerly from Ellore, on the frontier of Commammet, and between Medeongutt and Jemlavoy to the south-west, and Polaveram towards the north-east, in the pergunnah Desmooky, divided between Mullarow, Vencatrow, Narsinvarow, &c. cousins of the Velma tribe, and of the Toopellah family, who settled here in 1711, having emigrated from Udegeer, in like manner as all the rest of the Velma cast, now in the Circars, had done from other parts of the Carnatic, after the dissolution of the principality of Chandergerry in 1652, when the race of Nursingha, reckoned chiefs of the Rowars, were driven from thence, and dispersed by the Muzummar arms. It is therefore no less from clanship or family attachment, than from interested rebellious views, that these zemindars, together with those of Midoor Gutt, Janlavoy, Mylavaram, and Bejwarra, which encircle the larger jurisdiction of Opparow, make usually a common cause with that refractory landholder; while the impositive division of their respective lands, enables any one man, with or without the consent of the copartners, to assemble their numerous dependent peons, fraudulently maintained, to act against government, on its presumed lenity in all events towards the other more passive members of the same zemindarry fraternity.

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The district, though large, and containing 44 villages, being hilly, jungly, and poor, yields inclusive of the principal fraudulent alienations to brahmins and  
peons, only - - - - - 10,000

REVENUE:  
8d. Amount collected.

4th. TELLEKACHERTA, a small dismembered portion of the pergunnah of Cirvor, consisting of six villages, and forming the talook of Vencataputty and Mandavarauze, deserves to be distinguished, as being held singularly in the circars by something like a feudal tenure, having been granted, in the year 1616, to Upalaputty Madarauze as a jagher, on the express condition of guarding the frontiers of Ellore against the incursions of the Iteddewar of Pollaveram, the antient proprietors of the country, then expelled to their fastnesses in the hills - - - - - 2,000

5th. HAVILLEE Pergunnah, dismembered from Amberpet, still depending on the insignificant mud fort of Ellore, 40 miles north from Masulipatam, is worth 20,000 Pag<sup>a</sup>, to which must be added Dooa, half way between Pentapa, and Nerdole, valued at 4,500, but in the Doui, set down at 2,000 pagodas - - - - - 22,000

The villages of Palicole and Contaroo depend on a Dutch factory, established at the former, under the protection of, and paying an annual tribute to the English government, of - - - - - 143

Guntoor,  
Masulipatam,  
and Condapillee,  
M<sup>a</sup> pagodas  
8,13,500

3,41,143

• TOTAL south of the Godaveri - Rupees 46,18,572; or, Madras pag<sup>a</sup>

11,54,643

#### CIRCAR

RAJAHMUNDRY, since the establishment of European government, has acquired so many additional territorial dependencies by conquest or policy, and has undergone such a total reform and change in the extent, value, and denomination of its several local subdivisions, that a very few of the 17, of which it was anciently composed, can be now traced, but are all included with the new annexations, in the 7 following districts:

1st. THE HAVILLEE pergunnah, depending on the capital situated on the North bank of the Godaveri, 78 miles N. E. of Masulipatam, is reduced, properly speaking, to the town of Rajahmundry, and 5 neighbouring villages, possessed by Khajah Zeeloor Ullah Khan, as it is supposed by sunnud from the Nizam, previous to the grant to the English, which of course invalidated all inferior temporary alienations, though in deference to a subsequent request for the soubah, the occupant's claims have been acknowledged; viz.—to form the capital for Madras pagodas 2,100, from which to be deducted 1,900, allowed under the name of *Rosina*, or daily charity to Mussulman poor, and to hold the five villages as a free jagher, the whole, being worth annually 4,200. But as this pergunnah was rated formerly 50,311 rupees, and as we find a number of small talooks described as mecrasees, or inheritances in the possession of different persons, once or still officers of government; so we hesitate, not setting them down here as unauthorized alienations, which could not with equal probability have belonged to any of the other districts, 4,200

- (1.) VELIMPOLLAM, &c. 12 villages assigned to Bramjee Kistnoo Mujmadar, formerly of Rajemundry - - - - - 5,000
- (2.) VEOAMPETTAH, &c. 13 villages, claimed by Sondeapah, despandeah of the district - - - - - 3,000
- (3.) PATICONDA, &c. three villages claimed by Ramajee Burroo, another quondam Mujmadar - - - - - 1,500
- (4.) VEELA, the enaum villages of Mahomed Ruffia, when acting as canzee of the district - - - - - 700
- (5.) VENCATAPOLLAM, the enaum village, anciently of another Mussulman officer, now of Alta Ali Khan - - - - - 600
- (6.) PAMING-PILLEE, in the hands of Jebenevess Maganah, gomastah of Bramajee Kistnoo, valued at - - - - - 400
- (7.) VENDASSARAPORAM, in the management of Bookna Pundit, the Company's Persian linguist - - - - - 350
- (8.) MACAMATA, the village of Perottim dos Sugar Gujerally, worth - - - - - 85  
To which may be added, though perhaps not formerly included in the Havillee,
- (9.) JAGGERNAUTPORAM, or Cokenara and Gottapellum, two villages on the sea coast, near Ingaram, on the northern branch of the Godaveri, and belonging to the Dutch factory, paying a tribute to the English, as actual sovereign of the country - of - - - - - 217

16,052

2d. POLAVERAM, ten mss northerly, from Rajemundry on the southern bank of the Godaveri, is the capital of a small tributary rajé, or Hindoo principality, and the only one under the government of Masulipatam, immediately subject to the rheddewar, or territo-

\* The amount of tribute placed here to the account of, for the sum by which Palicole is debited in the circar of the Dutch factory of Jaggerauntporam, should be exchanged in Ellore.

rial proprietary chief, Munguputty Deo Rajepoot, descended from Hunner, of the royal family of Orissa, distinguished by the common appellation Gajeputty, or prince of elephants, and who, as before related, was put in possession of all the four circars north of the Kistna, in the year 1471, on condition of holding them as a dependent fief on the Mussulman empire of Mader, then ruled by Mahomed Shah, surnamed Lushkery, or, the warlike. In what manner, about a century afterwards, the princes of the house of Orissa lost the greater part of their inheritance, and were driven from the plains to the high unhealthy regions, at present constituting the whole of their tributary dominions, hath also been set forth. It is therefore only necessary here further to observe, that the great military power of two successive Mahomedan dynasties, employed on different occasions for a century and a half to exterminate the race of Rajepooty, or reduce their mountainous territory, proved altogether ineffectual; nor were the districts, now under consideration, explored or partially subdued under the establishment of the French government in 1753, and latter attempts to complete the conquest, to gratify the ambitious vanity perhaps of those upstart zemindars, whose aim it is to substitute their own groundless pretensions to territorial property, in the room of ancient acknowledged rights, once vested in the lordly ejected proprietors, have only served to evince the utility, the inglorious triumph, of dispossessing innocent inhabitants of their hills and wilds, resorted to from necessity, unhealthily, and yielding but a scanty subsistence; with a great certain sacrifice of men, and always a comparatively small, though at the same time a mere temporary doubtful benefit to revenue. The district is very large, and of unknown extent among the hills, but bounded on the north and west by Rumpa, the territory of Rambopetty, a perfectly independent rajah of the Coywar or savage mountainous tribe of Hindoos, and by Badrichellum and Peloucha, the imperfectly reduced zemindarry of Ashwa Rou Velmawar, dependant on the chief of Commamet; on the south and east it frontiers with the pergunnahs of Chinlapoondy and Cavour, in the province of Ellore. On both sides of the Godaveri which intersects it, the country besides a rich produce in grain, when the people are allowed the peaceable cultivation of their plains and vallies subject to a moderate quit rent, abounds with the largest and best teak timbers, which, though difficult in many places to be conveyed to the river side for more distant transportation by water carriage, might nevertheless under proper encouragement, be brought to any of the ports in the bay of Bengal, where ships are or may be constructed at a much lower rate, and no less fit than the wood imported from Pegu for the same purpose. That portion, however, of the district on the south side of the Godaveri is by far the largest and most valuable, and though now considered a part of the circar of Rajemundry yet being thus detached from it, would not most probably, if subdivided under the order and regularity of Mussulman arrangement, have been so disposed of. It forms two of the three following pergunnahs, into which the whole principality is properly divided:

- (1.) GOOTALAH, at the distance of eight coss from Rajemundry, on the banks of the Godaveri, is open plain and fertile, but easily commanded from, and always dependent on, the neighbouring hills. It has been wholly explored, and valued at - - - 24,000
- (2.) POLAVERAM, higher up the river two coss, has been traversed by European troops in great part, and cannot be deemed inaccessible anywhere, unless by reasons of the unhealthiness of the climate, and high pathless forests; the gross revenue has been estimated, from information, not records in the Doult Bundobust - - - at 26,000
- (3.) COTTAPILLEE is the pergunnah on the Rajemundry, or north side of the Godaveri, directly opposite to Gootalah, and extending in land to the frontiers of Rumpa, among different ridges of very high mountains. It has, till of late years, belonged to another branch of the same family; and was, for some time, under the immediate management of government, when the rents, including the munnim or family estate, was - - - 8,000

Mud. P<sup>a</sup> 58,000

But we may confidently reduce the tribute that should in justice or policy, or that can in effect be realised from the country, to 25,000.

3d. PEDDAPORE, 24 miles E. N. E. from Rajemundry, is the capital of the principal desmook or farming landholders of the province, named Finraje Vatcheri, though better known to the English under the title of Juggaputty Rauze, bestowed on his father by the Nizam, agreeable to the recently assumed privilege of the court of Hyderabad, thus to confer unsubstantial honours. This family were first distinguished by government in 1571. When acting as servants or managers to the Rheddewars, they made themselves useful in disclosing the value, and facilitating the conquest of the country under their superintendence, and were rewarded first with the farm, and then the zemindarry of the pergunnah of Hinoor. But in 1734, the lineal descendant with all the collateral branches of the house of Vachevoy to be found, were attainted and cut off by Rustom Khan, the provincial amildar; and all their rights, privileges, and effects, whether official or paternal, incurred legal forfeiture to the actual sovereign. Accordingly, the whole district was put under the immediate administration of ameens, or temporary Mussulman officers, until the year 1750, when Neamat Ulla Khan, at that time amildar, for the private consideration of 90,000 rupees, conferred by his proper sunnuds, the zemindarry of Peddapore, on Koyeperrauze, a youth of the Vachevoy family, who had been concealed under the protection of his kinsman, the famous Vizieram in Cicacole, and who now had a prospect of extending his jurisdiction and influence, in quality of guardian to the new desmook. Nine years however afterwards, the latter

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REVENUE:  
3d. Amount collected

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REVENUE:  
34. Amount collected.

latter; and his protector's successor, Gauseputty, took different parts, from personal animosity to each other, in the contest between the French and English, during which Royepperauze was killed fighting on the side of Mons'. Conflans, in the victory gained by Colonel Ford near Pettapore, at which time the present Timrajee, son of the deceased, was only 8 years of age. By what means the zemindarry might have been confined to this young man, it is needless to enquire, when the corruption of aumilars and the example of his father are so notoriously known; and when it is remembered how lavish the present Nizam was when he came to the circars in 1761, with the ambitious views of overturning his brother's government, through the pecuniary aid and personal attachment which he might command in return for such employments, in distributing them to the highest bidder, or at the recommendation of Hussain Khan. The district comprises near one half of the whole circar of Rajemundry, both in extent and value, and contains 585 villages under the following pergunnahs:

(1.) KIMMOOR, or Peddapore, of 65 villages, most advantageously situated on the Yel-erree, and to the eastward of the hills, of the same name of Kunnenoor, fertile in rice	60,000
(2.) BZHOLE, of 48 villages, between Redapore and the Char Mbal zemindarry, towards the Godaveri	29,000
(3.) ETACOTAN, of 99 villages, great and small, in the fertile island of Nagur. The first sunnuds for this and the following pergunnah, from the Mustafa Kode Khau aumilar in the year 1697, from Hyderabad	35,000
(4.) CHRGULNAUD, of 40 large, and 34 small villages or pollams, exclusive of enaums	11,000
(5.) TAUTEPAUK, of 71 villages, in the island of Nagur, first conferred in zemindarry in 1702, by Rustum dit Khan, and again under the English government in 1774/5, yields	28,000
(6.) JUNE-COTAIN, two mbals of 48 villages, among the hills, west of Sitiaverum, rented for	12,000
(7.) INGERAM and Moormillah, of 22 villages, first obtained in 1705, from the aumildar	10,000
(8.) MULLERE, of 20 villages, and rented for	5,000
(9.) PARVARUM, a mootah, in the island of Nagur	14,000
(10.) ISCAPILLEE, another kissinutt pergunnah	12,000
(11.) MUNERIVAREM, with the town of Casunacorass	10,000
(12.) MUNDAPETTAH MOOTAH	20,000
(13.) CONTRAVOOCOWAH MOOTAH, north of Tootapillee, together with the four preceding, containing 138 villages, were first regularly conferred in 1728 by Abdullah Khan, the Aumildar	8,000
(14.) TOTAPILLEE, a region of tygers, is a small hilly country 22 miles north-west of Pedapore, and adjoining to Cottapillee, the inheritance of Rajinadora of the independent Coyewar tribe. In 1771, at the instigation of Timrajee, this little territory, with the sacrifice of almost the whole detachment to the unhealthiness of the climate, was reduced by the English to pay a future tribute to the zemindar of Peddapore annually, of	7,000

TOTAL of the Doul bundobust of Jaggaputty Rauze - - - 2,61,000

4th. ~~CHAR~~ MBAL, or Two Pergunnahs Zemindarry, is surrounded by the preceding one of Pedapore, on the banks of the Goutumy or northern branch of the Godaveri, highly cultivated, and abounding in long cloth and other manufactures, and was first erected into a separate desmooky jurisdiction by M. Bussey in 1753, and conferred by him, under his proper sunnuds, in nearly equal divisions, at the request of old Vizieram Rauze, on two branches of the Cacarlamoody family, his own kinsmen; the district is therefore composed of the two following pergunnahs:

(1.) DACHEVARUM, or Ramchunderporam, about 16 coss S.E. by East from Rajamundry, was assigned to, and has continued since under the immediate zemindarry management of Cacarlamoody Ramchunder Rauze; contains 35 villages	20,000
(2.) COTAH, 20 coss in the same direction nearly from Rajemundry, and close to the Goutumy, assigned as the zemindarry portion of Cacarlamoody Venentaputty Rauze, cousin to the former, and though containing only 22 large villages, exclusive of pollams, yields a sub-rent, besides enaums, suaverum charges, of	25,000
	45,000

5th. PEROOR is the pergunnah portion of the zemindarry of Coldindee Trippety Rauze of Muggletore, in the circar of Rajamundry. It is divided from his other possessions dependent on Ellore by the Washeshta, the southern branch of the Godaveri, and forms what is properly called the Island of Nagur, though the same appellation is more generally applied to the whole insulated triangle, between the forks of the Godaveri and the sea, including the pergunnahs of Etacatanh, Tautepauk, &c. and which space, we before compared to the Delta of Egypt, as resembling it in figure and fertility, and being in like manner, formed or intersected by seven branches of a great river, to which the names of as many gutelar, perhaps in both countries derived from the Sabian or planetary divinities, have been assigned by the superstitious natives. When the English were put in possession of the circars, this valuable

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## REVENUE:

3d. Amount collected.

valuable little territory was under the desmooky management of Vizianan Rauze, whose predecessor in 1759, had made some alienations in favour of the Company; but in 1767, it was transferred with 68 villages of Tautepauk in jagher, to Hussein Ali Khan, and on his death, in like manner as these were bestowed by the English on the zemindar of Peddapore, so the district in question was conferred in 1774-5 on Trippety Rauze. It contains 37 villages, and together with those of Vadropillee and Tautepauk, worth separately 2,000 pagodas, are greatly under-rated in the Doul bundobust at - - - - - 22,000.

6th. CONCONDAN, four coss from Rajemundry on the north bank of the Godaveri, on the road to Cottapillee N. W. is the pergunnah zemindarry of the family. Trippety Rauze, who first obtained desmooky jurisdiction and rights from Meer Khaleel Khan, the aumildar, in 1744, and soon afterwards gave an ordinary proof of Hindoo magnanimity, in putting himself to death for a verbal insult offered to him by Meer Ibrahim, the aumildar's son. His immediate successor, father of the present occupant, fell more gloriously in 1759, in supporting the cause of the French, as actual rulers, against the invasion of the English. The district consists of 51 villages, of which 12 on the river side, 15 Mergaputty on an elevated ground, and the remainder, equally divided between Condaputty and Jungleputty, or hilly and woody ground; its annual rental, exclusive of enaums, is - - - - - 20,000.

7th. PETTAPORE, eight miles E. northerly from Peddapore, from which it is divided by the small river Yellerru, and five in the same direction from the fort of Samuel Cota, now the principal garrison of the English in the circar of Rajemundry, is the present capital of the zemindarry jurisdiction of Mahaputty Row, Veluawar, whose ancestors were established in part of the desmooky as early as the reign of Ibrahim Kootub Shah, after the expulsion of the Rheddewars, the ancient proprietors of the country in 1571; but this family were also involved in the general proscription of Indian landholders under the government of Rustum Khan, until the year 1746, when Neladerow, father of the present occupant, obtained the farm of Pellafore; and, after an imprisonment of four years for non-payment of rent, procured sunnuds for the zemindarry on the accession of Neamut ullah Khan, to the post of aumildar. This district borders on Cicacole, and contains 146 villages, under the following pergunnah divisions; viz.

(1) POLNAUD or Pettapore, of 48 villages, yielding - - - - -	60,000
(2) CAUKINARD and Salapah, 25 villages, including the profit on salt, produce - - -	10,000
(3) BENDAPOONDY, of 35 villages, near Sittiaverum, with salt - - - - -	12,000
(4) BHEEMYARUM, near Samuel Cota, a kissnut pergunnah, 13 villages - - - - -	15,000
(5) CHELLOOR, a mootah of another pergunnah of 7 villages - - - - -	4,000
(6) JALLIPILLEE, a third mootah pergunnah of 5 villages - - - - -	6,000
(7) KADEAM, a fourth mootah of 13 villages - - - - -	8,000

TOTAL gross Rent of Pettapore, exclusive of enaums - - - - - 1,15,000

TOTAL of the Khan Wasool, or first receipts of the circar, entire - - - 5,04,052

Amount of the 3 circars between the rivers Godaveri and Kistna, with the other detached dependencies on the subordinate government of Masulipatam, brought forward from the preceding account of their doul - - - - - 8,03,643

TOTAL Revenue under Masulipatam, rupees 52,30,780, or Madras pagodas - 13,07,695

Amount of the circar of Guntour south of the Kistna, brought forward rupees 14,04,000 or Madras pagodas - - - - - 3,51,000

TOTAL of the five southerly Provinces, rupees 66,34,780, or Madras pagodas 16,58,695

## C I R C A R

CICACOLE, or Kulling, the most northerly and largest of the circars, has in like manner as Rajemundry, undergone almost a total change in the denominations, extent, and value of its subdivisions, since the first establishment of European government; though less in reality, than apparently, with respect to the actual assessment of the country, which was always under Mussulman aumildars greatly beyond the old jumma kaumil, or the amount with which they were charged, or chose to account for, with the public treasury. In its present state, the whole province, as hath already been observed, is unequally divided between the superintendence of two subordinate councils, of which the most considerable is that of Vizagapatam on the sea coast, one hundred and seventy miles N. E. from Masulipatam, nearly central to all the circars; and exercising superior local jurisdiction over the following districts; viz.

1st. HAVILLE of Cicacole, 65 miles N. E. from Vizagapatam, originally comprehending all the lands on the sea coast, from the northern extremity of Rajemundry to the river of Poondy, was dismembered of so many pergunnahs conferred in zemindarry, on the desmook of Vizianagram, that in 1758 the annual assessments had decreased to rupees 4,27,970, which was little more than one half of the old valuation; and since this last period, it has been curtailed, though we believe irregularly, and unconstitutionally, of so large a portion of its territory that the remainder is now wholly included in the following pergunnahs, the gross rental of which, being of course greatly diminished through the impolitic system of farming the lands, especially to a neighbouring landholder, without giving him an interest in



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in the permanent prosperity; we shall substitute the net jummabundy clear of all charges, as settled under the French government for the Doulandobust or present mofussil receipts.

REVENUE:  
Id. Amount collected.

(1.) HAVILLE Proper of Cicacole, in its actual state, - - - - -	Madras pagodas	35,123
(2.) TILMOOR Bemaley Nagricottam and Currickvalsa, four pergunnahs lying behind the Havillee and Teekaly, or Ragunantpoor, rated as in 1758, at - - - - -		17,750
(3.) NOWPADA salt farms to the north near Poondy - - - - -		7,865½
(4.) CASSINCORAH Havillee, 18 miles S.W. from the port of Vizagapatam - - - - -		9,999½
(5.) VIZAGAPATAM sea port and lands, including also rupees 500, paid as a peshcush, or otherwise by the port of Bimlipatam - - - - -		1,074½

TOTAL Havillee carried forward, rupees 2,84,970 or - - - Madras pagodas 71,242½

The rents of Cicacole are paid in silver rupees, there being little or no gold in circulation in the circar; but for the sake of uniformity, and a comparison with the other provinces, the revenue is here stated in Madras pagodas of 4 rupees each.

2d. JAZPOOR, about 104 miles west from Cicacole, and of that distance, forty beyond Saloor Gaut; among the hills is the capital of a tributary raje called also Nundapore, which lyeth nearer to the W. southerly 20 miles, the poor remains of the extensive territorial inheritance once enjoyed by the Rajepoot family of Vickerum Deo, the actual representative, lineally descended from Wistua Deo, the last great prince of the house of Gajeputty, who in 1371, united under his sceptre all the ancient domains of the kings of Orissa. This barren and unhealthy principality, in its limited modern extent, is bounded on the west by Buster or Bussdero, the country of the independent rajah Derriao Sing, of Goondwannah, which being laterally situated among several ranges of high impassable hills, and about 80 miles in length, in a N.E. or S.W. direction, by 40 in breadth, forms a very secure barrier on the side of Berar, where the Marhattas, in taking possession of Chanda, the former inheritance of the Goondwannah family, might otherwise and without the cession of Saloor Gaut, the only known pass through which they entered the circars in 1754, be deemed formidable neighbours. Jazepoor, to the south, borders on Rumpa, and to the north joins the tributary munnims of two other branches of the royal family of Orissa; the one, Gajeputty, settled in Kinedy, and the other, Persotim Deo, in Kalolindi, lying farther to the N.W. dependant on Chatesguir. To the east, this district extended far into the plains of Cicacole, until the year 1742, when old Vizieram Rauze begun to make encroachments, and was so successful under the political favour of Bussey, as to wrest almost the whole of the low fertile portion of the country from its original proprietor, and obtain from his patron, sumuds for the zemindarry of it, on the footing of his other possessions, when a new revolution transferred the sovereignty of all these provinces to the English. Sitteram, the brother and manager of the present zemindar of Vizianagram, an artful, intelligent, ambitious man, neglected not the opportunity of obtaining a renewal of the family grant of the jurisdiction, or rights of saverum, over the recently conquered pergunnahs of Nundapore. Accordingly in 1768, perhaps inadvertently, though at the same time agreeable to the spirit of true and necessary policy, the claims of Vizieram to a landed desamooky income of 24,000 rupees per annum, issuing from the rents of the dismembered portion of Vickeram Dess's country, and other territorial acquisitions hereafter more particularly to be specified, were admitted, and we conceive firmly established during the life of the actual incumbent, by which act the districts in question were formally, as they were before virtually, annexed to the other dominions of Britain, and of course subjected to the same provincial rule of government. But in 1775, the restless Sitteram, under various pretences of employing the Company's arms, made further encroachments on the raje of Jazepoor; and through the conduct and gallantry of the English commander, who penetrated to the capital of this principality, still continues to levy in the nature of a tribute, for which he is accountable to his employers, from Vickeram Deo, the reigning sovereign of a mountainous region, valued in the whole in its present reduced state, at three lacks of rupees annually, for the following inconsiderable portions of it, more recently and thus imperfectly subdued; viz. Nairamapatam, Raigur Singaporam, and Vecessan, Cotah, from 36 to 64 coss N.W. together with the districts of Gundaporam, which, having been dismembered on a former occasion by Sitteram, from the territory of Kinedy, was exchanged in 1771, for Saloor, in which is the famous gaut or pass of the same name, or as sometimes called Saureacca, before dependant on Jazepoor; the whole estimated in the gross, at a lack of rupees, but actually yielding a precarious tribute from the ancient sovereign, of - - - - - 10,000.

3d. KIMEDY, 50 miles N.E. by N. from the town of Cicacole, is the capital of another tributary, but more accessible dependent principality, vested in a rajah of the royal family of Orissa, who actually bears the titular designation of that ancient house, under the proper name of Gajeputty Deo, through the refractory imprudence of Narrain Deo, father of the present occupant, in opposing the Company's authority. During the war with Nizam Ali in 1767-8, almost the whole country was over-run by the English arms, and the proprietor being expelled, was in danger of losing for ever the family inheritance; and though this object hath ever since been the favourite policy, and constant aim of Sitteram Rauze, as a necessary attainment to accomplish his own ambitious views of aggrandizement and unrivalled pre-eminence, yet the lenity and virtue of the British government have hitherto preserved the rights and privileges annexed to this little territory entire, in lineal succession,

succession, to the lawful heir, with the exception of the districts of Gundaporam a Freimundolam, valued at 60,000 rupees. Nevertheless, the remainder still yields a gross revenue of two lacs, of which perhaps the public, either in policy or justice, should not claim more than one half, being - - - - - 25,000.

REVENUE:  
3d. Amount collected.

4th. TACKALY, 43 miles N.E. from Cicacole on the sea coast, entirely reduced, serving, and necessarily, under complete subjection to the English government, as being situated in the line of communication between the northern and southern divisions of Cicacole, is, as it may in fact continue to be, the inheritance of Jagget Deo, another descendant of the royal family of Orissa, but more immediately branching from that of Kimedy. The district yields a lack of rupees; but if the proprietor is to be supported in princely grandeur, the tribute cannot with propriety be increased beyond - - - - - 10,000.

5. VIZIANAGRAM, 38 miles west southerly from Cicacole, and nearly the same distance northerly from Vizagapatnam, is the capital, not only of the largest desmooky jurisdiction in this, but, comparatively with districts held under a similar tenure, throughout all the Northern circars, and at present, as it has been since the establishment of the British government, through the extreme favour and indulgence of the Company, vested in form, or by sufferance, in Vizieram Rauze Reddewar, adopted in 1750, by the widow of old Vizieram, from a collateral branch of the Poossaputty family, on a failure of the direct line, at the decease of Gajeputty her son; while the office of zemindar virtually, and in fact with extraordinary, if not unconstitutional powers, has, at the same time exclusively and almost uninterruptedly been exercised by Sitteram Rauze the elder, but half brother of the nominal occupant. In general, the history of all the Rauzees, or tribe of Rachewar in the circars, trace their origin to a dependance on the ancient rajahs of the country, either as chelaks or favoured slaves; managers, talookdars, or renters of the subdivisions of the sovereign domain; and such also, was the rise of all the other petty holders of land existing in this province, whether descended from the Velmawars of Telinga, or natives of the soil itself, properly called Oria. But the family now under consideration, are an exception to this genealogical rule; for they are at least foreigners, with respect to Cicacole. The first of them on record, was Madavarama, who inhabited a small village in the Condapillee circar, called Poossaputty, afterwards retained as the local patrimony of the family; when in 1651, Shere Mahomed Khan was sent by Abdullah Kootub Shahi from Hyderabad, as amildar, or provincial governor of all the maritime dependencies north of the Kistna. The following year, this man engaged in the scumbdy train of the Mussulman deputy, accompanied his master to Cicacole, and in 1655, was rewarded for services which were not, throughout, worthy of being recorded, with the farm or rental of two mootahs of the pergunnah of Bogapoor, where from henceforth he fixed his residence, for the annual sum of, rupees, 5,207 and a fraction. From this time forward, under three irregular successions of the race of Poossaputty, they acquired, through the favour of eight succeeding amildars, at different periods, and in greater or smaller portions, down to the year 1734, almost the whole of their original rightful zemindarry in its present extent of four pergunnahs, dimembered from the Havillee lands of the circar, and rated in the antiquated jumma kamil of the Kootub Shahi, at only 1,02,857 rupees. At the last-mentioned period, the famous Vizieram, having dispatched by poison, in the district of Vizianagur, in the division of Jehapoor, his cousin Sitteram, who had received investiture as heir of line to Madavarama, of the Bogapoor desmooky, seized the family rights, and, through the corruption of Jaffier Ali Khan, in 1741 was allowed to exercise the public office to which they were annexed; having removed the zemindarry residence to its present site of Vizianagram, so called either from his proper name, or the place of his former abode in the division of Jehapoor. About this time, it was that the same ambition which prompted Vizieram to commit parricide, and led him more naturally to encroach on the civil rights of neighbouring landholders weaker than himself, in which he was politically supported by the amildar, until the greater part of the territories of Margool, Singrecotah, and Nundapoor, was added to his former possessions; but not being with equal policy checked in his career of power, and made sensible of his own dependance on superior authority, he punished, very properly, as an example to future rulers, the negligence, corruption, or inability of the government that cherished him, by being principally instrumental to the revolution in favour of the French in 1753, in like manner as his son and successor, six years afterwards, on similar grounds, aided in the expulsion of his benefactors, to bring about another change, which might be no less favourable to the interested views of an ambitious powerful subject. This zemindary, so extensive as generally described, has been acquired under such various rulers of civil or political right, and comprehends so many scattered inferior territorial jurisdictions, which, as they were before, should perhaps still, in justice and propriety, be considered as separate and wholly independent of each other, that it must be impossible, from rather imperfect materials, and a very limited local knowledge, to exhibit a connected accurate view of the whole in its real present state, especially as all and singular landed rights, privileges, or civil jurisdiction, as have been, can legally, by custom or in form, be claimed or vested in the zemindar of Vizianagram, could only be derived under sanction of the actual Government, by a renewal or confirmation of former grants, or other sunnuds entirely novel, and which being yet unpublished, have the nature, extent, and validity of Vizieram Rauze's pretensions to any territorial or desmooky jurisdiction (excepting the three districts of Nundapoor, Singrecotah, and Margool, of which the saverums are supposed to have been regularly assigned to him), matters of the greatest uncertainty and doubt. We have, therefore, been under the necessity of recurring to the period of M. Bussy's government in 1758, to determine the points in question, as they were then fixed, substituting, however, from later and equally authentic information, a more competent valuation of the lands

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REVENUE;  
8d. Amount collected.

lands than is stated in the huzabood, or gross rental formed by that able financier, of the whole zemindari, as it was conferred at that time, under his proper sunnuds, on Gajepetty Rauze, the son of Vizieram.

1st. TALOOKEN KUDMEM, or original zemindari possessions, dependant on Vizianagram, dismembered from the ancient Havillee lands by different annildars, in small portions, between the year 1655 and 1741, and formed into one desmooky jurisdiction, continued by successive administrations, in chosen or approved members of the Poossaputty family, and consisting of the following Pergunnahs, all in the neighbourhood of the capitals of the district and province, assessed, in M. Bussy's rent-roll, for the sums here set down in rupees, in contradistinction to the more recent valuation, in pagodas, which we follow, as the most perfect, to complete our Douh bundobust of the Circars; viz.

(1.) POTNOOR, of 88 villages, exclusive of enams, saverums, &c. valued by Bussy at - - - - - Rupees 1,20,000, in 1758; and by Matthews, in 1775, from village accounts, at - - - - -	Pagodas	50,000
(2.) BAGARPOOR, of 44 villages - Rupees 40,000 - - - - -	Pagodas	20,000
(3.) DEOVAPILLEE, 44 villages - Rupees 80,000 - - - - -	Pagodas	25,000
(4.) GUNDREFF, 44 villages - - Rupees 50,000 - - - - -	Pagodas	20,000

Rupees 2,90,000 - Total Assessment of Bussy.

2d. TALOOKEN JUDEED, or new possessions, for the most part conquered, as they were first bestowed by M. Bussy about the year 1756, in zemindari tenure of Vizieram Rauze: Muunim Sultan:

(1.) VODDAHDEL Pergunnah, near Cossim Cotah, and dismembered from the ancient Havillee, assessed by Bussy for, rupees 1,20,000; but estimated by Matthews, at - - - - -	Pagodas	81,250
(2.) COORNUM, another pergunnah of the Havillee, rated by the former, with its salt, at 10,000 rupees - - - - -		3,000
(3.) LAVEROO, with the following pergunnah, dismembered from Cheepurapillee of Dhoomunt Row, about 12 coss north, rated 18,000 rupees - - - - -		4,500
(4.) SAMBIAM, which, as not being specified by Matthews, we shall state at Bussy's valuation - - - - -		11,250
(5.) BINATIPATAM Port, &c. exclusive of the tribute under the Havillee farms, 20,000 rupees - - - - -		5,000
(6.) COMARA Port, including salt works - - - - -		6,500
(7.) POONREMURKA Port, and salt, part of Cossimcotah Havillee, in Bussy's time valued at, rupees 40,000; in 1775, at - - - - -		7,500
(8.) PENTAH SEEMA, or Pergunnah, with the two following, near Cossim Cotah - - - - -		3,500
(9.) YALMUNCHELLY Pergunnah, yielding - - - - -		2,000
(10.) PUNJEDARLOO, a mootah pergunnah - - - - -		1,000
(11.) LOAVAN TURKEE, or kissunt pergunnah to Bahoo Balundor - - - - -		2,000
(12.) CONDA CARLOO, two pergunnahs near Cossim Cotah - - - - -		5,250
(13.) COOVARAH, &c. villages, valued at - - - - -		500
(14.) BANDAPAR, Vernaloor, &c. 4 villages - - - - -		1,250
(15.) LUCKWARUP COTAH, supposed formerly to have belonged to a branch of the Rungaraw family, situated about 10 coss west of Vizianagram - - - - -		10,000

(16.) BOBILEE, the zemindari of Rangaraw Velmawar, the only one of this tribe, and of note, in the province; dispossessed in 1756 by Bussy. The heir of line, still a prisoner at Vizianagram, the next of kin, settled at Dumapet, situated 20 coss northerly from Vizianagram, and composed of the following Pergunnahs:

1. Rajam, worth - - - - -	Rupees	30,000
2. Covetal, rated - - - - -		70,000
3. Villages dependent on Bobilee - - - - -		80,000
Bussy's valuation - - - - -	R	1,80,000
But, according to Matthews - - - - -	Pagodas	75,000

(17.) SAYER, or land customs, punchait, or lime duties on opium, tobacco, &c. and rent of mango trees, valued - - - - -  | 18,000 |

TOTAL of Talookch Judeed, according to M. Bussy's Rent-roll, in 1758, was, rupees 6,11,000; but agreeable to General Matthews' valuation in 1775, of some of the same districts as before stated, a difference of 3,35,000 rupees must be added, to make up the account of the present statement, being - - - - - Pagodas | 2,37,500 |

3d. TALOOKCH MHALZAMINER, or pergunnahs of neighbouring zemindars, for which Vizieram Rauze, having become security for the annual rent, were even

3,52,500

even considered, in Bussy's time, as dependent on his jurisdiction; of these, the most considerable are,

(1.) NUNDAPOOR Dependencies, lying to the east of the Hills, and from 40 to 60 miles west of Cicacole, taken originally from vassals of Vickeram Deo:

1. Palconda, to Rambudda Rauze, valued by Bussy at 70,000; by Matthews, at one lack and half; and put down at - - Pagodas 22,500
2. Veeracotum, to Vizieram Rauze - - - - - 5,000
3. Coorpan, to Sitteram Rauze, by Bussy, 50,000 rupees; Matthews - - - - - 25,000
4. Saloor, to Seirias Rauze, in 1758 rated for 15,000 rupees; now - - - - - 10,000
5. Belgium and Narsapore, in 1758 for 15,000 rupees; now - - - - - 10,000
6. Ragool-vulta, as in 1758 - - - - - 3,750
7. Muchwab, as in 1758 - - - - - 2,000
8. Rumpelly and Peram - - - - - 7,000
9. Teada, by Bussy, 20,000 rupees; and in 1775 - - 17,500

TOTAL in Bussy's time - - Rupees 2,17,000  
but, according to Matthews, in 1775 - Pagodas 1,02,750

(2.) SINGWAREPETAH, or Singrugtah, about 12 coss west from Vize-nagram, taken from Mooky Gazeput Rauze, including the mootahs of Autwah Rolli, and Doorapillee, rated by Bussy at, rupees 1,00,000, but by Matthews - - - - - 50,000

(3.) MARGOOL, south-west from Vizianagram about 25 coss, taken from Longabopetty, and, with the two preceding districts, granted in zemindarry in 1768 to Vizieram Rauze, with a sayerum of 24,000 rupees, or, valued by Bussy in 1758, at, rupees 1,10,000; but, by Matthews, including the tribute Byrobopetty of Coleonda - - - - - 50,000

(4.) BUNDOOPILLEE, taken from Dhoomunt Row, valued in 1758 for 25,000 rupees; now - - - - - 5,000

(5.) PEDAGAREE Nerwah and Verja Gurrah, taken from Nuring Row; rated by Bussy 25,000 rupees; and in 1775 - - - - - 5,000

(6.) GORAUPELLEE and Bawringhy, taken from Bahoo Balender, famous in the history of Oris; in 1758, worth 25,000 rupees; now, - - 10,000

(7.) COTTAPOLLAM, by Bussy, 20,000 rupees; now - - - - - 6,250

(8.) EZEMUNDEL, dismembered from Kimerly - - - - - 4,000

TOTAL, as assessed in 1758 - - - - - 2,33,000

Rupees 5,22,000; corrected by Mr. Matthews - - - - - 5,85,500

4th. TALOOKEN ZEBBERDESY, or lands recently seized without any authority, and held rather through the inattention, than intended favour of government:

(1.) WOORATLA, &c. four pergunnahs, between Cossim Cotah, the Hills, and the Sitteaveram or Golinda rivers, 30 coss south of Vizagapatam, belonging to the Havillee Lands, let to Timrajee Vacheroy in 1750; before his restoration to the zemindarry of Peddapore, afterwards farmed by Hyder Kooli Khan, and in 1758 to Gajepetty Raja, for the net sum to be paid into the treasury of, rupees 1,43,000, besides 30 garce each of 7 ordinary candies of paddy, estimated at, rupees 8,000; but, according to the more adequate valuation of Matthews, the four pergunnahs yield us follows:

1. Woorotla, on the Punda river - - - - - 18,750
2. Cotacotah, 3 coss higher up - - - - - 6,250
3. Mulgopauk, near Cossim Cotah - - - - - 15,000
4. Uppalum Ryarum, 30 coss south on both sides of the Pondere river - - - - - 11,750

TOTAL of Woorotla - - - - - Pagodas 51,750

(2.) ANKAPILLEE, the zemindarry of Poythoo Radhoun, situated Appalee, 42 miles south of Vizianagram, and 4 north of Cossim Cotah; in 1758, yielded net to the public treasury 82,734 rupees, besides 500 garce of paddy, valued at, rupees 15,000 more. In 1769, after having cut off all the males of the family, as commonly supposed, Sitteram Rauze became security for, or rather levied, the rents, moderately valued, as follows:

1. Ankapillee and Milpauk &c. - - - - - 27,500
2. Sittigerum - - - - - 7,500
3. Doodigul, 38 coss south, - - - - - 3,550

3,850

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Ad. Amount collected.

(3.) TALOOKS of Majnadar and Enamdar, dispersed throughout this  
Circar, and being perhaps fraudulent alienations, were assessed by  
Bussy, in 1758, rupees 34,539, including a nuzzeranah of ru-  
pees 39,910; and though General Matthews states a lack and a half  
on this account, we take the former - - - - - 13,635

## TOTAL of Unauthorized Possessions

1,03,635

• TOTAL of the zemindary of Vizianagram in Bussy's mustabood account in  
1758, at rupees 18,51,539; in General Matthews' account in 1775, stated at  
rupees 27,43,000, and in the present Doul bundobust, exclusive of Verkeram  
Deo's tribute of 40,000 - - - - - Rupees 27,56,540; or Madras pagodas

6,89,135

TOTAL Revenue of the Vizagapatam division of the Circar of Chicacole, ac-  
cording to Matthews, 32,43,000; but by this account reduced to rupees 32,21,510,  
or - - - - - Madras pagodas

8,05,377½

GANJAM on the sea-coast, near the N.E. extremity of this and all the Northern circars,  
at the distance of 187 miles from Vizagapatam, 357 from Masulipatam, 650 from Madras,  
372 from Calcutta, and only 245 miles from Jellasore, the present boundary of Bengal to-  
wards the Marhatta division of Orissa, is the regular pentagon fort and capital of the lesser  
northern division of Chicacole, commonly called Ichapoor, in the country of Oria, under  
the superintendence of a chief and council, and subdivided as follows:

(1.) HAVILLER, rated in M. Bussy's Jummaundy of 1758, at rupees 1,76,141;  
yields now to the public, clear of charges; viz.

1. Ichapoor, 31 miles southerly from Ganjam, including the sayer or land  
customs, and arrack farms - - - - - 15,500
2. Papaconda, pergunnah, rented for - - - - - 14,300
3. Terrestann, or low grounds of Ganjam, formed into a  
pergunnah, and, with the sayer - - - - - 6,300
4. Monhedery, 23 miles southerly - - - - - 4,500
5. Askā, pergunnah, about 39 miles west - - - - - 3,000
6. Baraia, near Ichapoor, southerly - - - - - 2,200
7. Munsoor Cotah, 12 miles south - - - - - 2,000
8. Courlah, pergunnah or mootah - - - - - 1,500
9. Sayer, or sea and river customs of Ganjam - - - - - 2,500

## TOTAL of the Havillee Farms

Madras Pagodas

51,800

(2.) VIZIANAGUR, about 50 miles west of the capital of a small prin-  
cipality, among the hills; united, till lately, in the person of Rhesun  
Deo, another descendant of the royal family of Orissa; now divided  
pretty equally between Ramesh and Jaggernaut Deo, sons to the  
former occupant, the latter residing at the foot of Pertabgeery. The  
whole district may be worth 1,20,000 rupees; was assessed by Bussy,  
in 1758, for a tribute of rupees 84,454. But until this, with all the  
numerous petty munims in the division of Ganjam, be reunited  
under one head as formerly, and the person thus acting destitute of  
all pretensions of his own, the mere officer of government, which  
necessarily excludes every branch of the royal family of Gajepetty,  
we cannot realize, whatever may be the just or necessary demands of  
the public from this raj, more than - - - - - 15,000

66,800

(3.) MUNNIMS, or Jungle possessions, situated partly in the plain, and partly among  
the boundary northern and westerly hills, held by petty warrior proprietors of  
the Candiat or warlike tribe, formerly the servants or vassals of the Gajepetty  
family; and never reduced before the era of the French government, though then  
and ever since only partially so, by reason of the unhealthiness of their dwelling  
places. All these, taken together, may be estimated at eight-and-half lacks of  
rupees; but, perhaps, never will yield to government a greater revenue than  
M. Bussy's assessment of 1758; viz.

1. Mopery, eight coss south, the most central, to control the rest,  
under Varraindar, assessed for - - - - - 12,000
2. Goomsur, 50 miles west northerly, under Klisenbunje,  
increase of 20,000 rupees on Bussy's rent - - - - - 14,500
3. Callicotah, to Sampet Sing Burjah, near the Chilka - - - - - 14,000
4. Daracotah, to Rajender Sing Burjah - - - - - 11,800
5. Atgurrah to Harry Chunder, valued at - - - - - 13,000
6. Sigur to Harry Kissen Sing, rated at - - - - - 8,500
7. Suridgy to Harry Chunder, assessed for - - - - - 4,500
8. Souzerah to Itai Sing, 60 miles N.W. extremity - - - - - 2,750
9. Beredy to Martah, near Ganjam - - - - - 1,500

10. Paleor

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10. Paloor to Gajender, also near Ganjam	1,000
11. Houmah to Santerau, originally to the former	200
12. Burragurr, to Permandud Sing; this, with all the preceding munnims, except Mohery, lying between the sea and Souzerah, to the north of the Roushcoila, or river of Ganjam, on the frontiers of the Marhatta division of Orissa	3,000
13. Chigutty, to Rawal Rao, between Mohery and Vizianagrum	24,000
14. Jeridah to Santerow, farther south	2,000
15. Jellantha to Chowhao, south-west range	5,700
16. Mundesan to Rajamany, near Kinedy	7,250
17. Terlah to Ragonaut Soor; this and the four preceding munnims in the range of hills south-west from Ganjam, and from 20 to 35 miles from the sea-coast	5,350
18. Burah Singy to Neel Khaut, near ditto	1,200
	1,20,250
TOTAL of Ganjam Division, rupees 7,48,200 } or Mudras Pagodas }	1,87,050
TOTAL Revenue of the Circar of Chicacole - - rupees 39,69,710, or Madras pagodas	9,92,427½
Amount of the revenue of the four Provinces, under Masulipatam, brought forward - - - - - rupees 52,30,780, or Madras pagodas	13,07,695
TOTAL gross rent of all the Circars at present under the English jurisdiction, being, exclusive of Severum and Enaums - rupees 92,00,490, or Madras pagodas	23,00,122½
Amount of Guntour, brought forward - - - - - rupees 13,00,000, under the Nizam	3,31,000
TOTAL of the Daul bundooat of the Northern Circars, exclusive of the subsidiary freehold estates and alienations to Ibrahime or Feroz - - - - - Rs 1,06,04,490, or Madras pagodas	26,51,122½

THE original accounts and authorities on which the preceding Statement of the gross Revenue collected from the Northern circars is founded, may be considered in the following order.

Documents which authenticate the preceding Statement.

1st. The *Jumma Kaumil*, or complete standard assessment of the Deccan, begun by Moorshed Kooli Khan in 1654, on the principle of Turell Mull's original Rent-roll of Proper Hindostan, and finally terminated for the Deccan by the emperor Aurangzeer, in the year 1687. This account was obtained immediately from the duffer of the Nizamut; but it is so common, and of such universal use, that either in whole or in part, it must be in the hands of every man skilled in the finances of the country; accordingly, there is not a despandeah employed throughout the Peninsula, and worthy of holding his office, who cannot repeat at least as much of it, as regards the particular districts of his own superintendence: and many persons, entirely unconnected with the business of revenue, are in possession of the whole unimpaired in detail, by the extracts published in Mr. Orme's Historical Fragments. The manuscript procured for him of the subdivisions and territorial income of the Deccan, appears evidently to be no other than a copy of the jumma kaumil, with geographical illustrations drawn out for the use of Mr. Orme, under the inspection of Hyda Jung, while he had access to the public records, about the year 1756, and perhaps carried about by one of the dispersed followers of the Deccan chief after the national overthrow in India, until it accidentally fell several years afterwards into the hands of an English commander in one of the Northern provinces of Hindostan. We have already, on different occasions, explained the nature and utility of this famous rent-roll, and endeavoured to shew, that though every where indispensably necessary to ascertain even the present political circumstances of the country, yet with respect to the actual amount of the revenues of the circars, it is chiefly applicable to, and comes nearest the modern valuation of those south of the Godavari. Some very intelligent men have, however, suggested a doubt whether the population and more ardent arts, in all these provinces, may not have been on the decline, since the commencement of European administrations; and that consequently, the ancient rental may exceed what, on the same principle of taxation, should now be exacted from the landholders. There would be many extraordinary unaccountable facts, if they could be brought into proof, and, however mortifying to the pride of the highest civilization, should be fully displayed, as touching national prosperity, and the general interest of mankind. For if, after a lapse of two centuries, (in course of which such an amazing revolution has taken place all over the world, in the relative decreasing worth of specie, and in particular such prodigious advantages as already set forth, have been almost exclusively acquired and enjoyed by the inhabitants of the circars, through the channels of commerce) it should appear that a pecuniary estimate of the lands made with all possible acknowledged exactness, antecedently to that period, be too high in proportion to the actual produce of the country, as the medium by which it is rated, depending on the mass of gold and silver currency in circulation; or, above all, it should be found the violent sanguinary despotism of the Mahomedans, who have ruled universally and uninterruptedly



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all these provinces for ages past (holding in the most unqualified debasing slavery the native, inoffensive Hindoos, composing at least one tenth of the whole body of the people, and including every class of industrious subjects) proved more favourable to population, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, than a government the freest and most liberal and lenient, existing perhaps, at present, even in a more enlightened part of the world, in a time of the most profound tranquillity and abundant produce respectively of the country under consideration, than of Christians; Humanity initiated so far with one of its best precepts, "increase and multiply," as to reject the example of Mussulman tyranny, found experimentally thus to answer so effectually the great ends of society, we should at least have the satisfaction to know the chief impediment to the attainment of all these grand political desiderata, forming together the basis, as generally understood, of national power, wealth, and grandeur. But this would be more than a paradox; it would be a solecism in reason; and could only be admitted, under a total ignorance of existing circumstances, or from a partial observation of the wretched state of those districts denominated Havillas, rented so improvidently to mere temporary, needy, and unqualified farmers; for certainly the population has increased, and all the acts of civilization have been improved throughout all the Northern circars, under the influence of the British government, though these will be never made beneficial to the state, nor carried to the greatest possible height, on the present corrupt, dangerous, and oppressive system of usurped, indefinite, uncontroled zemindary administration; but that the jumma kamil falls greatly short of the amount of the revenue now actually collected on the same financial principles, as were laid down in the formation of that original antiquated assessment, has been more positively proved. Admitting the authenticity of the account following next in order, and on which more especially depends the verification of our statement, being,

2d. The *Doul Bundobust*, or sub-rental of the three middle circars, on a medium of the ten years preceding 1763, formed under the absolute authority of a Mussulman amildar, aided with all the acuteness, intelligence, and irresistible influence of a Bramin, at once dewan, serishtadar, and principal authority, feared for his knowledge and abilities by such of his own tribe as were most prone to enmity, but popular amongst all, for the extreme of a virtue rarely possessed in modern times by a Hindoo, profuse liberality; this man, whose name is Venkatram, a native of Comptaram, was grown old in practical finance before the deprivation of his office in consequence of the revolution, which transferred the reins of administration from his own and superior hands into those of the English, through the immediate effective agency of Tugare Pundit, his disciple; but by the death of his master Hussein Ali in 1771, and through his own extravagance, or an improvident turn of mind, fell into such indigence as to become a petitioner on the bounty of his successor in power, for a family subsistence in an allotment of about forty acres of land near Yamarum, six coss north of Masulipatam in the pergunna of Srisailam, under the denomination of an *enauin*, or charitable donation. As however he could not brook being indebted for his own personal expenses to his successor, nor to act in an inferior office, tendered to him in a place where he had before appeared, as principal, he accepted of an offer made by Sitteram Rauze, to be employed as *peishcar* for the district of Chicacole under the zemindary of Vizianagram; and in 1779 executed a similar proposal from Mohamed Taje udeen, amildar of Guntour, when he may be supposed to have completed his financial, by a particular local knowledge, of all the Northern circars. The vicissitudes of his fortune, brought him at length into the service of the author of this tract, whose curiosity being excited to make the inquiry, from the uncommon intelligence he discovered respecting the state of the country, learnt so much of his private history from many living evidences.

That the circumstance of Venkatram's former situation fully enabled him to ascertain, with the most minute accuracy, the gross revenues of those districts included in the rental now in question, no one will deny; and we know the unlimited power of a Mussulman delegate authorizing such an inquiry, and the personal influence of a Bramin, officially heard of the *darogah* members of his law acting in the capacity of despatches, the only native accountants and keepers of all the provincial records, or who has heard that Jougace Pundit, this man's successor, received a yearly pension of about twenty thousand pounds from the zemindars of Rajamahendrapur, for relinquishing a part of the public authority annexed to the serishtadary; or that the same Jougace inheritor still receives from the Company five thousand pounds more as dewan or interpreter, while his superior, the English chief and high representative of government, is not allowed a fourth of the same income. But the authenticity of the particular account thus exhibited as genuine, must in a great measure rest on probable circumstances, and the inquiries of the committee of circuit, or local knowledge of others, situated to be skilled in the finances of the country, bring the truth to light. As that we have to say on the subject, that it bore the marks of originality, and even of the chequered fragment of its owner, on whose part there were no apparent inducement to attempt deception, for he neither could have expected, nor did receive, any reward for bringing it forward, which was merely a matter of chance, occasioned by a reference to satisfy some inquiries on points beyond the scope of his memory; and being arrived at that time of life, when all the passions of a man, except avarice, are generally dormant, it is not likely that he had any personal malice to gratify; while the utmost of his ambition, after having outlived the vigour of his faculties, and being long since disencumbered of his family, may be actually supposed limited to a bare subsistence for himself individually. If these reasons should not be thought sufficient, Venkatram may yet live a few years to answer them more, in his own behalf; but we have indicated

indicated more minutely his family dwelling-place, in the event of his being called on; less, in the certainty of finding him there, than to prevent, through the liberal humanity of English superintendants, the sequestration of a miserable, perhaps an unauthorized enaam, which might otherwise inevitably be the consequences of incurring the resentment of his Brâmin brethren in office.

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3d. An *English manuscript* relative to the circars, in great part confirms the justness of the preceding document. We know not, with certainty, the Author of this piece, which was written in the year 1772-3, and professedly for the information of Mr. Dupréc, while in the government of Fort St. George; but from the uncommon and practical knowledge it discovers of the finances, or political state of the country, it may with confidence be said to be the production of some gentlemen long resident, and high in office, within the dependencies of Masulipatam, who only wanted original historical intelligence, with a true understanding of the forms and rights of government, alone to be acquired through the medium of the Persian language, to be perfect master of the subjects brought into discussion. Between the sum total of gross revenue here exhibited for the three middle circars, being pagodas 9,96,020, and that of Vencatram's doul bundobust 11,63,195 pagodas, there is a difference of 1,67,175; but as this deficiency in the former account, is owing to a notoriously undervalued rental of the four larger zemindaries of Peddapore, Pettapore, Nujere, and Mugletore; it serves rather to establish the authenticity of the latter statement; while a similar partial amount of 22,000 pagodas, in the estimate of Vencatayloo's meerassy, betrays the channel through which the misinformation of our English authors has proceeded.

4th. A *Hustabood account* of the village of lands of Rajemundry in detail, formed in the year 1758, by order of the French government, in exceeding greatly the medium valuation of Vencatram for the same circar, if it does not authenticate so much of the doul bundobust itself, proves at least the moderation of the scale on which this assessment has been formed.

5th. *Teshkhees Jumma* bundy of the whole circars Cicacole, concluded for the Fussulleh year 1167, under the auspices of M. Bussy, with an Appendix, showing the Khan wossool, or gross receipts on account of the zemindary of Vislanagram, being the valued rental of the lands, as then ascertained, to be specified in the sunnuds newly granted by the French chief Gasseputty Rauze, agreeable to the forms required in executing all such territorial grants. This account has been corroborated, enlarged, and corrected to the year 1775, by the more accurate, minute, and equally well directed investigation of General Matthews into the state of the revenues of the southern division of Cicacole, as exhibited in the abstract recently laid before a Committee of the House of Commons; and with respect to the value of the northern district of Ichapoor, it has been no less authoritatively confirmed by the special written informations of an English chief, to whose ability, zeal, and superior intelligence, the India Company are principally indebted for the first regular establishment of their authority over that portion of the same circar.

6th. A *comparative general estimate of the receipts* from all the six Northern provinces, which these are deemed equivalent to the whole of the remaining portion of the soubah Hydrabad, left to the government of Nizam Ali, and comprising 19 circars, rated annu-ly for one crore of rupees, though not above half be realized to the exchequer, founded a summary traditional calculation, adopted by all other native financiers, from the late Nizam ul Moolk, who succeeded his father, the famous Shah Nowas Khan, in the high offices of king's dewan and vice-royal prime minister of the soubadary of the Deccan, and responding with the result of local observation, and the best personal private information procurable, in a period of near three years residence within such of the Nizam's and Com-pany's territories as are made here the subject of comparison.

But the amount thus ascertained, by the positive and circumstantial evidence of facts, ten, or oral testimony, to be levied from the country, under the sanction, and wholly for use of the sovereign proprietary government vested in the Company, is absolutely in violation of the Kharige jumma, or territorial grants of revenues and estates, for the maintenance of zemindars, with their respective jurisdictions of Despardah throughout the patahs, in lieu of rissooms of koolkarnies in the villages, and of priests, mendicants, and others of the Hindoo or Mussulman persuasion, on the few existing religious and charitable foundations. Moreover, what is truly reproachful and dangerous to the state, it is in exclusion of those recent fraudulent and unconstitutional alienations of land, either to purchase collusive assent of Brâmin superintendants, or to support a numerous military force, dependent on the daimooks, and kept up with no other view than to tyrannize over and oppress the peaceable ryots, or to foment premeditated rebellion against the lawful sovereign, on the first convenient occasion. The former of these rightful appropriations to the farming holders, may now be moderately estimated at five lacks of rupees annually: half that sum more than the original pecuniary due of the provincial recorders; and reckoning one or two Brâmin accountants at a hundred rupees for each village, supposing the number of increased, by enlargement of territory and population, to 6,500, the amount then added in land to the immediate officers of provincial administration, will be in all fourteen lacks;

Kharige or excluded  
Jumma.

Due to the weakness of Mussulman government in the southern division, and the consequent neglect of the zemindars, or the corruption in executing at least and defrauding through the intervention of the Company of accountants, with all the lesser officers employed in the revenue department.

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Fraudulent alienations.

sic in orig.

Hypothetical calculation  
of rent on general  
principles.

Proportioned to the  
Bengal duttry.

lacks; to which we shall only add three more, on account of all public endowments or charity, as Simmachellum near Vizagapatam, is the sole pagoda of note within the circars, and amply provided for, as the clerical and soothsaying or calendar Bramins are otherwise supported, through the superstition of the people, who class them with balootedars, or artificers, entitled each at harvest time to a balootch, or bundle of corn; and as donations to Mahomedans, or mendicants in general, have been a great part resumed under the uncontrolled grasping sway of Hindoo zemindars.

To ascertain the amount of fraudulent sequestrations of land to peons, &c. it should be remembered that 41,000 armed men, of every denomination, are supposed to be maintained throughout all the provinces, by the official landholders, on pretence of enforcing the collection of the rents due to government, which is virtually or in fact debited for the expense of such militia establishment, under the head of *sebundy*; of this number, one half of different tribes, Mahomedans or Hindoos, wholly undisciplined, and with no local or personal attachments, are paid altogether in money, and a peon for every village, forming what is called the *Nafkevary* establishment, consisting chiefly of Mussulmen in hereditary succession, and indispensably necessary for the collections and peace of the country, paid a subsistence in kind in harvest time, in equal proportions, by government and its ryots, will make up the numerary of *Mofassil* troops thus provided for, 27,000. It is the remainder only of 14,000, composed of the military tribes of *Rachewars*, *Rowars*, *Velmas*, and *Kundais*, sprung from or adopted into the families of the zemindars, and therefore personally attached to their chiefs, that have been clandestinely favoured with territorial grants for their ordinary and constant maintenance, besides extraordinary pay in money when on service; and these alienations, at the most moderate computation of 50 rupees annually for each man, one with another, form an object of seven lacks, which, without pretending to estimate similar defalcations in favour of Bramins, &c. added to the *kharije jumma*, make the whole income of landed property, exclusive of what is assessed for government, amount to twenty-four lacks; and inclusively of the latter portion, one crore thirty lacks of rupees, with a fraction, being the sum total of what we shall henceforth assume, as the gross rental of the *mehal* and *sayer* throughout all the Northern circars collectively.

Large as this revenue may at first sight appear, either comparatively with the actual public receipts, or hitherto supposed capacity of the farming landholders, yet it will be found to fall short of the estimated yearly produce of the country, by the lowest general calculations which can be formed of the extent and value even of all the arable ground in or out of cultivation, setting aside the greater portion of land appropriated for pasture, now become altogether unproductive, and of no financial account to the state, unless in the gratuitous partial maintenance of the whole body of peasantry. To discuss this point with the wished-for precision, a topographical survey of the outlines of the Circars, particularly those of *Guantour*, *Rajemundry*, and the southern division of *Cicacole*, would be necessary, in order to ascertain their exact superficial contents; nevertheless, according to such imperfect materials, as the public or individuals on the spot, have as yet been furnished with, and hints derived from viewing a manuscript drawing executed under the French government, though still unpublished, (except on the diminutive scale of *D'Anville's* general map of Hindostan) we have ventured to give an area of 17,000 square geographic miles to all the six provinces united; but, to be within the most moderate bounds, let the dimensions be reduced to 15,000 of the same measure, or for the sake of easier calculation, in round numbers, to 20,000 square British miles. In like manner, we have been under the necessity of assuming the proportion of arable land rather arbitrarily, and, to ourselves, on very unsatisfactory grounds, at one fifth of the whole territorial extent, finding that neither the Mogul, French, or English administrations, the former from sloth and ignorance, the second for want of leisure, in the short period of six years' rule, and the latter no doubt from disinclination, have not adopted the easy constitutional mode of ascertaining this matter with greater accuracy, by an investigation into the detailed annual accounts of the despotheads or other revenue officers employed by government, and which can only be deficient from relaxation or negligence, in the exercise of necessary legal control.

To value this portion of land, being 4,000 square British miles, on the principles of *Toorel Mull's jumma* bundy *nekdy*, on a fair comparison, and with due attention to relative circumstances, it is to be observed, that the Bengal duttry, or square official measure instituted by the same financier, and serving as a basis for his general pecuniary assessment of one fourth of the yearly produce of the soil, in those parts of the empire where a money settlement could with advantage be made, consisting of 2,500 square ells, each at the lowest calculation of 33 inches, and at the highest 41, being very little short of an English acre. But in process of time, in consequence of the increased influx of specie, from the days of Akbar, throughout the commercial provinces as well as those around the capitals, so greatly benefited by a rapid circulation of the signs of wealth, and agreeable to the ever constant effects of growing luxury with riches, the natural and artificial produce of the country acquired a high proportionate value; the price of labour was enhanced, and, to re-establish an equilibrium in the general system of political economy over the whole empire, the *foujedars*, *amits*, and *zamins* employed in the *Mofassil* collections, sometimes blindly, and often interestedly, were made the state conductors for drawing a superabundant currency into the exchequer coffers of the exchequer. These intermediate agents sustained the shock often unexpectedly, and always irregularly themselves, from the hand of despotism; but communicated its influence for the sake of a selfish returning benefit,

benefit, with more moderation, though no less arbitrarily, to the great mass of the people. A fixed standard for estimating the lands had been instituted, and was found necessary to be continued, to regulate the extent and value of territorial assessments, whether for civil or military services. The tide of American treasure, which afterwards so prodigiously altered the relative worth of real and personal property in Hindostan, flowed in through so many different channels of commerce from the beginning, that its progress seemed slow, and was scarcely perceptible. When made visible by its effects, an increase of revenue was demanded; but instead of recurring to the original principles of finance established by Toorel Mull, ignorant or corrupt Mussulman deputies preferred the mode of arbitrary taxation in addition to the first regular assessment; and which being precarious, and indefinite, afforded greater scope for ministerial peculation, and was more agreeable to the ryots, and superior landholders, in the hopes of future discontinuance, or of purchasing partial remissions of public income by the private douceurs of bribery. An age elapsed before a weak, blind, unsystematical government, could avail itself of the change thus gradually introduced in the value of things in general, assert its territorial rights, and resuming only the known defalcations of its proper Mussulman aumils, or foujedary officers, consolidate with the original rents, all the recent abatements or imposts. The reform, however, was still but half completed in the soubahs of Delhi, Agra, and Bengal; the two former, so enriched by the collected spoils of the empire, or the profuse expense of a Mogul court, the latter, so greatly benefited by enlarged commerce. In these places, therefore, over and above the ordinary taxes, to remedy the growing disproportion between the gross produce of the land, and royal proprietary share, a reduction of two-thirds was made in the square extent of a begah, which, by a very simple operation, nominally tripled the quantity of ground in cultivation; this lessened measure of 1,400 ellis, being equally valuable or subject to the same financial demands as the larger one under the same denomination, instituted as a basis for the original assessment of Toorel Mull.

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3d. Amount collected.

Reduced to the Begah  
Ryotty.

Particularly in Bengal, (the circumstance of which may be deemed the fairest to be brought into comparison with those of the Northern crown), the common begah, now called Ryotty, in contra-distinction to doffery, and made almost the universal standard to estimate the annual farm or permanent transfer of territorial property, contains no more than 1,600 square yards, while the proportioned rent, including the stall toomah, with all the additional taxes since established, and already exhibited, may be calculated at least from one to four rupees, varying with situation and soil, for grounds laid out in the culture of grain; and from five to thirty, for such as are appropriated to the denser productions of second necessity. Or, to obviate every possibility of error, the medium yearly income of the whole, may be stated at two rupees, according to which 1,000 square miles each, of 1,000 begahs, being the supposed arable land in the circars, should yield a gross revenue to government of 1,54,88,000.

Valued by the Rebba  
or money settlement, at  
£ as in Bengal;

Nor will the amount be less, on a comparison by the actual established rule of Buttaï, of the produce of the three yearly harvests in corn, equally divided between the state and its ryots. Allowing the same quantity of ground as for cultivation as in the foregoing estimate, one fourth should be deducted for the portion always suffered to remain fallow, and subject to no assessment, reckoning only 3,000 square miles, or nearly 1/7 of the area assigned to the whole country in constant tillage, liable to the operations of finance. This territory then being equivalent in local measure to 2,94,464 caddies, each of 32 gantah, composed of 16 square veestant, every one of which consisting of from 4½ to 5 covids, or on a medium 71¼ feet square, and producing at the lowest calculation per catty, one year with another, 8 caddies, each of about 1,600 lbs weight in grain, either rice or toary, which usually fetches on the spot 3 pagodas, or 30 rupees per catty; will, after deduction of one moiety, as the legal and customary share of the peasantry, though sometimes curtailed through the iniquity of zemindars, yield an annual income to government of rupees 1,55,57,120; while the amount of never or variable imposts in addition, may be supposed amply to compensate for the extraordinary expenses, misdeeds, and unavoidable loss, in thus concluding with the farmers a revenue settlement in kind, paid by pecuniary estimation.

and by Buttaï, or divi-  
sion of crops, as in the  
circars.

On the other hand, we are not to imagine that the burthen thus imposed on the great mass of the people, more especially the wretched husbandmen, leaves a smaller proportion of the fruits of their labour to satisfy their own necessary wants, or indeed, is in any respect so oppressive, as what is experienced in all other civilized parts of the world. In the freest countries of Europe, Great Britain, Switzerland, Netherlands, and the Pais Bas of France, we believe the share left to the peasantry of the growth of the soil, with their own industry, has never been reckoned more than from two-thirds to four-fifths of the whole yearly produce. By the regulations of Tamerlane, for all his Tartarian, Persian and Syriac dominions, from China to the Mediterranean sea, one third of the annual crop, by common valuation, whether of the seed or coarser articles of culture, was to be appropriated to support the established military government, and the remainder, to subsist the ryots, or defray the expense of cultivation. But by the constitutions of Sultan Selim, for the general administration of his new conquests in Egypt in 1516, the lands, or native tenantry, were assessed chiefly in money, and by measurement. One half of the gross annual product of it is true an extraordinary luxuriant soil, either to maintain the feudal republican establishment with a standing army, in subordination to the Turkish bashaw, or to be remitted in treasure to the Porte, and as corn to Mecca, as an offering to the holy Mussulman see, under

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# REVENUE.

1. Amount collected.

2. Comparative and singular moderation of the government on Hindoo peasantry.

under the denomination of *Mirs*, or imperial tribute. \* Whereas, in Hindostan †, agreeable to the institutions of the emperor Akbar, universally adopted and invariably adhered to since, whether we make the *jumabundy*, *nekdy*, or *buttai*, the basis for calculation, it would seem as if a medium had been struck of all the foregoing proportions established in other countries, to fix those of the Mogul dominions, as they are by the despotic law and usage, wonderful moderation, at one quarter for the circar or sovereign proprietor, and three-fourths for the ryots, or immediate cultivators of the land. Though, when circumstances of climate and habit are taken into consideration; when necessary wants of clothing, fuel, and various diet, with all the conveniences required by the inhabitants of the colder regions, yet so scantily supplied even by excessive toil, from sandy barrenness in many places, united to the effect of inclement seasons in others, are compared with the expediency of Indian nakedness, under a scorching sun; the simplicity of milk and vegetable food, enjoined by the strongest moral and religious precepts; the rank luxuriance of a soil, yielding almost spontaneously, a triple yearly harvest; and above all, a perpetual verdant pasture, of such vast extent and richness as to subsist through its flocks gratuitously, without any fiscal charge, half the great body of the people; then it must be confessed that the proportional assessment stated as forming an apparent mean, is in reality, the very extreme of financial moderation; and that, instead of three-fourths, we may allow seven-eighths to be the share of annual territorial produce enjoyed by the Hindoo peasantry ‡.

But it may be urged, that it is not the great mass of the people, (two millions four hundred ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and thirty, out of two millions and a half, the supposed total enumeration of souls existing in the circars,) that are objects of consideration, as likely to be oppressed, or deprived of their rights, in realizing to the public treasury the territorial rental levied from the ryots in the name or behalf of government, and therefore stated as its due; it is solely a class of seventy zemindars, who being called landholders, must therefore be so in fact, according to European ideas of feudal tenures, or rather being ignorantly styled rajahs, or Hindoo princes, have of course an original hereditary right, not only to the proprietary occupancy of the land, but also to exercise tyrannical uncontrolled authority over the persons and property of the bulk of the inhabitants, either virtually, or in contemplation of law, subjects to the dismembered sovereignty of a portion of the Mogul empire. The very proposition is so palpably absurd, and erroneous in its principle, that it seems impossible to express it in any terms of language, which do not at the same time convey, a self-evident refutation; and expose the fallacy, both of the premises, and conclusion; yet in delicacy to the public opinions, and as the legislators of India in Great Britain, seem rather inclined to adopt the popular belief, though in their wisdom they have not thought proper to this time, to alter one of the most ancient fundamental maxims of policy in the East, by creating great intermediate proprietors of land, on the footing of freeholders, copyholders, or feudatories of Europe, otherwise than by temporary jagheers to the officers or pensioners of government, so we shall still formally suppose the existence of such a description of men under the appellation of zemindars, for the sake of a direct positive denial of the fact, and of the truth of the inference deduced from it, implying an unwarrantable oppressive infringement of individual privileges. This subject has already been irregularly discussed, in different parts of the preceding disquisition; and it seems only necessary here to bring all the arguments used by-reference, into one connected point of view.

Accordingly, it hath been asserted, and we presume to think, on grounds admitting of political demonstration, that no one tribe of Hindoo landholders, jointly or severally within the

\* The feudal republican establishment consisted of 26 foreign boys, with as many kashiks or lieutenants for the 26 provinces of Egypt, each of them possessing in property and feudal subordination, an indefinite number of Malukes or Circassian, Georgian and Abyssinian military slaves, educated in Mahomedanism, who formed the standing militia, and succeeded always by adoption, ability, or favouritism, to the landed property and offices of their masters, until they attained the highest dignity among the boys of Shekhul Belad, or chief of the whole country. The standing army was composed of 12,000 regular troops, chiefly infantry, divided into 7 *ujaks* or regiments, commanded by as many *kybaks* under the orders of the *ba-haw*. The mili for lower Egypt, in money, was settled at 25 *mydnis* per *medan* of ground, and for Said or upper Egypt, 5,00,000 *arabes* of wheat, according to the measure of that time.

† In Siam also under a different denomination, the title of *Buttai*, by equal division of the yearly output, between government and the peasantry, is a fixed regulation established by ancient despotic law or custom.

‡ From verbal information on the spot, not vouched to be correct in particulars, though perhaps sufficiently so to convey a general idea of the matter of fact, the town of Kalcobor pergunnah, Bhetharghelly zemindary, Chakker mahal on the fruitful borders of Cofur lake, circar of Kondapillor, contained in 1783 one hundred families, of which 80 farming Bramins, in all about 8,000 souls, paying to government as its due, under the denomination of a sixth of the product 2,000 pagodas yearly, for 1,000 *caries* of the richest arable ground in the circars of this

space, only  $\frac{1}{4}$  was in cultivation, and yielded 2,000 *candies* of grain, valued at 10,000 pagodas, from which, after deducting the stipulated rent to the state, and an allowance of 14 per cent. on the gross receipts to defray the customary charge of *Kassabs*, *Baverams*, &c. to zemindars and lower officers whose authority for some years past hath been suspended, 6,400 pagodas should remain to the husbandmen. The usual pay to the *paribhas*, who are the common labourers, and employed six months on tillage or reaping the harvest, is two *seer* of paddy per day each man, and  $\frac{1}{10}$ th of the grain produced, distributed among them all at the close of the season, being about four *seers* per month for half the year, each person at the usual calculation of three for every *batty* of ground, and which, together with the price of half *seer* of *ragi* grain, required for the same stage of labour, make the total expense of the cultivated lands 2,200, leaving a clear profit to the farmers of 2,500 pagodas; as the maintenance of oxen for the plough is otherwise gratuitously provided for by indigent sovereigns. Now besides the involving harvest income of these villages, they derived a gain of about 1,500 more, the yearly produce in *gucce* numerary increase of 600 *nah* cows, pastured on the remainder of the land in *lanancy*, subject to no *land-tax*, while it was necessary that the Bramin families forming  $\frac{1}{10}$ th of the whole population of the place, and there as well as does the rest of Hindostan, generally speaking, the most voluptuous and extravagant in their diet, drew half their subsistence from butter milk, or the very squeezings of their dairy, after having converted, without the help of *slaves*, the most abundant heritage into still more substantial gold.



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the circars, or the whole of them, collectively, under whatever denomination, (excepting the ancient rajahs of the country, which have been particularized as descendants of the royal family of Orissa or Gajeputty,) have in right, or fact, the smallest pretensions to any territorial property, beyond the extent of their specified official domains called Saverum, making scarcely 1/20th part of the local civil jurisdiction committed to their management by the sovereign proprietary government.—1st. The private right of a more extensive landholding could only be acquired, by conquest, royal grant, hereditary or prescriptive tenure of free or feudal possession, while it is notorious that every zemindary title is the most limited and precarious in its nature, depending on the arbitrary will of the lowest provincial delegate; equivalent to a simple lease in tenancy subject to annual renewals, and to be traced to the same base and recent origin, within the period of British rule, as generally distinguishes the spurious claims of the farmers-occupant themselves, to family pre-eminence from birth, on the enjoyment of a large territorial income, in prejudice of the prince's necessary undisputed regal dues.

2d.—The form of such sunnuds or dewanny patents, as constitute the desmooks or zemindar official collectors of the revenue with inferior civil powers, at the same time that it ascertains the extent of their petty freehold estates appropriated for family subsistence, with each local jurisdiction, determines specifically or comparatively, if we may be allowed to make use of an European term, the unqualified villainage to the sovereign, or his feudal representative, of the great portion of land in occupancy, as well as the slavish dependance of the Hindoo landholder, for the whole of his uncertain tenure, on the lordly Mussulman jagceedar or amil. That the possessors of such inferior grants, should be reluctant now in producing their respective deeds, under the prevalence of a delusive idea which magnifies their relative importance, is perfectly natural; but that the rights and privileges of subjects, as derived from government, should so frequently be agitated, and to this day acknowledged to be matters wholly undefined, or of the greatest doubt; and that yet the only sure, easy, and simple mode of discovering the truth by a critical examination of sunnuds, should be neglected, appears altogether extraordinary and unaccountable.—3d. In point of fact, the most conclusive evidence offers itself of the sovereign's claim to the landholder's share of yearly territorial produce, that the whole body of zemindars were from the beginning, and are still to be considered, simply, as intermediate agents for the state, to realize the stipulated rent of the peasantry. This doctrine forms incontrovertibly the groundwork of the past and actual system of finance, throughout all the dismembered members of the Mogul empire. It is practically enforced every where by the prince, acknowledged or acquiesced in by the Hindoo landholders themselves, and notoriously respected by the ryots universally, as the foundation of their Magna Charta, stating the proportions to be invariably drawn of the produce of the soil, assisted by their labour for the public service; accordingly it may be clearly traced in the letter and spirit of the original instruments conferring investiture, describing the nature, local extent, with the powers of zemindarry offices, as well as in the annual cowle, bestowing the temporary management of the revenue on the same generally permanent agents. It is manifested in the ever customary frequent acts of government at pleasure, or for mal-administration, in suspending their authority as collectors, and depriving them altogether of territorial jurisdiction with its assigned advantages, unless in some cases with the exception of *saverum* or subsistence in laud, then transferring their employments, official rights and privileges to others in perpetuity or for a time. And it is finally demonstrated, by the tenure of the *muchelca*, or written obligation of the zemindars, to discharge faithfully the trusts reposed in them, otherwise implicitly acquiescing in the justice of suspension or entire exoneration, and never requiring at any time in the nature of territorial property beyond the extent of their *saverum*, but always to account with the treasury for the last daum, collected throughout the remainder of their local jurisdiction, whether constructively or positively by royal authority, and which, though they do, by general abstract or false statements of receipts and disbursements, never doth, or can supersede, the sovereign's right to enter into detail, resume defalcations, and curtail unnecessary subsidy or exorbitant *motussil* expenses of the circar or state, being all that is contended for, as requiring public investigation and economical reform, in order to reduce the emoluments of intermediate agents, to the primitive, legal, and equitable standard of *russooms* and *saverums*, virtually as well as in form.

How far this decreased allowance in itself, may be supposed insufficient, adequate in policy, or an infringement in equity, on the natural rights of Indian landholders, can only be truly ascertained; by estimating their character, wants, and relative circumstances. In addition to what has already been observed on this topic, it is incontestable, that the most voluptuous Hindoo in the country, of whatever denomination, doth not in general, and (without a flagrant deviation from every good principle, moral and religious, which could make him as dangerous a subject in society, as in ordinary he is worthy of being cherished for inoffensive manners growing out of a virtuous simplicity) cannot in his own person, home, equipage, dress, and proper family subsistence, exceed in his expenses on a scale of the highest rank, from a hundred to one thousand rupees monthly; while a zemindar's legal allotment of about ten per cent. out of the public revenue, together with certain other pecuniary and contingent advantages, not only amply provide for all such necessary charges, but are considerably more than sufficient to defray all those of useless luxury, pernicious extravagance, joined to all the empty pageantry of retinue and outward shew, ever indulged in or affected by the richest, most debauched landholder, as yet unmoved by a spirit of extraordinary refractoriness, and untainted with the vice of ambition, so common among



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4th.—Deductions of  
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this order of men in India, to raise self-despotic independence, on the ruins of established constitutional authority. That therefore, and from a variety of moral and physical causes, in their effect not peculiar to Hindostan, any excess of wealth enjoyed for a while by these people, must ultimately and inevitably, according to the prevalent custom of ages, the most stubborn religious habits, or slavish pusillanimity in yielding to superior authority without regarding its legitimacy, be diverted into one or all of the three following channels equally pernicious to the state:—1st. A secret hoard of treasure, set apart for the purpose of chicanery or superstition, withdrawn from the public stock of currency, never to return again into circulation, unless by violence or chance. 2d. A profuse expense to purchase popularity, in retaining a number of licentious Bramins, vagrant fakeers, and useless dependants, or a visible or concealed train of soldiers, for the certain unequivocal purpose of subverting that government, which hath thus raised and nourished the native serpent of rebellion in its bosom: or lastly, a dangerous superfluity, which if neglected through ignorance or design to be drawn by authorized taxation, into the public coffers of the state, will most assuredly become a prey to ministerial agency, either in the way of private exaction or in purchasing remissions, privileges, and power, directly or indirectly, by corrupt influence, not otherwise to be guarded against, even in the golden age of the most virtuous societies, but in lessening or removing the evil of temptation.

Fourth.—Having shewn the nature and sources of Indian revenue, mode of raising it, and the amount collected, we shall now, agreeable to the form prescribed to ourselves in treating on the general subject of finance, pursue the grand pecuniary result of our enquiry, being a gross rental of one crore thirty lacks of rupees, ascertained to be actually levied from the country in behalf of government, through a detailed account of annual provincial disbursements, involving a plan of future expenditure, and leaving only the net, proper, or perhaps possible sum, after a deduction of every necessary local expense of administration, to answer the greater political exigencies of general superintendence.

1st.—The *Kharije Jumna*, or excludet rent of land assigned in freehold to certain individuals, either in the way of official, charitable, or religious donations, and therefore exempted from all public burthens for a time, or in perpetuity partially or otherwise, according to the arbitrary will of despotism as hitherto exercised, offers itself for consideration; but to comprehend clearly the nature and extent of this, with all the following heads of charges, it is necessary after the example of Toorel Mull, to fix on some definite financial divisions of country, in order to regulate the number, jurisdiction, and collections of agents employed in a chain of subordination to each other, or to the state, in due proportion to their personal capacities, or trusts reposed in them. Accordingly, we assume for data, that the whole territory is distributed into five circars under the ancient denominations, in exclusion of the sixth dismembered portion, constituting the immediate dependencies of Masulipatam, and reannexed to the neighbouring provinces, Nizampatam to Guntour, as lying south of the Kistna, and the straggling maritime pergunnahs situated north of the same river, to Condapillee, Ellore, and Rajemundry; that these five circars are subdivided into twenty zemindarries each, composed of five pergunnahs, and under the inferior jurisdiction or financial management of a *desmook*, rated annually and invariably for a revenue of five lacks of rupees present currency, being nearly equivalent to a crore of daums, as fixed for similar purposes in the time of Akbar, from whence may be derived all modern dewanue institutions; that every pergunnah is subject to a *choudry* or talookdar in subordination to the desmook, but in matters of account or record, wholly controlled by the *despandeah*; and that in every village of which there are supposed to be in all 6,500, allowing 900 to each of the southerly provinces, and 2,900 to Cicacole, a *puttelee* or *mucaudlin* presides over the other ryots as chief collector, checked and assisted by a *koolcurmy*, who keeps the public accounts, and by one or two peons on the naikwarry establishment, to enforce the payment of the stipulated rent, maintain the peace, or guard the crops when exposed to risque before and after partition. All which we believe to be nearly descriptive of the circumstances of the country, as in fact arranged with a few deviations in form, easy as expedient to be corrected. Then under this head, should in propriety be classed as a public charge,

1st.—*Saveram*, or *Namcar*, the freehold real estate of twenty zemindars, included within their respective territorial jurisdictions, both to give them a local attachment, and to serve as a certain independent means of subsistence, when in or out of financial employment. However proper and political it may be, thus to distribute the ordinary official appointments in land: yet it will appear rather a delicate if not a dangerous operation, without a minute historiogeographical knowledge of the country and people, for it affects three descriptions of property, as at present disposed of: (1.) The Havillee or household domains under the immediate management of the sovereign, by erecting them into new zemindarries, or incorporation with those already established, and in the neighbourhood. (2.) The overgrown possessions committed to the superintendence of the desmooks of Vizianagram, Peldapote, Muggletore, and Nooned, by reduction of local extent, to the limits actually producing according to the new or true valuation, a net revenue of five lacks of rupees. And (3.) The five tributary principalities, with all the lesser landholdings, to the number of forty; by annexation under zemindarry chiefs, on the same financial scale. With respect to the former, the present wretched state of the lands, comparatively with those adjacent under different management, sufficiently point out the propriety of the proposed regulation; in regard to the second, a reform is equally just, political and necessary, especially in the instance of Vizianagram, which has been increased to a dangerous magnitude of late years, by

by suffering the *tesmook* to usurp and engross in his own person, the territorial jurisdictions, rights, and privileges, of a number of lesser holders; as also in the instance of Noozed, which is too extensive for single superintendence, or from situation on an open frontier, to be left wholly in the hands of any one tribe or family, particularly the present rebellious occupants: and as to the last description of property, it is not intended there should be any diminution of individual advantages rightfully enjoyed by the proposed annexations. The lesser proprietors, in losing their *saverum*, or being united under one zemindary chief, may be amply indemnified, by enrolment as *talookdars*, to be assessed invariably hereafter for a rent equivalent to the actual *doul-bundobust*, subject to no farther increase; and the rajahs or ancient princes of the country, will experience no additional hardship or mortification in being denied the privileges of holding their lands *in capite* of the superior sovereign, or continuing to pay their tributes through intermediate agency. Happily for themselves and the public tranquillity, they have lost all sense of their former pre-eminence, or if the remembrance of it, be still engraved on their minds, or handed down by tradition, viewing as they do the deplorable condition of their ancient great feudal patriarchal lord, Birkishen Deo, actual representative of the royal family of Orissa, now reduced to beggary and a prison, by the violent tyranny of the Mahrattas, a brother Indian nation, they must exult in the benefits of a revolutionary dispensation, which, though superseding their own enfeebled dominion, derived only from equivocal, civil, hereditary rights, by the superior one of conquest, founded in nature, law, and equity, leaves them entire personal freedom, with the secure enjoyment of property on true constitutional principles, as universally admitted on a former occasion. We have stated, and here again suppose, the amount of *saverum*, as now distributed among the several zemindars, about 70 in number of high or low degree, henceforth reduced to 20, on an equal footing throughout all the circars, to be nearly - - - - - Rupees - - five lacks.

(2d.) Enaual, charitable, religious, or gratuitous donations, for the support of places of public worship, the officiating priests of either Mussulman or Hindoo officers, with all the different classes of inferior magistrates and mullas, left as an useless incumbrance eventually on the country by the preceding government, and before stated at three lacks; to which might be added one third more, as an endowment for two seminaries of learning, the one, to Hindoo pundits, the other, Mussulman molarics, with other public officers of both religions, highly necessary to be employed in the different departments of government, but more especially in the administration of justice. The antiquity, fame, and sanctity of the pagoda of Summachellam, near Vizagapatnam, mark the proper site for the Bramin foundation; while the magnificent mosque erected in the town of Cicacole, by Sheer Mahomed Khan, in the Hegyra year 1031, still unimpaired, indicates the fittest situation for a Madressa or Mussulman college.

Then the appropriations under this head, being - - - - - Rupees - - four lacks; together with the foregoing article of *Saverum*, deducted from what we shall henceforth call the corrected *jumma kaamil*, or complete assessment, will leave for the *doul bundobust* the sum of - - - - - 1 crore and 21 lacks.

2d. *Khureja Mofussil*, or expense of native, interior management of the collections, highly expedient, though contrary to the present practice in many instances, to be paid in money, either in the nature of a commission on the revenue, as anciently established, or by monthly stipend to the several officers employed.

(1.) *Rusoom Demookan*, or annual allowance of 5 per cent. on the net *Jumma*, stating at one crore of rupees in gross to the 20 zemindars acting in behalf of government, as farmers general of their respective territorial jurisdictions, or to the aumeens and lesser officers, occasionally substituted in the room of the other more permanent native class of agents, when these are necessarily deprived of a temporary collectorship - - - - -

Five lacks.

(2.) *Dastur Despondian*, or established commission of 2½ per cent. calculated on the same amount as the preceding charge to the chief Canongee residing at the capital, with 100 subordinate *despondians*, dispersed throughout the country, one to each *pergunnah*, in lieu of all other emoluments, especially such fraudulent possessions in land as they may hold under the denomination of Meerassy and Bilnookta villages - - - - -

2½ lacks.

(3.) *Mushaira Koolkernain*, a monthly stipend of 6,500 Bramin accountants, one to each village, at the rate of 100 rupees per annum each, as a compensation for all present undue advantages in land; or a proportion of the crop, called in some places *Seri*, being an allowance of 10 *scan* for every candy of grain produced at harvest time - - - - -

6½ lacks.

(4.) *Nesf Naickzarian*, or half the wages of all the village peons who are permanently stationed there as peace officers, exempted from all military service, and in subordination to the *murcudum*, or chief ryot, to support him in his dignity, or the exercise of his civil financial employment. They are chiefly, as they ought entirely to be, Mahomedans, being more orderly, better versed in rules of government, always commanding greater respect than Hindoos; and are too indolent or proud to attend to husbandry or manufactures, which might interfere with their official duties. They receive at harvest time, a

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bulotch of corn from the peasantry, constituting the moiety of their salary; and which, with some perquisites, in return for protection and the indulgencies in their power to bestow, render them somewhat dependant on, or conciliate their good will towards the poorer inhabitants, 6,500 peons, at 2½ rupees each per month, as half subsistence paid to the state, will rather be less than 2 lacs.

- (5.) *Bazee Kurch*, or various contingent disbursements made by, and indemnities allowed to, the zemindaries, in lieu of all expense, otherwise unprovided for; personal trouble, and risk of intermediate agency in the transfer and sale of yearly crops, including the charge of cleansing the tanks and canals, the repairs of their banks, those of rivers and causeways, under the denomination of *Foolbundy*; also of highways, bridges, ferry-boats, and choultries; the temporary salaries of inferior officers employed at seed-time or harvest in the *Mofussil*, such as the *mokum*, or appraisers of corn. The *jerebian*, or measurers of ground, and extra peons or pikes to guard the crops when cut and lying on the fields; likewise including a compensation for the possible losses which may be incurred by furnishing the ryots with tuckay or money, at 2 per cent. *per mensem*, to enable them to prosecute with vigour the business of cultivation, though this, of late years, by abuse and chicanery, has been rather a certain source of large benefit to the landholders, who have usually borrowed from and defrauded private individuals of a sum exceeding the necessary loans to the peasantry; and lastly, comprising a very considerable profit or allowance to the *Desmook* himself, to indemnify him against all casualties, risk, or uncertainty, in the transport and sale of territorial produce, until carried to market, over and above the customary acknowledgments made in money to the *serross*, or by participation with them in grain, for their security in teeps, or temporary advances to government in cash, before the returns of the harvest could, with the utmost advantage, be realized by a mercantile operation; and supplying every deficiency of weight in the coinage, loss of exchange, &c. expressed by the terms *Kumisagon*, *Serf*, and *Batta*; sources of vast speculation in the system of Indian finance, to these intermediate agents, in all, rupees five lacs; which, joined to the four preceding articles, and subtracted from the amount of the new *doul bundobust*, will leave a *teskees jumabundy*, or a net effective yearly revenue of exactly — — — — — R<sup>s</sup> 1 Crore.

Thirdly.—*Fonje Sebundy* or *Monlacho*, the established, indispensable native militia, to secure the stipulated revenue derived from the three yearly harvests, as expressed by the first appellation, to enforce the authority of *aumildars*, as understood by the second, and to maintain the public tranquillity against internal commotion or foreign invasion, agreeable to the design and use of the original institution, as inferred from the universal invariable practice of all the more civilized ancient or modern states of Hindostan. Accordingly under the *Mogul* empire, or lesser *Mussulman* governments, since raised on its ruins, the *sebundy* troops constitute the great effective standing force of the country. The expense is paid and deducted from the proprietary territorial income; the different crops should continually be all, in strict subordination to officers immediately appointed in command by the sovereign rulers, as they were indeed in form, even throughout the Northern circars, though more or less virtually, in proportion as the debility and corruption of governors yielded to the pecuniary temptation, or the restive ambition of upstart zemindars, down to the very instant which commenced the era of British administration; since which, through inadvertence or misconception of right and political expediency, not from any deficiency of power to enforce a legal authority, this grand palladium of an important conquered dominion has in fact been transferred from the sovereign, to a number of rebellious servants, who wait impatiently for the moment of a foreign invasion to throw off a yoke; the more galling, as it restrains their despotic and tyrannical power over inferior subjects, forming the great mass of an industrious, unoffensive people. Supposing, therefore, a necessity for resuming the ancient constitutional authority of government, to control unparticipated, the existing military force in all these provinces, we shall distribute the body of soldiers, henceforth thought requisite for the business of the collections, and amounting to 20,000 men, under the two following heads, expressive of their designation or number; viz.

- (1.) *SEDWARAIN*, or 100 independent companies, each of a hundred Hindoo pikemen of the military tribes, subject in part to a commandant of the same order; and in part to a *Mussulman*, both nominated by government, one to be stationed in the capital of every *pergunnah*, mustered once a year, and paid through the *desmook*, as well as under his immediate control when acting with full powers in behalf of the state, either to attend his own person to be deputed into the several villages, occasionally to secure the harvests: assist or restrain the inferior collectors, in levying the yearly assessment imposed on the ryots. It would be in vain to attempt to confine these troops to a stated and monthly salary. Such is the force of custom, that however sufficient in itself their pay might be made, they will constantly draw a subsistence, when employed on actual service, by the usual exaction of *batta*, from those persons over whom they exercise a coercive

Coercive power; and which may be considered rather as a political connivance of government, to lessen the occasion of coercion, by making the means a private incumbrance, in the nature of a fine for breach of agreement. Moreover, this class of soldiers, besides the constant favour of the zemindars, to whom they must naturally have personal attachment, will be entitled to a pecuniary gratification of two annas per day each man, agreeable to local custom, whenever they are called on by the state for military services, out of the ordinary line of their duty. For all these reasons, a retaining fee, equal however to a permanent subsistence, when stationary within each respective Mofussil jurisdiction, is the utmost that, from expediency or policy, should be allowed; and then the whole corps, consisting of 10,000 men, at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  rupees per month, on an average to every individual, will be maintained throughout the year, for . . . . . Rupees

Four lacks.

(2.) HAZARIAN, or two regiments of 1,000 men each, under the command of English officers, distributed as follows; viz. Two in the circar of Guntoor, three between the river Kistna and Godavari, one in the Rajamundry, and the remaining four to be stationed in the circar of Chicacole; but all subject to the immediate control of eight provincial intendants, covenanted servants of the Company, under the orders of one or two superintending chiefs, hereafter supposed to be vested in the management of the revenues, to support the sovereign authority, secure the collections, and check the refractory spirit of zemindars. It is from this corps that the Matsenahi or reinforcements sent to Amildars in native Mussulman governments, are usually draughted; but it is more properly the standing militia of the country, as well to maintain internal peace, as to repel any foreign invasion, and, under a proper system of administration, very rarely employed in the financial departments. When, however, called forth into actual service, or detached to any of the zemindarry districts, the men are entitled to the same additional allowance or perquisite, called butta, as hath been assigned to the Sedwaneau, and therefore their ordinary pay is proportionably less than that of regular troops; but as they are from number, personal ease, imputed want of discipline, and consequent reciprocal antipathies, a very important natural check in the last-mentioned body, whose obedience could not otherwise be so confidently relied on without the control of an European force, while they are both in use and order superior, comparatively, to the former corps of sebundies, so their pay with situation, should form a medium, and may be fixed at 5 Rs. monthly each man, which, for 10,000, will be . . . . . per ann.

Six lacks.

The sum total of these two sums being then deducted from the teshkees jumma bundy, there will remain, for further appropriation, in the public exchequer . . . ninety lacks; though this amount, according to the present dangerous system of leaving the standing provincial militia in the power of naturally disaffected Hindoo subjects, would only be on a par with the net corrected settlement of the year, as in ordinary concluded with, the landholders.

4th. *Khurcha Sudder*, the expense of the ruling local administration, or of the capital, in contra-distinction to that of Mofussil, or the country. In like manner as we were obliged to fix on certain data, to regulate the charges already detailed, so here too, we find ourselves necessitated to suppose in great part a new establishment, which, though extremely different from the old, yet apparently is only indispensably so, to complete or carry into effect the universal reform, suggested by recurring to the true original, financial system of the Mogul empire.

(1.) General Civil Department, without premiums, to determine whether a supreme legislative authority over all the British possessions on the coast, should be vested in the deliberative governments of Bengal or Madras; it will readily be admitted, that the immediate exclusive power in the Northern circars should hold of the latter. Time and experience must, in like manner, evince the expediency of single magistracy in all the offices of state influencing the conduct of, or capable of being influenced and disunited by the intriguing natives. On this principle, we assume for data, that the general local administration of the tract of country now in question, is committed to the charge of two chiefs, of at least 15 years standing in the Company's service; the one resident at Masulipatam, having ordinary jurisdiction over the four southerly provinces; but in time of open war or of danger, to extend his authority to that of Chicacole, which is otherwise supposed to be subject to a superintendant of its own. These two provincial rulers to have the inspection and supreme immediate controul over, without interfering in the detail of duty assigned to any of the subordinate departments classed under the heads, Financial, Judicial or Military. They are supposed, however, to make the circuits of their districts at least once in the year, to hear complaints, redress grievances, or, in general, to enforce the municipal laws existing; to regulate the form, with the conduct of interior administration; and to give them an interest in the true politico-economical management of the revenue which must be the secondary object to commerce of every European establishment in this country, they should be paid by a commission not less than 15 per cent. on the net amount of the jumma bundy,

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bundy, which being increased to one crore of rupees, will afford them a handsome income of a lack and a half of rupees, to be divided thus:

REVENUE:	To the chief of Masulipatam, as senior	80,000.
42--Deductions, &c.	- - - of Vizagapatam -	70,000
	Further; as it may be of political consideration to make as many as possible of the servants employed in finance, interested in its administration and improvement; so one half per-cent. more on the same capital may be distributed among the inferior agents, immediately attached to the chiefships, (viz.) six assistants, with an allowance of about 600 rupees per month each, besides the expectancy of preferment hereafter to be named; two head surgeons, in receipt of 500; and as many Hindoo dewans or sherishtedars, with 400 rupees, making together, for the year, about	50,000

Or, in all, for the general Civil Establishment, a commission of two per-cent. on the annual settlement - - - - - estimated at - Two Lacks.

Second. Financial.—The regulations and divisions of this department, have already in part been anticipated. Eight intendants or collectors of the revenue, at least of seven years standing in the service, and after the first succession, as an indispensable qualification, supposed to be versed in the Persian language, if not in one or more of the native Hindoo dialects, to have the exclusive local management of the several districts as hereafter named, subject only to the supervision and control of their respective chiefs, (viz.) Four in the capitals of the four Southern circars, of which each to compose a jurisdiction, all subordinate to Masulipatam, and the like number in the province of Chicacole; henceforth to be subdivided into so many portions of country dependant on Vizagapatam Cossim Cotah, extending from Rajmundry to the river of Boni or Bimalipatam, northerly, will form the first; Vizianagram, from thence to the Gurry Ghuda, or river of Handiraba, the ancient boundary towards the dependencies of Vickeram Deo, and the actual one of the Havillee lands, will constitute the second; Chicacole, to the river Peondy, inclusive of the three principalities of Nundepore, Kimmedy, and Tockaly, to make the third; and Ganjam, or Ichapour, as formerly, to remain the fourth collectorships. All these intendants, as mutual checks on each others management, and the better to be qualified for the two higher departments, to which they should have a certain prospect of succeeding according to respective adjudged merits, may be supposed, locally interchanged among themselves every two years, and entitled to a commission equally distributed, of three per cent. on the annual jumabundy, which will afford an immediate income, capable perhaps, largely to be increased, of 37,500 rupees to each individual per annum, or *in toto* 3,00,000. But in a country where health and life are so precarious, it may be necessary to provide for the vacancy of such important offices as have been now described, as well as to ensure their active zealous discharge, by the appointment and actual presence on the spot, of an apparent successor, who might also participate the burthen of inferior duties, such as superintendence of adawluts, payment of the sebandy corps, &c. and thus become qualified by local residence, with gradual initiation in the business of revenue, to occupy eventually, as principal, or *locum tenens*, the post of intendant. The situation and functions of these provincial agents, supposed eight in number, would answer more nearly to the *kotel* of the Moguls, under Tamerlane, than the Naib nabob, or deputy of Hindostan, which, by a strange perversion of language in modern times, is made to signify a prince with regal prerogatives, when applied to Mussulman delegates, but is used rather as a term of reproach, in the designation of Europeans. Whatever denomination may be given to such a description of officers, being at least five years in the country, and acting two more, as probationers in finance, they may be deemed competent to succeed to a collectorship, the certain prospect of which might, in the mean time, reconcile them to the otherwise inadequate subsistence of 7,500 rupees each per annum, as in like manner an equal number of assistants absolutely requisite for the eight intendants, being ensured in the succession to the *katelain*, might be contented with an income of 5,000 rupees, making together, one per cent. on the estimated revenue, or 1,00,000; and reckoning one half per cent. more to be divided among eight surgeons, at the rate of about 320 rupees monthly to each, with 200 rupees to as many dewans, attached to the several provincial establishments; then the whole expense of the proper financial department, will be 4½ per cent. commission on one crore, or four and half lacks.

Third. Judicial.—The charge necessary to be provided for under this head, is already actually incurred without any benefit to the state. All the petty officers employed in the Mussulman courts are still existing, enjoy enaums of land in lieu of salary, but have been exonerated from all public duty, since the era of the Company's territorial administration; and what may appear incredible to foreign civilized nations, no effective, regular, or formal judicial system, has been substituted in the room of that, which, for seventeen successive years, hath been virtually suspended throughout all the circars. Nevertheless, in criminal cases, the zemindars and farmers, without any legal authority, or rather contrary to the most approved maxims of law and policy introduced by the Moguls, and followed down to the period of British rule, have exercised, despotically and uncontrouled, the powers of civil magistracy, in punishing with death, dismemberment of limbs, or slavish personal labour; yet such is the habitual submissive indifference of the Hindoos, that whatever acts of cruelty or oppression have been, or may be, committed under the single arbitrary will of natives in office, no complaints can ever be expected to be brought forward against them by that people, though the same

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same may not be altogether the case, with respect to the less timid Mahomedans, or such other classes of individuals as have, by an intercourse with Europeans, acquired a greater or lesser spirit of freedom. It is, however, only consistent with Christian humanity, and liberal enlarged notions of civil jurisprudence, to rescue the more indigent, useful, docile, and numerous body of inhabitants, from the tyranny of uncertain law, or rather the yoke of brutal slavery, imposed by a race of the most ignorant, violent despots, known by the imposing nominal distinctions of Rajahs, or native landholders; and as they are supposed to be under their own ordinations, as handed down in the Mussulman or Indian codes formally, let them be so virtually and invariably, according to the letter and spirit of the text, as interpreted by enlightened judges presiding over regularly instituted courts, subject to the controul of the sovereign authority, but not wholly to be at the mercy of the single capricious will of depraved and generally illiterate fellow-subjects, in zemindary offices. When such a reform takes place, then will be re-established, and as before, predominant, the sadder cutcherry adawlut of the Mahomedans, tempered by the lenient influence of superior British administration.

It might be attended with some extraordinary expense, as pageantry is the very soul of every Oriental government, commanding due respect both at home and abroad, if, in the circars, the charge were not already amply provided for, besides the subsistence of land allowed to the lesser officers, in a pension of a lack of rupees continued gratuitously, and at present worse than useless, to the family of Hussein Ali Khan, the last amildar appointed under the Nizam's authority. That the actual representative of this man, should be wholly unfit in his own person, to execute the honorary, consequential, judicial employment henceforth to be conferred on him, in order to relieve himself from the reproach of eating the bread of idleness, and the public from the burden of furnishing it, is no more than what occurs in all the greater and lesser departments of perhaps every existing native government of Hindostan; naibs or deputies, with the whole train of inferior agents judiciously selected; and requiring only small allowances, are every where the real effective instruments; while the principal, in almost every instance, is the most pageant drone of state. As it is chiefly to curb the licentious depravity of the lower classes of foreigners of every denomination, native mariners, and mongrel Christians or Mahomedans inhabiting or itinerant on the sea coasts, and unrestrained in their conduct either by religion or morality, that the exercise of a high criminal judicature is more particularly wanting; so, one supreme court at Masulipatam, with another subordinate to it at Vizagapatam, under the immediate control of the two chiefs of these places, would be all that is necessary, while in civil disputes the superintendants of the Dewanny Adawluts might be referred to, when the more ordinary simple mode of arbitration through the canzy molavies, pundits, or others, proved dissatisfactory. The expense of such an institution is, as hath been observed, already largely provided for in the pension continued to the sons of Hussein Ali, who will most assuredly think the trouble to be imposed on them, amply repaid in honour and consequence, without requiring any additional pecuniary emolument to that which they possess from the Company's hitherto unmerited bounty annually, of - - - - - rupees one lack.

4th. Military.—Considering the great establishment of troops allowed already under the head of sebandy, more might be thought useless for internal defence; but a standing regular force for the same purpose, seems also necessary, either to garrison the principal forts, or to keep in perfect obedience and awe, the most turbulent of the natives, as well as the whole militia of the country. The number and expense of the disciplined corps actually stationed in the circars, might be the same in future (viz.) 200 effective Europeans, trained to the use of artillery, with two battalions of 750 seapoys each, for the garrison of Masulipatam; two battalions of the latter, in cantonments at Ellore, and the like number equally divided between Vizagapatam and Ganjam, in readiness for service. The body of seapoy infantry, however, thus amounting to 4,500, instead of being raised on the spot, dispersed as usual in the business of the collections, attached to the soil, unruly, undisciplined, and under the influence of the zemindars, should be altogether drawn from the Carnatic, and if possible, composed of that class of soldiers born and bred in our own camps, under the denomination of Pariahs. These are held in abomination by, and never incorporated with, the other casts, and have therefore a mutual antipathy to each other, which might be of use to subjecting both to the rule of a foreign government; while the indiscriminate use of animal and vegetable diet, renders them in every respect the fittest to follow the military profession, as they can never be in danger, while they can otherwise keep the field, of being famished for want of provisions, like the more scrupulous warlike tribe of Rajapoos, who live chiefly on rice. Allowing an expense, as now incurred under this head, inclusive of hospital charges, the amount per annum will be about - - - - - rupees six and half lacks.

5th. Fortifications.—To determine the disbursements necessary to be made for these, it may be proper to describe their situation and number.

Innicondah, in the province of Gujatur, on the frontiers of the Carnatic Payengaut, towards Kerpah; and Condapillee, the capital of the circar of the same name, on the confines of the Nizam's territory of Contnamet, are both fortified hills in the old Indian style, of great strength and extent, serving as places of rendezvous for the militia, or as an asylum for the inhabitants, in case of an invasion, and forming at the same time, very important outposts, capable of being defended each by a hundred men, against an army of thousands; for the security of treasure or stores, as well as to stop the progress of an enemy. Ganjam, near the northern extremity of the circars, on the



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sea coast, but beyond the reach of annoyance from shipping, is a small pentagon fort, on plain ground, which, with a garrison of one thousand men, ably commanded, and tolerably provided with ammunition and provisions, might hold out a regular siege for a month, even against a formidable armament, and might defy for ever any Indian force likely to be brought against it. But Masulipatan is the grand, and, with a few improvements, may be termed, inexpugnable bulwark of the circars, supposing it well furnished, and resolutely defended by 8,000 troops, such as may be drawn in two days from the regular or irregular military corps in the neighbourhood. It is nearly of an oblong figure, 800 yards by 600, situated in the midst of salt morass, close to an inlet or canal, which, opening a communication with the sea and the Kistna, enlarges the means of defence, without exposing the works to an immediate naval attack, as no ships can come within the reach of cannon shot, nor can any approaches be made on the land side, unless between the north and east points of the compass, and from the mouth of December to May. It was from the last-mentioned quarter, favoured by a cluster of sand hills on the beach, at the distance of 800 yards, that Colonel Forde attacked and carried the place; but the present excellent wet ditch which surrounds it, had not then entirely been formed: still, however, the defences on this side are incomplete. The bastions are too far asunder. The rampart is too low, and not thick enough to admit of an occasional battery to be opened from the curtains; while the revetment is too slender to bear any additional weight of earth, by greater height or breadth. After all, notwithstanding the advantage of a very extensive area, a few casemats might be necessary to shelter the troops within, and a counter exterior ditch, similar to that now used as a navigable canal on the west side of the fort, would be of vast importance on the east, especially as by the excavation, with ease and little expense, could be formed a proper glacis, which is very much wanted. These different works, together with the ordinary charge of all the fortifications, interior buildings, mounting artillery, magazines, &c. may be stated, on a medium of years, annually at, Rupees - - - - - one lack.

Which, with all the preceding charges, civil, financial, judicial, and military, make the total of Sudder expenses - - - - - fifteen lacks.

Leaving a clear net balance in the public treasury, of, rupees - - - - - seventy-five lacks.

But if to these several articles of disbursements be added,

6th. Pecuniary gratuity, or acknowledgment, conditionally to be paid to the present Nizam, and amounting to rupees, annual, of - - - - - seven lacks;

inclusive of two lacks, or the reversionary possession of Guntour, in consequence of the death of Bazalut Jung\*; then the actual receipts of the Company's exchequer, or free yearly income of all the Northern circars, after deduction of every ordinary expense necessary to be incurred, will be reduced to, rupees - - - - - sixty-eight lacks.

It is not however to be imagined, that the whole of this sum can be withdrawn from the general circulation, and remitted as an annual tribute in specie to the superior government of Fort St. George, although it falls rather short of the supposed revolving gain, on a balance of trade, within the same tract of country and period of time; thirty lacks of the amount, have been assigned for the commercial exports to Europe, which are indispensably necessary to support or realize the estimated territorial revenue, and as the English pay their proportion of the investment from the landed income of the circars, while foreigners alone can be expected to furnish bullion, so the share of either, must be ascertained in order to determine the surplus of cash that may be sent to the Presidency, without any injurious diminution of the provincial currency. If, as hath been already observed, half of all the cotton-manufactured cloths made in the course of the year for European markets, have ever reached England, such instances have been extremely rare; most frequently, the proportion has not exceeded a quarter; and we are sure of being within bounds, in stating the annual medium of the Company's commerce for the last seventeen years, at ten lacks of rupees, or one-third of the whole estimated produce. The remainder, unequally divided between the Dutch, French, Danes and Portuguese, through the inability or disinclination of the English to increase their own investment, hath been so far beneficial to the country, in having brought into it an equivalent in specie, excepting a very small amount imported by the agents of the former nation for home consumption in spices and copper. It may be true that the greater part of the sum requisite for the provision of goods thus allotted foreigners, was furnished from the settlements of Madras and Bengal, as affording a means of remittance to England for the fortunes of individuals there; but the advantage hath been in effect the same, in keeping up the revenues and manufactures of the circars.

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\* At the end of the Fasallee year 1189, when the Nizam took possession of the Guntour circar, there was due to him, on balance from the Company, on account of his annual stipend of five lacks of rupees, calculated exactly to the 1st of October 1780, the sum of 14,24,383 rupees. For the two following years, until the period of Bazalut Jung's death, in October 1782, ten lacks more should be added to this debt; but from the aggregate of both sums is to be deducted a demand of current pagodas 63,438, or rupees 2,22,033 on the Company, arising on balance of account in favour of the Company, for stores, &c. furnished for the defence of Guntour, to be repaid from the yearly revenue, and then the net balance owing to the Nizam will be 29,04,300 rupees. Now, as the rents in the circar in question (being, according to the British Manual or standard assessment, about 12 lacks per annum) forming a mean between the jumabundy and gross collections, were actually levied by and realized to his highness for the same period of two years, through the Com-

pany's favour in withdrawing their troops, with only a deduction of two lacks, paid in all that time to Bazalut Jung; so it may be said, that the Nizam's debt hath already been more than deservedly liquidated. But supposing the revenue of these two years gratuitously given up, on the ground that it is properly an affair to be settled between the son, successor of the nabob of Adour, and his uncle, then, as a difference of six lacks arises yearly against the Nizam while in possession of Guntour, after his brother's demise, on a comparison of the pulsed rent of the circar, with the pecuniary gratuity then paid by the Company in October 1784, only a balance of about twelve lacks, agreeable to the letter of the treaty of 1768, would remain due; and in the beginning of 1786, the whole debt must be virtually and absolutely cancelled, emitting thenceforth a pecuniary of five lacks per annum, in his highness, to be accounted for with the honourable Company.

A very important question here suggests itself, as to the policy or probable efficacy of the late Act of Parliament, in restraining British subjects in India from giving such pecuniary or mercantile supplies to other European nations, even when our Company (for there is no provisional clause) cannot purchase cargoes for their proper ships, or will not accept the means of doing it, on terms of mutual convenience from their servants abroad, who with the loss of health, and the labour of many years, may have acquired a very disproportionate compensation in personal wealth, which they are anxious to realize at home, and thus accumulate the general stock of national riches. Our laws, we are taught to consider as the perfection of reason, and, therefore, must in every instance, command due respect; and certainly the one now under consideration, was adopted by the legislature on principles as pure, as the limitations and objects might have appeared laudable, to the original advisers, for whose benefit it was no doubt intended, by obliging foreigners to bring bullion into the country, or contract the scale of their commerce, with the view of lessening the competition of sales in Europe. But if its wisdom or general good be not apparent, and universally acknowledged within the sphere of its operation; if it should be deemed illiberal and impolitic with respect to the other nations, as imposing an invidious, unprofitable restriction on their trade, which may provoke a retaliation in the way of farther prohibitions in receiving the re-exports of Great Britain; and especially, if it be found to militate against the private interests, natural views, and reasonable claim of a whole society of necessary agents in a remote corner of the world, some of whom are to enforce its execution as a legal check upon all; then we might venture to foretel, that it will in the first place, be evaded, and in the next, become obsolete or wholly disregarded, until finally expunged from our Statute Books, on the same principles as lately brought about the repeal of some other penal laws, antiquated and dormant. Indeed, from the glaring ineffectual provisions of the present act, to accomplish its apparent purpose, it may perhaps have been intended to be classed among the number of those recently made for the government of this country, acknowledged by the framers themselves to be proposed only for temporary expedience, or by way of experiment, until the lights of time, with a more perfect understanding of facts and local circumstances, evince the propriety, or the reverse, of giving them further stability. The truth is, so many openings occur for evasion, that this or any similar law must prove altogether nugatory, unless it can be first made manifest to ordinary comprehension, that more benefit will accrue to the State and individuals, from its actual operation, than virtual suspension; at the same time, that any loans in money, transfer of merchandize, or credit by bills to foreigners is interdicted to British subjects residing in India, the whole scope of such mercantile intercourse is left open to those individuals, who after having acquired fortunes here, have returned to Europe, and are willing to realize their wealth at home, by giving draughts on their agents abroad, in favour of adventurers of other nations; and while the prohibition of supplying goods extends only to European traders, without any immediate or indirect connection among themselves, the intelligent Hindoo may step in as mediator, in the capacity of merchant or broker, and administer to the wants of both: nay, it seems a matter of legal uncertainty, whether there may not be a direct communication between the principals, in the way of respondentia loans or bottomry payment of money for bills of exchange on Europe, and sales of merchandize by public auction, or from open warehouses in authorized markets, where a discrimination cannot be made of the nation, character, or employers of the buyers. Such being the presumed errors in the principle, and deficiencies in the provisions of the Act here alluded to, as to authorize anticipation of its speedy repeal, and supposing at the same time a change in the Company's policy, by which their servants abroad will be permitted to remit private fortunes through their proper always preferable channel; then we might venture with political certainty, to estimate the future proportion of English investment to be provided in the circles at eighteen lacks of rupees annually, and out of the balance of fifty lacks which after that deduction, would still remain unappropriated in the public exchequer from the current revenue, four-fifths might consistently, with the utmost safety, convenience and expediency, be remitted in specie or in grain, as the yearly tribute of the dependent provinces to the protecting superior government of Fort St. George.

TO conclude this division of our subject relative to Finance, in general it may be observed, that nothing is more easy, just, or necessary, than to reduce to universal practice, and give full effect to the whole system, as here rudely sketched in all its parts. It is only simply recurring to the ancient institutions of the country, following their order and spirit in the establishment or definition of the civil rights of persons and of things, as connected with revenue. These institutions, universally acknowledged to be founded in policy, moderation and equity, are deeply engrained on the minds of the more enlightened natives, revered by a great majority of the commonalty; and in their scope, design, and tendency, are manifestly calculated for the good of all, by enlarging or securing, according to a fixed invariable, equitable standard, the tenures of real or personal property, immunities, privileges, with the recompence of bodily labour, to be enjoyed by the more useful classes of society employed in agriculture or manufactures; by realizing to the zemindars or intermediate land holders to their utmost legal extent, certain supposed rights and advantages hitherto equivocal, indefinite, and precariously attached, agreeable to the capricious will of ruling despots, to their respective offices of receivers of farmers general of the rents, and reserving only for the sovereign the bare rightful, indubitable, legal dues indispensably necessary on the most economical scale, for the support of the best, most lenient, and in true ingenious belief, acceptable government, to the great mass of the people, comparatively with any of the past or still existing states to be found throughout the wide extending realms of Asiatic dominion.

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adjacent states.

### RELATIVE POWER.

The great political importance of the Northern circars is not alone to be estimated by the intrinsic or relative value of territory on the foundations of revenue and commerce, but must always depend, more or less, on comparative power, which, by way of contra-distinction may be termed contingent, worth only to be determined by ascertaining the facility with internal means of defence; either natural or artificial, joined to collateral aids, easily derived however from the superior neighbouring settlements, in virtue of a fortunately central position, the whole calculated on a comparison with the power, situation, and circumstances of surrounding states, or such as are likely to act offensively. We have already exhibited in some detail, though irregularly, the proper interior resources of the country, and shall again occasionally touch on them, as well as bring to view the nature and extent of extraneous assistance alluded to; but more particularly in this place, it is our intention to take a short political survey of the nations around, naturally inimical to, and capable of annoying the circars, in order to form a sufficient accurate idea of the effective force of these, compared with the probable occasions of resistance in the event of a foreign invasion, thence deducing the real permanent security of territorial possession.

First.—The rudely formed aristocratical republic of the Marhattas occurs. Under the most comprehensive description, their dominions may be said to extend from east to west on the parallel of  $21\frac{1}{2}$  degrees north lat. from Piply on the Soobanreeka falling into the Bay of Bengal to Broach, towards the mouth of the Nerbudda, in the gulph of Cambay, stretching full 16 degrees of longitude across the Peninsula, and from south to north near the meridian of Cape Comorin, or about  $77^{\circ}$  east long. from the fork of the Kistna, to Kalpee, on the banks of the Junna, ten degrees of latitude, consisting of the soubahs of the Jugeral Maliva and Khandees: two-thirds of that of Auringabad, one half of Bejapoor, as conquered by the Moguls: an equal portion of Berar, of Beder, and of Orissa, with a few pergunnahs of Allahabad and Agra; the whole comprising an area of about 255,000\* square geographic miles, yielding a yearly income, at the utmost calculation, with elout from neighbouring states, of four and a half crore of rupees. But of this, the share allotted to the Koking Bramin empire of Poonah, raised on the ruins of that of Sittarah, in 1750, on the death of the 2d Sahoojee Bhosla of the Sunker Kehtery tribes, together with the jageer and almost independent inheritances of a great number of inferior chiefs, all of the former race, and therefore acknowledging the Peshwa as their head, situated at the distance of 300 miles from the circars, beyond the territory of Nizam Ali, does not actually exceed one half. The other moiety of country and revenue is divided between rulers of a different cast, who have virtually dominions, views, and interests wholly distinct, alien, often hostile to their nominal sovereign, and can scarcely ever be united in the same causes. Of these, Futty Sing Guicawar, a Marhattah Rajapoot, enjoys a third of the soubah of Gujerat; Selindea claiming descent from the same tribe, and Mahar, of the Cutteecur Sooder, or fourth class, divide between them almost equally, Malva and Khandees, with the recent addition of some of the pergunnahs of Agra, conquered by the former, and Moodajee Bhosla, a branch of the depressed family of Satterah, under the nominal designation of samaputty, or commander in chief of the Marhattah armies, rules in the name of his son Ragoojee, in full sovereignty, one half of Berar; and collects to a mitekassa or tribute from the Nizam of a moiety of the rental of the other half is in possession, in violation of the English rights, of an equal portion of Orissa; pretends to a kind of feudal superiority over a part of Guudwanah called Gurrah, lying to the north of the Nerbudda, heretofore annexed to Malva, and forming the inheritance of Nizam and Boorham Shah, together with that of the districts of Buteapoor or Chateesgur, as also their dependencies of Samblarepoor, &c. making part of Jehar Cund, or the jaugly country of Bundoo or Battah, united by Alimgier to the soubah of Allahabad, and more recently seized as a free conquest by Bembajee, the younger brother of Moodajee.

Among these greater chieftains, denominated of the same nation, it is alone the dominions of the last mentioned, that have the smallest connection with the Northern circars. The superficial contents of the whole country may be computed at 60,000 square miles, and thinly inhabited, producing a revenue of one crore of rupees, which is sufficient to maintain a body of 20,000 horse of every kind; and yet, in time of peace, from the extreme of Hindoo parsimony, add a surplus of 50 lacs yearly to the hoarded treasure. But of this territory, it is only the division of Orissa, or Cuttack, that immediately borders on and touches any part of the British possessions. This province, at the distance of 600 miles from the capital of Nagpore, extends along the sea-coast in the Bay of Bengal, about 200 miles from Masond, the northern boundary of Ganjam, on the Cuileca lake, to Pihley, at the mouth of the Soobanreeka; the southern limits of Midnapore, dependant on Bengal, and on a medium being about 40 miles inland, should comprise an area of 80,000 square miles, yielding from a husbandry, in the beginning of the present century, 23,58,000 rupees, including a net

\* There being no correct map of Hindostan, or of any of its states, excepting the British possessions, it is impossible to ascertain with accuracy the square contents; taking however the whole country as laid down by European geographers at 1,100,000 square miles, and with greater precision allowing to the Deccan south of the rivers Nerbuddah and Malabar, and circumscribed by the ocean on all its other sides, an area of 410,000 square miles, we have endeavoured to divide each subdivision of territory described, its portion of the whole measure, which though perhaps not very correct

in itself, may yet be sufficiently so for purposes of political arithmetic, to compare the extent of one state with that of another.

NOTE. All the Marhattah dominions collectively, are rather of greater extent than the republic of Poland, before its late dismemberment, and with all its feudatory dependencies of Prussia, Courland, &c.

† About the extent of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in Poland.

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a not jummahundy of 13,94,322, lately increased to sixteen lacks, of which one half is remitted as a yearly tribute to Moodajee, after defraying the expense of a military establishment of 5,000 horse, besides the ordinary subsidy and charges of civil government. It is divided almost in equal portions from west to east, by the great river Mahanuddy, which, taking its rise in latitude 22° north, among the hills separating Khandess from Berar, and after running a course east southerly of 700 miles, empties itself at Pulse Point, or Coojung, in 20½° North latitude, 30 miles east of the provincial capital, passing close on the north side to the walls of Barrowbatty, its oblong square indefensible citadel, of 12 tower bastions. Besides the disadvantage which Cuttack labours under in being so remotely detached from the central force of government, it is wholly and absolutely cut off from Berar on the west by the districts of Jhareund, under the dominion of Bemlajee, on this side its frontier, from Goomsur, the most northerly point of the dependencies of Ganjam, to Congapoor, near the southern extreme of Chutea. Nagpore, subject to Bengal, does not exceed 150 miles. In that whole extent, however, along a mountainous, barbarous, unhealthy tract of country, there are scarcely three passes which can be termed practicable for an army; while Coppertongee, the easiest or most frequented, leading to the banks of the Mahanuddy, could not admit, as generally described, of a passage for any wheel carriages. But if troops be once introduced into the province, a double frontier on either side towards the British dominions, of at least 300 miles, is for the most part wholly defenceless, and exposed to depredation; so that however paradoxical the proposition may seem, yet, in the present case, it is demonstratively true, that to realize by possession, and extend our territorial rights over that portion of Orissa which now very inconveniently interrupts the land communication between Bengal and the Circars, would literally in fact lessen the necessary line of defence against the attack of a neighbouring enemy: nevertheless, as hath been already observed, on the side of Ganjam an invasion is never to be apprehended from the Marhattas, though they have found means improperly to possess themselves of some pergunnahs lying to the south of the natural barrier of Manickpatam, on the tongue of land between the sea and Chilca, at the same time that this lake, narrowed to a point by the boundary northern hills of Chicacole, widens and extends forty miles towards the centre of Cuttack, laying the whole country open to an attack by water from the English settlements.

Though in general description it might be observed, and from local ignorance pass unnoticed, that the two provinces of Deogar and Chhanda in Gondwannah imperfectly reduced, and annexed to Berar by the emperor Alemgeer, now governed by Moodajee, form actually an adjoining foreign frontier, as running parallel inland to the north-west side of the circars of Chicacole and Rajemundry, and having no formidable well known state between, yet in the present estimate of relative power inherent in the British territories, comparatively with those around naturally inimical or capable of giving annoyance, we cannot admit of the geographical precision or political justness of the remark. The intermediate space parting these collateral districts, and which may very properly in future be called Jhareund, though that name hitherto hath been exclusively applied to Chateesgar, &c. running in the same direction north of Mahomeddy, forms not only by nature an insurmountable barrier against invasions from either side, but is inhabited by a warlike savage race of aboriginal Hindoos under their native princes, for the most part perfectly independent. The whole country equally mountainous, poor, ill watered, unhealthy, and thinly peopled, extends in length, from the last-mentioned river to the Godaveri, in a line, nearly south-west, 200 miles, and in breadth, from the conquered plains of Chicacole, &c. westerly to the nearest ascertained limits of Berar, on a medium very little if at all short, of eighty; thus comprehending an area of 16,000\* square miles. It is usually described as divided longitudinally by seven high, impassable ranges of hills, forming a great number of valleys, under their respective chieftains of the Warrior, Coywar, or Gondwannah tribe, all of the Rajepoot or Khetery cast, among which, those of Kulahindi, Bustar, and Rumpa, entirely free towards the frontier of the Marhattas, and of Kimeedy, Nundapore, Golconda, and Cottapillee, partially subjected to the English government, are the most considerable. The revenue is chiefly paid in kind, and cannot exceed in the gross, by any tolerable well-founded calculation, fifteen lacks of rupees; for besides that, the commonalty are uncivilized, indolent, and stupid, being very much afflicted with those wens of the throat, called goitres in Europe, they carry on little or no commerce, and lands so elevated, in the more sterile regions are but, in small part watered by the Siffy, the only river proper to the country, and which taking its rise from an inland chilla or lake, as pretty correctly laid down by D'Anville, in the districts of Kulahindi, unites with the Godaveri, about 20 coss higher up than Polaveram, between Rumpa and Rahapillee, after having traversed the principal valley of Bustar. The people in general, although rude and barbarous, may yet be denominated warlike, as they have always distinguished themselves bold persevering champions of the great law of nature. Being driven to their wild unwholesome fastness, among the mountains, they frequently descend in harvest time, into the low lands, to dispute the produce of their ancient rightful inheritance with the present possessors, but their incursions are desultory and simply impelled, by the pressing want of subsistence; for as the sea air is as fatal to their temperament, as that of the hills is to the inhabitants of the neighbouring plains, the idea of a permanent conquest, even if they could conceive a possibility of effecting it, would be as foreign to their purpose as, on the counterpart, it is to be exploded by a civilized state, as inhuman, ungenerous, and unprofitable.

On

\* Nearly the dimensions of Switzerland, including the Alpine states of the Grisons and Valais.

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On the other hand, this tract of inhospitable country, has in all ages proved an insuperable obstacle to the union of the two nations of Orisa and Gondwannah, or reciprocally to the invasions of either. It has been described as 80 miles in breadth from the inland frontier of Chicacole to that of Berar, but this distance is to be understood in a straight line, and geographically measure. Following the ordinary course of the only practicable roads, it extends at least 120 British miles, which are equivalent to 200, either with respect to time or the fatigue of marching on the same space of level ground; and with this circumstance, considering the difficulties of passing through uninhabited jungles, over rugged hills, and deep watercourses, surrounded by pathless forests, deserts, or valleys, alone luxuriant from a poisonous atmosphere, it must be regarded as one of the strongest natural barriers existing. Accordingly, it is only traversed once in the driest season of the year, from the month of February to May, by those Tartar wandering carriers, the Lōmballies, as in like manner, such instruments would be found to penetrate a rock of iron, to gratify the craving necessities of humanity. These adventurers have as yet, however, only explored two passes in the whole length of the great mountainous ridge, extending from the Godaveri to the Mohianuddy, the one direct from Chauda to Chicacole, the other oblique from Chateesgur, by the way of Kalahindi, both uniting at the famous gant of Saloor, or Saureacca; though the latter, hath also an extremely difficult communication with the districts of Kinedy. It was through either of these inlets, at the instigation and under the guidance of the Jaepoor rajah, then harrassed by the merciless Vizeram Rauze, that a body of Mahrattas was introduced in 1754, into the circars, to combat the weak ill-established military force of the French; more than one half of the invaders fell a sacrifice to the noxious air of the hills, in effecting their passage, and the remainder, feeble or disheartened, rather than hazard returning the same way, adopted the desperate resolution of making a prodigious circuit through unfrequented routes, in order to cross the Godaveri, with the risque of being intercepted by the provincial troops, and perhaps after all, of not discovering a practicable ford; they, however, miraculously escaped the one, and succeeded, in a remarkably dry season near Rajemundry, in finding the other, by which a few hardy individuals were enabled to gain their homes, to spread the terrors of the dangers they encountered, and intimidated for ever, their countrymen, from attempting the like rash, deadly expedition, on any future occasion.

Strictly speaking, the circars of Ellore and Condapillee, between the rivers Godaveri and Kistna, are the only ones of the five, exposed to immediate invasion from an adjoining inland power; and this is the nizam, who holds formally from the emperor Shah Allum, the soubahdarry or government general of such parts of all the six soubahs of the Deccan as have not been otherwise alienated in perpetuity, and still rules virtually, though not wholly independent, a very extensive country, which henceforth should regain its ancient metropolitan names of Hyderabad or Golconda. From Commamet, the boundary province for 100 miles on the east, towards the British territories, it stretches almost due west along the north bank of the Kistna, 250 miles to Solapoor, near the forks of that river; and in like manner, on both sides of the Godaveri, in a north-west direction, about 350 miles to the celebrated fortress of Dowlatabad, from which, in a line nearly south to the most westerly point before indicated on the Kistna, full 200 miles. A chain of distant fortifications forms a very ineffectual barrier on the side of the Mahrattas of Poonah, who, besides levying a chout from the neighbouring circars, have penetrated far within the described frontier, and possess alternately, with the nominal proprietor of the whole, many fertile districts. The lands situated to the north of Godaveri, make little more than a narrow border, except where enlarged towards the middle by the accession of fifty-two pergunnahs of Berar, subject to a mockassa of 50 per cent. of the rental paid to Moodaje Bhosla; and as to the foudedaries of Adoni and Kanool, usually reckoned among the dependences of the Nizamut, though south of the Kistna, they are altogether free, or if otherwise rather inconvenient incumbrances on the lord paramount, who gives them protection, than any addition to his political strength. Reckoning, however, the whole extent of territory actually ruled in form, or in fact, by Nizam Ali, it cannot be estimated at less than 70,000 square miles, including one third of the soubah of Hyderabad, as conquered by Alemgeer, a like portion of Aurungabad, about one half of Beder and of Berar, with the circars of Kalaburga, Raichore, Adoni, and Nundee, formerly dependent on the soubah of Bejapoor. But being from situation or government, almost entirely deprived of the benefits of commerce; the soil for the most part, rocky, barren, and badly watered; all the inhabitants wretchedly poor, oppressed under the intolerance, tyranny or weakness of innumerable Mussulman despots, subject to no restraints, from the nominal superior, yet too feeble, to resist any foreign invasion; the utmost gross yearly revenue that can be extorted from the native Hindoos, by stripes, military execution, and the most wanton, inhuman, personal cruelties, does not exceed a krorc of rupees, of which only one half is paid into the public exchequer, after payment of the Mahratta chout defalcations, of intermediate agents, and immense jagger appropriations (including those of Zulferul Dowlah, late nabob of Niernul, now removed to the soubahdarry of Ellichpore) bestowed as a bribe of individuals, not in general much more so much as the necessity of sharing the spoils of ill-gotten dominions, weakly ruled by inferior condutors, and who therefore not only participate the sovereign authority, but for the most part assume, a refractory, rebellious independence. With this moiety, however, of the nominal territorial income of the Nizamut, and supporting an union of all



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the dependent jagregdars, a military force of 25,000 men, under every description of cavalry, infantry, or disengaged sebandy, may be supported on a scanty peace establishment, and might be collected, on any very pressing emergency affecting the general interests, for the interior defence of the country, and yet leave, after defraying the expence of civil government, on a scale of economy almost impracticable for any Mussulman despot to adopt, as much as in ten years of tranquillity would accumulate to a sum sufficient to maintain, with field extraordinaries, an army of ten thousand undisciplined horse and foot, equally divided for a twelvemonth beyond the national frontier. On the whole, and in plain, undisguised truth, according to an individual's opinion, considering the rapid decline of the power of Nizam Ali, who, in an inglorious administration of twenty-three years, hath lost, by three successive encroachments of his neighbours, the Mahrajas, Hyder, and the British, two-thirds of his dominions, acquired by the murder of his brother, instead of dreading any attack on the circars, from this quarter; which, as taking the lion by the paw, viewing the situation of Masulipatam, would be easily repelled by half the provincial force, the sudden annihilation of the subahdar himself, and in him the destruction of the poor equivocal remains of the Mogul empire in the Deccan, affecting more or less the actual balance of political interests, these are events more to be apprehended, and, as such, to be regretted or prevented, if it were not treason against the natural rights of mankind to take any measures to impede a revolution, which might afford at least a momentary respite to a great portion of the Hindoo inoffensive race, from the intolerable yoke of Mahomedan slavery.

Mahomedans of  
Mysore.

Notwithstanding, however, the apparent security of all these provinces, relatively to the power of bordering foreign principalities, it may be urged that Guntoor, as lying to the south of the Kistna, and though not touching, yet so nearly adjoining to the Mysorean dominions of Kerpa, being at the same time, from maritime situation on the coast of Coromandel, an object of such prodigious importance to the present ruler of the Balagnut country, and more especially to our rivals the French, who must benefit by the acquisition, in proportion as the British loss would be immense or irretrievable by the dismemberment; we repeat, it may be urged, that this circar is exposed to great and imminent danger of invasion from the enterprize of a barbarous, ambitious, and formidable neighbour, while he is under the influence or protection of an European force. The elevated regions composing the usurped or conquered estates of Hyder (recently devolving by inheritance on his elder son, Tuteh Ali Khan, better known by his infant Iskeer name of Tippoo Sultaun) comprehending the greater part of the ancient Indian empire of Canara or Bijenagur, or, according to the Mogul divisions, excepting a few circars, the whole of the soubah of Rajepoor situated to the south of the Kistna, including the Carnatic Balagnaut, Mysore, some districts of Malabar, Bednore, Chitteldorg, Herpen-heli, the superiority of Sanore, the forts and territory on the Junn Chattr, forming, before the late Maratta war, the jaguer of Ragonaut Row, together with the five circars of Kerpa dependant on the south of Hyderabad, making in all an area of 75,000 square geographical miles. The natural sterility of a high table land is in some degree compensated, by sharing the successive advantages of the rainy mousoon on both the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel; yet being for the most part, like the other interior countries of the Deccan, wholly excluded from the benefits of commerce, excepting the traffic of warlike stores, and in living instruments of destruction, carried on chiefly through the ports of Calicut and Mangalore, the yearly effective revenue cannot exceed two krote twenty lacks, of which, under one of those wonderful millennial geniusses born to be the scourges of mankind in life, and to future ages benefactors, in exhibiting an awful example of the merited punishment of excessive universal depravity; uniting in himself the requisite qualifications with the actual exercise of the functions of prince, minister, and general; equally despotic, merciless, able, and economical, in either character; a saving might have been made in times of peace to support the extraordinaries of meditated ambitious war, of one krote of rupees annually, considering the policy adopted of resuming former and suffering no further alienations of land to be made, in the way of jaguer, charitable or religious donations; of investing Bramins, the most pliant, cruel instruments of tyranny, with the management of the finances, and deriving extraordinary aids to defray the original expence of a standing military establishment of 30,000 irregular cavalry, 20,000 infantry, and 50 sibbendies, disciplined and countenanced by a body of Europeans, supported by a formidable train of artillery, innumerable fortifications, with all the requisites of warlike offensive operations, from the iniquitous exertion of the force it gave, in subverting the petty governments of neighbouring rajahs, and to ease the galling yoke perhaps imposed by these, on the great mass of their subjects but to add misery to slavery, drench the fields of the husbandman with blood, and bring devastation, ruin, or destruction on the whole country.

To stem such a torrent of power as might from this quarter, overwhelm the little territory of Guntoor, besides the provincial resources, a collateral aid here presents itself, in the neighbouring British dependencies of the Carnatic Payengaut. This maritime country, extending in length 600 miles from the banks of the Kistna to Cape Comorin, there considerably outstretching the bordering frontier of Mysore, yet in its greatest breadth from Madras on the sea coast to Vellore, westerly, near the foot of the Gaults, no more than 90 miles; and therefore, in all its dimensions, including the raj of Tanjore, cannot contain

above

\* Little short, in superficial measure, or territorial compass, of the barbaric states of Algiers and Tunis, comprising the inhabited parts of both dominions united under the same sovereign.



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above \* 36,000 square geographical miles in superficial measure; yet, from the superior fertility of low lands, plentifully watered, either naturally or artificially; an even surface, humid atmosphere, extraordinary population, in part subsisted by fisheries perfectly free; but, above all, by the enlivening territorial benefits resulting from an increasing foreign commerce to full effective revenue, under the extravagant incorrigible abuse, speculation, fraud, and corruption, of Mussulman administration, hath never fallen short (in times of internal tranquillity, since the complete conquest of this portion of the soubah of Hyderabad, in the reign of Alomgeek) of two kreore of rupees, allowing fifty lacks to be the proprietary income of Tanjore, and thereby giving to this little principality, so prodigiously favoured by nature, the second rank among all the provinces of Hindostan of equal magnitude, for agriculture or valued rent; on the same financial principles, assigning to Burdwan, in Bengal, which, though not equally fortunate in physical circumstances, has been more so in the enjoyment of a long intelligent British administration, and beyond all comparison in population, culture, manufactures, or prosperity, the first. In a long series of political mistakes, or rather by the artful connivance, chicanery, and intrigue, so peculiarly characteristic of Mahomedan ministry, under the incongruous form, with the corrupt influence of a double government, from the surrender of the nabab or nabobship of the Carnatic, to the actual occupant in 1763, after wresting it from the French in a contest of 15 years, with a larger waste of British blood and treasure, down to the present moment, when the country has been in a manner re-conquered from Hyder Ali, by the same powerful arm and means; it has happened that no military establishment, effective and sufficient for the purposes of defence, always obligatory, was ever fixed on, with certain pre-existent provision for its maintenance, to be drawn from the ample natural resources of the protected dominion; and such is the complexion, the delicacy of our situation with Mahomed Ali, raised to princely importance, by the intercourse, countenance and favour of a high and most glorious sovereign, that, during the former's life, perhaps, more than a suitable necessary supply to remedy so glaringly inconvenient a deficiency in the political system of the coast, can now be openly contended for. So much, however, is expedient, indispensable, though greatly short of undoubted civil right, in law and equity; and accordingly we shall take the liberty, by anticipation, of specifying the supposed force requisite in future, for interior defence. 30,000 sebandies are the least that can be employed in so large a tract of territory, to secure the public peace and collections. They already exist, and only require being commanded and tolerably disciplined by English officers, to be equal to twice the number under native leaders, who have hitherto exclusively benefited by the institution or use of a great standing militia; 2,000 European infantry, 1,000 artillery, 4,000 Mogul cavalry, and 10,000 sepoys; in all 17,000 regular troops, to be formed, after providing exclusively 1,500 British soldiers for the garrisons of Fort St. George, Vellore, and Trichinopoly, into equal divisions or legions; the one, stationary, and in cantonments in the neighbourhood of Trincomaly; the other, also collected in a state preparatory for field operations, without incurring any extraordinary expense, somewhere about the northern fortified port of Nellore. To judge experimentally of the efficacy of such a force, which is very little if at all greater than what is already really or nominally entertained, though otherwise distributed and unequipped, to keep in check the most formidable native power actually existing in Hindostan, even supposing it miraculously hereafter to acquire a double strength, contrary to its present rapid progress in declension, we have only to recall to memory the decisive victory of Porto Novo, with the circumstances that will for ever mark its glory in the annals of Britain. Hyder, a wonderful man, made for conquest and to rule, having perfected a great natural genius for tactics in an European camp, and by long experience in war, with or against the most skilful practitioners of the art, having raised himself by superior talents, from the meanest condition to be the sovereign of a kingdom, tripled its magnitude by an uninterrupted career of success and conquest; in a period of twenty years, selected or formed a great number of ministers and generals; trained on the parade, and exercised in the field, by continued military exploits, a long standing army, chiefly cavalry; and from the resources of universal rapine, with the ordinary accumulated revenue of an extensive empire, having completed with infinite diligence and foresight, his vast warlike preparations for premeditated invasion of the Poyengaut, he availed himself, in the spirit of true political wisdom, perverted by the madness of ambition, of the fleeting moment when his own fame, military strength and means of supporting a war were greatest, while his opponents were to be distracted at home, threatened from abroad, with scattered forces, an exhausted treasury, destitute of all the requisites for offensive or defensive operations, to rush like a torrent into the lower Carnatic, with a hundred thousand veteran soldiers, including 700 Europeans, under an approved personally hostile leader. He swept every thing before him; the devastation and terror were universal; and having cut off one-third of the opposing army, before a junction had been effected with the main body, in all the pride of triumph, flushed with victory, he turned his arms against the remainder, as if with certainty of success, while supposed to be dispirited with an unexpected recent loss. The event proved what a phalanx of European and native troops, even inferior in number to one of our proposed legions, can do, under the greatest possible disadvantages, when disciplined and commanded by British officers, against a host of Indian foes, outnumbering the former twelve to one, favoured by every circumstance which can at any time enable, to render such an enemy relatively powerful.

But.

\* In every respect, to all the scattered dominions of Denmark, Prussia, Russia, and Ducal Sleswig, Mecklenburg, &c. &c. &c.

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But though the northern circars may thus be completely secured against the attacks of native inland enemies, along an accessible coast of 470 miles they may be said to be every where exposed to the maritime invasion of an European force, and more particularly the French, as the most ambitious, enterprising, and formidable nation, notwithstanding that article of the treaty of Paris in 1763, which puts the coast of Orissa with Chittuck as far south as Yanam, on the Godavery, its ancient boundary, on the same footing as our other possessions of Bengal. It would be unnecessary to describe the various resources or means of offence within reach of this people, to execute such a purpose, did we think ourselves equal to the task; and we should feel no sentiment of exultation, in contrasting that decided superiority of the British navy, manifested in the course of the last war, as an eternal insuperable bar to inimical success. Suffice it to observe, that if Great Britain, torn by faction, and deprived of half its wonted energy at home; embarrassed by the unruliness of a sister kingdom, and dismembered of its colonies, could, with so much glory, maintain the empire of the sea, in a long and bloody conflict against the united efforts of all America, France, Spain, and Holland; with an armed equivocal neutrality of the rest of Europe, a combination of political strength, perhaps unparalleled in the annals of the world, as opposed to a single unsupported state! it is not to be supposed that any one power, making only part of that incongruous union, will dare to attempt, or can effect, what the whole found themselves unequal to, even after the object was determined on, under the most inviting circumstances to try its attainment. Yet admitting, for a moment, the worst that can possibly happen, and that the French, after gaining a superiority on the natural element of insular dominion, could effect the landing of an armament of five thousand, or more European troops, intended for the conquest of the circars; cut off, as the invaders must be, from any intercourse with either of the neighbouring interior powers; unassisted by the native militia of the country, and without resources of money or provisions: when these means of defence are, as they ought to be, taken out of the hands of traitorous, rebellious zemindars, and lodged with the protected sovereign, perhaps the provincial force of 30,000 men, under any description, with forts, natural barriers of hills, rivers, and woods, would be more than sufficient to repel the invasion; if not, the collateral aid of a Carnatic legion, in itself, almost equal to the like number of disciplined Europeans, from Nellore, is at hand; and should both resources fail, still the great superintending government of Bengal is near enough, and otherwise conveniently situated, to furnish an immediate auxiliary reinforcement.

It would convey a very inadequate idea of the intrinsic, or relative importance of this vast body of the British empire in India, with its immediate dependencies, to state its form, by giving reality to a thing heretofore imaginary, as resembling a horn of plenty\*, extending from its apex in lat. 30° North in the Servatic in Ganjam hills, where the Ganges first enters the plains of Hindostan, and thence, in a curvature of a thousand miles, in a south-east direction, constitutes the <sup>of this cornucopia to its aperture, under the lat. 20°, in the</sup> bay of Bengal, after traversing 14 degrees of longitude, and then pouring forth immense territorial or manufactured riches, through a hundred navigable channels, into the boundless southern ocean. To describe its square dimensions, to be 70,000 geographical miles, or longitudinal extent of the immediate dominion of the English alone, as stretching ten and an half degrees on the parallel of 25° North, from the western limits of Benares to Cossipoor, on the eastern frontiers of Sylhet, within 300 geographical miles of the province of Upmam, in China, being nearly equal to the distance of Ganjam from Calcutta; still less would the statement of an effective yearly revenue of six crore of rupees, of which four and an half, may enter the Company's treasury, serve to give a competent idea of the prodigious resources of this invaluable country; nor, besides delications and unconstitutional alienations of territory, so highly proper at all times, but indispensably necessary henceforth to be resumed, who can estimate the value of public credit; now so successfully introduced, and firmly established in the East, yet exclusively enjoyed by the English? while neighbouring states are compelled to hoard up the current specie, exhaust the veins of circulation, and thereby ruin commerce, solely in the view of carrying on a desultory languid war, the length of which, together with the scope of its operations, may be calculated to a minute precision. It is only by distant analogy, then, that even a tolerable guess may be formed on this subject. Great Britain, in Europe, on the strength of public credit, hath maintained a war eventually universal, from the year 1778, until its close in 1789; against the most formidable combinations of foes that perhaps ever were united against any single state in the western hemisphere; and besides the disbursements of an unappropriated revenue of five millions, a debt, funded or unfunded, of near 80 millions sterling more has been incurred, being about eight times the amount of the whole ordinary yearly income, as it stood at the commencement of hostilities. In like manner as at Bengal, disturbed internally by civil dissensions, or the rebellion of refractory zemindars, was beset by an inimical confederacy of all the respectable native powers of Hindostan, stimulated and assisted by the French

\* The origin of this emblematical figure, it will be remembered, was the gift of King Ammon to his daughter Asaphtha afterwards feigned by the poets to be Jupiter's nurse, of a territory in Lybia, exceedingly fertile, resembling in shape a bullock's horn.

† An area equal to the square dimensions of the following states united:—The kingdoms of Great Britain, Ireland, Sardinia, and Naples: the old Roman Commonwealth, when extended over the present territories of the Pope and Grand

Duke of Tuscany; all the ancient republics of Greece; the Jewish empire in Syria, together with the whole kingdom of Egypt, as ever inhabited or capable of cultivation.

‡ N.B. This was written before the 1st November 1794, when the letter of the 15th June preceding, from England, respecting the last resistance loan, for the payment of investment was received, and staggered the faith of many, as to the solidity of public credit.

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ceding sheets.

and Dutch America was lost to the British Empire in the contest of the West; but in India, with many vicissitudes of fortune, in the same period, the national power never appeared more formidable than at the completion of a general peace, effected by successful opposition against a host of enemies, without any other sacrifice or abscission than the poor detached town of Broach, and by incurring a debt far short of a single year's ordinary revenue, which may be easily liquidated in two more of tranquillity, through economical reforms, with many dormant resources, equally proper, as perhaps expedient to be brought forth, and after having supported, besides the military operations of many distant armies, in some measure the civil commercial establishments of all the presidencies united, supplied in great part the pecuniary wants of China, and, as usual, made chiefly by the spirited patriotic contributions, with a view of remittance of the private fortunes of British subjects; a provision for and dispatched the annual investments to Europe, without which, indeed, the national resources might have failed, and the credit of the Company in England be shaken to its foundation. In a word, with such collateral aids as the circars may thus derive on the one hand, from Bengal; on the other hand, from the Carnatic, joined to their own proper interior resources of men and money, we may venture to pronounce their perfect security of being long possessed as dependencies on the British Empire; on a comparative view of the power, situation, and relative circumstances of neighbouring states, naturally hostile, or capable of giving annoyance.

Summarily to estimate the political importance of the Northern circars, we shall recapitulate the substance of what hath been diffusely scattered on this subject, under different heads, throughout the preceding sheets. A territory happily situated on the sea-coast, under a more temperate climate than common, within the tropics, 17,000\* square geographic miles in all its dominions, yielding copiously all the gifts of nature necessary to the support of two millions and a half of inoffensive native inhabitants, with a commerce of seventy-five lacks on balance, and a gross revenue of a crore and thirty lacks of rupees, collected on the most moderate scale of exaction, to defray all the necessary expenses of government, are the circumstances which principally determine the intrinsic value of possession; dependent provinces lying between the superior establishments of Madras and Fort William, facilitating the communications between both, capable of receiving from or giving immediate support to either, particularly to the former, in the article of grain and other provisions in the north-east monsoon; excluding rival European nations in a length of coast, 470 miles, from any intercourse with the interior states of the Deccan, and thereby preventing intrigue with insidious policy, so baneful to the general peace of mankind, from entering into the ignorant councils of the natives, extending the scope of a foreign legitimate empire, desired and venerated by the great mass of the people, and at the same time, increasing its political strength, by checking neighbouring powers, or in yielding vast resources of an army; a marine and very extensive and universally beneficial coasting trade, a valuable commerce amounting to 18 lacks in cotton cloths, for the markets of England, there serving as raw materials for an inestimable home printed manufacture, besides 12 lacks of similar goods exported to other states of Europe, paid in specie in the country, to enliven provincial circulation, producing also a clear territorial income of one crore of rupees, deduction being made of all mossussil expenses, and affording, besides a surplus of ten lacks to remain in the subordinate treasury, an annual tribute of 40 lacks to the superior protecting government of Fort St. George, to be remitted in money or grain, after defraying the charge of a military force of 30,000 men, under every denomination; a great civil establishment which handsomely provides for at least sixty gentlemen, servants of the Company, and the yearly provision of an investment, exceeding double the worth in Europe of any other Indian commodity, originally invoiced equally;—these, are the most material advantages stated to convey an idea of the relative worth of the territory under consideration, while the contingent circumstances of great internal means for offensive or defensive operations, with the near and virtual support of collateral aids from Bengal and the Carnatic, comparatively with the slender resources, inefficient, contemptible, military power of barbarous neighbouring states, evince the security of possession, and finish the abstract of our proposed political estimate.

On the whole, if Bengal deserves to be considered the richest jewel in the British Crown, it may be observed of the Northern circars, that though only forming a cluster of lesser magnitude, they give additional value, with a superior lustre, to the royal diadem; as constituting the only portion, annexed constitutionally, without the incongruity of formal participation, except the secondary of Benares, in free, avowed, undivided sovereignty.

\* Equal in extent, but short in population and revenue, of the Republics of Holland and Venice united, by one-half.

## Appendix, No. 14.

MINUTES of Mr. C. N. WHITE (Member of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George;) dated 14th February, and 25th March, 1793.

EXTRACT Proceedings of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, 14th February 1793.

READ the following Minute, delivered in by Mr. White:

Mr. White's Minute—  
14 Feb 1793.

IT would appear that early in February 1791, the chief and council put the Billumcondah and Innaccondah districts under charge of Vassareddy, without consulting the board of revenue; which measure was disapproved by them. In consequence of a letter from the chief and council, dated 30th April, the board consented afterwards to his being continued in charge, on his engaging to protect the districts, and to pay their stipulated quota of the jumma agreed on for the whole Guntoor circar. In the month of June, the chief and council estimated the receipts of revenue for the Fusly year, from pagodas 24,000, to pagodas 28,000, and as this fell so short of the proportion (M. pagodas 57,000) of the general assessment proposed for that Circar, they remarked upon its inadequacy, and recommended that the rent of the two districts should be offered to Vassareddy for a term of years. This proposition, as well as the former measure, was reluctantly acquiesced in. However, the chief and council were desired, if they could devise no other means of securing the tranquillity of the country, and an adequate revenue, to settle for a rent; but not to extend the term beyond the period of the existing leases for the other districts, which was about three years. In August, the chief and council represented that Vassareddy declined undertaking the rent, for so short a period—that he alleged, the impoverished state of the districts must render it impossible for him to restore them within the period of the other settlements in the Guntoor circar, so as to enable him to pay their stated proportion of jumma (M. Pagodas 57,000), and that he could not engage, for a shorter time than seven years. The board of revenue stated their remarks on the occasion, and government acquiesced in the proposition so decidedly recommended by the gentlemen at Masulipatam; but as the term of rent was longer than they wished, the chief and council were desired, previous to entering into any engagement, to make a further trial to prevail with Vassareddy to agree for a shorter period, by reducing the demand of rent.—In consequence of the recommendation of the chief and council, it was at the same time resolved, with the view of relieving the inhabitants, to grant a remission of all balances standing against them for the two preceding years, amounting nearly to M. pagodas 30,000.

Various pleas of absence and sickness of the zemindar and his vakceels, have since been represented as the causes which delayed the final adjustment of this transaction; and it at length appears, that Vassareddy is totally averse in coming to any agreement for renting those districts on any terms. In the mean time, however, he could undertake the charge and detail of the collections; and it is evident that the mode now proposed for the future management, must effectually continue his interference and influence, without any degree of responsibility.—I conceive his motives must be sufficiently obvious; besides present advantage, he may wish to obtain controul over those districts, and ultimately to get them annexed to the Chintapilly zemindarry.

It cannot be supposed that Vassareddy was unacquainted with the actual situation and value of the two districts, which are contiguous to his own zemindarry, when he made his proposal for renting them: but as no caboodleat has been taken from him, it rests with the honourable the Governor in Council to determine on his conduct.

The actual collections for the year, are mentioned by the chief and council, to be M. pagodas 14,603. 9. 45. But this sum does not appear to correspond with the abstract transmitted by them, which states the collections at 16,331. 35. 35.

And if the amount charges, Sibbendy claimed by Vassareddy be deducted,

amounting to 9,079. 35. 35.

The actual net collections can be only 7,252. — —

And if from this sum be deducted, the monthly subsistence of Pagodas 100 to each zemindar, as proposed by the chief and council, and which certainly would be the smallest allowance hitherto given to persons in their situation, the net receipts for both districts, will only be Pagodas 4,852; though it is said Vassareddy effectually preserved the peace of the country. But the chief and council hold out hopes, that with proper management it may be increased in seven years, to pagodas 80,000 per annum. Before Vassareddy's charges of collection are admitted, it will be proper for the board to see his account particulars with other vouchers, which ought to be transmitted with the same regularity as the collectors forward such papers.

The chief and council mentioned the proposal of the Gundarows:—They paid in Fusly 1200, pagodas 33,998. 18; and offered to pay into the treasury, for the year Fusly 1201, M. pagodas 25,000; and that the balance of the seven years stated revenue should be di-

Mr. White's Minute—  
14 Feb. 1793.

Appendix to V<sup>th</sup> REPORT from The Select Committee on [No. 14]

vided upon the ensuing year.—Vassareddy offered to become security for the payment, on condition that he retained his influence in the country.

The appointment of an aumeen to act in conjunction with Vassareddy's manager, is, I believe, a new mode of administration for the company's revenue.—It appears to me more remarkable, that the chief and council should seriously tell this board that the despondence of the country will be a check upon those managers, when strengthened also by the influence of Vassareddy.—I believe there are few people who have had the least opportunity of observing the conduct of the native revenue officers in the Circars, would be satisfied that such a mode of checking them, was likely to be efficient.—The chief and council have not been in the habit of mentioning the names, or of giving any account of the qualifications of the persons employed on such occasions; but for my own part, whenever I hear that a set of men called aumeens, are dispatched from the pottah of Masulipatam, into the distant districts, without any vigilant inspection over them, I expect to find that the inhabitants will be plundered and the collections embezzled.

The chief and council say, however, that if this board think proper to require any other mode of management to be instituted, it will be readily attended to by them; so that after a year has elapsed, and their own recommendations consented to, in all their variations, another mode, widely different from any former proposition, is adopted "as a necessary expedient;" and it is left to this board, at this advanced season of the year, to acquiesce or to direct some other arrangement.

As the zemindars of the two districts were set aside, in consequence of the representations of the chief and council, I know of no other mode but that of placing them under a collector, or farming them out to the head inhabitants, or to renters of good character, and who would be likely to preserve their tranquillity. In such case, a small party of Sepoys might be kept there for a time, to assist for that purpose. But should either of these modes be attempted at present, the board may expect to hear of damages to the growing crops—that the peace of the country is likely to be disturbed, and other inconveniences;—and from what appears on record, and the former representations of the present chief and council, respecting the refractory and turbulent conduct of Vassareddy, I think it more than probable that he will be the principal, in exciting disturbances in the country. It will not be the first time that the board of revenue have felt themselves in a similar predicament; and have in a manner been forced to yield to measures, which appeared very objectionable, in order to avoid disturbances, loss of revenue, and charges stated or apprehended by the chiefs and councils.

The chief and council at Masulipatam having expressed their apprehensions that no part of the heavy balances outstanding for the two preceding years could be realized, they were directed, in October last, to ascertain and report what indulgences were shown by the different zemindars, and what proportion of their demands had been remitted to the inhabitants during the famine. This information appeared necessary, before the board submitted any opinion or recommendation to government, for granting remissions; and it became the more requisite, as they understood that the greater part of the zemindars had paid no attention to the distresses of the poorer classes of people; but, on the contrary, had secreted and disposed of their grain and other necessities of life, at the most exorbitant prices.

It would appear from their letter of the 26th ultimo, that the chief and council have lost sight of this object of the board's instructions, under date 31st October, and repeated on the 12th ultimo; and I conceive that the circular letter written upon the receipt of the board's orders to the different zemindars, requiring information from them as to the means they possessed for making good their balances, must be found not only ineffectual, but likely to occasion obstacles.

The chief and council however observe, that holding out hopes of remissions might be productive of inconvenience; but did this board desire them to hold out any hopes of the kind, or give them any order on the subject, until they had repeatedly declared their apprehensions of being unable to realize any part of the balances for the preceding years? Can it be conceived for a moment, that the vakeels and news-writers employed by the zemindars at Masulipatam, who are so watchful of the most minute circumstances, were ignorant on this point?

The chief and council seem to have confined their enquiry to the loss of inhabitants and state of the present crops; and without doubt, it will appear that the country has suffered in a dreadful degree, though perhaps not actually to the extent of the account collected by them, for the zemindars will certainly be inclined to exaggerate, as a foundation for claims to remissions. Instead of expecting any satisfactory information with respect to the conduct of the zemindars during the late calamity, and the means taken by them for the preservation of the inhabitants, it is pretty evident that the board will expect to find such an enquiry will, in the usual phrase, be represented as ill-timed interference, and likely to produce confusion and difficulties. If there had been an effectual interposition twelve or eighteen months ago, by obliging the zemindars and others to bring their secreted grain to market, and to dispose of the same at a moderate price, and actually to have remitted such a portion of the revenue to the ryots, as will now be claimed on account of deficiencies, it might possibly have saved the lives of many thousands of inhabitants in the different districts without loss to the company. I am sure that neither the present government or board would authorize any vexatious scrutiny or useless research; but there is a necessary enquiry and information, and without which, it is impossible to proceed with propriety in any decision.

I am however convinced, if the Masulipatam zemindars had been under the superintendence of three or four separate collectors, that they might, by a residence and local knowledge



knowledge, with proper enquiries in the respective districts, have furnished the required information without the least difficulty, and averted many of the late calamities. But in proof of the defects of the present system of administration in the Circars, and that innumerable mischiefs have been experienced under it, I would wish to appeal to the records, which must likewise show, that after twenty-five years possession, undisturbed by any foreign enemy, the company's authority is incompletely established—that no regulation has been introduced for the security of the inhabitants against oppression, and not a single improvement proposed worthy of any notice.

It has been a mass of contradictions and dissensions, garbled and disingenuous representations; or accounts of failures, disturbances, depredations, increased charges, frauds, balances, remissions, &c.; and until the reports of the committee of circuit were received in 1786 and 1787, there was little or no information on record with respect to the population, revenue, manufacture, or produce of those countries. Should it appear that I am mistaken in such opinions, I hope the board will explain and set me right. I have no hesitation, however, in offering it as my opinion, that the revenue will be better conducted, and that the inhabitants will receive more protection, under collectors residing in the different districts, than under the present system of a chief and council stationed at Muzulipatam.

The procrastination and various impediments which arise to the dispatch of business at present, are obvious; and the frequent attendance of so many zemindars or their vakeels at the chiefships, have occasioned the greatest inconvenience. From what may be learned on an examination of the records, and from every source of the most respectable private information, I apprehend there is not in any country, a greater sink of intrigue and corruption, than the petty or black town of that settlement. There, it would appear, the darkest schemes of cabal and counteraction have been contrived by dabashers and other natives, or the most daring projects formed for procuring undue advantages, by every means of oppression and plunder. The usual mode of transacting business by means of the chief's dabash as interpreter, and making him the sole channel of all negotiation with the zemindars and other natives, must have been favourable to such schemes, and could not fail of producing the worst of consequences. But as the influence and misconduct of such men, must be within the knowledge of every person who has paid the least attention to the affairs of this coast, I shall say no more on that subject.

The chiefs and councils do not transmit their accounts and vouchers in a distinct and regular manner, or enter into a simple and clear detail of the collections, or give that satisfactory elucidation, which must have been intended and expected from the institution of collectors. The latter, by residing in the districts, have it also in their power to watch the conduct of the zemindars, and to check any improper designs which the chiefs and councils cannot so well attempt, from being ignorant of what is actually passing in the different zemindars. In short, the forming of the districts into divisions, the establishing one uniform plan, by appointing collectors, and separating the duties of revenue and commerce, are measures which appear to me to be essential to the company's interests, and to the prosperity of the country. The regulations adopted in the year 1792, for the revenue department, and for the conduct of collectors, were framed, with very little alteration, from those established in Bengal. But the present mode of transacting business by the agency of chiefs and councils, appears to me in some degree incompatible with the revenue regulations; and I imagine the late board of revenue must at the same time, have had in view the introduction of one uniform system of collection, corresponding with that of Bengal, which, after long experience has been found to answer.

Let any one contrast for a moment, the situation of the Bengal provinces with the northern Circars: in the former, there will be observed a well-regulated and efficient system of revenue; but in the other, an unconnected jumble, without authority, subordination, arrangement or regulation. Although vested with such a charge and detail of revenue management, I do not recollect to have heard that any gentlemen in the provincial councils had ever acquired a proficiency in any of the country languages, or proposed any plan of general utility since the acquisition of the Circars. Can there be wanting any further proof of the supineness and total want of exertion and emulation in the public service, under the present system of chiefships? I will here add, that the regulations lately framed by this board for the administration of civil justice, and which I make no doubt government will approve, are also framed from the Bengal code. In my opinion, those regulations are equally well adapted for the Circars, without requiring further modification as to any local usages; but here again the present system may tend to obstruct an useful institution, though the necessity of establishing courts of justice for the security of property, and protection of the inhabitants, must be obvious.

Upon the establishment of collectorships, it will be of the utmost importance to select persons of moderation, industry, good capacity, and of honourable character. What interests of the company holding negotiations, aim at the rapid acquisition of a large revenue, many inconveniences must ensue; for whatever may be the vigilance of the board of revenue, the success of the collections must in a great measure depend, on those employed in the immediate management of the district. As the selection must be made by the honourable the Governor-in-Council, it might not be proper for me to say more; but I am sure the present government will not be displeased at any remark from a member of the board, on a point so connected with the revenue, and the various duties committed to their charge. This, I apprehend, in some respect to make distinctions; and yet it is the duty of this board to discriminate merits and demerits in the public service, on the spot of their acting, and then, I will only add, that the Circars were placed under seven or eight collectors,



Mr. White's Minutes—  
14 Feb. 1793.

who would conduct themselves as Captain Read has done for the last year in the Barramah districts, I am convinced that the most important benefits would soon be experienced.

There are other measures which must appear absolutely requisite for the benefit of the country, and should be carried into effect at a proper time. The mode of settling with the zemindars from year to year, or for a short and precarious lease, and assessing them in proportion to the value of their districts, without regard to those who may have increased their resources by good management, could not fail to check every attempt of improvement, and to render them equally rapacious and unfeeling as common renters. In this state of perplexity, and often harassed by demands for public or private payments, they have been left without any controul as to interior management, and might commit the greatest abuses and enormities with impunity.

Without the zemindars are assured that they shall not be liable, by additional demands, to be wholly deprived of the benefit of their exertions, and without adopting some more permanent plan of settlement (which would put a stop to the plea of private exactions) it is in vain to expect a proper conduct in the zemindars, and that they will not oppress the inhabitants. An arrangement of this nature, or giving the principal inhabitants an interest or property in the lands, would soon be attended with beneficial consequences to the country. The latter measure, would certainly be most effectual to its prosperity; but it cannot perhaps be effected without changing materially the present situation of the zemindars.

If the real value of the different zemindars is supposed not to be sufficiently ascertained by the reports of the committee of circuit, the appointment of the collectors must, I think, tend to complete that object, and to enable government to fix a plan of permanency whenever the affairs of the Circars approach to such a state as will admit of a permanent arrangement; the principle of the last settlement in Bengal for ten years is worthy of being taken as a model; but without the institution of courts of justice, and the appointment of collectors, as a previous step, I apprehend that it may be found impracticable to adopt many of the regulations of that settlement, though applicable in other respects to the circumstances of the Circars, and highly expedient for the benefit of the country. The collectors, within a proper time after their appointment, should make a full report of the state of the districts under their respective charge, with every information to assist the board in preparing and arranging a plan for the future settlement. On so important an occasion, and when their own credit must be so deeply concerned, the collectors will naturally feel an emulation, and be anxious to acquit themselves in a satisfactory manner, by furnishing complete materials for that purpose.

Then it is to be hoped that the present abuses will soon be rectified, with respect to the low and fluctuating exchange of the copper currency, which are so grievously felt by the poorer classes of people in the Circars;—that some effectual methods will be adopted for supplying the districts with water, by means of tanks and canals, which from the advantages of situation, and the many springs issuing from the adjacent hills, besides the two great rivers, can be accomplished with less difficulty than in most other countries;—that large tracts of lands capable of the highest improvement, but at present waste and neglected, will be brought into a state of cultivation;—that manufactures will be promoted, as well as the culture of the sugar cane, the mulberry, indigo, cotton, and other valuable articles, which hitherto have been totally overlooked or discouraged by chiefs and councils.

The necessity of a reform, with respect to internal taxes, is evident. Mr. Petrie and Mr. Oram delivered in Minutes on this subject in the months of November and December 1791, and both have shown in strong colours, that great abuses are at present practised, but the arrangement proposed by the former gentleman appears to have been intended, rather as a temporary expedient than an effectual remedy. The plan of commutation recommended by the latter, might not be found to answer. In consequence of an application to the supreme government, the Bengal regulations for inland duties are now in the possession of this board; and as this subject has been so fully investigated there, it may be the safest and best mode to adopt them, as a guide in regulating or abolishing oppressive imposts in the Circars.

At a proper time, similar regulations should be established to those adopted in Bengal, for the management of lands, whose proprietors are excluded on the grounds of sex, minority, incapacity, contumacy, or lunacy, as well as for the care of the persons, maintenance, or education of such disqualified land-holders. It must also appear necessary to adopt the Regulations passed in July 1792, by the right honourable the Governor General in Council, defining the nature and extent of the encroachment, which land-holders and farmers may exercise to enforce payment of their just arrears, and at the same time for protecting under-tenants and ryots from oppressive and unjust demands of the land-holders. There are other useful revenue regulations observed in Bengal, which may be introduced at proper times, and when government can fully rely on the zeal of those employed for carrying them into execution.

Every attempt almost for introducing any remedy with respect to oppressive taxes, or the administration of the revenue, has been opposed by the chiefships; but upon no better ground than that I can discover than that of affecting the present receipts of government. The more wise and equitable considerations of increasing the population and securing the permanent prosperity of the country, by rendering the condition of the people more comfortable, by encouraging industry and commerce, by discontinuing unjust demands, and adopting useful regulations, appear to have had but little weight.

The progress made in Bengal in every branch of the revenue, and knowledge of the nature and government of the country, is without comparison, far beyond any attainments of the merchants on the coast; and the expediency of establishing an uniform system, as far as local circumstances will admit, in all the company's possessions, must be evident: but there

is a more powerful argument;—why should not the inhabitants on this coast, enjoy equal indulgences with those in Bengal? And indeed, exposed as they are at present, to the uncontrolled power of the zemindars, and having suffered so much from the late famine, they have stronger claims to lenity. Should it appear that within the two last years a third, and in many places, half of the inhabitants have perished in the zemindaries, as private reports mention, some diminution of the present assessments, at least for a few years, must be allowed, or the country will become more depopulated. Upon receipt of the public accounts from Masulipatam, the amount of remissions should be determined, as well as the abatement of the future revenue, proportioned to the effects of the famine, for the relief of the remaining inhabitants. This may appear a proper time for the regulating or abolition of the inland taxes in the zemindaries.

Corcondah is situated about six coss to the northward of Rajahmundry, and as it is represented that no person has a just claim of succession to this zemindary, which contains, by the accounts of the committee of circuit, 55 villages. I am decidedly of opinion, that it ought to be declared havelly, and that the giving a preference, by appointing any one of the claimants, would probably tend to produce disputes and future embarrassment. I agree with the chief and council, that in choosing districts for havelly, those in the plain country near the sea coast should be preferred; but it appears to me that the disturbances in the zemindaries situated near the frontiers, have frequently been occasioned by the misconduct of the zemindars, in refusing the just demands of government, and then taking refuge in the hills until they obtain, their own terms, and at other times by affording shelter and assistance to the refractory dependants of the company. The usual pleas of the subordinates, for not taking vigorous and efficient measures, on account of the war with Hyder, Tippoo, or others, or in the present situation of affairs, cannot now be urged, and such arguments would be more humiliating than ever for foregoing the rights of government, or the security of the inhabitants. The resistance however of the zemindars is not always occasioned by endeavouring to enforce the public claims; for example, is it not evident that the demands of individuals and their private loans, were the principal causes of the disorders and loss of revenue experienced in the Noozced zemindary?

Mylaveram is represented by the committee of circuit, to be about seven coss from Condapilly, and they mention that this district, consisting of 53 villages, had suffered much from the disputes between the two zemindars: Mr. Oram stated it, on a late occasion, "to be in reality a part of the Condapilly havelly, and that as the villages of both interfere, they might with great propriety be added to the havelly collection."

In settling for the rent, or with the inhabitants in all lands near the hills, it would certainly be good policy to require a more moderate assessment, and to allow every indulgence with respect to vexatious taxes, &c. A small force of Sepoys being stationed in such situations, would probably secure their tranquillity, and be the means of security to other districts in the neighbourhood, which have often suffered from depredations.

While I am on the subject of havelies, it might be proper to mention that I understand a scheme has been on foot for some time among several natives, to get a zemindar appointed to the Muglalore district, though it had been long resolved and finally determined in 1791 to make it havelly, as no one had a right of succession on the death of Trepetty Rauze. The person employed for this purpose at Madras, is named Cousinadoo Venkiah; but finding, I have reason to believe, that he is not likely to get the business brought forward at the presidency, it is reported that he has advised his party to redouble their efforts among the natives at the northward. As such views must produce intrigue, besides inconvenience to Mr. Gambier, in the management and collections of the districts, I think Venkiah should be ordered to return to the northward, or to desist from his present pursuit, in case the board have reason to believe that it is not an unfounded report.

I am also of opinion, that it might prevent many such designs and intrigues, if the serishtadar or interpreter of this department, were directed to lay before the board once or twice every month, the names of all vakeels, agents, or others employed publicly or privately by the zemindars, renters, or others concerned in the revenue, or on the part of any persons who have any claim to lands, which will better enable this board to carry the orders of government into effect respecting vakeels, &c.

I will take leave to add, that the foregoing opinions are not hastily adopted, but the result of some examination of the records, corroborated by an evident combination of circumstances, and by the sentiments of men of character and observation, who have been on the spot.—It is a subject that embraces the happiness and prosperity of a whole country; and cannot be considered with indifference by any person. Should it appear therefore that I might in any instance have used a more qualifying expression, I hope it will not be the objection of a moment.—I may be deceived; but under a full conviction at present, that such evils have existed, it might be blamable in me to express myself in a less undisguised and ingenuous language. I can safely say that to the best of my judgment I have used no exaggeration, that no private motive can weigh with me, and that I never have had the least personal difference with any one hitherto employed, or likely to be employed, in the provincial councils.

(Signed)

CHA. N. WILKINSON

Feb. 14, 1793.

EXTRACT Proceedings of the Board of Revenue at Fort<sup>s</sup> St. George,  
the 25<sup>th</sup>, March 1793.

MR. White delivers in the following Minute:

Mr. White's Minute—  
25 March 1793.

IN a Minute delivered at our meeting of the 14<sup>th</sup> ultimo, I stated my opinion of the defects in the present system of administration of the company's revenue on this coast. It has afforded me the greatest satisfaction to find that government have concurred in the proposed alteration, and intend to recommend it to the honourable court of directors. With this pleasing prospect before them, and the previous institution of courts of justice, this board may begin to hope that a plan is soon to be established which will produce regularity, subordination, and a due realization of the revenue, with full protection to the inhabitants, who at present have not the smallest security, either of property or person, against the rapacity or violence of the zemindars or principal tenants.

Without the institution of courts of justice, and under the present system, it is in vain to stipulate any conditions in favour of the inhabitants in the muchelkas of the zemindars, because any complaint against the latter, would not only prove ineffectual, but must expose the poor ryots to their resentment and greater acts of oppression. Indeed, however disposed the chief or collector may be to do justice, and however fair the decision, yet where there are no legal established rules of process, it will be unsatisfactory and disregarded. Hitherto in the Circars, the settling of causes, for it cannot be called an administration of justice, has been left with the zemindars, renters, or the native revenue servants, according to their influence. Sometimes, it appears by the records, the native commandants of the Sepoy battalions have assumed the right of deciding disputes and causes in the districts, which proved a profitable concern to them. Those who could not pay, but who in general were the injured parties, had a very small chance of success.

As the time did not admit, when I delivered the afore-mentioned Minute, of my being so explicit on several points as their nature and importance required, I take this occasion to offer some observations more in detail, and of submitting a few propositions for remedying particular inconveniences.

My opinion was stated before, respecting the necessity of a permanent assessment with the zemindars, and that it is equally expedient to settle, on a similar principle, with the head inhabitants of the government lands, as the system of employing intermediate renters, however modified and regulated, must ultimately prove ruinous. It may then be expected that the zemindars and others will again think of protecting and preserving the industrious cultivator, instead of reducing him to a scanty and miserable subsistence, and at other times harrassing him even to famine and death, which has lately been experienced to a dreadful extent in the Circars; but I am aware that obstacles occur in respect to the company's possessions on this coast, which are not felt in Bengal, arising as well from the want of due obedience on the part of the principal landholders, as from doubts of having accurate materials of the real value of their districts. The devastations occasioned by the former war, and the effects of the late famine in the Circars, must increase the difficulty for the present.

In the meantime, it is proper to keep this desirable object in view, and that the present measures should tend to a permanent establishment of land-rent, as soon as affairs will admit. The next settlements might be formed for a period of five or seven years, within which time, every necessary information ought to be obtained relative to the value and state of the country.—Much countenance in this respect, and in establishing the company's authority, may, however, be expected, while the zemindars are allowed to retain such a number of armed people, and to hold such ideas of their own independence. It has often encouraged them to withhold the public demands, to resist the company's troops, and to commit depredations in the adjoining districts. The records must show, that few instances of such misconduct have been attended with any serious punishment, particularly when the zemindars had the means or would agree to discharge their payments; and as to any enormities committed within their respective limits, they have not been considered a matter of enquiry at the subordinates, or, if known, were apparently disregarded. Indeed, the chiefships have constantly represented, that inconvenience would result from any interference with the internal controul of the zemindars, which could not fail to impress them with ideas of their own independence, and to encourage them often to acts of resistance.

The want of a sufficient force in the Circars, and the danger to be apprehended to the health of the troops in pursuing refractory dependants among the hills, are in general the reasons assigned for not acting with vigour and effect on occasions of disobedience. It has been usual to allow the zemindars, and particularly those in hilly and frontier situations, to entertain a considerable number of armed men for the protection of the districts against incursions, but hitherto the inconvenience of this measure has been frequently experienced, without any adequate advantages; for instead of assisting the intentions of government, they have constantly given great cause of displeasure, by affording shelter to delinquents, by committing oppressions in their own districts, and irregularities in the adjacent countries. It will perhaps appear highly proper to restrict the zemindars to the internal duties of their lands, and not to trust them, in any instance, with a large body of military for the purpose of defence, but who in fact are oftener employed in resisting the orders of government. In Bengal, the zemindars are not allowed even to keep up any police establishment for the preservation of peace within their own limits; but this duty is now confided to officers of government, appointed to that trust under proper regulations.

I have heard that in Bengal there are small cantonments in particular frontier zemindaries; and I make no doubt a very small force stationed in such situations in the Circars would effectually secure their tranquillity, and obviate many inconveniences. The most healthy spots

might be chosen, and encouragement given for clearing away the jungle in the neighbouring lands, by allowing the whole produce for three or five years, and afterwards to pay a moderate and increasing rent. To guard against the fatal effects of the climate, to which the regular troops must be exposed near the hills, it will be highly expedient, on every consideration of policy and humanity, to employ the people of the country, as was suggested by the committee of circuit, and lately by the resident at Ganjam, under date 7th October last.

A sufficient number of the military peons employed by the zemindars, might perhaps be easily retained for the purpose; and certainly no persons would be fitter for that service, than those who have already been employed in situations near the hills. If ever such an arrangement takes place, a party should be stationed in the Nundaporam zemindarry, who, by commanding the passes of that country, will be enabled to prevent the incursion of any enemy, and, at the same time, to contribute materially to the interior tranquillity of the company's districts.

A corps of this description was raised by a well-known collector of the Bauglepore district in Bengal, who induced the savage inhabitants to quit the adjacent mountains and woods, to enter into the service of the company.—They soon became a protection to that country, which they had so often desolated by acts of plunder and bloodshed; and the traveller, the merchant, and peaceful cultivator and manufacturer were no longer under apprehension of safety.—Trade, revived; agriculture, and manufactures, were improved and extended; and the population rapidly increased.

The expense of a similar corps in each of the four Circars under Masulipatam, and two corps for the Chicacole circar, would be no object to be put in competition with the advantages which would result from the establishment of order and regularity throughout the country. No further time should be lost in establishing an efficient controul, and in adopting preparatory measures for the institution of courts of justice, and other necessary regulations. But without the aid of some corps, on the footing before mentioned, the usual force stationed in the Circars may be found insufficient to overawe the zemindars, and to preserve a proper submission to government, particularly upon the introduction of any plan, which must affect their independent authority, by a reduction of their armed people, and by restricting them from undue demands and giving relief to the inhabitants.

Additional military establishments, and the employing them in the districts, should be avoided as far as possible; but until the orders of government are respected and obeyed by the zemindaries, such inconvenience must be submitted to, as they are trifling in comparison to the solid and permanent benefits which result to the prosperity of the country, from establishing justice, order, and a due subordination. At present, the irregular military in the service of the zemindars are very numerous, attended with an enormous expense, and extremely burthensome to the inhabitants. The necessity of taking some decided steps for establishing the company's authority, and reducing the zemindars to a proper state of subjection, must be obvious. If the measure be attempted, it should be carried through with vigour; for, if done by halves, the zemindars will have recourse to their old habits of intrigue to raise disturbances, and counteract the intentions of government. The apprehension of a temporary deficiency of revenue ought not to impede the object for a moment, and it will soon be seen that they will relinquish their practices of throwing the country into confusion, and leave the collectors in quiet possession of the districts. While the zemindars are suffered to retain their present force and influence, incompatible with, and derogatory to, every principle of good government, no collector will be able to afford protection to the inhabitants, to obtain the necessary information of the revenue, or to realize it, without perpetual difficulty and embarrassment. If the zemindars in Bengal some years ago were in a state of depression, I am sure every person must allow that their situation on this coast, has been on the other extreme. The medium is what, in my opinion, they are justly entitled to, and what is necessary for the good order and prosperity of the country; and on this principle, they ought not to keep up large bodies of armed men at an enormous expense, in order to maintain an improper influence and consequence, and often from more dangerous motives.

It will be an essential object in conciliating the zemindars to the proposed reform, to convince them that it is intended, as well for the security of their rights and to guard them against undue exactions, as to protect the inferior classes of inhabitants;—in short, that government have no other end in view than the general welfare and prosperity of the country, by affording mutual justice, and supporting the proper degree of rank and situation of all description of persons residing within their limits. Nothing, however, will contribute to relieve their minds so much, as the conviction that government intend to form a permanent settlement with them; and without this belief, and that they are to enjoy the fruits of their labours, they will never heartily attend to the population and improvement of their districts.

I have already stated my opinion on this point, and that the principles of the present Bengal settlement, with the subsidiary regulations, are so excellent, that it may be safely taken as a model on this coast. Particular modifications, which local differences may require to be adopted, must hereafter be pointed out by the collectors, when they become well acquainted with the customs existing in different parts of the country. Upon one point, however, I must presume to express a doubt how far it might not be advisable, as a security to the great body of the people, and particularly as the landholders on this coast are not reduced to the same submission, to require their giving fixed leases to the ryots, renewable or descending in perpetuity, specifying the proportion of revenue or share of the crops which the cultivators of every denomination are to receive, free of all superadded demands or claims whatever, which should be duly registered. At present it is well known that the ryots are exposed to great distress, by the frequent practice of exorbitant demands

additional

additional assessments, or by taking their shares of grain at a low rate, and afterwards imposing it on them, at a high valuation.

The reports of the committee of circuit have been taken as the guide in the late settlements with the zemindars; but considering the method observed by them of obtaining information from the accounts delivered by the village curmushs, without, in general, a personal investigation of the different pergunnahs; that no one of the members, or their assistants, had a knowledge of any of the country languages, but was, under the necessity of trusting entirely to native interpreters, to prevent and discover impositions; considering the influence which the zemindars had over every description of the revenue officers and inhabitants; that they even refused, in many instances, to furnish any accounts; and that all were interested in concealing the truth, and under-rating their lands; considering the counteractions used by those people, the habits of rapacity and deception of the public officers, and their probable fabrication of accounts, on many occasions; considering the limited powers of the committee,—that they received but little countenance and support, and met with constant opposition from the chiefships;—I am really of opinion, that their calculations in general must fall short of the actual value of the districts, which indeed the committee acknowledge in respect to Nundegamah, held by Vassareddy and other zemindars. There were, however, men of integrity on the committee, and I have no doubt of the authenticity of their information on many other points, particularly with respect to the produce and manufactures, the imports and exports, the oppression and abuses of the landholders and public officers, the poverty and degraded situation of the inhabitants, the heavy and vexatious inland duties, &c.

However, for want of more accurate documents, which might and ought to have been furnished by the chiefships, the last assessments, particularly in the three circars of Rajahmundry, Ellore, and Condapillee, under Masulipatam, were formed upon the principle of requiring two-thirds of the gross revenue, as estimated by the committee of circuit; and allowing the remaining third to the zemindar, for charges of collection and his own expenses. The same rule has since been adopted with regard to the Guntoor circar, and it is perhaps a more moderate assessment in general, than the jumma fixed in Bengal.

But in the Chicacole circar, this regulation or proportion of the revenue has not been observed. Vizieram Rauze, the most considerable zemindar on the coast, is scarcely assessed more than one-third; and until a few years ago, he did not pay to government the proportion of one-fifth of the gross collections of the countries under him, though there is the most indubitable evidence that, by means of intrigue and oppression, and often without any public sanction, the districts of several zemindars of much more ancient family, have been annexed to his authority, besides a considerable part of the havelly or government lands. The conduct of Vizieram Rauze, for some years past, gives him no claim to indulgence; and should government be compelled, by continued acts of disobedience and mismanagement, to divest him of his authority, they will have an opportunity of doing justice to several ancient families, and of obtaining a considerable increase of revenue. From the circumstances stated by the committee of circuit, it would appear that, on an average, the other two zemindaries (Kinnedy and Teekuly), in the Cossimcotah division of the Chicacole circar, are assessed about one-third of the gross collections. These two zemindars, and perhaps a few others in this Circar, are, I believe, the only persons subject to the company's government who have descended from the ancient rajah families. It would appear that most of the ancestors of the other zemindars, have acquired possession within the present century.

In the Ichapour division under Ganjam, the committee of circuit often proceeded upon conjecture or private information, as several zemindars refused or declined to furnish any accounts for their inspection. It may be supposed that the zemindars in general, or upon an average, pay to government about the same proportion, that is, one-third of the gross revenue. But the zemindaries are of small extent, and many, very difficult of access, from their hilly and frontier situations. The whole stipulated annual jumma, with about twenty zemindars in this district, amounts only to about lacs of rupees; but though there may be motives of policy in assessing many of them at a moderate rate, I imagine the same reasons cannot be urged for fixing the jumma of Vizieram Rauze, in a proportion so unequal to what is settled with the zemindars in the other four Circars.

I am decidedly of opinion that Vizieram Rauze ought, upon every principle of reason and justice, to pay to government as large a portion of his revenue, as any zemindar subject to the company's authority on this coast; and upon this footing, he will still have a very considerable residue for his own expenses, without great misapplication and profusion. The reduction of his numerous armed peons, and the separation of the small zemindaries now dependent on his authority, would effectually check his overgrown power, and prove essential to the proper regulation of the country. It must appear extraordinary, and is a strong proof against the present system, that so inadequate a revenue has not been realized, without balances striking, and frequently employing an armed force for the purpose; and, what is more to be lamented, the inhabitants were suffering the most cruel oppressions under Sitteram Rauze's management. In short, it must appear that this province, in common with the other northern Circars, has suffered a material decline in trade, manufactures, and population; though, if a proper management had been observed within the last 25 years, the country must have afforded nearly double the revenue actually realized, without the least oppression. But with the exception of the late Codant Row of Tallapillee, and Mahapetty Row of Potapore, I have not heard of any zemindars who pay a proper attention to the cultivation and improvement of their districts. They trust to managers, from whom as little good can be expected as from a Madras dubai, if allowed by any collector to interfere with



with the revenue. The usual mode of proceeding has been, for the zemindars or their vackeels to attend at the chiefship to negotiate the future settlement; and conditions being agreed upon, the whole junto of zemindars, renters, dubashes, interpreters, cutcherry servants, and inferior oppressors, form a league, without fear or remorse, against the devoted inhabitants. It does not appear that the provincial councils have attempted any interference, and consequently they could have very little experience of the interior management and detail of the collections in the zemindaries, which, added to their distant and stationary situation, must in a manner disqualify them, from judging with accuracy and precision of the real condition of the districts, or from what particular sources the revenues have arisen.

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The principle of equal assessment should on every account be observed, as far as circumstances will admit; and upon adopting any future settlement, especially upon a plan of permanency, it must become a serious question, how far the reports of the committee of circuit should be relied on or taken as a guide, in respect to the valuation of the lands. In the present state of the country and diminished population, and from other local causes, it is impossible to prepare any standard, as a future assessment, or at least as a permanent jumma; but in those districts where the famine has raged in a greater degree, it may be necessary to allow a temporary abatement, and not to increase the present stipulated revenue for the next five or seven years, upon the expiration of existing leases. The Chicacole circar has suffered less from the drought; and an increase of revenue may and ought to be expected within that time, nearer to the proportion fixed with the zemindars in the other four Circars. The deficiency of population, under a proper mode of management, might soon be replaced, as many inhabitants would be induced to leave the neighbouring districts subject to the Nizam and other unsettled governments, if they were once encouraged by protection; and granting such privileges, as have been allowed in many parts of the country to new settlers. In case of any remission for the past or future abatement being allowed of the present revenue, it will be necessary to act with caution and a due consideration to the particular state of the districts. During the most unfavourable seasons, the country gives crops of dry grain, and if the tanks were in good condition, the inhabitants ought not, with proper care, to be exposed to any severe calamities from the drought of one year; and as the cultivators get an advanced rate for their grain, they are enabled to pay their kists to the zemindar. The burden in this case, falls upon the manufacturers and other classes, who for one year are better able to support it; but this calculation supposes that the ryots and cultivators receive their proper share, and are allowed to dispose of it, without restrictions.

A temporary drought or failure of a third or even half of the usual harvest for a year, ought not to be productive, as at present, of a famine, and claim to remissions. Such a scarcity, is generally a source of profit to the zemindars and others, by the increased price of grain; and they are better enabled to pay the revenue, than in ordinary years. It is therefore extremely difficult, and indeed impossible, without the minutest knowledge and inspection, to ascertain the amount of remissions which should be allowed from the want of rain, and in what proportion, to the different zemindars. I would ask, how a chief and council stationed at Masulipatam, without a competent knowledge of what is passing in the many zemindaries under them, can regulate the proportion, or take effectual measures for securing to the ryots the benefit of such indulgencies? Even under a vigilant collector residing on the spot, and distributing the proportion with his own hands to each village, there would be some abuses practised. The extent, however, of the late famine was such, and its effects so dreadful to the population of some parts of the country, during three successive seasons, that it may become highly expedient to adopt some mode of relief for the inhabitants, and that they should benefit, by any abatement allowed. It would be a great delusion to suppose that the zemindars in general will not exact their usual demands, without an effectual interference to prevent them; and in excuse, they may plead the present uncertain state and apprehension of being called upon for the full payment of their kists. Where collectors are stationed in the districts, government may, in times of great scarcity, declare a remission of the public revenue to the zemindars, directing them to remit an equal proportion to the ryots, and that any deviation will be attended with a heavy fine or expulsion. If this mode cannot be adopted, the collectors should at all events prevent exorbitant prices for grain; and a reasonable deduction ought to be allowed to the land-holders.

Under present circumstances, it is difficult to determine what measures to adopt.—If the full amount of the zemindar's engagements be required, under plea that he has not relaxed in his demands, and that the high price of grain has enabled him to make good his kists, he will consider it a tacit sanction for keeping up his demands in future, as well as the prices, to the inhabitants; at the same time, it is well known that during the late famine, the zemindars did actually sell their grain at triple and quadruple the usual rates, and exacted the full duties on all the necessaries of life. But in the present state of the country, it may be better to err on the side of lenity; and though such an example will not perhaps have a material effect on the conduct of the zemindars, yet it will obviate any pretence for future exactions.

As the chief and council at Masulipatam have omitted to report, agreeably to the orders of the board, on the subject of the balances of the preceding years, which they were of opinion could not be realized, I think they should again be called upon to state particularly what steps have been taken by them. Uncertainty with respect to such arrears, or claims of remission, must be attended with inconvenience; for, whatever may be the result, the zemindars will not, until they know the decision, relax in their demands.

The present zemindary cowlas in the Chicacole circar, are granted only for one year; but the agreements with the zemindars in the other four northern provinces, are for the period



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of five years, and expire in September 1794. The next leases should tend to a permanent arrangement, and to the expectation of such a revenue as the country will be capable of affording to government. I am convinced it may be greatly increased in the event of there being no war or famine, and that the districts are placed under a proper system of management. As it will be satisfactory to have the most accurate information that can be obtained without inconvenience to the inhabitants, the collectors should be directed to exert themselves in furnishing every useful document, with their observations.

In the Bara mahal, Salem, Dindigul, and Nagore districts, and such havelly lands to the northward, as have suffered less by the effects of war, famine, or rapacious renters, it might be eligible to take the first opportunity of settling for a long period for a permanent arrangement with the inhabitants. A thousand advantages must result from a plan of permanency, not only by exciting the people to improvements, but by enabling government to effect a reduction of the revenue officers, by rendering those employed of some use, instead of a burden on the inhabitants; by reducing in general, the charges of collection; by ensuring regular payments; by rendering the revenue accounts more simple; and, above all, by putting a stop to intrigue and corrupt practices.—Under the present system, and from a total ignorance of the country languages, it appears to me that, with the exception of a few instances, the management of the company's revenue has, in a great measure, been committed to dubashes and their creatures.

Wherever this pernicious influence has prevailed, an evident collusion may be perceived between them and the native revenue officers. It is to be apprehended their whole drift has been, to conceal the real state of the revenue from the company's servants employed, to levy undue advantages, by the payment of large bribes, or stipulating for private assessments amounting to a considerable per-centage on the public settlement, under various pleas and promises of indulgence. As far as relates to the concealment of the real produce of the lands, and fabricating false accounts, the landholders and ryots had a material interest in the connivance of the revenue officers. But if the tricks and deceptions of these people be such, that the most vigilant, able, and upright European, with every advantage of experience and knowledge of the languages, cannot entirely guard against their dishonest practices, I would not attempt any description of the abuses that must be felt, where the company's servants are deficient in those points, and wanting in zeal and other qualifications.

With respect to the other possessions of the company at the southward, (the Jaghire, including the home farms, and lands under the resident at Cuddalore,) which suffered considerably by the former war, it might be necessary to postpone any agreement for a permanent settlement, until they have recovered their former population. Agreements, however, may be made with the inhabitants for five or seven years, renewable at a proper rent; and, in about the space of 15 or 20 years, a perpetual assessment may be determined. Similar leases may be granted in the havelly lands in the Circars, which have suffered much from the late famine and other causes. It has been represented that, from mismanagement and the oppression of renters, the inhabitants are reduced to such poverty in many parts of the havelly villages, as to be incapable of renting the land; but their present state of wretchedness, must I think prove the impropriety of trusting any longer to intermediate renters.

As the southern and western poligars belonging to the Carnatic are, in consequence of the late treaty with the nabob, to pay their peshcuch directly to the company, it may be supposed that they will conduct themselves differently from what has been their former practice, not only in respect to the regularity of their payments, but in laying aside their plundering schemes, and attending to the improvement of their lands. Many of them possess the most fertile countries, and in general, by no means difficult of access, but they are very inadequately assessed, in proportion to any other persons paying revenue to the company. There may be good reasons at present, for not demanding any increase; but as in general, their present stipulated revenue does not perhaps exceed  $\frac{1}{4}$ , and in some instances,  $\frac{1}{6}$  or  $\frac{1}{8}$  part of their gross collections, it may hereafter appear necessary to require an augmentation, as, in justice to the public and individuals, the principle of equal assessment should be observed among all the dependants of the same government. It is well known, that while they paid their peshcuch to the nabob, the poligars were constantly obliged to pay considerable nuzzers and other extra demands, far exceeding the fixed kists. It was the policy of the durbar to adopt this mode of assessing them, in preference to an open, fair, and acknowledged revenue.

Among the many humane, liberal, and wise regulations adopted in the Bengal provinces by the present Governor General, those for constructing new works, and keeping the former in repair for the supply of water, are very important, and worthy of being followed on this coast. If such works, (of which there is not, I believe, a single instance since the establishment of the company's administration on the coast,) had been executed in Circars previous to the late famine, a great part of the inhabitants who have perished within the last three years, might without doubt, have been preserved. It is not less remarkable, that the tanks and watercourses in the southern districts, have been suffered to fall into a most ruinous condition. For example, the company's Jaghire, which abounds with works of this kind, and formed at a vast expense under the country governments, had no substantial repair, for the last 30 or 40 years. It often happens, therefore, that even the blessings of Providence are attended with ruinous consequences to the inhabitants; for we have had experience at our own doors, that in plentiful seasons the patched and unrepaired banks cannot resist the pressure within, and the great stores of cultivation is lost, which, if preserved with due care, might have served as a store, for one or two years.

Indeed,

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Indeed this district, which formerly was and is still capable, from its soil and situation, of being rendered one of the most fertile spots in India, has within the last ten or twelve years, been the prey either of needy and rapacious renters, or of dishonest dubashes and native revenue officers. After the loss of 2-5ths or  $\frac{1}{3}$  of its inhabitants by the former war, it would ill bear such an accumulation of misfortunes and checks to the recovery of population. The planting of fruit-trees, and of other descriptions in the villages, so useful to the inhabitants, and advantageous to government, has been totally neglected by the renters; although the plantations were almost entirely destroyed by the enemy and our own troops during that war. By the exertions of Mr. Clerk and Mr. Balfour, a more adequate revenue has lately been settled with the inhabitants, for three years. But, without an effectual repair of the tanks and watercourses, this valuable district cannot be restored to its former state of prosperity. The appropriation of one year's receipts, would probably effect this object completely; and I am convinced that, at the end of the present leases, the country would afford a material increase of revenue, and in a few years, more than double the present assessment. I am of opinion that this measure ought to be recommended to the immediate attention of government.

The last war commenced by Hyder Ally occasioned so great an increase of expense, and left such heavy incumbrances, that government have seldom had it in their power to spare any considerable part of their resources for useful purposes; and the same reasons must, I imagine, have operated in preventing any attempt for altering the present inconvenient mode of managing the revenue, and correcting many evils experienced under it, from an apprehension of incurring any additional expense, or any temporary diminution of the collections. But, for my own part, I cannot perceive its policy, independent of the injustice of sacrificing the ease and comfort of the inhabitants to such considerations. It is now to be hoped that the late treaty with Tippoo, terminated in a mode and under circumstances, as honourable as the former were humiliating, will produce a long peace. Indeed, the effect it has already produced with respect to public credit in this country, is obvious.

In the execution of so important a work as the repairs of the tanks, it will be necessary to proceed upon the best information, and under proper checks to guard against collusion and abuse in the expenditure of the company's money. The head inhabitants, who are the present renters in the Jaghire, might, in the first instance, be called upon to deliver in to the collectors an account of the tanks, wells, and watercourses in their respective villages, describing their nature and extent, with their exact measurement, and the work requisite to their complete repair, with an estimate of the expense; also the grounds at present watered from each tank, and what would be the additional cultivation when the tanks are repaired, with a list of the inhabitants in each village; after which, the collectors might proceed, or some professional persons, to examine and deliver a report of the repairs necessary, with an estimate of the expense of each tank, and their observations thereon, and within what period the work can be completed, without interruption to the cultivation of the country.

The chiefs and councils and residents should be directed to report the state of the tanks in the government lands in the Circars and to the southward, where others are wanted, and could with advantage be constructed. A similar report should also be required with respect to the tanks in the zemindary lands; and as the zemindars will seldom commence such works, or at least, not until a permanent settlement is made with them, they should be undertaken by government, and their lands held responsible for the amount advanced. It appears by the reports of the committee of circuit, that several of the districts in the Chicacole circar, are watered by small rivers issuing from the adjacent hills, and that some parts of the zemindaries under Masulipatam are supplied by small channels from the Godavery and Kistnah. But it is a melancholy truth, that, with so many natural advantages, large quantities of rice are annually imported for the consumption of Masulipatam.

The survey lately ordered by government, of the rivers Kistnah and Godavery, is a circumstance which must afford the highest satisfaction to every person who feels a wish for the prosperity of the country. With the supplies furnished by means of canals from these sources, and the further advantage of tanks in proper situations, the Circars will scarcely be liable, from a failure of the periodical rains, to any material want of water for the purpose of cultivation. The expense will, I imagine, be of little consideration, even should it appear necessary to sink a large portion of the current revenue for two or three years. It is a matter that deeply affects not only the comfort, but the preservation of the inhabitants, from whose labour the funds of government are wholly supplied, and whose industry is the source of every public and private benefit.

As no measures have been adopted by government or the principal landholders, to prevent the dreadful effects of famine, by providing storehouses of grain, the inhabitants on this coast have no other dependence for their preservation in times of scarcity, than from Bengal supplies, or the scanty stores of those persons who may have kept up their grain for the sake of great profit. The prices, however, are so high on those occasions, that it is not within the reach of the poorer people to purchase it, as they have unhappily experienced, during the last three years in the Circars. It therefore becomes necessary to guard against the consequences of failures of the periodical rains, by providing reservoirs of water, and by preventing oppressive duties being levied on grain and provisions. Here, I cannot omit repeating, that there are the strongest reasons to believe the zemindars, during the distress of the inhabitants, not only collected to the amount of their usual assessments, but levied the inland taxes on the grain imported, even on the supplies sent by government, for the preservation of the lower class natives.

The precautions lately adopted by this board, should be observed, with such others as may appear more effectual to prevent abuses in the expenditure and execution of the

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pairs to the tanks, &c. A daily or weekly account of the number of persons employed on such works, specifying the rates of their wages, with a statement of the work done, signed by the native officers, the agents of the collectors, and a certain number of head inhabitants, should be kept as a necessary voucher, and a copy of it, should be sent to the nearest entcherry for general inspection. The mode hitherto observed of receiving and transmitting an account attested by two or three revenue officers only, does not appear to me to be an adequate check.

It may be proper in future leases, unless any material embarrassment is apprehended from it, to insert a reservation with respect to waste or particular lands, in order that government may have it in their power to encourage improvements in manufactures and agriculture. Independent of the natural timidity of the people, and their want of enterprise, arising from the nature of the government, and the uncertainty of possessing any acquired advantages, the natives on this coast, and particularly in the Circars, have been reduced to great poverty, by a long series of hardships. It cannot therefore be supposed, that under the best administration, they will be inclined or have the means for some time, to venture on speculative pursuits; and as the principal landholders will be too apt to increase their demands of rent, when they find that Europeans are engaging in undertakings of this kind, it should be the care of this board to prevent their exacting unreasonable rates, for ground actually appropriated to plantations of the sugar cane, mulberry tree, indigo, cotton or other valuable articles produced on this coast, and which with moderate encouragement, might be carried to a great extent. In short, the country extending from Cape Comorin to Ganjam, enjoys so many natural advantages of situation and climate, and so rapid a progress of vegetation, that innumerable sources of industry and wealth might be introduced in the way of produce and manufacture, but the system which has pervaded this coast, is deficient in those principles which ensure prosperity, and indeed carries on its face, the most evident defects; separate interests, and a divided authority, with all the disadvantages of want of energy, regulation, and good management.

In the Minute before alluded to, I mentioned generally the great hardships experienced by the poorer classes of people, from the low and fluctuating value of the copper coinage. In the Circars, the usual daily pay of a labourer has been, I understand, for a length of time, at the rate of 6 dubs; but the exchange, which not long ago was about 192 dubs for a Madras pagoda, has within these few years, fell so low as 330 and 360. If the poor labourer was paid in silver, it would not perhaps affect him; but the landholders and inferior tenants, who under the present system seldom think of future benefit and the safety of the people, take care to pay him in copper only; and indeed, such is the wretchedness of the poor ryots, that they would often be unable to subsist themselves and families for a few days until their wages amounted to any current silver coin in use.

By the present low value of the copper currency, and the tricks of soucars in altering the exchange, the poor cultivators and manufacturers are defrauded of a great part of their daily labour; and it is equally evident that their 6 dubs, at the present rate of exchange and high price of provisions, will not procure them half the subsistence and means of support, which were enjoyed by their ancestors. There can be little doubt but this evil has operated in a material degree, to depopulate the country, particularly during the late famine and exorbitant prices of grain; and I am of opinion it should be recommended to government, to remedy the grievance without delay.

It perhaps can only be effected, by calling in the present coin, and issuing a different copper currency; prohibiting within the company's limits, the dubs coined by the Dutch, and every other sort. I conceive the want of smaller silver coins (there being none of a less value than quarter rupee), may be one cause of the present inconvenience, as silver cannot fluctuate in value, in the same proportion as copper. At Madras, the price of copper continually varies; but having small silver coins, the copper currency always passes at the rate of eight doodies for a single fanam.

In addition to the inconvenience felt from the low value of the dubs, it is well known that the shroffs and other natives, raise or lower the exchange by improper combinations, varying it at times ten or fifteen per cent. in the course of a few days. Within these few years, it has generally been estimated upwards of twenty fanams per rupee; and as four dubs are nominally reckoned one fanam, and four rupees one Madras pagoda, the exchange of dubs is 320 per pagoda, at the rate of twenty fanams per rupee. Not many years ago, it was usual to calculate twelve fanams (which is a nominal coin in the Circars) or forty-eight dubs per rupee, or 192 dubs per Madras pagoda, which is the present rated exchange in the company's books; and I do not perceive that any benefit can arise from the alteration, except to renters, shroffs, &c. Whether the chief and council have taken any steps to remedy the abuses of the shroffs, I know not; but without a strong interference, it cannot be expected that such people will relinquish an unjust advantage.

Justice to the gentlemen in general at the subordinate settlements, it must be observed, they seem sensible of the necessity of some regulations respecting the copper coin. The Madras board have persevered, however, in the opinion, that no change should be attempted; but upon no better grounds than that the company might be subject to a loss in calling in the present currency, and because the demand for their copper might be increased, as the merchants carrying on the inland trade frequently have it coined into small pieces to save the duties. I trust such narrow and limited views of mercantile profit will not be suffered to supersede the enlarged intentions of affording relief to the people, and promoting the general interests of the country.

These objections are perhaps to be obviated; but admitting them entirely, and viewing the measure as a matter of profit or traffic, and that the lives of the people are no more to be

be considered than goods to be disposed of from the warehouses, it appears to me that the advantages of preserving the population must be infinitely greater than any gain upon a single article of trade, which is not sold in any considerable quantities in the Circars, on account of the company: at present, it must appear that the daily hire of the poor labourer is insufficient to save himself and family from perishing, even if provisions could be procured at cheaper rates.

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With respect to the first-mentioned objection, I should imagine the loss to the company would not be considerable; and as to the latter, it might, if not thought incompatible, be obviated, by still allowing the former coin of dubs for exportation, upon application from the inland merchants, though their currency be prohibited within the company's districts. But as the present government have considered the subject upon more benevolent, just, and liberal grounds, I make no doubt of their acquiescence, upon a recommendation from this board, to call in the dubs in circulation, and to substitute a different coin at a fixed exchange, with a distinguishing mark.

The heavy and increased duties collected at the different chokies on salt manufactured in the Circars, have materially affected the trade in the article, carried on by the Benjaries and other merchants. The revenue as well as the inland trade with the neighbouring countries, has suffered in consequence; and while the embargo on coast salt is continued at Bengal, there appears a greater necessity for some early relief, by abolishing or reducing the number of such exactions. Independent of the immediate advantages derived to the revenue from the interior trade, it has been the policy of the country governments to encourage an intercourse with the Benjaries, from a view to their services in times of war, in furnishing cattle and provisions. In seasons of scarcity, they often contribute to alleviate the distresses of the inhabitants, by supplies of grain and other articles. At present, many of the zemindaries, though not far remote from the coast, have no trade whatever, and only a few manufactures for internal use. These useful traders, not only experience heavy impositions upon their returns with salt, but are obliged to pay such exorbitant duties on their goods, in the different zemindaries through which they must necessarily pass, that the greatest part of their profits are absorbed.

The article of cotton being so heavily burdened, must of course enhance the prices of those manufactures, which form the principal branch of the commerce, as well as the company's investment, on this coast. An account of the exactions levied on this raw material in the different zemindaries, should be called for, without loss of time; and as it must appear both just and necessary to afford every relief to those manufacturers who have survived the late calamity, I am of opinion that it might be recommended to government to lessen the taxes, or to allow the free importation of this valuable article. Besides the present heavy impositions on the inland trade, it would appear there is an arbitrary custom in the zemindaries, of granting to particular individuals an exclusive privilege of selling cotton, which must also have the bad consequence of advancing the price to the weavers. Cotton thread brought by the Benjaries, should likewise be exempted from the present heavy duties. The mortality occasioned by the famine, has fallen very heavily upon the class of spinners as well as weavers, and all possible encouragement should be given to the people of those useful professions; without which, they cannot recover their former situations, and the manufactures must long languish, in a proportionate degree.

It is of much importance to restore to its former prosperity this inland trade, which has been nearly abandoned; and for this purpose it should, I think, be recommended to government to permit this board to submit to them a plan for limiting the number, and prescribing specific rates of duties, which may be done, I conceive, without any diminution of the revenue, as far as relates to the trade of the Benjaries. Every zemindar is now at liberty to levy whatever duties, and to vary them as he pleases. After the institution of courts of justice, I make no doubt similar regulations to those established in Bengal, respecting the weavers and manufacturers, will be adopted on the coast.

The abolition, in whole or part, of the internal duties, upon the principle of the Bengal Regulations, will hereafter be considered; and such as are continued, should be distinct from the jumma, and of course resumed by government. It may not be advisable to adopt this measure immediately in its fullest extent, but it will become more necessary, on the establishment of any plan of permanency with respect to the landed revenue, not only with the view of preventing abuses, but to bring additional resources into the public treasury, from an increase of produce, manufactures, commerce, and consumption. An entire stop should also be put to the practice of allowing one zemindar to collect fees or rassoons in the districts of other zemindars, as it has been one cause of keeping up the dissensions, disputes, and jealousies so frequent among them, and so prejudicial to the inhabitants and to the cultivation.

The department of sea customs at the presidency, and the different parts on the coast, appears to require some reform. The duties on Bengal and coast articles are abolished; as all other imports, as well as goods exported, are liable to the payment of customs. Merchants are still subject to vexatious delays, by their goods passing the usual examination; and as the same establishment of native servants is kept up, it will be difficult to prevent impositions. The fees to the sea customers at the presidency are fixed; but those at the different stations, and which vary from each other, have never been sanctioned by this board. Besides the fees to the sea customers, there are others which merchants are required to pay to the native servants, and for charities under different denominations. It might be proper for this board to call for a list of the fees, as well as the duties of every description collected or demanded at each station, and such as are approved should be inserted in a register to be constantly kept for general inspection in some public part of the

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the sea customer's office. If any indulgences or exemptions be allowed to particular merchants, they should be stated. As the anchorage fees and river duties on vessels produce a trifling income to the company, and are inconvenient to the merchants and owners of the small coasting craft, it may appear proper to recommend their abolition. I observe they were abolished in Ganjam, by orders from this board, in December 1788.

It is to be lamented that no maps or surveys of the districts are to be procured. Had the chiefs and councils bestowed a few of their leisure hours for the purpose, or if they had employed the talents of others which occasionally offered, they might have ascertained the geography of their own limits, with little difficulty. But I do not recollect hearing that any gentleman in the provincial councils had ever visited the zemindaries under their respective charge, unless for some hostile purpose of punishing refractory dependants, or enforcing payment of arrears. Who among them, has even made a tour to enquire into the real value of the lands, to ascertain what improvements could be introduced with respect to manufactures and agriculture, to redress grievances, or to relieve the inhabitants from oppressions, and the effects of famine? It is to be hoped, when a change takes place, that the collectors will employ themselves in such useful enquiries, and in visiting the different parts of the districts under them, for the purpose of observing the conduct of the zemindars, for affording relief to the inhabitants, and preserving order and good government.

Under the present system, every useful object appears to have been overlooked; and besides so many other defects already noticed, it is without any defined responsibility. A great part of the business is transacted by the chief alone; and the council receive his report of all personal interviews with the zemindars and others, which could not fail of producing inconvenience. The arguments used in the late suit against Mr. Floyer, are in proof on this point, as his solicitors endeavoured to show that he could not be individually answerable for any act, which had the sanction of the Masulipatam board; and that the responsibility must rest with them, and with him jointly as chief. This kind of reasoning has been urged on other occasions, according as it suited the parties concerned, and must often have been the cause of embarrassment, in discriminating on whom to fix the greater or less degree of blame. It seems a further proof in favour of an undivided authority in the detail of the collections, and the appointment of collectors.

It appears, however, to me, that no one circumstance has contributed more to irregularity, than the small salaries granted to persons in such situations. Until a few years ago, the allowed emoluments of the chief of Masulipatam amounted only to about 400 rupees per month; and to this time, the members of the provincial boards are without any allowance, and prohibited from trade, but permitted to hold different employments, such as export and import warehouse-keepers, sea customers, &c. which produce a very trifling emolument. While men were vested with a considerable trust, and so inadequately paid, with various temptations around them, few would refrain from improper channels of gaining advantages, and still fewer, who would exert themselves with zeal and ardour for the prosperity of the country. Under such a system, considerable fortunes were acquired by the chiefs, dubashes and others, and the zemindars were left without any controul; but the public revenue suffered materially, and the inhabitants could find no protection against oppression. One irregularity produces another; and the evil had taken such deep root, that it could be no easy matter for any administration to put a stop to the prevailing example of preferring private interests, in opposition to useful institutions, and objects of public advantage.

If the collectors execute their trust with attention and fidelity, it will soon give a new face to the whole country, and put an end in a great measure to those calamities, of which there have been so many instances. But I am not so sanguine as to suppose that essential benefits will arise from the best arrangements, without men of integrity and experience are employed. Upon adopting the plan of collectors, many of the servants will without doubt conceive that they possess the necessary qualifications, excepting a knowledge of the languages; but this last is so requisite, that they cannot completely discharge their duty without it;—whatever may be their good intentions, they will be constantly liable to impositions; and I am really of opinion, that no permanent settlement of any district should be made, without being minutely investigated by a collector of tried integrity and industry, after a residence of a few years in it, and who possesses some knowledge of the language and of the customs of the people. Intrigue and counteraction were the only means of defence which the natives could have under a tyrannical government, and those habits will not easily be corrected under the best administration.

It becomes requisite, therefore, that the collectors should be able to speak without the intervention of a dubash. In Bengal, every European soon understands something of the Hindostany, and in consequence, the company's servants acquire more knowledge of the country, of the revenue, and of the manners of the natives, in two or three years, than they can in the coast, in ten years, or during their whole residence in India. It is unnecessary for me to say more in respect to the beneficial influence it would have, in the management of the revenue; but until some farther encouragement be held out, or a declaration be made that no person will be eligible to a revenue appointment, who is not qualified in one or more of the country languages, I despair of any great progress being made, for some time. As there is not, I believe, any dictionary of the Gentoo language, a suitable reward might be offered for the compilation of a proper work of this description, with such other materials as might be useful to learners. Upon the institution of courts of justice, a knowledge of the languages will become more indispensably requisite.

The Honourable Court of Directors, in their letter of the 10th of June 1792, and in subsequent letters, of which were transmitted to the Board of Revenue, direct that a plan should be prepared for the administration of their revenue on this coast. It was found difficult,



difficult, perhaps, to offer any general plan for a permanent settlement; which has been increased, I conceive, by the depopulating effects of the late famine in the Circars. But whatever might have been the difficulty in this respect, it ought not to prevent any member of the board from pointing out any defects in the present system, or proposing some mode of relief to the inhabitants, by the institution of courts of justice, by the abolition of oppressive demands, and by establishing one uniform system, which might be productive of subordination and tranquillity in the country. I have therefore thought it my duty to offer some remarks on this occasion, which I am sensible can only be considered as a general view or outline of the company's revenue; but they may lead to a further detail or other suggestions towards completing a future plan, of more efficacy than the present system. Should it appear that I have been mistaken or misinformed on any point, I can only say that I have acted to the best of my judgment, and that I can at least lay claim to the indulgence of the board, for offering a disinterested opinion.

I will only add, that the present appears a proper time for offering any proposition of improvement, or that may be of any public utility, as this board can depend upon its meeting with support, or at least a suitable attention from the honourable the Governor in Council; and if recommended by him to the honourable the Court of Directors, there can be little doubt of their confirmation.

(Signed)

C. N. WHITE.

Mr. White's Motion  
25 March 1791.

## Appendix, No. 15.

### INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO COLLECTORS UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF FORT ST. GEORGE DATED IN JUNE 1791.

Extract FORT ST. GEORGE Revenue Consultations, the 24th June 1791.

**R**EAD the following letter from the Board of Revenue, with Draft of Regulations for the different Collectors.

To the Hon. Major Gen. Medows, Governor in Council.

Hon. Sir,

Under date the 10th February last, we had the honor to submit for your approbation, a code of regulations for the conduct of the board of revenue, and which you were pleased to sanction with your concurrence.

We have since drafted another set of regulations, for the guidance of the several collectors employed under this board, having selected such part of them as appeared to us applicable to circumstances on this coast, and modified, and introduced others, so as to form a system, which, properly supported, will be adequate, we hope, to the purposes of benefit to the revenue as well as justice and security to the inhabitants. Copy of these Regulations are now submitted for your approval and confirmation.

We have the honour, &c.

(Signed)

J<sup>r</sup> Hudleston, T. Oakes, Geo. Moubray.

Fort St. George, 21st June 1791.

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issued to Collectors  
under the Government  
of Fort St. George  
in June 1791.

#### REGULATIONS FOR THE COLLECTORS.

Para. 1. That all proceedings or orders held or issued by the collector in the revenue department, shall be duly recorded at the time, and a diary of them to be transmitted monthly.

2. That all acts and proceedings of the collector must be done and held publicly.

3. That the collector shall not refer any complaints preferred by ryots against a renter, or other person employed under him, to such renter, or person complained against, for redress; but shall hear, examine, and decide them himself, and if well founded, shall compel the party committing the injury, to afford redress; and if the complaint should be proved to be litigious and ill-founded, he should punish such complainant according to his or her sex, rank and circumstances, and to the degree of the injury to the party complained against, by compelling the complainant to make suitable reparation to the latter, or by confinement of his person.

4. That the collector be nevertheless authorized to refer trifling complaints between ryots or of ryots against inferior officers in the collections, to the renter, or head officer stationed at part of the renter in the district; but that he observe it as an invariable rule, to require exact from the person to whom such reference is made, a regular return to the collector, under his signature, and that of one or more of the principal officers of the cutcherry, or the pergunnah. The return to become a record on his proceedings.

5. That all summons requiring the appearance of any persons, in matters relating to revenues, be in writing, under the signature of the collector, or of his assistant, and the approbation of the collector, and official seal. This rule is not meant to extend to the case of persons on the spot, in the course of daily or official attendance.

6. That in no instance, the number of persons serving the summons, shall exceed two.

7. That in case of neglect, or refusal to obey the summons, the persons guilty of such neglect or refusal shall be required to answer for their conduct, and suffer a punishment according



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according to the degree of the offence, either by fine, not exceeding in any instance the sum of fifty star pagodas; or by imprisonment, not to extend beyond the term of one month.

8. That a time be limited for the serving and return of the summons, and to be endorsed upon it.

9. That the fees of the peons shall in no instance exceed one fanam a day for each man, which is to be in full of every allowance whatever to him, and the collector to punish immediately, in an exemplary manner, every act of extortion in the peons employed.

10. That the collectors be in every case, strictly prohibited from making use of the agency of their private servants, whether dubashes, mautsedies, and others, in the discharge of any part of their public duty; it being expected and required, that in all cases they shall themselves stand forth, and act as the only empowered agents of government in their several stations.

11. That the appointment and dismissal of the inferior public servants, be vested in the collectors respectively, with this proviso, that they transmit regular lists of the names of those they shall so prefer, to the board of revenue, and give notice of all subsequent dismissals and appointments, and employ none but such public and registered officers, in any respect in their official capacity, nor on any plea or pretext confer on any such public officer or servant, any private or personal trust, in regard to their personal concerns, or *vice versa*.

12. That the personal attendance of any zemindar or renter, or other person entrusted with the collections, be not insisted upon, where the attendance of a vakeel on their part, may be sufficient for the business required; every vakeel attending the collector's cutcherry is previously to deliver a written authority properly authenticated.

13. That every demand for rent, according to the kistbundy, be made in writing, under the signature of the collector and his official seal. The amount demanded to be specified.

14. That every collector be required to give monthly receipts for all payments of revenue into his treasury, specifying the dates on which the money was received, if at different periods, and the species thereof; and that he keep a register of such receipts, regularly numbered in his records under his signature, to be transmitted monthly to the board of revenue; and that he require of all zemindars, farmers and renters, to give receipts to their under renters, for the sums received by them.

15. That for the purpose of enforcing the payment of the collections, mahsouly peons shall be employed as little as possible; but when indisputably necessary, that no greater number of peons than two be placed over any renter.

16. That the collector, in case of the neglect of any renter in making good his kists, be authorized to put him into confinement, and in case a sum equal to one-third of the kist, be not discharged within fifteen days, to keep him in confinement until the whole is discharged, and to take his farm from him. With regard to zemindars who are in arrear of their kists, the collector is authorized to take such steps as may have been in use hitherto, to oblige them to make good their payments, but not to sequester their zemindari, until leave is previously obtained for the purpose, from the board of revenue. That in the former case with regard to renters, the collectors do take precautions to prevent any inconvenience or loss of revenue by the confinement of such renter, by investing the peschar or principal servant of such renter, with the temporary management of the collections, or by the appointment of an aumeen for this purpose; and in that case, whoever is entrusted with this temporary management, is to collect the settlement made by the renter from the persons under engagement to him; and this is not to make any alteration in the detail of the management, until the renter be absolutely dismissed from his farm.

17. That as cases may, however, occur, in which the payment of the revenue may be protracted or delayed, from accidental causes of necessity, without any fault or neglect of the renter, the collector in such instances be authorized to suspend the rigorous execution of the injunctions in the conclusion of the 16th article, reporting the case to the board of revenue, with the reasons which have induced him to suspend the incasure.

18. During the absence of the collector from his station, the senior assistant on the spot, is to have charge of the business.

19. That monthly receipts for the allowances paid by the collector agreeable to the fixed establishment, be taken by him, and deposited with the public records of his collectorship, and a register kept thereof; and that such receipts be annually, or on his relinquishing his office, transmitted to the presidency, at his option with regard to the time, unless the board of revenue should require the transmission of them, sooner.

20. That no collector, or assistant under him, or any native in the employ of any collector or assistant, shall hold, directly or indirectly, any farm, or be concerned in the revenues of any place under his jurisdiction, either as renter, security or otherwise.

21. That no collector or his assistant, or any native in the employ of any collector or assistant, shall be allowed, either directly or indirectly, to lend money to any renters, or be responsible for the revenues within the bounds of such collector's jurisdiction.

22. That no collector, or his assistant, shall be allowed to exercise or carry on any trade or business in the districts placed under his authority.

23. That whenever any aumeens are appointed by the collectors, the charges thereof shall be defrayed by the person or parties on whose account they are sent; or if to superintend the revenues, at the expense of the renters. That where aumeens are deputed for any

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any local investigation, or other purposes admitting a limitation for the execution thereof, a time be limited them, for the performance of the business of their appointment, and that they be not allowed to receive their salary, for any time beyond the limited period.

24. The collector is invariably to report to the board of revenue all such appointments, as soon as made, and the purposes of them.

25. That together with the sunnud or appointment of the aumeen, a statement of such establishment, fixing the expense, be previously settled, and delivered to the aumeen.

26. The collector to ascertain the rate of interest paid by the ryots on sums borrowed, and where excessive, to cause a due limitation thereof, reporting the same.

27. That the collector do give the most unremitted attention to ascertain the rules and rates of assessments on the ryots under his jurisdiction, and endeavour to fix upon some mode by which they may be regulated, on general, fair, and ascertained principles.

28. That he take care to collect all the records and accounts of his collectorship, and preserve them, as complete as possible.

29. That no collector publish any proclamation or order which may in any shape affect our intercourse with foreign nations, or the general constitution of this government, without an express order from the Governor in Council.

30. That in all answers to letters from the board of revenue, the collectors do recapitulate the substance of such letters to which they reply; and when they have occasion to make any remarks or allusions to other papers sent enclosed in the letter, they briefly state such parts of them, as those remarks appertain to.

31. The letters accompanying monthly or annual accounts, to contain nothing more than a recital of those accounts;—all explanations of such accounts, to be inserted at the foot of each account respectively.

32. That no collector shall authorize or suffer any tax or imposition on the renters, or owners of horses, or stop horses from passing, on any pretence whatever, or shall suffer others under his authority, to do either; and shall compel any person under him offending against this rule, to refund the amount of the exaction so taken, and be made answerable for whatever loss the merchant or proprietor of the horse shall have sustained by such detention.

33. That no collector or assistant shall be authorized to possess or occupy ground, or erect any buildings, without previous application to, and the sanction of, the board of revenue.

34. That the board of revenue shall be authorized, in the first instance, to hear and receive appeals in matters of revenue from the decisions of the collectors, and to confirm or rescind the decision, subject however to the revision and ultimate decision of the Governor in Council, in case either party shall think fit to make a further appeal, provided that such ultimate appeal be prepared within one month from the passing of the decision by the board of revenue.

35. That in case of appeal, the decision of the collector shall remain in force, until approved or disapproved by the board of revenue; and in like manner, the decision of the board of revenue, until confirmed or rescinded by the superior board, the collector and board of revenue to have a discretion of suspending the decision, on security given to abide the event of the suit.

36. That the collector do make it an invariable rule to accompany all papers in the country languages with translations thereof.

37. That to provide against the loss of rents and confusion of accounts, from any collector being permitted to resign, it be and it is hereby made a standing rule of the service, that no collector shall be permitted to depart from his station, till either he shall have delivered over complete charge of his trust to his successor, or to his assistant, and until due notification thereof shall have been made to the board of revenue, and their sanction obtained for his departure; and this regulation shall on no account be dispensed with, unless by express permission of the board of revenue, to be separately granted for any particular case that may require it.

38. That all application from the collectors for temporary leave of absence from their stations, shall be made to the board of revenue.

39. That no collector upon any account exceed the fixed or established charges; and that he insert no charge in his treasury account, but such as may be conformable to the fixed establishment, or sanctioned by a special order of the board of revenue, which is in that case to be quoted, with the date of its being issued.

40. That no collector shall be authorized to depute his assistant upon any service for a longer period than ten days, without the express permission of the board of revenue, nor to pay the allowances of any deputation, without obtaining their previous sanction.

41. The collector is strictly enjoined to make no assessment whatever, under the name of nuzzer, saderward, or gram khurch, but what are already established and considered as articles of revenue. Neither is he to impose, on any account whatever, any new tax of taxation upon the ryots; and if hereafter any irregular assessments, under the name of nuzzer, saderward, or gram khurch, batta, &c. or any new taxes whatever, shall be imposed by any renter, the collector, on proof of such extortion, is to decree double amount thereof to the party injured.

42. That no collector shall be authorized to confer grants of lands, or to make alienations, sale, mortgage, or other transfer of landed property, without the sanction of the board of revenue; and that he prevent all alienations, or grants, by zemindars or others under his authority.

43. That no collector be authorized to give any land in farm to any European, or indirectly, or accept the security of any European for any renter.

44. That each collector report to the board of revenue all such unauthorized alienations.

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as may come to his knowledge; and if from the date fixed for the operation of these orders, any other should be made, he do immediately resume them, and keep them for the use of government, reporting such acts of resumption to the board of revenue.

45. That every collector shall attend to the instructions given him by the Accountant to the board of revenue, respecting the nature of the accounts required from him.

46. That no collector do give credit in his treasury account for the amount of any bills or topes, or for any sums but such as have been actually received; and that he shall be held responsible for all sums inserted, as received in his public accounts.

47. That the collector do insert in his treasury account, the amount of all fees, fines, and forfeitures levied by him, agreeable to a specific list thereof, which is to accompany his treasury account; and that he send a monthly register of any deposits he may occasionally receive.

48. That the treasury accounts be invariably accompanied with a register of the monthly vouchers.

49. As the zemindars have at times been suspected of conniving at robberies and murder, or of being parties concerned in such enormities, contrary to their duty, which enjoins them to preserve the peace of the country within the limits of their respective jurisdiction, any zemindars, against whom shall in future be proved his having abetted, practised, or connived at such atrocious offences, will be considered as having forfeited all claim to his zemindary, and be proceeded against accordingly, as government may direct; and all persons who may be found in arms against the company's government, shall be apprehended and sent to the presidency, from thence to be transported for life beyond sea. This resolution is to be notified by every collector, by public proclamation, throughout the district under his charge, and to be communicated by letter to each zemindar under his authority, requiring that the same be published to their dependants of every description, in order that no person may plead ignorance of the punishment denounced against such as are found guilty of the crimes above mentioned.

50. Whenever there shall be any of the honourable company's troops at a revenue station, the commanding officer shall on no account, of his own authority, detach any Sepoys, either singly or in parties, beyond their quarters, upon any service whatever, except at the requisition in writing of the collector of the station at which he is fixed. This order is not to be understood to impede the performance of any customary regimental services or duties.

51. The commanding officer shall not be permitted to punish or confine any person, not appertaining to his command; or any officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, or any private under his command, be permitted to lend or borrow money, nor to take any concern in any farm or securityship, or to sell or to contract to sell any article whatever, either in the district in which he resides, or in any other, or to have any dealings of any kind whatever, with any dewan, zemindar, farmer, ryot, dependant, or officer of the revenue: these orders shall be equally binding upon native officers, and on all the Sepoys and followers of the corps; and the collector is to report any deviation from this regulation that may come to his knowledge.

52. Whenever the collector shall find it necessary to detach any Sepoys for escorts of treasure, or other public duties, he shall make a requisition in writing to the commanding officer, specifying the nature of the service; and the officer shall determine the strength of the detachment, and give his separate orders to the officer commanding such detachment, for the performance of any service in such case as may require it, and no detachment shall be made without a requisition in writing from the collector.

53. That no collector shall be authorized to employ regular troops in the collection of the revenue. Such particular cases as may require the assistance of regulars, must be immediately reported to government.

54. All requisitions and instructions relative to military service, shall be entered by the collector in a separate book, to be kept for that purpose, of which he shall transmit a copy monthly to the board of revenue.

55. That whenever a requisition for Sepoys shall be made by a collector, he shall, within twenty-four hours after such requisition has been made, transmit advice thereof to the board of revenue, assigning the reasons which induced him to make it, that the board may, if the reasons shall not appear to them sufficient, give orders for recalling the detachment, or limit the duration of it.

56. That no batta be ever levied or taken by Sepoys employed on revenue business.

57. That the collectors do pay attention to all references of complaints, and to all applications or requisitions made by the president of the board of revenue, the acting president, or the accountant, for papers or accounts.

That no collector shall be authorized to make any advance on account of tuccavy, without the express sanction of the board of revenue.

The collectors are positively enjoined to collect the cowle aumulmana fees with the first lists of the year, and to remit the amount thereof by bills to the secretary of the board of revenue.

That the collector make it an invariable rule to report the death or apparent approach of death of any zemindar, as also the death of any pensioner, or officer paid by him; and that the property of any deceased pensioner be not continued to his family, without the express sanction of the board of revenue.

That when the property of land is disputed between persons under the authority of different collectors, the land shall remain in the possession of the person holding it, until a regulation upon the case shall pass.

62. That

INSTRUCTIONS  
issued to Collectors  
under the Government  
of Fort St. George, in  
June 1791.

62. That when persons under the authority of any collectors shall take refuge within lands under another jurisdiction, they shall, upon application from the person from whose authority they have fled, to the collector of the district where they have fled, be delivered up.

63. That no application shall be made by any collector for persons flying from his authority to that of another, excepting for officers of government, or upon specific complaints preferred against the parties flying, for balances due on accounts unadjusted; and previous to such an application, the collector shall endeavour to satisfy himself as far as possible, that the complaints are well founded, and that the persons complained against have not been forced into elopement by severities or extortions. On their return, the collector himself is required to enquire into and decide the complaints preferred to him, on which his application is grounded; it being understood, that no collector shall compel any ryot or other persons, not his public servants, to reside within the bounds of his collectorship, but shall permit them to settle where they please.

64. That the present Regulations, except the 19th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 45th, 46th, 48th, 50th, 51st, 52d, 53d, 54th, 55th, the latter part of the 64th, the 69th, and 70th, be translated into the country languages, and published for the information of the persons under the authority of the collectors; being all orders, injunctive or prohibitive, contained in these Regulations, to which their observance is required; and that copies of them be constantly kept in the public cutcherry of each collectorship, and be there open to the access of all persons desirous of consulting them.

65. That the collectors be directed to cause the deeds of settlement to be executed by the zemindars and renters in their presence at all times, where there is no good reason for the zemindar not appearing in person.

66. That every petition or application relating to any matter of revenue, either verbal or written, shall be received, heard, and recorded by the collector, whether dismissed or not; and the dismissal, with the reasons assigned for it, be recorded, leaving it to the party to seek further redress at the presidency, if he thinks fit.

67. Numerous petitions being daily presented to the board from different quarters, which tend to embarrass and impede business of greater importance, as without having sufficient means of decision before them, they are under the necessity of making constant references; to remove this inconvenience, all petitions, being regularly signed and dated, shall be first presented to the collector in whose districts the subject of complaint or representation may occur; who shall either afford redress or satisfaction to the parties aggrieved; or on the other hand, if the claim or fact is deemed inadmissible, the collector shall subscribe or affix to the petition, the causes of dismissal, and return it to the petitioner (reserving an authenticated copy for record) who, if he should think proper, may afterwards lay it before the board of revenue, who will then be enabled, from the consideration of both sides of the question, to decide thereon, and either finally reject the prayer of the petition, or confirm such part as they may judge admissible.

68. And further, if any petitioner shall complain to the board, of the collector having refused, or unnecessarily delayed to give him a hearing, in which, if it shall be found he has been well grounded, such collector will incur their severe displeasure, however trifling the cause; and if on the contrary it shall appear that the complainant has been guilty of misrepresentation, and that his petition had not been previously presented to the collector, he will either receive an adequate punishment for such an offence from the board, or be returned to the collector for that purpose, to be made an example of, on the spot, as circumstances may determine.

69. That on the resignation of a collector, he shall deliver over to his successor every public account and document, with all original letters received, and copies of letters sent, relative to his charge: two lists of such accounts, letters, &c. are to be signed by the collector on making over his employ, one, to be delivered to his successors, the other, to be transmitted to the board of revenue.

70. The collectors are required to address the board of revenue, if they have reason to apprehend any particular inconvenience likely to arise from a literal adherence to any of the above Regulations, and they are to state the grounds of such apprehensions to the board of revenue, who are to submit the same, with their opinion, to the decision of the Governor in Council. The above present general Regulations are to be held in force from the 1st of August 1791; and the collectors are to consider them, as standing rules of conduct; any particular orders or instructions they may have received that are not revoked or superseded by the above rules, are also to be in force and observed accordingly. The Governor in Council require the strictest attention on the part of the collectors of the revenue to all and each of the preceding Regulations. And the Board of Revenue are hereby strictly enjoined minutely to attend to their execution, and to report every instance in which their observance shall be neglected, or in any manner omitted.

A true Copy.

(Signed)

W<sup>m</sup> HARRINGTON,  
Secretary.

The board entirely approve of the Regulations selected from those established in Bengal and modified according to the circumstances of the several Collectors employed in the presidency.

## Appendix, No. 16.

## EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF MR. PLACE,

Respecting the Land Tenures in the Jaghire, dated 6<sup>th</sup> June 1799.

Collector's Report  
on Land Tenures in  
The Jaghire.

PARA. 69.—I draw my first arguments in favour of the hereditary right of the indigenous natives and husbandmen to the usufructuary property of the soil,—from the division of the lands into shares,—and from the appointment of a distinct class of people to record them, to note down every variation that takes place, and to keep all accounts of the cultivation and produce. As I have already said, these divisions are supposed to have taken place at the original settlement of each village, and were, to a greater or smaller number, according to the number of original settlers or of labouring servants that they brought with them: for I presume I need not explain that the latter, doomed to the meanest offices, can acquire no property in land. Had they been regulated by any other rule, villages of the same extent, would have been divided into the same number of shares; whereas, whilst one is divided into ten, another having the same quantity of land annexed to it, may be divided into one hundred shares, but all equal. Every original share may be reckoned a freehold, which although it may have been subsequently subdivided into several smaller ones, they all hold of the proprietor of the original remainder, who retains a pre-eminence over them, and to whom, I imagine, they were originally considered to owe service: for his right of pre-eminence is still so tenaciously asserted, and so unequivocally acknowledged, that when making the late settlement of the jaghire, a few *meerassadars* only of villages, where I knew them to be very numerous, appeared to rent them. I was told that these were the proprietors of the original shares: that all others were sub-meerassadars, and would agree to whatever terms their principals entered into: and although I thought it proper that all should give their consent personally, or by writing, yet I found that the sub-meerassadars invariably considered themselves dependent upon the proprietor of that share, from which they had rented, if I may use the expression. The village of Poolatoor, for instance, was originally divided into four shares, which stand upon its records, and originally held by four proprietors or meerassadars, but from those causes which, in all parts of the world, occasion, in the course of time, a greater diffusion of property, there are thirty meerassadars; yet the original division into four shares is preserved, and not multiplied into thirty. Ask any one of the thirty, into how many shares his village is divided, he will say four: ask him, how much meerassee, or how much landed property he has in the village, he will say an half, a quarter, a sixteenth, or any fractional part of a share. The village of Damerlah, on the other hand, is divided into 160 original shares, but is now enjoyed only by twenty-three proprietors, who are registered, as holding so many shares and fractional parts of a share. But although the sub-meerassadars are thus considered subordinate to their principals, this is all the difference between them; for they are equally entitled to participate in those fees and privileges which, as I shall show hereafter, mark the distinction between a *meerassadar*, or actual proprietor, and a *pyucarry*, or temporary cultivating tenant. This, perhaps, will convey a distinct idea of the terms meerassee and meerassadar; and the system bears so strong an analogy to feudal tenure, that mankind, when formed into societies, seems to have been intuitively directed to it. It is indeed the doctrine of confederacy and subordination, calculated to impress upon the mind, that individual property is invariably subservient to the purposes of the community, and conditionally held of some superior. By the feudal system, the great feudatories held of the king; and the lesser owed service to their superior lords. The whole, afterwards, were denominated freeholders. Here the original meerassadars held also, of the sovereign, and the sub-meerassadars, of them: and all, I think, come precisely under the definition of freeholders, and are equally entitled to hold their property on the same terms.

70. In the course of the various revolutions that have happened since the original settlement of the villages, it may be supposed that their division into shares, has been frequently changed. Whole districts were desolated by the cruelties and arbitrary exactions of the Madras government, and the entire population of them removed, either temporarily or for ever, to some other parts of the country, for protection. If the whole returned to their native villages, they retained of course their former customs; but if partially, after any great lapse of time, or if the villages were settled with new inhabitants, these circumstances directed their customs to the establishment of shares; still more, if the lands had by long neglect become overgrown with jungle. But reverence for the customs of their forefathers and their attachment to the management in the Jaghire, have had occasion to settle villages of all descriptions, and have found this attachment to ancient habits and institutions, invariably prevailed. In consequence of them was preserved, I adopted them, as far as was practicable; but in some cases more was to be obtained, that is, where the lands had grown entirely into disuse, and nothing more was known of the villages to which they belonged, than the name, the division of them, was regulated by the abilities of those who were to be settled on them. As it



was deemed essential by the inhabitants, that all the shares should be equal, I conformed to preceding usage; and they agreed among themselves, to take one or more, or only a fractional part of one.

71. It may perhaps at first sight be thought that the office of *curnum*, being that to which I said a distinct class of people is appointed, whose duty is to register the mecrassadars or proprietors of the village; to note down all changes among them; to attest all deeds of sale, transfer or assignment; and to keep an account of the cultivation and produce; argues against the inheritance of the lands, and that it is instituted, because, as they may pass from one to another, and be occupied promiscuously by the inhabitants of that or any other village, at the will of government, it is the more expedient to have such a check. The office itself, is known to be hereditary, so long as the duty of it, is faithfully performed; and to be mutually for the interest and convenience of the government and the subject. Every office besides implies a compensation; and it could neither be hereditary nor compensated, if the lands were precariously held. The caprice of the inhabitants might give them a preference for the lands of another village; and any temporary dissatisfaction might prompt them to remove, if their interest expired with the harvest. The lands being forsaken, (for it might not always be possible, to persuade other inhabitants to cultivate them), the office of *curnum* could be of no dependence, and he would also forsake it to find subsistence elsewhere. I have made use of the word *meerassadar* to express this hereditary property, because it is in more familiar use; but *chumachy* is the proper term, as I have before shown, among the natives, to denote the interest which they possess in it; and by its signification, conveys a self-evident proof of this right.

72. I draw my argument, secondly, in favour of the hereditary right of the husbandmen, from the tanks and other immense works that have been constructed for the purposes of cultivation. If the division of the lands, and the office of *curnum* are received as testimonies in favour of the hereditary property of the inhabitants, these expensive undertakings argue in favour of the intention of government, that it should be hereditary; for it is absurd to imagine that they would have been constructed, without a sufficient assurance of the attachment of the husbandman to the lands that they water; and this attachment, as I have already said, and shall further illustrate by positive example, is to be given only by permanent possession, and a total freedom from restraint, in the use and transfer of property. I might indeed here put the question immediately home, by asking,—if under an impression of the precarious occupation of the lands, the very large sums that have been laid out upon the tanks and watercourses the last four years, would have been expended? These are, I think, such self-evident proofs, as are superior to all argument.

73. Thirdly, I deduce the position, from the two discriminating terms made use of, to express the two descriptions of husbandmen in whose occupation the land may be, of *meerassadar* and *pyacarry*, and from the usages that obtain among the natives themselves, under a conviction of the privileges appertaining to these different tenures. If the first of these terms, as I have already endeavoured to show, is definitive of that class of husbandmen who have descended from, succeeded to, or stand in the place of, the original settlers in the villages, that is, real proprietors; the latter, must be expressive of another class, who have a different interest in the land, less than that of proprietors. A *pyacarry*, accordingly, means a husbandman who cultivates the land of another, either for one or more years, by agreement, but mostly for one only, as leases do not seem formerly to have been in use; and having only a contingent interest in it, as an encouragement to induce him to bring part of his labours from his own village, or as an incitement to exertion, he receives one half of the produce, which is, generally speaking, a greater share than a *meerassadar* receives. If the *meerassadars* are capable of cultivating all their lands, a *pyacarry* will not be admitted; nor can he, on any account, in that case, have a preference, from any competent authority, without a palpable injustice to the others.

74. There are, however, many instances, where *pyacarries* bear exact analogy to the copyholders of England. The latter, it has been shown, derived their title to their estates from long residence and occupancy of them, and thence were enabled to prescribe against the lords of whom they held them, even before the statute of Charles II. which gave them a property in land, although originally mere tenants: they could not, before this, be compelled to relinquish their lands at the lord's will, if they continued to perform the services, that is, to pay him the rent into which all services were for the most part resolved. Yet their subjection to the lord is, even to this day, so clearly preserved, that a copyhold does not pass from one man to another, by the common rules of alienation, as in other estates; but must be first surrendered back to the lord of the fee, on which it is dependant. So the description of *pyacarries* here mentioned, enjoy the right of cultivating the soil by prescription, themselves and their ancestors having done so, for many generations. They cannot be forced away from the village at the will of the *meerassadars*, who must assign ground for them. But they cannot sell, mortgage, or transfer, for a valuable consideration, their right; for it consists in the use only, and not in the substance of the soil. Their right succeeds; but, in default of them, the lands revert to the *meerassadars*. This, however, to be considered the law, as it originally stood with regard to such property; for, on account of the reduced state of population, these *pyacarries*, I believe, are allowed to sell, and to appoint successors. Still the right is never a subject of bargain and sale. They receive a share of 45, instead of 50 percent; because, although they have more than a contingent interest, yet it is improved at least into a life estate. They are, in any shape, participate in the fees and privileges of the *meerassadars*, to whom, in the contrary, they pay fees.

75. There is yet another description of *pyacarry*, or rather perhaps of *serfs*, who may be compared with a copyholder. They are found in fertile and well-watered villages.



the mecrassee whereof belongs to Bramins, who being forbid to cultivate the lands themselves, must employ servants for that purpose. The labouring servants are for the most part *prarians*, who can by no means acquire property in land; and I have not yet met with an instance of their having done so. They receive wages, partly in money and partly in those fees, which I explained in my report of the 6th October 1795, called *callavassum*, and if not the slaves of the mecrasaddars, renew their service every year. But the other class of servants are men of the *pullee* cast, and, either by custom or rule, have an hereditary right of service under the mecrasaddars, and are entitled to one-third of the share which the latter receive of the crops. The mecrasaddars, in this case, receive the *callavassum*. Madran-ticum affords a very curious example of the preservation and assertion of this right. Previous to the repair of the tank, it is not known how long the lands were cultivated: but so soon as this work was completed, the descendants of many families, who had formerly been the hereditary servants of the Bramins, claimed and were admitted to their inheritance; although in the intermediate time, they had taken up other occupations, and might be supposed to have forgot it. The office constitutes the inheritance, like many offices of the feudal system. It might of course be relinquished by the occupant, who by that means, broke the succession; and in failure of heirs, it rested with the mecrasaddar to appoint others or not; but this, also, could not be sold, mortgaged, or transferred.

76. It may be better perhaps to mention now, than hereafter, one very striking resemblance that this country affords to the feudal system, regarding servants; and as I could not possibly find other words that would so well describe their situation, I shall beg leave to quote those of Judge Blackstone. In my report of the 6th October 1795, I slightly mentioned them; and intimated my intention of making further enquiry into their circumstances; but it would now be difficult to institute any investigation into their origin; and is one of those things that we must be contented to have existed with the Hindoo constitution, without assigning a reason, or discovering a cause.

77. "Under the Saxon government there were, as Sir William Temple speaks, a sort of people, in a condition of downright servitude, used and employed in the most servile works, and belonging, both they and their children and effects, to the lord of the soil, like the rest of the cattle or stock upon it."

78. "These villains belonging principally to the lords of the manors, were either villains *regardant*, that is, annexed to the manor or land; or else they were *in gross* or at large, and transferable by deed, from one owner to another. They could not leave their lord, without his permission; but if they ran away, or were purloined from him, might be claimed and recovered by action, like beasts or other chatties. They held, indeed, small portions of land, by way of sustaining themselves and their families; but it was at the mere will of the lord, who might dispossess them whenever he pleased."

79. Slaves of this description are very numerous all over the country; and are, I think, preferably situated to servants more at liberty, who also, from the constitution of their religion, are very little better than slaves. I have seen that the masters of the former, take an interest in protecting, and in marrying them; for their offspring is in fact, an increase of their own property. Nay, so contented are they with the treatment they meet with, that but very few instances have come within my knowledge of their desertion, when they have been claimed in the manner stated in the quotation; and but one, where it has been so tyrannical, that they were not to be prevailed upon to return. One man, a *nattawar* in Poonamalee, lately dead, possessed four hundred families of slaves. Reduced by the improvidence of his father to great distress, he could employ only about one hundred; but so strong did the attachment of all the rest remain to him, that although they had for the most part, engaged in the service of European gentlemen, and of many among the rest, had he possessed the means of subsisting them, they would voluntarily, or with very little persuasion, have returned to him. The servants of the *vallahs* were entirely all slaves, and I believe it is only with such that they are now found. Perhaps it was thought to be politically necessary that they should be made slaves, on the first peopling of the Carnatic.

80. But to resume my subject. The striking contrast between a mecrasaddar and a pyacary of any description, fixes, I think satisfactorily, a right to the substance of the soil in the former: for if he had no more than a right to cultivate it, or only a preference in the cultivation, it would be equally to him, as to the pyacary, a thing of no real value.—Whereas the mecrasaddar sells, mortgages, gives away, or leaves his lands to his posterity, which the other, cannot; at least, he cannot do that which constitutes value, he cannot sell or mortgage them; nor would he, but for the low state of population, be allowed to give them away, or appoint his successors in default of heirs.

81. This idea of property, I conceive, can never have rested on a surreptitious title. It must either have been acquired by a positive grant; or conceded upon the principle of that compact which binds society together, by which every individual establishes in himself, a right to use his property, liable to those demands which the state has, or may have upon it. It had been a pretended title, forever set up, doubts and suspicions would somewhere have betrayed it; and we never should have seen the natives so tenaciously assert and challenge enquiry into their rights regarding it; nay, if they harboured a suspicion that it was a thing of which they might be deprived, without infringing justice, it is impossible that they would have sold it, or that they could consider it the most substantial security for borrowing of money.

If there then is the ultimate and the largest interest that they can covet or can have, and the force of its operation upon them has, on numerous occasions, been as exemplified as in the enfranchised villages of Poland; and if it bears a construction from that which I have always given it, and which it has, in the common accepta-

tion of the natives themselves, I can only hope to be excused for having mistaken the rights of government, by the beneficial effects of the illusion.

83. The war of 1780, and the famine which it occasioned, I need not say swept off a great part of the population of the Jaghire, whereby the lands of most villages were partially or wholly left without proprietors. Parents, children, and relations were, in some places, extirpated. In this state, I found many parts of the Jaghire; but when the system of village-rents was to take place, it was indispensable to assign mecrassadars to the unappropriated lands. Without it, I found that they could not be rented; but the idea of permanent property was such an inducement, that I was not only able to fill up the vacant shares, but to convert the most stubborn soil, and the thickest jungle, into fertile villages. Give us the mecrassade, and we will both rent the lands and employ all our labour to make them productive, was the common observation; but without it, as we can have our choice of land, we will cultivate only that which will yield us the quickest and the largest product.

84. But besides the contingency of extinction by death, other causes may call forth the exercise of this sovereign privilege. Voluntary relinquishment is one; and many acts may be done contrary to the tenure by which property is held, amounting to a forfeiture of it, as when the land is wilfully neglected: for as the public revenue is drawn from it, public embarrassment in that case ensues, and it is incompatible that the state should be exposed to injury, by individual caprice. One of the first duties of the sovereign, is to neglect no means of rendering the land under his obedience, as well cultivated as possible, and not to allow either communities or private persons to acquire tracts of land, in order to leave it uncultivated. Upon all these occasions then, the privilege appearing to me so inherent, and the exercise of it so indispensable, I had no scruple in giving cowle for the unoccupied mecrassade. To those who would consent to accept it, I gave it to them, and their heirs for ever, so long as they "continued in obedience to the Cioor, and paid all just dues:" in which words, are comprized all the duties they owe, and the conditions they are to perform. The effect hereby produced, I shall have occasion to explain hereafter.

85. Lastly, the right of the mecrassadar to the property of the soil, is established by the Gentoo laws themselves. The translator makes a very obvious and just remark in his preface or commentaries, that "the code begins with regulations for that which, is one of the first cements of civil society, the intimation of property," by which I suppose he means security in the possession, and free agency in the use of it. The laws speak of property and effects, and of estates real and personal; and the first chapter ordains that money shall be lent on pledge, security, bond or witness, the two first of which are to answer the payment of the debt, and the latter to prove its validity. Now these distinctions are perfectly conformable with our own ideas and our own laws; for although every thing that belongs to a man may be called his property, in common language, yet when the term real is prefixed, it defines it to be that substantial kind of property which exists independent of himself, and which he cannot annihilate or destroy; on the other hand, personal property means that which is produced by a man's own labour or industry, and absolutely at his disposal. His money, his goods, or his chattels, may pass away from him; but his land remains for ever. I apprehend also the terms pledge and security will be most aptly applied to those two kinds of property, in the same order; for although property real and personal may be considered either as a pledge or a security, yet the word pledge conveys an idea of solidity most adapted to land or real property. It may be said also, that security does not always mean an actual deposit. A man may borrow upon the security of another; but it is the property of this man, the wealth which he is known to possess, that becomes the security, and not his pledged faith; for it is to answer the debt.

86. The Gentoo laws regulate the division, which a man among his sons, or which his heirs shall make among themselves, of his gleebe land, orchard, houses, rents, &c. of his "estate real and personal." They permit him to mortgage his land as a pledge for debt, and even to sell it.

87. page 83. "A father shall not give away or sell the effects and glebe belonging to himself, or to his father and ancestors, as that his immediate dependant should be distressed for want of victuals and clothing; if reserving so much as is necessary for the immediate food and clothing of his dependants, he should sell or give away the rest of the property, he has authority so to sell and give away." He could not sell or give away that to which he had not a permanent right; and as his sons may succeed to his estate, property in land, as well as other things, I conceive, is clearly made inheritable. I might quote many more passages, in support of the position; but unless any imputation, which I have never heard of, lies against the authority of the code, this will be received as sufficient.

88. The only objection that presents itself against the inheritance of land is, in the use of terms glebe and glebe land; but I think it is very easily explained away. It is to be understood in the same acceptation as they have been among ourselves, with they signify those small allotments of land which belong to the clergy, village masters, which bear the nearest assimilation to them, must be meant. But when lands are in state of villainage, that is, divided among the resident tenants, these terms mean man's particular portion of the lands of the village; and in no other sense can this the Gentoo law be made to apply; for the manumissions of the mecrassadars, as not to be divisible among them, still less to admit of the operation of inheritance, in respects.

89. "If a parcel of land hath not been divided among brothers, they shall have equal shares." The village of Madrantoum, and ten others dependent upon it, fifty-two mecrassadars; and their manumissions consist only of 202 cowries, 800

the mecrassee to be equally divided among all, and any one man to have five sons, on his death they would divide a little more than ten goontahs each, or 640 square yards; the next subdivision would leave two goontahs, or 128 square yards, upon the same scale; and in the course of a short time, the property would be indivisible. In many villages, much larger than this, the mecrassee mauniums are not a tenth part, belonging to perhaps a greater number of mecrassadars: so that this kind of property is too diminutive to be an object of legal regulation; and in some, there are none at all: and we cannot suppose a law to be made for a nonentity. Besides, the Gentoo laws prescribe what is to be observed, in cases of the mortgage of "as much land as will serve for the maintenance of one man " for a year." Now I don't know an instance where any man's proportion of village mauniums, will do this; and it seems intended for wise purposes, that they should not; otherwise he would cultivate his mauniums, and leave the other land waste. Rules are also laid down for sons building themselves houses and making gardens "on their father's " land," to which uses, mauniums cannot be applied; for they belong to the mecrassadars at large, and are never parcelled out among them individually.

90. But not to weary with anticipating more objections; by mecrassee mauniums, I must be understood to mean only those which belong to the proprietors of the whole lands of the village, and not what are set aside for the various village servants, to whom they are often an adequate subsistence, but which do not come under the law in other respects. These village servants, are respectively mecrassadars of their office, to which the mauniums are attached, and cannot be sold or separated from it. But the first mentioned description of mauniums, I have not found to have any other design, than as tokens or attestations of the right of property in the lands. This may be said to stand in the room of title deeds; for when a man has no other proof, he rests his right upon, having received his proportion of the produce of the mauniums, or if there are no mauniums, upon having participated in, the *cawny semah*, which has been explained in my report of the 6th Oct. 1793, and is set apart with the same intent; and such is so evidently the construction among the natives themselves, that although a man by other pursuits, may be induced for a time to relinquish the cultivation of his lands, he will appoint a gomastah or attorney solely to receive his proportion of one or the other, or both, where they exist together, if he means at a future day to resume it. A very extraordinary instance of this occurred, in making the late lease. A man had removed from his native village to some distant part of the country; so long ago, that it became almost a waste, and indeed acquired the appellation of a desolate village. This gomastah appeared, and clearly proved having received the produce of the mauniums and the *cawny semah*, when any cultivation had been carried on by virtue of due powers; but could give no information of his constituent, whom therefore, after having allowed him a sufficient time to assert his right by public notification, I considered to have renounced it altogether.

91. Under all these circumstances, I think it must be admitted that the mecrassadar has an undoubted hereditary property in the soil; that he derives his right originally from the sovereign, to whom he acknowledges obedience, and the render of a stated proportion of the produce, as the tenure by which he holds it; that under this impression, he uses it, as may be most for his advantage; and that by law, he considers that right sacred and unalienable, so long as he performs the condition annexed to it.

94. Were I called upon to define the term mecrassee, and its properties, I think it bears exact analogy to a fee. I would call *meccrassee*, a freehold estate of inheritance; and a *meccrasadar*, a tenant in fee simple, holding of a superior lord, on condition of rendering him service. This lord is the circar; his estate, the usufructuary right of the soil; and the service he owes, a render of a stated portion of the produce of his labour. This definition applies equally to hereditary officers, to the *polijar*, *curnum* and others, as to the proprietor of the land.

96. But even admitting the right of property to the soil, to have been a positive grant from the sovereign to the mecrassadar, it is as well confirmed to him, as that of the freeholder to his estate in Great Britain; and in the room of the title deeds, his right is supported by a much more lasting evidence, the land itself; which, besides what has been already spoken of, testifies in another way, to his favour; namely, that every native takes one of his names from his family village. If a preference in the cultivation is all that belongs to him, it must so often have been denied, and occasioned his removal, that he could have felt no attachment to his native soil, and there could have been no necessity for the distinction between a mecrassadar and *pyacarry*; the latter of whom, comes I think nearer to the situation of the tenant of an estate; for he to whom the preference of cultivation was given, became in that case, the mecrassadar. Hereditary residence, however, and a precarious subsistence, do not well coincide: a man continues to live where his father lived before him, only because he succeeds to certain rights and privileges, which constitute his estate, and of which he cannot be deprived, but under those circumstances, by the laws of his country, amount to a forfeiture; and he has so well grounded confidence in the justice of those laws, that the forfeiture is made to be his own act, in that place.

Land cannot be alienated without a written instrument; because, both the sovereign and the subject have a mutual property in them. Each, however, may alienate, and neither is not affected. The sovereign may part with his interest in them, but his right remains with the subject; and all that the latter can sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of, is the enjoyment of the profit, after paying what is due to the sovereign; which is well defined, so clear, and so thoroughly established in the mecrassadar, that he can repeat, without it, the country never could have attained such a pitch of cultivation and fertility, as formerly distinguished it. Alienations of land, however, by written

written instruments, are not peculiar to the Mahomedan governments; for I have met with patents granted by Hindoo princes. But there is one kind of alienated land, which has its origin entirely in the former, I mean *sunnud mauniams*; or rather, as they should be called, *sunnud encums*; for *mauniam* is a Sanscrit word, and *sunnud*, a Persian. They are small portions of land held by *sunnud*, or order, renewable from year to year; and if they are not so renewed, the title ceases. I conceive them to have been at first given, in liquidation of pay to servants and dependents, as well as for the expenses of mosques, and for the subsistence of those who attended them. One man got orders for three or four years successively, on the same village; and hence, establishing a sort of usage, he claimed the issuing of the *sunnud*, as a matter of right; but to this day, he can receive nothing, without a renewal by some competent authority. *Sunnud mauniams* are still distinguished in the accounts from *turrabuddy mauniams*, which include those of all kinds; that is, to *meerassadars*, whether of the lands or offices; to *pagodas*, and whatever was set apart at the original measurement of the lands of the village, as the term denotes.

98. If the *meerassadar* has no other interest than is vested in him, according to the acceptance of government, it is in fact none, when examined into. Preference is no more than a priority in choice; and choice implies a power of rejection; so that a preference of cultivation must suppose a competition, open to all offers, and may be given indifferently to any man. *Meerassce*, therefore, in this sense, is no more than immediate occupancy; and *meerassadar*, the present tenant.

99. Change this preference into a right of cultivation, which shall exclude competition, so long as the occupier of the ground has the means, or is willing to cultivate it,—still it is no right, unless the demand upon his labour is defined, so as to leave him a surplus or profit, which shall constitute a certain dependance or estate. This brings the question exactly to what I have laid down; that *meerassce* is a right to use the thing, and to enjoy it, so long as the condition annexed to that enjoyment is performed; in other words, so long as the rent is paid in money or in kind.

100. It is a fundamental maxim in the practice of the natives, that a *pyacarry* is entitled, generally speaking, to one-half of the produce of his cultivation, after setting aside the fees of different kinds, issuable out of it. There are different kinds of *pyacarries*, as I have before shown; but their share is universally higher than that of the *meerassadar* in the same village. The word *pyacarry*, or rather *payacarry*, is a compound Persian word from *pay* *س* the foot, and *karidum*, *کاردن* to labour; or, as others say, *kisht*, *کار*, *kurdun* *کاردن* to cultivate; signifying, a man who journeys to his work or cultivation. The Hindoo and Malabar word for this description of cultivator, is *succowashee*, which signifies technically, that not being bound to any particular spot, he may take what belongs to him, and go where he pleases.—In fact, a sojourner, a resident *pyacarry*, that is, such as I have assimilated to a copyholder in England, usually cultivates and makes his dwelling near them; but having a life estate in them, he receives no more than 45 per cent of the produce, as may be seen by the old accounts which I furnished of Outramalore. The *pyacarry* who cultivates from year to year, having only a contingent interest, which may expire with the harvest, it is necessary to hold out some additional incitement to him. He is usually brought from an adjoining village, where he has *meerassce*, and of course will not bring any part of his labour from that village, unless some extra advantage, which he cannot there have, is given to compensate him for doing so; he therefore receives 5 per cent. more than the resident *pyacarry*, or 50 per cent. of his cultivation, after setting aside fees. He receives a higher proportion than this, it is under the sanction of specific agreements for the culture of waste or very poor lands. The *meerassadars* having the choice of land, always cultivate that which is nearest to the village, unless select spots here and there are found, whose fertility will repay them for going to a distance.

100. This, therefore, which is an usage established by themselves, becomes a fixed principle and criterion by which to judge of their genuine rights; and it is further established, by the fraudulent practices which I have before had occasion to observe were used in this respect. A man would enter one part of his cultivation in his own name, as *meerassadar*, and the other in a borrowed name, as *pyacarry*; because in the first capacity, besides his share of the crops, he participates in the fees that *meerassadars* collect upon the cultivation at large; and in the latter, he receives a higher *wartum* than as *meerassadar* he was entitled to. It was no unusual thing to keep the name of a *meerassadar* upon the accounts, who had been dead perhaps fifty years, because it gave an opportunity to his successor to claim a higher share, under pretence of being only in trust of his *meerassce*, which he cultivated as *pyacarry*, whilst at the same time, this successor was his son and heir, and being known as such among the inhabitants of the village, lost none of his fees. The excuse given for this was, that was *mamool* to keep the name of the deceased upon record.

101. Such a counterfeit, argues that the share of the *pyacarry* is the highest that can general be divided; and as most villages had at some time or other, admitted this kind of cultivators, so it afforded for the most part, a good rule for establishing that of the *meerassadars*; or, if there were any exceptions, villages under the same circumstances, might be taken as a defect. But as encroachments had been proportioned to the opportunities of doing so, so they were various and fluctuating. In some, they had been enormous, in others, they were small; and in a few, there did not appear to have been any; but as the discovery of the *meerassce* has since shown, always subject to the caprice and favour of the *Circar* and its officers, that no degree of encroachment had been so uniformly observed, as to grow into a right of usage or prescription. When, therefore, the inhabitants laid claim prescriptively to a particular rate of division, their title was destroyed by evidence of a different usage. Being introduced by the voluntary consent of the inhabitants themselves, it must be supposed

have been regulated, so as to leave him a reasonable compensation, and no more; for if he demanded more, he was not allowed to cultivate the land. There are particular situations in which he receives both more and less; but in the one case, it is by express agreement from year to year, or for the lease, and in the other, in conformity with local customs affecting particular villages. In all other cases, even if he makes no previous agreement, he is always considered entitled to half the produce, after deducting fees.

192. This rule then, with respect to pyacarrics, raises such an implication, and affords so strong a presumption against the just claim of the meerassadars, to so high a share as they receive, as supersedes the necessity of any other proof. A contingent interest must have some extraordinary compensation to balance the disadvantage, which the termination of it may occasion; and it is for this reason, that a tenant in Europe will be satisfied with a moderate profit upon a long lease, and that the landlord must concede to him higher advantages, for a short one.

193. There can be no doubt that the share of the pyacarry has gradually increased since the days of Saadat Ullah Cawn; for if, generally speaking, the meerassadar's proportion was thirty-five per cent. at that time, a very little more, may well have been a sufficient compensation to the former. And although I am of opinion that even less than the average of the present times, would both repay his labour and afford him a profit, yet it is the best criterion to follow, as having been determined by circumstances into which no enquiry can now be made; and because it is marked by general acquiescence and contentment. The rule also does not seem to be confined to the Carnatic, for independent of Bengal, it appears, by Tippoo's revenue regulations, to extend to the Mysore country, where the produce of land of a certain description—*hisra*, is equally divided between government and the ryot;—and it is notorious that Tippoo pays the strictest attention to the situation of the husbandman.

194. By what I have said, it must be very manifest that reference to so distant a period as thirty or forty years, for establishing the just shares of the inhabitants, must either be impossible or inconclusive.—If practicable, as some villages may be supposed to have enjoyed a greater, and others a less degree of the favour of the Circar and its servants, they would consequently have made proportionate encroachments; some also might be labouring under their displeasure, and altogether deprived of the advantages, which by connivance they had once gained; so that so fluctuating a system, in all likelihood, would have been far from giving universal satisfaction. If a further retrospect was had, namely, into the days of Saadat Ullah Cawn, the same shares which they then enjoyed, would in these times, afford them no more than subsistence.—Both therefore, only offer a choice of difficulties; whilst in taking their own practice, as it has grown up and been established by the concurrence of various circumstances, as the basis of their just rights, I have done that which seems the least objectionable, and is the most agreeable to themselves.

195. A meerassadar, therefore, must be understood, in general to have a right to no more than 45 per cent. of the produce divisible between him and the Circar; except in certain situations, as follow:

196. First,—In lands which are situated under small tanks, holding from one to two months water, where the crops being dependent the first part of the season on timely rains, and the latter, on a sufficiency of water being retained in the tanks till they are matured, disappointment sometimes occurs;—the meerassadar receives 50 per cent.

197. Second,—In high ground, under large tanks, where small picotahs are used to draw water to the crops, after the rains are over, he receives 55 per cent.

198. Third,—In situations where long picotahs are used throughout, he receives 60 per cent.

199. If he any where gets a higher share than this, it is by virtue of cawle granted to him for particular reasons; as, to bring waste land into use.

200. Although it is natural to suppose that encroachments had been pretty general; yet considering the decrease of population, and the privation which the country has suffered of other advantages, particularly in the article of manure, which affect the abundance of the crops, I made no reduction below 45 per cent.; but if I found the customary share less, I allowed it to remain so; for it was fair to presume that the inhabitants thought it sufficient.—It is accordingly, chiefly in those villages which are watered by channels from rivers, and from natural springs, which run more or less, and consequently the cultivation is carried on all the year round, that it varies from 40 to 45, but for the most part, stands at 40.—Below this, it is not found in ten villages throughout the Jaghire, and those only in the Ponnary district.

These are the general directions which regulate the shares; but a variety of peculiarities may be imagined, which affect particular situations, and cannot be detailed; unless I should be thought not to have carried my researches to the depth that they merit; and that the matter should still appear to rest upon insufficient proof; a minute detail will not be required, since every thing material resulting from this subject is shown by the *terwa* of the last lease.

It is already noticed, must be always remembered; that besides the portions of the produce which the inhabitants divide with government, their fees of every description are preserved to them; for without these, I am persuaded that the produce would not suppress complaint, for the reasons which I have already mentioned. They are the tests of property; and however complicated they may be, they are perfectly understood by each inhabitant, and on the receipt of them, his idea of justice depends.

It is a part of that system with which he is familiar; and however they may seem



seem bewildered in inconsistency and confusion, yet, referring to rules and principles with which he is acquainted, he is inspired with confidence, and litigation is obviated.—In a country where the law, in most cases, is determined by the evidence of custom, either as it is practised or preserved in the memory of the natives, the violation of the most trivial usage should be avoided; and however desirable simplicity may be, certainty is of much more importance.—To alter a system to which they have been enured, in all likelihood through a series of several generations, is attended with danger; for, to give it effect and durability, their habits, prejudices and sentiments must be changed; and by far the greater probability is, that in attempting this, diffidence, chicane, and misery, will supply the place, of confidence, honesty and contentment.—Innovation is always impolitic, for men cannot in an instant by any, even the strongest incentives, be reconciled to it; and until they are, both their public affections and their industry will be obstructed.

212. It is not easy to imagine a society without one or more members, who shall take the lead in the conduct of its affairs, still less is it to be expected, where, as in this country, society, united by the bonds of religion, is, by that sacred obligation, independent of the operation of nature. Each sect under the controul of its superior, each, it may have been observed, has its patriarch both in spiritual and temporal concerns, chosen by themselves, and the latter, often hereditary when the son or next heir has, or promises to have, those qualities which befit him for the office. As in every sect, so in every district and in every village, there are leading men who direct the rest; but that ascendancy which was once gained by the reverence of character for the peace and good government of the society, I believe has been often coveted and exercised, for a very different purpose.

213. When the inhabitants saw that the whole scope of the nabob's management tended to prey upon the vitals of the country when justice; was withheld; every degree of extortion practised by himself and his managers, and complaint never heard, but with a view to profit; this ascendancy was often desirable to secure the conveniences of life to the possessor of it, at the expense of his neighbours, and competition became a fruitful source of revenue; as, instead of arising out of the voluntary choice of the inhabitants, it was converted into a sort of dignity conferred by the Circars servants;—the soothing influence of a bribe both procured and preserved it. Thus, it was changed into an instrument of oppression on the inferior classes, for the advantage of a few individuals. Every motive to industry was annihilated, except among the latter; and the reluctant labour of the rest, divested of their rights, and kept in a degraded state of humility, fed the nabob's avarice, paid his whole train of corrupt relations and dependents, and lastly, furnished his scanty revenue, every year diminishing.

214. These superiors, graduating from the head man of a village to that of a district, conformably with the nabob's general system of extortion, became objects of jealousy in proportion to the extent of their influence, and were required to disgorge to him the effects of that oppression, which they had been allowed to exercise over others. However sorely, therefore, their authority might be at first felt, when relinquishing the character of elders, they assumed that of petty tyrants; it soon obtained acquiescence, for the connivance of all, it was seen, was necessary to their common advantage. Upon this principle, the inhabitants at large were easily brought to act in concert with the head men, and persuaded implicitly to entrust the care of their general interests into their hands, and to follow their directions in all things tending to the common cause. Hence the interest of the head man of a village or district, is considered inseparable from that of the village or district at large; and the invasion of one, is a signal to unite the whole. Thus then, the chain of connection was carried on,—the husbandman depended upon the superior of the village, appointed to guard its welfare, as it were, in the general council of the district,—and the superiors of the villages, upon those of the district, who carried on their machinations immediately with the servants of the Circar; and hence it is, that without any previous communication with each other, the whole population of a district are so often, upon the signal of alarm being given, seen to combine for the promotion of one object, which cannot be equally beneficial to the whole, if it is not detrimental to by far the major part.

215. I shall not enlarge upon the conduct of the nabob and of his managers in other respects, as already touched upon; too notorious as it is for a want of faith, and for oppression in all its relations. The evils which it occasioned sprung from the same root, and pervading every part of the Carnatic, it was under the mature growth of such habits as they necessarily occasioned in his subjects; that the Jaghire fell into the company's own hands; but to its misfortunes, not until it had been more than half depopulated, ravaged with fire and sword, and its tanks and reservoirs so long neglected, as almost to be effaced and destroyed.

342. I have mentioned before, the dependence of the interior, or fractional, upon principal, or integral shares, and the custom that prevailed in making the late lease, of proprietors of the latter only, appearing to enter into engagements; and although I endeavoured to obviate this, by requiring either the personal attendance of all, or that the proprietors should furnish the others with written authorities, which were always produced to the company, for particular reasons among themselves, I afterwards found my precautions were not what I intended. It is indeed probable that the novelty of the thing, misapprehensions of a design, that they thought it their interest to defeat. A minute state of property always occasions alarm; and men are, by natural habit, suspicious and distrustful; ever averse to disclose their real worth. But if it produced the same effect in some instances, where there was a mutual reliance among themselves, in other respects it was beneficial; because, as I signified, that the rightful proprietors were on all occasions to have the preference, and held out every encouragement to them to come forward, it gave



opportunity to great numbers to assert their claims to lands, of which they had been most unjustly dispossessed; and in many districts much more of my time was taken up by investigating these claims, than in renting the villages. I have had occasion to state the iniquitous uses which the dubashes made of their power over the Jaghire, in acquiring property for themselves or their dependents;—the means that they so fruitfully possessed of drowning by artifice, by money, or by influence, the complaints of those whom they wished to remove;—the precarious tenure by which property hence became held, and its constant changes from one possessor to another. The confusion introduced, and the injustice which had been maintained, is hardly to be imagined. A dubash of some description was always the origin of these complaints; and it afforded me a singular gratification to be the instrument of restoring numbers of unprotected sufferers to their rights, who without such an occasion, must still longer have been kept out of them. Hope, however, never dies in a native: the vicissitudes of the country have been too numerous to encourage despair; and although all respect of property was destroyed, yet as favour or corruption was the momentum of the grand machine, it was a chance, almost equal, that every man might at one time or other, come within its influence, and displace to-morrow, the man by whom he was displaced to-day. This consideration, together with a natural attachment to his soil, the rivet, as it is emphatically called, which bound him to it, often reconciled the ejected meerasadar to the temporary use of that which he could not substantially enjoy; many indeed had withdrawn; but were always at hand, when gladdened by the hope of recovering their rights. Whatever time, therefore, was occupied in this business, was fully compensated by the benefit that it conferred. A simple story, and short enquiry, generally proved the injustice, and occasioned redress; or if the matter of complaint was complicated, and involved a question of law, in regard to the descent of lands, an arbitration in my own presence, by men chosen either by the parties or by myself, if they desired it, speedily and equitably adjusted it.

343. In an account which I have in hand, and will if possible complete to accompany this report, the meerassee of every village is minutely detailed, and its distribution among the respective proprietors by name; but it is a subject of such intricacy as ought to have a further separate enquiry to be accurately ascertained, if indispensable towards any material object that may be in view; but it is also a subject of such delicacy, that, for my own part, I think that further enquiry would only tend, at least at present, to clog that freedom of property which should always be unrestrained, for a suspicion has already been awakened that it would be prudent to allay.

344. By an accompanying abstract account, it will appear that the whole lands of the Jaghire are divided into 17,821 $\frac{1}{2}$  meerassee shares; that the number of existing rightful proprietors amount to 8,387, who hold 15,994 $\frac{1}{2}$  of those shares, and that the remainder, or 1,827 $\frac{1}{2}$  shares, are unclaimed, but occupied by pyacarrics. Of these, however, it is to be observed, that a part also belong to the meerasadars, to which, for political reasons, they chuse that their right should lay dormant; and the rest, by the consequences of the war of 1780, and the subsequent famine, are altogether without claimants. The great difficulty which I could not surmount, before leaving the Jaghire, consisted in discriminating between the two latter; for although the actual proprietors of every village, might be supposed sufficiently known to the curmish, yet as the former had secret motives for a temporary disavowal of part of their lands; and as there existed no very urgent reason why they should entirely disclaim them, I was cautious of pressing this matter, and chose that it should continue in suspense, until either those motives should die away, or a formal renunciation be required on grounds of public exigency, which cannot well be any other than an increase of population, when every man will gradually assert his right, without any other impulse than his own interest.

345. So much as every subject relative to the Jaghire, as well the eradication of abuse by all classes of inhabitants, as the restoration of their genuine rights, and substantiation of property, stood in need of revision and reform, it ought not to have been expected, that every thing should be accomplished at once. Some things must be left for future completion and gradual attainment; and the actual distribution of the lands is one of them. Considering, also, whatever may be the real character and principles of the British government; that from circumstances, the inhabitants of the Jaghire have felt but little of its disposition to do them justice, and that intriguing men have always interposed to prevent the redress of their grievances; it ought not to be wondered at, that any assurance whatsoever, the faith of which they have yet to experience, should fail to establish their confidence of future protection.

There are many undoubted symptoms of a better, and, I hope, growing dependence on public faith; but it must ripen spontaneously, by conviction of the actual benefits that are derived from it, or if unnaturally forced, will infallibly be supplanted by suspicion. The connection between the government that they have been accustomed to, and that which it is intended to establish, and by whose principles it is intended that they shall substantially be governed, is too quick for their apprehension, and the change too great to be thought durable.

It is by no means unlikely however, that this collusive concealment or disguise, may in some instances, have been promoted by the new system, that the government have been avert to it, in case of failure in their engagements; and that the pyacarrics, in the management of the unclaimed part, in order to avoid participating in the consequences which they belong. But as this conduct, can proceed only from a want of confidence in the success of the undertaking may have excited, I think that their diffidence may be dissipated, by the adoption of judicious measures, on the former system. If by an equal and just assessment, they should be convinced that the new system, the lands will rise in value; the meerasadars will defend their rights, and thus expose any part to the risk of being disputed; and the pyacarrics

pyacarrics will be encouraged to obtain confirmation in that property, which by longer forbearance, they may be compelled to forego. This is a subject of considerable importance to the future success of the system, and every conciliatory measure should be adopted to promote the confidence of the inhabitants.

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347. The number 8,360 mecrassadars appears, however, small to enjoy so extensive a property as even they avow to belong to them, and pay so large a revenue; but it must be remembered that the heads and principal branches of families only appear as proprietors, in whose name all the members and other branches are included, who perhaps may amount to ten times that number. The law of primogeniture is unknown among the Hindoos; and property is divisible generally in equal shares among the sons, by which, if each had claimed his distinct portion, it would in the course of time, have become indivisible, or at least separately insufficient for his maintenance. In order to correct, therefore, the manifest inconvenience of their laws in this respect, the sons preserve an union of co-partnership among themselves, which continues perhaps through several generations; a part attend to their inheritance, and the rest seek other employment. Necessity pointed out this remedy, and custom has made it a disgrace not to conform; for they are particularly liable to the censure of their cast, if they separate and divide their estate. Yet inveterate animosities sometimes break out, to the gratification of which, every other sentiment and every interest must give way.

348. It would be superfluous, impracticable, and impolitic to ascertain with greater precision than has already been done, the measured extent of each share, or of each man's proportion of mecrassce; because, in the first place, it would strengthen those suspicions which have arisen; and in the next, it could only be done by personal survey, and the most unremitting attention, which I think hardly any one man can give, till the completion of such a work, independent of innumerable variations that would take place while it was in hand; and it would be unwise, because, not only it will be ever the most beneficial mode to let the lands of every village jointly to the inhabitants at large, both with a view to security and to good cultivation; but to let them separately, would tend to create divisions and dissensions, to the undoubted embarrassment of themselves, as well as of the public. No difficulty occurs in fixing the value of all the lands together of one village, but it would be nearly impossible to assign to every small allotment its portion so exactly, and with such due regard to fertility of soil and other circumstances, that some should not benefit and others suffer; yet the latter, would not receive the assistance of the former, in case of failure in their engagements.

349. At present, every village considers itself a distinct society, and its general concerns, the sole object of the inhabitants at large; a practice, surely, which redounds as much to the public good, as to theirs; each having, in some way or other, the assistance of the rest; the labours of all yield the rent; they enjoy the profit proportionate to their original interest, and the loss falls light. It consists exactly with the principles upon which the advantages are divided by a division of labour; one man goes to market, whilst the rest attend to the cultivation and harvest; each, has his particular occupation assigned to him, and insensibly labours for all; but if each, had these several duties to attend to, it is obvious that all the inhabitants must be absent together at those times that are most critical, both to them and to the state; and that many must want those abilities necessary to the performance of the various employments that would arise.

350. If a measurement of lands should be made, with a view to assign to each proprietor what belonged to him, and to confine him to the cultivation of that spot only, it would interfere with another practice, which very frequently prevails, and which I do not know can be surmounted, of each changing his lands every year. It is found in some of the richest villages, and intended, I imagine, to obviate that inequality to which a fixed distribution would be liable.

351. On the whole, I cannot but consider that any reform tending to do away the union, or, if I may be allowed the expression, the unity of the inhabitants, and to fix each exclusively to his property, will be attended with danger. Every man's right and place is well known among themselves; and the customs to which they are attached, as I have before said, are necessary to their contentment and confidence. If it should be observed that they give way to intemperance and abuse, I answer, that the superintending authority placed over the inhabitants; whilst it assures every man of the redress of his wrongs, encourages him to know his rights. If he complains, enquiry is instituted; and if he is not, it is fair to conclude he is contented, and receives justice among his associates; it is hardly possible to conceive a man, to whom property descends, labouring under such a degree of ignorance, or so destitute of friends and relatives, that he can be egregiously imposed upon, since neither an idiot nor a lunatic can inherit landed property; still less he succeeds to it by purchase, which argues sufficient natural understanding to know he receives his just dues.

## Appendix, No. 17.

LETTER FROM MADRAS GOVERNMENT TO THE  
BOARD OF REVENUE,

On the Appointment of a Special Commission for permanently settling the Lands;  
dated 9th February 1802.

EXTRACT Proceedings of the Special Commission at Fort St. George,  
9th February 1802.

Diary.

Letter from Madras  
Government, of 9 Feb.  
1802.

To William Petrie, Esq. President, &c. Members of the Board of Revenue.

Gentlemen,

PARA. 1. The right honourable the Governor in Council having deemed it to be expedient to appoint a special commission, for the purpose of fixing with all practicable dispatch the settlement of a permanent land revenue in the districts at present capable of that necessary improvement; I am directed to acquaint you, that his Lordship in Council has been pleased to nominate William Petrie, Esq. and Messrs. Thomas Cockburn and Josiah Webb, to be the commissioners for that purpose.

2. The appointment of the commission, will be confined to such proceedings as may be necessary to the permanent settlement of the districts under its immediate consideration; and will not interfere in the ordinary transaction of the business of the revenue department.

3. I am directed to assure you, that the Governor in Council has no intention of casting, by this measure, any imputation on the board of revenue; but considerable progress having been made towards the attainment of this most desirable object, his Lordship in Council is anxious that the body of information already collected, should be applied with the utmost practicable degree of expedition to the commencement of the settlement.

4. The state of the valuable and extensive provinces which have been recently annexed to the dominions of the honourable company under this presidency, will require the undivided attention of the board of revenue to the immediate improvement of those territories, and to such arrangements as may be necessary, with a view to the introduction of the permanent settlement of the land revenue, at the earliest practicable period of time.

5. The Governor in Council is therefore desirous of avoiding all further delay in the commencement of this most essential work, by directing it to the constant attention of the commission, and at the same time to provide for the efficient execution of the business of the revenue department, by relieving the board from that laborious attention which is indispensably requisite to the progress of the settlement.

6. By these means, the Governor in Council expects to provide for the commencement of a permanent settlement of the land revenue, by the immediate application of the materials already collected; and at the same time, to avail himself of the information, experience, and talents (especially selected by the honourable court of directors) in directing the ordinary administration of the revenue, and in advancing the provinces recently acquired, to that state of improvement which may admit of the settlement of a permanent land-tax, at the earliest practicable period of time.

7. In the absence of Mr. Cockburn from the board of revenue, in consequence of his nomination to the commission, Mr. Oakes will discharge the duties of the senior member of that board; and as the progress of the permanent settlement will occupy a considerable portion of the attention of Mr. Cockburn, during the remaining period of that gentleman's residence in India, the Governor in Council relies on the vigilance and abilities of Mr. Oakes to sustain the duties which will devolve on him.

8. In consideration of the extraordinary labour and responsibility which by these means will be imposed on Mr. Oakes, the Governor in Council permits him to draw a salary equal to that of the senior member of the board of revenue.

The Governor in Council has judged it to be necessary to explain the grounds of these orders, as well as for the purpose of removing from the minds of the board of revenue any misapprehension of his Lordship's intention, as of expressing to you the object of his Lordship's wishes in making these arrangements; for it will be obvious to you, that the execution of these orders, will require the most essential co-operation on your part with the commission, and the most prompt obedience on the part of the subordinate officers under your authority, to the orders which may be issued by the commission.

I am further directed to desire that the records of the revenue department may at all times be open to the members of the commission, and that such papers as may be required, may be furnished by the secretary to the board of revenue. I am further directed to desire that the collectors and the subordinate officers may be instructed to obey, and execute all orders which may be directed to them, by the authority of the Governor in Council desires that these orders may be issued to the collectors and subordinate officers, &c.

(Signed)

OLIVE.

J. STUART.

W. PETRIE.

M. DICK.

Fort St. George, 9th February 1802.

## Appendix, No. 18.

INSTRUCTIONS issued to COLLECTORS under the Presidency of Fort St. George, as to permanently settling the Lands; dated 15 October 1799.

EXTRACT Proceedings of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George,  
the 14th October 1799.

INSTRUCTIONS  
issued to Collectors  
under the Presidency  
of Fort St. George,  
in Oct. 1799.

READ the following draft of general Instructions, ordered to be prepared in Consultation the 9th September.

1. The following is copy of the Orders of Government, under date the 4th September last.

To William Petrie, Esquire, President, and Members of the Board of Revenue;

Gentlemen,

We have received your Report on the proposed changes in the Revenue System on the coast, and shall hereafter furnish you with our Orders thereon. In the meantime, we desire that you will prepare materials for forming a permanent settlement with the zemindars, whom it is our intention to constitute proprietors of their respective estates or zemindarries, on the best information which your records and the recent enquiries of your collectors may afford.

You are already fully informed of the principles on which the permanent settlement has been established in Bengal; and we desire, generally, that you will conform to those principles, in all cases in which it may be practicable.

You will also prepare every necessary information respecting the rights of the talookdars and under-tenantry throughout the different districts; that in confirming the proprietary rights of the zemindars, we may not violate the ascertained rights of other individuals.

In the Havelly lands, in which the property in the soil is vested immediately in government, you will prepare to form small sub-divisions or estates of from 1 to 10,000 pagodas annual jumma; and you will apportion the allotment in such estates with a due computation of their actual assets; it being our intention, where it may be practicable, to dispose of or otherwise transfer the proprietary right in all such lands to native landholders.

We are, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient servants,

Fort St. George,  
4th Sept. 1799.

(Signed)

MORNINGTON.

CLIVE.

GEO. HARRIS.

W. PETRIE.

E. W. HALLOFIELD.

2. In order that you may be able fully to comprehend the proposed new system, as resolved upon in the foregoing letter, we shall explain to you the principles of it; which, by pointing out to you the objects in view, will better enable you to furnish the requisite information in the first instance, and ultimately to carry into effect the wishes of government.

3. They may be reduced under the following general heads; viz.

Constituting the zemindars proprietors of their respective zemindarries, as estates. Concluding with them, a permanent settlement:—their estates answerable, by sale and transfer, for any deficiency in the due discharge of the public revenue. The right of talookdars, and of all other description of inhabitants, to be secured against any infringement, or in consequence of the confirmation of the zemindars or others in the proprietary right in the soil. Respecting persons declining to hold their estates on the jumma which may be assessed thereon; and disqualified landholders.

Relative to the transfer of estates, in whole or in part, from one proprietor to another, by public or private sale, gift or otherwise, and the apportioning the fixed jumma division respectively; regarding native revenue officers to keep the accounts, and furnish other information, for the purpose of government. The disposition of the havelly lands, the proprietary right in which is now vested in the government.

4. At present, the zemindars hold their zemindarries by a tenure so precarious, as to convey the least idea of property in the soil. It has been considered a session, but the public assessment has been fluctuating and arbitrary, and the zemindary liable to sequestration, in case of even a partial failure in the discharge of government. Several instances have occurred of this alternative basis, and the zemindars becoming pensioners; for it has rarely happened that they have been restored, owing to the accumulated arrears of public revenue remaining undischarged, the assets of the zemindary under management of the collector. At this period, the zemindars are in the predicament here described.

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issued to Collectors  
under the Presidency  
of Fort St. George,  
in Oct. 1799.

5. This system having been found delusive to government, and at the same time, incompatible with the general interests of the country, it has been resolved to adopt the reform introduced some years since into the Bengal provinces, by constituting the several zemindars and other landholders having individual claims to such distinction, actual proprietors of the soil or lands composing their estates, subject to such conditions as will be hereafter noted; and secured to them, under strict adherence to those conditions by regular established courts of justice;—the principles of these, will be also hereafter explained.

6. When the possession of land no longer subjects the proprietor to the disgrace he is at present liable to; and when the tenure is known to be secure, as long as the fixed public dues are regularly discharged; and that whilst they conform to the laws to be administered by the courts, there is no power in the country that can infringe their rights or property, or oppress them with impunity; there can be little doubt but land will be every where coveted, and that a considerable portion of the wealth possessed by the inhabitants, which now lies dead, or is employed in other channels, will be applied to the improvement of it.

7. In order, however, more effectually to secure this great desideratum, by giving property its chief value, by the limitation of the public demand thereon, it has been further resolved to form a settlement with each estate on a principle of permanency, calculating the same upon equitable moderate terms, according to the resources of the district; combining its present state and probable improvement in the course of a short period under the system of property and security about to take place.—The jumma, or land tax which may be deemed adequate upon this principle, to be fixed in perpetuity, and declared unalterable.

8. The object of government distinct from the consideration of the public revenue, is to ascertain and protect private rights; and the limitation of the public demand upon the lands is obviously the most important and valuable right that can be conferred on the body of the people, who are in any respect, concerned in the cultivation of the land. The measure is likewise connected with the emancipation of this class of people from the severities and oppressions of amlils, farmers and other officers necessarily employed to collect the public dues: when they are liable to frequent and arbitrary variations, it involves the happiness of the cultivators of the soil, who cannot expect to experience moderation or encouragement from their landlords, whilst they themselves are exposed to indefinite demands.—The prosperity of the commercial part of the people, equally depends upon the adoption of it; as trade and manufactures must flourish in proportion to the quantity of raw materials produced from the lands. It will render the situation of proprietor of land honourable instead of disreputable, and land will become the best, instead of the worst of property; and what is of equal importance, it will enable us to perpetuate to the people, a government of law and security, in the room of one founded on temporary expedient, and which must be either beneficial or destructive, according to the character of the individual appointed to superintend it.

9. We are aware that the landholders and cultivators on this coast, have not been accustomed to the more regular form of government which has been gradually established in Bengal; but security of property, and the numerous advantages connected with it, are benefits, of the importance of which they must soon be fully sensible, although they may not be immediately able to comprehend the causes from which they are derived.

10. We quote for your information, the following observations of the honourable court of directors, on a permanent settlement applied to Bengal, viz. “ We find it convincingly argued, that a permanent assessment, upon the scale of the present ability of the country, “ must contain in its nature, a productive principle; that the possession of property, “ and the sure enjoyment of the benefits derivable from it, will awaken and stimulate “ industry, promote agriculture, extend improvement, establish credit, and augment the “ general wealth and prosperity. Hence arises the best security, that no permanent “ diminution can be expected to take place, at least to any considerable amount. Occasional deficiencies may occur for a time, from the mismanagement of particular landholders; but it cannot be supposed that any of the lands will permanently be less productive, than at present; and as we have every reason to believe that the jumma now levied, is moderate in its total amount and properly distributed, the lands themselves, in most instances, ultimately be a sufficient security for the proportion charged upon them, with respect to losses from drought, inundation, and other casualties. These also in the present system, and usually fall upon the company themselves; but hereafter be different; because the advantages of proprietary right and secured tenure in the landholders, will on his part, afford means to support, and excite exertions. The deficiencies of bad seasons, will on the whole, be more than counterbalanced by the fruits of favourable years. There will thus be a gradual accumulation, and the policy of government continue the same; and in every step of this process, property becomes of more value; the owner of more importance; and the government acquires additional strength.—Such surely appears to be the tendency and result of an equitable fixed assessment.

“ In respect to the objections drawn from the disorder and confusion in the present system, the uncertainty of their amount; the variable indefinite rules by which the revenue is collected; the exactions and collusions thence too prevalent; the intricacies in the details of the revenue business; and the ignorance and incapacity of the zemindars, the Company willis charges these evils, so far as they exist, (and we think with great justice) “ upon

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upon the old system, as a system defective in its principle, and carrying, through all the gradation of the people, with multiplied ill effects; that character of uncertain arbitrary imposition which originated at the head. He therefore very properly contends, that reform must begin there; and that in order to simplify and regulate the demands of the landholders upon their tenants, the first step, is to fix the demand of government itself.

12. "Having thus explained our opinions on the several points which have arisen, we conclude, by stating to you, that important and arduous as we consider the measure of a perpetual settlement, and irreversible as it is in its nature, we think ourselves bound, from considerations of duty to all the interests which it concerns, to proceed to it. No conviction is stronger upon our minds, than that instability in the mode of administering our revenues, has had the most prejudicial effects upon the welfare of the provinces, upon our affairs, and the character of our government; and of all the generated evils of unsettled principles of administration, none has been more baneful than frequent variation in the assessment;—it has reduced every thing to temporary expedient, and destroyed all enlarged views of improvement. Impolitic as such a principle must be at all times, it is peculiarly so, with respect to a dependent country paying a large annual tribute, and deprived of many of its ancient supports: such a country requires especially the aid of a productive principle of management; and it is with solid satisfaction that we look to the great resources which it yet has, in its uncultivated, though excellent lands; but these lands, must be opened;—and what have all the attempts of nearly thirty years to this end produced?—what are we to expect from still leaving room for the principle of fluctuation, which has prevailed during that period, though we may profess to place succeeding change at a remoter distance?—Long leases, with a view to the equal gradual establishment of a permanent system, though recommended upon the ground of safety, we must think, would still continue, in a certain degree, the evils of the former practice. Periodical corrections in the assessments, would be, in effect, of the nature of a general increase, and tend to destroy the hope of a permanent system, with the confidence and exertion it is calculated to inspire. Had such a system been adopted twenty years ago, and fairly followed, it is not to be doubted that the produce, manufactures and commerce of the country, would at this time, have been in a more flourishing state than they are; and the people, sensible of a new order of things, of privileges, and prosperity unenjoyed before, would have risen in their character, and felt real attachment to the government from which those blessings are derived."

13. The assessment on the zemindarries is to be fixed exclusive and independent of all duties, taxes, and other collections known under the general denomination of sayer, which includes that of the alkary, or tax on the sale of intoxicating liquors and drugs.

14. This assumption of the sayer, is however not meant to include the rent derivable by the proprietor, for orchards, pasture grounds, and fisheries; or for warehouses, shops, or other buildings, the same being for the use of the ground, or, in other words, ground rent; though these have been sometimes classed under the general denomination of sayer, such rents being properly the private right of the proprietor, and in no respect, a tax or duty on commodities, the exclusive right of government.

15. It is also to be fixed exclusive of the salt revenue, and independent of all existing alienated lands, whether exempt from the payment of public revenue, with or without due authority, (the village manumias, or lands held by public and private servants in lieu of wages, excepted;) the whole of which, are to be considered annexed to the Circar lands, and declared responsible for the public revenue assessed on the zemindary.

16. All allowances of cauzees and government revenue officers, (curnums excepted,) heretofore paid by land-holders, as well as any public pensions hitherto paid through the land-holders, are to be added to the amount of curnums, and to be provided for by government, under prescribed regulations.

17. With respect to the amount of the permanent settlement to be concluded on these principles with the zemindars, you will observe that government have desired us to prepare materials for that purpose, on the best information which our records, and the recent enquiries of our collectors, may afford. In reference to the former, it has been resolved to adopt the statements of the committee of circuit as the general standard; that is, after deducting the amount of the revenue derived from sayer or internal duties, and salt included therein, which, as already noticed, are to be resumed entirely into the hands of government, the latter, to be placed under the management of the collector, and the former, to be at pleasure, collected, suspended, or abolished; taking two-thirds of the remaining gross collections upon a general calculation, as the average estimate of the fixed land-tax. We mean by this, to lay it down as a fixed principle; that each zemindary shall be assessed according to this ratio, from the accounts of the committee of circuit, as in that case, proceed to form the settlement, without further delay; but it is expected that the permanent settlement will not fall short in the gross of the aggregate committee's statements, after the deduction of the sayer and salt as above.

18. Some variation may be necessary, with respect to particular zemindars, from local considerations; and it is on this account, that we wish to avail ourselves of information you may be possessed of, or may be able to procure, in already on record, since the date of the committee of circuit's reports.

19. In allusion to these reports, it will occur to you that the accounts of the zemindars, were collected under circumstances which leave no doubt of their having under-rated the value of the districts at that period; the committee themselves admit the revenue officers from whom they were obtained, were the actually Circar servants.



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the controul or influence of the zemindars or others, whose interests rendered it an object of the first consequence, to conceal the real resources of the country, and consequently to corrupt the channels through which the committee were seeking the required information. In some instances, indeed, they were obliged to take the accounts from the zemindars themselves, and in all others, there was equal reason to believe, from the above-named cause, that they were fabricated to serve the interested purpose of the principals, who naturally regarded the enquiry that was going forward with a jealous eye, and made it a common cause among all gradations of people, to depreciate their resources as much as possible. In some situations, subsequent experience of the collections has incontrovertibly established this fact; and where this has been the case, there can be no hesitation in increasing the jumma beyond the two-thirds of the committee's statement, whilst in others, particular circumstances may render it politic to demand less, though the actual value of the districts should even exceed, as we have concluded, the committee's accounts;—such as Frontier Hill zemindaries, which may be difficult for internal management, and not easy of access; but great responsibility will attach to the opinions you may give, in recommendation of any such exceptions; and it will be expected that you fully and specifically state the grounds of them; as government will not recede from the demand, according to the general standard before stated, but on the most satisfactory explanation of its expediency.

20. In the consideration of the proposed settlement, we have not been unmindful of the famine which has intervened since the committee of circuit's reports; but above seven years have elapsed since that calamity, during which, the country has been gradually recovering from its effects; and though a further lapse of time will be necessary to its complete recovery, the fact we have noticed of the districts having been considerably under-valued by the committee, and the great advantages to be derived by the proprietary land-holders under a permanent settlement, satisfy us that they will be in general fully competent to the proposed assessment. That you may be at no loss as to the general standard we have resolved upon, we shall transmit you herewith, Extract from the Committee of Circuit Accounts, including the zemindaries in your division, shewing the deductions to be made on account of salt and sayer, and the two-thirds of the remaining gross collections.

21. The amount of sayer and salt being deducted from the gross collections before the two-thirds, (forming the last column,) are taken, the only claim to remuneration which the zemindar could advance, would be on account of the one-third which would have been left to him, had the collection of the sayer been continued in his hands; but deducting therefrom the charges, collection, the net profit, or income, supposing it to amount to even two-thirds of the sum stated by the committee of circuit, would be so inconsiderable, that we deem it to be amply provided for in the favourable terms of the permanent settlement, adverting to the sacrifice of revenue to be made by the company, by abolishing the numerous internal chokies, and to all the advantages connected therewith. You will therefore understand that the settlement is to be formed on the principle of excluding the zemindars from all interference with, or participation in the collection, or disposal of the sayer, which government assumes to itself as its indefeasible right; but allowing them a deduction in their jumma of one-tenth of the net produce from the salt, as estimated by the committee of circuit.

22. It is further to be understood, that government will impose such assessment, exclusive of the permanent settlement, as they may deem equitable, on all lands at present alienated, and paying no public revenue, which may have been, or may be proved to be held, under illegal or invalid titles, and the revenue of which, is not included in the committee's accounts. Rules will be prescribed for trying, in the regular judicial courts, the validity of the titles of persons holding, or claiming a right to hold such lands, and for determining the amount of the annual assessment to be imposed thereon by government, if exceeding a certain extent, otherwise to be considered the property of the zemindar.

23. Further rules will also be enacted in regard to all lands paying no revenue to government (the titles to which may be confirmed), in case of the grants, some of which are for life only, expiring and escheating to government, when they would also be liable to additional assessment by government, forming no part of the present resources of the district on which the permanent jumma is calculated. It is to be presumed great progress has been made, in ascertaining all alienations, in consequence of the board's orders under date 23d May 1795.

You will hereafter be furnished with a publication respecting these lands, requiring all grants to be registered within a specific period, and in default thereof, to be thenceforward declared invalid, and resumable without enquiry, unless in very peculiar cases, a sufficient cause can be shown for the omission; and to prevent all future alienations, a regular register will be formed in the first instance, and hereafter kept, of all existing alienations, noting progressively those which may be resumed, or otherwise

made at present appropriated by the zemindars and other land-holders to themselves and families, as well as all lands held by private servants and considered as forming part of the vicar land, and therewith responsible

advances in land or money, at present appropriated for the support of the same, shall be considered exclusive of and unconnected with the permanent settlement by government, should they take the conduct of it, into their own hands. In that case, to be solely applicable to that purpose.—And we desire you still to take every measure for ascertaining the particulars of each, and report them to

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our information, explaining fully at the same time, the establishment kept up, and the regulations under which this duty has been performed by the zemindars: this is not meant to include the fees and manumans of village tallians or watchers.

27. It is well known that in the Circars there are very extensive tracts of uncultivated, arable, and waste lands, forming part of every zemindary. These are to be given up in perpetuity to the zemindars, free of any additional assessment, with such encouragement to every proprietor to improve his estate to the utmost extent of his means, as is held out by the limitation of the public demand for ever, and the institution of regular judicial courts to support him in all his just rights, whether against individuals or the officers of government, who may attempt in any respect to encroach upon them. The advantages which may be expected to result, in the course of progressive improvement from these lands, will, or ought to put the zemindar upon that respectable footing as to enable him with the greatest readiness to discharge the public demand, to secure to himself and family every necessary comfort, and to have besides, a surplus to answer any possible emergency.

28. There may be instances of a zemindary having so little recovered from the effects of the famine, and subsequent mismanagement, as to be unequal at first to bear the full amount of the proposed assessment. In such case, it is our wish to be fully informed on the subject, premising, however, that nothing but the most satisfactory documents will be admitted, as the grounds for any temporary abatement on this account: but should such documents be laid before us, we shall consider within what time, under the new system, it may be reasonably expected the districts will arrive at a state of improvement competent to bear the full assessment, and in the interim, require a gradual rise, until it reach the full assessment; the several progressive demands to be specified in the annuities conferring the proprietary right in the soil, together with the dates, so that the proprietor may be equally at a certainty as to the extent of the public demand to be ultimately made upon him, as if a permanent settlement was to be concluded, at once for a specific sum. In all such cases, we shall expect the opinion of the collector, which it will be of the most material consequence to himself as well as to the public, not to offer on light grounds, but on the most diligent enquiry and personal investigation, explaining from what sources his information is derived.

29. Having constituted the zemindars proprietors of their estates, their land becomes the security to government for the due realization of the public jumma assessed thereon: Instead, therefore, of the practice which has hitherto obtained, of dispossessing the zemindar of his whole zemindary, and putting it under the management of the collector, in the event of any material failure in the public payments, such portion thereof as may be adequate to produce at the public sale, a sum equal to the deficiency, will be separated from the estate of the defaulting proprietor, a proportionate quota of his fixed jumma be attached thereto, and after due public notice, (as well to give the said proprietor a reasonable time to avert the loss of his property by the liquidation of the arrears, as to do him justice, should he persist in withholding it, by affording an opportunity of selling the lands to the best advantage,) it will be put up at public auction, and sold to the highest bidder, who with the land will purchase the right of property in the soil, and from thenceforward be considered the legal zemindar or proprietor, paying to government the quota of the public land-tax transferred therewith, while the defaulting proprietor will cease from that date, to have any right or title thereto. Specific regulations will be laid down for the guidance of the public officers in all such cases; and if the zemindar or other land-holder thinks himself, in any respect aggrieved; the courts will be at all times open, to grant him redress. As the lands improve under the new system, arrears will be less frequent; at the same time, the tenure under which it is proposed the proprietors shall hold their property, will render it daily a better security for the discharge of any balance. The industrious land-holder, sensible of the advantages placed within his power, by the improvement of his estate to whatever extent beyond his fixed permanent jumma, being effectually secured to him, will never expose himself to the above consequence, while the more dissipated and careless will feel the effects of their folly, and prove a useful example to others, at the same time, that their lands being transferred to more thrifty proprietors, the prosperity of the country will increase in proportion.

30. Rules will be established to enable the proprietors and farmers of land to realize with promptness what is justly due from their under-tenants and ryots; at the same time, they will be subject to prosecution and damages for the abuse of this authority. These rules will be substituted for the undefined power now exercised by the zemindars and farmers in the collection of their rents from their ryots; and will be enforced by the regular courts.

31. Government, you will observe, have directed that every necessary information be procured respecting the rights of the talookdars and under-tenantry throughout the different districts, that in confirming the proprietary rights of the zemindars, they may not violate the ascertained rights of other individuals.

32. That you may fully comprehend the rights of talookdars, as well as of certain descriptions of inhabitants here alluded to, we transmit you herewith copies of Bengal Regulations, to which we desire your particular attention, it being of importance that the information you may furnish with respect to any similar tenures on this coast, shall be well founded. You will therefore direct your inquiries, and render your report as complete as possible; accompanying it with means which may be produced to you in support of any such claims, and as to their validity, or otherwise, annexed to each.

33. In the event of any talookdars or others being rendered independent of their talooks forming a part of his present zemindary, a proportionate abatement will be allowed in the jumma of the latter; and if he thinks himself aggrieved, he may thereupon sue the holder of such talook or other land in the courts, with a view to recover it.

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34. Distinct from these claims, are the rights and privileges of the cultivating ryots, who though they have no positive property in the soil, have a right of occupancy as long as they cultivate to the extent of their usual means, and give to the circar or proprietor, whether in money or in kind, the accustomed portion of the produce.

35. To ensure the dues of the circar or proprietor of the estate, it has been already observed, that rules will be prescribed and administered by the judicial courts; and that the same rules will also extend protection to the ryots and under-tenants. But in order that there may be some standard of judgment between these parties, the proprietor or under-farmer will be obliged to enter into specific written agreements or pottahs with the ryots and under-tenants. The rents to be paid, by whatever rule or custom they may be regulated, to be specifically stated in the pottah, which in every possible case shall contain the exact sum to be paid. In cases where the rate only can be specified, such as where the rents are adjusted upon a measurement of the lands after cultivation, or on a survey of the crop, or when they are made payable in kind, the rate and terms of payment, and proportion of the crop to be delivered, with every condition, shall be clearly specified.

36. Every zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, will be required to prepare the form of a pottah or pottahs, conformably to the rules above prescribed, and adapted to the circumstances and usages of his estate or talook, and after obtaining the collector's approbation of it (to be signed by such officer, superscribing the form with his name and official appellation) to register a copy thereof in the adawlut of the district, and to deposit a copy also in each of the principal cutcheries in his estate or talook. Every ryot will be entitled to receive corresponding pottahs on application, and no pottahs of any other than the prescribed form, will be held valid.

37. A ryot, when his rent has been ascertained and settled, may demand a pottah from the actual proprietor of land, dependent talookdar or farmer, of whom he holds his lands, or from the person acting for him; and any refusal to deliver the pottahs, upon being proved in the court of adawlut of the district, will be punished by the court, by a fine proportioned to the expense and trouble of the ryot, in consequence of such refusal. On the other hand, it will be required of the zemindar or farmer to cause a pottah for the adjusted rent to be prepared, according to the form prescribed and tendered to the ryot, either granting the same themselves, or instructing their agents to grant them, under their special authority; and the necessary rules will be enacted to afford redress to the party acting in conformity hereto, in all cases of resistance on the part of the ryot. In all cases of farmers granting pottahs, they must of course be limited to the period of their own leases, and as estates are liable constantly to division, and partial transfer to different proprietors, some limitation of leases to be granted by proprietary landholders will also be expedient, and will probably be fixed at ten years.

38. Every proprietor of land, dependent talookdar, or farmer of land, of whatever description, and their agents of every gradation, receiving rents or revenues from dependent talookdars, under-farmers, ryots or others, are to give receipts for all sums received by them; and a receipt in full, on the complete discharge of every obligation. Any person to whom a receipt may be refused, on his establishing the same in the adawlut court of the district, will be entitled to damages from the party who received his rent or revenue and refused the receipt, equal to double the amount paid by him; and they are to adjust the instalments of the rents receivable by them from their under-renters and ryots, according to the time of reaping and selling the produce, being liable to be sued for damages for not conforming to this rule.

39. It is to be hoped, that in time the proprietary landholders, talookdars and farmers, and the ryots, will find it for their mutual advantage to enter into agreements in every instance for a specific sum, for a certain quantity of land, leaving it to the option of the latter to cultivate whatever species of produce may appear to them likely to yield the largest profit; and in the interim, to protect them against any new taxes, under any pretence whatever: the person discovered to have imposed them, will be liable to a very heavy penalty for the same. Indeed we wish to direct your attention to the impositions they are already subject to, which from their number and uncertainty, we apprehend to have become intricate to adjust, and a source of oppression. It would be desirable that the zemindars should revise the same in concert with the ryots, and consolidate the whole to one specific sum, by which the rents would be much simplified, and much inconvenience to both parties be thereby obviated in future.

40. In the event of any proprietor declining to engage for the permanent settlement of his lands at the jumma proposed to him, the collector will have to report the objections, with his opinions respecting them. The board will then order any further enquiry they may think necessary; and having finally determined on the proper assessment, the proprietor will be required to engage for it, without further delay; and in the event of refusal, which is to be given in writing, his lands are to be let in farm, or otherwise as the board of revenue may in each instance, think most expedient.

Who may thus finally decline the jumma, will receive malikanah (an allowance for the exercise of their proprietary right) at the rate of 10 per cent. on the value of their lands may be rented, if let in farm; or at the same rate on the value of the produce, if under sumpance, viz. on the net amount realized by government, after deducting malikanah, as well as other charges, out of this allowance; however, no allowance is to be made for such persons belonging to the families of the proprietors, as are mentioned hereto.

It is not meant by this regulation, to exclude the proprietors for ever from their lands, but on their consenting, at any subsequent period, to pay the equalized jumma, and

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and after the expiration of any existing leases to farmers, if their lands are let in rent, or satisfactory arrangement being made between them and the latter, whose leases are guaranteed by government, it will be at their option to be restored, and to be in every respect on the same footing with other proprietary landholders.

43. The exception to the general regulation for the conclusion of the permanent settlement with the actual proprietors of the soil, include the following descriptions of persons: females (excepting those whom the Governor in Council may judge competent to the management of their estates), minors, idiots, lunatics, or others rendered incapable of managing their lands, by natural defects or infirmities of whatever nature, and persons whom the Governor in Council may deem disqualified, on account of their contumacy or notorious profligacy of character; provided however, with regard to the whole of these descriptions, that they are not partners in the zemindarries, independent talooks, or other estates held by them, with others of a different description; in which case, themselves or guardians will be allowed with their partners to engage for the settlement of their lands, and elect a joint manager, under certain restrictions to be provided.

44. The lands of disqualified proprietors coming within the above descriptions, are to be managed for the benefit of the proprietors by the board of revenue, under prescribed regulations, including the provision to be made for the support of the proprietors.

45. While the lands of proprietors of the foregoing description, as well those who decline the jumma proposed as those disqualified, may be under the company's management, they will be exempt from sale and transfer on account of any arrears or deficiency in the collection.

46. Besides the transfer of landed property from one proprietor to another, by the sales on account of arrears of the public jumma, as before explained, the decrees of the courts of adawlut in questions of property between the proprietary landholders and individuals, when given against the former, may also attach a part of the estate, proportionate to the demand, and sell it at public auction, for the benefit of the complainant, to the entire exclusion of the original proprietor, but subject to its due proportion of the fixed jumma.

47. Estates will be further subject to division, by the privilege which will be allowed to all actual proprietors of land to transfer to whomsoever they may think proper, by sale, gift, or otherwise, their proprietary rights in the whole, or any portion of their respective estates, without applying to government for its sanction to such transfer; and all such transfers will be held valid, provided that they be conformable to the Mahomedan or the Hindoo laws (according as the religious persuasion of the parties to each transaction, may render the validity of it determinable by the former or the latter code), provided they be not repugnant to any existing regulation.

48. Proprietors of a joint, undivided estate, who may be desirous of dividing it into two or more separate estates, will be at liberty to do so, on application to the collector; or any individual may, by the same mode, have his share separated from the rest.

49. Rules will be prescribed for apportioning and adjusting the fixed jumma, in all the cases above described and the jumma so adjusted, will be declared fixed for ever; and in order to enable the officers of government to carry these rules into complete effect, and for affording government the means of discovering every deviation from them, a register will be kept of all estates paying revenue to the company, the annual revenue charged upon each of them, the names of the proprietors, and also of the transfer of estates, or of the portions of estates, of the allotment of public revenue upon such portions, and of the union of any estates which may have originally formed parts of the same zemindarry, talook, or other property; and that every such union and all such transfers, divisions, and allotments of the public revenue, may be traceable with facility at any future period. It being also requisite for financial purposes, and for the information of the courts of judicature, from or to whose jurisdiction any districts or lands may be transferred or annexed, that there should be a record of the transfer of all districts or lands from the jurisdiction of one division to another; complete quinquennial registers will be formed from the register of intermediate mutations in landed property, forms for which will be prescribed.

50. Whilst the revenue was liable to frequent variation, it was absolutely necessary that the ruling authority should have officers on the spot, to keep accounts of the produce, and to furnish information to the persons occasionally appointed to collect the revenues. The same necessity, under the circumstances of a fixed revenue, a regular code of regulations embracing and defining every matter in any respect concerning the rights or property of the people and courts of judicature, for the administration of them, will not exist; an accurate register of the lands, and of the jumma assessed on them, will be sufficient for the collection of the revenue and all financial operations. As to general or local customs, which have had the force of law, they will be included in the code; and with regard to usages of particular places or districts, the testimony of creditable inhabitants will be better evidence of them, than the information of an individual, liable to be untruthful, ignorant, or influenced by corrupt or other motives.

51. Under these circumstances, it is resolved to abolish all the revenue description above alluded to, except the village curnums or putwarries, to be on the same footing in every respect as those of Bengal; and the proprietary landholders to be in the same manner, responsible with regard to them. The accompanying copy of the regulations relating to them, will fully explain their duties, as well as the obligations of the landholders.

52. That we may have complete information of all the curnums at present existing, we desire to be furnished with a register of all those in your division, showing the names of the villages to which they respectively belong, and the allowances made them.

money, land, or fees, distinguishing and showing the amount of each; also the extent of land; and you will at the same time, point out where, in your opinion, any officer of this description may be wanting, or if in any instance there should be more than may be necessary.

53. Though it is the resolution of government to abolish all other revenue officers intermediate of the collector and curnum, it is their intention to have due consideration for the present holders, who with their families have depended on their stations for subsistence. With this view, they mean to constitute them the proprietors of the lands now held by them, subject to a fixed adequate assessment. You will therefore prepare and lay before the board, an accurate statement of all such lands, showing the extent thereof, and distinguishing the nunja, punja, arable and waste lands, and the annual gross produce for the last five years: this information to be arranged opposite to the name and official designation of each of the parties respectively, and an explanation to be annexed thereto in a column for remarks of the nature of his office, and of the length of the time he has held it, as well as of his age and general character and conduct therein. Their original sunnuds of office to be transmitted with your report, you giving them a receipt for the same, and an attested copy.

54. A proclamation will be hereafter made on similar principles to that noted in the margin, and which is copy of the one published in Bengal, upon the annunciation of the permanency of the settlement, declaring those the conditions under which it was made, and other matters connected therewith, particularly the principles on which the fixed jumma is to be apportioned, in the event of the division of any estate from whatever cause. Without such a public pledge and explanation, the terms on which the lands are to be held would be uncertain, and consequently the inducements to improvement, considerably lessened.

55. A Regulation will likewise be framed, containing all the general rules and principles of the settlements to be concluded; and which will be the standard for determining the rights of those with whom the settlement may be made, and also all disputes between the landholders, farmers, and ryots.

56. There will of course be many subsidiary regulations, which it is unnecessary to mention particularly, at this time. In the present stage of the matter, we only aim to give you a general idea of the principles of the permanent settlement, and of the objects intended by it, trusting that you will furnish your report on the zemindarries, with all practicable expedition.

57. The arguments which have been advanced in support of the good policy of constituting the zemindars actual proprietors of their estates, and of concluding with them a permanent settlement of jumma, will equally apply with respect to the lands now denominated havelly, inasmuch as that vesting the property in the soil in the natives, and limiting the public demand thereon to an ascertained permanent jumma, will tend more to the general prosperity of the country and happiness of the people, than any mode of management hitherto adopted, being the substitution of a system, which is calculated to call forth all the energy and resources of the country, by making it the interest of the native inhabitants to carry cultivation and every other improvement to the utmost extent of their means, for the uncertainty, and consequent discouragement attendant upon constant fluctuation in the public assessments, and no uniform plan of internal administration, but all resting on temporary expedient.

58. Under this consideration, government has come to the resolution of transferring to native landholders, in all practicable cases, the property which they now hold in the havelly lands; and with this view, it is their intention to parcel it out into lots competent to bear a fixed annual jumma of from 1 to 10,000 pagodas each, and to put them up to public sale, exclusive of the salt and sayer revenue, which include the abkary, or tax on the sale of intoxicating liquors and drugs, which are to be retained in the hands of government, as already explained with respect to the zemindarries: varying the lots between the above two sums, will enable a greater number of bidders to come forward adapted to the circumstances of all classes of inhabitants, above the cultivating ryots; for where one is not competent, it is most probable, such is the desire to possess landed property, that one or more will join to make the purchase; at the same time, we are rather inclined to lean to estates above than below an annual jumma of 5,000 pagodas, as being more likely to give better security for a permanent revenue; as tending more to encourage extensive improvement, and enabling the proprietor to make up deficiencies, in some, from advantages derived in villages, more favourably situated.

59. In forming the lots, you will of course pay attention to local circumstances, such as including all villages watered from one tank in one estate; each estate to be compact, not a collection of dispersed villages, as mootahs or pergunnahs sometimes are in this country. It is the wish of government to leave the construction and care of the tank and watercourses to the proprietors, who will however, to encourage improvement, be assisted with a loan of money, repayable with interest at 10 per cent. on security of their estates, and regulations for ensuring the objects for which such advances are made may be of great general importance to the country, or too extensive to be left in the charge of individual proprietors, or where there may in your opinion be any other consideration which would make it advisable for government to reserve the care and management thereof. You will state your reasons at large, at the same time, apportioning the charge to the proprietors, as far as may be practicable, for the charge to be made on the estate. The conditions of the purchase will be the same as those prescribed to the zemindars becoming



becoming proprietors of their estates, and the purchasers will be to all intents and purposes on the same footing, as well in regard to their under-tenants and ryots, as to all other regulations which will be contained in the general code; having equally in view the protection of all descriptions of inhabitants, proprietary land-holders, and those residing under them, in their just rights and privileges, and the due enforcement of the legal demands of the company, founded on the principles of the permanent settlement.

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61. One of the conditions above alluded to, and the principal security of government for the due realization of public revenue, is the lands being held answerable, by sale and transfer, under specific rules, for any deficiency thereof. This, as regards the interests of the company, is an object of the first importance in the new system; it will therefore be obvious to you, that in order to render this security efficient, the most diligent attention must be given to apportioning the allotment of public revenue on the several quotas or divisions, with a due computation of their actual assets.

62. In pointing out this duty to you, we shall not attempt to prescribe any particular line of conduct by which you are to accomplish it; for as the responsibility for the accuracy of your report, will attach entirely to yourself; and as time will evince the degree of attention you may have given to the subject, by showing the adequacy, or otherwise, of each estate, to the jumma fixed thereon; we wish to leave you at full liberty to adopt any mode of enquiry or investigation that may appear to yourself most likely to obtain the required information, only explaining the same fully to us, and forwarding any authentic documents you may procure, when you transmit your report.

This 63d paragraph not being applicable to the collectors of the Jaghire, Salem, and Kistnagherry, the following paragraphs were inserted in the general instructions to them:

To Mr. Hodgson.

In proposing the assessment on the several lots, you will no doubt avail yourself of the information to be derived from the able reports of your predecessor, and the complete revenue accounts of the produce kept for the last six years, compared with the value of the villages, when delivered over by his highness the nabob to the company. Under the permanent arrangement now resolved upon, the advantages will be so much extended, that there can be little doubt the resources of the estates will soon far exceed the present or any former state of the country. It is not however the wish of government to exceed a moderate equitable jumma.

To Captain Macleod.

To Captain Graham.

Of the Baramahal, or other districts in your division, which lately composed part of Colonel Read's charge, you possess the fullest information, and can have no difficulty in forming the division, and proposing the assessments to be paid thereon. In regard to those recently placed under your management, we can only hope you will exert yourself to obtain it, with as little delay as possible.

To Mr. Hurdie, Collector at Dindigul.

63. The information derived since your residence in the Dindigul district, as well as from the survey carrying on under your direction, will we trust furnish sufficient data for you to proceed upon, in forming the divisions and proposing the assessment to be fixed thereon; as we cannot consider the average of collections since our possession of the district, a criterion for a permanent settlement on the principles proposed. In some situations, they may have been excessive, though we apprehend this has been rarely the case (we speak of the collections brought to the public account) and in general, we conceive they have been short of the actual resources, had they been all properly applied; but under the permanent arrangement now resolved upon, the advantages will be so much greater, and the cultivation be in consequence so much extended, that there can be little doubt of the resources of the estates in a very few years far exceeding the present or any former state of the country. It is not however the wish of government to exceed a moderate equitable jumma. In regard to the conquered countries, recently placed under your authority, we rely on your exertions to procure, with as little delay as possible, the information necessary to enable government to proceed to a permanent settlement thereof.

64. Some of the lots will of course contain a larger extent of uncultivated waste lands than others; while some may possess peculiar advantages, favourable to cultivation, and the disposal of the produce, such as having a good water, and being near to the sea-coast or large towns:—all these and other affecting the value of a lot you may apportion for sale, must be ascertained in fixing the assessment.

65. It is very probable that in some instances, the improveable nature of the favourable circumstances of future avail, may make it advisable not to demand the present jumma, which may be proportionate to its computed value when in an improved state.



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a future date; but nevertheless, that it may derive all the benefit of permanency in the assessment, we think, where this is the case, it would be advisable to fix a reduced jumma at the commencement, and gradually to rise to the full assessment the progressive increase, and the periods thereof to be all specified in the bill of sale, that the purchaser may know the bounds of the demand to be made upon him in perpetuity.

66. Again, in other instances where villages may be fully cultivated, and little room for improvement left, it may be necessary to grant some abatement, and perhaps to assess comparatively at a reduced rate in perpetuity certain villages in the vicinity of hills in jungles, from which depredations have been often committed; and though it is to be expected these will in a great measure be checked, as the country becomes better regulated under the change of system, we apprehend they may never be so entirely subdued, as not to operate on the fears of the inhabitants, and to keep such villages thinly populated.

67. Reflecting on the very serious responsibility which attaches to you in the execution of this highly important duty, involving on one hand, permanent interests of your honourable employers, and on the other, the most critical consequences as affecting the future prosperity of the country and welfare of its inhabitants; we trust that every exertion will be called forth on your part, to do justice to all parties; and we strongly recommend to you to give your personal attention in carrying on the necessary enquiries and investigations, that you may possess yourself of local information of the havelly lands under your charge, of the actual situation of each village, and the lands dependent thereon, with all their advantages and disadvantages; so that when you make your report, you may be enabled to speak with that confidence which can never be derived from the mere communications of native agents, upon whose information, in such a case as the present, we should be reluctant to place much reliance. Indeed we cannot too strongly caution you against dependence on information coming through this channel; so much is it their interest to mislead you, either in concert with others or for their individual benefit, perhaps in the hope of making collusive purchases when the lands shall be offered for sale. This is not of course meant to preclude you from the assistance of native agents, as we are aware of the necessity of employing them, but to guard you against their impositions, and to impress you with the necessity of satisfying yourself personally, of every point of information.

68. It is not intended that the actual measurement of lands shall be resorted to, except in very particular cases; and these, must be reported to us with your reasons, for our previous sanction. It not being the wish of government, as before observed, to demand more than a moderate equitable jumma, it is hoped that this may be generally ascertained with a due regard to the assets present and to come of each lot, without the necessity of incurring the expense and delay of measurement.

69. That we may be making a gradual progress in the settlement and disposal of the lands in question; you will forward your report on each pergunnah as you complete the allotment and proposed assessment, with copy of all your proceedings and investigations relative thereto, that we may submit them to government; if approved, the extent of the estates, and the jumma assessed, will be advertised for sale, under the prescribed conditions, and sealed proposals invited for the purpose.

70. It is proposed to appoint judges throughout the company's districts on this coast, vesting in them the entire judicial authority within their respective jurisdictions. Provincial courts of appeal and circuit will also be instituted, at the most convenient situations relative to the zillah or district courts, to which an appeal will lie from the latter; and the Governor and Council at the presidency, in their executive judicial capacity, will compose the sudder, or supreme civil and criminal courts, to whom a further appeal will lie from the provincial courts; and ultimately, in civil suits, an appeal lies to the king in council, certain limitations and rules being in all these cases, provided to be contained in a general Code of Regulations.

71. Each judge will be also constituted the magistrate of the same jurisdiction, and in that capacity take cognizance of all criminal cases; and the court of circuit above alluded to, will at prescribed periods, make the circuit of the stations within their respective jurisdictions, for the purpose of general jail deliveries. For the conduct of this department also, the necessary rules will be provided in the general Code of Regulations.

72. It is sufficient at this time to have explained generally the constitution of these courts, referring to the future, for the detail. The regulations or laws to be comprized in our general code, are meant to extend to all probable occurrences founded on the laws and usages of the country, with certain modifications; and may be altered, rescinded, or added to, as experience shall point out to be necessary, thereby preserving all that will tend to the permanent good of the country, and gradually working out and remedying all defects.

73. Every provision will be made, as far as our political situation will allow, that all regulations shall be formed upon principles of justice, and with a due regard to local circumstances; the faithful administration thereof will be best secured, by its forming the sole duty of the judges, who will be liberally rewarded, and bound under a most solemn oath, to a strict observance of the law, and to dispense them impartially; being at the same time, liable to prosecution for having been guilty of corruption in the execution of their offices.

The power of government delegated to these courts, making them competent to decide on all civil and criminal matters whatever, will render it, together with their being employed in all financial and commercial concerns of the company, amenable to the same laws, and their acts done in their official capacity, in opposition to the existing regulations, will be decided in the same manner, as suits between individuals.

As your own credit and responsibility are so deeply involved, we need not further impress upon your mind the very great importance of the objects herein pointed out, whether

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as they relate to the permanent prosperity and happiness of the people, or the honour and interests of the English government on this coast. Where so much depends upon intelligent activity, we can only express an earnest hope, that your most strenuous endeavours will be exerted to fulfil the wishes and expectations of government, as conveyed in these instructions; and that your first consideration will be how to overcome any difficulties that may present themselves in the progress of your labours. We at the same time, feel it an indispensable duty to communicate, for your information, a recent order from the Governor General in Council, alluding to the introduction of the system in view,

76. "The conduct of the collector on this occasion, forcibly evinces the impossibility of introducing a permanent system, either of revenue or judicature, unless the collectors shall be disposed to a zealous and cordial discharge of their duty; but as the public prosperity and welfare absolutely require the introduction of that system without delay, we are determined to guard against the failure of it, by the removal of those collectors who shall be found either incapable or unwilling to execute our orders through your board; instead, therefore, of allowing much valuable time to be sacrificed in the consideration of indolent or negligent excuses, we enjoin you to point out, without hesitation, the instances in which it may become necessary to apply this effectual remedy."

Fort St. George,  
15 Oct. 1799.

We are, Sir, your obedient servants,  
(Signed) William Petrie, &c. Members.

#### A. D. 1793, REGULATION VIII.

V. First, The talookdars to be considered the actual proprietors of the lands composing their talooks, are the following:

Second, Talookdars who purchased their lands by private or at public sale, or obtained them by gift from the zemindar, or other actual proprietor of land to whom they now pay the revenue assessed upon their talooks, or from his ancestors, subject to the payment of the established dues of government; and who received deeds of sale, or gift of such land from the zemindar, or sunnuds from the Khalsa, making over to them his proprietary rights therein.

Third, Talookdars whose talooks were formed before the zemindar, or other actual proprietor of land to whom they now pay their revenue, or his ancestors, succeeded to the zemindarry.

Fourth, Talookdars, the lands comprized in whose talooks were never the property of the zemindar, or other actual proprietor of the soil to whom they now pay their revenue, or his ancestors.

Fifth, Talookdars who have succeeded to talooks of the nature of those described in the preceding clauses, by right of purchase, gift, or inheritance from the former proprietors of such talooks.

VI. The proprietors of talooks, however, who now pay the public revenue assessed upon their lands through a zemindar, or other actual proprietor of land, and whose title deeds contain a clause stipulating that their revenue is to be paid through him, shall continue to pay their revenue through such zemindar or other actual proprietor of land, as heretofore.

VII. Talookdars whose talooks are held under writings or sunnuds from zemindars, or other actual proprietors of lands, which do not expressly transfer the property in the soil, but only entitle the talookdar's possession, so long as he continues to discharge the rent, or perform the conditions stipulated therein, are considered as leaseholders only, not actual proprietors of the soil, and consequently are not entitled to be rendered independent of the zemindar, or other actual proprietor of land, from whom they derive their tenures, provided they now pay the rent assessed upon their talooks to him.

VIII. Talookdars also whose tenure is denominated junglebroory, and is of the following description, are not considered entitled to separation from the proprietors of whom they hold. The pottahs granted to these talookdars, in consideration of the grantee clearing away the jungle, and bringing the land into a productive state, give it to him and his heirs in perpetuity, with the right of disposing of it either by sale or gift, exempting him from payment of revenue for a certain term, and at the expiration of it, subjecting him to a specific assul jumma, with all increases, abwabs, and mhatoots imposed on the pergunnah generally, but this for such part of the land only as the grantee brings into a state of cultivation; and the grantee is further subject to the payment of a certain specified portion of all complimentary presents and fees which he may receive from his under-tenants, exclusive of the fixed revenue. The pottah specifies the boundaries of the land granted, but not the quantity of it, until it is brought into cultivation.

IX. The rules in Section V. respecting talooks, have also been extended to ayma lands liable to the payment of a fixed quit revenue, denominated Malguzarry ayma, and agreeably to the distinctions laid down in that Section, it has been ordered that Malguzarry ayma tenures are held under grants of the Mahomedan government, prior to the company's accession to the Dewanny, or which have been since granted by proprietors of estates for a consideration received by them, and to be separated from proprietors to whom their revenue is now paid, as coming within the spirit of the separation of talookdars, who are proprietors of the lands composing the Malguzarry ayma tenures which may appear to have been bona fide granted for the purpose of bringing waste lands into cultivation, shall continue included in the class of junglebroory talooks, which they are now annexed, as coming within the rules in Section VIII. respecting junglebroory talooks.

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X. The rules contained in the following Section have been prescribed for the guidance of the collectors in carrying into execution the rules relative to the separation of talookdars, who are the actual proprietors of the lands composing their talooks, and are declared entitled to separation.

XI. Every talookdar being considered as the rightful possessor of his talook, until a better title is established against him by due course of law; the point to be ascertained by the collectors, in carrying the above-mentioned orders into effect, is not, whether the holders of the several talooks under their authority, are the lawful possessors of the talooks held by them, but whether the nature of their tenure is such as to entitle them to separation under the rules contained in Sections V. and IX.; to ascertain which, they are to call upon the talookdars to produce their title deeds; and after having examined them, are to separate from the jurisdiction of the zemindars, or other actual proprietors of estates, those who may appear to them to be actual proprietors of the lands composing their talooks, as described in those Sections; continuing the remainder under the zemindars, or other actual proprietors, as heretofore. If a talookdar should have no title deeds to produce, the collector is to make a summary enquiry into his right to separation; and after attending to such proofs and documents as may be produced by the talookdar in support of his title to separation, and by the zemindar or other actual proprietor, in objection thereto, is to decide, according to the best of his judgment, whether such talookdar be entitled to separation or not, and conclude the settlement accordingly.

XII. The collectors are to acquaint the talookdars, whom they may adjudge not to be actual proprietors of the lands composing their talooks, and consequently continue under the zemindars or other actual proprietors, as heretofore, that if dissatisfied with their decision, they are at liberty to sue such zemindars or actual proprietors of land in the court of Dewanny adawlat of the zillah, for the right of property in their talooks; and that in the event of their establishing such right, they will be separated from such zemindars, or other actual proprietors, and allowed to pay the revenue assessed upon their talooks, to the public treasury. They are also to acquaint the zemindars, or other actual proprietors, from whose estates talooks may be separated, and who may be dissatisfied with such separation, on the grounds of the holders of such talooks not being the actual proprietors of them, and consequently not entitled to separation under Sections V. and IX., that they are at liberty to sue such talookdars in the court of Dewanny adawlat, for the right of property in their talooks; and that in the event of their establishing such right, the talooks will be replaced under them, as heretofore. The right of property in every talook, in cases where it may be disputed, will thus be tried and decided upon according to law in the court of Dewanny adawlat of the zillah; and either party dissatisfied with the decision of the judge, will have an appeal therefrom to the provincial court of appeal, and from the decision of that court to the sudder Dewanny adawlat, in cases that may be appealable to the last-mentioned court.

XIII. Talookdars ordered to be separated, are not to be permitted to pay the revenue assessed upon their lands through the zemindars, or other actual proprietors of estates, as heretofore.

XIV. Talookdars who, in consequence of the rules in Sections V. and IX., may be separated from the zemindars, or other actual proprietors of estates, through whom they heretofore paid their revenues, are to pay their revenue in future, immediately into the collector's treasury; except in districts where, from the number of talooks, or other cause, this mode would be attended with considerable inconvenience, in which case, tehsildars or native collectors are to be appointed to receive the revenue of the talooks in such districts.

XV. Zemindars or other actual proprietors of land, from whose zemindaries or estates, talooks may be separated, shall not be appointed tehsildars to receive the revenue of the talooks so separated; but the office of tehsildar shall in every instance be given to some other person of character and responsibility, and the whole expense of it, is to be defrayed by government.

XVI. Mocurrey leases to persons not the actual proprietors of the lands included in such leases, if granted or confirmed by the supreme government, or obtained previous to the company's accession to the Dewanny, are to be continued in force during the lives of the lessees, subject to an abatement of the fixed jumma for the authorized sayer resumed or abolished; but on their death, the settlement is to be made with the actual proprietor of the soil, agreeable to this Regulation.

XVII. Mocurrey grants to the actual proprietors of the soil, made or confirmed by the supreme government, are also to be continued in force, subject in like manner to an abatement of the fixed jumma on account of the resumption or abolition of the authorized sayer. The provisions contained in this Section, and Section XVI. are to be considered subject to the confirmation or revocation of the honourable court of directors.

XVIII. Talookdars holding lands of which they are not to be the actual proprietors, and whose grants have been obtained since the company's accession to the Dewanny, and have received the sanction of the supreme government, are to be disposed of as follows: In cases where the settlement is to be made with the actual proprietors of the soil, under this Regulation, in cases, however, where such mocurreydars have been in possession of their talooks for a term exceeding twelve years, they are to receive during their lives (subject to the sanction of the honourable court of directors) the difference between the jumma

at which they held the lands, and that which may be agreed to by the actual proprietors, added to the real produce of the authorized sayer resumed or abolished.

XIX. Istemrardars, however, who have not got possession of their lands to the exclusion or without the consent of the actual proprietors, as the mocurreydars mentioned in Section XVIII. are supposed to have done, but hold them of the proprietors on pottah or lease, to be considered as a species of pottah talookdars, and the settlement is to be made with them as hereafter specified.

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LXII. First, The annual revenue to be paid to government from the estates of the proprietors of land with whom a settlement has been or may be concluded, having been declared fixed for ever, and courts of justice having been established with powers to protect them against all demands exceeding that fixed revenue, whether made by the officers of government or other persons, or by the authority of government itself, and on the other hand the grounds on which deductions and abatements were heretofore occasionally obtained by proprietors of estates when their jama was liable to frequent variation, no longer existing, neither their rights nor the value of their property can be affected in future by the real produce of their estates being known. The rules therefore, hereafter prescribed, regarding putwarries, which are framed solely to facilitate the decision of suits in the courts of judicature between proprietors and farmers of lands, and persons paying rent or revenue to them, and to guard against any diminution of the fixed revenue of government, or injustice to individuals, by enabling the collectors to procure the necessary information and accounts for allotting the public jama upon estates that may be divided agreeably to the principles prescribed in Regulation I. 1793, can be objected to by those proprietors only who may have it in contemplation, in the event of the division or transfer of a portion of their estates, to deprive government of a part of the fixed revenue, or defraud some of the partners in their estates, by obtaining a disproportionate allotment of the public assessment out of the several shares, or to oppress the persons paying rent or revenues to them with impunity, by withholding from the courts of justice the documents necessary to enable them to afford redress to the complainants. It being essential to the security of the public revenue, as well as of private rights and property, and at the same time, consistent with the ancient usages of the country, and the declarations in the Proclamation announcing the public assessment on the lands fixed for ever, that government should have the means of counteracting such unjustifiable views; the following rules have been adopted:—

Second, Every proprietor of land who may not have established a putwarry in each village in his or her estate, to keep the accounts of the ryots, as required by the original rules for the decennial settlement of the three provinces, shall immediately appoint a putwarry in each village for that purpose. All proprietors of estates are to deposit in the Dewanny adawlut of the zillah, the collectors cutcherry, and the principal cutcherry in each mehul or pergunnah, a list of the putwarries in their respective estates, and the names of the villages, the accounts of which they may be severally appointed to keep. The proprietors are to notify every three months to the court and the collector, all vacancies that may occur, and the names of the persons whom they may appoint to fill them. The board of revenue are empowered to authorize any proprietor to reduce the number of putwarries, in such proportion as they may think proper, in cases in which it may appear to them unnecessary to entertain a separate putwarry for each village.

Third, The putwarries in every estate are to produce all accounts relating to the lands, produce, collections, and charges of the village or villages, the accounts of which may be kept by them respectively, and to furnish every information and explanation that may be required regarding them, whenever they may be required by any court of justice to adjust any suit that may be depending before the court, between the proprietor or farmer of the estate and the ryots, or any persons paying rent or revenue to them, or any other suit.

Fourth, The putwarries in each estate shall also produce the accounts specified in the preceding clause, and furnish every explanation and information that may be required respecting them for the allotment of the public revenue, agreeably to the principles laid down in Regulation I. 1793; in the event of the whole or any portion of the estates being directed to be disposed of at public sale, or being transferred by any private act of the proprietor or proprietors, or of the estate being ordered to be divided pursuant to a decree of a court of judicature, or where it may be a joint estate, in consequence of the request of one or more of the proprietors. But no collector is to require a putwarry to attend him, and produce his accounts, but for the purposes above mentioned, or in any other cases in which they may be expressly empowered to require them by any regulation printed and published in the manner directed in Regulation XLI. 1793. If any collector shall require the putwarry of any village or villages to attend him, and produce the village accounts for purposes or in cases in which he may not be authorized to inspect them, the court of Dewanny adawlut, upon the circumstances being represented to it by the proprietor of the estate, is empowered to make an order to prohibit the collector from requiring the accounts, and in the event of his repeating the requisition, to adjudge the collector to pay a fine to the proprietor of the estate, of such sum as to the court may appear proper, and to levy the fine in the mode in which the courts are empowered to levy fines from collectors in the suits described in Section XXXIII. Regulation XVI. 1793.

Fifth, When a collector shall require the attendance of a putwarry for the production of his accounts, either before him or any officer whom he may depute for the purpose, he is to serve such putwarry with a written notice under his official signature and the seal of the zillah, to attend with the accounts required, which are to be particularized in the notice.

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If he shall omit to attend with the accounts by the limited time, and shall not show good cause to the collector for the omission, the collector is authorized to represent the circumstances through the vakeel of government to the court of Dewanny adawlut of the zillah, the judge of which, provided there shall appear to him sufficient cause for so doing, may order such putwarry to be committed to close custody, until he produces the accounts. The courts are to observe the same process with putwarries who may omit to attend with their accounts when required, for the adjustment of any matter or dispute depending before the courts.

Sixth, Putwarries shall be required to swear to the truth of the accounts they may produce, when deemed necessary; and in the event of the collector having occasion to proceed in person, or to depute an officer to examine any village accounts on the spot, the judge, upon application being made to him for that purpose by the collector, through the vakeel of government, may grant to him or to such officer, a commission to swear the several putwarries whose accounts are to be inspected, inserting in the commission, the name of each putwarry to be sworn. If the collector shall have occasion to examine the accounts of a putwarry at the station at which the court may be established, he is to cause him to be sworn before the court, if he shall judge it necessary to require him to make oath to the truth of his accounts.

Seventh, If a putwarry who shall have sworn to the truth of any account that he may have been required to produce before a court of justice, for the purpose of deciding any matter before the court, and the accounts shall afterwards be found to have been fabricated or altered, or not to be the true accounts, the judge of the court is empowered to commit him to be tried for perjury before the court of circuit.

Eighth, If a putwarry shall have been sworn before a judge, or before a collector, or the officer of a collector, to any accounts that he may have been required to produce before the collector or his officer, in a case in which the collector may have been empowered to require him to produce such accounts, and the accounts shall afterwards appear to have been fabricated or altered, or not to be the true accounts, the collector is empowered to employ the vakeel of government to prosecute such putwarry for perjury, in the case specified in this and the preceding clause. If it shall be proved to the satisfaction of the court, that the accounts were fabricated, altered, and exchanged by the orders, or with the knowledge or connivance of the proprietor or farmer of the estate, the court shall impose such fine upon the proprietor or farmer so offending, as may appear to it proper, upon a consideration of the case, and the situation and circumstances of the offender.

Ninth, Upon the accounts of any village being ordered to be produced, if it shall be found that no putwarry has been appointed to keep the accounts of the ryots in conformity to the rules prescribed in clause second, the court, provided it be a case in which the requisition of the accounts may be authorized, shall fine the proprietor for the first offence, in such sum as it may judge proper, upon a consideration of his or her situation and circumstances, and the nature of the case; and for the second offence, twice the amount of the fine for the first; and for the third and every subsequent offence, double the amount of the preceding one. If the accounts shall have been required by the collector, he is to order the vakeel of government to sue the proprietor on the part of government under this section, for a breach of the rule in clause second.

Tenth, The rules contained in this section are hereby equally applicable to dependent talooks as to estates paying revenue immediately to government.

#### A. D. 1793. REGULATION I.

A REGULATION for enacting into a Regulation certain Articles of a Proclamation, bearing date the 22d March 1793:—Passed by the Governor General in Council on the 1st May 1793; corresponding with the 1st Bysaak 1200, Bengal era; the 6th Bysaak 1200 Fushly; the 21st Bysaak 1200 Willaity; the 6th Bysaak 1850 Sumbut; and the 19th Ramzaan 1207 Higeree.

The following Articles of the Proclamation relative to the limitation of the public demand upon the lands, addressed by the Governor General in Council to the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land paying revenue to government, in the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, is hereby enacted into a Regulation, which is to have force and effect from the 22d March 1793, the date of the Proclamation.

II. Proclamation, Art. 1.—In the original Regulations for the decennial settlement of the public revenues of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, passed for these provinces respectively on the 18th September 1780, the 25th November 1780, and the 10th February 1790, it was notified to the proprietors of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement might be concluded, that the jumma assessed upon their lands under those Regulations, would be continued after the expiration of the ten years, and remain unalterable for ever, provided such continuance should meet with the approbation of the honourable Court of Directors for the affairs of the East India Company, and not otherwise.

III. The Marquis Cornwallis, knight of the most noble order of the garter, Governor General in Council, now notifies to all zemindars, independent talookdars, and other proprietors of land paying revenue to government, in the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, that he has been empowered by the honourable Court of Directors for the affairs of the East India Company, to declare the jumma which has been or may be assessed upon their lands, under the Regulations above mentioned, fixed for ever.

IV. Art. 3.



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IV. Art. 3.—The Governor General in Council accordingly declares to the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been concluded under the Regulations above mentioned, that at the expiration of the term of the settlement, no alteration will be made in the assessment which they have respectively engaged to pay, but that they and their heirs and lawful successors will be allowed to hold their estates at such assessment, for ever.

V. Art. 4.—The lands of some zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, having been held khas, or let in farm, in consequence of their refusing to pay the assessment required of them under the Regulations above mentioned, the Governor General in Council now notifies to the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, whose lands are held khas, that they shall be restored to the management of their lands, upon their agreeing to the payment of the assessment which has been or may be required of them, in conformity to the Regulations above mentioned, and that no alteration shall afterwards be made in that assessment; but that they and their heirs and lawful successors shall be permitted to hold their respective estates at such assessment, for ever; and he declares to the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of lands, whose lands have been let in farm, that they shall not regain possession of their lands before the expiration of the period for which they have been farmed (unless the farmers shall voluntarily consent to make over to them the remaining term of their lease, and the Governor General in Council shall approve of the transfer); but that at the expiration of that period, upon their agreeing to the payment of the assessment which may be required of them, they shall be reinstated; and that no alteration shall afterwards be made in that assessment, but that they and their heirs and lawful successors shall be allowed to hold their respective estates at such assessment, for ever.

VI. Art. 5.—In the event of the proprietary right in lands that are or may become the property of government, being transferred to individuals, such individuals and their heirs and lawful successors shall be permitted to hold the lands at the assessment at which they may be transferred, for ever.

VII. Art. 6.—It is well known to the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, as well as to the inhabitants of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa in general, that from the earliest times until the present period, the public assessment upon the lands has never been fixed; but that according to established usage and custom, the rulers of these provinces have from time to time, demanded an increase of assessment from the proprietors of land; and that for the purpose of obtaining this increase, not only frequent investigations have been made to ascertain the actual produce of their estates, but that it has been the practice to deprive them of the management of their lands, and either to let them in farm, or to appoint officers on the part of government to collect the assessment immediately from the ryots. The honourable Court of Directors considering these usages and measures to be detrimental to the prosperity of the country, have, with a view to promote the future ease and happiness of the people, authorized the foregoing declarations; and the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, with or on the behalf of whom a settlement has been or may be concluded, are to consider these orders fixing the amount of the assessment as irrevocable, and not liable to alteration by any persons whom the Court of Directors may hereafter appoint to the administration of their affairs in this country.

The Governor General in Council trusts that the proprietors of land, sensible of the benefits conferred upon them, by the public assessment being fixed for ever, will exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands, under the certainty that they will enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry; and that no demand will ever be made upon them, or their heirs or successors, by the present or any future government, for an augmentation of the public assessment, in consequence of the improvement of their respective estates.

To discharge the revenues at the stipulated periods without delay or evasion, and to conduct themselves with good faith and moderation towards their dependent talookdars and ryots, are duties at all times indispensably required from the proprietors of land; and a strict observance of those duties, is now more than ever incumbent upon them, in return for the benefits which they will themselves derive from the orders now issued. The Governor General in Council therefore expects that the proprietors of land will not only act in this manner themselves, towards their dependent talookdars and ryots, but also enjoin the strictest adherence to the same principles, in the persons whom they may appoint to collect the rents from them. He further expects, that without deviating from this line of conduct, they will regularly discharge the revenue in all seasons; and he accordingly notifies to them, that in future no claims or applications for suspensions or remissions, on account of drought, inundation, or other calamity of seasons, will be attended to; but that in the event of any zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been or may be concluded, or his or her heirs or successors failing in the punctual discharge of the public revenue, which has been or may be assessed upon their lands under the above-mentioned Regulations, the whole of the lands of the defaulter, or such portion of them as may be sufficient to make good the arrears, will positively and invariably take place.

VIII. Art. 7.—To prevent any misconception of the foregoing Articles, the Governor General in Council thinks it necessary to make the following declarations to the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land.

First, It being the duty of the ruling power to protect all classes of people, and more particularly



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particularly those who from situation are most helpless, the Governor General in Council will, whenever he may deem it proper, enact such regulations as he may think necessary for the protection and welfare of the dependent talookdars, ryots, and other cultivators of the soil; and no zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, shall be entitled on this account, to make any objection to the discharge of the fixed assessment which they have respectively agreed to pay.

- Second, The Governor General in Council having on the 28th of July 1790, directed the sayer collections to be abolished, a full compensation was granted to the proprietors of land for the loss of revenue sustained by them in consequence of this abolition; and he now declares, that if he should hereafter think it proper to re-establish the sayer collections, or any other internal duties, and to appoint officers on the part of government to collect them, no proprietor of land will be admitted to any participation thereof, or be entitled to make any claims for remissions of assessment on that account.

Third, The Governor General in Council will impose such assessment as he may deem equitable, on all lands at present alienated, and paying no public revenue, which have been, or may be proved to be held under illegal or invalid titles. The assessment so imposed, will belong to government, and no proprietor of land will be entitled to any part of it.

Fourth, The jumma of those zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, which is declared fixed in the foregoing articles, is to be considered entirely unconnected with and exclusive of any allowances which have been made to them in the adjustment of their jumma, for keeping up manahs or police establishments, and also of the produce of any lands which they may have been permitted to appropriate for the same purpose; and the Governor General in Council reserves to himself the option of resuming the whole or part of such allowances, or produce of such lands, according as he may think proper, in consequence of his having exonerated the proprietors of land from the charge of keeping the peace, and appointed officers on the part of government to superintend the police of the country. The Governor General in Council however declares, that the allowance or produce of lands which may be resumed, will be appropriated to no other purpose but that of defraying the expense of the police, and that instructions will be sent to the collectors, not to add such allowances, or the produce of such lands, to the jumma of the proprietors of land, but to collect the amount from them, separately.

Fifth, Nothing contained in this Proclamation shall be construed to render the lands of the several descriptions of disqualified proprietors, specified in the first article of the Regulations regarding disqualified landholders, passed on the 15th July 1791, liable to sale, for any arrears which have accrued or may accrue on the fixed jumma that has been or may be assessed upon their lands under the above-mentioned Regulations for the decennial settlement; provided that such arrears have accrued or may accrue during the time that they have been or may be dispossessed of the management of their lands, under the said Regulations of the 15th July 1791. It is to be understood, however, all or any of the descriptions of disqualified landholders, specified in the first article of the last-mentioned Regulations, shall be permitted to assume or retain the management of their lands, in consequence of the ground of their disqualification no longer existing, or of the Governor General in Council dispensing with, altering, or abolishing those Regulations; the lands of such proprietors will be held responsible for the fixed jumma that has been or may be assessed thereon from the time that the management may devolve upon them, in the same manner as the lands of all actual proprietors of land, who are declared qualified for the management of their estates, and also of all actual proprietors who are unqualified for such management, by natural or other disabilities, but do not come within the descriptions of disqualified landholders specified in the first article of the Regulations of the 15th July 1791,—are and will be held answerable for any arrears that are or may become due from them on the fixed jumma, which they or any persons on their behalf, have engaged or may engage to pay under the above-mentioned Regulations for the decennial settlement.

IX. Art. 8.—That no doubt may be entertained whether proprietors of land are entitled, under the existing Regulations, to dispose of their estates without previous sanction of government, the Governor General in Council notices to the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, that they are privileged to transfer to whomsoever they may think proper, by sale, gift or otherwise, their proprietary rights in the whole or any portion of their respective estates, without applying to government for its sanction to the transfer; and that all such transfers will be held valid, provided that they be conformable to the Mahomedan or the Hindoo laws (according as the religious persuasions of the parties to each transaction, may render the validity of it, determinable by the former or the latter code), and that they be not repugnant to any regulations now in force, which have been passed by the British Administration, or to any regulations that they may hereafter enact.

From the limitation of the public demand upon the lands, the net income, and consequently the value (independent of increase of rent, attainable by improvements) of any such property, for the assessment on which a distinct engagement has been or may be entered into between government and the proprietor, or that may be separately entered into by the proprietor with other estates belonging to the same proprietor, which may be offered for public or private sale entire, will always be ascertained by a comparison of the amount of the fixed jumma assessed upon it, (which, according to the foregoing regulations, is to remain unalterable for ever, to whomsoever the land may be transferred) with the whole of its produce, allowing for the charges of management.—But it is also essential that a total and complete discharge of the principles

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upon which the fixed assessment charged upon any such estate will be apportioned on the several divisions of it, in the event of the whole of it being transferred, by public or private sale or otherwise, in two or more lots, or of a portion of it being transferred in one, or in two or more lots, or of its being joint property, and a division of it being made amongst the proprietors; otherwise, from the want of a declared rule for estimating the proportion of the fixed jumma with which the several shares would be chargeable in such cases, the real value of each share would be uncertain, and consequently the benefits expected to result from fixing the public assessment upon the lands, would be but partially obtained.—The Governor General in Council has accordingly prescribed the following rules for apportioning the fixed assessment in the several cases above mentioned; but as government might sustain a considerable loss of revenue by disproportionate allotments of the assessment, were the apportioning of it, in any of the cases above specified, to be left to the proprietors, he requires that all such transfers or divisions as may be made by the private act of the parties themselves, be notified to the collector of the revenue of the zillah in which the lands may be situated, or such other officer as government may in future prescribe, in order that the fixed jumma assessed upon the whole estate, may be apportioned on the several shares, in the manner hereafter directed; and that the names of the proprietors of each share, and the jumma charged thereon, may be entered upon the public registers; and that separate engagements for the payment of the jumma assessed upon each share, may be executed by the proprietors, who will thenceforward be considered as actual proprietors of land; and the Governor General in Council declares, that if the parties to such transfers or divisions, shall omit to notify them to the collector of the revenue of the zillah, or such other officer as may be hereafter prescribed for the purposes before mentioned, the whole of such estate, will be held responsible to government for the discharge of the fixed jumma assessed upon it, in the same manner as if no such transfer or division had ever taken place.—The Governor General in Council thinks it necessary further to notify, in elucidation of the declarations contained in this article (which are conformable to the principles of the existing Regulations) that if any zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, shall dispose of a portion of his or her lands as a dependant talook, the jumma which may be stipulated to be paid by the dependant talookdar, will not be entered upon the records of government; nor will the transfer exempt such lands from being answerable, in common with the remainder of the estate, for the payment of the public revenue assessed upon the whole of it, in the event of the proprietor, or his or her heirs or successors, falling in arrear, from any cause whatever; nor will it be allowed in any case, to affect the rights or claims of government, any more than if it had never taken place.

First, In the event of the whole of the lands of a zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been or may be concluded under the Regulations above mentioned, being exposed to public sale by the order of the Governor General in Council, for the discharge of arrears of assessment, or in consequence of the decision of a court of justice, in two or more lots, the assessment upon each lot shall be fixed at an amount which shall bear the same proportion to its actual produce, as the fixed assessment upon the whole of the lands sold, may bear to the whole of their actual produce. This produce shall be ascertained in the mode that is or may be prescribed by the existing Regulations, or such other regulations as the Governor General in Council may hereafter adopt; and the purchaser or purchasers of such lands, and his or her or their heirs and lawful successors, shall hold them at the jumma at which they may be so purchased, for ever.

Second, When a portion of the lands of a zemindar, talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been or may be concluded under the Regulations before mentioned, shall be exposed to public sale by order of the Governor General in Council, for the liquidation of arrears of settlement, or pursuant to the decision of a court of justice, the assessment upon such lands, if disposed of in one lot, shall be fixed at an amount which shall bear the same proportion to their actual produce, as the fixed assessment upon the whole of the lands of such proprietor, including those disposed of, may bear to the whole of their actual produce. If the lands sold be disposed of in two or more lots, the assessment upon each lot shall be fixed at an amount which shall bear the same proportion to its actual produce, as the fixed assessment upon the whole of the lands of such proprietor, including those sold, may bear to the whole of their actual produce, the actual produce of the whole of the lands of such proprietor, whether the portion of them which may be sold be disposed of in one, or in two, or more lots, shall be ascertained in the mode that is or may be prescribed by the existing Regulations, or such other regulations as the Governor General in Council may hereafter enact; and the purchaser or purchasers of such lands, and his or her or their heirs or successors, will be allowed to hold them at the jumma at which they may be so purchased, for ever; and the remainder of the public jumma, which will consequently be payable by the former proprietor of the whole estate, on account of the portion of it that may be left in his or her possession, shall continue unalterable for ever.

Third, When a zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, with or on behalf of whom a settlement has been or may be concluded, shall divide the whole of his or her estate in two or more distinct portions to two or more persons, or a portion thereof to one person, or two or more persons in joint property, by private sale, or otherwise, the assessment upon each distinct portion of such estate, so transferred, shall be fixed at an amount which shall bear the same proportion to its actual produce as the assessment upon the whole of the estate of the transferring proprietor, of which the portion may be so transferred, may bear to the whole of its actual produce. This produce shall

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shall be ascertained in the mode that is or may be prescribed in the existing Regulations, or such other regulations as government may hereafter adopt, and the person or persons to whom such lands may be transferred, and his or her or their heirs and lawful successors, shall hold them at the jumma at which they may be so transferred, for ever; and where only a portion of such estates shall be transferred, the remainder of the public jumma, which will consequently be payable by the former proprietor of the whole estates, on account of the lands that may remain in his or her possession, shall be continued unalterable for ever.

Fourth, Whenever a division shall be made of lands, the settlement of which has been or may be concluded with or on behalf of the proprietor or proprietors, and that are or may become the joint property of two or more persons, the assessment upon each share shall be fixed at an amount which shall bear the same proportion to its actual produce, as the fixed jumma assessed upon the whole of the estate divided, may bear to the whole of its actual produce. This produce shall be ascertained in the mode that is or may be prescribed by the existing Regulations, or such other regulations as the Governor General in Council may hereafter adopt, and the \* shares and their heirs and lawful successors shall hold their respective shares at the jumma which may be so assessed upon them for ever.

XI. Art. 10.—The following rules are prescribed respecting the adjustment of the assessment on the lands of zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, whose lands are or may be held khas, or let in farm, in the event of their being disposed of by public sale, or transferred by any private act of the proprietor, or of their being joint property, and a division of them taking place amongst the proprietors.

First, If the whole or a portion of the lands of a zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, who may not have agreed to the payment of the assessment proposed to him or her, under the Regulations above-mentioned, and whose lands are or may be held khas, or let in farm, shall be exposed to public sale, in one, or in two or more lots, pursuant to the decree of a court of justice, such lands, if khas, shall be disposed of at whatever assessment the Governor General in Council may deem equitable, and the purchaser or purchasers of such lands, and his or her or their heirs and lawful successors, shall hold the lands at the assessment at which they may be purchased, for ever; if the lands, at the time of their being exposed to sale, shall be held in farm, and shall be put up in one, or in two or more lots, they shall be disposed of under the following conditions: The purchaser or purchasers shall receive, during the unexpired part of the term of the lease of the farmer, whatever such proprietor shall have been entitled to receive, in virtue of his or her proprietary rights, on account of the lands so purchased; and such purchaser or purchasers shall engage to pay, at the expiration of the lease of the farmer, such assessment, on account of the lands, as government may deem equitable. The sum to be received by the purchaser or purchasers, during the unexpired part of the term of the lease of the farmer, and the jumma to be paid by such purchaser or purchasers, after the expiration of the lease, shall be specified at the time of the sale, and such purchaser or purchasers, and his or her or their heirs and lawful successors, shall be allowed to hold the lands at the assessment at which they may be so purchased, for ever.

Second, If a zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, whose lands are or may be held khas, or let in farm, shall transfer by private sale, gift, or otherwise, the whole or a portion of his or her lands, in one, or in two or more lots, the person or persons to whom the lands may be so transferred, shall be entitled to receive from government (if the lands are held khas) or from the farmer (if the lands are let in farm) the malicannah to which the former proprietor was entitled on account of the lands so transferred. Persons to whom such lands may be so transferred, will stand in the same predicament as the zemindars, independent talookdars, or other actual proprietors of lands mentioned in the fourth article, whose lands are held khas, or have been let in farm, in consequence of their refusing to pay the assessment required of them under the before-mentioned Regulations for the decennial settlement, and the declarations contained in that article, are to be held applicable to them.

Third, In the event of a division being made of lands that are or may become the joint property of two or more persons, and which are or may be held khas, or let in farm, the proprietors of the several shares will stand in the same predicament, with regard to their respective shares, as the zemindars, independent talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, specified in the fourth article, whose lands have been let in farm or are held khas, in consequence of their having refused to pay the assessment required of them under the before-mentioned Regulations for the decennial settlement; and the declarations contained in that article, are to be considered applicable to them.

Approved; and ordered, that each collector be addressed accordingly.

## Appendix, No. 19.

LETTER from Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, to Captain Alexander Read, Superintendent of the Revenues in the Barahmah Country, dated 31st March 1792.

Sir,

**L**ORD Cornwallis conceiving it doubtful whether it may be altogether convenient for the Madras government to appoint collectors immediately, for the management of the ceded countries, has formed the intention of having them placed under your immediate charge, not only from the experience you have had in that branch of business, but from the convenience that attends the measure, on account of your being already desired to march with the necessary force, and take possession of the posts ceded in the Barahmah.

Letter from Lieut. Col. B. Close, of 31 March 1792.

In pursuance therefore of the intention above mentioned, his lordship hereby nominates you to be collector and manager, on the part of the Honourable Company, of all the revenue concerns in the ceded districts, contained in the Barahmah and the Salem country, including the Nancul, from the 16th day of the present month, which is the date of the treaty of peace concluded with the nabob Tippoo Sultann, until the end of the present year, when it is proposed that collectors shall be appointed by government for the said concerns, from the list of civil servants.

When you proceed to the Barahmah therefore, agreeably to former instructions, his lordship wishes you to be prepared and provided to enter on the office in the best manner possible, prepared with such authentic information as can be gathered together, respecting the real annual produce of the districts that are to come under your management:—a point that you must spare no pains to ascertain with precision, and without delay; and provided with such number of accountants and subordinate instruments from amongst the natives, on whose integrity you can place reliance, as the effectual execution of your arrangements may require.

The officers attached to you at present as assistants, his lordship is in hopes will contribute largely to your aid. However, as you will have concerns of a wide extent to arrange and settle, his lordship proposes to send you from head quarters, to be employed under your directions in the revenue branch, Lieutenant William Macleod, whose merits are not unknown to you, and who, from having long maintained a constant intercourse with the natives, in which he has become familiar with their languages, customs and manners, promises to afford you the fullest satisfaction.

In nominating you to an office of such high trust and importance, and so difficult to execute with propriety and success, as that now conferred upon you, his lordship thinks it unnecessary to advert to the reliance he places in your zeal, integrity and abilities; the ready selection he has made of you on the present occasion, being a sufficient proof of the opinion he entertains of you, in those respects.

In entering upon your charge however, he desires you will hold it constantly in view, as a leading principle never to be departed from, that neither the Company nor Tippoo Sultann has any claim on the ceded countries, for arrears of any denomination, connected with any period previous to the 16th of the present month, the date of the treaty of peace as aforementioned; and his lordship is the more particular in marking this circumstance to you, from thinking it not improbable but since that date, persons subject to Tippoo's government may have driven off, or shown themselves desirous of driving off, cattle or inhabitants, or removing the implements of husbandry from the ceded districts.

Such a conduct on their parts, his lordship wishes me to intimate, it must be your particular, care to ascertain and resist; referring cases of doubt or difficulty to the head quarters or to government.

Under the change of government that is occasioned by the cession, it is but natural that the inhabitants should be for a time, impressed with doubts and fears.

On similar occasions amongst the native governments, the old master generally exacts what rapacity suggests, and the new one, seldom fails to insist, with a rigorous hand, on the discharge of long arrears. The villagers therefore, ignorant of the just and moderate intentions of the English government towards them, may from apprehension, be disposed to abandon their habitations, and keep aloof amongst the hills, to the great detriment of the districts, till they can inspect the system of your management, and receive encouragement from it, to draw them from their retreats; while, on the other hand, some of the poor of inhabitants, may be willing to subject themselves to imposition, rather than fly their former masters.

On these accounts, his lordship enjoins you to use the earliest and most effectual means possible, to inspire the inhabitants at large, and particularly the villagers, with an adequate confidence in the English government, giving them such explanations yourself, or through your European assistants, as may tend to remove every ground of apprehension on the above points; and taking every precaution that none of your native followers may fall themselves of the diffidence and timidity of the villager, to subject him to the exorbitant demands.

Letter from Lieut. Col.  
B. Close, of 31 March  
1792.

These matters of regulation, his lordship has little doubt, your own experience would have suggested to you. However, his solicitude for the welfare and improvement of our new acquisitions, in which the credit of government and the interest of the company are so materially concerned, would not permit him to refrain from having them detailed.

Major Cuppage is directed to receive charge of the posts ceded in the Salem and Nancul districts; and you will be informed when he gets possession of them, that you may proceed to settle those districts accordingly.

To the above, his lordship has at present, little to add. He has directed me to repeat his former instructions to you, to correspond with government and head quarters on every material circumstance that may occur connected with your employments; and to subjoin his hopes, that from your experience, and the success that has attended your arrangements and exertions in the revenue branch; your knowledge of the languages; and the qualifications of your European assistants, you will not only be able to regulate a just and effectual system of revenue management for the districts under your charge, but that principles of improvement may be derived from your regulations hereafter, for the better management of other countries subject to the company's government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Head Quarters,  
Camp near Buckelly, 31st March 1792.

B. Close,  
Adj<sup>t</sup> Gen<sup>l</sup> to the Army.

• EXTRACT of Letter from Governor General to Court of Directors;  
dated 2d May 1792.

Important as our late acquisitions are, in every point of view, I am exceedingly anxious that no means should be omitted to introduce and establish a system for their management, which shall be calculated to promote the happiness of the people, and to secure to the company all the substantial advantages of their revenue and commerce.

Being well acquainted with Sir Charles Oakeley's public spirit and zeal for your service, I know that I can depend upon him for doing his utmost to fulfil my wishes and expectations; but I cannot conceal from you, that from many circumstances which have come under my own observation, as well as from the present wretched state of the company's Jaghire, and of the Northern Circars, that have been so long under the management of the government of Port St. George, I am not without my apprehensions of his meeting with some difficulty in finding gentlemen amongst the company's civil servants at that presidency, possessed of all the qualifications that could be wished for discharging properly the duties of collectors and managers of the newly acquired countries that will be annexed to their territorial possessions. I must however, in justice to the civil servants at Madras, declare that those apprehensions are not founded upon my entertaining any doubts that a number of them, are men of great private honour and good talents. But unluckily, few of them are acquainted with the country languages, and are therefore obliged, both from habit and necessity, to allow the management of their official, as well as their own private business, to fall into the hands of dubashes, a description of people in the Carnatic, who, with very few exceptions, are calculated for being the most cruel instruments of rapine and extortion in the hands of unprincipled masters, and even of rendering (by the artifices and the ascendancy that they acquire over men who are forced to depend implicitly upon them for transacting their business) the most upright and humane intentions on the part of masters of different characters, perfectly useless to the interests of the company, and to the unfortunate natives who happen to be within the reach of their power or influence.

I am sorry to say, that as your Bombay servants have had no experience in the management of revenue, or in superintending the administration of justice amongst the natives in the country, my expectations are still less sanguine that gentlemen will be found at that presidency, properly qualified to manage to advantage our newly acquired possessions on the coast of Malabar. But I can rely upon General Abercromby for selecting men, on whose honour and good intentions he can depend; and who at the same time, possess the greatest share of the other necessary qualifications.

## Appendix, No. 20.

REPORTS, AND EXTRACTS OF REPORTS, FROM COLLECTORS,  
On the mode of conducting a RYOTWAR SETTLEMENT; and explanatory of  
SURVEYS and ASSESSMENTS.

Extract Proceedings of the BOARD of REVENUE, at Fort St. George,  
the 5th January 1807.

To the President and Members of the Board of Revenue.

Gentlemen,

Par. 1. I HAD, some time ago, the honour to receive your letter of the 9th September last, with a copy of an extract from the honourable Court of Directors, dated the 6th November 1805, and of the minutes of government thereon, dated the 1st August 1806; and I shall now, agreeably to the orders of the Board, give as circumstantial an explanation of the manner in which the kulwar, or individual settlement, is made, as the subject seems to require.

REPORTS, &c. from  
Collectors, on a Ryotwar Settlement.

Letters from the Principal Collector of the Ceded Districts, 30 Nov. 1806.

2. This kind of settlement, though it appears intricate and laborious, is so greatly facilitated by a variety of causes, as to render the execution of it easy, to any person of common attention. It is the ancient and universal practice under all the native governments; and hence the collector has no trouble of introducing a new system, but has only to follow that which he finds already established.

Districts are divided into villages under the management of potails, or head farmers, who are, from long habit, perfectly capable of making the settlement of their respective villages; and the ryots, from having been long accustomed to be guided by them, readily agree to what they fix or propose, as it is usually what they themselves know to be the proper rent.

In all villages, the ryots are in the habit of meeting and debating upon the subject of rent; but there are many villages in which they settle among themselves the exact proportion of the whole rent that each individual is to pay; these are called, Veespuddi, or sixteenth villages, from the land and rent being divided into sixteenth shares; and they compose a considerable part of the Cuddapah province, which is about one third of the Ceded Districts, besides being scattered, though more thinly, over other parts of the country. When the season of cultivation draws near, all the ryots of the veespuddi village assemble to regulate their several rents for the year. The pagoda is the place usually chosen for this purpose, from the idea that its sanctity will render their engagements with each other, the more binding. They ascertain the amount of the agricultural stock of each individual, and of the whole body, the quantity of land, to the culture of which it is adequate; and they divide it accordingly, giving to each man the portion which he has the means of cultivating, and fixing his share of the rent; and whether his share be one or two sixteenths, he pays this proportion, whether the whole rent of the village be higher or lower, than last year.

Every village is, in fact, a small collectorate; and where the potail does his duty, the collector has only to confirm what he has already done. From all these circumstances, together with the aid which is derived from the tehsildars and their cutcheries, the kulwar settlement, which on the first view, might appear to be an endless task, is so much simplified, that it may be accomplished by any person of ordinary talents and exertion.

3. The chief obstacles in the way of it, arise from false accounts, from doubts concerning the rate of assessment, and from the difficulty of ascertaining the condition of the poorer ryots. There is perhaps no curmuree, who in any one year, ever gives a perfectly true statement of the cultivation of his village; and it is only the fear of removal or suspension, that can make him give such accounts as are tolerably accurate. The proper rate of assessment is found, either by reference to the accounts of former years, or by comparison with the rent of lands of the same quality which have long been nearly stationary; and the condition of the poorer ryots is learned, from the concurring testimony of their neighbours, who at the same time not exaggerate their poverty, lest the remissions which may in consequence be granted, fall upon themselves. A short explanation of what takes place in the kulwar settlement of a single district or tehsildarri, will equally apply to the whole number of districts forming a collectorate. I shall here speak of a district, in its ordinary state of prosperity, not of one that has been reduced below it, by war, or any other calamity.

4. A district paying a revenue of fifty thousand pagodas, usually contains about a hundred villages, differing greatly in extent and produce; some of them, not paying more than a few hundred pagodas, and others, as much as five thousand annual rent. Every village has itself a complete establishment of hereditary revenue servants; a potail to direct the collection of the rent, and manage its affairs in general; a curmuree to keep the accounts



REPORTS, &c. from  
Collectors, on a Ryot-  
war Settlement.

Letter from the prin-  
cipal Collector of the  
Ceded Districts.

certain number of peons to act under the potail, in collecting the kists from the ryots. When the ploughing season begins, the potail ascertains what land each ryot can cultivate; he permits those who may have met with losses to relinquish a part of their land, which he distributes to others, who may be willing to take it; and to such as require none, he continues their former lands. He does not fix their rents, because this is done by the collector, when the season is so far advanced that a judgment can be formed of the crop; but he assures them, that their respective rents will continue the same as last year, only making allowance for such alterations as may become unavoidable, from the total revenue of the village being somewhat raised or lowered by the collector: they are satisfied with this promise, receive betel from him, as a confirmation of it, and yoke their ploughs. Specific written engagements cannot be made with them at this early period of the year, because, as in annual settlements, where the failure of the crop is great, remissions must be allowed; so where the produce is uncommonly abundant, increase must be taken to balance such failures, because the potail having relations and friends in the village, to whom he would be partial, could not safely be entrusted with the power of fixing rents, and because the ryots themselves, will not in this year agree to pay the same rent in the ensuing one, lest they should meet with losses, which would be aggravated by a rent which they might then be unable to bear. The tehtildar goes round his district, in the early part of the season. His business is chiefly to regulate cultivation in those villages where it is mismanaged from the incapacity of the potail, or impeded by disputes among the principal ryots, and to make advances to the poorer sort for the purchase of seed, ploughs, or cattle. He also ascertains what land each ryot has already cultivated, or engaged to cultivate during the year, which he does, by assembling the ryots in their respective villages, and examining them in the presence of the potails and curmums; and accounts of the land occupied and unoccupied are taken by his catcherry, which accompanies him. He goes round again when the crops are ripening, to see their condition, and to ascertain whether the quantity of land actually cultivated is more or less than that which the ryots had engaged to take.

5. The collector sets out on his circuit, in September or October, when the early crops begin to be reaped, and the late ones, to be down. On arriving in a district he assembles all the ryots of the four or five nearest villages. The first business is, to learn how far the cultivation of the present year, is more or less than that of the last. This is soon done, by the help of the tehtildars and curmums accounts, compared with the reports of the potails and ryots. Where there is a decrease, it is commonly owing to deaths, emigrations, or loss of cattle. Where there is an increase, it is usually derived from new settlers, or additional lands being occupied, by the old ones. In the case of decrease, the rent of the lands thrown up, is deducted from the settlement of last year. In that of increase the rent of the land newly occupied is added; and in both cases, the rent of the remaining lands remains the same as before. The rent of the land newly occupied is determined by the accounts of what it was in former times, or, if such accounts cannot be procured, by the opinions of the most intelligent ryots; but the full rent of waste land is not exacted, until it has been in cultivation from two to seven years. The number of years, and the gradual rise in each year, depend upon the nature of the land, and the custom of the village. They are known to all parties; and all doubts are removed, by their being detailed in a proclamation or cowle namah, under the collector's seal, circulated to every village.

If the cultivation is the same as last year's, and no failures occur among the ryots; the rents remain unaltered. If the crops are bad, and it appears that some of the poor ryots must have a remission; the loss, or a part of it, is assessed upon the lands of the rest, where it can be done, without causing any material inconvenience. This assessment never exceeds ten or twelve per cent; and is much oftener relinquished, than carried into effect. In cases where it can be easily borne, it is frequently agreed to without difficulty; and if opposition is made, it is generally soon got over, by the mediation of the ryots of the neighbouring villages present. These, discuss the point in question; with the ryots of the objecting village; tell them that it is the custom of the country; use such other arguments as may be applicable to the subject; and never fail in persuading them to accede to the demand, unless it is really too high, in which event it is lowered. Wherever individuals, or villages, object to their rent, it is always the most expeditious and satisfactory way of settling the dispute, to refer it to the ryots of other villages, who do more on such occasions, in half an hour, than a collector and his catcherry, in a whole day.

6. The great number of ryots assembled, and the publicity of every operation, are of great use in expediting the settlement. If failures of crops are to be remitted to needy ryots, those who claim indulgence on insufficient grounds, cannot succeed, because their neighbours, who are present, object to it; for they will not allow a remission to be given in which they do not themselves partake, unless it is absolutely necessary; and in the same manner, if in any where raised too high, the parties on whom it falls, by appealing to the judgment of the ryots of other villages, get an abatement; so that, as much aid is derived from the ryots themselves, as from accounts, in making the settlement.

7. When the land in cultivation and its rent, has been ascertained, the collector gives every ryot a puttah, with his signature, in which every field he holds, and its rent for the year are inserted. In most villages, the greatest part of the ryots hold the same fields several years; so that among fifty individuals, there are not perhaps ten whose rights require alteration. When the collector has finished the first four or five villages, he moves on, and assembles the ryots of the adjacent villages, and having settled their rents, proceeds in the same manner, until he has finished the whole district, which usually requires a month or

five weeks. The sub-collectors, who have only four or five districts each, make the whole kulwar settlement personally. My own division, is too extensive to be annually settled in detail by one person; and I therefore leave what I cannot accomplish myself, to the district servants. I make the village settlements of every district, and also the kulwar settlement of one district, in some years, and of one village in each district, in others, and direct the rest to be done, by the tehsildars. The tehsildar having one village as a model, is easily enabled to settle the rest, in the same way. The rent of each village having been settled by me, he can only add to it, by including lands which may have been suppressed by the curnums, and he can only lower it, where some of the ryots may have met with great losses. If he lowers it without cause, the ryots who do not share in the remission, object to it, and complain; or if, without altering the rent of the village, he lowers that of one ryot and raises that of another unjustly, the ryot on whom the extra rent is thrown, complains. Even where the ryots neglect to bring the grievance forward immediately, they hardly ever omit to state it, when assembled for the settlement of the ensuing year; and the tehsildar, knowing that gross negligence or partiality will be attended with the loss of his place, seldom ventures to make an unfair settlement. There are, however, cases in which he does so, either from ignorance or corrupt motives; but where the collector is vigilant, they are not frequent. There is, indeed, no possibility of preventing them altogether; for the collector, when he makes the settlement in person, may be deceived occasionally by the servants of his own cutcherry, who may be dishonest as well as the tehsildar. The business of a collector is not properly so much to labour through all the details of the settlement, as to make those do it, who can do it best. The potails, and curnums of villages, are the persons most capable of making the settlement correctly; but they cannot be trusted, because they are cultivators themselves, and have always friends and enemies among the ryots. It therefore becomes necessary to employ a tehsildar, who, not being a native of the district, is not so liable to be influenced by partialities. As his attention too, is confined to a single district, he will consequently know the state of its cultivation, better than the collector or his cutcherry, and will be better qualified than them, to make the settlements properly; and hence I have found that the settlements of tehsildars, have usually been better adapted than my own, to the circumstances of the ryots.

REPORTS: &c. from  
Collectors, on a Ryot-  
war Settlement.

Letter from the prin-  
cipal Collector of the  
Ceded Districts,  
30 Nov. 1806.

8. I have described the kulwar settlement, as it is made in a country in its ordinary state of cultivation; but in one, which has suffered from invasion or internal disturbances, and in which a part of the land formerly cultivated is waste, and the remainder held at a rent considerably below the ancient standard, the process is more tedious and difficult, because it is requisite, not only to increase or diminish the rents of such individuals as occupy or throw up land, but to raise the rent of every ryot, by raising the rent of all land, gradually to its former level, following cautiously the improving condition of the ryots. This was done throughout the Ceded Districts for some years; but they have all now, with a very few exceptions, reached their standard assessment. The same mode is followed, in raising the general rent of whole villages and districts, as the particular rent of a few individuals. It is effected by the means of accounts; of the opinions of intelligent revenue servants; and more than all, by the assistance derived from the ryots of one village, in assessing those of another.

9. When a district has been surveyed, and the rent of every field permanently fixed, the kulwar settlement becomes extremely simple; for all that is required, is to ascertain what fields are occupied by each ryot, and to enter them, with the fixed rents attached to them, in his puttah; their aggregate, constitutes his rent for the year. He cannot be called upon for more; but he may obtain an abatement, in case of poverty or extraordinary losses. He has the advantage of knowing in the beginning of the season, when he ploughs his land, the exact amount of what he is to pay; he knows the fixed rents of the different fields which he cultivates, and that the demand upon him, cannot exceed their total amount; he knows the utmost limit of his rent, not only for the present, but for every succeeding year; for it cannot be raised, unless he takes additional land, and he is thereby, the better enabled to provide for the regular discharge of his kists, and against the losses of bad, by the profits of good seasons.

10. The kulwar settlement, though it may appear tedious, when compared to the village one, is however not only better calculated to realize the revenue, but is on the whole, a saving of time, because when it is once made, there is no further trouble; but in the village settlement, there is so much room for malversation; so many disputes between the potails, and ryots about extra collections, on the one hand, and the withholding of rents on the other, that more time is consumed in enquiring into those matters, than in the original settlement.

11. The honourable Court of Directors seem to be apprehensive that too much must be left in the kulwar settlement to the agency of native servants; but it does not appear to me, that such agency can be dispensed with, or that, when properly controuled, any serious result from its employment. Without it, the Company's servants could do little or nothing. The most experienced collector, could hardly make the settlement of ten villages, in a year; and after all, it would most likely be done very indifferently. The native servants are restrained, as far as men with inadequate allowances can be restrained, by the same considerations as the public servants in other countries; by the fear of detection, of losing their situation, and of punishment. In all provinces that have been permanently settled, their agency has been used, and it had then a much wider field for abuse than in the Kulwar settlements, because such provinces, having been previously settled for some years, by village settlements, or other large tracts, without descending lower into detail, and being then disposed to alinquency was at an end; so that, if the revenue of villages or talooks could be settled, and concealed for a short period, till the permanent settlement took place,

REPORTS, &c. from  
Collectors, on a Ryot-  
war Settlement.

Letter from the Prin-  
cipal Collector of the  
Ceded Districts,  
30 Nov. 1806.

discovery was over; whereas, under the Ryotwar system, the minute process that is gone through every year, renders the most trifling abuse, liable every moment to detection. When the rent of every field has been fixed by survey, there is little room for abuse; it cannot be against the ryot, but may be in his favour; because it can be effected only, by reporting cultivated land as waste, or by obtaining remission on false pretences of poverty; but it has already been shown, that from the public manner in which the kulwar settlement is conducted and the contending interests of the ryots, either of those modes of injuring the revenue, can never reach to any extent, or be long concealed. There can be no doubt that the kulwar settlement is better calculated than any other, to bring to view the whole resources of the country; but whether it is equally well adapted to improve them, can, perhaps never be certainly known, but by a long trial of its effects in an extensive district.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

Kowelgountah, }  
30th Nov. 1806. }

Your most obedient and humble servant,

(Signed) THO. MUNRO,  
P<sup>r</sup> Collector.

Extract of Proceedings of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, the 19th May 1809.

To the Collectors of the Ceded Districts.

Gentlemen,

Letter from the Prin-  
cipal Collector of the  
Ceded Districts to his  
Assistants, 25 Aug. 1802,  
in Remissions.

Para. 1.—WHEN remissions are required, it is generally owing to some one or more of the following causes:—1st. Peculation of the amildar and other district servants;—2d. Peculation of the potails and curnums;—3d. Improvidence of the ryots;—4th. Bad crops and other accidents;—5th. Over-assessment.

2. The amildar's peculations arise, either from the public revenue, or from a private assessment. The amildar usually wishes that rents should be low, because the lower they are, the higher he can make his private assessment, and the less probability there is, of its being soon discovered; because the potail and ryots, partaking in the benefit, are averse to informing against him. While he confines himself to his private assessment, he may carry on the public collections, without leaving any balance outstanding; but, whenever he appropriates any part of them to his own use, he raises a proportionate balance against the district; and the cause of it, will very soon be discovered, unless the division servants are concerned with him, and the collector is himself very indolent. If he is pressed for payment, and attempts to raise the money by an extra assessment, the transaction will certainly be brought to light by some of the inhabitants, either by complaining, or by talking so much of it, that it becomes known every where, and is carried to the collector's catchetry by some person who wishes to recommend himself for employment. The amildar, sensible of the danger of an extra assessment, seldom ventures upon it, but usually prefers the safer mode of fabricating stories of loss of crops and other accidents, and of the inability of the inhabitants to discharge the balances. When such excuses are received, it ought invariably to be concluded, unless the facts are very fully established, that there is something wrong in his conduct, and his removal from office, ought to follow without delay. His successor will find no difficulty in ascertaining the real time of the balances; for, on pressing the villages by which they are reported to be due, the inhabitants, if they have already paid them, will, in order to save themselves, inform against the late amildar.

3. The potails and curnums, when they know that the amildar diverts a part of the public revenue to his own emolument, always follow his example, and thereby augment the outstanding balance. They frequently go further; and levy additional sums from the more substantial cultivators, because they are conscious that the amildar, being himself guilty of peculation, will not dare to bring them to punishment. These last impositions, though they do not affect the balance of the current year, will most likely increase that of the next, or, what is the same thing, diminish the settlement. The potails and curnums can hardly ever make away with any of the public money, without the knowledge of the amildar. If, in any case, they do; it is a proof that he is either very careless or very ignorant, and that he is unfit for his situation. Their influence, particularly when they have obtained by their exertions, a favourable assessment for their village, is usually sufficient to make the cultivators conceal the demand for a small private assessment, which is always, on such occasions, made upon them, provided that, together with the public one, it does not exceed what their rent ought to have been; but, when they attempt to make an extra assessment, to supply any deficiency of the public revenue which they may have embezzled, the cultivators never pay without opposition: and they will always complain of it to the amildar, unless they know that he is a party himself, and will not hear them.

The mismanagement of the cultivators is not so frequent a cause of failure, as might at first be imagined. When they have money sufficient to pay their rents, but do not apply it to that purpose, it is usually expended upon a marriage, or in discharging a debt: the ryots, when left to themselves, always pay their rent in preference to every other demand. It may generally be suspected, when they act otherwise, that the district or village servants are concerned in the transaction. Many potails and curnums having, under the pretence of a loan, embezzled a part of the revenues of their villages, and been forced to make good the borrowing money from farmers, upon bonds running in the names of themselves and their families, they frequently employ the money collected as revenue in paying these debts, and are so anxious to conceal the fact, that all the ryots were answerable, as well as themselves, for the debt. They

They call upon them again for the rent, which they have already paid; but, as some of them are unable to comply, an outstanding balance appears against the village. Besides the general debts of the village, the ryots are often so much pressed for their own private debts, as to be rendered incapable of discharging their rents. These debts, are frequently nothing but the accumulation of exorbitant interest, which the ryots would never pay, if they were not afraid of being compelled. When private creditors are permitted to seize the property of the ryots before their rents are paid, it is always to be inferred that they have bribed the amildar; and when the potails are allowed to assess them on account of general bonds, it may be concluded, that the amildar has been guilty of peculation, and that he cannot support the cultivators, lest the potail should inform against him.

5. Bad crops are the chief cause of failures, and consequently of remissions; and they are also frequently brought forward as a plea for obtaining remissions, without any absolute necessity. All complaints regarding them, should therefore be received, with very great caution. Were an investigation to be ordered, whenever a cultivator thought proper to solicit an indulgence for his loss, claims would soon become so numerous, that all the revenue servants in the country, would not be able to examine one-half of them. The cultivators would likewise have no difficulty, even in a favourable year, of showing a real loss of 8 or 10 per cent. of the whole revenue; because, in every village, in every season, there are a few fields whose produce is not equal to their rent; and these fields only, would be mentioned as the cause of distress and failure; while those, whose crops had been more abundant, having probably been already reaped, there would be no means of determining how far the deficiency of produce, in the one case, was counterbalanced by the excess, on the other. Were it even possible to estimate exactly the actual loss in every year, it would not follow that it ought to be remitted; for the same cultivators who have lost this year, may have gained last, and, as no extra assessment was then laid upon their profit, no remission can now fairly be claimed for their loss. Whatever may have been the crop, should it have been even less than the seed, they should always be made to pay the full rent, if they can; because good and bad seasons being supposed to be equal in the long run, the loss is merely temporary, and the making of it good, is only applying to the deficiency of a year of scarcity, the funds which have arisen, from one of abundance. Though there is no rule by which a positive judgment can be formed whether or not a ryot who asks a remission, can pay his rents, it may, in most cases, be discovered, by ordering the amount of his failure to be assessed upon the village; for, as the other inhabitants are usually well acquainted with his circumstances, if he has any means of answering the demand against him, they will point them out, in order to exempt themselves from being burthened with it. In the same manner, when a village fails, if the balance upon it, is assessed upon the neighbouring villages, the desire of saving themselves from additional taxation will induce the ryots of those villages to find out and give information, how far the failing village may be able to pay the whole, or a part of its balance. When individual balances are to be levied upon the village by which they are due, great care should be taken, lest the rigorous exaction of them should so much distress the inhabitants, as to disable them from cultivating their usual quantity of land, the ensuing year. The amount of this second assessment, ought seldom or ever to exceed ten per cent. of the rent of the ryots of the muzera, or inferior village on which it is imposed. If a balance still remains, it should be assessed upon all the muzeras which constitute the mouza, but not in a greater proportion than 10 per cent. of the rent. Should a part of the balance yet remain unextinguished, it ought to be remitted; because the inhabitants are extremely averse to contributing to the losses of any village but their own, and because, if more than an additional 10 per cent. is raised upon the mouza in whose muzera the failure has arisen, there is great danger of its occasioning a considerable decrease of cultivation, the following season. When individuals are pressed for balances, the extent of the consequent loss, can never exceed the sum of their particular rents; but when a whole village is laid under a greater second assessment than it can bear, it may hereafter cause a very serious diminution of revenue. Whenever the failure of the crop gives reason to apprehend that there will be a balance against any village, the amildar ought to repair to the spot without delay; ascertain, with the assistance of the inhabitants of it, and the neighbouring villages, what sum it will be necessary to raise by a second assessment; and, after making known to every ryot, the additional amount he is to pay, take measures for its being collected with the last, or two last kists. When the loss, however, appears in a village whose inhabitants are able to make it good, the amildar ought to take no notice of it, but proceed with his collections in the same manner as if there had been a plentiful crop; for the necessity of making remissions is much lessened, by giving the ryots no encouragement to expect them.

6. When over-assessment is the cause of an outstanding balance, it ought to be remitted; for it would be unjust to exact more from the cultivators, than their lands can possibly yield. Cases of failure from over-assessment alone, are however, very rare; because the potails, at the time of the settlement, always refuse to take their puttahs if it is too high, and obtain a reduction, when they show clearly that it is over-rated. Their own enmities, most common source of over-assessment; for one potail often exaggerates the produce of the village of another, or offers more for it, than it is really worth, with the intent of supplanting his rival, and making the ryots pay the loss. He ought to be obliged to pay it himself, as far as his means go; and, if they are not sufficient, the difference ought to be remitted. If, by any mistake or false information, one muzera in a mouza, is rated too high, and another too low, a second assessment ought to be laid upon the underrated muzera, and applied to the discharge of the balance.

I am, Gentlemen, Your obedient servant,

Coddapah,  
25th August 1802.

(Signed) THO. MUNRO.

REPORTS, &c.  
Collectors, on a  
new Settlement.

Letter from the  
Principal Collector of  
Ceded Districts, to  
Assistants: 2d Aug.  
1802, on remissions.

## To the Collectors of the Ceded Districts.

REPORTS, &c. from  
Collectors on a Ryot-  
war Settlement.

Letter from the Prin-  
cipal Collector of the  
Ceded Districts;  
May, 1807, on the  
mode of conducting a  
Ryot-war Settlement.

Gentlemen,

Para. 1. IN making the annual revenue settlements, there are three ways which are usually followed, and which have each, according to particular circumstances, their claim to preference. The first is, to make the mouzawar, or village settlement of a whole district at once, and then to proceed to the kulwar, or individual settlement, with every inhabitant of each village. The second is, to make the village settlement of one village, and then the individual settlement of it, before beginning with another; and the third is, to begin by settling with each individual of one village separately, and then, by adding their rents together, to make the village settlement.

2. The first mode, that of beginning with a general village settlement of a whole district, is that which I always observe myself, not only because it has in itself many advantages, but because no other would answer, in a division so extensive as mine. It is much more expeditious, and is also frequently as correct, as the others. By assembling all the potails and curnums of a district in one place, there is a better chance of obtaining speedy and even accurate knowledge of its actual state of cultivation, than there is by meeting them in their respective villages; because, besides the usual information to be derived from the curnums accounts, there is always a great deal obtained from discharged curnums who wish to be restored, and from persons without employment residing in the different villages, who are desirous of renting them. By drawing intelligence from so many different sources, it usually happens, that the produce of some villages is more fully brought forward, than that of others. But, as the potails and curnums of such villages, are averse to being higher assessed than their neighbours, they seldom fail to disclose whatever they know of their concealed resources; and, in this manner, the total actual produce of the district is soon known; and after the gross amount of the assessment is once fixed, should it still fall too heavy on any particular villages, it is easily equalized by the potails themselves, with the assistance of the cutcherry. When neither the accounts of the curnums, nor any other information, raise the revenue so high, as there is reason to think that it ought to be; and when it is, therefore, thought advisable to try the dangerous experiment of increasing the assessment, not from the accounts of the current year, but from the presumption that the produce, being known from authentic documents to have been much greater some years ago, cannot possibly be now, so much diminished as it is represented to be, the additional rent which may be imposed upon the district on such an occasion, is in general, very readily partitioned by the potails and curnums among their respective villages. It is, however, very hazardous to attempt to raise the revenue upon such uncertain foundations; for there is often more mischief done, by one year of over-assessment, than can be remedied, by seven of moderation. Revenue servants who have had much experience, can easily ascertain, from the manner in which the potails and curnums proceed in distributing the extra assessment, whether or not there be really a corresponding extra produce. When they divide the extra assessment in a certain proportion among all the villages, it is usually a proof that the first assessment had been to the produce, nearly in the same rates, in them all; but it is no proof that it is too low. When they divide the extra assessment unequally, it is a strong indication that at least those villages in which the greatest additional weight is thrown, had before been under-rated. The chief objections to making a settlement of all the villages of a district at once are, that it is sometimes detrimental to cultivation, by keeping the potails and curnums away from their villages when their presence is wanted to promote it, and that by bringing the heads of villages together, it enables them to form combinations to prevent the raising of the assessment, which they would not otherwise have thought of. Their being assembled is, however, much more frequently attended by a contrary effect; for private quarrels, and their jealousy of any of their neighbours obtaining more favourable terms than themselves, most commonly urge them, rather to exaggerate the value of each others villages, than to form any concert for their mutual benefit. In my division, the settlement of all the villages composing a district is always made at once, and the kulwar or individual settlement, is afterwards made by the amildar; but, as few amildars, who have not before been in the Company's service, have ever seen a kulwar settlement, people are sent from the cutcherry to carry it into execution in all those districts, where it is thought that it cannot be safely entrusted to the amildar.

3. The second mode, that of making the settlement of each village separately, is a very common one. It is less liable to be either too high, or too low, than the district settlement; because the state of a tank, or of the cultivation of particular fields, about which there may be a dispute, can be readily ascertained, by sending some person to the spot; because those who are to make the settlements, have also an opportunity of observing the general state of culture among the lands of the village; because it can be easily discovered, whether those who are reported by the curnums to have emigrated, are present or not; and because the amount of the mortgages, or taxes on trades, can be more accurately determined at the place, than any where else. When the village settlement is once fixed, that of the individual cultivators is greatly facilitated; because the potal and curnum, knowing that a certain sum must be levied, give every assistance, except perhaps in the case of a few of their own relations, to make a fair distribution of it;—and because the cultivators, for the same reason, agree without much difficulty to their several proportions; and as the discovery of every unauthorized again or cultivated circular field, not brought to account, lightens their assessment, a regard for their own interest encourages them to give information of all of this nature, which could not otherwise have been, so readily detected. The amildar may visit and settle every village separately, a collector, who has the management of five or six districts, may settle two, three, or more villages, in one place; for

were



were he not to do so, the season would be over, before he could finish his settlement. He has in this way, more people to give him information of the state of these villages, than he could have had, by going to each of them separately.

4. The third kind of settlement, the kulwar or individual settlement; if the earnings accounts could be depended upon, would naturally be the best, because the stock of cattle, and the quantity and quality of land belonging to each cultivator, being known, it would be easy to fix his rent; and that of all the cultivators added together, would form the land rent of the village. But, as the earnings accounts are always false, to begin with fixing the rents of the cultivators, would not only be the most tedious, but the most unequal of all settlements. Every single cultivator objects to his own assessment. When the catcherry servants, by stating the quantity of his land, and the rent that had been drawn from it in preceding years, endeavour to convince him that the assessment is moderate, and that he ought to agree to it; he urges all the excuses commonly brought forward by that class of men; that grain is now, very cheap; that some of his cattle, are dead; that he is poor, and cannot cultivate his land, without an abatement of rent. He is privately encouraged by the potail and principal farmers, to give as much opposition as possible; because they all in their turns, intend to do the same, and the hope that, if he can obtain a reduction of his rent, they may also, under the same pretences, expect the same indulgence. Every ryot is usually sufficiently careful of his own interest to dispute about his rent, whether it is high or low; but should there even be some among them who, being satisfied with it, have no thoughts of starting objections, the fear of the potails displeasure, and of the reproaches of the other ryots for deserting the common cause, induces them to raise as many difficulties as any of the rest. Much time is consumed, in thus debating upon the rent of every individual; and if the revenue servants, either believing their representations of their distress, or wishing to expedite the settlement, allow some abatement of rent to those who are reckoned the poorest, they find that the aggregate of these remissions, not only causes a considerable loss of rent, but increases the difficulty of settling other villages, by encouraging the ryots to insist on a similar or perhaps a greater reduction. The ryots who dispute the most obstinately, even though their rents are already too low, are the most likely to get a further abatement; and those who are less noisy and litigious, are most liable to have their rents, perhaps already too high, raised still higher. It may be thought that the ryots being collected together in one place, no one would allow the land of another to be more favourably rated than his own, without complaining. This usually takes place in villages where none of the ryots are very poor; where there are few in number, and nearly on a footing with regard to property. In such cases, they generally insist upon a fair division of the assessment; but in most other villages, in which both the poorest and the most substantial ryots are found, the assessment is for the most part, unequal, and is always most favourable to the relations of the potail, and to such other ryots as hold out the most stubbornly.

5. When a country has been surveyed, the individual, supercedes both the village and district settlement, because it is then no longer necessary to waste time, in endeavouring to persuade the cultivators to accede to the assessment. The rent of every field being fixed, each cultivator takes, or rejects, what he pleases, and the rents of all the fields occupied in the course of the year in any one village, form what is called the settlement of that village. But where no survey has been made, either the settlement with all the villages of a district at once, or that with three or four at a time in succession, must always be adopted. Besides the reasons already mentioned, the various accidents that affect the crop, render it convenient to make the village, precede the kulwar settlement, because, though the general state of cultivation in a village may be known early in the season, the particular lands on which the crop may thrive or fail, can never be ascertained, until it is pretty far advanced: and as the assessment of individuals must, in some manner, be regulated by the produce, the more advanced the harvest season is when their rents are fixed, the more likely are they to be proportioned to their means of discharging them. This system operates, no doubt, in many cases, as a tax upon industry, and an encouragement to idleness; but as there is at present no other method of securing the realization of the public revenue, it must be continued until the country is surveyed, when every man will be made to pay, not according to the quantity of his crop, but of his land.

6. Though the crop should be considerably advanced before the individual settlement is begun, yet it ought not to be delayed beyond this period; and the sooner it is then finished, the better. If it were possible, it would be of great benefit to the inhabitants, that it could be effected by the time the first kist becomes due; because every cultivator, knowing the full amount of his rent, and having the whole of his crop on hand, would see at once how far it was likely to answer the demand upon him, and would thereby be the more enabled to turn it to the greatest advantage. If it was more than sufficient, he would lay up a part late in the year, when the price had risen to its highest pitch. If it was inadequate, he would still endeavour, by selling it only by degrees in proportion to his kists, and by cutting his expenses, to pay his rent. But when his rent is not settled till after most of the kists have been collected; it is sometimes higher than he expected. He has probably not been so careful or economical as he would have been, had he known the amount of it earlier; and he is therefore, unable to make it good. On the other hand, while he remains in this state of uncertainty, he sometimes suspects, without cause, that his rent will be raised higher than is actually intended. He perceives that his grain will not equal the demand against him, and he sells it off in a hurry at a low price, and absconds with the produce. It is of importance that the individual settlement should never be longer delayed.

REPORTS  
Cult. Serv. in a  
war Settlement.

Letter from the  
Chief Collector of the  
Ceded Districts  
30 Sep. 1804, on the  
modes of settling  
Ryotwar Settlements.



REPORTS, &c. from  
the Chief, on a Ryot-  
war Settlement.

Letter from the Prin-  
cipal Collector of the  
Sole Districts;  
1802, on the  
mode of conducting a  
Ryotwar Settlement.

lately necessary; for the same bad consequences often ensue from uncertainty, as from a higher assessment.

7. Whenever the individual settlement of a district is completed, pottahs for every ryot paying rent to government, should be made out by the curnums, according to the form prescribed in my letter of the 30th August, and transmitted to the catcherry, to be signed by you, after having been compared. You should give them yourself, to the inhabitants of the villages, near the spot where you happen to be at the time; in all other places they may be delivered by the amildar. It is proper that every pottah should have your signature, because the inhabitants have more confidence in it, than in that of the amildar or potail. They know it is intended to guard them against extra demands; and they will be more likely to refuse compliance with them, when they have such a voucher in their possession. It likewise teaches them to look up to you, instead of the native servants; and, though they may not have courage to resist the demand in the village, to come forward afterwards with the complaint. They have always been so much accustomed to arbitrary exactions, that it is very difficult to prevail upon them, at least upon the poorer classes, to oppose them. But nothing tends sooner to convince them that there is a limit to assessment, and to encourage them to reject all extra impositions, than the general distribution of pottahs by the collector.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO,

Collector.

Chitweyl, }  
30th September 1802. }

Instructions of Collector of Southern Division of Arcot, to his Sub-Collectors, on the mode of conducting a Ryotwar Settlement; enclosed in his Report, dated 1st July, 1806.

Gentlemen,

Instructions of Collec-  
tor of Southern Division  
Arcot, to his Sub-  
collector, on the modes  
conducting a Ryot-  
war Settlement.

Para. 1. YOU were some time since furnished for your general guidance with my instructions to Tehsildars, relative to repairs, of tanks, the distribution of tucceavy, and the jummahbundy of the current Fally. On the two former subjects, I have already offered such remarks as appear to me most necessary. My present object is to furnish you with a few, on the latter, and some other points.

2. From all I can learn, which is corroborated by all I have seen, no doubt remains in my mind but that the assessment in this subah, is in most cases, far too high; and that the revenue realized from the country since it was ceded to the honourable Company, has very materially injured its permanent resources, and reduced the lesser inhabitants to a state of poverty, very much to be deplored.

3. The lamentable influence of the gramatans of villages over the lesser ryots, from whom they have always been in the habit of extorting considerable sums above the circar demand, was a ruinous evil under the late government; and the continuance of it in this, has certainly contributed to reduce the ryots to their present state.

4. The great difficulty of collection; the desertion of villages in part, and wholly; the artifices practised by the inhabitants to avoid payment of their rents, and conceal the public revenue; the miserable appearance of most villages, a great portion of the inhabited houses of which are without roofs, and of the inhabitants, a great number of whom are clothed in the garb of extreme misery, with many other marks which strike the eye of a traveller, and must touch the heart of one who has any spark of sensibility or feeling for his fellow creatures; are sufficient proofs of the opinion before stated, on the state of the country.

5. That many inhabitants, of comparatively affluent circumstances, have seceded, and others have joined in the frauds lately committed, merely with the view of profiting by the confusion created thereby, and avoiding the payment of their rents, I have no doubt; and where is the country in which there are not such people, always ready to support a popular cause of complaint, in the hope of aggrandizing themselves? The lesser inhabitants, as is always the case, have profited less than their leaders; but that they have profited is equally certain; and it is only thereby, that many of them have found means to pay the revenue that has been realized from them.

6. Wherever a tax is such, that the thing or property it is levied on, will not yield a sufficiency, after paying the tax, to recompence the owner for all expense incurred in taking care of it, and yield him a fair remuneration for his trouble; he must either give it up altogether, or supply the deficiency by fraud.

7. The mode of making the settlement last year (and nearly the same has, I believe, been observed in all former ones) is not calculated in my opinion, to correct existing evils; to ascertain the actual resources of the country, the circumstances of the inhabitants; or to do justice to the lesser ryots, who are so much in need of it.

In a new unsettled country, the assembling the curnums of four or five talooks at one place for the purpose of drawing out the jummahbundy accounts, even if they are supervised by the collector, cannot prevent the exercise of many abuses, which might otherwise be checked; but when the superintendence is left to a native, in whom little or no confidence can be placed, the plan will rather tend to perpetuate, than extirpate existing evils. The occurrences of last year, sufficiently prove the latter position.

9. The corrupt and fraudulent conduct of the curnums is well known; and yet it is on the word of these people only, that the settlements have hitherto been grounded. It is true, surveyors have been employed to check their accounts; but it is equally true, that where they have been false, in the proportion of more than 150 per cent. the surveyors have not discovered more than 10 per cent.

10. The

REPORTS, &c. of  
Collectors, on a Reg-  
ular Settlement.

Instructions of Col-  
lector of Southern Divi-  
of Arcot, to his Sub-  
Collectors, on the  
of conducting a Reg-  
ular Settlement.

10. The plan is equally injurious to many of the ryots; for as the curnums accounts of cultivation are too frequently written from memory, instead of on the spot, I have found in numerous instances, many more cawnies entered than were actually cultivated; many as reaped, that never were; many as nunjee, that have turned out punjee, and many totacal, which have turned out nunjee.

11. The tehsildars, with their cutcherries, instead of being a check on the curnums; instead of being caused to make regular circuits of their villages to excite the ryots, to extend their cultivation, to ascertain their circumstances, to alleviate them, to learn the resources of their districts, and how they can best be improved; instead of exulting the curnums to accompany them on their village tour, and take the cultivation accounts on the spot, the correctness of which the tehsildars would then have the best opportunity of ascertaining by inquiry among the ryots, or by ocular demonstration if necessary, have hitherto been confined to the mere business of collection.

12. Hence arises that want of energy, that deplorable negligence, shameful ignorance, and, in some cases, corruption, for which the generality of the tehsildars and other native servants are so remarkable in this soubah. I have met with very few who know any other village than their cusbah, who know any thing of the resources of their districts, or who can give a satisfactory answer to any question relative thereto.

13. Till the survey and valuation of all the lands in the country are finished, we must content ourselves with correcting the most prominent evils, by such means as are afforded us.

14. The instructions lately sent to the tehsildars have been framed, with this view. They are thereby, you will perceive, strictly enjoined to do every thing I have remarked in the 11th paragraph, that they have hitherto neglected to do. They ought now, therefore, to be on a circuit, distributing tucavay according to the wants of the ryots, taking engagements from them to cultivate to the full extent of their means, and performing such other duties as are enjoined them, before the Huzzoor Cutcherry proceeds on circuit; they are directed to make a second circuit, in order to see how far the ryots have fulfilled their engagements.

15. When they have thus prepared their accounts, I propose (and wish you, to do the same) to make a circuit of every talook under my immediate management, and conclude the settlement myself. I mean not to ground it on the village accounts only, however diligently they may have been superintended by the tehsildars; but I mean to check them by the presence of every cultivator in the talook, who will be examined as to the quantity of land he has agreed to take, and who will be told at the time what he is to pay; therefore, if he has then any fair objections to make, they will be attended to, but not afterwards.

16. Such is the present indolence, as well as ignorance of the generality of tehsildars, that I have little hope of their executing the orders sent them with any degree of vigour, unless they are stimulated thereto, by your presence in the talooks. I wish you, therefore, with that view, to make a tour of your districts without loss of time; and when you have finished it, to report the progress the tehsildars are making, with any other remarks you may deem worthy of communicating.

17. The plan of making a distinct settlement with every individual cultivating land, appears, at first, a most arduous undertaking. It is so on its introduction; but the benefits arising from it are so numerous, that in the end you will find it save much trouble. I speak of it from experience, having practised it for five years.

18. It tends more than any thing, to give the lesser ryots a confidence in those who govern them, and to render them independent of the curnums and heads of villages, at whose mercy they have hitherto lived. It gives them an opportunity of stating any injustice which may have been practised towards them by those people, either in the classing or assessing their lands; the truth or otherwise of which, can be ascertained immediately, by confronting the parties, and examining the accounts. It gives the fairest opportunity of proving the zeal and other merits of the tehsildars; and what is by no means the least material benefit, it gives us, as collectors, a greater insight into the actual state of the country and circumstances of the inhabitants, than can be obtained, in any other way.

19. The lesser ryot, by learning at the time what he is to pay to government, will soon learn to resist any extra demand made on him; and by knowing that a settlement will be made with him in the collector's presence, when he will have an opportunity of stating any fair objections thereto, will enter on the labours of cultivation with a degree of confidence and pleasure, he has never yet experienced in this soubah.

20. The frauds hitherto practised by the curnums, will be in a great degree prevented. They will in the first place, be checked by the tehsildar, who, if he does his duty (which it is our business, to cause him to do) will be able to detect most abuses on the spot; but such as escape him, will most probably be discovered by the collector's cutcherry, with the assistance of a few examiners, who should be sent to every suspected village. Persons discovered in consequence to have committed frauds, should meet with instantaneous punishment, which will tend more than any thing to prevent their repetition.

21. By the cowle namah circulated through the country, the teerwa on all cultivated at present so highly assessed, will be reduced to a standard that will at least give the trifling interest in the cultivation of it, though not so great as he ought to have. terms, however, on which he will thereby be permitted to cultivate waste land, will render interest on the whole, better than it has ever yet been; and will, I have no doubt, tend to cause a very considerable increase of cultivation, in this at present desert country.

22. The satisfaction this cowle appears already to have afforded, satisfies me that the effects of it, will be extremely beneficial to government, as well as its subjects. The latter, seeing our attention to their circumstances, and our wish to render the country prosperous, will have

REPORTS, &c. from  
Collectors on a Ryot-  
war Settlement.

Instructions of Collec-  
tor of Southern Divi-  
sion of Arcot, of 1st  
July 1806, on the mode  
of conducting a Ryot-  
war Settlement.

reason to rejoice in the change of government, and finding they can exist without it, will cease in a great measure, from resorting to those artifices lately practised by them.

23. The cowle namah is meant for your general, rather than your particular guidance; many instances will probably occur in which you may see reason to deviate from it. In any trifling case, I beg you will exercise your own discretion; but I desire the general principles of it may not be materially altered, without a reference to me.

24. I most particularly exhort you to let moderation be your guide, in the whole progress of your settlement. In a case of doubt, as to what ought to be a ryot's assessment, your decision should incline, if any thing, in his favour. The numerous arguments to be urged in favour of a moderate assessment are, to my judgment, incontrovertible. The flourishing state of those few districts that are blessed with one, sufficiently prove its benefits.

25. The effects of our inclining to moderation, will be beneficial to the circumstances of the ryot; and which are better, he will increase his cultivation, and thence the revenue of government. There can never be any difficulty in drawing any exuberance of wealth from him, should he ever be so fortunate as to possess it; on the contrary, by being too hard on him, we may most materially injure the resources of the country: by over assessing him one year, we may prevent his contributing to government, for many afterwards. How frequently this has been the case already in this soubah, you must well know. Increase of revenue, from increase of cultivation, not from an enhanced assessment, and increase of happiness and prosperity to the inhabitants and the country, should go hand in hand. If the former is obtained by a sacrifice of the latter, we defeat our aim, and prove ourselves most unworthy labourers, in the field we toil in.

26. At the same time I wish you to incline to moderation, I cannot sufficiently warn you against the artifices practised to deceive us. I am satisfied that frauds will decrease, as the circumstances of the people improve. But wherever they do happen, it will be our business to discover them; and not to punish the whole, on account of the misconduct of a few.

27. In concluding these remarks, I must remind you, that success depends more on our vigilant superintendence, than any thing else. The most unexceptionable orders that can be framed will have little effect, without it. The native officers in this soubah in particular, either cannot or will not act under them, with any degree of activity, unless they know they are diligently watched, and that their continuing to hold their situation, depends on their success, and the consequent approbation of their superiors. Much is expected of us. The result of our exertions, will shew how far we are worthy of the trust reposed in us. The facility, or otherwise, with which we realize our jumabundy, and the improvement, or otherwise, which at the same time, takes place in the revenues of the country, and its general prosperity; will prove with what degree of ability, we have made it.

I am, &c. &c.

(Signed) JOHN G. RAVENSHAW,  
Collr.

Extracts from  
REPORTS of Collec-  
tors on Surveys and  
Assessments.

Mr. Hurd's, on Per-  
manent Settlement of  
the Dindigul Province.

#### Extract of the Proceedings of the BOARD of REVENUE, Fort St. George; 25th June 1804.

#### Extract Mr. HURD's Report relative to the permanent Settlement of the Dindigul Province dated 16th Feb. 1803.

Para. 1. IN bringing before your board the Schedules for the permanent system of revenue in the Dindigul province, I shall, with leave of your board, endeavour to show, with as much conciseness as possible, the mode the survey has permitted me to form in settling the zemindaries, and the detail thence arising, from the lowest ryot, with the value of his farm, to the first zemindar, and the value of his zemindarry.

2. This extent, I propose shewing in its full detail, as settled from the survey; and its jamma, as collected during the several fully years that have passed since its formation; and that the land rent may be solely and wholly seen, I have exhibited that only, in the statement, totally subtracting all enams, shotrium and devastanum lands, and all lands of sounardyem, each particular branch of which will be separately treated on, hereafter.

3. This statement shews the Dindigul districts and the sequestered pollams, converted into forty zemindaries; the number of villages composing each zemindarry; the resources in water for the cultivation; the census of the population; the agricultural property of the ryots, and the immediate resources of the zemindarry, in its number of looms, shops, and houses.

4. It enumerates the grants from the Cirkars, distinguishing the number of those who inhabit one zemindarry or village, from those who inhabit the neighbouring zemindarry or villages; the numbers under the head Oolcoody, being the actual number of ryots, viz. 16,146, chiefly possess the actual cultivating property mentioned in the preceding columns, as the number noted as pyncoodies, are of those same people, but possessing lands in zemindaries or villages, within the precincts of which, they do not reside.

It shows also the numbers paying sounardyem to the Cirkar, which will in its own place separately explained.

5. The first part of the abstract that demands attention after the preceding columns, is the total tyout or land, with one exception only, exclusively the property of the Cirkar, which is distinguished by the survey, under its appropriate designation of poonje and nuuje, giving in the forty zemindaries, goonsahs 13,69,820. 12. or cawnies of Madras measurement,

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Assessments.

Mr. Harth, on  
ment, Settlement  
the Dindigul Division

7. The land in dispute, forming the above-noted exception, will be an addition merely as land, to the zemindarry, or to the polygar with whom the dispute is or may be settled. The detail as regarding what is not productive, is now wholly deducted from the Cirkar land, in order that the investigation may be made without difficulty.

8. It however happens that in several of the lands under dispute, the sequestration of the pollams renders the whole the Cirkar property. What therefore was the contest with the polygars, is now simplified to the dispute between villages, and on the evidence given, there will be little cause for future dispute.

9. This deduction, thus made, leaves to the Cirkar, as its own exclusive right in poonjee and nunjee, 13,57,203. 7½. or in Madras measurement, cawnies 5,89,766. 9. from which must be deducted the land classed as porempoco, or what is wholly uncultivable; and this deduction made, the remainder of poonjee 10,75,989. 3. or cawnies 4,67,566. 11. 2½; and the remainder of nunjee 54,326. 2½. is the land on which both the real and probable value of each and every zemindarry is either fixed at, or may be expected to be, as agriculture may extend itself.

10. The valuation by survey of this tract of poonjee, viz. 10,75,989. appears on the average at 3. 4½. per goontah, per cawney 20. 4. and comprehends the rents of the cultivated poonjee lands of the districts as it is, together with the probable profit of intelligent and diligent zemindaries. The valuation of the nunjee in like manner, is at 1. 4. 10½. per goontah, or per Madras cawney, 3. 3. 12½. and includes, as in the poonjee, both actual rents and probable improvement.

11. The average value on the total lands, poonjee and nunjee, viz. 11,30,315. or cawnies, 4,91,171. is on the same mode of calculation, 3. 13½. giving an apparent gross revenue of 4,31,264. 4. 12. on the Ain tyacut of the Dindigul province.

12. But from this apparent revenue, the whole of the terrace, or waste cultivated lands on which a valuation has been placed, must be deducted; the respective zemindaries show the valuation of it on each, both on poonjee and nunjee, and the total average per goontah appears on the aggregate of goontahs, 7,30,380. 7½. cawnies 3,17,388½. to be 2. 15. per goontah, or per cawney 6. 12½. making as a jumma, 2,14,594. 2. 1. which estimated value of lands neglected, deducted from the gross jumma of 4,31,264. 4. 12. leaves, as the real land revenue of the district, 2,16,670. 2. 11.

13. I have thus far trespassed on the indulgence of your board, presuming that any other detail of lands, which are at present unproductive, would, at the present part of the report, be unnecessary. They will be noted on when the advantages which may arise to the zemindar from extended cultivation, are discussed.

14. The part of the statement now to be noticed, is that which begins to show the value of the lands under cultivation; and the first of those are such, as come under the description of garden lands. (Bajyhut.)

15. The explanation of the particular rates of assessment on the aggregate, would give too large a detail; I have therefore (and I trust your board may not disapprove) thought it best to exhibit the detail of the Toddycomboo zemindarry, the whole of which applies to the whole of the forty zemindaries.

16. With this view, I beg leave to request the attention of your board to the mouzawar, or village statement of the zemindaries; in which No. 2. will show the principal villages composing the zemindarry of Toddycomboo, the total lands and assessment on which are formed the line entered in the abstract statement of zemindaries, and show the total goontahs, 582. 5½. and cawnies, 252. 8. under the head of garden lands (bajyhut) in the zemindarry, their average value per goontah, 2. 4. 4½. and per cawney, 5. 6½. both villages, and their gross fixed value 1,414. 1. 6½. which constitutes the present assessment on those lands.

17. The statement, however, shows only the separate and collective value of each village, on the average of their respective and whole contents, under this express sort of cultivation. It therefore becomes necessary to show, from the statement of the hamlets depending on this zemindarry, the quantity and quality of the land giving the assessment, which shows the present average in each, and on both.

18. Hence in the detail quantity of land rated to its quality and situation, and according to the opinion and agreement of all concerned, your board will please to perceive in the total for Toddycomboo village and its hamlets, the number of goontahs, 278. 9½. assessed at the gross sum of £ 634. 7. 15½. as noted in the Mouzawar statement, and in the totals of the same statement for Chittenaigputty, previously noting the several rates of assessment, the number of goontahs, 303. 11½. assessed at the gross sum of 779. 3. 7½.; these particular lands of these villages and hamlets, separately and collectively, computing this branch of cultivation, as before noted in their respective villages and zemindaries.

19. In the formation of the statement of hamlets depending on this zemindarry, it is necessary, to the proper examination of the lands, to enter into the most minute particular detail of the farms composing the hamlets. The farms are mentioned rather than villages; because the convenience of the inhabitants of the hamlets drew them for their cult. that they might be nearer to the lands they cultivated.

20. These are all lands belonging to the cusbah, but although each hamlet has its name, it does not partake of the distinction of villages, as it has not the fixed bounds in respect to other villages, that its cusbah possesses in respect to other cusbahs.

21. Thus the statement of the ryots holding farms (the cusbah statement) became necessary to show the detail on which the statement of the hamlets was founded, each

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farmer being therein noted, with the quantity of the land he holds under grant from the collector, and to each quantity the specific assessment made by the survey, and agreed to by the ryot.

22. In the detail of Camavaputty in Toddycomboo cusbah, your board will please to see an abstract statement of each ryot's farm, and the rate of assessment on the lands each respectively holds, under the head garden land (bajyhaut) and in the total of that head, will be seen the number of goontahs, 15. 3. classed under that head of cultivation, and the assessment thereon, 32. 9. 2. which quantity and assessment is carried into the statement of hamlets, and is one part of the general estimate average value of the garden lands (bajyhaut) of the village.

23. The same statement, viz. the coolwar statement of Chittanaigputty, applies in like manner to the statement of hamlets for the same village, as the one before noted for Toddycomboo; the various rates of assessment for garden lands, giving on the various holders of the 129. 13. an assessment of 343. 8. 13. which also is one part of the general average value of the village, and which, with its own remaining hamlets and Toddycomboo Proper, forms the average of assessment for this description of lands, in the zemindarry.

24. But as this detail would be insufficient to bring before your board, the specific field on which the specific terwa is put, and which, through the claim I have before noted, gives the result already mentioned, I have added the field account, composing the respective farms of the different ryots.

25. This detail shows the fields, by name each ryot possesses; their measurement, and the rate of assessment on each field, and on each goontah. This rate of assessment is formed, as well from the judgment of the surveyors, as from the consent of the ryots of the village, who, with the proprietor of the land, were always present at every valuation, and fully canvassed every rate of terwa, ere the rate itself was made.

26. From this detail the farm of Tilla, No. 1, in the culwar statement, appears first in the village, and the garden land attached to his farm, under the name of the peleamunaum (tamarind tree) garden, appears to be one field containing three goontahs, eleven and a half anas, rated and settled at thirty fanams per goontah, giving as its total assessment, 11. 1. 9. as already entered in the culwar statement.

27. The remaining garden lands of this village, stand each as they were rated in the statwa accounts, each garden bearing its own particular name, so given either from its situation, trees, or buildings on it, or remarkable rocks near it.

28. The statwa account of Chittanaigputta cusbah, shows the Nautameaur Nachyputta garden land (exhady and tholocum) its quantity, rate of terwa and fixed assessment, in like manner as for the same description of land in the cusbah of Toddycomba.

29. In requesting the attention of your board to these details, my especial object is to show, that the general rate of assessment is easy, and that if the particular rate of particular fields appear heavy in account, the locality in respect to consumption of produce, or the quality of the land, in respect to the quantity of the produce, is the general cause. On these subjects, I shall hereafter have the pleasure of remarking. At present, I wish to carry your board through this detail, that should any error have occurred, I may avail myself of the full assistance of your board, in rectifying it.

30. The next division of resource in cultivation, is that which arises from the poonja, or dry land, the quantity of which, distinct from garden land, in fields and under cowle, is 33,755.841. 12  $\frac{1}{2}$ . averaging 3. 14.  $\frac{81}{216}$  per goontah, and making cawnies, 1,46,692. 2. averaging per cawney, 815.  $\frac{74\frac{1}{2}}{16}$  and yielding as its fixed assessment, 1,31,940. 5  $\frac{1}{2}$ . or 8<sup>th</sup> pag<sup>re</sup> 79,963. 42. 46.

31. The detail of this average, I beg to follow up in the same zemindarry, the same villages composing the zemindarry, the same hamlets composing the villages, the same coolwar statement for the hamlets, and the same statwar statement for the coolwar account, as noted on in respect to the garden lands.

32. Hence the total and particulars of the poonjee in the culwar accounts of Toddycomboo, will show the particular assessment, and the total poonjee in the culwar statement, and the particulars and total of the culwar will show the separate and assessed rates of the hamlets, the particulars and general total of which will show the total rate of assessment and fixed present value of the village (mouza).

33. The reference to the detail in Chittanaigputty, as in like manner the same mode of applying the field account (statwar) upwards, to the culwar statement, that to the mouzara statement of hamlets, that to the mouzara statement of villages, and thence to the zemindarry, as appears in the statement.

34. The two divisions of garden lands and fields of the poonjee, show the total dry grain land under cultivation, to be goontas, 3,51,879. 5  $\frac{1}{2}$ . giving an average of 4. 5  $\frac{21}{16}$  per goontah, cawnies, 1,52,003. 54  $\frac{1}{2}$ . averaging 9. 15  $\frac{1}{2}$ . or 27. 10. per cawney, as the fixed rent of the zemindaries.

35. With permission of your board, I shall again recur to the Toddycomboo zemindarry, to show as distinctly as possible, that the rent as fixed, is proper both on that zemindarry, and by the application of the same general reasoning, on the whole of forty zemindaries.

36. It will doubtless occur to your board, that the average rate of rent per goontah for the garden lands in Toddycomboo and Chittanaigputty, comparatively in the abstract statement, differ more; that the average rate on the poonjee rate (or fields of dry grain) in the two differ more; that the comparative average of both descriptions of lands, are still

further in value each from the other, and that the average of both, partially constituting a zemindarry, exceeds the total average value of the forty zemindarries.

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37. And first, for the difference obtaining in the garden lands, those for Toddycomboo rating on the average 2. 2. 12½. and those for Chittanaigputty, rating 2. 5. 10½. giving in favour of the latter, an apparent increase in value on the former, of 12½. 14½. per cent.

38. This difference arises, from the different rates of assessment in each village. Rates in Toddycomboo are from 35 fanams to four fanams per goontah, comprising with and within these extremes, fourteen different rates of assessment, which are specifically placed on the total garden lands, 278. 9½. according to its quality and situation.

39. In Chittanaigputty, the rates vary from 35 fanams to 8 fanams per goontah, containing twenty-one different rates of assessment, which also are placed on the total garden land, 303. 11½. according to its quality and situation; the average of the higher rates of terwa in the village, on its own greater number of goontahs of garden lands, gives an higher value than the lower rate of terwa, on the lesser of goontahs of this description, in Toddycomboo.

40. In regard to the difference in the poonjee lands, on comparison it will appear, that the land of Chittanaigputty is better than the land of Toddycomboo. In these villages, the rate of assessment is made from 13 to 2 fanams per goontah, containing ten different rates of assessment.

41. In Chittanaigputty, the rate of assessment is from 15 fanams to 2 fanams, containing fourteen rates of assessment, according with the quality of the soil in this as well as in Toddycomboo.

42. The general average value of the poonjee fields in Toddycomboo, is 3. 7½. goontahs; in Chittanaigputty, is 5. 7½. per goontah, yielding an increase of the latter on the former, of about 50½. per cent.

43. That such difference should be, in villages joining each other, will at first view surprize; but the conclusion must not be drawn from these columns, a reference being had to the details of the poonjee fields. It will appear, that the greater part of the land of Chittanaigputty bears an higher rate of assessment, than the land of Toddycomboo.

44. This rate of assessment in Chittanaigputty, when averaged on the total poonjee fields cultivated in its village, gives a far greater rate of average value, in comparison with Toddycomboo, in consequence of its average being taken on a much less number of goontahs, the total poonjah cultivated in Chittanaigputty, being 2,880. 7.; and in Toddycomboo the greater number of 9,386.

45. Of this land in Chittanaigputty, viz. 2,880. 7. goontahs, 1,684. 10. are assessed at from 15 to 5 fanams per goontah, and of the poonjee fields in Toddycomboo, viz. 9,386, 1,464. 2½. only are assessed at those rates; the proportion this land of Chittanaigputty bears to its total, equals about 58½. per cent. whereas the land thus assessed in Toddycomboo, viz. 1,464. 2½. equals, on its total, about 15 9/16. per cent. only.

46. The lands of inferior rates, from 4 fanams to 2 fanams per goontah, in Chittanaigputty, are 1,195. 13. to its total poonjee fields cultivated, 41½. per cent. and the lands thus assessed in Toddycomboo, are 7,922. 5½. bearing on its total poonjee field cultivation, about 84. 6½. per cent. Thus the difference appearing on the average of each village is easily explained, and perfectly corresponding with the reason already given.

47. The average value of the garden lands and poonjee fields together, is according to the rates before noted, apparently 82. 10. per cent. more in Chittanaigputty than in Toddycomboo; the details in the rates of assessment already remarked, bring it to this difference of rate of terwa, and the explanations, whilst showing how it happens, fully confirm its consistency with them.

48. The proportion of each description of land in Toddycomboo and Chittanaigputty, to the cultivated poonjee, is in each, as follows; the total of Toddycomboo comprizing 9,665. 2. and the total of Chittanaigputty, 3,184. 2½. goontahs only.

Toddycomboo:			
	Goontahs.		Goontahs.
Garden	278 9½	Average on total	8 14½
Field's poonjee	9,386 8½	D° - - D°	97 1½
	9,665 2		100 —
Chittanaigputty:			
Garden	303 11½	D° - - D°	9 8½
Fields	2,880 7	D° - - D°	90 7½
	3,184 2½		100 —

49. Hence, in the great difference of 82. 10. per cent. noted in the distinct average terwa value of the two villages will be seen, an additional reason for such average in the larger number of goontahs of garden lands, independent of higher rates being calculated.



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on the lesser number of goontahs of cultivated poonjee in Chittanaigputty, and the small number of goontahs of garden lands being taken on the much larger number of cultivated poonjee fields in Toddycomboo.

50. This mode of reasoning through the details applies generally, and in the particular manner of it, to the total average on the forty zemindaries, and shows the reason of the average rate of *teerwa* of Toddycomboo being greater than the total average rate of assessment on the poonjee cultivated land of the forty zemindaries.

51. The next head of resource in revenue is, that which is denominated Nunjee, or wet lands. This head is divided into such lands as are made garden lands for betel, &c. named *paumala*, and into *dammuddy*, or paddy fields.

52. On the first division, viz. *Paumala*, there is little to say. A reference to the village of Toddycomboo in the hamlets of No. 11. Bodipooram, and No. 24. Cotior, will show the quantity and value of this description of land. The *culwar* account of Bodipoor will show the farmer of the village holding it; and the *stulwar* account, under the same number, will show the situation and name; and the same reference to the *culwar* statement of Cotior will show the same result in every respect.

53. The average of *teerwa* on this description of land in the Toddycomboo zemindary, is less than the total average rate 15. 11 per cent.; and this difference is, on account of locality with respect to water; those gardens for which water is drawn from the wells ever being of less value, and costing more labour, than those watered from nullahs or rivers, and the produce of which is certain.

54. It may be right to show, as briefly as may be consistent with perspicuity, this difference; and it may perhaps best be done by noting, that in Bodipooram the gardens are watered by a tank, giving water only, four months in the year.

55. The produce of this garden per goontah is as follows:—

From the betel vines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	103	6	8
- - - plantations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	6	8
- - - agatty trees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	—	—
										114	3
Deduct, Charges which relate solely to labour, and of the vines, trees, and feeds										54	3
										Remainder	60
From the remainder deduct the Ryot's share										45	—
Remains as the Circar's share										15	—

which, divided on the cowle of three years, usually given for these gardens, gives the rent now settled, viz. C. 5. 6. *hs.* per annum per goontah to the Circar; and this rate of rent calculated on Verapilly's garden of 17½, gives the total *teerwa* entered in the Schedule.

56. It may be noted here, that the ryots share is too great, in proportion to the Circar; the reason which custom has advisedly, perhaps, directed is, that the expense of watering is included in the ryot's share; and that even with every industry, a failure of the tank causes a partial failure of the crop.

57. The zemindary of Battulagoonter exhibits the rent of 8. 5. per goontah, the highest rent of this description of land. This proceeds from the gardens being fully watered all the year by nullahs from the river; and the produce from which this high rent is derived, is as follows:—

From the betel vines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	111	6	15
- - - plaintain trees and agatty trees	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	3	—
										130	9
Deduct, Charges which relate solely to labour, and purchase of vines, trees, and feeds										54	4
										76	5
Deduct Ryot's share										51	—
Remainder, as Circar's share										25	5

which, divided on the time for which the cowles are given, yields 8. 5. per goontah per annum.

58. In this zemindary, from the favourable situation of the garden lands, and consequently the probability of failure in the produce, the increase of the Circar's share is made.

59. The lowest rent for this description of land is that paid for the gardens in Cullemunde zemindary, amounting per goontah to 3 C. which arises from the necessity of watering from wells, wholly; the produce is as follows:—

From the betel vines	-	-	-	-	-	86	3	11½
- - - plaintain trees	-	-	-	-	-	12	8	8
- - - agatty trees	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-

Deduct, Charges which relate solely to labour and purchase of the vines	99	3	2½
and trees	54	3	2½

Deduct Ryots share 4/	45	-	-
	30	-	-

Remainder as circar's share -	9	-	-
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divided in the three years cowlé, gives the rent entered in the Schedule, and which is rated lower from the unfavourable situation (as above noted) of the gardens.

60. In observing the average rates of rent on (daummudyer) of the paddy fields, the great difference in many zemindaries will, without explanation, be a matter of astonishment: the reference to the distinct villages of Toddycomboo and Chittanaigputty will shew a very great difference; but when the lands, giving the average noted, are compared in quantity and quality with those in the different villages to which they are joined, and the mode of average is attended to, these seeming difficulties will be easily reconciled.

61. Thus in Toddycomboo are 710. 6¼, averaged at 13½, and in Chittanaigputty are 38. 12½, averaged at 2. 1. 15½. These two rates of teerwa, compared with the view of giving a fair average on the zemindary, could never answer. In the former are 60. 2. at rates inferior, and equal to all in the latter, but those rates compose 8. 7½. Only on the total mungal quality of Toddycomboo; whereas, in Chittanaigputty, the whole of the nunjee cultivation is comprised under 38. 12½.

62. Hence it is, that the rates on the very few goontahs, though averaging justly on these goontahs, appear, on the comparative average of the two villages, greater than the rate in Toddycomboo; but when the rate is added in average to that on Toddycomboo zemindary total, the difference in the average, or between the

former	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	3½
the latter	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	13½

equalling - - - - - 8 12 - - 1, or

66. 6¼. per cent. which appears, on this mode, in favour of Chittanaigputty, will increase the total average of the zemindary 7¼ only, or about 8. 7¼. per cent. which also is the difference between these lands in Toddycomboo and the whole lands of the zemindary.

63. The number of goontahs, and their situation, are detailed in the statement of Hamlets; but that your board may see the division of the highest rated lands among the ryots, I beg leave to refer you to the culwar statement, noted, and to the shulwar statement as noted on in reference to this paragraph.

64. The highest rated land in appearance, is that of Malmungalum zemindary; and it requires explanation in abstract detail, as well to show the propriety of the assessment, as to prove it not comparatively higher rated than other nunjee lands. The Allenagrum zemindary is the lowest rated; and it is necessary to show, in the difference between each, that the lands have been properly valued, and justly assessed according to their quality.

65. The nunjee in the Malmungalum zemindary is thus divided:

	Average rate.	Goontahs.	Total value. CC.
Turmeric and sugar cane, and gardens not included, in Pammala	45 4½	98 2½	417 4 10½
Paddy land yielding 2 crops	38 13	562 5½	2,182 1 3½
- - D <sup>o</sup> - - - 1 crop only	20 8½	1,331 11½	2,732 5 -
Nunjee taum poonjee	12 -	1 13½	2 1 15
Total average of zemindary	26 13½	1,988 1	5,334 2 13

66. From this it will be seen, that in the average, the rate of assessment bears from 45 fa. to 12 fa. per goontah; but if the detail be further examined, the assessment will appear still higher.

per Goontah.

Thus on the turmeric and sugar-cane gardens, from 30. 10. to 55. on the quantity of land above noted, giving the average before-mentioned.

67. It would seem that this rate is very high. The mode of settling it, is as follows:—The produce is always certain, as the lands that have the best command of water are always appropriated to it. This produce on the first sort of lands, by a full investigation, is, of turmeric, 60 tolans the goontah, the price of which has never been known lower than three fanams the tolan, and it is seldom higher than five fanams per tolan; the average then is rendered at four, which gives as follows:—

The produce 60 tolans, at 4 per tolan	24	-	-
Charges, labour and seeds, &c. rated on the general customs of the villages	13	-	-
Remainder	11	-	-

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This remainder is divided with the sirkar, and that division fixed the rent of 5. 5. on the lands giving such produce.

68. The same mode in settling is observed, on the lands less productive; the charges are the same, and I may say, from my own investigation of them, fair, triflingly favouring the ryot. The lesser quantity in produce arises from a decrease in weight, rather than apparent bulk, but the value by measure and weight is generally the same, and the division with the sirkar less in proportion to the weights; which division, at the former rate, fixes the value of the goontah.

69. The rate of estimating the sugar-cane gardens is in this zemindarry as follows:—The produce of the canes equals per goontah, on the first sort of land, on full investigation, one hundred tolas of jaggery.

This valued at 5½ fa <sup>s</sup> per tola gives	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	—	—
Charges on cultivation, &c.	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	—	—

Leaving as remainder	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	—	—
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which is divided between the ryots and the sirkar, as the rent, custom has ever authorized should be paid and received.

70. In lands of inferior quality, or when the command of water is less, the size of the canes diminishes; and that diminution giving a less quantity of jaggery, lessens also the sirkar share, and consequently the value of the land it is grown from.

71. The plantain gardens in this zemindarry, for this fruit alone, are the next head; and are settled as follows:—One goontah contains 300 trees; each tree yielding a produce of 1½ of one cully fanam, or 68 Madras cash, gives for the whole, as the yearly produce, 15 6 4

Charges thereon for plants and labour	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	6	4
---------------------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Leaving as remainder	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	—	—
----------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

which, when divided with the ryots, gives the sirkar its fixed rent on the garden per goontah as noted; and this rate progressively descends as the quality and situation of the land, in respect to water, appears to warrant.

72. The rates for plantain gardens, so settled, are only equal to the average rent of the better sort of paddy land yielding two crops, and the better sort yielding one crop. They are, however, seldom made in places like this, for sale of the produce, so much as for household consumption; and, generally speaking, if the lands laid in these gardens, were sown as paddy fields, the produce to the sirkar would probably be the same. The several rates of the lands which compose these gardens give the rate 45. 4½. on goontahs 92. 3½. as before noted.

73. The lands in paddy fields, yielding two crops, are ascertained to be 562. 5½. goontahs; and giving per goontah from 28 to 44 fa<sup>s</sup>. as the sirkar rent, the highest of which is as follows:

The first crop of the best of wet lands	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	—
The 2 <sup>d</sup> crop from the same ground	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	6
							25	6
							3	2½
Sotundrum, &c. equal 12½ per cent.	-	-	-	-	-	-		

Ryot's share	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	3½
							11	1½

Sirkar share	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	—
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the fractions being let go to the ryots, gives at the rate of 4 fanams per cullum, 44 fa<sup>s</sup> per goontah.

74. The lowest rate of the lands giving two crops, is thus settled:—

1 <sup>st</sup> crop produces	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	6
2 <sup>d</sup> crop	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	4
							16	—
							2	—
Sotundrum, &c. of 12½ per cent.	-	-	-	-	-	-		
							14	—
Ryot's share	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	—
							7	—

which, at the same price, gives the lowest rate noted 28 fa<sup>s</sup>.

75. The intermediate rates depend wholly on the quality of the lands, and their situation for water. The first sort of land, giving one crop only, approaches very near, in point of value, the best sort of that which gives two; but its quality as land, is very superior, as the produce of the former arises almost wholly from the water, rather than the soil.

76. The lands yielding one crop are rated from 26. 4. to 13. 15. : the whole produce of the first sort

The sotundrum	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	—
							1	10½
							13	1½
Ryot's share	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6½
							6	6½

C. f. a.  
Fanams per cullum 2. 6. 4.

The

The last fort gives, as its whole produce, per goontah - - - - -

Sotundrum - - - - -

Ryot's share - - - - -

Circar's share - - - - -

C. N.

17 11  $\frac{1}{2}$

11  $\frac{1}{2}$

3 5  $\frac{1}{2}$

3 5  $\frac{1}{2}$

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at four fanams per cullum; is 13. 15. as noted. In this, as in the land giving two crops, the intermediate rates depend on the quality of the lands, and their situation for water. The average value in both instances, if taken from the division of the value of the highest and lowest rated lands, is less than the average value noted; and this arises from the various rates of assessment on the intermediate lands, being generally of the higher rate.

77. The total average produce on the lands giving two crops, is as follows:—

Whole average produce per goontah - - - - -

Sotundrum, at 12  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. - - - - -

22 2

2 9  $\frac{1}{2}$

Ryot's share - - - - -

19 4  $\frac{1}{2}$

9 8  $\frac{1}{2}$

Circar share at 4 fa' per cullum, gives 38. 13. - - - - -

0 8  $\frac{1}{2}$

78. The total average produce in the lands yielding one crop is as follows:—

Whole average produce - - - - -

Sotundrum - - - - -

11 9

7 5  $\frac{1}{2}$

Ryot's share - - - - -

10 3  $\frac{1}{2}$

5 1  $\frac{1}{2}$

Circar share - - - - -

5 1  $\frac{1}{2}$

which, at 4 fanams the cullum, gives 20. 8  $\frac{1}{2}$ , as the average before noted.

79. The last description of nunjee land in this zemindarry, is designated as nunjeteenum poonjee, to distinguish it as land that is uncertain of water, and thence the least valuable of the nunjee, as well as to show that the chance of a dry grain crop is preferred to be taken from it. A very small quantity of this land appears in this zemindarry, and is valued on its produce at 12 fanams per goontah.

80. Thus, in bringing before your board the variations in the nunjee land, and the proportionate assessment levied thereon in the Malmungalum zemindarry, I trust I have shown these lands equal to the rent fixed on them. In showing that placed on the Allynagrum zemindarry, I shall reduce the detail as much as may be consistent with the necessary explanation.

81. It may perhaps be proper to give a short account of this zemindarry. The villages composing it are Allynagrum, Woonjamputty, and Coonoor. When I took charge of the Dindigul revenues in September 1796, these villages were nearly desolate, as well from the rapacity of former managers, as from the incursions of the Collicies.

82. Allynagrum and Woonjamputty gave a small rent each, but the lands of Coonoor had not given any for many years; and the site of the village could hardly be ascertained, from its being covered with jungle. I gradually induced the inhabitants to extend their cultivation, and partly rebuilt Coonoor, which, from being totally unproductive, gives a rent of 36s CC. per annum; increased the cultivation and rents of Allynagrum 335  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent; and of Woonjamputty 385  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. above what they had been, since the Company's government had obtained in the district.

83. The industry of the few people in Coonoor (about ten houses) has however been ill repaid, as the lands are so very inferior in soil, and so very uncertain of water, that a half crop is never raised. Ryots have refused to settle there, and the lands which have been brought into cultivation have been those conveniently situated on the bounds of Allynagrum and Woonjamputty, and thence occupied by the inhabitants of those villages.

84. Much as may be said on this subject, the chief reason of the low rate on the nunjee of this zemindarry, arises from the proportion of low-rated, and consequently bad lands, being much greater than that rated on the better sort of lands therein; and the better sort of lands in it, collectively and generally, being less productive and valuable than any lands in Malmungalum.

85. In Allynagrum the average of the paddy lands, 245. 5  $\frac{1}{2}$  goontahs, is 12. 15  $\frac{1}{2}$ ; but to this must be added nunjee tenum poonjee 6 goontahs, at 5 fanams, which increases the quantity of goontahs to 251, and lessens the average value to 12. 12  $\frac{1}{2}$ . and this average arises from rates at 20s to 5 fa' per goontah.

86. In Coonoor, the nunjee lands are 653. 24  $\frac{1}{2}$  of which 236. 11, only can be said to be properly paddy lands: these, average 6. 9  $\frac{1}{2}$ , which arises from rates of 7  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 5 fanams per goontah; adding to the general average the nunjeteenum poonjee goontah to 416. 7  $\frac{1}{2}$ . at 4. 1  $\frac{1}{2}$ , making the number 653. 2  $\frac{1}{2}$ . it gives, as the general average of Coonoor, 4. 15  $\frac{1}{2}$ . as entered in the deswar statement.

87. Hence it appears that the nunjee lands in the zemindarry are 482.  $\frac{1}{2}$ . which average 9. 15  $\frac{1}{2}$  per goontah, and that the nunjeteenum poonjee are 422. 7  $\frac{1}{2}$ . at 4. 1.  $\frac{11}{16}$  per goontah, added to the nunjee before noted, give the decreased average entered in deswar statement of 7. 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  per goontah.

88. This abstract of Allynagrum, in comparison with Malmungalum, will, I trust, show your board that the difference arises from the difference of land; the total average in Malmungalum

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sum is 2. 6. 12. per goontah, in which average, there is not one goontah below the rate of 12. but in 1,088 goontahs. The total average in Allypore is 7. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  per goontah, or 904. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$  less than half the quantity in Malmungalum, and of that quantity 131. 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  goontahs only being from 16. 4. to 12. fanams per goontah; and the remainder 772. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$  being at rates inferior in many respects to those on well cultivated poonjee lands.

89. Having thus substantiated that the value of the land has been properly placed in respect to its quality and situation, and according to the specific agreements of the individuals concerned, I beg leave to call the attention of your board to the total cultivation, and to the general modes used in assessing its value.

90. The total fagnally or cultivated land, amounts to 387. 948. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ . making 16,854.  $\frac{21}{10}$  cawnies, calculating the goontah at  $\frac{64}{16}$  square feet, and at 2. 4.  $\frac{64}{16}$  as equal to one cawney; this land gives the rent assessed as 216. 070. 9 10. averaging on the goontah 15. 15. per goontah, or 34. 75. per cawney.

91. That the general mode of fixing the assessment may clearly be shown, it is necessary to note the rates in the first instances, levied on the poonjee gardens (or baughut), this part gives in the general cultivation 14,294. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ , averaging 1. 4. 1 $\frac{21}{10}$  and yields a revenue of 20,144. 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ . or, six pagodas 12,208. 23.

92. In rating the land giving this income, the assessment is at  $\frac{1}{3}$ ds to the ryots, after deducting the generally estimated charges of 3 l. colly per goontah, the prescriptive allowance for manure, hence 66 $\frac{2}{3}$  per cent. are for the ryots, or 13d or 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ d per cent. only to the circar. This rate is the same on all lands of this description, and in whatever situation they may be placed.

93. The poonjee fields, or kate, gives on the general assessment of the quantity of the land noted under this head, viz. goontah 337,584. 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ . total of 131,940. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ . or six pag<sup>s</sup> 79,963. 42. 46. averaging at 3. 14.  $\frac{81}{16}$  per goontah, or 24. 42. per cawney.

94. This average equally arises from the assessment being made at  $\frac{1}{3}$ ths, or 60 per cent. to the ryots, and  $\frac{2}{3}$ th, or 40. per cent. to the circar from the average total produce. These two descriptions of land give the total poonjee, viz. 3. 51,879. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ .

95. The nunjee pammaler goontahs 254. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$  are but a small part of the revenue; the average is 5. 7. 13.  $\frac{141}{16}$  giving a total 14 $\frac{1}{2}$ . 9. 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ ; this average and total is produced from the various assessments on these gardens according to their situation.

96. The best situated give, after deduction of all charges cultivation,  $\frac{1}{3}$ ds to the ryot, or 66 $\frac{2}{3}$ d per cent. and  $\frac{1}{3}$ d or 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ d, to the circar, and are watered, in constancy from rivers, or nullahs.

97. The second sort give  $\frac{1}{2}$ , or 75 per cent. to the ryot, after deducting all charges of cultivation, and  $\frac{1}{2}$ , or 25 per cent. to the circar; these lands are watered from tanks by nullahs, and partly from wells, whence the uncertainty of the crop and increased labour causes the deduction.

98. The third and last description of these lands gives  $\frac{2}{3}$ th, or 80 per cent. to the ryots, after deducting the proper charges of cultivation. These lands are always watered from wells alone, and thence the crop generally less certain, and the labour always greater.

99. The general assessment on the nunjee paddy lands is made on the customary division of the crop after deducting the satundrum, which cover all the proper expenses that the circar should attend to, and which amount to 12 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent; hence, including the sotundrum, the ryot's share is  $\frac{1}{3}$ , or 36 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. and the circar share  $\frac{2}{3}$ , or 43 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The garden produce of turmeric, sugar cane, &c. are, after deducting charges, shared in equality with the circar, and the nunjee term poonjee, is on the whole produce 60 per cent. to the ryot, and 40 to the circar.

100. The general rates applied to the total goontahs 35,814. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ . or cawnies 15,560. 2 $\frac{3}{4}$  gives the sum of C C. 62,513. 4. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ . on the former, averaging per goontah 1. 7. 7 $\frac{11}{16}$  and on the latter S.P. 37,886. 40. 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ . averaging 2. 19. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cawney.

101. The remaining land in the abstract is entered under the head Pillwany, and is let for the grafs to the proprietors for their cattle. This land bearing a real value, was not included in the notice; neither is it entered in the average value of land, as the entry would fallaciously reduce the average value of the land under cultivation.

102. It did not appear right to me to give it to the ryots, at their discretion; the cowle is for it, as grafs land, but if cultivated, it will give the rent the survey has fixed on it. This land has been made a specific head in the statement, both on account of the distinction with the ryots, and because, in the conquered countries south of the Noyah, a very considerable rent is derived from lands, which custom has given long since, on their own.

103. Your board will please to observe, that this custom obtains in the sequestered pollams of Pylney and Vempatchec only. The origin of the tax is the arbitrary imposition, of the pollars on their ryots, and the assumption of power to themselves in their own pollams, similar to that of the circar on its own provinces.

104. This custom, if properly defined, as a rent for right of commonage, might perhaps be productive of general utility; but great abuse proceeded from it in the Sultan's country, and his government, which has partially only been corrected by the specific entry of the land, in the particular cases to the inferior ryots.

The rent for the quantity herein noted, is trifling; but the consequences of the fact—this would probably have taught the ryots in the Sultan's country, depending on

these pollans, to expect the same favourable exemptions; and those would have been a sacrifice too important of the revenue of the country, to have been made with propriety.

105. Hence it remains for the determination of your Board. If added to the Teersey Jand, it will increase the valuation placed thereon; but if remaining to the ryots for the year, according to their cowles, there is the probable advantage of an extended cultivation on this land, in the ensuing year, to the zemindar, at the rate of its worth according to the survey.

107. Thus the whole assessment on the lands under cultivation of the forty zemindaries amount to 216,670. 2. 11. or ft pag. 1,31,315. 14. 18. which is settled on a progressive increasing cowle for three years, as hereafter mentioned.

108. The zemindars, from No. 1. to No. 13. exclusive, were settled previously to, in, and from, Fussy 1210; the fixed bariz of these zemindaries, and for permanency, is that in Fussy 1212, and amounts to 71. 233. 9. 3½. This amount, is an increase on the settlement of these zemindaries previously to survey, which was 49,090. 3. 9. equalling 45. 1½. per cent.

109. The progressive settlement of these zemindaries, to completion of the fixed bariz, is as follows:

Zemindaries 1 to 13. in Coll. 13. 14. & 106.	Progressive fixed Bariz.	Soubay Bariz on which the fixed Bariz is calculated.	Decrease.	Increase.
	1210 - 54,209 1 10	- - -	- - -	5,11,881 10 6½.
	1211 - 62,827 4 11½	49,090 3 9	- - -	13,737 1 2½ 27 15½.
	1212 - 71,233 9 3½	- - -	- - -	2,21,435 10½ 45½.

110. The increase thus laid, was cheerfully agreed to by the ryots. The assessment had full respect to the preceding seasons, as well as to the individual circumstances, and, as made, has hitherto been fully and regularly collected.

111. The zemindaries, from No. 14. to 36. inclusive, were settled from 1211 to 1213; the fixed bariz for these zemindaries for permanency is that of 1213, and amounts to 1,23,411. 9. 9. This amount is an increase on the settlement of these zemindaries previously to survey, which was 1,03,364. 3. 7½. equalling 19. 6½; the progress from Fussy 1211, to the completion in 1213, is as follows;

Zemindaries from No 14 to 36. Coll. 14. 108, 109.	Progressive fixed Bariz.	Soubah Bariz.	Decrease.	Increase.
	1211 - 1,00,818 1 3½	- - -	2,552 2 7½	—
	1212 - 1,12,431 7 1	1,03,364 3 7½	- - -	9,06,739½ 8 125½.
	1213 - 1,23,411 9 9	- - -	- - -	2,0,247 6 1½ 19 6½.

112. It may appear strange that a decrease on the previous bariz should be made in the first year of a progressive increasing settlement; but the reason was, that the seasons of 1209-1210, were very unfavourable in the zemindaries that were lowered, and that many ryots gave up partially their lands, which, previously to the survey, were too highly assessed, and which, on being equalized by the survey, caused the decrease on the previous settlement, the deduction of which I judged were more salutary to the ryots to be made on the first year of the settlement, than in division on the 3 years.

113. Added to this, the rents before the settlement on the survey, were gradually increasing on the lands, from the time I took charge of the district to the time of settlement in Fussy 1211. Hence the ultimate increase of 19. 6½ per cent. by the survey, was less than on those lands settled one or two seasons before, and which on that account, did not show the increase on them, viz. from No. 1. to 13. as the delay in settlement has made it appear in these.

114. The zemindaries, from No. 37. to 40. inclusive, were settled in permanency in and from Fussy 1212, and are progressive until 1214 Fussy, the amount of which is the permanent bariz, or 22,024. 3. 14½. This amount is an increase on the settlement of these zemindaries from 1211 Fussy, which was 18,149. 9. 11½. equalling ultimately 21. 5. 8½ per cent.

115. The progressive settlement of these zemindaries to the completion of the fixed bariz is as follows:

Zemindaries 37 to 40. Coll. 108. 110. 112.	Fixed Bariz.	Soubah Bariz.	Decrease.	Increase.
	1212 - 17,814 7 11½	- - -	3,352 0 3½	—
	1213 - 19,921 9 7	18,149 9 11½	- - -	1,771. 91½ 9.
	1214 - 22,024 3 14½	- - -	- - -	3,374. 4. 3. 2½.

Extract from the  
REPORT of the  
Surveys and  
Accounts.

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FOUNTS of Collection,  
to Surveys and Assess-  
ments.

Mr. Herdiss, our Pres-  
ident Settlement of  
the Dandigal Province.

116. The decrease in Fully 1212 in this settlement, has reference to the causes before noted on, and your Board will remark that these zemindaries relate wholly to what formerly com-  
posed the Verapatchee pollam, the assumption of which took place in Fully 1210, and when the cultivation for that year was made and ascertained.

117. The peons of the polygar, who held lands, and whose cultivation in that season, 1210, enabled the nautumcars to pay the partial settlement, left partly those lands in 1211, and several of them wholly, in 1212, following their inclination generally as to their place of residence; this deficit thence partially arising in Verapatchee pollam is compensated ultimately in other places wherein those people have settled; and the increase of 21.  $\frac{81}{10}$  per cent. on the full settlement, shows that their emigration was very trifling in its effect, on the revenue of these zemindaries.

118. The total of this settlement, for permanency on the lands absolutely the property of the cirkar, is CC<sup>rs</sup> 2,16,670. 2. 10. or R<sup>rs</sup> pag 1,31,313. 14. 12. being an increase of the average value of the six first years of this district, from 1200 to 1205 inclusive, or 59,180. 14. 48. equal to 121. 14.  $\frac{3}{4}$  per cent.; and if calculated on the average of the cirkar collections, or what from the existing accounts was brought to the cirkar account, viz. 43,543. 39. 24. equals 201. 9. per cent.

119. Having shown the value and settlement of the cirkar lands under cultivation, the next addition to the jumma will arise from the assumption of such enaums as are directed by orders to be annexed to the cirkar lands, and declared responsible for the public revenue assessed on the zemindary.

120. The total lands that were in enaums in the forty zemindaries equal 68,254. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ . being 61 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the total cirkar cultivable lands, the value of which, amounts to CC. 35,788. 3. 10. equalling 8. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the gross value of the total cirkar cultivable land.

121. The deductions in waste cultivable land of 23,020. 5. valued at 18,975. 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ . leaves as the enaum cultivable lands 45,234.  $\frac{1}{2}$ . valued at 26,843. 2. 10 $\frac{1}{2}$  which number of goon-  
tahs and valuation, as well totally as partially, are shown in two separate statements, as they belong to their particular zemindaries.

122. The enaum list shows the total extent, and explains the cause of the enaum. I have not found sunnuds for any. All, with some exceptions which I shall point out, have been retained by the incumbents, under the prescriptive right of long possession.

123. The statement of the enaums which should remain in their possession, comprehend those solely of a religious nature, and some few of such as the prejudices and super-  
stition of the natives require, should be given up to them; these are found as Davadyen Bumaraya, and some fees of the Chitta (or fundry enaums) the explanation of which in the general list, shows their use, and which explanation will, with the leave of your board, be the cause of their confirmation.

124. This confirmation, if given, will extend to cultivable land for the enaumdar, equal to 35,173. 4. valued at 16,484. 59 $\frac{1}{2}$ ; giving on the gross cirkar cultivable land, 31 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. and the value of the cirkar cultivable, 3. 13 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

125. Of this land thus valued, the quantity of 17,215. 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ . only are cultivated, giving 10,160. 2. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ . being on the gross quantity of the cirkar cultivated land, 4. 7. per cent. and on the rent of the cirkar cultivated land, 4. 11 $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

126. The enaums thus noted on, are, exclusive of the villages in enaum to the pagodas, which will be noted hereafter, and whether taken in their most extended or most confined view on their accounts, are submitted to your board, as most moderate.

127. These explanations, may perhaps not be thought to have been necessary in this place; but as the display of all the resources of revenue here, may make your board more decisive on what is ultimately to be fixed, I thought it necessary to show all, notwithstanding I have not added these items to the fixed barizet. Part of the assumed enaums, and those added into the jumma, are the Woolija enaums; these, comprehending the fifth-day, public and private, of the village, are under the directions of the board of revenue, solely responsible for the assessment of the zemindary.

128. The remainder of the assumed enaums, are those given by the heads of villages, or by annuidars and renters to dancing girls, poets, musicians, heroes and others, contributing to the pleasure of their immediate employers, and which never having had positive claims on the cirkar, have generally been assumed and formed part of the extra revenue account, although they have been distinguished separately in account, that, under reference to the board, an ultimate decision might be obtained on them.

129. To these enaums clandestinely bestowed, are to be added usurpations and alienations of the polygars for the cavel; those as heretofore obtaining, are under the orders of the board of revenue, added to the zemindary estates; and although the sum is small, to each respectively, the measure has certainly given the final blow to polygar authority, and promises, under the future police, safety to the ryot and the traveller.

130. The cavelies of Gollapamug, Gopanaig, and Poojanyanig, were assumed with their pollams; but have always been kept distinct in account. The proceeds from them, have hitherto always been entered in the extra revenue account. Those lands entered under the name of Annanigur, are recorded usurpations of that polygar, from an original alienation of the land from the lands of Autoor; the income of this also has heretofore, since been carried to the extra revenue account.

131. A description of enaums assumed, viz. the Woolija enaum, the fundry (chiffer) enaum, and generally, amount wholly to 33,081. 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ . giving the estimated value of 29,303. 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ . being

being on the gross number of sirkar gontahs, 2. 14  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. and value being 4. 7  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the gross estimated value of the sirkar cultivable land.

132. The reference to the cultivation is far greater in its rating, than in the enaums proposed to be let go, the cultivated of the whole being 28,018. 5  $\frac{1}{2}$  giving on the sirkar cultivated land, a quantity equal to 7. 3  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. and in real value, 16,653. 4 being on the sirkar rents, for its cultivated lands, 7. 11  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

133. Of the amount quantity of total enaum lands, viz. 68,254. 5  $\frac{1}{2}$ . it appears that the land proposed to be permitted to remain with the present incumbents, viz. 35,173. 4. equals 51. 8  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total, and the amount proposed to be assumed and added to the estate, viz. 33,081. 1  $\frac{1}{2}$  equals 48  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total, both giving the amount 68,254. 5  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

134. Included in the above 35,173. 4. proposed to be free, but deducted in the total value, because belonging to founardiyem, are those which pay a fixed tribute of 92. 3. 8. pootroopa to the respective zemindaries; these enaums, it is reported, were originally free-gift by the Gentoo and Mysore governments, but after the war with Chundab Sahib, and about 50 years ago, the present pootroopa was assessed by the amildars and renters, and remained so until this day. These deductions, in value 92. 3. 8. thus made from the total value of the cultivated land before noted, there remains with the enaumdars, 10,067. 6. 14  $\frac{1}{2}$ , which bears 4. 10  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the total fixed tax of Fully 1214.

135. Thus, these severally previously noted additions of assumed lands, enaums to the sirkar jumma on the lands, give a total for Fully 1214 of 2,33,323. 2. 15. or ft' pag' 1,41,408. 2. 40.

136. The taxes that are derivable by the proprietor of the land, and belonging to the branch of revenue known in these districts under the name of Souardiyem, literally gold collection, because they are not subject to any charge under an aumeeny management, are wholly shown opposite each zemindarry to which they respectively belong.

137. In the particular statement, your board will observe, the different heads under which this revenue is derived. The poncando, literally hill fields, contain a number of spots of land, called corookums; these are cultivated by the Momooly billbook and richare; no settled measurement is given for the rent, but several corookums are cultivated at the will of the labourers, and paid for by an usage rent as cultivated.

138. The tax on topes is assessed according to the produce of the trees, which chiefly is affected by their age and situation; there are sixteen forts which are usually productive to the sirkar, the assessment on which is noted in the detail on each fort specifically.

139. The pootroopa, 92. 3. 8. before noted, deducted in the enaum statement, is by usage added to the founardiyem; the detail of this usage is entered on the statement, explanatory of this kind of revenue.

140. The total hence arising from what under this head belongs to the zemindaries, equalling 2,383. 5  $\frac{1}{2}$  or ft' pag' 1,444. 24. 34. to which must be added the founardiyem of the cawelly, arising from a tax on topes, and equalling 14. 4. or 8. 27. 33. with the former, making a total of 2,397. 7  $\frac{1}{2}$  or ft' pag' 1,453. 6. 57. is added to the former total, making, as the revenue of the district, specifically explained, the sum of CC. 2,35,720. 9. 15  $\frac{1}{2}$ . or ft' pag' 1,42,861. 9. 23.

141. Having thus brought forwards the founardiyem belonging to the sirkar exclusively; that which belongs to the enaums proposed to be left with their possessors, stands next for explanation. This your board will perceive, on reference, to be entirely made up from taxes on topes, amounting to 344. 1. 15. which sum, added to 10,067. 8. 14  $\frac{1}{2}$ . gives to the enaumdars the total amount of 10,412. 6. 13  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

142. The taxes in this statement, I deem to be such as do not, under the orders for the formation of the permanent settlement, belong to the land, but that, as being wholly professional, are retainable by government, and subject to such future alterations, as its judgment may choose to make.

143. The number of shops are noted, and the taxes thereon. They are regularly fixed, in proportion to the estimated value of the trade each individual carries on.

144. The house tax is improperly so called, as it is in fact a sort of shop tax, levied in manner similar to that called the shop tax. The customary mode of settlement is by estimate, on the probable trade of individuals, viz. the victualler, or manufacturer who carries on his trade at home, is fixed on the produce of his trade and profit; the dyers and silversmiths, in proportion to their income derived from their trade; the antioopy, or people who work in trade as common workmen, in proportion to their respective estimated income.

145. The loom tax is assessed by knowledge on the produce of the loom, rather than on the loom itself. Thus, those weavers who have a loom in their family, put out more work from the loom than those who have a loom in their shop; and the number of pieces, as well as quality, determine the rate of assessment.

146. In other villages, the labour of the dhans is assessed, in proportion to the time they work at their looms, and the produce of their time; since, in the months of cultivation, they leave their craft to attend on that particular business. Hence, by so much the less as they may in proportion with other weavers, appear to pay for their looms, they by a much greater proportion uplift the revenue of the sirkar in cultivation.

147. The tax on oil mills is fixed on the proportionate estimated at the mill. The tax on iron-founders is fixed on the furnace, according to the labour of the foundry, in bringing the ore from different distances; and that on the indigo makers, is levied in proportion to the labour, in bringing the leaves of the rippul, and the produce of the rats.

Extracts from the  
FORIS of Collection  
on Survey and  
Enaums.

Mr. Herdley, as  
man and Settlement  
of the District of  
Pondicherry.

148. The paper money is a tax, which lies in the hands of the management, but which has been improperly constituted as part of the fourth year, even after the lands have been held in rent. It is settled and collected in the pullers of the various villages, as a prescriptive and to the cirkar, from the privilege they have, of dividing the main or different fees they get in reaping, and threshing the crops in the fields.

149. The honey-rent, or *gontas*, is a licence by custom paid for as much of that article and the wax of bees, as may be found by the renter, in particular jungles or mountains.

150. The tax on the Patna Chitty and Bogamry, has its rise from the custom of the right and left hand cast, each having an head or chief. The one of the right hand cast, was called the Patna Chitty, and of the left, Bogamry. Each respectively by prescription collected from their cast, certain impositions authorized by the Government of government.

151. The chief of each, was that of comfort on their respective cast and dependants; and the tax was originally supposed to have been gratuitous, and in compensation to them for their trouble.

152. The British government destroyed partly the power of these people, which was very dangerous inasmuch as they enjoyed their custom to their inclination, and ever were the sentiments of the right and left hand casts generally; the assembly of each being always under them, and influenced by their advice, which in many instances stayed not at murder.

153. On my arrival at Dindigul, in Sept. 1798, several tumultuous assemblies were made which determined me to support the power of the chiefs of these castings; and as my appointment gave me the power of doing so, I thought it right the cast should continue the payment to the cirkar they had before made to the Patna Chitty and Bogamry.

154. The *gontas* is a sort of village monopoly; the renter has the exclusive right of buying and selling rice in them; and, on the computed profit of this monopoly, the tax is levied.

155. The tax on carriage business is levied, on the proportion of income to the owner derived from their sale; those working in and near the residence are said to be less profitable, but that may be from the mode of barter among the natives, whence real profit is neither so easily defined or so minutely settled. But for those going far, the profit is easily known from the general regulations for hire; and, on the estimated union of these different modes of labour, the tax is fixed.

156. These several taxes, amount to 8,330, 5, 9, or for pag 5,048. 37. 12. and though belonging to the jumma of the district, do not, for the reasons before stated, belong to the zemindars. To these also must be added the townships of the enaumdars, proposed to be permitted to enjoy their enaums, amount to 6, 4, 6, or for pag 50. 3, 51. making in toto, 8,394. 9. 15, or for pag 5,097. 39. 43. These assumptions of privilege by the enaumdars, I have entered with taxes that belong exclusively to the cirkar; conceiving, under the present orders, that the enaumdars are not to have the privilege of bringing taxes so properly derived to the zemindars.

157. This statement will exhibit to your board at one view, the increase in land brought forward by the survey; and from the inaccuracy of the old accounts, prove the necessity of the measure. In justice however to the ryots, it is proper to remark, that those places in which the difference is very enormous, have been very generally debilitated, from either the unhealthiness of the climate, the frequent inroads of banditti, or the rapacity and deception of former managers.

158. The total increase appears to be 100 per cent. on the area cultivable land; the decrease in battalagoints. I have not been able to ascertain the increase in the tersey of

141. 9.  $\frac{1}{10}$  is enormous, more in quantity than the total amount of the number of *gontas* given in by the curnums on the ain cirkar land.

159. The accounts of the curnums were delivered in to the cirkar, as the survey proceeded; and the survey of them was proved before the cirkar. In that manner, the accounts were made up by the curnums, or on what management, I cannot find out; but the survey has restored order, and the accounts now made by the curnums, are those made by the survey.

160. The increase in the cultivated lands in several enaumdaries, appears very large. This arises from the accuracy of the survey, and the great defect of the old accounts and curnums in concealing and falsifying accounts, which though highly culpable in itself, was the only means they find of continuing the dominion of the venal servants of the cirkar.

161. Hence arose an inequality of treatment and great inequality of rent. Those ryots who were able to meet the curnums and their lands, and a not a moment, whilst those who were not so fortunate, although possessing lands equally productive, were under-sold in the markets, and ultimately ruined. Their lands were taken into the general cultivation of the village by the curnum, and usually entered as waste in the accounts given to the cirkar; and so long as the spoils derived from this conduct were equally distributed, the act was not noticed. On this assumption, it will appear, that the general increase equalling 67  $\frac{1}{10}$  per cent.

was not so hard on the ryots.

In bringing the increase of land before your board, I must advert to the report of 1795, on the Dindigul district, by Mr. Wynch, and extract his reported measurement.

ment of the agency, or total cultivable land, exclusive of amount of what in the schedules now rent comprises the Toddicomboo zemindary, as follows:

	Circ.	Mr. Wynch's Report.	Carnum's Account previous to Survey.	Present Measurement.
Toddicomboo Village.	Poonjee	15,000 11	17,221 3	21,473 14.
	Nunjee	17,904 15	240 6	1,060 154
		12,500 7	17,961 9	22,514 131
	Poonjee	2,127 53	1,000 4	4,746 51
	Nunjee	23 10	33 11	18 101
TOTAL Zemindary		27,521 41	35,515 41	27,299 151

Extracts from  
REPORTS of Com-  
missioners on Surveys and  
Measurements.

Mr. Wynch's  
Report on the  
Measurement of  
the District of  
Toddicomboo.

163. From this, it will be easily seen that his accounts were incorrect; first, in being less than the Carnum's account by 37. 31 per cent.; and secondly, less by the present measurement 82. 91 per cent. which is an increase of 55. 60 per cent. on the former accounts of the Carnum's.

164. By the incorrectness, in the first instance, is shown the proof of what has been previously urged in respect to the deceit of the nautamengs and Carnums, and of their fabrication of the village accounts, which was partially corrected by my promulgating the intention to survey, as the work was commenced.

165. I do not mean by this, so much to condemn the sources of information, on which Mr. Wynch's report of 24 November 1795, was founded, as to endeavour to show that the general great increase observable in the statement of the Carnum's account, arose more from their own fabrication of them, with the view of procuring means to satisfy venality, than from the ignorance of the actual extent of lands, and its positive increase on their accounts by survey.

185. In the resources of the fourthryes, as belonging to the zemindars, at present, little improvement can be expected; even that which may arise from planting of topes or extension of the ponitance cultivation, can hardly be held out as an object for immediate speculation.

186. On the fourthryes, which are professional commodities in detail, I have not included in the resources of the zemindary, a very great increase may be expected under proper regulations of excise; but as publicans and others might injure rather than improve the revenue, I have not attempted to alter what custom has established, and which cannot effectually be regulated, but under some general system for excise on the whole country.

187. In every act of my management, I invariably adhered to the customs of the natives in cultivation, and made the extension of agriculture the first object; the very great increase of revenue also shows the increase of agriculture, and I am so well convinced of the resources of this province, from my own observation, that I cannot doubt, but that under a vigilant superintendence, and the yet almost imperceptible addition of the labours of the inhabitants, if peace continues, the revenues from the increase of population, and the habits of industry which may be then expected to be continued in the crops, will, in the course of ten years, be nearly doubled.

188. But as agriculture must be considered as the foundation of what must in the most essential manner contribute to the prosperity of the country, it is necessary that its particular effects should be encouraged, and that the revenue on the land must not exhaust the district, unless its manufactures be encouraged, and that, only, can bring back to it the sums exacted from it by taxation.

189. Hence it is necessary for the prosperity of the country, that commerce should in some degree, more plentiful than at present, be carried on; in the pernicious ryots, the sums which the various settlements of the country have collected, and that the circulation of revenue is derived, if not made beneficial, at least not so pernicious in the province from which it may be drawn, should not be so pernicious, become pernicious to it.

190. I beg to apologize for this digression, but in observing the state of this treasury, the factories of Salem, I have observed that it cannot but be seen that, the progress of these manufactures must be better established, from the more extensive circulation of cash within them than elsewhere, notwithstanding the state of the country, and the same reason may be not regularly and fully employed, and its internal commerce more sought after, and more firmly established.

Extract PROCEEDINGS of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George,  
8th January 1807.

Extract Letter from Mr. W. M. GARROW, Collector of Coimbatore; dated 30th November 1806.

Para. 5. SINCE the year 1801-2, these assessments have been the established standard of collection. Corrections and modifications have been introduced where it has been found necessary, and the present accounts and report are submitted, as the ultimate result of the survey arrangement, and from which there does not appear the least necessity for deviating.

6. The object of the survey being to equalize the land rent throughout, it was necessary to refer to the present state then existing. Their diversity however, and the disproportion found between the recorded area of land, and the quantity ascertained after measurement, rendered much consideration necessary before an average rate could be found to be so generally adopted in the country as to supersede the effect of individual assessments; the two extremes of rendering the assessments of the country too high, or too low, compared with that of the preceding.

7. The Andoor and Erond talooks were the first upon which the experiment was tried; and from them, were obtained the data upon which were founded the subsequent general assessment for the other districts. In these two talooks, the rents differ considerably from those obtaining in the remainder of the division; the reason is, that being the two first, which were assessed, village by village, and field by field, the regularity which appears in the rents of the other districts, was impracticable with regard to them; for that regularity in the latter, was produced by the data obtained, and final arrangement resulting from the detailed assessment of Erond and Andoor.

8. Previously to the survey, the different gradations of land was unlimited. Properly speaking, the gradation did not depend upon the land, capricious assessments were made upon the soil, and it frequently happened that the personal circumstances of the owner, was the principal criterion by which his field was assessed. As an example of the diversity of rates obtaining, your board will find in the Appendix, a statement of the former rates of assessments in nine villages of the Andoor, and a smaller number of the Erond talooks. The gradations will be observed in the village of Chudayanpottam, to amount to sixteen. In Tullampellur, to be only five. In Chudayanpottam, of the latter talook, they in poonjee, are fifteen; and garden, two in number. I need add but one more example in the instance of Sankarupottam, which has twenty kinds of assessments. Had these classes of land been attended with an equitable progressive decrease of assessments, the rents of the ryot would have been tolerably moderate; but, as I have before remarked, the assessment paid by the owner gave rank to the soil in the scale of gradations, instead of the soil proving the standard of assessment.

9. This will be the better observable, as a reference to the first sort of land, where the same description paid 8 chackrams in Chudayanpottam, and 2 only in Coomaryanoor. The same difference exists, more or less, in the various sorts of land. Those whose farms were most highly assessed, were generally those who were thought not able to pay it. They in return, imposed upon the clerk by concealing the real extent of those farms. This struggle between rapacity on one hand, and fraud on the other, had totally confounded the real and equitable assessment of the village.

10. Experience, and the information of the ryots themselves, confirmed the necessity of consolidating the different classes into a smaller number, which was done by the consent of the people themselves, in conjunction with the following rates; viz.

For Poonjee  
For Garden  
For Nujee

which number was found to embrace all the descriptions of the lands of the division. In course of classifying the lands, the quantity recorded in the current differed, as may be supposed, from the measurement now made. The current rents butta exceeded in double and triple proportions, the measured area. The various rents produced by the current, therefore were not proportioned to the extent of the lands, &c. then mentioned, proved less than the land actually contained. It may be supposed that the adaptation of the manual rent per butta, to the extent of the land, in 1200, would not answer on the same land. After a survey of the land, it was necessary to ascertain the proportion that should now fall on the butta, and to ascertain it, with as great a degree of accuracy as possible. The proportion of the manual rent to the land thus ascertained to answer the butta, was to be found not only in one or two instances, but in the most considerable and capricious cases obtaining in every village. The detailed accounts at length afforded the necessary data. By averaging the scale of the different rents in different villages, by a further reference to the rents of the lands, and the division of the land into poodies, charges, &c. and the ryots farms, the manual, D. was found to be a correct and equitable scale of assessment as could be desired.

11. The averaged manual rate of the former measurement having been formed, a scale of the assessment, after measurement, was fixed upon the same standard, in order to judge of the comparative reduction that might be made as a consequence of the reduction of the manual, &c. after measurement.



12. On advertng to the Scale of Assessment, D. the third column will show the averaged mamool rate per butta, alluded to. In column four, will be found the proportionate remission; and in column five, the permanent rent as it now stands, on each field.

13. After the formation of this scale, little further labour was necessary. The quantity and quality of land being furnished from the surveyors in the districts, the assessment was applied to each class of land, as it corresponded with the class in the scale.

14. The next point was the comparative state and situation of the villages.

15. It is evident that lands, though first, second, and so forth, in one village, cannot correspond invariably, with similar classes in other villages. Independently of this circumstance, local causes throw some villages of equal, or even superior quality of soil, into an inferior scale to others, either from their remoteness, which has an effect upon the scale of their produce, the unhealthiness of the climate, and the depredation of wild animals; besides various other impediments to agriculture, which it is needless to enumerate.

16. These considerations, held out the propriety of subdividing the villages, in reference to their relative prosperous circumstances and local advantages, into four kinds; and in order to form the distinction, it was fixed that the first sort of land, in the second class of villages, should be assessed on a par with the second sort of land, in the first description of villages, and the calculation so continued, until the rents of the four description of villages were equalized.

17. The talooks also are affected in a similar degree, in respect to their remoteness and other cause; a further remission was granted on this account also, as will be observed on reference to the note at the foot of the scale.

18. In order to convey an idea of the effect which the operation of this scale of assessment has had upon the revenue, I have, in the statement E. instanced two villages. It bears example of the increase and decrease of the revenue by its introduction, and shows the remissions found necessary to be made.

19. The village of Vellacannar will be observed to have had, by mamool accounts, 213  $\frac{1}{2}$  bullas of poonjee, for which at various rates, it paid a revenue of 920 7. making an average

of 4. 3. 2. per butta. By the survey, the quantity of the land was increased to 276 bullas, the whole of which was included, in five of the twelve gradations of land, as affixed by the ryot and surveyors in conjunction. It will be recollected, that 33 fanams per mamool butta, was found to be the highest poonjee, when averaged upon a particular number of villages in Erood and Andoor, with the progressive deduction of 2 fanams in every inferior class in succession. Upon this principle, the first sort of land containing 100 bullas, at 32 fanams, would have paid 3200; the second sort, containing 87 bullas, and assessed at 2 fanams less than the first, viz. 30 fanams, would have afforded 261; and progressively,

until the total cultivated land rent was reduced to 814 4. 0. by paying even according to the averaged mamool scale in D. but, by the general application of the scale of remission,

the subtraction of 5 minas, reduced it still further to 511 7. 0.

20. Gardens, by mamool, formerly paid, not for the soil, but chiefly upon the productions cultivated in them; and, as I have mentioned before, generally upon reference to the circumstances of the holder. It was difficult to obtain any criterion to fix the assessments upon them. By the correctest average that could be obtained from the gardens of Erood and Andoor, the highest assessment was found to be between eight and thirteen, and the lowest from about 1. 8. to 5. con' chackrams the butta.

21. In the same manner as it had been applied to poonjee, the average mamool teerwa was adopted, as a scale of assessment for gardens, also in order to ascertain the possibility of its being generally fixed for all the districts; with the intention, should it be found that the increase of revenue was too great, to reduce it considerably.

22. The mamool scale of assessment made it from 8. to 6. 5. per butta; the average teerwa found, was 7. 5. 6. but at this rate of assessment, though on reference to the former rent, was comparatively easy in the village of Vellacannar, would have fallen heavy on others, if generally adopted, it was necessary to reduce it still further, by remitting 30 fanams on the first, 22 fanams on the second, and 20 fanams on the third class of garden; as being a more equitable difference between the garden and poonjee rent. By this means, the permanent average rate is reduced from 7. 5. 6. the mamool teerwa to 4. 0. per butta.

23. Such a reduction, would scarcely appear warranted, unless the following circumstances are adverted to.

24. The Northern Division contained 107 villages, the addition, by measurement, classification, and by calculating (for experiment) by the average mamool scale of assessment, but chiefly by the increase of assessment in poonjee, which hereafter the gross rents rose to chackrams, 5,13,346. 3. 10. exceeding the total of the Fully 1209, by 1,59,432. 5. 5. This increase, was by no means an object desired, as the consequence of a new assessment; it served only to point out the mode of assessing and moderating the rent throughout the country, without incurring the danger of depreciating the revenue.

25. While the reduction between the averaged rate of 32. and the reduced rate of 20. &c. was executing, the increased quantity of land brought into account, proved, in general, more than equivalent to the fall by their remissions; so that the error, in lightening the land rent of every tract too much, below its former rate, was gaining, by the greater quantity of land brought into account.

Extracts from RE-  
PORTS of Collect  
on Surveys and Al-  
ments.

Letter from Coll  
of Comptrollers; da  
30 Nov. 1800.



Extracts from RE-  
PORTS of Collectors  
on Surveys and Assess-  
ments.

Letter from Collector  
of Canimbatore; dated  
30 Nov. 1806.

26. While, owing to this circumstance, the gross bariz of some villages in one talook actually was made to exceed that of the preceding year, it mattered little whether, by the operation of the remission, the revenue fell in other villages, as in the instance of Vellacannar; for so long as the total bariz of the talook, was found to maintain its level with that of the year before, there existed no ground for apprehension, that government could suffer even a temporary loss of their usual receipts, as I have more than once repeated. The object of the survey was not to occasion a rise of the revenue, further than by the beneficial effects of its operation, at a future period.

27. The village of Veerabaundy will show the reverse, by the adaptation of the same principle of assessment. It contained in the mamool account, 198½ buttas of poonjee, paying 508. 6. 5. at the average rate of 2. 5. 10½. per butta; the measurement multiplied the number of buttas to 363, which composed eight different classes of soil, upon inspection. By calculating at the rate of 32 fanams for the first sort of soil, and 2 fanams less in the classes in succession, there occurred the very great increase of 444. 5. 11. upon the same land that was cultivated in the preceding year. A remission was found necessary to be made, as would bring the gross revenue nearest to the level of the bariz of 1209. The very highest poonjee assessment now established, excepting Erood and Andoor, does exceed 20; the difference between that, and the mamool average rate, was remitted; being 6 annas, or 12 fanams for the first sort, 11 for the second, and in the successive remission of 1 fanam, in every class.

28. Still, there was a rise in the gross bariz of that village. But this may be attributed, to the greater quantity of land in cultivation, which had not paid its fair rent, or had been altogether a fraudulent tenure.

29. The same remarks that have been made on the garden lands of Vellacannar, apply to those of Veerabandy; and upon the same principles of assessment and remission, there is an increase in this village of Conteroy, ehuckrams, 32. 7. which, with its poonjee increase, shows again, in consequence of the survey, of 126. 2. 11.

30. The foregoing examples attach chiefly to poonjee; by which it is clear, that by the adoption of one uniform scale, there can be no loss; since the fall on the rents of one village may be always expected to be counterbalanced by the additional acquisition of land in another. It may now be necessary to add a few words on the subject of nunjee assessment. The measurement and classification took place at the same time, and in the same manner, as in the former.

31. The most considerable tract of land of the former, is situated under the watercourses of the Myar and Bhovany rivers, in the talooks of Danuigun, Cottah, Sateenungalum, Gopaulchetty pollam, and Erood.

32. On reference to the nunjee lands of Gopaulchetty pollam, and of Erood, there appeared a very great disparity in the assessments. The average rate of the former, was 5½ annas only per goonty, or 3. 6½. per cawney. In Erood, the same land paid 13½ annas per goonty, or 3. 2. 13. per cawney. The reasons assigned for this fraudulent difference were, that Gopaulchetty pollam abounded with Bramins, the dependants of the late government servants. As the uncertainty of money payments from the sirkar was a plausible excuse, so they availed themselves of it, in paying themselves in land at a low rent, which they underlet to the lower ryot. Their friends and relations were, in course, not forgotten in these misappropriations.

33. Another reason assigned was, that the apprehension of paying double rent, prevented their raising a second crop; and that they paid only in reference to a single one. There is, however, little justice in the excuse.

34. The nunjee lands of Erood were cultivated by the common class of ryots. They always raise two crops, in which that talook differs from Gopaulchetty pollam. It borders on the Salem districts, where a speedy sale is effected of the produce. These advantages, of course tended to advance the Erood assessments. The Gopaulchetty pollam nunjee, did not however, so far fall short of these advantages, as to be entitled to the very great indulgence in rent. The produce of a single crop in the latter, was nearly equal, from the fertility of the soil, to the double crops of Erood; and the superiority in quality, in a great measure, counterbalanced any casual deficiency in quantity. It became necessary to assimilate the rents of the land of the two districts as much as possible; and they are fixed, as will be observed, in the scale of assessment, taking, in average of the five of the highest assessed villages of the Erood district, the mean highest rent per goonty will be found to be 1. 2½. per cawney, 11. 6. 6½. In reference to this and other local circumstances, the permanent rent for the first description of land, in the first class of the village of Erood, was fixed at 1. 1. or 10. 6. 4. per cawney, with a deduction of 1 and 2 annas for the class of land immediately below it, and a progressive decrease of one anna between each of the remaining inferior gradations.

35. The above paragraphs, will be more particularly explained by a reference to the scale of nunjee assessment, in Statement D. wherein is comprehended a distinct account of every description of land, from the rent of the first description of soil of the most favoured village, to the worst class of the most inferior village. It may scarcely be necessary to remark, that the gradation of nunjee assessments must depend less upon the quality of the soil, than upon the contiguity of its situation to the stream. By this statement, it will appear that the Gopaulchetty pollam lands, are assessed on more equal terms with Erood; but as the high assessment of the latter, arises mostly from its double crop, the deduction of 1-4th of the assessment is allowed, when the land of Gopaulchetty pollam bears but one crop, to be paid in full on raising a second.

36. The rent of lands watered by tanks, were settled, in a similar way. Reference was had to the quantity of water, and the period for which they would hold it on an average of seasons.

seasons. The highest rent, per cawney, of such lands, has been fixed at 5. 6. 4.; and the lowest at 4. 11. as will be seen in Statement D.

37. It is only necessary to make one remark further; that whatever the description of land may be, and whatever the assessment, one-third of that rent is demanded, when invested as pasture.

38. The land-rent having been thus settled, the fournydyem, or money-rent, was the next object of attention. I have, on a former occasion, fully entered upon the subject. It will be necessary, therefore, to say but a few words in addition to my address, under date the 9th May 1805, in explanation of the mode in which this description of revenue was taxed. It must be first premised, that they were divided into two classes; the one called Hyum or fixed fournydyam, which is not subject to much variation, such as the production of trees (the ground on which they stand not paying land-rent) the rent of the collections made of ginger, &c. in the hills; this is a solitary instance only in the talook of Coimbatore, and the jodiga, or quit rent paid by bramins of Bramhadain enam lands possessed by them. The second class of fournydyam is the taxes on bazars, professions, &c. &c. For a more particular explanation, I beg to refer to my letter of the 9th May, 1805, with its references.

39. The mode adopted in classifying the bazars, was similar to that observed, in the classing of the land. It would have been hard, and indeed oppressive, to have formed the assessment, by a scrutiny into the private profits on the extent of commerce in which the merchants were concerned; and even were the attempt made, there was every probability that the inquiry, would have been defeated, by the reserve of those to whom it was directed. It would have been desirable to have made one single defined tax answer for every bazar in the place; but it would have been at variance with the system of equalization, which it was the intention to introduce; and certainly the lower retail dealers, would have had considerable room for complaint, in being obliged to bear the unequal burden with their more substantial competitors.

40. It was, therefore, left to the merchants, in conjunction with the surveyors, to fix their own gradations of rank. This left them no room to complain; and indeed the result was more advantageous to the revenue, for many who may, on scrutiny, have avoided coming forward, would, from a principle of vanity, assert their situations, rather than be placed, in point of consequence, below their inferiors. The bazars are therefore formed into four distinct classes; the highest paying four chuckrums, and the lowest one, throughout the country. The remainder of taxes on professions, houses, &c. is detailed in statement E.

41. I trust, that in endeavouring to explain the foregoing mode of survey and assessment, I may have been sufficiently clear. The accounts have been, as far as practicable, formed to avoid dissensens; and at the same time, to retain their simplicity and perspicuity, for the purpose of enabling your board to observe, at one view, the innumerable and undefined mamool rents reduced to a collected state, by an average made upon those of two talooks. In the next instance, the reduction made upon that average, in consequence of the relative superiority of the recorded quantity of land to the butta and gooly adopted as the standard, the progressive decrease made in the different classes of land; and finally, the further remissions granted to the villages and talooks, on consideration of their local and accidental inferiority.

42. By this simple mode of assessment, the equality throughout the division is general. No ryot can complain of his rents being unjustly higher, than those of his neighbour. The assessments are acknowledged to be equitable upon the different classes of ground; and the only room for complaint must originate in the erroneously placing the land in a class superior to its quality; a mistake which ought to have been avoided by the ryots, who, in conjunction with the surveyors, classed their own field; where others have been found, they have been immediately rectified, and in all instances, to the advantage of the ryot. I am therefore confident in offering, that the arrangement, as it now stands, will be found to have been formed with a precision, which will obviate much future trouble.

#### Extract PROCEEDINGS of the Board of Revenue, at Fort St. George; dated 24th July 1806.

Extract Report from Mr. WALLACE, principal collector in Tanjore and Trichinopoly;  
dated 15th June 1806.

2. **ALTHOUGH** the board is in possession of the general grounds on which the present settlement is formed; it will be still proper to recapitulate briefly those grounds, as well as to offer, more at large, some remarks and observations regarding the result of them, in order that a just opinion may be formed of the nature and effect of the plan which has been adopted for the realization of the revenues of those districts, particularly of Tanjore.

3. I shall bring the settlement of Tanjore and Trichinopoly under the consideration of the board separately, and I shall commence with that of the former district.

#### TANJORE.

4. The nunjah lands of Tanjore have been assessed in the present year, in the following manner:

5. The average produce, per vally, of each village, in July 1210, 11, and 12, has been taken at a medium standard produce for all the lands of each village, and the standard produce has been allotted on each cutta or field of each village, by the general consent of all the

Extracts from RE-  
PORTS of Collectors  
on Surveys and Assess-  
ments.

Letter from Collector  
at Coimbatore; dated  
30 Nov. 1806.

Extracts from RE-  
PORTS of Collectors  
on Surveys and Assess-  
ments.

Letter from Principal  
Collector in Tanjore  
and Trichinopoly;  
13 June 1806.

the mecrassadars of each village, where there was more than one landholder, and where there was only one landholder in one village, the allotment on each field was made by himself. In some villages, at the eastern extremity of the Cavery, in the Mayaveram district, where there was not any nunjah produce in Pudy 1212, owing to the entire failure of the river, the produce of one of the two subsequent years formed part of the average.

6. The proportions of this medium produce liable to taxation, which forms the foundations of the land revenue of this province, were allotted according to the plan submitted by my predecessor, in his report to the board of 20th December 1803.

7. It varies from 50 to 60 per cent. of the standard gross produce, after deducting the usual sotundrums and mauniums; and its variety depends on the facility or difficulty of irrigation, which the different rivers and large channels of Tanjore are known in general to present.

8. The rate at which the taxable proportion of the standard produce of the lands have been valued, are the results of the averaged prices which the grain of each particular district yielded to the circar, during the three last years of the rajah's administration, and the three first of that of the Company's.

9. The foregoing plan has been adopted for the settlement of the revenues of the nunjah lands of 4,081 villages; the adoption of it, has been found impracticable in 595 villages, for reasons which will be hereafter explained.

10. The extent of nunjah land brought under cultivation in the 4,081 villages above-mentioned, amounts to valies 72,653. The land revenue arising from this extent of land, amounts to Tanjore chuckrums, 1,74,105. of star pagodas, 7,27,960. This amount divided

P. F. C.

on the lands assessed in this year, makes the average tax, per valey, 10. 0. 66. or per Madras

SP. F. C.

cawney, 1. 40. 35.

11. Before I proceed to remark on the degree of permanency which may be allowed to the assessment thus fixed, on a considerable portion of the nunjah lands; I shall state such further particulars regarding the settlement of the land revenues of Tanjore for the present Pudy, as are to be considered entirely of a temporary nature.

12. The plan alluded to in the foregoing paragraphs having for its principal object the establishment of a fixed land tax, could not, at the season of the year when the settlement was commenced on, be introduced universally into the districts. As in the arrangement for fixing the jumma, the future welfare and happiness of the landholders were particularly consulted, it was of importance that it should be received by them, not as the expedient of the day, but as a permanent measure calculated to insure to them all the benefits arising from the fixation of a moderate defined land tax, and from future increased industry in the cultivation of their lands, and in the disposal of the produce of them.

13. It was further necessary to the successful operation of the plan, that no restraint or compulsion should be used in introducing it; but that those who were not sensible of its advantages should be gradually led to its adoption by a practical comparison of the benefit it held forth, with those of plans adopted on former occasions, for the realization of the revenue.

14. The circumstances under which the general plan could not be introduced into the nunjah lands of Tanjore, are to be considered as arising from two causes; the one where the season had operated so very unfavourably as to counterbalance in the opinions of the landholders, by its present evil effects, the future advantages derivable from the plan: the other, where the landholders, notwithstanding timely rains and abundant freshes in the rivers, were either too indolent to profit by them, or influenced by a desire to have their lands assessed at a low rate; and thinking that this desire could be easily accomplished by impoverishing their crops (a practice not at all novel in Tanjore) ~~were~~ only neglected to do justice to the fertility of their lands ~~and to the bounty of the seasons.~~

15. Between the unavoidable calamity of the one class, and the wanton neglect or indolence of the other, it was just to make a wide distinction.

16. Accordingly, where drought or inundation were known to have occurred, either the actual produce of the lands, or a correct estimate of the crops was taken, and the taxable proportion thereof was calculated, and its value commuted, ~~and~~ in the lands where the land-tax had been fixed. The settlement thus made was declared to be only temporary; and the inhabitants were instructed to consider it as an indulgence, which they were in no case to expect a repetition of.

17. The situations where the season had the unfavourable effect here alluded to, are in the southern parts of the provinces. In the Talacand and Minnargoody talooks, 75 villages were overflowed at different periods, as well from the rivers as by heavy rains, so as in some places to reduce the crops below one quarter of the ordinary produce of these lands which are some of the lowest of the province, which are situated close to the rivers, and which, besides, are so near to the sea as to feel the bad effects of heavy monsoon rains.

18. The villages in Pattacottah, which suffered from the extreme drought, which many parts of the southward experienced during last year, are at the southern extremity of Tanjore, on the borders of Shevavunga and Pondiman. These villages, situated on a high level, are entirely dependant on lakes for their cultivation; and the want of heavy rains having left the lakes almost without water, the cultivation was not only reduced in extent, but the crops on the ground were quite impoverished. A few villages, likewise, on the high lands of Minnargoody Trivady and Talacand, suffered from the same cause. The total number that suffered from drought was 89, of which 74 are in Pattacottah, and 15, the remainder, in the other three talooks just mentioned.

19. The number of villages, the nunjah lands of which, in consequence of the badness of the season, were thus temporarily taxed, are in number 104; their extent of nunjah land is 4,034 valies

4,034 valies, and the amount of the assessment on them is Tanjore chockrams 46,670, or star pagodas 19,446.

Extracts from REPORTS of Collectors on Surveys and Assessments.

Letter from Principal Collector in Tanjore and Trichinopoly; 15 June 1806.

20. In those cases where the season was avowedly favourable, but where the landholders insisted on rejecting the assessment arising from the average produce and commutation price, without assigning any sufficient reasons for their lands not being fully able to pay as much as lands which had been under exactly similar circumstances, it appeared necessary that the landholders should not have advantages superior to, or the same as were conferred on those, who, by paying proper attention to their cultivation, were enabled to accept the new mode of settlement, or who, disregarding any trifling temporary loss which it might occasion them, embraced with satisfaction, the future and permanent advantages which it held out. Were not some marked distinction thus made, the introduction of a permanent land-tax into the district would have been impossible; for none of the inhabitants would have acceded to the risk which the payment of fixed revenue renders indispensable, if they saw the full advantage a warum and price held out by the plan of settlement granted to those who insisted on the actual state of their crops as the basis of the settlement.

21. Besides, great expenses have been incurred by the government to secure to the district where these villages, in particular, are situated, the full effect of good seasons; and very large succavie advances had been made to the landholders. In consequence of these measures, the meerassidars had full and sufficient supplies of water, as well as ample means for profiting thereby.

22. Notwithstanding these advantages, the inhabitants of 595 villages alledged that the crops on their lands were, in the present year, unequal to the proposed assessment, and disregarding the permanent advantages held out to them, they preferred a settlement calculated on the actual state of their crops.

23. Had it been practicable to have fixed the assessment previously to the commencement of the cultivation, these objections would, of course, have been disregarded; indeed they could not have been urged. But as it appeared that the crops in these villages did not, from the indolence or wanton neglect of the inhabitants, promise to yield crops so large as the medium produce gave, it became necessary to make a temporary arrangement, which, while it would secure the landholders from all loss, should still show the people at large, that the superior benefits of the new mode of assessment would be granted only to those who would likewise take the risk of seasons on themselves.

24. A reduction of the untaxable portion of the ascertained or estimated produce appeared best calculated to attain this end; accordingly, the warum of the inhabitants of the villages under consideration, was reduced 10 per cent. lower than that which was allowed in the settlement of the other villages in the same district, where the general plan had been received; and the remainder of the ascertained or actual produce was commuted, as in the other villages of the district.

25. The number of villages in which this temporary settlement was made, I have before remarked, amounts to 595; the extent of nunjah lands in them is 10,059 valies, and the amount of the jumma 1,69,182, or 70,492.

26. The whole extent of nunjah land thus brought under cultivation within the year was 83,612 valies, and the amount of the fixed and temporary assessments thereon is 19,16,287, or 7,98,453.

27. The other principal head of revenue is Panja, payable on the high lands of the province. Under this head, I shall class all lands not yielding paddy; they are as follows:

1. Nunjah land cultivated with dry grain, called vail panja.
2. Bangayut, or garden land, formerly calledournadyum; the two former are watered from the rivers by picotahs, or from wells and tanks.
3. Panjah land, particularly called seiddul panja, being the highest land in the country, and dependent entirely on the falling rains.
4. Topes.

28. Where nunjah land was temporarily brought under panjah cultivation, on account of the want of water in the rivers, it became necessary, of course, to form a temporary assessment on it. On a consideration of all circumstances, it was calculated that these lands generally could bear one-half of the assessment on lands of the same description, in the same village, but which were cultivated with nunja or paddy crops, which were more abundant and valuable than those of dry grain. This was the general principle adopted for these lands; but where, after due enquiry, it appeared that the assessment thus given was too high, or too low, the necessary augmentation or reduction of it was made.

29. There were 2,878 valies of vail panja land brought this year under cultivation, the total amount of the assessment on it is 23,067, or 9,580.

30. The bangayut land has been assessed, not with reference to the articles with which it was actually cultivated; but on a consideration of the different degrees of fertility which it possesses, and which it would have shown under ordinary cultivation, with wet or dry grain. Accordingly nunjah land, which had been converted into bangayut, has been charged with the average nunjah assessment of the village in which it may be situated. Where lands under bangayut cultivation are watered by picotahs, or wells, they have been assessed according to their different degrees of fertility, arising as well from the nature of the soil, as the manner in which they are watered, and where, as in some few instances, the bangayut productions are

cultivated on the high teddul punjah lands dependant solely on the rains, they have been assessed with reference to the soil only, the same as all other teddul punja lands.

31. The extent of land brought under haugayut cultivation amounts to 2,029 valies, and

the assessment thereon yields a total of 25,713, or 10,713.

32. The teddul punja land, dependent wholly on rains, has been assessed entirely with reference to the degree of fertility which the soil possesses, ascertained by classification, and by reference to the produce of former years.

33. The extent of teddul punjah land brought under cultivation in this year is valies 29,478:

and the assessment thereon yields a total of 1,43,010, or 59,587.

34. The tope tax, as levied according to the number and nature of the trees composing each tope, has been abolished, and the land on which the topes are situated, has been assessed according to its fertility, and with reference to the same class of teddul punjah land under grain

cultivation; the extent of tope land is 1,025 valies, and the assessment thereon 4,467, or

1,861.

35. In fixing the assessment on all the different descriptions of land brought under the general head of punjah, the taxable proportion of the produce has been taken at two-fifths, and the value thereof has been calculated on an average of the prices of the different sorts of punjah grain in the last three years.

36. The total extent of punjah land brought under cultivation, is 35,412 valies, and the

assessment thereon yields a total of 196,199, or 81,749.

37. The total extent of nunjah and punjah land brought under cultivation in the present year is 1,19,024 valies, and the total amount of the land revenue arising therefrom is chuk<sup>o</sup> 21,12,487, or st<sup>o</sup> pag<sup>o</sup> 8,80,203.

38. For the details of the foregoing general results, as they affect the divisions and talooks of Tanjore, I beg leave to refer to the statement, No. 3.

39. Before entering on the few remaining heads, under which the revenues not arising directly from the lands, are classed; I shall proceed to offer such remarks regarding the arrangements which have been adopted for the realization of the land revenues, as appear to me necessary to enable the Board to judge how far the establishment of a defined, moderate, and fixed land tax, has been attained in the present settlement.

40. The general plan for the assessment of nunjah lands was detailed at considerable length in the propositions which I had the honour of submitting to the board, under date the 8th September last. The instructions of government and the board, on the subject of warrum, and the mode of taxing garden and tope land, I had the honour of receiving in a letter from the board under date the 3d of January last, and the approval of my propositions of the 8th September was communicated to me with reference to the instructions just mentioned on the point of warrum, &c. on the 16th of January.

41. Thus the instructions of government and the board, on the subject of warrum, and my propositions regarding the average medium produce of the lands, and the valuation to be set on the taxable proportion thereof, form the basis of a settlement, which has for its chief object the establishment of a fixed land tax.

42. Out of the whole number of nunjah villages, 4,676, containing an extent of nunjah land of 83,612 valies, brought under cultivation in the present year, it has been found practicable to introduce the plan in question into 4,081 villages, and to extend it to 72,653 valies of land, being 83  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the whole arable nunjah land, cultivated and uncultivated, in Tanjore.

43. From the badacha of the season, it was found impracticable to establish the plan in 593 villages, containing 5,573 valies, being 6  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total nunjah land of the district; and in 363 villages, containing 5,385 valies, being 6  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the total nunjah land, the plan could not be introduced, from the neglect of the meerassadars, without exciting a repugnance to it, which, at the season of the year when the settlement was commenced on, it would have been improper to give room for, and which general policy rendered it necessary, in every point of view, to avoid. The temporary settlements which have been effected in the two last cases, making together an exception of 12  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. of the whole nunjah lands of the districts, have been explained in paragraphs 16. and 34.

44. The board will have observed, that the plan in question has been first applied to the lands of each village in general. The assessment payable on each kuttai has been left to the joint determination of all the meerassadars of each village, who doubtless are best acquainted with their different degrees of fertility; the amount, thus allotted as the tax payable on each field, is entered in a register signed by the meerassadars and curmums of each village, and deposited in the division cutcherry as well as in the villages.

45. Where a meerassadar holds one or more kuttais in one village, the extent of each kuttai, and the tax on it, are inserted in the pottah which has been granted to him; where a meerassadar holds only a portion of a kuttai, or portions in several kuttais, the proportion of the tax on such kuttai or kuttais is allotted on its portion or portions, and the amount thereof, with the extent of such portion, is inserted in the individual pottah. Every meerassadar in Tanjore has been furnished with a separate pottah for the land held by him in each village; and each pottah is regularly stamped, numbered, and registered. For the information of the Board, I transmit a translation of the registers of kuttais, proprietors and teerwas, in one village.

46. I have much pleasure in stating to the Board, that the plan adopted for the establishment of a fixed land tax on the nunjah lands has been received, with marked satisfaction, by the

the landholders of the very large portion of Tanjore into which it has been introduced. They regard the ground on which the medium produce of their lands has been taken, as a just and moderate standard of their fertility; the proportion of this produce, which forms their untaxed share, is extremely favourable to them; and the rates at which the government right in that produce has been commuted, are universally allowed to be as low as they ought to be. The arrangement having been calculated for each village on actual facts, both in regard to produce and price, and not on theoretical statements, has secured, as far as was practicable, the impossibility of the tax on the lands being oppressive, and the degree of permanent benefit which the plan offers to enterprise and industry; indeed, the ready acceptance of it, even in cases where its immediate effects were not so advantageous as could have been wished.

Extracts from the  
PORTS of Collection  
on Surveys and Assess-  
ments.

Letter from Principal  
Collector in Tanjore  
and Trichinopoly;  
15 June 1806.

47. Measures are taking for the extension in the ensuing Fuly, of the plan of settlement above described, to the 595 villages, which, for reasons before mentioned, have had a temporary jumma assessed on their lands in the present Fuly.

48. In regard to the punjah lands, although a classification of them has taken place, which in some instances has been attended to in the present settlement, I still think that a more correct survey of them by persons specifically nominated for that purpose, will be necessary previously to the tax on each field of this description being declared. Fixed measures have accordingly been taken for a revival of the late classification of the punjah lands, which, as their extent is comparatively inconsiderable, can be completed fully in about three months.

49. It is likewise my intention, that an immediate examination shall be made into the details of the allotment on each kuttai by the meerassadars, of the teerwa arising from the present plan of fixed assessment. This examination I propose establishing, not with a view to any alteration of the ground-work of the plan which has been adopted; but entirely with a view to remedy any defects or inequalities which may have occurred in the detailed application of it.

50. After this examination has been concluded for the punjah lands, and the revival of the classification and assessment of the punjah land has been finished, both of which can be effected before the close of the year, the object of establishing a tax on each field of Tanjore will, I think, be satisfactorily obtained, and its permanency secured, as far as practicable.

Extract PROCEEDINGS of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, the  
18th Sept. 1806.

To the Subordinate Collectors in Tanjore.

Gentlemen,

YOU will be pleased to commence on the settlement of the revenues of your respective divisions without delay, and on the following grounds:

Letter from Mr. Wal-  
lace to the Subordinate  
Collectors of Tanjore;  
22 Jan. 18 6.

#### PUNJAH.

Par. 1.—You will first take the produce of each village in Fuly 1810-11 and 12, and ascertain therefrom, the average produce per valy; this average you will consider as the medium standard produce of the village.

2. The average produce per valy, you will apply to all the lands at present under cultivation in each village; and the produce thus given, you will consider as the ground-work of the settlement of the present year.

3. From the total produce thus calculated, you will deduct the fotontrums and mauniums, as in the last year's settlement.

4. The rates of warum will be determined according to the panchel of each village; the particular warum allotted to each panchel in each talook is stated in the accompanying enclosure, No. 1. to which you will pay strict attention.

5. The commutation rates at which the government share is to be calculated, are mentioned in the inclosed paper, No. 2. for each talook. They are taken on a medium of the prices of six years; the three last of the rajah's management, and the three first of that of the Company.

6. The government share of the average produce of a village being thus commuted, the whole demands upon each village will be ascertained; the object then will be, to fix the proportion of the total demand payable for each field or kuttai. This can best be done, by the body of the meerassadars of each village themselves, as they alone can have a perfect knowledge of the degrees of fertility which different parts of their lands possess.

7. It will therefore be expedient, that when the total demand on a village is fixed, the teeldars assemble all the meerassadars, and the earnings of such village; and that after due consideration by them, the tax payable for each kuttai be fixed. This arrangement can take place, after the settlement of the demands on each village of a talook is completed.

8. In the event of any dispute arising among the meerassadars of a village, as to the amount to be paid for each kuttai, the points in dispute are to be referred to the teeldar, who shall immediately call on the parties in dispute to nominate, each, two meerassadars of the neighbouring villages, and one conjointly, who shall form a panjayet for settling the settlement on the land, relative to which the dispute may arise.

9. The amount payable for each kuttai in a village, must, when concluded, be registered in the village by the conum, in the talook cutcheries, and in the division cutcheries.

10. When the total and proportionate assessment are thus ascertained, the amount payable by each individual meerassadar, can readily be fixed. When sadjan potals, pre-



Extracts from RE-  
PORTS of Collectors  
on Surveys and Assess-  
ments.

Letter from Mr. Wal-  
lace to the Subordinate  
Collectors of Tanjore;  
22 Jan. 1806.

pared in the talook cutcherries by the cartons of each village, and which must be sent to you for the purpose of being stamped with your names, must be issued to each merassadar.

#### BAUGAYET LANDS.

11. The principle hitherto observed, of assessing Baugayet lands according to the articles produced on them, is to be entirely done away in the present rent; and these lands are to be taxed solely with a reference to the various degrees of fertility which they possess. If therefore, any portion of the nunjah lands of a village have been recently brought under garden cultivation, such land will be assessed as nunjah, on the general ground laid down in the preceding paragraphs. In the event of lands hitherto classed as baugayet or fuornadayum, having not been cultivated within the last five years with punjah, you will, in such cases, regard them as punjah lands, and assess them as such, according to their different degrees of fertility, according to the principles hereafter laid down. Under this arrangement, the head of baugayet will be henceforward discontinued in the accounts.

#### PUNJAH LANDS.

12. The accounts of classification of the punjah lands already received in your cutcherries, together with the accounts of the produce thereof, in 1210, 11, and 12, will be your guide in assessing these lands.

You will be pleased to observe, as a further principle, that 3-5ths of the produce of these lands, ought to be considered as the right of the merassadar or cultivator, and the commutation of the remaining 2-5ths, should form the tax on them; both to be calculated after deducting the sotuntrums, as in last year.

13. In commuting the government share in these lands, you will be pleased to observe, the prices of the different sorts of punjah grain set down in the enclosure, No. 3, which have been ascertained by the average price current, received from different parts of the province, in the three preceding years.

14. The defining the tax on each kutlai, or field of punjah lands; the registering thereof in villages by the curnums, and in the talook and division cutcherries; and the issue of individual pottahs, are all to be conducted in the same manner as has been directed for the nunjah lands.

15. It will be necessary that the fixed sotuntrums and mauniums be deducted as well in Nunjah as in Punjah, previously to the calculation of the tax; but a portion of these deductions, equal to 3 per cent. of the gross produce adopted as the basis of the settlement, must be consolidated with the rent, and accordingly apportioned on the tax on each field, in order to defray the fixed charges mentioned in the margin †, and which the cirkar will hereafter take upon himself to discharge.

16. The tax levied last year on topes was taken according to the number of fruit-bearing trees in each village. That mode must in the present settlement be modified, by fixing a moderate tax on the lands occupied by topes; all assessment on single trees, and on all trees of the kind mentioned in the margin, being abolished, in establishing the tax on tope land. You will be guided by the information you may acquire regarding the nature of the trees planted on it, or the fitness of the land for cultivation with other produce beside trees.

17. In regard to the periods at which the kists are to be paid, I enclose a statement shewing the proportion of the total rent which may, I think, be paid in each month. It is desirable to give the merassadars every possible indulgence, so as to allow them a fair market for their grain; but the regular and easy collection of the revenues, as well as the attention necessary to be given by the merassadars to the cultivation of their lands, renders it expedient that the whole of the kists should be paid in by June. The periods mentioned in the enclosed statement will, I think, embrace the objects of the merassadars and of the cirkar, in this particular point, and you will therefore be pleased to arrange the kists according thereto. Any prolongation of the payments of the kists, which may appear absolutely necessary, can at all times be granted, by a specific application for that purpose.

18. You will observe, that a principal object in the mode of settlement now proposed, is, the establishment of a moderate defined tax on the land under cultivation, and the ascertaining with precision the amount payable on each field, and by each individual merassadar. These objects will, I trust, be satisfactorily attained by you, under the instructions which have in the foregoing paragraphs been laid down for your guidance. Should you deem any further information on points connected with the rents, necessary; I shall expect that you will, without reserve, address me regarding them.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

Trichinopoly,

22d Jan. 1806.

(A true Copy.)

(Signed) J. WALLACE,

Principal Coll. of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

To the Subordinate Collectors of Tanjore:

Gentlemen,

Par. 1.—In assessing the punjah lands in the present year, you have been directed to take the average produce of Fully 1210, 1211 and 1212, of each class of soils in each village, and to apply that average, to the whole extent of land of each class brought under cultivation. It appears, that in some villages during one or more of the years in question, proportions of the land, forming a distinct class of the lands of the village, have not been cultivated; for instance, in the village of Combaconum the land classed as Sheval, was not cultivated in 1211. When cases of this kind occur, it will be necessary for you to ascertain by inquiry, what the produce of that class of land in the village, regarding which the difficulty arises, has generally been; and, according to the judgment which you may in consequence form, you will arrange the assessment on that class.

2. In lands distinguished hitherto by the appellation of taddul Punjab lands, it would appear that there is a considerable portion of garden land watered by wells, tanks, or from rivers, by picottahs. According to the instructions formerly sent to you, these lands should be classed as punjah lands, a name which is strictly applicable only to lands watered by the falling rains; I think, therefore, that it will be necessary to make some distinction between the former and the latter lands in the settlement, and accounts of the present Fusly; you will consequently be pleased to bring all garden lands included in the taddul punjah lands, but watered by tanks, wells, or rivers, under the head of punja terrum nunja, and assess them at double the average of the taddul punja teerva of the village in which they may be situated. The foregoing is laid down, as a general rule, for your guidance; wherever you may find it necessary to deviate from it, you will deem yourselves authorized to make such modifications as you shall be satisfied will be proper.

3. I believe that the instructions contained in this letter, and in those addressed to you under date the 22d ultimo, will be found sufficient to enable you to proceed in the rent, without difficulty. I could wish you further to understand, that the rules which I have laid down for your guidance, are considered by me, as generally applicable to Tanjore; and, as uniformity of plan in the management of that province is most desirable, I could wish those rules to be deviated from as little as possible; in cases, however, where you think the welfare of the inhabitants, or the interests of government, will be materially consulted by a departure from the strict letter of the rules laid down for you, or where local circumstances may render it necessary, you will consider yourselves authorized to modify the inferior details of the rent, in such a manner as to you may appear proper; in all such cases, giving me the earliest possible notice of your having done so, and not delaying such notification until the conclusion of the settlement.

4. The average punjah prices to be observed in farming the settlements on the punjah lands, are forwarded herewith.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

John Wallace,

Principal Coll<sup>r</sup> of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

Trichinopoly, }  
3d February 1806. }

(A true copy.)

To the subordinate Collector in the Mamargoody Division of Tanjore.

Sir,

Par. 1. I HAVE just received your letter of the 4th instant. The sournadayum lands alluded to by you, are what yield bangayur, or garden produce; and as such, are not to be taxed according to the value of the article proposed, but according to the fertility and means of irrigation possessed by the land. With this view, in the second paragraph of my letter of the 3rd, you were directed to assume double the average taddul punja teerva of each village, as the rate which these lands in each village can, generally speaking, bear; but which you were instructed to modify, by increasing or diminishing that rate, in such proportion, as on investigation should appear necessary.

2. In regard to the cootally cultivation, it should, I think, be classed as punjah and taxed as such.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed)

John Wallace,

Principal Collector of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

Trichinopoly, }  
5th February 1806. }

The subordinate collectors will, as far as may be practicable, attend to the following rules regarding tauladdy lands in the formation of the settlement.

1st. When there are lands yielding a modelady and tauladdy nunjah crop, such lands will of course bear an assessment in the present rent, in proportion to their produce.

2d. When there are nunjah lands yielding one nunjah and one punjah crop, an additional assessment for the latter crop is to be levied on them, equal to one half of the nunjah teerva.

3d. In nunjah lands, the accounts of the standard produce of which, in the Fuslies 1210, 11, and 12, shew a tauladdy nunjah produce, but which have not yielded two nunjah, but one nunjah and one punjah crop in the present year, no additional assessment is to be levied for the punjah crop, but the produce, according to the accounts, is to be taken.

4th. In viel punjah lands, yielding a double punjah crop, it will be proper that an assessment equal to double the amount of the tax ordered to be levied on the viel punjah lands (which was, in general terms, one half of the average nunjah teerva of the village) be assumed as the teerva.

5th. Where nunjah, or viel punjah lands have been, for the first time in the present year, cultivated with a tauladdy crop, the tax on such lands is to be augmented in proportion to the augmentation of the produce.

6th. Where nunjah or viel punjah lands have formerly been cultivated with tauladdy crops, but in the present year have yielded, or will yield only one crop, such lands will be assessed as bearing only one crop.

7th. Where taddul punjah, or punjah terrum nunjah lands, have yielded two crops in Fuslies 1210-11 and 12, the produce, on such lands, is to be taken from the accounts; and such lands, if cultivated in the present year, with two crops, will be assessed accordingly; but if

Extracts from REPORTS of Collectors on Surveys and Assessments.

not cultivated with tauladdy crops in the present year, they will be assessed as only yielding one crop.

8th. The above are given as rules to be generally observed, but which the subordinate collectors are allowed to modify, where particular circumstances may render a modification necessary.

Trichinopoly, }  
8th February 1806. }

(Signed) John Wallace,  
Principal Coll<sup>r</sup> of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

(A true copy.)

To the subordinate Collector in the Mayaverum division of Tanjore—Combaconum.

Sir,

Letter from Mr. Wallace to the subordinate Collectors of Mayaverum; 11 Feb. 1806.

IN reply to your letter of the 12th, just received, I have to acquaint you, that in such of the villages in your division as have not yielded any produce in Pussies 1210-11 or 12, you will form the settlement with reference to the present state of the crops, and the produce of former years.

2. The inhabitants of the Keertimaun Panchal appear to me to be justified in their objection to the general standard produce which you had been directed to assume for your division, as the work on that panchal, which was executed for the relief of the very extensive cultivation dependent on the Nautam Vaickol, has doubtless been detrimental to them. It will be proper, therefore, that you should, in the present settlement of those villages, adopt such grounds regarding the grain standard, as you may think just. It will be likewise proper that you should consider the expediency and justice of augmenting the warum in the Keertimaun Panchal, in remuneration to the mecrassadars, for the losses they have sustained by the work above alluded to.

3. In any other villages of your division, to which, from particularly unfavourable circumstances, the general grain standard may not be strictly applicable in the present year, you will consider yourself authorized to make such modifications as you shall be satisfied are necessary. Confiding in your judgment, and in your attention, as well to the welfare of the inhabitants as to the public interests, I feel no hesitation in committing to you the discretionary power above mentioned.

I have the honour, &c.

Tanjore, }  
14th February 1806. }

(Signed) John Wallace,  
Principal Coll<sup>r</sup> of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

To the subordinate Collectors in Tanjore.

Gentlemen,

Letter from Mr. Wallace to the subordinate Collectors of Tanjore; 1 Feb. 1806.

Par. 1. It has occurred to me, that in the settlement of your respective divisions, the accounts of the measurement of the lands lately received, may, unless some instructions on the subject are given for general observance, lead to an increase of the teerva on the lands. I have, therefore, laid down the following rules, which you will observe in the villages not yet settled; and which, should you be aware of any considerable increase in the jumma occasioned by the late measurement, in any of the villages already settled, you will apply to them previously to your closing your jumma bundics.

2. In some instances, by the re-measurement, in whole or in part, of a village, the extent of the lands will have been apparently increased, although the whole of the produce of the lands have been inserted in the accounts; and the increase will have been caused merely by the mode of measurement. In such cases, it would be obviously unjust to apply the averaged standard produce to the excess of lands which appear in the accounts, and to commute that amount for the purpose of adding it to the jumma. For example; the extent of land in a village, according to the accounts of former Pussies, is 10 valies; the averaged standard produce 200 cullums per valy; or, for the whole village, 2,000 cullums, in the accounts of re-measurement; it would appear that there are 12 valies in the village, 2,000 cullums divided on which give 166. 8. per valy, which is the rate that should be taken in the settlement.

3. But from what I have observed in some instances, I am apprehensive that the Mahratta accountants may have drawn out the village accounts in a different manner; for instance, that they have taken 200 cullums for the 12 valies, thereby increasing the standard grain amount of the village to 2,400, being 400 more than the average, according to the real produce, has been.

4. In cases, therefore, where there is an increase of the lands by re-measurement, and where you shall feel satisfied that this increase is caused only by the mode of re-measurement (which by the rod, must always vary somewhat) and that the produce of the lands in Pussies 1210-11 & 12, has not been kept out of the accounts, you will divide the whole standard produce given by the three years revenue on all the land, which, according to the late accounts of re-measurement and cultivation, are under tillage, as in the example given in the second paragraph.

5. The same reasoning which applies to an increase in the lands by re-measurement, when the whole of the produce has been brought to account, will be also applicable where a decrease in the extent of land appears by re-measurement. In the former case, the extent being increased, the average per valy will be diminished; in the latter case, the extent

extent being increased, the average per valy will be increased; but the whole produce of the lands being brought into the accounts, the standard grain produce for all the lands will not be affected by the re-measurement; and the village, consequently, will pay the same as if no alteration in the extent of its lands, took place in the accounts.

Extracts from R.E. PORIS of Collectors on Surveys and Assessments.

Letter from Mr. Wallace to the subordinate Collectors of Tanjore; 23 Feb. 1806.

6. In some cases the Mahratta accountants have, I am apprehensive, included for the whole lands of a village, an increase or decrease proportionate to the increase or decrease of only part of its lands on re-measurement; the orders for re-measurement, only directed one third of a village to be re-measured, for the purpose of ascertaining, in a general way, the correctness of the accounts which had previously been got, of the extent of the lands; the increase or decrease found in this portion, should not be applied to the whole of the village lands, as, in cases where any great difference was observed, the whole village should have been measured, and its real extent ascertained as nearly as possible.

7. The foregoing remarks apply to the nunjah lands; an attention to the rules which they have given rise to, may not be generally necessary in the punjah lands, as the measurement of the latter is not liable to the variation almost inseparable from the measurement of the former; and the punjah cultivation is not confined to particular spots, as the nunjah cultivation is. It is therefore concluded that the increase in the extent of punjah lands, or re-measurement, is real, and not fictitious; and consequently you will consider it as such, unless it shall appear to you on full proof that the increase has been occasioned merely by the mode of measurement, in which case a reduction in the jumma should of course be made.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed)

John Wallace,

Principal Coll<sup>r</sup> of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

Tanjore, }  
23d February 1806. }

To the subordinate Collectors, in Tanjore.

Gentlemen,

Para. 1. ENCLOSED I send two forms of registers, which must be kept as well in your respective cutcherries as in those of the tehsildars, and in each village by the curmum.

Letter from Mr. Wallace to the subordinate Collectors of Tanjore; 10 Mar. 1806.

2. The form, N<sup>o</sup> 1, is merely an abstract of the pottahs to be issued to each individual, shewing the detail of the settlement as affecting each individual in particular, as well as the whole village in general.

3. The form, N<sup>o</sup> 2, is meant to show the proportion which each nunjah kutlai in each village bears of the whole nunjah jumma, now fixed for each village, as settled among themselves by the merassadars; it is the intention that this register should form a document whereon to ground the future settlement of the nunjah lands, it answering in this respect, the purpose of a registered classification of the soil. This register is confined to the nunjah lands brought under cultivation this year. The dry lands of every description in each village, it is my intention to have regularly surveyed, classed, and the assessment on them fixed, as soon as the business of the settlement of the present year is completed, at which period also, a teerva can be set on the principle of the present year's settlement on the nunjah lands, which for the last four years have been uncultivated; which teerva will be paid on them whenever circumstances may admit of their being brought under cultivation.

4. I trust that you have taken steps for issuing pottahs to each individual merassadar, at the earliest possible period. This is a measure which will best establish in the minds of the people the advantages which they individually and generally will derive from the establishment of a defined money rent on their respective lands. A form of the pottah which I have issued, I transmit herewith for your guidance.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed)

John Wallace,

Principal Coll<sup>r</sup> of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

Trivalore, }  
10 March 1806. }

To the subordinate Collector in the Mayaveram Division of Tanjore.

D<sup>r</sup> - - - - - Manargoody Division - - D<sup>r</sup>

Sir,

Para. 1. As in some cases the obstinacy of the inhabitants, and in others their ill fortune, may render it impracticable to establish the rent of the current Fusly, on the basis stated in my letter of 22d January; and as to force the measure on the inhabitants, must in all cases be avoided; I have deemed it proper to communicate to you the following instructions for all such cases of difficulty, aware that although the rent is far advanced, the settlement of villages, where opposition may have been made, is deferred until that of those where no difficulty have been experienced has been concluded.

Letter from Mr. Wallace to the subordinate Collectors of Tanjore; 11 March 1806.

2. The difficulties to the entire establishment of the rent on the proposed grounds, may arise—1st, from obstinacy without the plea of inability.—2dly, from inability arising from negligence, wilful or otherwise, in the cultivation.—3dly, from inability arising from calamities incidental to agriculture, which could not have been either foreseen or prevented.

3. Between the last and the first supposed cases, every distinction which there is between unavoidable ill fortune and premeditated mischief or unaccounted for objection, to a plan calculated for the general good, should be observed in the rent. The former is liable, in the

Extracts from RE-  
PORTS of Collectors,  
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ments.

Letter from Mr. Wal-  
lace to the subordinate  
Collectors of Tanjore;  
11 March 1866.

present instance especially, to every proper indulgence; the two latter, in a manner equally special to justice, without indulgence.

4. The adoption of the settlement is now so far advanced, that we may safely, I think, conclude that its basis is satisfactory to the inhabitants in general; they regard the advantages conferred on them by it, not as confined to the present year, but as permanently settled, as far as permanency is consistent with the possibility of great fluctuation in the seasons; and they, on the other hand, seem to understand very well that the advantages which they derive are granted to them in consideration of their taking on themselves the risk of trifling and casual fluctuations of season, unattended by any marked or great calamity. They feel that the advantage is reciprocal to themselves, and to government.

5. In the two first cases which I proposed, and particularly in the first, reciprocity is not looked for; the merassadars are desirous that all the advantage should be on their side; they wish either for an aumani division of the crops, which would throw the revenue of government at their discretion, or to make a settlement in which they shall derive every possible advantage, without any one possible risk. The security of the revenue; the establishment of a uniform regular mode of management, as well as justice to those who have taken moderate risk and considerable advantages together, demand that views of the kind should be defeated; for this purpose, you will be pleased to observe the following instructions.

6. I think, that in the first case, viz. where the merassadars object to the proposed plan of settlement, although it appears that their grain produce in the present year is nearly 10 or 15 per cent. what the averaged produce of the three years adopted in the plan of settlement amounts to, the actual and past selling price of grain certainly higher than the commutation price, and an increase probably in the warum; in this case, I would recommend your adopting, without hesitation, a division of the crops, allowing to the merassadars a warum of 40 per cent. on the produce of their lands, and charging them with all the expenses of a rigid aumani management of their villages; they to be in all times, held responsible to produce the government share, or to pay the current selling price thereof.

7. In cases where the produce of the present year may, from negligence, have been so far reduced, from 15 to 20 per cent. below the nunjah produce, as to cause an inability on the part of the merassadars to accede to the average produce in their lands, a reduction of their warum equal to 10 per cent. should be made in the actual or estimated produce of their lands, and then a settlement formed with them on the basis of actual or estimated produce, and the commutation prices adopted for the district in which villages thus circumstanced may be situated, should be made with the merassadars.

8. Where the calamities of drought or inundation shall, on full and sufficient proof, appear to have fallen, it will be proper to ascertain the produce of the lands in the present year, and to establish on them a temporary rate, formed on the produce accounts and the warum, and commutation rates, allotted to the districts where the temporary plan may be necessary.

9. In carrying the above arrangements into execution, you will inform the inhabitants that they are entirely temporary, and you will assure them, that they are not to expect (in the two first cases) any future departure from the plan of management which has been adopted, except on the very best grounds; it being the intention that the amount assessable on each field shall be clearly defined and made known before the season of cultivation; and that the person asserting a merassy right in it, will be chargeable with such amount, whenever the land may be brought under cultivation, without adverting to its produce.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

John Wallace,

Principal Collector of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

Trivalore, }  
11th March 1866. }

#### Extract of PROCEEDINGS of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George; 30th October 1866.

#### Extract of Letter from the Collector in the Northern division of Arcot; dated 18th October 1866.

Para. 15. THE share of government, and of the ryot, has been settled nearly in the following proportion:

	Government share per cent.	Ryot's share.
In punjah	34	66½
In nunjah	46½	53½
In nunjah watered from wells	33½	66½
Gardens	25	75

16. The ryot has to pay out of his share the established fees in kind to the village sibbendi, &c. the expenses incident to cultivation, and the remainder goes to the support of himself and family.

17. The average selling price of grain, in ten moderate years, is the rate by which the government share of the produce has been commuted for a money rent, as particularized in Statement No. 2.

18. The

18. The villages of each talook have been divided into three classes, and each village has been included in one or other of these classes, according to its distance from, or contiguity to, market towns, and consequent difficulty or facility of its grain meeting with a sale.

19. The same proportion of marah, or fees in kind, which has prevailed for a long period back in each village, has been admitted in the present assessment, with the exception of the marah of monigars and curnums of villages, which was assumed by my predecessor. In the Chittoor assumed pollans, however, it is still continued; and it may become the subject of a future letter, whether it would be expedient to restore the marah in the other districts, or grant some compensation in money to those who have been deprived of it. Statement No. 3. explains the proportion of marah in each district.

Extracts from  
REPORTS of Col-  
lectors, on Surveys and  
Assessments.

Extract Letter from  
Collector in Northern  
Division of Arcot;  
13 Oct. 1806.

20. It is now necessary to point out the proportion which the present rate of assessment (Fusly 1215) bears to the assessment established by my predecessor in Fusly 1213. With this view is drawn out the accompanying Statement No. 4. It is here assumed, for the sake of comparing the rates of assessment, that the extent of cultivation in the two years was the same; that is, the account of cultivation for Fusly 1215, is adopted for the two Fuslies. This statement results from a comparison on each field; that is, the number of goonthahs, or cawnies, which the curnums reported each field to contain in Fusly 1213, and the assessment it then bore, are contrasted with the actual extent according to measurement, and the amount of rent fixed, by inspection of the quality of the soil.

21. Where fields were cultivated in Fusly 1213, which were waste in 1213, the curnums accounts of measurement, and the average rent of the whole of the lands in the village, which was the rent fixed by my predecessor for waste lands, are taken to compare with Fusly 1215.

22. It appears that the average rent of nunjah and punjah lands was higher in Fusly 1213 than in 1215, but that the garden lands bear a heavier assessment in the latter, than in the former year; that notwithstanding the decrease in the rate of assessment in 1215, there is a net increase, in the same reputed extent of land, of star pagodas 7,162.32. 23. in 1215, above 1213, in consequence of lands to the value of star pagodas 32,332. 24. 12. (according to the present rate of assessment) being brought to light by measurement, which were not registered by the curnums in Fusly 1213.

23. It may be objected, however, to this mode of comparison, that though the lands now brought forward by measurement were not registered by the curnums, the ryots were yet in the actual possession, and enjoyed the produce of them; whilst, in forming the average of Fusly 1213, they are not considered as belonging to them.

24. I have therefore drawn out another Statement, No. 5, in which the number of unregistered cawnies, discovered by measurement, are added to the number of cawnies acknowledged by the curnums in Fusly 1213. To the aggregate of those two numbers, is applied the aggregate amount rent of Fusly 1213; and the average is deducted therefrom.

25. This causes the average assessment in most talooks to be somewhat higher in Fusly 1215; but I do not conceive that it falls heavier on the country, as it bears a better proportion to the value of each man's land than that of 1213, and is, on the whole, therefore, more regular and equal.

26. It is nevertheless by no means improbable, that many lands have been over-rated in quality; but all such inequalities shall, if possible, be corrected in the course of this year.

27. On the subject of the survey, it is only requisite to add further, that the expense of it has been very considerably exceeded by the amount of rent of the concealed lands which it has brought to light.

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Extract PROCEEDINGS of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George;  
23d July 1804.

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Extract Letter from the Collector of Zilla Chingleput; dated 12th July 1804.

ALTHOUGH my state of health has not permitted me to report to the Board on several subjects which require to be brought under their consideration, I am desirous, as the Fusly year has expired, of communicating to them the result in abstract of the survey of the district of Sativaid, and the introduction of individual rents into that district; hoping that the board will be satisfied with the abstract till such period as it may be in my power to detail the principles of the survey, and of the rent.

The board are in the knowledge that the district of Sativaid was under aumanie in the last year, a mode of management, which although in general inadvisable, became expedient for that district, where the poverty of the people was extreme, and their want of confidence great; evils which required to be remedied previously to introducing money rents among them. An immediate and early division of the crop to the full extent of their mamool warum secured their confidence, while a patient explanation of the principles which I intended to establish for the Fusly which has expired, secured their concurrence in the plan I had formed for establishing a defined system of rent, founded on the basis of individual interest.



Extracts from  
REPORTS of Col-  
lectors, on Surveys and  
Assessments.

Extract Letter from  
the Collector of Zilla  
Chingleput; 12 July  
1894.

In consequence of the foregoing arrangements, and the completion of the survey, laid to the following extent was, at the commencement of the season, voluntarily taken in farm by the cultivators, and held under

Nunjah	-	-	-	-	2,100	Pottahs.
Punjah	-	-	-	-	8,409	
Punjah Cawnies	-	-	-	-	7,056	Cawnies.
Garden land d°	-	-	-	-	92	
						15557.

It will occur to the board, that although the moderate value which may be supposed to be set on the land, and the nature of the settlement, may require that the rents of all land actually engaged for, should be paid, that it is not advisable, at least on the first introduction of this system while the resources of the people are contracted, to insist on the strict performance of their engagements. In conformity to a previous promise, therefore, that no man should pay for land he had not cultivated, I compared, after the season of cultivation had passed, the account of land originally occupied, with the account of land actually cultivated; and finding that in consequence of the river which runs by Peddapollam not coming down, that the finest villages had been deprived of their usual supply of water, and that no exertions of industry had been wanting where other deficiencies of cultivation had occurred; the following deductions were in consequence made:

Nunjah Cawnies	-	-	-	-	1,117	
Punjah - d°	-	-	-	-	1,360	
Garden land d°	-	-	-	-	13	
						2,490.

On the other hand, in some villages where the inhabitants found the season would permit of an extended occupation of land, they engaged for the following additional number of cawnies:

Nunjah	-	-	-	-	357	
Punjah	-	-	-	-	444	
Garden land	-	-	-	-	8	
						809:

which makes the difference between the quantity of land engaged for at the beginning of the season, and that actually cultivated.

						Cawnies.
Nunjah	-	-	-	-	760	
Punjah	-	-	-	-	906	
Garden land	-	-	-	-	5	
						1,671.

The value of the land originally farmed being cawnies 15,557, stands valued on the books of the survey at the sum of - - - - - S<sup>r</sup> pag<sup>s</sup> - 14,781 5 70 and the value of the difference between the land engaged for, and the quantity cultivated, being cawnies 1,671, was, by the same valuation - 1,238 10 8

Leaving the jumma of the land revenue of Fusly 1213, at the sum of - - - - - S<sup>r</sup> pag<sup>s</sup> 13,542 41 62

The comparison of the jumma above stated, with the aumanie collections of last year, will stand as follows:

The collections on account of Fusly 1212 in that year, and in the subsequent year, was - - - - - Star pagodas 10,920 22 20

Deduct road duties, not collected under the present regulations - - - - - 995 30 73

Remains Land Revenue - - - 10,014 37 27

which, deducted from the jumma of Fusly 1213, as above stated, leaves an increase of - - - - - star pagodas 3,528 4 35:

Being 35 3/4 p. 8.

If the preceding result shall prove satisfactory to the board, I have much pleasure in assuring them it has been satisfactory to the people also; for having invited representations from those who might experience any difficulty from an inequality of assessment, or other cause, I only received one complaint, and that from a ryot who had taken 3 cawnies of land, but whose only pair of bullocks dying at the season of cultivation, had rendered him unable to fulfil his agreement; while the readiness and punctuality with which the amount of the jumma has been realized, is, I hope, evidence of their ability to pay it.

Extract PROCEEDINGS of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George;  
the 24th August 1807.

Extracts from  
REPORTS of Col-  
lectors on Surveys and  
Assessments.

Principal Collector of CEDED DISTRICTS to Board of Revenue, on the survey of that  
country; dated 30th November 1806—&c. &c.

Principal Collector of  
Ceded Districts to the  
Board of Revenue;  
dated 26 July 1807.

Gentlemen,

Para. 1. THE survey of the Ceded Districts being now completed, it becomes my duty to report to the board the manner in which it has been conducted; the result of it, in exhibiting the extent and assessment of all the various descriptions of land in the country, whether cultivated or waste; and the expense with which it has been attended, from its beginning to its conclusion.

2. It was begun in June 1802, by four gomastahs of my catcherry, who were at that time, the only persons in the Ceded Districts who understood land measuring. It proceeded very slowly at first, from the want of hands; but several of the inhabitants being instructed every month, the number of surveyors, by the end of the year amounted to fifty, and was in the course of the following one, augmented to a hundred. The surveyors were at first formed into parties of six, but afterwards of ten, to each of which a head surveyor or inspector was appointed. With the exception of hills and rocks, all land, of whatever kind, was measured. All roads, sites of towns and villages, beds of tanks and rivers, wastes and jungles, were included in the survey. Ancient wastes were usually measured in extensive lots to be subdivided hereafter, as they may be occupied; but when it could be conveniently done, they were also frequently divided into fields of the ordinary size. As all fields that have ever been cultivated have names, they were distinguished in the survey registers by these names, and also, by a particular number, affixed to each, in the order in which it was measured. The surveyors used every where the same standard measure, a chain of thirty-three feet; forty of which, made an acre. They were paid by the acre at such a rate as it was supposed would enable them, with diligence, to earn about six pagodas monthly. They were encouraged to be expeditious, by the hope of gain; and deterred, at the same time, from being inaccurate through haste, by the fear of dismission; for no false measurement beyond ten per cent. in dry land, and five per cent. in wet, whether proceeding from negligence, from haste or design, was ever excused; and the frequent instances of loss of employment in this account, that occurred during the early part of the survey, soon rendered the surveyors so cautious, that their measurement was afterwards in general sufficiently correct. The vacancies that were continually happening among them from dismission, and more frequently from sickness, were at all times easily filled up from among a number of persons who always attended them, with the view of being instructed and employed; but these persons, on being appointed, were, in order to guard against partiality, sent to the party of a head surveyor, different from that by whom they had been reported as qualified.

3. The head surveyors, or inspectors, examined the measurement of the surveyors placed under their charge. They were paid by the month. To have paid them by the acre, would have defeated the end of their appointment, by preventing them from examining, carefully and deliberately, the operations of the under surveyors. But to guard against remissness, and to leave them at the same time sufficient leisure for investigation, they were required to measure monthly one tenth of the quantity of land fixed for a surveyor. They were not permitted to make this measurement all at once, in the course of a few days; but were obliged to make it gradually and uniformly, throughout the month, by taking a few fields every day. The whole of the inspectors were frequently removed from one party to another, because by remaining too long with one party, they were apt to entertain partialities and enmities, and to pass over the false measurement of some surveyors, while they exaggerated the trifling errors of others; and for these causes, many inspectors were at different times, dismissed. Both inspectors and surveyors were at first allowed a share of the produce of all extra collections, and unauthorized exactions, which they brought to light; but as they often earned more in this way, than by the survey, and with less labour, it was soon found that the survey was impeded by these investigations, and it therefore became necessary to confine them to the single object of measuring the land.

4. The surveyors were followed by assessors, two of whom were allotted for the assessment of the land measured by each party of ten surveyors. The assessor, on arriving in a village, went over the land with the potail curnum and ryots, and arranged it in different classes, according to its quality. In all villages, the land, both wet and dry, had from ancient custom been divided into 1st, 2d, and 3rd sorts, agreeably to their supposed respective produce; but these divisions not being sufficiently minute for a permanent assessment, the classes of wet land in a village, were often increased to five or six, and those of dry, to eight or ten. The classification was made rather by the potail curnum and ryots than by the assessor; for he adopted their opinion, unless he saw evident cause to believe that it was wrong, when a reference was made to the head ryots of any of the neighbouring villages, who fixed the class to which the land in dispute should belong. The quality of the land, where all other circumstances were equal, determined its class; but allowance was made for distance from the village, and every other incident by which the expense of cultivation was augmented. The ryots were directed to be careful in classing the land, as the whole of any one class would be assessed at the same rate; but they were not told what that rate would be, because it was apprehended that they would be induced by

REPORTS of Col  
lectors, on Surveys and  
Assessments.

Principal Collector of  
Ceded Districts to the  
Board of Revenue;  
dated 25 July 1807.

by such information, to enter a great deal of the better sort of land in the inferior classes. It was discovered, however, after a trial of a few months, that by following this mode, the potails and ryots, not seeing immediately the effects of classification, were not sufficiently impressed with its importance, and sometimes by entering too much land in the higher classes, and sometimes in the lower, the assessment of some villages became more than they could possibly pay, and that of others, much less than they had ever paid before. To obviate this mischief, the lands were both classed and assessed, at the same time, by which means, the ryots perceiving at once the effect of classification in raising or lowering their own individual rents, felt the necessity of making it with care. After this principle was adopted, the classification was in general sufficiently accurate, except that, in some instances the land of potail, curnums, and a few head ryots, were inserted in too low a class. These, irregularities, however, were usually corrected, either on the spot by the assessor, with the advice of the ryots of the adjacent villages, or afterwards, by persons appointed to revise his assessment.

5. As the assessors did not always rectify fraudulent classification, but sometimes remained ignorant of it, from negligence, or connived at it, from bribery; and as it was impossible to ensure from so many individuals, a punctual observance of the same method of proceeding, it was thought advisable, for the sake of preserving uniformity, and of checking abuses, to appoint five head assessors selected from the most intelligent of the ordinary assessors. Each head assessor had four ordinary ones, under him; his business was to review their classification and assessment, and to correct them, when wrong. He looked particularly to the classification of the lands of such persons, as he suspected might have been favoured by the assessors; and where he was convinced, both from his own opinion and that of the principal ryots of the neighbouring villages, that partiality had been shown, he transferred such lands to higher classes; and in the same manner, when he found that the lands of any ryots were classed too high, he removed them to their proper classes. If he saw no occasion for changing land from one class to another, he examined whether whole classes were not assessed too high or low, and raised or depressed them to different rates, wherever it appeared that an alteration was necessary; but he was not permitted to make any alterations in the accounts of the ordinary assessor: such alterations as he thought requisite were entered in those accounts, in columns left for that purpose; so that when the settlement came to be finally made in the collector's cutcherry, all alterations might be seen, and the reasons examined, upon which they were grounded. As an interval of one or two months usually elapsed between the investigation of the ordinary assessor, and that of the head one, there was full time for every ryot to ascertain, whether his own land was properly classed: and if he thought that it was not, he had an opportunity of stating his objections to him on his arrival in the village; and as the ryots of all the neighbouring villages were assembled, the head assessor, by means of arbitrators from among them, easily determined all complaints of this nature.

6. If entire dependence could have been placed on the judgment and impartiality of the head assessors, nothing more would have been required in fixing the assessment than to have adopted their estimates; but as these estimates were sometimes incorrect, and as they would have been still more so, had the assessors been relieved from the fear of a future examination, the whole of the classification and assessment underwent a complete investigation in the collector's cutcherry. On this occasion, all the potails, curnums, and principal ryots of every village in the district to be settled, were assembled at the cutcherry. The business was begun by fixing the sum which was to be the total revenue of the district. This was usually effected by the collector in a few days, by comparing the collections under the native princes, under the Company's government from its commencement, the estimates of the ordinary and head assessors, and the opinions of the most intelligent natives; and, after a due consideration of the whole, adopting such a sum as it was thought would be the fair assessment of the district, in its present state, or what the inhabitants, in similar circumstances, under a native government, would have regarded as somewhat below the usual standard. The amount fixed by the collector, was usually from five to fifteen per cent. lower than the estimates of the assessors; for it is the nature of assessment, proceeding from single fields, to whole districts, and taking each field at its supposed average produce, to make the aggregate sum greater than what can be easily realized. After fixing a certain sum for the districts, it next remained to determine what share of this sum, was to be imposed on each village. Had the detailed assessment been perfectly correct, it might have been done at once, by an uniform remission of 5 or 10 per cent. to every field; but as this was always objected to by many of the inhabitants, who thought their lands were not so favourably assessed as those of their neighbours, either in the same or other villages, it therefore became necessary to examine again the assessment of every village: such villages as claimed more than the average remission, were investigated by the principal ryots of other villages; and each claim was admitted either fully, or with such modification as both parties agreed upon. The extra remission thus granted to one set of villages, was to be deducted from another; and it was effected in the same manner, by employing the ryots of other villages. After settling what proportion of the whole remission was to be allowed to each village, it still was necessary to ascertain whether, or not, any alteration was requisite in the classification of lands. In some villages where none appeared to be necessary, and where no objections were made, the classification of the head assessor was confirmed, and the rent of each class, and consequently of each field, determined at once, by lowering their assessment by the rate of remission granted to the village. In those villages where complaints were made of the classification, the objections were examined; and if they were allowed to be just by ryots not interested

REPORTS of Collectors, on Surveys and Assessments.

Principal Collector of Ceded Districts to the Board of Revenue dated 26 July 1802.

interested in the matter, the necessary alterations were made. Complaints of whole classes being rated too high, or too low, were much more frequent than those of particular fields being entered in a wrong class; because each ryot, knowing the produce of his own and his neighbour's lands, took care to see, where their qualities were equal, that his own were not placed in a higher class by the assessors; but he was not so anxious about the rate at which the class was assessed, as he considered, that whatever it was, it would be as favourable to him as to others. Where some classes were rated too high, or too low, it was usually owing to the portail and curnum of the village contriving to make the assessor under-rate the class which contained most of their own land, and over-rate some other one, composed principally of the land of the inferior ryots. But as the collector's cutcherry always inquired minutely into the assessment of the lands of the leading men in each village, and as the whole district was present at the discussion, and every man ready to prevent another from obtaining an advantage in which he did not himself share, no fraudulent assessment of any consequence could possibly be concealed.

7. The classification and assessment of the land having undergone three several investigations, by the assessor, head assessor, and collector's cutcherry; and all objections having been heard, and admitted when well founded, nothing remained but to ascertain and register the rent of every field. This was an easy operation; for as each class of land had been already rated according to its quality, it was only to calculate the number of acres in the field by 2, 3, or 4 fanams, as the rate of the class might happen to be, to which it belonged. As this was a mere arithmetical process, it was performed by persons hired for the purpose, who were paid at the rate of one and a half cantaray fanams, for a hundred fields. They were superintended by two gomastahs from the cutcherry; and when they had made out two copies of the register of fields, one for the collector, and the other for the tchisdar, the survey of the district was closed for the time. It still, however, remained to ascertain by experiment, whether the assessment might not be too high in some cases. In the course of collecting the first year's survey rent, a list was made of such fields as were asserted by the cultivators to be over-rated. Their rent was, at the end of the year, again examined in the presence of the principal inhabitants, and either lowered, or confirmed, as circumstances appeared to require. This was the last operation of the survey; and it usually occasioned a reduction of from one half, to one and a half per cent. on the assessment. The equivalent might easily have been made up from lands which had been under-rated, for the assessment was as often below as above the proper point; but it was thought better, in this case, to make no alterations, lest it should weaken the confidence with which it was wished to impress the inhabitants in the permanency of the survey rent. The final correction above mentioned has been made in all the districts which were settled by the survey rent in 1215; but in those districts where the survey rent was not established till 1216, and in those where it will not be introduced till 1217, the correction cannot be effected until 1217 in the one case, or until 1218 in the other. It will occasion a decrease of about ten thousand (10,000) pagodas, in the total assessment of the land inserted in the statement. The mode of measuring and assessing the land has been explained at so much length, that it can hardly be necessary to say more upon the subject; but should any further information be required, it will be more easily gathered from the accompanying copies (N<sup>os</sup> 1, 2, 3, 4.) of instructions to surveyors and assessors, than from any description whatever.

8. The accompanying statement, N<sup>o</sup> 5, contains an abstract of every thing that seems to be necessary in an agricultural survey. It shows the population, the number of cattle and sheep, and the extent and value of all land, cultivated and waste, and though unavoidably somewhat long, it is so plain that it may be easily understood from the slightest inspection; and I shall, therefore, have occasion to make only a few remarks upon the principal heads.

9. When I transmitted to the Board, on the 24th August 1802, an abstract of the population of the country, I was convinced that it was greatly under-rated; but I took no immediate measures to ascertain the fact; because I was aware that the inhabitants at that time, would have suspected that the inquiry was instituted merely with the view of introducing a general capitation tax, and would have endeavoured as much as possible, to suppress information. But as I knew that whatever apprehensions they might formerly have entertained on this point, had been dispelled by the abolition of many old taxes within the last four or five years, and by the limitation of the land rent by the survey, I thought the conclusion of the survey, a proper time for obtaining a more accurate account of the population than had hitherto been done. Instructions were therefore circulated in August last, to make out new returns of the number of inhabitants in every village, founded, as far as it might be practicable, upon actual muster, except in the case of those casts who exclude their women from public view. The returns were prepared by the curnums of the different villages, assisted by the potails; from muster where that mode could be adopted; and where it could not, as among Mussalmen, as well as several casts of Hindoos, from the information of the heads of families, or of their neighbours. The paper, N<sup>o</sup> 7, has been drawn up from these returns, and probably exhibits as accurate a statement of the population of an extensive province, as can in general be procured in any other part of the world. The total number of inhabitants is 1,917,376, which is 689,263 more than the return of 1802; a part of this excess, perhaps one fourth, arises from the increase of population during a period of five years of tranquillity, a small part is also owing to the return of inhabitants who had emigrated under the Nizam's government; but the remainder must be attributed to the falsity of the former returns. There is every reason to believe that the total is rather below than above the actual population, for the number of families

REPORTS of Collectors, on Surveys and Assessments.

Principal Collector of Ceded Districts to the Board of Revenue; dated 26 July 1807.

ought to be greater. It is according to the statement, one tenth less than that of males; but if the same proportions exist here as in Europe, the difference cannot be more than in a hundred; and the whole number of inhabitants would, upon this principle, be 2,014,000. It should, however, be observed, that it is a general opinion among the inhabitants that the number of males is actually always one tenth greater than that of females. I was at first inclined to believe, that the difference might have arisen from the seclusion of females; but it is not particularly great among those casts who follow this practice, but extends to every cast, and every district. I examined the details of several villages in different parts of the country, and though in one village the females were more numerous than the males, and in a few others, nearly equal in number to them; yet the average result was the same as in whole districts. The coincidence of so many unconnected accounts is certainly a strong argument in favour of the popular notion, of males being one tenth more numerous than females.

10. Accounts were also taken in the course of the last Fusly of the number of cattle and sheep in the country, but they cannot be expected to be so accurate, as those of the population; not only because the owners are averse to giving true reports, but because herds and flocks move frequently from one part of the country to another for the sake of pasture, and many herds are almost wild; and their numbers must therefore be taken, upon the word of their keepers. After making allowance, however, for these obstacles, the actual does not, I imagine, exceed the estimated numbers of cattle and sheep above one tenth, or at most one eighth. The number of black cattle is 1,198,613; and that of buffaloes, 493,906; although a considerable proportion of both perished during the severe droughts of 1212 and 1213, the stock of both has increased within the last five years.

11. The number of sheep, according to the returns, is 1,147,492, and of goats 604,633. The actual number of both is probably one-eighth more, because from their being kept chiefly in the fields or jungle, and from the owners having a superstitious prejudice against their being counted by others, or even by themselves, it is more difficult to obtain correct statements of sheep and goats than of black cattle and buffaloes.

12. The quantity of sirkar land in cultivation, according to the survey, is 3,203,850 acres; of which the assessment or fixed rent is star pagodas, 17,08,115; and the quit and extra rent S. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,44,840; in all, S. Pag<sup>a</sup> 18,52,955. (N<sup>o</sup> 5.) The cultivation in the statement, is not that of any one year, but of several; that of each district is entered for the year in which its survey was made, from 1213 to 1216: but as the best cultivated districts were first surveyed, and afterwards those in which the greatest increase has taken place, the total may be considered, as the average cultivation of ordinary years. It is exceeded only by the cultivation of Fusly 1215. The various products from which the land rent is drawn, and the proportions of each, are shown in the statement N<sup>o</sup> 8. It was made out in 1211, since which period, the proportions of some of the more valuable articles, as indigo and sugar, have greatly augmented. Indigo to the value of star pagodas 1,05,000, paid duty in 1215; and it is supposed that the export to the Carnatic, for which no duty was paid, was equal to star pagodas, 20,000. The quantity would have been nearly doubled in 1216, had not the crops been destroyed by the drought. The coarse sugar, or jaggery, manufactured in 1216, was double the quantity of any preceding year. The increase of these articles, is occasioned by the addition of an extra land-rent, amounting to twice or three times the ordinary rate, to which all land employed in their culture was subjected; and this increase is likely to go on progressively, as the demand for them is great. Cotton, one of the chief products of the Ceded Districts, has not increased in a similar degree, because the demand for it is not greater than usual, and because, from its being a common article of cultivation, and never having paid more than the ordinary land-rent, it has obtained no advantage, from the equalization of rent by the survey. Its estimated produce in Fusly 1215, is shown in the statement N<sup>o</sup> 9, which was last year transmitted to the board of trade. This produce is not likely to increase, in a greater rate than the general cultivation of the country, because cotton is hardly more profitable than grain to the ryots. But should any considerable supply be required for the Company's investment, the rise in the price which must in consequence take place, will occasion a greater quantity to be grown upon the land now occupied. The augmentation, however, will not be so great as might be expected, because it will be limited by the more substantial ryots being unable to raise cotton, without a succession of other crops, and from the poorer ryots seldom being able to raise it at all. This does not proceed from any particular difficulty or expense attending the cultivation, but from the necessity of raising, in the first place, grain for themselves, and straw for their cattle; and from their rarely, after providing these articles, having the means of raising any thing else; so that not one fifth of the cotton land now in cultivation is employed in rearing that article.

13. The waste land is the great source from which an additional supply of cotton may be obtained; but this can only be effected, by lowering the present assessment. A reduction of 25 per cent. would, in the course of ten or fifteen years, bring into cultivation from a million and a quarter of acres; and cotton could be grown to any extent that could possibly be required. The price would rise at first, by the purchase for the investment, and it would fall again to the ordinary standard, whenever the increased produce bore the proportion to the increased demand, as the present produce to the present demand. The quantity which might be required for the price to fall, would depend, upon the quantity which might be wanted for the investment, but it could hardly exceed eight or ten

ten years, because more additional cotton might be raised within that period, than the investment could demand. The waste which has been in cultivation within the last twenty years, amounts to 2,133,363 acres; and that which has either not been cultivated within that time, or never, amounts to 4,129,953 acres, making in all above six million of acres, of which about one sixth is fit for cotton.

14. The total enaum land in the Ceded Districts, contains 2,599,747 acres, of which the estimated rent is star pagodas 12,35,458; about six tenths ( $\frac{6}{10}$ ) of the whole is waste. The land held by Bramins under the denomination of Dhirmadey (Statement N° 6.) is chiefly cultivated by ryots, who seldom pay the enaumdar more than a fourth or a fifth of the rent. In many villages, these enaums are divided among the ryots, who allow the enaumdar only a small quit rent, and regard the rest as their own, from long possession. The enaums of potails and curnums amount to 64,701,138 acres, of which, the estimated rent is star pagodas, 3,02,587. 21. 33.; about four fifths of the whole are cultivated. These enaums are in many villages, thirty or forty per cent. of the revenue, but in others, not more than two or three per cent. In general, all above five per cent. may be regarded as unauthorized. The frequent changes of government, and the loss or rather concealment of accounts, have during a long course of years, facilitated the fraudulent extension of these enaums, at the expense of the cirkar lands. Many additions have in this manner, been made to them under the Company's government, and even at the moment of the survey, as it was feared that no opportunity might afterwards offer for such practices. In some cases, a portion of these extra enaums arises from grants for building small forts or digging wells, for public use. In others, they pay a quit rent; but they ought all to be examined hereafter, and be subjected, where excessive, to resumption or assessment. The whole of the cirkar and enaum land capable of cultivation, amounts to twelve million and sixty-six thousand and nine hundred and twenty-three acres (12,066,923) of which the rent, as fixed by the survey, is star pagodas 39,54,417.

15. The last description of land in the statement, is what is called Purrampoke. It comprehends all land that is utterly unproductive; sites of towns and villages; beds of rivers, and in some cases of tanks, roads, and extensive tracts of rocky and stoney ground where no plough can ever go.

16. I reckoned at the commencement of the survey, that it might be finished in four years, and that the expense would be about four per cent. of the revenue of one year. The average revenue has been about sixteen lacs of pagodas, which, at four per cent. gives 64,000 pagodas. But the survey has already cost 80,000 pag<sup>a</sup>, and will cost about 3,000 more. This increase, is occasioned by its having occupied nearly five years instead of four, owing to my attention having been partly diverted from it, to the business of supplies, while the army was in the field, and to its having been necessary to survey, a second time, a great part of the lands on the banks of rivers, in order to ascertain how much of them had been carried away, by the inundation in October 1801.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,

Anantpoor, }  
26th July 1807. }

Your most obedient and humble servant,

(Signed) Thomas Munro,  
P. Collr.

#### No. 1.—Instructions to Surveyors.

1. ALL your measurements, of every description of land, wet and dry, are to be made with a chain of thirty-three feet.

2. Your accounts are to be kept in acres, goontas, and anas. One square chain is one goonta, and forty such goontas, are one acre.

3. When you arrive in a village, you will, previously to beginning the measurement, take a muchulka from the potail and curnum, according to the form which has been delivered to you.—N. B. This form states, that the curnum's account of cirkar and enaum land, house and shop tax, and every article of revenue, is true; and that if it is found to be false in any point, he will forfeit his office.

4. The curnum and potail of the village must attend you, during the measurement; and you must give timely notice to the ryots, in order that they may be present at the measurement of their own fields.

5. In measuring a village, you will begin at one side, and proceed regularly, on marking the field first measured No. 1, the next No. 2, &c. These numbers, will serve to distinguish fields, when there are several of the same name in one village. After measuring the dry, you will measure the wet land, and number the fields in the same manner, beginning again at No. 1; 2, &c.; and the same rule must be observed, with respect to baghayet or garden land.

6. The name of every field, must be entered in your accounts. Where fields, whether cultivated, uncultivated, or waste, have a name, you will insert that name: where they have none, you will, in concert with the potail and curnum, give them one.

7. In the account of the measurement of every field, whether wet or dry, you will always specify the names and numbers of the fields by which it is bounded.

8. In dividing fields of red land, you will mark the division by a bank of earth or stones; but in black land, you will always mark the division by setting up boundary stones; because the polli or bank of earth would injure the black land, by overrunning it with tall rooted grass.

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the Board of Revenue  
dated 26 July 1807



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9. You will pay the hire of the coolies employed, in marking boundaries, either by stones or banks of earth.

10. If a field, not being larger than may be cultivated by one plough, is ploughed in part only, and the rest waste, you will not divide it, but measure it as one field.

11. If a field is too large to be cultivated by one plough, you will divide it into two or three fields, as may be necessary. As the extent of land cultivable by one plough depends upon the nature of the soil, you will be guided by the custom of the village, and the opinion of the potail, curnum, and principal ryots, in regulating the size of fields.

As the subdivision of a large cultivated field is ordered to be made solely upon the supposition, that if thrown up by the present occupant, it may be left waste, from their being few ryots in the village who have the means of cultivating it; yet, if, from the state of agriculture in the village, there is no danger of its being left uncultivated, it will not be necessary to divide it, even though it should be too large for one plough.

12. In the measurement of dry land, you will class black and red land separately.

13. If a quarter only of a field is cultivated, enter the whole field as waste. If half only is cultivated, enter half as cultivated, and half as waste; and if three quarters are cultivated, and one quarter waste, enter the whole as cultivated.

14. In measuring uncultivated land, you will divide it according to the old marks or bounds; should you meet with waste (anadi) having no such marks, you will direct them to be made. You will class uncultivated lands into fallow of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years; waste from 5 to 10, 10 to 15, and 15 to 20 years; and anadi, or waste, which has either never been cultivated, or not been cultivated within twenty years.

It is only when waste is divided into fields, or found in small pieces, that it is to be measured, by separate fields; when lying in large undistinguished tracts, it is to be measured in the gross; but whether found in small fields, or in extensive commons, it is to be named and numbered.

If, after measuring twenty cultivated fields, numbered 1, 2, 3, to 20, a piece of waste follows, it will be numbered 21, and the cultivated field which comes after it 22, and so on, as often as waste intervenes; but as the largest piece of waste, is usually surveyed after all the rest of the village is finished, it will, of course, be the last number. Suppose that this number is 50, then, if at any future period it should, from the extension of cultivation, become necessary to divide it into fields, these fields will be numbered in succession No. 51, 52, &c. But this cannot be done in the case of the waste No. 21, because it is already followed by No. 22; when, therefore, No. 21 comes to be divided into fields, these new fields must be numbered No. 1. in 21, 2. in 21, &c.

15. When a field contains a few tamarind, kikar, or other productive trees, you will make no deduction for the land under their shade, because the ryot derives a profit from them; but where there is a bher-tree, or several other unproductive trees together, forming a shade, you will measure the land occupied by it, and deduct it from the field.

16. In measuring purimpoke, or land that cannot be cultivated, you will specify the extent of forts, of pettahs, of open villages, of the court-yards of houses, with the number and kinds of trees in such yards; of the banks of tanks, rivers, nullahs, ravines, hillocks, roads, kullar or barren land, wells, salt mounds, and of topes; stating the numbers and species of trees. You will also specify the purimpoke in the fields of ryots, and deduct it from their land.

17. In tarbunds, or palmirah topes, you will insert the number of trees, and class them into male and female, young, productive, and old, or past bearing. You will also measure separately, the divisions or parts of the tope occupied by different ryots.

18. You are not to measure halls or beds of rivers.

19. You will consider as garden or baghayet, all lands, in whatever manner they may be watered, that do not yield rice, but produce raggy, jewate, tobacco, red pepper, &c. and you will enter as garden so much land only, as can be watered.

20. In measuring wet land, you will specify whether it is watered by large tanks, by great nullahs, such as those of the Toombadda and Pennah, by kumpli, or draw-wells, or by kushens or nullahs, proceeding from springs.

21. You will enter as wet land all gardens having a constant supply of water, and containing cocoa-nut and other fruit trees. You will specify the quantity of waste land between the rows of trees of land cultivated, where the trees are thinly scattered; and of cultivated land where there are no trees. You will note the number of plants of young trees, of productive, and of old or unproductive trees, and specify whether they are cocoa-nut, soopari, tamarind, jamoon, lime or orange, &c. You will also enter as wet land, plantations of betel and sugur-cane; and likewise land producing tobacco and red pepper, &c. provided there is water enough for rice.

22. In wells and river kumplis, where there is a constant supply of water, and where the land, having formerly produced rice, is now, from some cause or other, cultivated with dry grain, you will enter as wet land, all that land which is marked out as atchkutt, or rice-fields, and which can be watered; but if, from the scarcity of water, such land is, in particular years only, cultivated as wet, you will measure it as dry.

23. When fields of garden or wet land are too large, they must be subdivided in the same manner as those of dry.

24. You will measure the beds of tanks, and class the lands included in them, according to the nature of the soil.

25. You are to enter as cultivated land, the cultivation of the last Fasy only; that is to say, of the year previous to that in which the survey takes place; for if lands cultivated in former years, but waste last year, or cultivated in the last, but not in the present year, are entered in the survey cultivation, the account will not exhibit a true statement of the cultivation of any one year.

26. You are to measure only such lands, as are allotted to you. If you measure the lands of another surveyor, you will not be paid for them, but fined.

27. When boundaries are disputed, if the lands in dispute are cultivated, and have been annexed to one village since the year Kelah, or the establishment of the Ahkam Namah, enter them in that village; if the lands are anadi, or old waste, enter them in the village which agrees to walk along the boundary.

28. To prevent the survey from being retarded by indolence, you must measure daily, whether cirkar or enaum land, as follows:

Dry:

If cultivated	-	-	-	-	5,000	goontas or chains.
If sayeh bunjer, or uncultivated land divided into fields	-	-	-	-	6,500	- - d°.
If anad bunjer, or undivided waste or common	-	-	-	-	25,000	- - d°.

Wet:

If cultivated	-	-	-	-	1,500	- - d°.
If uncultivated	-	-	-	-	2,500	- - d°.

29. You will receive at the above rates six pagodas monthly; but your pay being regulated by your measurement, will be increased or diminished in the proportion that your measurement, during the month, may be greater or less than the quantity prescribed. In order to ascertain the amount of your pay, you will send an abstract of your measurement monthly, through the examiner to the treasury, in the following form:

		Dry:		Goontas.	Acres.
Cultivated	{ Cirkar	-	-	90,000	or 2,250
	{ Enaum	-	-	5,000	- 125
				95,000	- 2,375
Uncultivated	{ Cirkar	-	-	45,500	- 113 1/2
	{ Enaum	-	-	5,000	- 125
				50,500	- 1,262 1/2
Waste Cirkar		-	-	75,000	- 1,875
Total acres dry		-	-		5,512 1/2
		Wet:			
Cultivated	{ Cirkar	-	-	4,500	- 112 1/2
	{ Enaum	-	-	750	- 18 1/2
				5,250	- 131 1/2
Uncultivated	{ Cirkar	-	-	2,000	- 50
	{ Enaum	-	-	500	- 12 1/2
				2,500	- 62 1/2
Total wet acres		-	-		193 1/2
Grand Total		-	-		Acres 5,706 1/2

30. In your abstract, it is not necessary to particularize the dates of measurement; the name of the month only is wanted.

31. As the chain is frequently broken, and some of its links lost, you will compare it from time to time, with the standard which you have received for that purpose.

32. If, on trial by the examiner, your measurement is found to be false, you will be dismissed, if it has proceeded from negligence; and punished, if from design.

33. You will inquire into unauthorized new enaums and concealed lands. If you discover any not entered in the accounts of the enaum, you will receive, on proof, one half the amount; and the persons through whose information you make the discovery, one quarter of your half.

34. You will be allowed two chain-bearers, and one quarter of a canteray sanam for each, daily. You will pay them, and also the cooleys employed in making the boundary marks, daily, in presence of the potail and curnum, and take their receipts.

35. You will receive half a pagoda monthly for oil and stationary.

36. You will let the curnums enter the account of the measurement, and you will compare your abstract with theirs, daily.

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37. You will deliver both your rough and fair accounts of measurement, to the examiner.

38. You will pay the bazar price for all articles received in the villages. If you do not pay, or if you receive batta, you will be dismissed.

(Signed) Thomas Munro,  
P<sup>l</sup> Collr.

(No. 2.)—Instructions to Azmayesh Gomastahs, or Examiners of the Survey.

Enclosure.

1. As you are appointed to the superintendence of a party of ten surveyors, you will regulate their survey, as follows:

2. When a village has eight or ten large mujerahs, you will send two surveyors to each; but if the mujerahs are small, only one.

3. When there is a large mouzah, without any mujerah, you will mark out by flags, the portions to be surveyed by each surveyor; and let them compare their account of boundaries with each other, so as to prevent any land from being omitted in their respective limits.

4. When a mouzah is small, and you think that the survey will be accelerated, by employing only a part of the surveyors in it, and sending the rest to another mouzah, you will do so.

5. If the mujerahs of a mouzah have old boundaries, you will adopt them: if they have no visible boundaries, you will set up stones in order to distinguish them.

6. You will take care that no land is omitted between the respective limits of your own surveyors; or between their limits, and those of other parties of surveyors.

7. You will take the rough accounts (the kham chitah or ) from the surveyors, and make by them, all your comparisons of measurement.

8. In your examinations of measurement, you will attend particularly to the fields of potails, curmums, and khoobash inhabitants.

9. You will examine by re-measurement daily, as follows:

Dry	-	-	-	-	-	500	goontahs or chains.
Or wet	-	-	-	-	-	150	D°

and transmit the account of the examination in the following form, N° 1. (Margoza tree field of Rungah Reddy, sirkar land) to the north of Goind Gaurus yetmannee field, measured by Bhum Row

viz. East to West	-	-	-	-	-	11 $\frac{1}{2}$	chains
North to South	-	-	-	-	-	15 $\frac{1}{2}$	

Total	-	-	-	-	-	178 $\frac{1}{2}$	- or 4 — 18 $\frac{1}{2}$
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Azmayesh or trial - - - - - 5 acres 1 chain;

viz. East to West	-	-	-	-	-	12	chains.
North to South	-	-	-	-	-	16 $\frac{3}{4}$	

Total	-	-	-	-	-	201	- or 5 — 1
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10. You will transmit your trials, with the rough accounts, to the catcherry, and give the fair ones to the accountants (Awurdah Nowis.)

11. In examining the measurement, if the excess of the land on trial, is above 12  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. in dry, or 10 per cent. in wet, you will add the difference to the field. If the deficiency is more than ten per cent. in dry, or 5 per cent. in wet, you will deduct it.

12. If in any village you find the measurement of the whole, or the greater part of the fields incorrect, and that a new survey is required, you will state the circumstance, and obtain leave before you begin.

13. If any ryot complains that the measurement of his field is not fair, you will measure it again.

14. You will inquire into new unauthorized enams, extra collections, land, and articles of the village taxes suppressed in the accounts; of all such discoveries, you will receive one half as a reward, and one quarter of your half, will be paid to the person from whom you may have received your information.

15. As the chains are frequently broken, you will compare them occasionally with the standard measure.

16. You will get two chain-bearers from the totties or tallaries of the village. You will pay them one quarter of a cantaray famam each daily, in the presence of the potail and curnum, and take their receipt; and you will send a statement of the expense, with your monthly account.

17. You will divide all the villages that fall to your share, according to the number of surveyors. Write the different shares on an equal number of papers, and let the surveyors draw lots, and measure the villages which their respective lots contain.

18. Your party is to measure only such villages, as may be allotted to it. If in the hope of getting more pay from black land, your surveyors measure the lands allotted to another party, they will receive no pay for them, and be fined.

19. After finishing the measurement of the villages allotted to your party in any district, if there is any party which has not begun its measurement in that district, you will measure its villages; but if there is no party which has not commenced, you will proceed to the next district.

20. You

20. You are not to measure in four or five days the number of acres prescribed to you for the month, but to measure daily, except on those days when you are on your way to another district. The measurement may be more in some days and less in others; but the prescribed quantity for the month must be completed.

21. You are not to try the measurement of a part of the surveyors in one month, and that of the rest in another; but you are, in each month, to try the measurement of all the surveyors.

22. You are not to remain behind the surveyors, because, unless you are with them, you cannot compare with them the false measurement which you may discover. If you are not always in the same district with them, you will be dismissed.

23. With your monthly abstracts, you will send a list of the surveyors and peons, present and absent; you will give your rough accounts of measurement examined to the amildar, who will forward them to the collector's cutcherry, and you will take the amildar's receipts for the accounts.

24. You will receive a monthly allowance of 22  $\frac{1}{2}$  fanams for Sader Wared.

25. You will pay for all articles, at the Bazar price.

(Signed)

Thomas Munro,

Principal Collector.

Enclosure.

### N<sup>o</sup> 3.—To Asse-sors or Terrim Muttasaddies.

1. You are to class the surveyed by ten surveyors, according to their rate or terrim. In setting the terrim, you are to assemble the potail, curnum, and ryots of the village, and also the heads of the neighbouring villages, and do it with their advice.

2. You are to class the lands of the whole mouza into first, second, third, &c. according to their rates. If the best land is in the cusbah, you will enter it, in the first rate. If the first land of any of the mujerahs is only equal to the second of the cusbah, you will enter it, on the second rate. If on the contrary, the first land of the cusbah is equal only to the second of the mujerah, you will enter it, in the second rate; for the rates are to be for the whole village generally, and not for each mujerah separately.

3. In fixing the rates, the ryot who occupies the land must be present; you are to consider the condition of the land, and not of the ryot; for the one is permanent, but the other is not; and you are to be careful not to enter the first rate, as second, or the second, as first, &c.

4. You are to mention the colour of the land, in order that in fixing the rent, the class to which it belongs, may be the better known. The colours are as follows:—

#### Regur:

- 1 Black mixed with stones.
- 1 Black mixed with chunam stones.
- 1 Black - - with white earth.
- 1 Black - - with sand.
- 1 Black - - with pebbles (gargatt.)
- 1 Black mould.

6

#### Red:

- 1 Red mixed with stones.
- 1 Red - - with sand.
- 1 Red earth.

3

5. You will inform the ryots, that the whole land of each class, will be assessed at the same rate; and caution them to class the fields, according to the real quality.

6. In classing the lands you will proceed, as follows:

Dry, at  $\frac{1}{2}$  capteray fanam difference for each rate.

Rate.	Acres.	Rate per acre.
1	100	1 0 0
2	50	0 9 8
3	40	0 9 0
4	—	0 8 8
5	—	0 8 0
6	—	0 7 8
7	—	0 7 0
8	—	0 6 8
9	—	0 6 0
10	—	0 5 8
11	—	0 5 0
12	50	0 4 8
13	40	0 4 0
14	50	0 3 8
15	40	0 3 0
16	30	0 2 8
17	—	0 2 0
18	—	0 1 8
19	50	0 1 0
20	—	0 0 0

Bagayet, at 5 canteray fanams between each rate.

Rate.	Acres.	P <sup>r</sup> acres C. Pagodas.
1	10	10 0 0
2	15	9 5 0
3	—	9 0 0
4	40	8 5 0
5	50	8 0 0
6	—	7 5 0
7	—	7 0 0
8	—	6 5 0
9	—	6 0 0
10	—	5 5 0
11	—	5 0 0
12	—	4 5 0
13	4	4 0 0
14	—	3 5 0
15	—	3 0 0
16	10	2 5 0
17	—	2 0 0
18	—	1 5 0
19	—	1 0 0
20	10	5 0 0

Wet, at 5 canteray fanams difference between each class:

Rate.	Acres.	Rent p <sup>r</sup> acres Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>s</sup> .
1	10	6 0 0
2	—	5 0 0
3	—	5 0 0
4	—	4 5 0
5	40	4 0 0
6	50	3 5 0
7	—	3 0 0
8	20	2 5 0
9	15	2 0 0
10	20	1 5 0
11	10	1 0 0
12	3	0 5 0
13	—	0 0 0
14	—	0 0 0
15	—	0 0 0
16	—	0 0 0
17	—	0 0 0
18	—	0 0 0
19	—	0 0 0
20	—	0 0 0

The above, is given as an example, for your information; you are not, however, to enter the money rates, but only to take care that the lands are correctly classed. The classes may be as numerous, as the different kinds of land are; but in one mouza you are not to make more than 10 classes of dry;

6 of garden; and

8 of wet.

7 In regulating the proportions of the decrease of rent between each class, you will be guided by the quality of the land; and make it, in some villages, for dry  $\frac{1}{2}$  a canteray fanam; and in other villages, where the rent is low,  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a canteray fanam;

For garden - 5 and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  canteray fanams;

For wet - 5 and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ditto.

If in a village, you find that the difference between any two classes of land should be  $\frac{1}{2}$  canteray fanam, you will make the same difference between every other class, and in the same manner: if the difference between any two is  $\frac{1}{4}$  canteray fanam, you will continue that difference, through all the other classes; and in garden and wet, if the difference, between two classes in  $2\frac{1}{2}$  or 5 canteray fanams, you will make one of these rates, the difference between all the other classes: but you must not have both rates of difference in the same village.

N. B. The rent of dry land in some of the western districts was found to be so low, that the rate of decrease (oottar) could not be restricted to  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a canteray fanam without great inconvenience; it was therefore extended to one-eighth of a canteray fanam, or two anas; and the following additional articles were inserted in the instructions:

8. Though you were formerly directed to restrict the rate of decrease (oottar) in dry land to  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a canteray fanam; yet, as the accounts must be regulated by the land, and not the land be made to suit the accounts; and as the annual rent is in some places only from  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 canteray fanam per acre; if there are seven or eight classes rising  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a canteray fanam each, it will make the rent too high; you will, therefore, if there are only three or four classes, keep the oottar at  $\frac{1}{2}$  fanam; but if there are more, you will make the oottar 2 or 3 anas of a canteray fanam, according to the custom of the village.

9. In writing the abstract of the village, you will state, at the head of the columns of Dry, Wet, and Garden, the oottar, or rate of decrease between the different classes: if dry,  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{1}{4}$ , or  $\frac{1}{8}$  canteray fanam; if garden or wet,  $\frac{1}{2}$ , or 5 canteray fanams.

10. In classing the land, you will consider both the nature of the soil, and the expense of labour; for instance, if one field is near the village, and another, of the same quality, at a distance from it, the distant field must be rated lower, because it requires more labour to watch, and also to plough it. You will make allowance for the additional expense, and lower the rate accordingly; so that it may be cultivated with the same ease as the land of the same kind near the village. You will also, in garden and wet land, make allowance for the deficiency of water; and where there are nullahs and wells, for the extra labour, and reduce the class.

11. You are to class the land not merely by its intrinsic quality, but also by its actual state of cultivation. Thus, if two adjoining fields, of the same quality with respect to soil, are held, the one by a poor, and the other by a substantial ryot, you will not enter them in the same class; but you will place the field of the poor ryot in such lower one, as its unimproved state may render necessary.

12. If in one field, whether dry, wet, or garden, there are two or three different kinds of soil, you will not class the kinds separately; but take the average of the whole, and make one class.

13. In classing wet and garden, observe the following detail. Divide the lands of tanks and nullahs into one crop and two crop land. In well land, consider whether the well has water for one or two crops, and make the class higher or lower accordingly.

14. In classing betel and cocoa-nut, &c. gardens, you will enter the land in the same class as land of the same kind on which there are no fruit-trees, without making it either higher or lower, on account of the trees.

15. In garden, you will enter as garden, only what is now cultivated; and you are not to add to it any of the neighbouring dry land, on the supposition that there is water enough to convert it hereafter into garden.

16. In garden which is now waste (anadi) you will examine whether, when last cultivated, the crop was a dry or a wet one. If dry, you will class the land, as dry; and if wet, as garden.

17. In classing dry waste (anadi) you will proceed as follows: If it is divided into fields by old boundaries, and has been so measured, you will class each field separately: if there are no old boundaries or land marks, you will class it, by the divisions into which the surveyors may have formed it.

18. In classing the lands, you will take the rough account of the survey, and class according to the order of the numbers in that account; after which you will separate the cirkar and enaum, and the cirkar cultivated, and uncultivated, and waste land; and class the whole according to their respective rates. You will not add up the fields ryotwar, for it is not necessary to show what each ryot occupies; but in enaum lands, you will add up the fields both in their classes, and under the name of the person to whom they belong.

19. You are to class the lands, dry, garden, and wet, as they are distinguished by the surveyors. You are not to alter their classification, but you may note where you think it is wrong.

20. You are to class, monthly, 3,000 canteray pagodes of land cultivated, by the rent of the preceding year, for which you will receive ten star pagodas monthly. If you class a smaller quantity, your pay will be reduced in the same proportion; viz.

For cantaray pag 2,750	-	-	-	pay 8	1/2
2,500	-	-	-	8	
2,250	-	-	-	7	
2,000	-	-	-	6	

If you class a smaller quantity than 2,000, you will be dismissed; but you will receive no increase above ten pagodas pay, whatever quantity you may class. If, however, in the course of the year, you class more in one month and less in another, the difference will be allowed, provided it does not on the whole exceed 10 pagodas monthly.

21. You are to examine if fields have been concealed, or articles in the village taxes suppressed; but you are not to inquire into differences of rent, or extra collections.

22. You will not enter the land forming the beds of tanks, and barren or useless purimpoke; but you will inquire how it is cultivated when the tank is dry, and class it accordingly.

23. You are to compare your accounts with the cultivator, daily, and let him take them on the spot; you may carry him and the result to the neighbouring villages, to give their opinion on classing the lands of them, but not to write the accounts of their own village. If you make out your accounts without letting the cultivator take a copy, your pay will be stopped every month in which this is done.

24. In making out your abstract of the land in classing (Goshwarah) you are not to enter as cultivated, the cultivation of two or three years, but only that of the preceding year. If more is entered, you will be dismissed.

25. As the surveyors, in order to get more pay, make out their accounts hastily, and give false additions, you will make your own, and compare them, and send a list of all errors monthly to the treasury, showing the cause of measurement, and the difference of the number of acres.

26. The land classed by you, will be examined by the land auditor (Ser Tamm) and if any material error is discovered, you will be dismissed.



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27. You will make out the accounts of each village according to the forms, and when the district is completed give the whole to the amildar; you are not to keep the accounts after the district is finished, nor to carry the accounts to another district.
28. You are not to wait for the (Ser Terriah) head assessor, but as soon as you finish one village, proceed to another.
29. You are not to dismiss or employ goondas or peons, without reporting and obtaining authority.
30. You are not to beat or confine any of the inhabitants; and you are to pay for all articles, at the bazar rate.

(Signed) Thomas Munro,  
Principal Collector.

(N<sup>o</sup> 4.)—To Ser Terriahs, or Head Assessors.

Enclosure.

1. As you are appointed to superintend and correct the assessment of five (Terriahs) assessors, you will divide your share of each district into five divisions, and give one to each terriah; and you will give him at the same time, the survey accounts, which will be delivered to you by the amildar.
2. You will examine the classification of the lands, and you will fix the rates of assessment, in conjunction with the potails, curmums, and principal ryots; and if you wish for the assistance of any intelligent persons formerly employed in the revenue, the amildar will send them to you, on your application.
3. In making the assessment, you must examine all circumstances that may assist in enabling you to form a right judgment. You must consider the Ahkam namah, or assessment of Tippee Sahib; the present extent of cultivation; the condition of the ryots, and the nature of the soil; you will then fix the rate of assessment of each class of land, in dry, garden, and wet; you will explain it to the ryots, and obtain their consent to it, and you will take care that it is not so high, as to impede cultivation hereafter; you will also examine well the kamit rent of each village, the detail of the ahkam namah, and of the rent of the last twenty years, and enter them in your statements.
4. If you find that any of the terriahs have classed the lands wrong, whether from ignorance or corrupt motives, you will report, in order that they may be dismissed.
5. Where you find that the terriahs have entered two or three kinds of land in the same class, you will transfer each kind, to its proper class.
6. As the classing the fallow and waste lands at too low a rate, might induce the ryots to occupy them, and throw up their cultivated lands to the injury of revenue; you will therefore keep in view, that waste lands are to be so classed as not to discourage their cultivation, and at the same time, as not to give them any advantage over the old cultivated lands.
7. As your assessment is regulated by the quality of the land, and its actual state of cultivation, and as the arbab and other ryagur or privileged casts, and the cullgootah-shotrum, and gaddah landholders, have always had the same rate, still be permitted, to hold their lands at a reduced rate, and as this assessment must be deducted from your assessment, and thereby reduce its amount, you must be careful in comparing your assessment with that of former periods, to deduct the reduction accordingly.
8. You will ascertain whatever has been allowed for the ryots of the village as cuttgootah (low rent, or different casts) shotrum, arbab, and for rented villages to Bramins, and (Gaddah) and rent for levelling rugged land, and enter the amount of each separately in your statements.
9. You are not to detain the terriahs until you have yourself examined their assessment; but let them, as soon as they have finished one village, proceed to another.
10. If a part of your terriahs have finished their divisions, while another part is still behind in a different district, they will also finish the divisions which have not been begun before they proceed to a new district.
11. You will send the list of assessments and peons monthly to the amildar, who will get the amounts from the treasury; and you will issue it, and send a receipt.
12. When the assessments of a district is finished, you will deliver all the accounts to the amildar, and take his receipt.
13. You will class and assess the lands of the ryots, and the lands cultivated, by the rent of the preceding year; and if the rent of any district, your rate of fifteen pagodas will be reduced, in the assessment of that district, to the same rate.

(Signed) Thomas Munro,  
Principal Collector.

Extract from the Report of the Principal Collector of Ceded Districts, dated 21st July 1807, on the Survey of Ceded Districts.

Par. 247. In a survey of the Ceded Districts, being conducted, the principal collector submitted the accounts of the survey, and the results thereof, to the Board of Revenue; and we recommended that the same should be referred to your Honourable Court. The mode in which the survey was conducted, was conducted with a care and circumspection which secured the accuracy of the statements of the measured extent of the lands, and the amount of the rent payable by the inhabitants, and the accuracy of the assessment. The assessment was observed, read on the firm basis of the existing approbation of the persons who pay it.

## Appendix, No. 21.

Extract from FORT ST. GEORGE Revenue Consultations, of the  
27th October 1807.

THE honourable the President records the following Minute; with Enclosure.

As the importance of the Ceded Districts to the honourable Company, both in a political light, and as a valuable source of existing public revenue, has frequently drawn the attention of the honourable Court, as well as of this government, to the best mode of management for those extensive possessions, it became a primary duty upon me, on my succession to the government of this presidency, to take into my most mature deliberation, assisted by the best authorities I could consult, the most expedient measures to be pursued upon the resignation of Colonel Munro, that the public might suffer the least possible injury, by the departure of that enlightened officer, and that the principles he had acted upon with so much success, might still continue to be the guide of the revenue administration in that province. Upon this subject I had many conversations with the late president of the council and Colonel Munro, as well as with the present members of the government; and the result of my best and perfectly unbiassed reflection is, that it is my duty to recommend to the council, the adoption of Colonel Munro's suggestions, contained in the memorandum which I have now the honour to submit to the board. I believe it was not the intention of Colonel Munro that this paper should be considered, as a public document; but I trust I shall appear justified in producing it, as I consider it as a testimony too honourable to the merits of the late collector, and too creditable to the gentlemen whom he recommends, to be withheld from the records.

Mr. Thackeray having declined, for reasons which I could not disapprove, the charge of the Ceded Districts, I beg leave to recommend that Messrs. Gabagan, Shaw, and Chaplin, be appointed collectors of the three divisions of the province, as explained in Colonel Munro's memorandum; that the division should be the same, as the three judicial zillahs, with this addition, that the district of Yarkee should be transferred from the southern to the western, or Bellari division, for the reasons given by the late collector.

The pleasure I have felt in perusing the accompanying paper, so descriptive of present comfort and tranquillity in the country, and so flattering to the hopes of future improvement, induce me to conclude this minute with the following extract:

"If no alternate has attempted, the Ceded Districts will yield, one year with another, about  
"all kinds of paddy; and it will never be necessary to call out a single Sepoy to support  
"the collections. But the importance of the Ceded Districts does not rest merely upon the  
"production of a great revenue. In a political and military view, they are of still higher  
"value; for they are now, what the Carnatic formerly was, the country from which our  
"armies, when employed in the Deccan, must draw all their supplies of cattle and provisions.  
"All these considerations, urge the expediency of keeping the Ceded Districts, as they now  
"are; and of not risking any thing, by a change of men and measures."

Madras,

26 October 1807. }

WILLIAM PETRIE.

THE revenue of the Ceded Districts, when under the Nizam, was declining rapidly every year. An army was constantly in the field, whose expense consumed the collections; and the country was altogether in such a distracted state, that the Nizam seems to have given it up to the Company, because he could not retain it, in subjection. The country is now quiet, and well-affected. No troops are required in it, for the preservation of internal tranquillity; and the revenue is collected, with the greatest ease.

The way most likely to secure these advantages would be, to continue, as nearly as possible, the system of management which has been observed, during the last seven years. This might easily be effected, by appointing Mr. Thackeray principal collector, who, from his general knowledge of revenue, his experience in the Ceded Districts, and his acquaintance with the inhabitants, is the person best qualified for that situation. In the event of his declining it, the next best mode of arrangement would be, to divide the districts into two divisions, each to be under a principal and sub-collector, and the divisions containing respectively the same districts, that were entered in the two zillahs, which I formerly recommended to the board of revenue, to be established. This plan is however objectionable, under present circumstances, because there are not two sub-collectors in the Ceded Districts, who have had sufficient experience to act, as principals, and because the introduction of new men into them, unacquainted with the mode of management, and with the inhabitants and poligars, might be attended with bad consequences, both to the revenue and the peace of the country.

Extract Fort St. George  
Revenue Consultations, Oct. 1807.

Minute of the President;  
relating to the  
Ceded Districts.  
26 Oct. 1807.

Extract Fort St. George  
Revenue Consultations,  
Oct. 1807.

Memorandum of  
Col. Munro, as to the  
Ceded Districts.

It would, therefore be advisable, in place of two principals, to have three ordinary collectors; to divide the country into three divisions; and to appoint the present sub-collectors to the management of them.

Mr. Gabagan has been employed in the Ceded Districts between four and five years; and Messrs. Shaw and Chaplin, between three and four. The system which now prevails, is familiar to them. They know the disposition of the inhabitants, and the characters of the native servants; and from these, and other causes, they are better calculated than any other set of men, to conduct the affairs of the Ceded Districts successfully.

It is essential to the welfare of that province, that there should not only, be no actual change, but that nothing should be done which might excite a suspicion, that any was intended. The disturbances by which it was formerly agitated, have been too recently settled, to render it either prudent or safe to hazard any experiment of innovation. The appointment of new men, would shake the confidence of the inhabitants in the stability of the present system; would revive the hopes and obsolete pretensions of fugitive poligars; and might throw things into a state of confusion, from which they would not again be easily extricated.

If no alteration is attempted, the Ceded Districts will yield, one year with another, about eighteen lacs of pagodas; and it will never be necessary to call out a single sepoy to support the collections. But the importance of the Ceded Districts does not rest merely upon the production of a great revenue. In a political and military view, they are of still higher value; for they are now, what the Carnatic formerly was, the country from which our armies, when employed in the Deccan, must draw all their supplies of cattle and provisions. All these considerations, urge the expediency of keeping the Ceded Districts, as they now are; and of not risking any thing, by a change of men or measures.

The three divisions should be the same as the three judicial zillahs, with the exception only, that the district of Yarkee should be transferred from the southern to the western or Bellary division, because its nullahs and cultivation on the river Pennah, are intermixed with those of that division. The annual revenue of the western division, would be nearly seven lacs; and of each of the other two, about five and a half lacs of pagodas.

*Thomas Munro.*

Resolution thereon.

THE Board concurring in the recommendation contained in the foregoing Minute, it is ordered, that the appointments be communicated to the gentlemen, and to the Board of Revenue.

Extract from Revenue Dispatch from Fort St. George;  
dated 21st October 1807.

Extract Revenue Dispatch from Fort St. George, Oct. 1807.

Para. 260. Mr. PETRIE reviewed the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro in the Ceded Districts, noticed the gradual augmentation which he had produced of the revenue, from  $12\frac{1}{2}$  lacs to 18 lacs of S. pag<sup>a</sup> per annum; and the general amelioration and improvement of the manners and habits of the inhabitants of the Ceded Districts, which had kept pace with the increase of revenue. From disunited hordes of lawless plunderers and freebooters, they are now stated to be as far advanced in civilization, submission to the laws, and obedience to the magistrates, as any of the subjects under this government. The revenues are collected with facility; every one seems satisfied with his situation; and the regret of the people is universal on the departure of the principal collector.

Extract from General Report of Board of Revenue at Fort St. George;  
dated 5th October 1808.

Para. 156. We had the honour to conclude our address by inserting the following Statement of the collections derived from these districts, from Fusly 1210 to 1217\* inclusive, a series of eight years, constituting the whole period of time, during which they had been subject to the Company's government.

STATEMENT of COLLECTIONS derived from the CEDED DISTRICTS; from the Fusly year 1210 (1800-1) until Fusly 1217 (1807-8) inclusive.

	Land Rent.			Licences.			Customs.			TOTAL.			Remission.			Actual Collection.		
	S. Pag.	f.	c.	S. P.	f.	c.	S. P.	f.	c.	S. P.	f.	c.	S. P.	f.	c.	S. P.	f.	c.
Fusly - 1210	10,06,543	25	76	27,170	—	12	69,057	15	50	11,02,770	41	58	24,674	26	48	10,78,096	13	10
— - 1211	12,48,493	39	11	39,349	39	59	69,671	1	29	13,84,514	38	19	2,519	34	23	13,81,093	3	76
— - 1212	12,79,723	7	43	52,940	19	17	80,950	33	26	14,13,614	40	6	714	41	47	14,12,899	40	39
— - 1213	13,08,169	2	12	57,954	—	55	83,412	26	73	14,49,535	29	60	—	—	—	14,49,535	29	60
— - 1214	15,33,603	3	35	63,907	41	64	69,237	11	72	16,46,750	15	11	—	—	—	16,46,750	15	11
Kurnoul -	32,560	31	71	—	—	—	—	—	—	32,560	31	71	—	—	—	32,560	31	71
Fusly - 1215	16,41,986	24	48	59,838	39	25	56,790	30	32	17,58,616	10	25	180	36	32	17,58,435	15	73
Kurnoul -	28,645	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28,645	35	—	—	—	—	28,645	35	—
Fusly - 1216	13,91,110	37	18	72,485	34	70	46,099	17	53	15,99,696	5	61	8,158	41	4	15,91,537	6	57
Kurnoul -	28,645	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28,645	35	—	—	—	—	28,645	35	—
Fusly - 1217	15,17,272	27	5	73,551	2	1	15,593	3	78	16,06,421	33	4	—	—	—	16,06,421	33	4
Kurnoul -	28,645	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28,645	35	—	—	—	—	28,645	35	—
TOTAL -	1,09,06,904	41	8	4,47,198	29	63	5,17,817	17	13	1,18,71,921	4	4	36,249	11	74	1,18,35,671	41	1
TOTAL } Kurnoul }	1,18,498	10	71	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,18,498	10	71	—	—	—	1,18,498	10	71
GRAND TOTAL	1,10,25,403	9	79	4,47,198	29	63	5,17,817	17	13	1,19,90,459	14	75	36,249	11	74	1,19,54,170	8	1

157. The judicious policy, we remarked, could not be too highly applauded, by which Lieut. Colonel Munro, fixing in the first instance, on a moderate scale of jumma, and increasing it only as the means of the renters, and the capacity of the country, enabled him safely to do, advanced these provinces from the almost ultimate point of declension, to which they had been sunk by a weak and improvident government, to the degree of comparative prosperity and promise, in which they now remain.

158. The example we believe to be unparalleled in the revenue annals of this presidency, of so extensive a tract of territory, with a body of inhabitants little accustomed to passive submission and legitimate obedience to the ruling authority, reduced from confusion to order; and a mass of revenue, amounting to no less a sum than 1,19,90,419 star pag<sup>s</sup> being regularly, and at length readily collected, with a remission, on the whole, of only 3,415. 28. 22. pagodas, or 1 fanam 22 cash per cent.

159. Amidst the cares and exertions of conducting and sustaining such an extensive series of collections, Lieut. Colonel Munro, at the same time commenced, prosecuted, and accomplished the arduous duty of surveying, classifying, and assessing, with a moderate, but adequate money-rent, the whole range of these provinces. This survey had cost the Company between eighty and ninety thousand pagodas. The result of it was reported to government, in our letter of 5th September 1807; and we had only further to observe, on this occasion, that it would be of important use, as a guide for a long time to come, not only to collectors, in regulating the operations of revenue detail, but also, to the local judicial authorities, in cases of civil adjudication.

160. From the comparative statement of the revenues of the Ceded Districts for Fuslies 1216 and 1217, as entered in the report above recited, the customs were altogether excluded, because their actual amount for the latter period, could not be ascertained until the expiration of the Fusly, and because the usual substitute for an estimate could not be supplied, the collector of Bellary having omitted to furnish the estimate for his particular division.

Note. The value at which they were coded was - S. Pag<sup>s</sup> 16,51,414

The first year's jumma was - S. Pag<sup>s</sup> 10,06,543

Inclusive of Kurnoul, Peshcush, last year's collections.

The sum of S. Pag<sup>s</sup> 24,674. 26. 4 the foregoing statement, for Fusly 1217 is composed of remissions made in 1806-7, in consequence of events which took place before the introduction of the Company's government, and which could not be prevented.

The sum of S. Pag<sup>s</sup> 8,158. 41. 4 omitted in Fusly 1216, was remitted to the renters, in consequence of government, after having collected.

These sums, are therefore deducted from the total of remission.

• 1806-7.

1807-8.

## Appendix, No. 22.

General Report  
Board of Revenue,  
St. George, 5th  
Nov 1808, as to  
Government of revenue  
in Malabar.

Extract from General Report of Board of Revenue at Port St. George,  
dated 5th October 1808; on MALABAR REVENUES.

Para. 618. BEFORE we concluded our report, we requested the attention of the honourable the Governor in Council to the following abstract Statement of actual Collections in Malabar, from the period of its cession to the Company, compared with the jumma of Fusly 1217.

ABSTRACT STATEMENT, showing the Actual Collections in the Province of MALABAR, from the period of its Cession to the Company, compared with the Jumma of Fusly 1217.

	Collections on account of Land Revenue.		Collections on account of Farms, Licences, Sayer, and Salt.		Total Collections, inclusive of Farms, Licences, Sayer and Salt.		Above the Jumma of 1217.		Below the Jumma of 1217.	
	Star Pag.	F. C.	Star Pag.	F. C.	Star Pag.	F. C.	Star Pag.	F. C.	Star Pag.	F. C.
FUSLY:										
1202 - - -	2,17,619	25 55	} Not on the Records.		2,17,619	25 55	-	-	4,20,889	7 35
1203 - - -	4,25,268	14 59			4,25,268	14 59	-	-	2,15,220	18 31
1204 - - -	3,53,589	28 24		22,568 5 13	3,76,247	33 37	-	-	2,62,240	41 53
1205 - - -	3,54,224	— 22		26,126 19 70	3,80,350	20 12	-	-	2,57,138	12 73
1206 - - -	3,85,149	4 47		23,489 31 39	4,08,638	25 6	-	-	2,29,850	8 4
1207 - - -	3,73,531	14 72		26,946 41 57	4,00,478	14 49	-	-	2,38,010	18 41
1208 - - -	4,00,024	4 77		30,358 — 79	4,30,382	25 76	-	-	2,08,106	27 14
1209 - - -	4,47,697	— 7		27,335 8 47	4,75,032	8 56	-	-	1,63,656	24 36
			Total - -		31,14,017	22 28				
1210 - - -	5,08,399	23 39		36,078 41 61	5,44,478	23 20	-	-	94,070	9 70
1211 - - -	5,94,591	1 41		74,212 26 41	6,68,803	28 2	30,314	36 72	—	—
1212 - - -	5,00,529	37 47		81,006 23 23	5,81,536	18 70	-	-	55,952	14 20
1213 - - -	5,18,834	41 58		77,348 20 57	5,96,183	2 35	-	-	42,305	30 55
1214 - - -	5,31,117	22 27		75,526 10 17	6,06,643	32 44	-	-	30,845	— 46
1215 - - -	5,27,406	36 16		72,955 22 22	6,00,362	16 38	-	-	38,126	16 52
1216 - - -	5,07,961	11 54		92,100 36 48	6,00,062	6 22	-	-	38,426	26 68
1217 - - -	5,16,073	33 10		1,22,415 — —	6,38,488	33 18	-	-	—	—
			Total - -		48,36,558	35 1				
Average - - - - - 6,04,569. 37. 70.										

619. It was hence observable, that the revenues of Malabar had progressively increased; and that the jumma of the current year exceeded, in a very considerable amount, the jumma of any other year, Fusly 1211 alone excepted, in which year Major Macleod succeeded to the Bombay Commissioners, and effected a sudden rise in the land revenue, by adopting rates of assessment inconsistent with the long established local usage, and from which it was soon after found expedient, to recede.

620. It was moreover to be observed, that the jumma of Fusly 1217, as now submitted, was exclusive of extra revenue, and exclusive of a further sum expected to be realized in the department of customs. It was also to be recollected, that the tax on pepper vines, amounting to pagodas 38,147. 7. 34. was remitted by order of government in Fusly 1216, and that the proposed equivalent, had not as yet been adjusted. The communication recently promised on this subject, we observed, would be submitted so soon as the desired information should be received from the collector.

621. We finally observed, that if allowances were made for these deductions, it would appear that the revenue of the current Fusly was higher even than that of Fusly 1211; and we had the pleasure to state, at the same time, that it had been realized without difficulty or objection, because the increase had been obtained by indirect modes of taxation, bearing equally on the community at large; while the direct tax upon the land affecting one class in particular, had been levied according to established usage, by a scale which is exceedingly moderate.

## Appendix, No. 23.

*Extracts from REPORTS respecting LAND TENURES  
and ASSESSMENTS, in MALABAR.*

Extract from GENERAL REPORT of Board of Revenue at Fort St. George;  
dated 31st January 1803.

Para. 178. IN Malabar, with the exception of a few estates forfeited by rebellion, there appear to be no circar or government lands, individual proprietary right generally prevailing throughout the province. The tenures were described to be of two kinds—the *jennum*, or immediate right of property, resembling the freehold tenure under other feudal systems; and *kanum*, or usufructuary property acquired by mortgage, which may be compared to copyhold. By the latter, the collector said the greater part of the land was held, and generally without the authority of written documents.

179. We, however, considered the following to be a more correct definition of the several modes of land tenure in Malabar, a precise understanding of which, we deemed to be very necessary.

1st. *Jennum*, or proprietary right, as above described, not that allodial right (as the native proprietors maintain it to be) which recognizes no superior, renders no service, nor contributes any portion of its profits to the commonwealth. Such a right, can appertain to the sovereign or lord paramount of the soil only; but it is a fee simple or hereditary right of possession, subject to some of those various conditions from which no subject can be exempt.

2. *Patum*, being single rent or lease, where the land and its products belong entirely to the renter. The rent is annual, or for a definite term; and the conditions specified in writing.

3. *Kanum patum*, or tenure by mortgage. Here a sum of money is given by the mortgagee, for the occupancy of the land made over by the mortgagor. If the produce exceed the interest of the sum lent, the *kanumkar* (mortgagee) pays the overplus to the mortgagor, and *vice versa*, the mortgagor generally neglects to pay the overplus until it accumulates to an amount which precludes redemption, though this is always in his option. Hence the *kanumkar* does not improve the land with the same confidence, as if it were his unalienable property.

4. *Cuy kanum patum*, tenure by labour, usufructuary tenure; by which the *jennumkar* gives a spot of land to a person who undertakes to fence and plant it with productive trees, for which he is insured in the possession of it, for a specified period (10 years) free from all charges. The trees do not generally produce, for the first six years; but the *cuy kanumkar* has five or six years enjoyment of the ground, in a productive state. At the expiration of the lease, the *jennumkar* has the right of resumption, on paying the renter for the buildings and wells, according to appraisement; and for the plantation, at fixed rates. The resumption of this tenure, is seldom enforced; but the *cuy kanumkar* enjoys the lease, at an easy rent, till re-imbursed. This tenure can be transferred or mortgaged; the soil to one, the buildings to another, which tends to a deterioration of the estate.

Extracts from Report of Mr. TILACKERAY, dated 4th August 1807.

ALMOST the whole of the land in Malabar, cultivated and uncultivated, is private property, and held by *jennum* right, which converts all absolute property in the soil. Many conjectures might be formed about the origin of landed property in these countries. The natives have many fables of God creating, or rather making Malabar and Canara, out of the sea, and giving it to the Brahmins. Without going so far back into antiquity, it may be only necessary to observe, that we find the land occupied by a set of men, who have had possession, time out of mind; we find that they have enjoyed a landlord's rent, that they have pledged it for large sums, which they borrowed on the security of the land, and that it has been taken as good security; so that at this day, a very large sum is due to creditors, to whom the land is mortgaged. Had the creditors ever doubted the validity of the *jennum* title, or imagined that government would have called it in question, it is not probable that they would have risked their money on so precarious a security. There are rules established time out of mind, for the transfer, lease, and mortgage of land; and where a regular system of common law has been established and observed time out of mind, and where it

Extracts of Reports respecting Land Tenures and Assessments, in Malabar.

Extract General Report of Revenue Board, of 31 January 1803.



Extracts of Reports re-  
specting Land Tenures  
and Assessments, in  
Malabar.

Extract Report of  
Mr. Thacker 33;  
Aug. 1807.

appears in general reasonable and applicable, it may be inferred that the object for which such a system was formed, must exist. There is obstinate opinion, and general tradition, to confirm the validity and antiquity of the title. The neighbouring countries of Travancore, Bednore, and Canara, have the same institution, and nearly the same rules regarding private property, which seem never to have been called in question. Every public and private authority, except Tippoo, appears to have admitted this right; the British government appears to have recognized it, and the people of Malabar have shown that they are able and willing to defend it, with stronger arguments than words: and, at all events, whether the right existed or not, it would be now impolitic and unjust, to call it in question. So that I think it will be admitted that the Malabar jelmkars do possess the full property in the soil. It is almost certain that the lands originally belonged to the pagodas, and at a very early period, were largely alienated; and from the pagodas, the present jelmkars, or proprietors, derived their title. There is no doubt but that many lands have been usurped since Hyder's invasion. The Mopillahs under the Mysore, the rajahs under the Company's government, have probably possessed themselves of lands to which they had no right; but their individual usurpations, do not affect the general rights of the jelmkars, who consider them just as valid and sacred, as the country gentlemen in England. The jennum right conveys full absolute property in the land, is not liable to become extinct by laches or desertion. The jelmkar, or proprietor, can dispose of his land, as he pleases; by executing the deeds of transfer, he transfers it to an individual; by treason, he forfeits it to the sovereign. If he dies intestate without heirs, it escheats to the state; but as the jelmkars claim the right of adoption, and the power of devising their lands to whom they please, but chiefly to pagodas, land seldom reverts to the state for want of heirs.

The jelmkar may dispose of his estate, in a variety of ways. By *kyvelobath*, he pledges his land, and delivers it over to the mortgagee; in this case, the proprietor receives from the mortgagee two-thirds of the value of the estate, but retains a certain quantity of interest in the land, which may be valued at one-third of the whole value: he must alienate this remaining quantity of interest in the land, before he loses the character of a proprietor. Rules are established for the adjustment of rent and interest between the parties, and for the redemption of the land, on the repayment of the sum received by the proprietor.

*Atti* is another contract, nearly the same, or rather another term for the same transaction. In both cases, the mortgagee, or tenant in possession, pays the surplus of rent above his interest, to the proprietor.

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If the necessities of the proprietor require a further advance of cash, he executes the *Ner Moodut*, as it is termed, and receives a further per-centage on the whole value of the estate, and resigns so much more of his interest: which becomes so faint, that there is little chance of redemption. There appears to be some difference, in different places, in the conditions of the *ner moodut*. In some, the option of redemption seems to reside with the tenant; in some, the original proprietor still seems to have the option of redeeming the land, upon the payment of a fine, in addition to the debt. The *koodima ner* seems to be nearly the same, as the *ner moodut*. Where the option of redemption has been long in the possession of the tenant, the tenure is converted, by pledge, into a kind of freehold.

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The lands are so deeply involved and alienated by those contracts, that in many cases the jehnkari, or original proprietor, only receives a handful of grain, or measure of ghee, as an acknowledgment of his title. In some cases, the jehnkari, in others, the tenant, in others, the cultivator, pays the land tax. The value of land varies; but it is said that land sells for twenty years purchase, reckoning on the clear rent. If this is the case, land sells for more than in Canara, which is owing either to the less improved state of the Malabar land, or the concealment of the real rental. If land is capable of improvement, it is more valuable, in proportion to its rent. If the real rent is greater than the ostensible, it will appear to sell for more, in proportion to the ostensible rent. The difficulty of absolute transfer may perhaps injure the interests of agriculture, and the courts may hit upon some method of simplifying the rules and transactions relating to land. The incumbrance on the land, has been considered as a clog upon improvement. The mopillas are the great purchasers and mortgagees; their industry, wealth, and habits of business, seem to give them some advantage over the nairs. However, it is, perhaps, in a great measure, the money of the mopillahs, which gives such value to the lands in Malabar. Government have nothing to do with the *kanum*, or incumbrance on the landed property, except that care must be taken to prevent any collusive management by which the collection of the land tax may be impeded. Land seems to be more valuable in the northern, than in the southern districts; because the land tax is higher. In Cotiote, and the northern districts, they are said to pay only 50; in the northern districts 80 per cent. of the rent to government. In both cases, the proportion paid as land tax may be exaggerated; however, they must still pay more to the southward. This inequality, is owing to the nature of the country. The southern districts are more open, where armies can act; and most likely, in a few years, Tippeo would have forced the people there, to have paid the whole rent to the cirkar; they would then have lost their property in the land, and have virtually become farmers, like the ryots in the Ceded Districts. But Cotiote, and the northern districts of Malabar, were never thoroughly subdued by the Mysore government; and it is only now that we are beginning to establish our authority there. The strength of the country has enabled the people to defend their rent, and remain landlords. Perhaps the strength of the country along the Ghauts, is the true cause of the existence of private property in the soil, which the inhabitants of Bednore, Canara, Malabar, and Travancore, not only claim, but have been generally ready to support by force of arms. It would most likely have existed every where: but in other parts of India, armies of horse could carry into immediate execution the orders of a despot, who never admitted of private property; because his wants excited, and his power enabled him, to draw the whole landlord's rent.

The succession to landed property is guided by the same rules which govern the succession to other real property. In those casts in which the sister's son performs the funeral ceremonies, he succeeds as heir. In those, where the succession follows the common Hindoo law, the sons perform the ceremonies, and succeed to the estate. The same rules seem generally to prevail, except, perhaps with some slight differences respecting the elder brother's portion, in dividing estates among coheirs. In the one cast, the estate is divided among the sons, as it is in other parts of India; in the other, among the sisters, or rather among their sons. The succession of the sister's son has no particular effect upon, nor does it arise particularly from, the institution of private property in the soil. It probably arises from the ancient privileges of the Brahmins to visit the women; for when they established

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appears in general reasonable and applicable, it may be inferred that the object for which such a system was formed, must exist. There is obstinate opinion, and general tradition, to confirm the validity and antiquity of the title. The neighbouring countries of Travancore, Bednore, and Canara, have the same institution, and nearly the same rules regarding private property, which seem never to have been called in question. Every public and private authority, except Tippoo, appears to have admitted this right; the British government appears to have recognized it, and the people of Malabar have shown that they are able and willing to defend it, with stronger arguments than words: and, at all events, whether the right existed or not, it would be now impolitic and unjust, to call it in question. So that I think it will be admitted that the Malabar jelmkars do possess the full property in the soil. It is almost certain that the lands originally belonged to the pagodas, and at a very early period, were largely alienated; and from the pagodas, the present jelmkars, or proprietors, derived their title. There is no doubt but that many lands have been usurped since Hyder's invasion. The Mopillahs under the Mysore, the rajahs under the Company's government, have probably possessed themselves of lands to which they had no right; but their individual usurpations, do not affect the general rights of the jelmkars, who consider them just as valid and sacred, as the country gentlemen in England. The jennum right conveys full absolute property in the land, is not liable to become extinct by laches or desertion. The jelmkar, or proprietor, can dispose of his land, as he pleases; by executing the deeds of transfer, he transfers it to an individual; by treason, he forfeits it to the sovereign. If he dies intestate without heirs, it escheats to the state; but as the jelmkars claim the right of adoption, and the power of devising their lands to whom they please, but chiefly to pagodas, land seldom reverts to the state for want of heirs.

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The lands are so deeply involved and alienated by those contracts, that in many cases the jehmkar, or original proprietor, only receives a handful of grain, or measure of ghee, as an acknowledgment of his title. In some cases, the jehmkar, in others, the tenant, in others, the cultivator, pays the land tax. The value of land varies; but it is said that land sells for twenty years purchase, reckoning on the clear rent. If this is the case, land sells for more than in Canara, which is owing either to the less improved state of the Malabar land, or the concealment of the real rental. If land is capable of improvement, it is more valuable, in proportion to its rent. If the real rent is greater than the ostensible, it will appear to sell for more, in proportion to the ostensible rent. The difficulty of absolute transfer may perhaps injure the interests of agriculture, and the courts may fit upon some method of simplifying the rules and transactions relating to land. The incumbrance on the land, has been considered as a clog upon improvement. The mopillas are the great purchasers and mortgagees; their industry, wealth, and habits of business, seem to give them some advantage over the nairs. However, it is, perhaps, in a great measure, the money of the mopillahs, which gives such value to the lands in Malabar. Government have nothing to do with the *kanum*, or incumbrance on the landed property, except that care must be taken to prevent any collusive management by which the collection of the land tax may be impeded. Land seems to be more valuable in the northern, than in the southern districts; because the land tax is higher. In Cotiote, and the northern districts, they are said to pay only 50; in the northern districts 80 per cent. of the rent to government. In both cases, the proportion paid as land tax may be exaggerated; however, they must still pay more to the southward. This inequality, is owing to the nature of the country. The southern districts are more open, where armies can act; and most likely, in a few years, Tippeco would have forced the people there, to have paid the whole rent to the cirkar; they would then have lost their property in the land, and have virtually become farmers, like the ryots in the Ceded Districts. But Cotiote, and the northern districts of Malabar, were never thoroughly subdued by the Mysore government; and it is only now that we are beginning to establish our authority there. The strength of the country has enabled the people to defend their rent, and remain landlords. Perhaps the strength of the country along the Ghauts, is the true cause of the existence of private property in the soil, which the inhabitants of Bednore, Canara, Malabar, and Travancore, not only claim, but have been generally ready to support by force of arms. It would most likely have existed every where; but in other parts of India, armies of horse could carry into immediate execution the orders of a despot, who never admitted of private property; because his wants excited, and his power enabled him, to draw the whole landlord's rent.

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their hierarchy; they probably wanted soldiers and witnesses. They introduced the Nairs, and they have continued the custom, ever since. The head peons most likely became rajahs; as they have in most other places, and by degrees, got possession of the lands. As the fathers of the children were uncertain, the succession followed the mother, about whom no mistake could arise. This appears to me to be the origin of this extraordinary custom, which, when once established among the polite Nairs, became fashionable, and was adopted by the other castes, even by the fanatic Mopillahs, who are followers of the prophet. The Nair is said never to marry like other Hindoos; he forms a temporary connection with any young woman who pleases him, which lasts while she continues faithful. The children, he has nothing to do with; they belong to the family of the lady. This aversion to wedlock, so contrary to the usual customs, ideas, and religion of the Hindoos, has probably given rise to a rule of succession, as contrary to their general customs.

At a very early period, it is probable that Malabar was conquered by a king from above the Ghauts, who established the pagodas; and Malabar was governed by a theocracy. The Nairs may have been established at the same time by the conqueror, or called in by the Brahmins, as a military body, to support the government, in the same manner that the Velmah dhorahs were introduced in the Northern circars. In process of time, they obtained settlements on the land. The head peons probably took advantage of opportunities of aggrandizing themselves, and became rajahs; from a remote period, they continued to govern Malabar like independent princes, but still, as deputies of the gods, who resided in the pagodas, until Hyder's invasion, A. D. 1760. There is no proof that any regular land-tax existed in Malabar, previous to that event; tradition and general opinion seem to deny it. The state of Travencore, where it was said there was no regular land tax, gives probability to this opinion, while the former state of Canara, where there has been a regular land tax for many centuries, renders it somewhat doubtful. The proprietors of land were certainly bound to render military service, and were likely to contribute twenty per cent. in case of invasion. The pagodas and the rajahs had lands of their own. The rajahs had other sources of revenue, from fines, royalties, imposts, personal taxes, and plunder, which were sufficient to support them. There was no army besides the militia, nor any expensive establishments to support; so that there does not seem to have been any necessity for a general land tax; nor had the rajahs power perhaps to collect one. It is only great states that want, or in India can, collect the land revenue easily.

Hyder sent an army into Malabar in 1760, and came himself in 1761. He subdued the country; and according to his custom, drove out most of the rajahs, except those who conciliated him, by immediate submission. During the war of 1768, the rajahs occasioned some disturbance; but in 1771, he came down himself, and re-established his authority. In 1782, Archee Beg Cawn was appointed his deputy, who made considerable progress in subduing and settling the country. This settlement of the revenue is said to be the foundation of that of the commissioners; but there are some doubts about his assessment and collections; for as Malabar was never thoroughly subdued and settled, like the countries long subject to the great governments which existed in the Peninsula, there is no regular establishment of village registers. Even the *Mencwars*, who now keep the *hobly* accounts, are not on the same footing as the hereditary curmushs of the other provinces; nor are they so skilful at accounts. In 1787, it is said that things were going on pretty well; but in 1788, Tippoo came down and proposed to the Hindoos the true faith; and not content with empty propositions about religion, he levied a contribution on his infidel subjects, and began the pious work of conversion, by forcibly circumcising a great many Brahmins, Nairs, and others, whom he thought deserving of paradise. This produced a serious rebellion; but he sent a large force, returned himself next year; and so vigorous was his administration, that in spite of religion, he drove out the rajahs and re-established his authority. He fairly bullied the chief of Tellicherry, and circumcised all the natives he could get hold of. It is not to be supposed that much revenue could be collected, or financial business arranged, during this scene of confusion.

The war between the English and Tippoo broke out in 1790, when we encouraged the refugee rajahs, who collected followers, sallied into Malabar, and raised contributions in the name of allies of the honourable Company. They received cowle from our officers, which seems afterwards to have puzzled the commissioners who were appointed on the conquest of the province, and who did not know whether the rajahs were to be considered as allies or subjects. Some of them, set up lofty pretensions to independent authority; however, at last a settlement was formed with them, and they were put into the management of their districts. It may be safely said, that the rajahs were either too weak to manage their districts, which happened to the southward chiefly, or too strong to submit to one government, which happened to the northward chiefly; and to this cause, most of the subsequent disturbances may be attributed. A scene of confusion, and an accumulation of balances ensued, which has only been lately changed for a better order of things: commissioners, superintendants, committees, and collectors, succeeded each other; but however zealous and able they might have been, order was not established in Malabar. The revenue was inadequate, yet not collected; the government was lenient, yet rebellion ensued. The Mopillah rebellion to the southward, the Cottiote rebellion to the northward, were civil wars which distracted the country, and prevented any financial arrangements. This deplorable state of affairs, may be in a great degree attributed, to the installation of the rajahs; for the Mysore government seemed to have managed pretty well when they got rid of the rajahs; and we have only begun to establish our authority, since the rajahs have been shut out from any interference with the revenue.

As the principle of assessment recommended in Mr. Richards's letter of the 22d February 1804, has been adopted, and confirmed by your Lordship's minute of the 22d April 1804; the Board of Revenue informed Mr. Warden, the collector, of the resolution of government on the 5th May 1804; and Mr. Warden issued a proclamation in consequence. As the principle of assessment has been fixed, and is, in respect to rice-fields, in every respect just and politic, it only remains to carry it into execution.

**Extracts of Reports re-  
specting Land Tenures  
and Assessments, in  
Malabar.**

Extract Report of  
Mr Thackeray, 4 Aug.  
1807.

The land-tax is to be fixed at 60 per cent. of the land rent, derivable to the owners of rice-fields.

The inhabitants have given in a statement of the rent of their rice-fields, calculated in the following manner:

Suppose the land requires 10 seers to sow and that it produces 12 fold, the produce will be - - - - - 120

The seed grain is deducted	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
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Amount equal to seed is deducted for charges	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
--	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Of this remainder, the land-owner takes two thirds, the tenant one third, which is - 33½

The landlord's clear rent is - - - - - 66½

**Their accounts, however, of seed and produce, are no doubt false.**

## Appendix, No. 24.

*Extracts from* REPORTS *respecting* LAND TENURES  
and ASSESSMENTS, *in* CANARA.

Extracts from REPORT of Principal Collector of CANARA; dated 31st May 1800.

FROM the remotest times of which there is any record, till near the middle of the fourteenth century, all land was assessed in rice at a quantity equal to the quantity of paddy sown; that is to say, a field which required ten bundies of paddy to sow it, paid ten candies of rice to the circar. The measure then in use was called a katti, which contained forty banis of eighty rupees weight; a katti was therefore equal to three thousand two hundred rupees weight. The rent of three such kattis of land, was three kattis of rice, or one ghetti pagoda of the same value as the bahadire now is. The revenue was sometimes collected in kind, and sometimes in money, at the discretion of the eiskar; and, probably, according as the state of prices rendered the one or the other, most advantageous.

**Extracts of Reports  
respecting Land Tenure  
and Amelioration  
Canada.**

Extract Report  
Principal Collector  
31st May 1800.

Between the years A. D. 1334 and 1347, Horryhurr Roy, the rajah of Bijanuggur, made a new assessment of Canara upon the principles laid down in the shaster, which suppose the produce to be to the seed as 12 to 1, and which prescribe the proportions into which it is to be divided, between the circar and the cultivator, agreeable to the shaster; therefore he reckoned that 2½ kattis of seed yielded 30 kattis of paddy, which he divided as follows:—

To the landlord	-	-	-	-	74	24
To the cultivator or labourer	-	-	-	-	15	50
To the carter	-	-	-	-	74	25
					<u>30:</u>	76

and still following the shaster, he divided the circular share, as follows: •

To the circar, one sixth of the gross produce	-	-	-	5
Dewustah, one thirtieth	-	-	-	1
Bremhaday, or Bramins, one twentieth	-	-	-	1 1/2
				<u>7 1/2</u>

He reckoned the  $7\frac{1}{2}$  kattis of paddy equal to half or  $3\frac{1}{2}$  kattis of rice, from which he deducted four *banis* per katti of rice, or one tenth, for beating it from the paddy. The balance, 3 kattis and  $\frac{1}{2}$  *banis*, he supposed to be the fund from which the *circar* rent of one *ghatti* *pagoda* to  $\frac{1}{2}$  katti of land was to be paid. Though it is said that in the  $7\frac{1}{2}$  parts of the gross produce taken at the *circar*'s share,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  are for *pagodas* and *Brahmins*, it appears from a statement of *enamins*, that the share actually allowed to them, was little more than one. This curtailment was made, on the idea of their possessing lands to a large amount, not included in the *jumma*, and it appears from investigations made in subsequent periods, that these *enamins*, added to what they held openly, exceeded the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  parts, which ought to have, on the whole, of the *jumma*, except in what is called the *hobby* of



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Principal Collector, of  
31st May, 1800.

Mangalore, which comprises about one-third of Canara, and which being at that time mostly held by a number of tributary poligars, was only partially subjected to this assessment. Between this period and 1660, the only considerable addition they made to it was by an assessment of cocoa-nut, and other fruit trees, which, under the Bijanugger government, do not seem ever to have paid any rent, exclusive of the land rent. The Bijanugger assessment, with all additions down to this era incorporated with it, has been for more than a century, considered as the *rekah*, or *standard rent* of all the lands in the country, cultivated and waste; and it is therefore entered under that denomination, in the 2d column of the statement N° 1. The deductions in the four following columns are made in order to show the amount of the standard rent of the circar lands actually occupied, and paying rent at the end of the Bednore government.

The 3d column contains the total of the enaums; the amount of which, like that of the circar lands, was swelled by the addition of 50 per cent in 1618; but no real increase of them was made by the Bednore rajahs. The apparent increase arose from those enaums which had been concealed during the Bijanugger government, having been in the course of subsequent investigations, discovered and brought to account. The Bednore rajahs, though they made no addition to the enaums, made considerable alterations in them, by transferring S. P. 23,595. 2. 13. from Bramins to the Mutts, and pagodas of Linga Muts, to which cast they themselves belonged.

The deficiencies of *rekah* or standard rent, in column 4, are composed of uncultivated lands, and reduction of rent. The first of these heads, comprehends all lands overflowed by the sea, or torn up and washed away by rivers and nullas, and ancient waste lands which had been in that state, ever since the Bijanugger government; and which, from their situation among hills and jungles, being deemed unlikely to be ever again cultivated, were withdrawn from the sum of the general assessment of the country.

The second head includes reductions of such parts of the extra assessment of 50 per cent. and of that of cocoa-nut trees, as it was found could not be realized.

The waste lands in column 5, are all supposed to be fit for cultivation, because the whole or the greater part of them had been cultivated at different periods, under the Beddanore government.

It was usual to grant *tunkahs* to the peons of Simogn, and other garrisons above the Ghauts, on the ryots of Canara, for a certain proportion of their pay. These men, being always impatient to get home, were glad, for the sake of prompt payment, to accept of what was much less than their due. By degrees, it became a rule that they were to get no more than sixty per cent. for their *tunkahs*. As this was in fact a remission of rent, the *tunkahs* were generally written upon the poorest villages; but when, in consequence of a reduction of the peons, the *tunkahs* were discontinued, it was found expedient still to continue to the villages the indulgence to which they had been so long accustomed; and the diminution of rent which this occasioned is entered in column 6.

The eighth column contains the net standard rent of all the land occupied at the close of the Beddanore government; which, together with the additions in the following columns, formed the *jumma* at that period. The *pugdi*, or extra assessment of 1711, was imposed by the wife of the rajah, who was also regent during the madness of her husband, on occasion of the marriage of her son Buswapah Naigue. It was at the rate of one sixteenth of the *kist*, or standard rent, and was for a few years levied as a *nuzzer*, but soon came to be considered, as part of the *jumma*.

The *Putri*, or extra assessment of 1718, in column 10, was imposed by the rajah of Sondah, for the purpose of discharging the Mogul *peshcush*, at the rate of 30 per cent. on all gardens, and from 2½ to 12½ per cent. on rice-fields. The addition under this head in Buntwah, was made by the Adjel poligar, who then rented a part of that district.

The *Chuckes*, or extra assessment of 1726, was imposed in lieu of interest paid to the *soucars*, who advanced the early *kists* for the ryots. In Beddanore, 50 per cent. had always been paid, by the middle of October; but only 12½ per cent. in Canara. The rajah wished to regulate the *kists* of Canara, in the same manner; but the inhabitants, from the lateness of the crops, being unable to comply, it was agreed that he should borrow the money, and that they should pay him, as interest, half an *anna*, or one thirty-second part additional on the *kist*, or standard rent.

The assessment of 1725 was made by Buswapah Naigue, at the rate of one tenth of an *anna*, or one one-hundred and sixteenth part of the standard rent, in order to meet *chutters* and feed pilgrims, on account of the murder of his father.

The additions in column 12, consist of extra assessments by petty poligars in the Mangalore Hobly, and those in the next column, of *nuzzers* formerly made to the rajahs, of betel-nut and pepper, converted into money, and a variety of other trifling articles.

The addition of 1758 was made by the Rani, to discharge the arrears of the Mharatta *chout*. They had accumulated to so great a sum, that she pretended she could not pay them off, without a *nuzzer* from the inhabitants, equal to one year's rent. To this demand, they utterly refused to submit; and when she attempted to enforce compliance, they rose in a body upon the *amildars*. The matter was at last accommodated, by their consenting to pay 50 per cent. in four years, at the rate of 12½ per cent. each year; but in the fifth year, when it was to have been remitted, Hyder ordered it to be made permanent.

Col. 17. consists of extra assessments made by petty poligars in the districts which they rented, to supply deficiencies from increase of waste land, &c. Col. 18. contains an increase



Extracts from the Report of the Select Committee on the Revenue of the Madras Presidency, in 1800.

Extracts from the Report of the Select Committee on the Revenue of the Madras Presidency, in 1800.

14. Columns 78, 79, and 80, shew the proportions of the land-rent that were received in kind. The whole are now commuted for money; because rice is not now wanted for numerous garrisons; and because the monopoly of pepper was destroying the very plantations from whence it arose.

The increase of land-rent is divided into extra assessments, and new heads of revenue, because it is the extra assessments alone that add to the burden of the landholders, and exhibit the excess of the modern, above the ancient assessment of the same lands.

This ancient assessment is still written, not only in all general accounts of districts, but in those of every individual landholder. It is alone considered, as the due of government; all subsequent additions are regarded, as oppressive exactions. They are not called rent, but are stigmatised by the names of chout, neposts, fines, &c. and distinguished by the names of the dewans who first levied them. They were always opposed by the inhabitants; and it was therefore necessary in most cases to make them, as general and equal as possible, by an even rate of per-centage.

This forms a remarkable distinction between the land-rent of Canara, and that of Mysore and the neighbouring countries; for there, the rent of every village, and of almost every ryot, fluctuates from year to year, because it is not fixed upon the land, but is regulated by the supposed ability of the cultivator.

The sums entered in columns 8, 44, and 72, exhibit the standard rent of the land in cultivation, under the revenue of Belnore, Hyder, and Tippoo; and had all these lands been actually cultivated, they would likewise show exactly, the comparative rates of assessment of those three periods. But this was not the case; for a small portion of land in occupancy, even under the Ranuy, was waste. More of it, was waste under Hyder, particularly in the latter years of his government; and a far greater share, under Tippoo.

It never was the practice under any one of those governments to keep an account of waste lands, unless of such as from the failure of heirs or other accidents, had reverted to the emperor. The accounts contained a register of the number of landholders, and the fixed assessment of their respective estates, the total of which formed the jumma; but they took no notice of waste lands, when there was a proprietor in existence. As long as he was present, he was responsible for the full rent, whether he cultivated or not. This was little felt under the Belnore government, when there were very few proprietors, who had not the means of cultivating the whole of their estates; but it became a serious evil under Hyder and Tippoo, when the increase of rent diminished cultivation; and, by being thrown upon a narrower share, pressed with double weight upon the landholders.

Both their assessments, therefore, must be reckoned higher than they appear to be, from the statement. There is no method of ascertaining what, in either of them, was the quantity of waste in those estates which composed the jumma, and which of course was subjected to full rent, in the same manner as if it had been cultivated; but many circumstances render it probable, that during the last five or six years of Tippoo's reign, the land in cultivation did not exceed the amount of that of the present year, entered in column 83.

If this conclusion is just, it would add about one-sixth more to the proportional rate of assessment, and with the increasing embezzlements of his servants, sufficiently accounts for the extraordinary diminution of his receipts in N° 2.

The sum of S. Pag. 1, 50, 740 4. 36. in column 82, deducted from his assessment in the settlement of the current year, is principally composed of waste lands, of which the proprietors are extinct; and which though they have been in that state for a long time past, had been permitted to swell the jumma at the beginning, and the outstanding balances at the close of the year.

It is also composed of a reduction of a part of the extra assessments on such estates as were running to waste from the inability of their owners to pay the exorbitant rents with which they were loaded.

However much I disapprove of the numerous additions made to the ancient land-rent by Hyder and Tippoo, I did not think myself at liberty to depart wholly from the system which I found established; as it is the same as that which exists in all the provinces which the Company have acquired, in the last and former war. I have made no other reduction in the assessment of Tippoo Saltanah than such as was absolutely necessary, in order to ensure the collection of the rent. I considered myself merely as a collector, who was to investigate and report upon the state of the country, but who was to leave it to the board to decide, as to the expediency of lowering the assessment.

Had such an assessment as that introduced by Hyder and Tippoo existed in ancient times, Canara would long ago have been converted into a desert. In a country so rocky and uneven, where cattle are not only scarce, but even where they are to be had, cannot always be employed; where every spot, before it can be cultivated, must be levelled with great labour, by the hand of man; the expense of the first preparation of waste ground must have been so great that it never could have been attempted, unless the assessment had been extremely moderate; and even after land has been brought into cultivation, if it is neglected for a few years, it is soon broke up by deep gullies formed by the torrents which fall during the monsoon.

Not only these reasons, therefore, but the most positive evidence of accounts, clearly demonstrate that the fourth of the gross produce, said to have been taken as the circuit share in the Byjnager assessment, was fully as much as was paid by the ryots under that government; for, under the addition made to it by the Belnore family in 1618, of

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50 per cent. besides many smaller additions, making about 20 per cent. more; it appears to have been little felt by the inhabitants. Indeed it appears that the circar share was reckoned higher than it ought to have been, by adopting the shaster rule of the seed, girdling 12 to 1, as the basis of cultivation; for an ancient estimate of produce, and the expenses of cultivation drawn up at the time of the original assessment, makes the circar's share only one-sixth, which was probably nearer the truth than one fourth. Whatever proportion it might have borne to the gross produce in 1762, at the time of the conquest of Canara by Hyder, it still seems to have been sufficiently moderate to have enabled the country, if not to extend cultivation, at least to preserve it in the same flourishing state in which it had been, in earlier times. Where districts were in a state of decline, it was not caused by the land-rent, but had been the consequence of the diminution of their population, during the frequent revolts of their numerous petty poligars, or it has been occasioned by temporary acts of oppression; for the rajahs of Bednore, though they adhered to the principle of a fixed land-rent, frequently permitted their favourites and dependants, when placed in the management of districts, to ruin many of the principal inhabitants, by the exaction of exorbitant fines under various pretences.

From these and other causes, there were in many parts of the country, tracts of waste land which paid no rent, and which could not be sold, at the rate of from one to eight or ten years purchase of the circar rent. I have met with some instances, in which particular fields had been sold as high as twenty-five and thirty years. Under the Bednore rulers, therefore, those outstanding balances which have since been so common in Canara, were almost unknown. It was thought necessary to keep annual details of the state of cultivation.

It was never enquired what portion of his estates a landlord cultivated, or left waste. It was expected, that in whatever state they were, he was to pay the whole rent. When he failed, however, as was sometimes the case, it was not usual, even where it could be done, to sell the whole or a part of his land, to make good the deficiency. This was looked upon, as a harsh measure, and was seldom resorted to. The usual custom was to grant him time; to assist him with a loan of money, or to remit the debt altogether. The village or district was scarcely ever assessed, for individual failures. On the whole, the revenue was then easily realized, and when there were at times outstanding balances, they seem to have been produced, rather from mismanagement than from the operation of the land-rent.

Canara has, however, now completely fallen from this state of prosperity. The evils which have been continually accumulating upon it, since it became a province of Mysore, have destroyed a great part of its former population; and rendered its remaining inhabitants as poor, as those of the neighbouring countries. Its lands which are now saleable are reduced to a very small portion, and lie chiefly between the Cundapoor and Chundergherry rivers, and within five or six miles of the sea.

It is not to be supposed that the whole of this tract, can be sold; but only that saleable lands are scattered throughout every part of it, thinner in some places, and thicker in others; particularly in the Mangalore district. There is scarcely any saleable land, even on the sea coast, any where to the northward of Cundapoor, or any where inland, from one end of Canara to the other; excepting on the banks of the Mangalore, and some of the other great rivers. In the vicinity of the Ghauts, the lands are not only unsaleable, but the greatest part of them, is waste and overgrown with wood. It is reckoned that the population of the country has been diminished one third within the last forty years; and there can be little doubt but that its property has suffered, a much greater reduction. Gusaiah, Ankalah, and Cundapoor, formerly flourishing places, contain now only a few beggarly inhabitants. Honawer, once the second town in trade after Mangalore, has not a single house; and Mangalore itself, is greatly decayed.

It may be said that this change has been brought about, by the invasion of Hyder; by the four wars which have happened since that event; by Tippoo himself destroying many of the principal towns upon the coast, and forcing their inhabitants to remove to Jumalabad, and other unhealthy situations near the hills; by his seizing in one night, all the Christian men, women and children, amounting to above sixty thousand, and sending them into captivity to Mysore, from whence one tenth of them never returned; by the prohibition of foreign trade, and by the general corruption and disorder of his government in all its departments. These circumstances, certainly accelerated the change; but taken altogether, they probably did not contribute to it so much, as the extraordinary augmentation of the land-rent.

A moderate land-rent carries in itself, such an active principle of prosperity, that it enables a country to resist for a long time, all the evils attending bad government, and also to recover quickly from the calamities of war. When it is fixed, and light, the farmer sees that he will reap the reward of his own industry. The cheerful prospect of improving his situation, animates his labours, and enables him to replace, in a short time, the losses he may have sustained from adverse seasons, the devastations of war, and other accidents. But when oppression is added to all the other mischiefs of a tyrannical government, the country, however flourishing it may ever have been, must sink under them at last; and must hasten to ruin, at a more rapid rate, every succeeding year.

Hyder ruined Canara, a highly improved country, filled with industrious inhabitants enjoying a greater proportion of the produce of the soil, and being more comfortable than those of any province, under any native power in India: but instead of observing the wise and temperate conduct which would have secured to it, the enjoyment of these advantages, he

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regarded it as a fund from which he might draw, without limit, for the expenses of his military operations in other quarters. The whole course of the administration of his deputies seems to have been nothing but a series of experiments, made for the purpose of discovering the utmost extent to which the land-rent could be carried, or how much it was possible to extract from the former, without diminishing cultivation. The savings, accumulated in better times, enabled the country to support, for some years, the pressure of continually increasing demands: but they would not do so for ever. Failing, and out-standing balances, became frequent before his death.

The same demands, and worse management, increased them in the beginning of Tippoo's reign. He was determined to relinquish no part of his father's revenue. He knew no way of making up for failures, but by compelling one part of the ryots to pay for the deficiencies of the other. He made them pay, not only for those which arose upon the cultivation of the current year, but also for those which arose from the waste lands of dead and deserted ryots, which were annually increasing. Severity, and a certain degree of vigilance and control, in the early part of his government, kept the collections for some time, nearly at their former standard: but it was impossible that they could remain so, long; for the amount of land left unoccupied from the flight or death of its cultivators, became at last so great, that it could not be discharged by the remaining part of the inhabitants; and the collections, before the end of his reign, fell short of the assessment from 10 to 60 per cent. The measure which he adopted for preserving his revenue, was that which most effectually destroyed it. He forced the ryots, who were present, to cultivate the lands of the dead and absent: but as the increased rent of their own lands required all their care and labour, by turning a part of it to these new lands, the produce of their own, was diminished, and they became incapable of paying the rent of either.

The effect of this violent regulation was, to hasten the extinction of the class of ancient proprietors or landlords: for many who might still have contrived to have held that rank, had they been permitted to confine their stock to the cultivation of their own lands; when they were obliged to employ it, in the cultivation of those of other people; and when the consequent decrease of the produce, left no surplus, after paying the rent of government, sunk to the state of labourers. Nothing can more strongly indicate the poverty of a country, than when its lands, so far from being saleable, must be forced upon the cultivators: but this practice prevails more or less throughout Canara, and is very general every where, to the northward of Cundapoor.

As far as can be gathered from traditions and accounts, it appears that in the fourteenth century, at the time when the Reka or Bijnugger standard rent was paid, the whole of the lands were parcelled out among a prodigious number of landholders paying annual rents, in various gradations, from 5 to 5,000 pagodas. Great estates, however, were not common; and the average was nearer 50 pagodas than any other sum. The demand of the circar was fixed for two centuries and a half, under the Bijnugger government, and may be said to have been fixed under the Bednore rajahs also, during more than a century; for in all that period, the fixed additions to it, hardly amounted to 10 per cent.

The price of land, it has been already observed, was low; but this low nature ought not to be ascribed entirely to the assessment. Some of it, may fairly be laid to the charge of other causes; to the danger of being suspected of being rich, which hindered so much money going to the improvement of land, and so much from being paid for it, as would otherwise have been done; to the total want of manufactures for the internal consumption of grain, from which the revenue chiefly arose; to the difficulty and expense of transporting so bulky a commodity by land, depriving it of the market of the countries above the Ghauts; and to the want of a naval force to protect the coast against pirates, and to secure, at all times, a free export for the surplus produce by sea. But though the price was low, the property itself was guarded by several equitable and humane laws, or rather customs, originating in precautions which mankind naturally take to transmit their possessions to their descendants.

The alienation of land, by sale or otherwise, was unrestrained. Nothing but gift, or sale, or non-payment of rent, could take it from the owner. If he absconded with balances standing against him, it was transferred to another person; but if he or his heir returned, at ever so distant a period, it was restored, on either of them paying a reasonable compensation for the balance, and such extra expenses as might have been incurred on account of improvements. No crime in the proprietor, could extinguish the right of the heir to the succession. Where proprietors, holding directly of the circar, died without heir, their estates reverted to the circar, which gave them away to a new set of owners, on receiving one, two, or more years rent, as a nuzzeranah, according to the condition in which the lands might have been at the time. It does not appear that the landlords were, by their tenures, bound to the performance of personal service, or any other condition, beyond the simple one of discharging the public rent; and even this, was not always rigorously exacted. Though the estates held immediately of government were so small, that the rent of each did not exceed 50 pagodas, yet the proprietors had under them an infinite number of lesser proprietors, holding their lands of them, with all the same proprietary rights as they held their own, of government. It was usual for the original proprietors to rent, either for a term of years, or for ever, such a portion of their lands as was sufficient to discharge the whole of their public rent, and to keep the rest in their own hands. The tenants for ever, became a second class of proprietors, whom nothing could deprive of their right of possession, unless their own act, of gift or sale. On failure of heirs, their lands reverted to the original superior landlord; but a reversion of the estate of the superior landlord to the circar did not, if that of the interior could be found.

As all land was private property, no man would occupy or cultivate waste, until he had obtained a pottah, either to secure him in the possession, or if turned out, to indemnify him for his expenses; because he was liable, if he neglected this precaution, to be turned out at any time by the owner, without compensation. When a proprietor alienated land for a certain rent for ever, he either received a price for it, or received none, or paid a sum of money to the person to whom the land was transferred. Which of these modes was adopted, depended on the circumstances of the parties, and the nature of the land; but in each of these cases, the tenure was the same, and the tenant was called, tenant by purchase.

When the circar disposed of lands which had reverted to it by failure of heirs, it followed the practice of individuals. It sold them almost always by a nuzzeraah. It sometimes gave them gratis, but it never paid money, and seldom or ever advanced tucavvy to the tenant or owner. The reason why individuals rarely received, and why the circar almost always received, a price for land, is sufficiently obvious. Individuals, in transferring or alienating one part of their estates, always endeavour to do it, at the very highest rent that could be got, in order to free the other, if possible, from taxation. But as the circar took no such advantage, it gave the whole or any portion of the estate, for the whole or for a quota of the standard rent. As all alienations of land in perpetuity were said to be by sale, all proprietors, therefore, while the Bednore government lasted, were said to hold their lands either by purchase, or by immemorial prescription.

The lands of Canara are still to be considered as held under the same conditions, and governed by the same rules of transfer, as they were under the ancient government. The increase of assessment by Hyder and Tippoo Sultaun, has, in some places, annihilated the old proprietors; and it has every where diminished the quantity, but not altered the nature of the property. What remains is still as much cherished, and the title to it, as obstinately contested, as it ever was perhaps at any former period. The landlords, who once lived chiefly on their rents, have now hardly any rent at all. Few of them, have sufficient to constitute, of itself, the fund of their subsistence. Many of them, procure a part or the whole of their subsistence, by the management of farms, or even by acting as labourers. The destruction of a part of the property by the heavy demands of the circar, seems rather to have increased than impaired the attachment of the proprietor to the remainder. He never quits the estate of his ancestors, while he can live upon it, as a farmer or a labourer; but if after paying the circar rent, and what is due to himself for his labour, there remains the most trifling surplus, he will almost as soon part with his life, as with his estate. Disputes concerning land, where the property frequently does not amount to ten pagodas, are often carried before every successive amildar for twenty years.

The only land in Canara that can, in any way, come under the description of circar lands, is unclaimed waste; to a great deal of which, it is very likely claimants would appear were it once brought into cultivation. There are also some uncultivated lands, particularly in the Northern districts, which may be reckoned public. There are lands which were originally unproductive, and which from the death or absence of their owners, would have been allowed to run waste, had they not been contiguous to more productive lands, whose owners it was supposed were able, and were therefore compelled, to cultivate them. But exclusive of this land, cultivated by compulsion, and unclaimed waste, all other is private property.

STATEMENT of the LAND RENT of CANARA and Soondair, showing all the changes it has undergone from the year 1660 to the current year 1799-1800, or Fusly 1209; (inclosed in principal Collector's Report of 31st May 1800.)

<b>Rajah of BEDNORE:</b>		
Reka, or standard rent of the 17 districts for A. D. 1660 -	5,80,759 22 15	
Deductions:—Enaams - - - - -	1,43,866 12 20	
Deficiencies of reka or standard rent - - - - -	1,23,194 16 78	
Waste lands - - - - -	58,561 28 14	
Tunkhas to peons - - - - -	8,513 22 51	
	3,34,136 8 3	
Shist, or balance of standard rent, after deductions	- - - - -	2,46,623 14 12
<b>Additions to the standard rent:</b>		
Pugdi, or extra assessment of 1711 - - - - -	11,021 19 1	
Putti, or extra assessment of 1718 - - - - -	8,448 35 39	
Chucker, or extra assessment of 1720 - - - - -	5,064 19 4	
Duśwanah, or enaams to chutters, A. D. 1723 - - - - -	408 30 69	
Nisht, or extra assessment for deficiencies of rent from 1740 - - - - -	940 8 60	
Miscellaneous additions 1740 - - - - -	1,159 35 38	
Total additions by the Rajah - - - - -	- - - - -	27,043 31 51

(continued)

Extracts of Reports respecting Land Tenures and Assessments, in Canara.

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Extract of Reports respecting Land Tenure and Assessments, in Canara.

Historical Abstract Statement of the Land Rent in Canara and Goondah.

### Ranny of BEDNORE:

#### Additions by the Ranny:

Putti, or extra assessment of 1758	- - - -	26,988	33	16
Nisht, or assessment for deficiencies of rent from 1741 to 1763	- - - - - }	8,941	8	79
Miscellaneous additions	- - - - -	4,400	24	54
Total additions by the Ranny	- - - - -	-	-	-
				40,330 30 69
Total balances of standard rent or shist, and additions	- - - -	-	-	-
				3,14,007 4 52
Village taxes	- - - - -	-	-	-
				6,820 — 21
TOTAL Land Rent and Village Taxes, at the end of the Ranny's government	- - - - - }	-	-	-
				3,20,827 4 79

### HYDER ALLY:

#### Additions by Hyder Ally:

##### Extra assessments of land rent:

For loss in standard rent, 1764	- - - -	62,851	27	25
Nugger extra assessment, 1782	- - - -	34,330	21	27
By amildars	- - - -	10,337	21	48
Sanderward	- - - -	1,701	14	52
Miscellaneous	- - - -	12,140	21	67
Total extra assessment	- - - -	1,21,361	34	59

#### New heads of Revenue:

Cultivation of ancient waste	- - - -	3,330	9	22
Enaums resumed - 1764	- - - -	83,392	17	63
Shambogue's rissooms 1766	- - - -	568	31	51
Profit on paddy - 1766	- - - -	2,394	23	52
Sale of prostitutes - 1766	- - - -	739	6	55
Treasury bonds - 1774	- - - -	578	10	24
Miscellaneous - 1782	- - - -	5,840	17	57

TOTAL of new heads of revenue - - - - 96,844 9 4

TOTAL extra assessment, and new heads of revenue 2,18,206 7 63

Village taxes - - - - 2,450 31 9

TOTAL additions by Hyder - - - - 2,20,657 2 72

TOTAL assessment of the Ranny and Hyder - - - - 5,41,484 7 65

#### Deductions by Hyder:

Waste lands	- - - -	7,987	30	48
Enaums restored	- - - -	294	9	—
TOTAL deductions by Hyder	- - - -	8,282	3	48

#### Division of Hyder's assessment:

Shist, or standard land-rent of Bednore	- - - -	3,27,159	7	62
Extra assessment	- - - -	1,86,053	10	69
New heads of revenue	- - - -	10,718	26	17
TOTAL land-rent	- - - -	5,23,931	8	68
Village taxes	- - - -	8,270	31	29

TOTAL assessment under Hyder - - - - 5,33,202 4 17

Extracts of Reports re-  
specting Land Tenures  
and Assessments in  
Canara.

Historical Abstract  
Statement of the Land-  
rent in Canara and  
Soondah.

## TIPPOO SULTAUN:

## Additions by Tippoo Sultaun:

## Extra assessment of the land rent:

Nugger assessment	-	-	-	-	-	9,827	21	21
Annildar's assessment	-	-	-	-	-	1,934	27	--
Sanderward	-	-	-	-	-	7,934	31	5
Miscellaneous	-	-	-	-	-	4,204	11	8

TOTAL extra assessments - - - - - 23,9018 21 40

## New heads of revenue:

Cultivation of waste	-	-	-	231	5	31
Enaums resumed	-	-	-	33,671	7	57
Shambogue's resumed	-	-	-	10,145	18	52
Profit on paddy	-	-	-	6,262	1	64
Sale of prostitutes	-	-	-	167	10	42
Treasury bonds	-	-	-	9	5	11
Miscellaneous	-	-	-	3,493	14	54

TOTAL new heads of revenue - - - - - 57,979 27 71

TOTAL extra assessment and new heads of revenue 80,881 10 31

Addition ordered but never collected - 2,52,589 22 76

TOTAL additions to land rent collected, and not collected - - - - - 3,33,470 33 27

Village taxes - - - - - 4,605 32 32

TOTAL addition by Tippoo - - - - - 3,38,076 29 59

TOTAL assessment under Tippoo - - - - - 8,71,278 33 76

## Deduction:

From land rent in 1788 - - - - - 2,600 8 60

TOTAL of Tippoo's assessment, after deductions of 1788 - - - 8,68,678 25 16

TOTAL balance of Tippoo's assessment, after deducting addition never collected - - - - - 6,16,089 2 24

## Division of Tippoo's actual assessment:

Standard rent or shist	-	-	-	-	-	3,59,732	22	35
Extra assessment	-	-	-	-	-	2,08,056	11	30
New heads of revenue	-	-	-	-	-	35,503	2	54
Total land rent	-	-	-	-	-	6,02,212	10	39
Village taxes	-	-	-	-	-	13,876	27	61

## Division of Tippoo's assessment in money and kind:

Money rents	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,47,888	30	3
Rice in kind	-	-	-	-	-	58,616	6	56	-	-	-
Pepper d°	-	-	-	-	-	9,084	18	--	-	-	-
Oil, &c. d°	-	-	-	-	-	499	19	41	-	-	-
TOTAL rents in kind	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68,200	8	17

## Settlement of Current Year 1209 or 1799-1800:

Deductions from Tippoo's assessment on account of waste lands, &c. - - - 1,50,940 4 36

Division of the assessment of the current year - - - - - 2,84,604 28 45

Extra assessment by the rajah of Bednore - - - - - 21,425 33 11

Extra assessment by the ranny of Bednore - - - - - 33,252 22 32

Extra assessment by Hyder - - - - - 8,462 18 4

Extra assessment by Tippoo - - - - - 15,317 28 63

TOTAL extra assessment - - - - - 1,53,458 30 30

— New heads of revenue - - - - - 16,580 -- 67

TOTAL land rent - - - - - 4,54,643 23 62

Village taxes - - - - - 10,505 10 2

TOTAL current year's assessment - - - - - 4,65,148 33 64

Extracts from REPORT of principal Collector of CANARA;—dated 9<sup>th</sup> November 1800.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Land Te-  
nures and Assessments  
in Canara.

Extracts from Report  
of Principal Collector  
of Canara,  
9 Nov. 1800.

MANY circumstances have occurred, within these few months, to induce me to judge more favourably than I formerly did, of the condition of the inhabitants of Canara; but none has so much attracted my attention, as their numberless disputes about Landed Property. In the Barahmahl, a dispute about land scarcely came before me, once in six months. In this country, every other cause of litigation or complaint seems to be lost, in that of Land. It alone produces more than nineteen in twenty, of all the complaints that I hear. The accumulated suits of half a century, appear to have broken loose at once: and every moment that I can spare from my ordinary business, has been given to the hearing of them; without having sensibly reduced their number. They formed a principal branch of the emoluments of the circar servants, not only under the Mysore, but also under the Bednore government; for it was the practice of almost every amildar to receive money, to set aside the decisions of his predecessors; which accounts for such a multitude, still remaining unsettled. Both, these claims of long standing, and new ones which arise every day, evince that land, notwithstanding all the subsequent additions to the shist, is still considered as a very valuable property. Claims come chiefly, as may be supposed, from the most flourishing districts: and the proportions that come from different districts, may be reckoned a tolerable good criterion for estimating their comparative state of wealth or poverty. We may be sure that where lands are so much the object of contention, that there is no danger of their being unable to discharge the public rent; for men would hardly lose their time, and spend their money, for the sake of acquiring that which was not worth the holding, or which might involve them in loss. Were all estates in Canara worth disputing for, I should not think any absolute necessity existed for reducing any part of the assessment. There is no part of Canara where the ryots of themselves throw up their old lands and occupy new. But there are parts, where though a man will not quit his land, yet when he has been dispossessed by force or intrigue, he does think the object sufficiently important for him, to pay any thing for its recovery; but in by far the greatest part of Canara, the right to land is so obstinately contested, that a man, however just his title may be, is rarely permitted to succeed to his estate, without encountering the opposition of some rival or other, who endeavours to invalidate his claim, and to set up one of his own, supported by false witnesses or forged deeds, which are very common in this country.

The relative degrees of value attached by the natives themselves to land in different parts of the province, could we exactly ascertain it, combined in some degree, with a retrospect to the shist and collections of former times, would afford the best standard for determining the proportions of the assessment which ought to be reduced.

It is scarcely possible to ascertain the produce or value of land from the owners or cultivators. Long experience has taught them, that concealment is their best defence against new exactions; and all of them, however simple in other respects, are continually on their guard, against any questions that tend to lead to any disclosure of their circumstances. A careful survey would, however, yield us a great deal of useful information, which cannot be drawn from them; for by learning the rents paid by tenants to the landlords, and comparing the lands of the tenants to the whole lands of the estate, a tolerably good guess might be made of the net income of the landlords. A survey, however, cannot be made, without a heavy expense, and there is no other mode of acquiring so much knowledge of the state of the country. Next to a survey, the best way of gaining this knowledge would be, by keeping a register for some years, of the rent and produce of all lands that become the subject of litigation. There is always something or other on such occasions, which induces one of the parties to bring forward a statement of the produce. As there is, therefore, no difficulty in discovering it, and as these disputes are so very frequent; a great number of examples might soon be collected from each district; and the average produce of these lands, might be taken as that of the whole district; or, at least, it would not be far from it, after deducting circar lands, which, from not having an owner, are but poorly cultivated.

I have endeavoured, by every means in my power, to ascertain, from such circumstances as have come within my observation, what are the relative proportions of the produce, after deducting all expenses of cultivation, that go to the circar and to the landlord. The evidence of the tenants, were it not most commonly false, would at once determine the point; because all rents of tenants to landlords in Canara are paid either in money or a certain fixed quantity of grain, and never by a share of the crop, or what is called warum. In taking the reports of the landlords themselves, the lowest that any of them have reckoned their average share of the net produce to a district or maganie, is 15 per cent. and the highest 40 per cent. Though I imagine that the highest of the extremes are too low, yet the admission of either of them, on their part, is more than could have been expected; for it proves indcontestably the existence of a land rent. The reply of the farmers of the Barahmahl to similar queries, was always, that there was no rent, and seldom any profit, or any thing beyond the mere wages of their labour. In both cases, they represented their situation as much worse, than it really was. According to their own statements, however, there is a wide difference between the condition of the farmer of the Barahmahl, and that of the landlords of Canara.

Among the numerous causes respecting land which have come before me, the landlord's rent was much oftener above than below 50 per cent. of the net produce. In many instances, it was 60, 70, and 80 per cent. The most productive lands, it may be said, are the most liable to become the subject of litigation, and cannot therefore be taken, as a standard for the average of the whole. It does not appear to me, however, that they ought to be re-  
garded

Extracts from Reports  
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nures and Assessments  
in Canara.

Extracts from Report  
of the Principal Col-  
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garded as a selection, or that they might not form a fair average; for they comprehended every description of land, those of the poorest as well as those of the most substantial landlords. A cause in which most of the native Christian proprietors were concerned, has furnished me with a great number of examples, the result of which is still more in favour of the landlords. In 1784, when they were carried into captivity by Tippoo, their lands were confiscated, and either given away or sold to men of other casts, for a price far below their value. They have now claimed their restoration; and in order to determine what the present holders may be entitled to, as a compensation for purchase money, improvements, &c.; a statement, No. 1, has been drawn up by the parties themselves; and as both have agreed to abide by it, there can be no doubt of its being perfectly correct. The only difference is about the price of the rice, the one party reckoning the average three moras to the pagoda, and the other four. The Hindoos assert that the Christians are the most industrious of all casts, and that therefore they have more rent than any other. The Christians deny this, and say that they have got the name of being industrious, from selling vegetables in Mangalore, and engaging in various occupations; but that the Hindoo landlords, from confining themselves entirely to the cultivation of their lands, render them fully as productive as theirs are; that the Hindoos, though they have more bad land, have also more good, and that the average rent of Hindoo landlords is not, in any one of the five districts contained in the statement, so low as fifty per cent. of the net produce. It was my intention to have procured from every Christian landlord, an account of the produce of every estate which bordered on his own. This would have probably furnished me with the detail of a thousand estates, the average of which might, without any material error, have been taken as that of the districts to which they respectively belonged; but as my removal has prevented me from obtaining this account, I can only attempt to draw a conclusion from such circumstances, tending to throw a light on this subject, as I have hitherto had an opportunity of noticing. From comparing them all, I am inclined to believe that the average rent of landlords is about fifty per cent. of the net produce, in all the districts below the Ghauts, except Mulki, Cundapoor, and Bekul, where it may be from thirty to forty, and Ankalah and part of Honawer, where it is somewhat less.

Any thing like equality of assessment or of produce, can hardly be supposed to exist throughout so extensive a tract of country. The clear rent is in many instances, as low as 15 per cent.; and in many, as high as 80 per cent. of the net produce. The disparities are oftener owing to the different proportions of labour bestowed on the land, than to those of the assessment. Many of those estates which now yield the smallest proportions of rent, were formerly among the most productive. They have fallen into decay from the exactions of nuzzeranahs for the Circar, of fines for pretended or trifling offences, and of presents for an endless succession of asophs and aumildars; from the arbitrary and uncertain amount of the different kists; from their frequent anticipations, by which petty land-holders were often compelled to sell or mortgage their estates for the payment of revenue before it was due: from such anticipations being often directed beyond the general rate, against particular landlords, in order to compel them to sell their estates to persons who had bribed the aumildars for this purpose; and above all, from the gratuitous services required every year by the Circar. The numerous forts in Canara have each a strong shed running the whole length of the rampart, in order to cover the troops from the weather. These sheds, and all other public buildings, besides the houses of all public servants, having been annually repaired before the setting in of the monsoon, demanded a vast number of labourers, as did likewise the felling of trees among the hills, and transporting them to the beach, for the use of the marine establishment. All these services, were performed by country labourers; and as the more substantial land-holders had usually sufficient influence to get their own exempted, the weight fell wholly upon the lower class, who were often deprived of the assistance of their servants, at the time they stood in the greatest need of them, for the cultivation of their lands.

As the income of the landlord was affected by these and other temporary causes, the removal of them, will enable it to rise gradually to its former standard; and it is not therefore so necessary that the reduction of the assessment should be regulated by the present state of income, as by the consideration of what it is likely to be in a few years, when the country shall have recovered from the effects of those disorders.

Whether the conclusions I have formed respecting the proportions of income, are just or not, there is one thing certain, that whatever they may be, they do not impede in any way the realization of the revenue; for it has been paid, with a readiness of which I have seen no example. Where balances have appeared in my accounts to stand against particular districts, it was not owing to any failure on the part of the inhabitants, but to the late disturbances, having hindered the revenue servants from carrying on the collections, or remitting what had been collected to the treasury. The regularity of payments is the more remarkable, when it is considered that I have anticipated at least three months, what the period of the kists has been, during the last forty years: for the inhabitants opposed so strongly every increase of land-rent, that no part of the additions, either of the Rannec, or of Hyder and Tippoo, ever were paid with the old rent, within the year; but the whole was collected separately, in the first three months of the ensuing Fusly. They now make no difficulty in paying both the old rent and additions, before the end of June; not because they are more able than formerly, but because they believe that their readiness in discharging their rents, will not, under the company's government, be regarded as a proof of wealth, or as an argument for laying new impositions upon them.—I am positive not only that the alterations of their kists, has produced no distress; but that their circumstances are improving.—I know it, from having few complaints concerning rent, and more directly, from their own acknowledgment, which ryots very seldom make. I see it, in their cultivating waste lands, and in their taking as pri-  
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Extracts from Reports  
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of Principal Collector  
of Canara,  
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vate property, lands which have long been cultivated, on account of the cirar. These are lands, which, from having no owners, had been neglected, and which, as the produce had of course decreased, had usually been given at a reduced rent, to different people, for one or more years. The temporary holder could not obtain the proprietary right, without paying a sum of money, which he was unwilling to do: and he could not venture to improve, lest he should be dispossessed in favour of a stranger. As he could gain little, so, on the other hand, he could not lose much; because remissions were granted, on account of bad crops, which was never allowed, in cases where land was private property. When a man agrees to become a proprietor of cirar land, he shows, at the same time, a confidence both in the forbearance of government, and in his own means of improvement, because, by the custom of the country, whatever may happen, he has from this moment, no claim to remission. In the district of Cundapoor, cirar lands which paid a rent last year of star pagodas 3,071. 15. 8. have this year, been given away in proprietary right, at an annual rent of star pagodas 3,329. 32. 62.; and I have no doubt that all cirar lands now in cultivation, may, in the course of two or three years, be disposed of, in the same manner. The facility of collection, and the growing confidence of the landholders, convince me that the settlement of 1209 (1799-1800) might always be collected without a balance, and that no abatement whatever is necessary to secure it from failure. But if we aim not merely at the obtaining of a certain sum as revenue, but also at giving a new spirit to agriculture, and raising the country to a pitch of prosperity, beyond what it has ever been in former times, the present assessment must be lowered. Were I certain that in the course of a few years the country would so far recover from the shocks it sustained under the late government, that one half the net produce or landlord's rent would be equivalent to the public revenue, I would propose no reduction, because, from observing the condition of those landlords whom I positively know to be in the possession of half the net produce, and from many conversations with them, I am satisfied that it is fully adequate to every end, not only of present realization, but of future improvement; and that a country moderately improved, the basis of whose assessment should be one-half of the net produce, would, if protected from all other demands, soon pay with one-third, what it had before paid with one-half.

In estimating the rates of reduction, I have thought that many other points were entitled to as much attention as the reka or shist, because I suppose the reka itself to have originally been, like all other assessments, extremely unequal, and that this inequality has been increased, in particular districts, by the falsification of accounts. It however deserves consideration, as showing what the land-rent formerly has been, as forming a standard to which it may possibly, at some future period, be raised again, and as being regarded by the inhabitants, as the only proper foundation of assessment. But, after the many changes that have been wrought by time, it can no longer be implicitly followed as a guide. It is safer to be directed by the present condition of the inhabitants, and of the revenue, with a retrospect to what it has been, for the last twenty years. No guide is so sure as collection. By observing how the land-holders feel under it, many discoveries are made that never would have been suggested by accounts, and which, though they cannot be easily explained by figures, the manager on the spot perceives, have wasted the resources of agriculture, and must have a principal place in his calculation of a permanent revenue.

The only reductions I have made for the present year, are by lowering the land rent  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. and the export customs on rice to 2 bahadry pagodas per corgé, and abolishing the inland duties on grain, cattle, sheep, &c. These are all that are required to serve the end of affording some immediate relief. The remaining reductions of customs may be deferred till the Madras custom regulations are introduced; and of the land rent, till the permanent system is established.

There will be an increase of about 3,000 pagodas to the land rent, from the cultivation of waste, which will diminish in part the reduction of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

My chief reason for remitting the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. was to convince the landlords that demand is limited; and thereby to encourage them to exert their whole means in improving their estates to the utmost, without any fear of a new assessment. Any further reduction of the export duties on rice, is perhaps unnecessary. It is the only channel through which a compensation can be received, for the loss of land-rent; and through which, revenue may rise, in some degree, as the country flourishes: for there is no solid ground to suppose that consumption of luxuries, or even of conveniences, will ever yield much revenue in India.

Both the reduction of customs and of land-rent, will eventually benefit the landlord; but they will act, in different ways. A reduction of land-rent will operate, both more directly and more equally, in giving vigour to agriculture, and relieving the poorer class of landlords, than any reduction of customs could do, because they receive the benefit of it immediately, without waiting for the sale of their grain. In this case, too, the benefit is extended equally, in the same proportion to the rich and the poor. But the reduction of the customs is more in favour of the rich than of the poor, because the rich proprietor can always raise a greater quantity of produce on the same extent of land, or in proportion to his rent, than the poor one possibly can do.

Extracts of Report from Collector of NORTHERN DIVISION of CANARA; dated  
1st May 1801.

In appropriating the reduction, I have allowed Ankalah the greatest share, because the poverty of its cultivators, and the inferiority of cultivation, compared with Cundapoor or even Honawer, is very conspicuous; and the want of enclosures, so common over all the other parts of Canara, strongly mark its proportion of cirar land to private land. Nothing shows the poverty of its cultivators more, than by the number who pay warum for their

Extracts from Reports  
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tures and Assessments  
in Canara.

Extracts of Report of  
Collector of Northern  
Division of Canara,  
1st July 1801.

lands, and by their frequently changing their residence. Owing to the last circumstance, I found some difficulty in procuring renters for villages to become responsible for a money rent, because the cultivation in many villages has hitherto never been the same for two years together. Ankalah certainly possesses a great portion of waste lands, both of that which has been cultivated formerly, and of that which might be brought into cultivation. The latter description, however, appears to me to be of that nature that would require more than ordinary labour and expense to bring it into cultivation. It lies principally at the foot of the hills, which in Ankalah, and a great part of Honawer, do not terminate so abruptly as in the more southerly districts, but spread themselves more out of the bottom. Whilst in that district, I endeavoured to encourage the conversion of circar cultivated lands into private property, rather than the increase of cultivation; for which purpose, at every assembly of ryots, I had the terms fully explained to them, on which they should have their lands as private property, and furnished every shambogue with copies of cowlas adapted to their respective managias.

Though no circar land has been converted into private property, but in Cundapoor, I am hopeful to find many candidates in Ankalah next year, from the pains I took to explain the advantages they would derive from it. I thought this encouragement the more necessary, from observing that the idea of private property in land, did not seem to be regarded by the ryots of that district, with that estimation so common over the rest of Canara. This may have proceeded from the incursions which Ankalah has long been subject to, having tended to destroy all security in land. Major Munro recommends that the conversion of circar into private lands, be not urged on too fast, because the great reduction of the customs, and the security of the company's government, will tend speedily to raise the value of land, and bring forward more candidates, and higher offers, every year. This observation will apply better to the southern than the northern division, because there is so much waste in the latter, that there is little danger of its becoming converted too soon into private property.

The heads of increase exhibited in the different balances of the accompanying statement, requires, I believe, no explanation. I wished to have procured the number of ryots in 1209 (1799—1800), but as Major Munro had no time to assemble them, no list was obtained. However, by the reports of the curnams, the number of people paying rent to the circar in 1210 (1800-1) are fewer than in 1209. This is not owing to the diminution of the actual number of cultivators, but is caused by the opulence of many landholders taking lands under their own names this year, that were held by their tenants, the year before. I consider this as a proof of the increasing prosperity of the country, and of the ease with which a permanent settlement may be effected in Canara, from the having so many substantial people as security for its revenue, when the country shall come to be divided into estates. As the point to which the property in Canara is verging, may have an important effect, at the period when the permanent settlement is about to be introduced, I shall notice every year the alterations that may occur among the number of ryots. This partial opulence, as it may be termed, of the great landlords, can make no difference to the poorer class, so long as they have it in their option to hold their lands immediately of the circar or of a landlord; and it is evident, by their preferring the latter mode, that it must be the most advantageous to them.

Honawer and Cundapoor are both improving; the decrease in the land-rent of the former is already accounted for. I have not a doubt but the land-rent will rise, in every district, annually, by an increase of cultivation, because exportation being so much encouraged, by the reduction of the duties upon rice, more of that article will be cultivated and exported. I could perceive, as I went through the country, many little symptoms of improvement, which were not begun the year before; and as the present settlement has been made with so much particularity, I am convinced that there can be but few, who have reason to complain of our assessment.

#### Extracts of Report from principal Collector of the CANARA; dated 1st July 1801.

By the statement, it appears that the landlords have very little rent to themselves in Barkoor, after discharging the revenue. Tumbuttoo is the most desolate and hilly district of Barkoor; and it is not unlikely that at the period when it lost the greater part of its population, the land-holders were forced, by the difficulty of procuring labourers, to rent the greatest part of their estates to under-tenants. But even admitting this to be true, it will hardly account for the very great number of these tenants, and there seems therefore to be reason to suspect, that the landlords may in several instances, have instructed their servants to call themselves tenants. Some parts of Korbail, Buntwail, and Karrup, are as thinly inhabited as Tumbuttoo. Their tenants are also pretty numerous; but they do not bear near so high a proportion to the landlords as in that Managie. In Mangalore, Kittel, and all the best cultivated districts, by much the greatest share of the land is in the hands of the landlords; and this, I imagine, is the case even in Barkoor, nearer the sea. I think it also probable that the *chalie guenies*, or tenants at will, have been called *mul guenies*, or tenants by purchase, that is, for ever, because the landlords may get some additional rent from the former, whenever there is a higher offer: but they can get none from the latter, because their rent can be raised only by government, which was seldom done, except at long intervals in former times, when an additional assessment was imposed after a new valuation.

All the land now in cultivation in Canara, and a great deal more, was cultivated many centuries ago. The stability of the tenants, even though at will, encouraged them to improve every



Extracts from Report  
respecting Land Tenures  
and Assessments  
in Canara.

Extract, from Report  
of Principal Collector  
of Canara, 1st July  
1801.

every field as much as they could. The rent fixed by the landlord, was calculated upon the produce of several years, while under his own management. These experiments have, in succeeding times, been often repeated; so that every field is now known, to the proprietor, generally, by written accounts, and always, by tradition, to be a field of so many moras produce. The landlord scarcely ever rents it below this rate, unless in particular situations, where the scarcity of labour leaves him no alternative; he has therefore no ground to look for any additional rent, from an increase of produce. He can only obtain, it, either by advancing money to the tenant, or giving him cowrie, to enable him to make a plantation of cocoa-nut, or some other kind of trees. He may, likewise, sometimes gain a trifling additional rent, by the tenant levelling a few spots on the side of a hill.

Besides the mul gueny, or tenant by purchase, there is, in some parts of Canara, and probably in Barkoor, another species of tenants for ever, called the *nair gueny*. The origin of this tenure, is, by some, derived from the tenants having held of the nairs, who were, in ancient times, masters of the country: but the more common opinion derives it from agricultural services, which gave the right of ploughing; the word *nair* signifying a plough: and, in this way, it corresponds, in some degree, to the description, which has sometimes been given of the soccage tenure. The *nair mul gueny*, as it is usually called, is both a more ancient and more secure tenure than the other, properly denominated *shud mul gueny*, or, tenure by simple purchase. In this last case, when the descent to heirs, is not particularly specified, there are instances of the landlords resuming the farm, on the death of the tenant; but he is never allowed to retain it, unless where he is supported by the revenue servants.

Extract from Report of Collector of SOUTHERN DIVISION of CANARA;  
dated 7th August 1801.

Extract from Report of  
Collector of Southern  
Division of Canara, 7th  
Aug. 1801.

In the Oloor village, there are some few *mul guenies*, or tenants by purchase, or gift, for ever, but by far the greater, and indeed, nearly the whole in that and the other four villages, I apprehend are *chuly guenies*, or tenants at will. It is often difficult to define, which is which. The landlords all declare they are *chuly guenies*, because they look forward to increasing their rents. The tenants again declare they are *mul guenies*, because their rents can be raised only by government. *Mul gueny* tenures have been created after, by purchase; in which case, a deed is always entered into by the parties, often from the landlord's friendship to his relations, and often in cases where tenants have offered to pay a higher rent for a *mul gueny* tenure. In the latter case, deeds are generally entered into, as also in the second, but oftener not. Under the late government, so many villanies were practised by, forcing title deeds from persons, that those having them, frequently buried them, or laid them by, in some place where time destroyed them. Those only who have deeds, or who can prove their tenure, should be admitted as *mul guenies*.

From every information I have been able to obtain, the number of *mul guenies* in Canara, is very small. Indeed, by a statement of the population of the country, I have lately made, the total number of that class is 4,886, of which there are only 219 in the Barkoor talook; while the number in the Bekkil talook, which comprizes a part of ancient Malabar, amounts to 4,436.

Extract from Report of Collector of SOUTHERN DIVISION of CANARA;  
dated 30th April 1804.

Canara is so particularly circumstanced, that a tolerable correct estimate of its gross produce, may be formed from its known population, consumption, and exportation. The first, we know from last year's accounts, on which I shall calculate; the second may be estimated pretty correctly by the first, and from a knowledge that the lowest class of people in the country, eat rice only; and the latter is accurately recorded.

By the revenue statement, last year, the population, in men, women, and children, was 396,672 resident inhabitants. The general average consumption, from the best informed people, is at least one *hany*, of 25 *sepes* weight, per diem per head; at which rate, the consumption per day, would be coorge 924.36, and per annum, 82,072.36. In consideration, however, of several thousand *Thannins* leaving the country for a few months every year, to go to the Tripetty pagoda, and other religious places of worship, — though the number coming from above the ghats to Woorp, Soobramany, and other pagodas in Canara, is also great; — yet wishing to be rather low in my calculation, I have taken the consumption of one-half of the inhabitants at a *hany* per day, and the remainder, at half a one; which reduces the before-mentioned quantity one-fourth, or to per diem 168 coorge 27 moras, or, per annum

Average exportation 1,000,000 moras	5,534 27
Seed, or per col. 2, in N <sup>o</sup> 1, and the quantity sown in 2d and 3d crops	3,523 34
Consumption for troops, followers, &c. at 3,000 heads, at one <i>hany</i> per day	11,438 —
	6,207 —

Total coorge - 88,723 19

This quantity is less than that before calculated on by the *shist*, by 1,370.21; more than which, I am confident, is consumed by the crews of the many hundred vessels, which touch at the different ports, in the course of the season, and many of which lay there for two and three months together.

Every person must, in a great measure, be guided, in calculations of this sort, by the best available accounts; but there are other circumstances, which the manager on the spot, and he only can judge, from what may justify him in forming a more correct idea of the resources

resources of a country, than any accounts can show. This has been my case, in the present instance; though obliged to calculate from the best accounts I could obtain, yet I knew, from general observation, and from a serious reflection on the actual state of things, that those accounts were considerably under-rated; and before examining my own idea with any other correspondent data, I calculated the accounts were deficient, in the rates mentioned in paragraph 10; the gross produce in rice, in col. 6, of N° 1, is - - - - - 60,522 9 31½  
To which, add 25 per cent. deficiency, that is, 17 in the quantity of seed sown, or land cultivated, and 8 in the produce per mora - - - - - 19,635 23 18½

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Land Tenures and Assessments  
in Canara.

Extract from Report of  
Collector of Southern  
Division of Canara,  
30th April 1824.

Total produce, with supposed deficiency - - - 80,177 33 7½  
less than the calculation of produce by the shist.—Consumption, &c. 1,416. 16. ½, equal to about 1 per cent. more. Inaccurate as all calculation of gross produce must be, even from an actual survey and valuation, yet, in comparing the supposed produce with the shist, in the first place, and then with the consumption of, and exportation from, the country, and finding each to correspond so nearly with the other, I feel a confidence in hazarding a belief, that it is thereby as nearly ascertained, as it would have been, supposing it to be so; and the value of the 80,177. 33. 7½, the estimated produce at the average rate of the ten talooks in col. 7, of N° 1, would amount to star pagodas 14,88,387. 6; at this rate, the gross circular land tax, including what is collected by enaumdars, would be equal to but 21 per cent. of the gross produce valuation, in rice only, and the ryots would have their garden produce besides.

Another circumstance, affording a correspondent proof of the truth of the conclusions I have drawn, is worthy of mention. Hurry Hur Roy's rekah on every 70 moras of paddy, was only 7½ moras, which was supposed to yield one pagoda, and at that rate, was only about 10 per cent. of the gross produce: allowing, therefore, the present land tax to be double the ancient shist, after all deductions from rekah, or to be star pagodas 2,48,489. 32. 76, this equals about 20 per cent. of what was then supposed the gross produce, and nearly correspondent with the per-centage in the foregoing paragraph;—the difference between this sum, and the land tax entered in col. 20, of N° 1, is star pagodas 64,105. 29. 24; this sum, however, is no addition whatever to the shist, but arises from the resumed enaum land-rent by Hyder and Tippoo, as also, from the malikdars that has lately been discovered. The enaums, it must be remembered, were included in the rekah, but deducted from the shist, on which I have made my calculations. Whatever credit may be due to the data here brought forward, we may rest satisfied, from the unequalled punctuality of its payment, from the few people under collection, from their generally improving state in their mode of dress and living; and, above all, from few, or no complaints, I may say, of the heaviness of assessment, that the present land rent is, generally, low enough to afford the inhabitants the means of making every needful improvement in the agricultural and general state of the country.

The advantages they have already received from the mild and liberal principles of the Company's government, would enable its landlords now to pay a tax with ease, which, under the violent restrictions and universal corruption of the last government, they could not do; rent, and the progress of improvement, though they may even increase in extent, frequently decrease in proportion to the produce of land.—Canara, for instance, from the uninterrupted security she now enjoys, from the possession of freedom and the security of property, could better afford to pay the accumulated assessment imposed during the late government, than she could, what was collected under it.—In the first place, the landlords, from the rise in the price of rice, and every other grain or garden produce they cultivate, can pay their rent now from a much smaller portion of their gross produce, while the remainder yields them a larger sum than heretofore, to purchase the other necessaries of life, such as cloths, salt, &c.; which articles, in consequence of the trade being thrown open, are to be had much cheaper than under the two last, or even the Bednore government.—It may, beside the dearth of the greatest necessary of life, necessarily drawn, with its dearth of labour and all other wants, and that consequently the landlord's other expenses may be expected to increase in proportion to his profit from the rise in the price of the gross produce of his land; Canara, however, is so peculiarly situated, that they in no way suffer this inconvenience; the wants of the people are certainly so few, that it may be partly owing to this.—Every necessary but cloth, the country produces, and its rice is so sought after from every quarter, that the inhabitants have no occasion whatever, to be at the trouble of sending it to foreign markets, or seeking custom.—Foreign merchants even come and beg it of them; and these people seldom coming with empty vessels, it happens that much more of the people's cloth than is necessary, is brought into the country, than can be expended; and thence they can buy it frequently at prime cost, or at a very moderate increase thereon.—The natural rise in the nominal price of labour, indeed, caused by that in the price of rice, in few cases, affects the landlords, all of whom have a number of dairds or slaves, by whom they cultivate their lands;—the wages of labour are, in most common cases of husbandry, confined to a full sufficiency for the food and clothing of the labourer:—when it is paid in money, there must of course be a nominal rise, in proportion to that of the greatest necessary of life; the increase in money, however, does not draw with it, that of the quantity of food or clothing: the labourer can purchase these, with what remains, nearly the same in every change. When the labourers are fed from the produce of the soil, and clothed, as in Canara, by their masters, their real wages are the same, from one generation to another, though the nominal value of what they receive for their maintenance, may be greater one year than another. Some quantities of rice per day, and of cloth per annum, are given to every labourer now.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Land Tenures  
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Extract from Report of  
Collector of Southern  
Division of Canara,  
30th April 18612

was customary from the earliest ages; and the landlords have the advantage of being able to purchase cloth now, considerably cheaper than at any former period; they have also more frequent opportunities, from the increasing demand for labour, of letting out such of their slaves as they have not in employ themselves. The instruments of husbandry are so simple in India, that they can scarcely be reckoned on; but cattle are something cheaper than under the Bydgnugger government. To every maganny there are village artificers, barbers, washermen, &c. to whom the landlord pays a certain quantity of grain per annum: this is not now increased to the landlords, though it is, in value, to the workmen; and is as an increase of pay. To them, money is rendered less valuable, in proportion to the smallness of the quantity of the greatest necessary of life, a given sum can command; but no other alteration in its value, has happened since the time of fixing the rekah; a coin, of similar weight to the Bahadry pagoda, was then in use, and of the same value, with respect to the other real or nominal coins of the country, as now.

Nearly all the waste lands of Canara, are lying close under the range of ghauts; which tract has, for more than a century, been continually plundered, and many of its inhabitants carried off, or murdered, by some rebellious chieftain or other, and the remainder reduced to a state of extreme indigence; and I fear it must naturally, therefore, take a considerable time, ere those few can acquire the means and confidence to extend their cultivation, or others can be induced to go and take lands in that quarter. All along the sea coast, as much land as ever was, is now in cultivation with paddy, and much more than ever was before known, converted into gardens. The number of lands, by the present, is greater than by the last general revenue statement, which is a proof how good and secure a property land is now considered. Under the late government, it was customary for persons to purchase and hold lands in the name of some opulent inhabitants, which gave a sort of security, and prevented any wretch, by bribing an asoph, or otherwise, from wresting it from him. Numerous landlords, in this and such like situations, have now come forward and proved their own right of inheritance, which shows they have no small confidence in the government under which they are placed.

I have before observed, that till the conquests by Hyder, land was universally sold at the average of ten years purchase of the net rent, and that any bought for more or less, was considered an invalid transaction. The industry of the people, however, in the course of a number of years, has so much increased the rents of some, and the oppression of government, so reduced those of other estates, that there are many now, not saleable; but those that are, fetch from ten to sixteen years purchase.

From general observation, I am inclined to think that, in the aggregate, the landlords may get about 18 per cent. and the under-tenants, 57 or 58, leaving the remainder, or 24 or 25 per cent. of the gross produce, as the land tax. In Mangalore, Poloor, Buntwall, and Vettul talooks, however, I apprehend the landlords enjoy from 60 to 70 per cent. of their net rent, while their under-tenants also enjoy a large proportion of the gross produce. In most of the villages bordering on the range of the ghauts, or more than 20 miles inland, in proportion to its produce, land lets for considerably more than on the sea coast. Its distance from the place of export, may, in some measure, account for this; but it is otherwise to be attributed to an extraordinary indulgence the landlords found it necessary to afford their tenants, to induce them to remain in such jingly and unhealthy situations. In many cases, also, they have found it necessary to grant them *moolgueny tenures*, i. e. tenants for ever, at a fixed rent. This species of tenure, is nearly as good as a freehold. It descends from father to son, and from uncles to nephews, as the law of the inhabitants may be, from one generation to another. A tenant can in no case be ousted, but for non-payment of rent; and even in this case, not till he has been fully recompensed by his landlord, for every lasting improvement he may have made to the land. A tenant without heirs, may bequeath his tenure to any person he pleases; the general custom, however, where there is no issue, is, to adopt a son, or nephew, as successor, who has every claim the father or uncle had, with the consent of the landlord: he can also sell his property in such lands; and the purchaser stands in every way in the same respect towards the landlord as he did. Some tenures of this sort, are purchased, others are not; in the former case, in the event of the tenant's wishing, at any time, to give up his land, he may do so, and the landlord is bound to reimburse him for every lasting improvement made to the lands; as also, to refund any consideration he may have received at the time of granting tenure. The tenants may also have their under-tenants, or *challi guenies*, who hold in every way as *challi guenies* under land-holders. Any failure on the part of a *moolgueny* (under-tenant), is in no case a plea for keeping his superior landlord in arrears of his rent.

There are *challi guenies*, or tenants at will, who, by courtesy, have become tenants in perpetuity; these are such, as have held lands of a superior landlord for two generations or more;—in some cases, indeed, it has been extended to those who have held 50 years, and who, with the consent of the superior, have at different times made expensive improvements to their lands, or have levelled, or brought others into cultivation. Such lands are generally supposed to descend from father to son, for ever, at the original rent agreed on. The superior has the right, either to raise his rent, or omit his tenant; but it is universally considered a stretch of power, so unjust and illiberal, that it is seldom or ever resorted to; at any rate, before it can be done, the tenant must be reimbursed in full for all lasting improvements. This custom, indeed, is also extended by right to all tenants at will for a year, even making improvements without the consent of their landlord, and, by courtesy, to those making them without his knowledge. This is the grand fundamental system, and prop. of the Canara agricultural system, and is worthy of imitation, either in other parts of India, or Europe. It alone may be said to have been the cause of half the land in Canara being brought into and kept in cultivation.

Extracts from Report  
respecting Canal Re-  
venues and Assessments  
in Canara.

Extract from Report  
of Collector of Southern  
Division of Canara  
30th April 1801.

On the death of any landlord, his successor is obliged, by usage, to observe all engagements he may have made, either with challi or mool guenies.

The rents of some tenants are paid in money, others, in grain, but at a fixed quantity; the former gain, in proportion as the value of the rice rises, because a smaller quantity of that article, will yield them the amount of their rent than heretofore the latter would gain if the price of rice was to fall lower than it was at the time their rent was fixed; but now they neither gain or lose, though their landlords gain, in proportion as the price of the commodity they pay in rises. These circumstances, also that of the number of chaly and mool guenies under each landlord, are matters, which should have their weight in the consideration of any new permanent settlement, which may be ordered; as the rent of mool guenies can in no case be increased, in proportion to the value of rice, or otherwise. When it is paid in money, it follows, that all additional assessments, hitherto made, or to come, have fallen, and must fall, on their landlords alone. This has been the chief cause of the net rent of many of them being so very trifling, while their tenants are enjoying every ease they can wish for. Those landlords, however, whose lands are farmed to challi, or tenants at will, have the option of raising their rent, either by commuting a money rent for one in kind, or by raising either, in proportion to the price of rice. I have not been able to ascertain the portions of each species of tenants, though I know the tenants at will are three times more numerous than the tenants for ever; all the latter originally held by some written agreement; where it remains, there can be no doubt of the validity of the tenure, which seems to have been granted only in ancient times, or in cases of landlords bringing a large tract of the country into cultivation, when they seem to have thought it necessary to grant such indulgences to new ryots. As, however, it has not been customary to grant new agreements on the decay of old ones, it happens that few ancient deeds can be produced, and the landlords, well aware of the advantages they will derive from converting a mool to a challi gueney, deny the authenticity of any copy they may keep, while the originals have generally been granted too long ago, to be proved. On the other hand, all challi guenies who have held more than a generation, urged long possession, as a proof of their mool gueney tenure; all who have held at one fixed rent for fifty years, might be decided such, and all under that period, as liable to be ousted; there would be no hardship in this, for it is reasonable to suppose that no landlords, especially pressed as they were, under the late government, would allow a tenant at will to cultivate a portion of his land at one certain rent for fifty years together, while his land tax to government was annually increasing.

When the rent of a landlord trenches upon the sum required for the necessary subsistence of the tenants, his failure will soon be equal, not only to the sum which is required to be deducted from that set aside for his maintenance, but to a much greater one; because, as he can now both pay his landlord's rent, and maintain himself only by diminishing the usual and necessary expenses of cultivation, the produce will also lessen and sink, at least to a half or third of its former amount, when his failure becomes irremediable, and the landlord's loss much greater than the original increase of rent. When the government land tax trenches on the landlord's net rent, in the same way, the same consequences must ensue; and to prevent the land tax so doing, the only effectual way is, to define a tenure and rent for the under-tenants of landlords, by which that of government can be regulated. Under-tenants holding in the state of security they do in Canara, carry improvement to the greatest possible extent: they are always able to pay their rent regularly to their superior, which enables him to do so likewise to government; the ensuring also, in this way, the high cultivation of the lands by under-tenants, in the event of a failure on the part of the landlords to government, his estates will always meet a ready and advantageous sale.

#### Extracts from REPORT of Collector of Northern Division of CANARA; dated 25th April 1802.

CIRCAR Lands, from the want of owners, are never so well cultivated as they would be, were they private; besides, they are, in general, worse situated in Canara for retaining water. A large reduction was therefore made by Major Munro, during his first settlement, to enable their cultivators to bestow more labour upon them; and the sum entered in column 5, is the increase in consequence. In columns 12 and 15, the greatest part of the increase appearing in the Cundapoor district, arises from false accounts having been detected. I have made no decrease column opposite to No. 8. in the increase, because there is no reason for restoring the full amount collected under that head. As much as necessary, only, will be returned; so that it is for the advantage of government to resume all remissions of this nature which, for several years past, has been literally a reduction of land-rent; for the same bank cannot be supposed to burst, or be overflowed, every year successively.

I now perceive I was too sanguine in expecting that the number of landlords, or rather proprietors, would be considerably increased this year. I naturally imagined, that as the ryots became more acquainted with our government, and, finding that their rents were not risen beyond the point they must have expected, that they would endeavour to secure right of possession to their land, by demanding a sum of the circar; but it has been proved by enquiries made during the course of the survey, that many of the mool guenies tenants for ever, are, in many respects, better off than the landlords: Indeed, while rice, dear as it has lately been, there can be no doubt of their being so. I likewise did not consider that the mool guenies, in order to become proprietors, must necessarily...

Extracts from Reports,  
respecting Land Ten-  
ures and Assessments,  
in Canara.

Extracts from Report  
of Collector of Northern  
Division of Canara,  
20th April 1802.

lands they have so long cultivated, in order to occupy new, unless their landlords would consent to alienate such portion of their estates as was occupied by tenantry, in consideration of a nuzzerannah, or present: but land is too eagerly coveted in Canara, for us to expect that. The mool guenies are, in every sense, proprietors: but, as they hold their lands of landlords, the circar cannot interfere in their rent. Revenue may lose something, by their being so; but the people are unquestionably happier as they are; and as a proof of which, not a single mool gueny has become a proprietor of circar land this year. Some of the chaly guenies, or tenants at will, may occasionally desert their landlords, and become proprietors; but I conclude, that the increase of private estates in future, will chiefly arise from the affluence of some landlords enabling them to extend their old estates.

The sum in column 12 is owing to false representations of the ryots being detected: that in column 13 is the total avowed amount of melwassie enjoyed by the bramins of Cundipore for Fusly 1210 (1800-1) which is paid back in the column 23: but that in column 14 is newly discovered melwassie, and for which I am chiefly indebted to the vigilance of the Kham Wasool and his gomastahs. The sums in the decrease columns, being occasioned by the reverse reasons to those in the increase, require no particular explanation.

This statement, from its intimate connection with the land-rent, has occupied by far the greatest share of my attention. I shall, therefore, defer mentioning the customs till the close of this letter, beginning with the principles on which the current year's settlement has been made.

As it was necessary to determine some point within myself, to which the rent of lands should be raised, that have had a portion of their rent excused lately, from various causes, in order to bring up the value of the depressed estates to the general level, I circulated the following Hokuinnama among the amildars, to serve as a guide in levying an additional assessment on the inhabitants this year; subject, however, to such alterations, as I might deem necessary on reaching the different districts.

1st. All those assessed at the full rent on the shist, with all its additions, to remain fixed, provided their ability is sufficient to discharge that rent punctually.

2d. In increasing rents this year, not to demand more than the rent of Hyder, and three-fourths of the additional assessments.

3d. In assessing lands newly cultivated, not to exact more than three fanams per pagoda this year, three the next, and four the year after.

4th. Lands paying the Bednore rent only, not to have more than one-fourth of the additional assessment laid on them this year.

5th. In assessing lands for which the owner had a cowle, to follow the rules contained in it.

My principal reason for circulating the above rules, was to guard against too sudden a demand of the whole or full rent, wishing to be the judge myself how far the cultivators could afford that rent or not; and the third clause is to prevent checking improvements; for, if every field, newly brought into cultivation, was to be taxed according to its produce the very first year, it would discourage the landlords greatly. I hope the propriety of the above few rules will appear obvious; for to burthen those with the rent of Tippoo who never paid it before, and whose low rent, at present, has most probably been counterbalanced by the high nuzzerannah, or purchase money, paid in consequence, would not only be incompatible with the permanent system, but would be carrying our rent much higher than government would desire to see it. After having determined the rent of each district, with the consent of the inhabitants, I always allowed a couple of hundred pagodas to be left in reserve, either to be collected or not, as circumstances happened towards the close of the Fusly, and advising the amildar to be attentive in his collections from those who paid above 7 F. of the extra assessment. In assessing the maganics situated near the foot of the Ghauts, I was careful not to exact too heavy a rent from the cultivators; and am happy to observe, that a great deal of extra cultivation has been brought to account this Fusly. An easy land-rent, for several years, will be the surest means of increasing the cultivation in those maganics, and counterbalance the inconvenience they must sustain in the disposal of their produce, by their distance from the sea.

Being resolved to ascertain, as correctly as I could, the various rates of rent paid by the inhabitants of the Northern Division, in order to form a standard for every district, deduced from the average rent paid by each, I have shown in the accompanying Statement, the number of people paying all the gradations of rent, from the simple dist to the whole of the additional assessments, by entering the rents under the class to which they approached the nearest, and which I conceive to be sufficiently minute to form a general idea of the land-rent of any particular district. This statement is useful to me in many respects, but particularly in showing the ability of the cultivators below the Ghauts; for the Board will perceive that the land-rent is lighter, the further north it goes. Major Munro was so sensible of the difference between the districts of Honawer and Ankalah, and those situated to the southward of the Cundipoor river, in point of fertility and population, that in the cowles granted to their inhabitants, the terms vary twice in Honawer, and three times in Ankalah. This enables me to state with greater confidence, the plan I have in contemplation for settling my division, the ensuing Fusly.

The rents of every individual having been adjusted this year with the utmost particularity (for they were almost all pronounced by myself) and having every reason to believe, that the rents of old estates are not only sufficiently high, but incapable of bearing any addition,



addition, without discouraging all improvements, it is my intention, during my next circuit, to demand no increase which does not arise from the following causes, viz. newly-discovered melwassi land, the rents of which may have been concealed from the knowledge of the district cutcherries; circular waste cultivated, and waste upon estates; and in demanding rent from those heads, not to exceed the following standard or proportion of the additional assessments of each district; viz.

Cundipore	-	-	-	-	-	75 per Ct.
Honawer	-	-	-	-	-	50.
Ankalah	-	-	-	-	-	35.
Goobah	-	-	-	-	-	25.
Soondah	-	-	-	-	-	30.
Bunwassee	-	-	-	-	-	30.
Belghi	-	-	-	-	-	30.

And I shall give my reasons for each, in a few words.

The district of Cundipore is evidently much more populous and higher cultivated than either Honawer or Ankalah. Its chief seaport is more frequented than any other in Canara, except Mangalore. It exports the greatest quantity of rice, is situated directly opposite Nungurghaut, and commands a portion of the trade to and from Mysore, which may be expected to increase; and it is in Major Muro's opinion, as well as my own, the one of all others, capable of bearing the highest assessment. Honawer is in the next best condition below the Ghauts, and produces, besides rice, a large quantity of pepper and beetle nut; but its chief drawback is a thinness of population. Ankalah is, in the worst condition; contains less inhabitants, more overrun with jungle, and possesses fewer private estates than any district in Canara. In the northern part especially, they have little idea of landed property, except in gardens; and the whole of that district bears a great resemblance to Soondah. Soopa is the most jungly desolate district above the Ghauts, and produces very little pepper and beetle compared to Soondah, Bunwassee, or Belghi, which appear to me to be much the same in capability. Bunwassee is obviously the most open, and the best cultivated with rice lands, but not gardens.

By adopting the standard I have proposed upon those now paying a low rent, there would only be occasion to alter the rent of 4,097 individuals next year, instead of 8,652; the number remaining fixed in each district would then be as follows, and would increase greatly, every year:

	TOTAL N <sup>o</sup> of Cultivators in 1211.	To remain fixed in 1212.	To alter in 1212.
Cundipore - - - -	2,372	1,881	491
Honawer - - - -	4,065	3,429	636
Ankalah - - - -	3,711	2,690	1,021
Soopah - - - -	4,087	2,924	1,163
Soondah - - - -	1,056	688	368
Bunwassee - - - -	1,027	890	137
Belghi - - - -	945	664	281
		13,166	4,097

As the Board, in their proceedings on the settlement of 1210, have observed, "That the revenue will annually improve, not by an enhancement of the assessment, but by giving confidence that it will not be raised," they may probably conceive that I have deviated from the above rule, when I ought not to have done so. The moderate increase in columns 2 and 3 of Statement 2, will, however, take away all blame from me of that nature: for a moderate land rent has ever been, in my mind, the surest spring of encouragement, and without which, a country can seldom improve. I know the Board would be most pleased to find my annual increase arising from the conversion of circular lands into private estates, and the cultivation of arable waste; but had I added no other increase to my present year's jumma bundy, but what arose from those heads, the addition would have been very small indeed, and might have led you to suppose that a very different management obtained, in the northern to the southern division. It may safely be concluded, that, before any considerable portion of circular waste land can be brought into cultivation, the northern division must receive either a great addition of inhabitants, or a sensible increase to the wealth of the present number; because I conceive that abundance of waste lands are still to be found upon estates, especially in Honawer and Ankalah.

From the accompanying Survey Statements, it appears that Belghi is the lightest assessment in gardens, and Bunwassee in rice lands; and it is fortunate for the inhabitants of the district, that it is so, for a very large proportion of it, is totally unfit for gardens. At

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Land Re-  
venues and Assessments  
in Canara.

Extracts from Reports  
of Collector of Northern  
Division of Canara  
10th April 1809.



Extracts from Reports,  
respecting Land Te-  
nures and Assessments  
in Canara.

Extracts from Report  
of Collector of Northern  
Division of Canara,  
20th April 1807.

Munro supposes that the difference of customs being more in Belghi than in Soondah, prevents the cultivators in the former, from demanding so high a price for their produce; consequently to cause the profits in both districts, to be pretty equal; however, I am apt to suppose, notwithstanding the double duty in Belghi, that gardens are more valuable there than in Soondah, because the demand for the whole produce of the country is such (unless in times of disturbances) that I imagine the actual difference of the price is not so great as he conceived it. With regard to assessing Belghi the same as Soondah, it would undoubtedly be wrong to attempt it, because the amount that would be lost, by a diminution of the customs, would far exceed any gain in the land-rent. Even before the survey took place, I foresaw that the rent of rice lands in Belghi was very high, from the number who paid full rent; and I, therefore, added little or nothing to their cultivators this year, that I might make the assessment every where as equal as I could. I shall hereafter furnish your Board with a comparison between the rents of paddy fields and gardens above and below the Ghauts, by forwarding certain queries to Mr. Ravenshaw, to be returned to me. I can draw no comparison at present between the rents of this country and the Baramahl, from the want of correct averages of the latter; however, I believe it is well known that the rents here are much lower.

That they are sufficiently low throughout Soondah and Belghi, I am thoroughly convinced of; since my residence above the Ghauts; were they otherwise, I should certainly have had some convincing proof of it, before now. But of the complainants who came before me, not one in fifty was about their rent; they chiefly relate to debts, and petty transactions among themselves; very few are concerning land, which proves, I think, incontestibly, that the people are contented with the present assessment; and also, that land is not valuable above, as it is below the Ghauts. There are also certain leading points by which the person entrusted with the management of a country can judge of the wealth or poverty of its inhabitants; and the following, as they differ so much from what I have seen, or expected to have met with, deserve to be noticed:—First, the ease with which the settlement of every district is annually effected;—secondly, from their great litigiousness in points concerning land compared to any others, is a sure sign of its value, whatever may be the rent paid for it;—and, thirdly, from frequent indirect acknowledgements of their present comfortable state, corroborated by the opinion of my own entcherry, who are most of them, natives of Canara;—and lastly, from there being scarcely a single town of any consequence, in which there are not a few new houses, and other signs of improvement, to be met with annually. I, therefore, do not hesitate to assert that the present year's settlement of the land-rent is a moderate one, throughout the Northern division; the amount of which will be realized in a few weeks more, with ease and certainty; and that it is by no means, above the abilities of its inhabitants.

#### Extracts from Mr. THACKERAY's Report; dated 4th August 1807.

THE greater part of the lands in Canara are private property. The former, and present state of private property, has been so amply discussed by Major Munro, that it leaves me little to say on the subject. Original inscriptions on stone and copper prove the antiquity of this venerable institution. They consist of grants of ancient princes to pagodas, &c. granting the land-tax derivable from certain lands and villages; thus transferring the land-tax from the treasury, to the individual grantee: but the property in the soil was not granted, because not possessed or claimed by the prince, when he gave the absolute property in the soil; the sunnud expressly mentions the previous purchase of the right.

Although black books, papers, leaves, or even copper-plates, are often forged; yet these inscriptions, so generally found, could not have been forged. They, therefore, are unquestionable evidence to the antiquity and validity of the institution.

The black books, however, are very curious records; and as inscriptions, black books, tradition, annual settlements, and revenue accounts, all concur to show what the ancient land tax was; to show that it was light and fixed, they show that the lands were private property. The sunnuds, and inscriptions on stones and copper, are to be found, in every part of Canara; in every pagoda; they, together with the revenue accounts, the black books, tradition, and the state of the country, afford undeniable proof of the antiquity of the institution. A complete investigation of these ancient inscriptions, would throw great light on the former state of the country, perhaps of the ancient history of India. The different princes of Bednore, Bijjanuggur, and even Mysore, never seem to have questioned the general rights of the people, though an arbitrary assessment, and individual acts of oppression, may have rendered some private estates less valuable.

The power to sell and mortgage lands, all along exercised by the landholders in Canara; the readiness of others to buy or take them, in pledge; show that the people at large, have a good opinion of the validity of the title. This practice prevails, indeed, in those provinces, where the cirkar is proprietor; but it is not so, in general. The culture they have bestowed on the land, shows that they considered that government would respect their rights; and this culture, as it has chiefly rendered the lands valuable, gives them a right in them, according to the general principles of natural justice. The attachment which they show to their estates, is a proof of the validity of their titles; and the rules which exist for the sale and mortgage and lease of land, show that it has been long private property. It may be that original grants conferring the rights of property to the primitive grantees,

should be produced, that it should be shown what prince originally granted the land to individuals; but it may be answered, that perhaps in no country, at least in no country long settled and civilized, do such original grants or title deeds exist. The sovereign may have granted away escheated estates, or unclaimed lands, and such grants are to be found in Canara, and in Europe; but if the rights of individual proprietors at large, were traced up, or rather if private rights in certain lands were traced up, they would soon be lost in antiquity; and prescription would be found, the general original title. Deeds transferring land are to be found in Canara, and in England; grants conferring cirkar lands are forthcoming, in both countries; but perhaps, in neither country, original grants or deeds conferring or establishing the primitive right in private property in the soil, could be found; for they most likely, never existed. A man cultivated a certain field—mixed his labour with the soil—and in process of time, obtained a title, by prescription, which is the best of all titles. Indeed, no person who has seen Canara, or considered the subject, can doubt the antiquity and validity of the titles of the Canara landlords; and any government that should attempt to overturn it, would act like the French government when it confiscated the private estates of the nobility and church.

Extracts from Reports, respecting Land Tenures and Assessments in Canara.

Extracts from Mr. Thackeray's Report; dated 4 Aug. 1807.

The land is frequently pledged; and is, generally speaking, deeply incumbered. One species of mortgage is, when the land is merely pledged, and the deeds and papers relating to it, are put into the hands of the mortgagee. This transaction is termed *Tooradhi*. In this case, the mortgagee merely receives a quantity of rice equal to the interest due on his loan; but has no interference in the management of the estate. When it happens that the proprietor, not only being unable to pay the principal, also fails to pay the interest regularly, he is obliged to make over the land itself to the mortgagee, who takes possession, and becomes a fixed tenant, manages the estate, and pays the land tax; however, on receiving the full amount of his debt, he must deliver up the land. This transaction is termed *Bhogpadhi*, or pledge in possession; and is the more common kind of mortgage. Rules exist for the redemption of the land, and adjustment of the accounts. The proceeds of the estate, and the improvements which have been made, are usually settled by an arbitration. The general use of pledging land, renders the sale of it, less common; however, notwithstanding the aversion felt at totally alienating their ancient patrimony, there are many instances, of actual sale. Land generally sells for from eight to twelve years purchase money, on the clear rent; near Bekul, they said, it only sold for four years purchase; though they admitted that they got about half the rent clear; that is, money laid out in the purchase of land, ought to bring ten or twelve per cent. interest. The inequality of the land-tax, and the distance from great towns, perhaps, makes the value of land, vary; in some places, it is not saleable. In some cases, estates bought ninety or a hundred years ago, for a considerable sum, would not, as the owners say, sell at all now, on account of the extra assessment which has been laid on, since the purchase. The land-tax is heavier than in the northern parts of Malabar, and land is perhaps more completely cultivated, which seem to be the causes of the higher price at which it is sold, in Malabar.

Land is leased to tenants at will, or to fixed tenants. The tenants at will usually pay a certain quantity of rice, or sometimes money, upon the quantity of seed supposed to be requisite to sow the land. The lands are classed into first, second, and third sort; and each field is reckoned and called a field of so many morahs. Though the proprietors have power to turn out or raise the rents of the tenants at will, they seldom do so, but go on content with the customary rent. The rent lies between one-fourth and one-third of the gross produce; but in general, near one half, I should imagine seldom more than one half, seldom less than one third. Hands and stock are scarce; as the country gets more populous, rents may be raised.

The fixed tenants are a kind of sub-proprietors, and are, in some respects, more independent than the proprietors from whom they hold. Major Munro has described the two tenures of *Nair Moolgueni*, and *Shud Moolgueni*; so that I need say little on the subject. These fixed tenants, sometimes again let out their estates, to tenants at will. If the fixed tenants die without heirs, the land reverts to the original proprietor. The landlord and tenant sometimes dispute about the nature of the tenure, the landlord asserting, that he is merely a tenant at will; the tenant contending, that he is a fixed tenant: and the general loss of deeds and written documents renders it a doubtful question. The jealousy which must exist to produce these kind of disputes between landlord and tenant, would afford one way of ascertaining the rent. Few *moolguenies*, or fixed tenants, have, it is said, been created since the Company's government. This is attributed, by the collector, to their confidence in our government:—this is one cause; and the increasing stock of the landlord, which enables him to cultivate more of his own estate, is perhaps another. The *moolguenies*, or fixed tenants, have not been obliged to contribute any thing when the proprietor has been extra assessed: however, I should think that they ought to contribute in the same manner, in proportion to the value of their estates. If it be just to equalize the assessment on the landlords, it ought to find its level on the fixed tenants. On the whole, the state of landed property is nearly the same, in both these provinces. The property in the soil rests in individuals, or rather in families. Transfers, mortgages, and successions to lands, are generally regulated on the same principles, and by similar rules, except where violence may have rendered property less valuable, or the different rules of cast and place, may occasion different customs. Land is

valuable

Extracts from Reports,  
respecting Land Tenures  
and Assessments in Ca-  
nara.

Extracts from Mr.  
Thackeray's Report;  
dated 4 Aug. 1807.

valuable in proportion to the clear rent, and loses its value when the land-tax becomes so heavy, as to absorb the whole rent. Under the Mysore government, few landlords chose to avow the full extent of their property, and some part was held in the name of a relation. Some private lands are held in the name of pagodas, because church lands are favoured;—some lands were held in the name of one person, who managed for several co-partners; and some lands were held by the revenue servants, under feigned names, to avoid suspicion.

The great difference between the land in these two provinces, and those in other provinces, is, that here, it is vested in individuals;—there, in communities. The villages above the Ghauts are like corporations, communities, municipalities, republics, who are the proprietors of the whole lands of the villages; at least, they and the sirkar share the qualities of property between them. They have cleared and cultivated the village lands, time out of mind; and there is none but the sirkar who can claim any share in the property from them. The village community only wants a fixed land-tax, which shall leave them some part of the rent, to become joint proprietors of the village lands: they are at present, however, only common tenants, because, in most places, the government draws the whole landlord's rent. If the government exacted the whole rent from Canara and Malabar, the present proprietors would not be common, but individual tenants.

FROM the earliest times to the middle of the fourteenth century, the land was assessed at a quantity of rice equal to the quantity of paddy supposed to be necessary to sow it; so that a field which required 10 kandies of paddy to sow it, paid a land-tax of 10 kandies of rice, which was paid in either money or kind.

Between the years 1334 and 1347, Hurrihur Roy, king of Bijanugger, made a new assessment, on the principle laid down in the shaster, where the produce is supposed to be to the seed as 12 to 1. Agreeably to this computation, he supposed that  $2\frac{1}{2}$  katties of seed yielded thirty katties of paddy, which he divided as follows:

To the landlord	-	-	-	-	$7\frac{1}{2}$ or 25 per cent.
To the labourer	-	-	-	-	15 or 50 per cent.
To the sirkar	-	-	-	-	$7\frac{1}{2}$ or 25 per cent.

and still following the shaster, he divided the sirkar share as follows:

To the sirkar	1-6th of the gross,	or	-	-	5
To churches	1-30th of the gross	-	-	-	1
To Brahmins	1-20th	-	-	-	$1\frac{1}{2}$
					<hr/> 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ <hr/>

This settlement was concluded upon a rough estimate of the quantity of seed usually sown, and it remained without any alteration, till the country was transferred to the Bednore government about the middle of the seventeenth century; the Bednore government had levied an additional 50 per cent., and in 1650 the Bijnuggur and Bednore assessment together, formed the shist or standard, which amounted,

In Canara	-	-	-	-	2,02,229 29 47
In Soondah	-	-	-	-	44,393 20 45
Total standard shist	-	-	-	-	<hr/> 2,46,623 14 12 <hr/>

This remained for near a century, the land-tax of Canara; but in the eighteenth century, the Bednore government laid on additional cesses, and raised the land-tax to

Hyder laid on an extra assessment, and raised the revenue to	-	-	3,14,007 4 52
Tippoo, by extra assessment and new heads of revenue, raised it to	-	-	5,33,202 4 17
But from this must be deducted, additions never likely to be collected, amounting to	-	-	<hr/> 8,68,678 25 16 <hr/>
	-	-	2,52,589 22 76

Leaving Tippoo's assessment - 6,16,089 2 20; °

of this sum, the shist or standard came to 3,59,752. 32. 35.; the rest consisted of impositions and extra assessment.

This sum was however merely a nominal assessment; for he never collected more than 4,73,550. 3. 12., and of that, about 25,938 arose from the sale of grain, and items not properly of land revenue.

Major

Major Munro took this settlement as the basis of his assessment of Fusly 1209; he added some fresh items and new heads of revenue, but deducted 1,50,040. 4. 36. on account of waste land, heads of revenue lost, and the balance constituted the settlement of Fusly 1209, and amounted to

Extracts from Report  
respecting Land Revenue  
and Assessments in Canara.

Of this sum the ancient shist was	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,84,604	28	45
Shamul, or extra assessment	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,53,458	30	30
New heads of revenue	-	-	-	-	-	-	16,580	—	67
Village taxes	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,505	10	2
							4,65,148	33	64

Extracts from  
Thackeray's Report  
dated 4 Aug. 1807.

The collectors of Canara have ever since gone on, lowering or raising the rent, according to circumstances. Upon Tippoo's standard, each ryot's payment to government consists of two parts, *shist* and *shamul*. The *shist* is the old land-tax, and is easy: the *shamul* is the extra assessment, which is sometimes more, sometimes less, than the *shist*. Few individuals pay the full sum, including *shist* and *shamul*; but while the collector keeps the full standard, 6,16,089. 2. 20. in view, the ryots have to look forward to pay it, according to the *Kykaghiz*, as it is termed. This standard is too high; but the annual settlement is made with a view to it, and the amount is regulated by circumstances.

It may here be proper to observe, that though the standard of Tippoo be too high for the country, yet that the settlement of Fusly 1209, was concluded, and regularly collected, under great disadvantages. Canara had been almost desolated by many years of oppressive government; and latterly, by the confusion which the war with the English had occasioned. Major Munro was appointed collector after the fall of Seringapatam, and did not enter Canara till late in 1799, when the Mysore troops were still in possession of the forts, which they did not give up for some time, until a force had entered and laid siege to the fort of Jumalabad. No sooner had they evacuated the province, than Dhoondia's people took possession of the country above the Ghauts; and several adventurers sprung up in different parts of the country, who occasioned great confusion till the middle of 1800. Some of the adventurers surprised and took the strong fort of Jumalabad; others got into other districts; and a general scene of confusion, if not civil war, took place. Notwithstanding all this confusion, and the low state to which former bad governments had reduced the province, the revenue of Fusly 1209 was collected, and the people, so far from murmuring, universally supported the collector, and enabled him to seize or drive out the adventurers who had occasioned so much trouble. The people paid the revenue regularly, and turned out, with arms in their hands, whenever there were intruders or disturbers of the peace, and by their own exertions, restored order.

1779-1801.

Major Munro proposed a reduction of 36,164 pagodas from the settlement of Fusly 1209, calculating all the circumstances of each district, so as to reduce the assessment, where it was heavy, and generally equalize it. He thought it difficult to ascertain the landlord's rent, and proposed this mode of reduction, which he considered necessary to give that spirit to agriculture, which former ages never saw. His opinion seems to have been justified by experience: the Fusly 1209 settlement has been, in some measure increased; and though the country has improved, those rapid advances which a reduction might have produced, have perhaps not taken place.

## Appendix, No. 25.

## Extracts from REPORTS respecting the LAND TENURES in the CARNATIC and MYSORE TERRITORY.

Extract REPORT of Collector of SOUTHERN POLIGAR PESHCUSH; dated 29th December 1800.

Extracts from Reports respecting Land Tenures in the Carnatic, Tanjore and Mysore Territory.

Extract Report of Collector of Southern Poligar Peshcush; dated 29 Dec. 1800.

IN a former part of this Report, I expressed my intention of offering, for your consideration, some reflections upon the introduction of the Permanent Settlement in these countries. Those observations will have no reference to the system itself, more than to express that respect, which must be universally felt for the enlightened principles upon which it is founded, and especially by collectors, who, with hourly experience of the disorders and embarrassments of the present modes of finance and justice, cannot but anxiously desire and promote a system, which brings relief from these evils, and places the honour, security, and advantage of the Company's government, upon the only solid basis on which it can rest,—the happiness and prosperity of the people.

91. The observations I have to offer, apply exclusively to the opinions entertained, as to the right of property in the lands of the country in general, at the present day: opinions, which claim to be attentively considered, before changes, founded altogether on the faith and force of them, are finally determined on. I understand it to be a fundamental principle to the introduction of the new system, as defined in your instructions, that all lands denominated havelly, are the lands of government; and that all the lands denominated pollams, are the lands of the poligar;—that the proprietary right of government in the havelly lands, is to be sold in perpetuity to any natives who may wish to buy them; and that the proprietary rights of the poligars, are to be confirmed to them, in the most full and solemn manner;—and though reservation is made, that in confirming the rights of zemindars or poligars, the ascertained rights of talookdars or other individuals (for a description of whom, I am referred to an extract from the Bengal Regulations) shall not be violated; yet in the havellics, no such reservation is particularly expressed; and upon reference to the Bengal Regulations, for a description of the nature of those rights, which the zemindars were to respect, the reservation does not appear to me to be extended so far as is necessary in these countries (whether havellics or pollams), in order to secure the legitimate ends of the system, the confidence of the people, and the establishment of internal order and peace.

92. As it is, in every point of view, of the highest importance, that the nature of the rights to be ceded to the proprietary land-holders, be thoroughly understood, before the lands are sold, I shall first explain the nature of the tenures under which all the lands in the Tinnevelly pollams, in Rammad, and in the Shevagunga district, from manumissions and church lands, may be comprehended.

First, Villages of the *agragrah vadiky*, or villages of which the absolute proprietary right is chiefly held by Bramins: Secondly, Villages of the *pundarah vandiky*, or villages of which the absolute proprietary right is chiefly held by soodra inhabitants: Thirdly, Villages which, having gone to perfect waste, soodra inhabitants were invited to occupy and to cultivate them.

93. First, Of the *agragrah vadiky*:—This tenure usually takes its name from the Bramins, not only from their being inhabitants of the superior cast, but from the village being originally bestowed on them; and because they possess the chief authority among the inhabitants.—It has been acquired in various ways, but chiefly, it is presumed, by rulers, or other personages of rank and opulence, giving them originally as endowments to communities of Bramins; and by buying them from others, for this particular purpose. This property has of course, in the lapse of many years, undergone many changes, and has been invariably transferred, sold, and purchased, at the pleasure of the owners. It is essential to the validity of every transfer, that it be sanctioned and authenticated by every individual concerned in the property of his village.—The property itself, is denominated *pung* or *banglum*, literally signifying, share and proportion. Four of these pungs, constitute what is termed a *caray*, and each village is said to consist of so many pungs, and each individual share, of so many caray, more or less. The right of property, in the proportion of these shares, is ascertained in the village *kosham*, which is an accurate register of this property, in the same manner as the *gyarum* account of its lands. The right of caray rarely conveys a right to any proprietor, to any specific spot of land in perpetuity; and whenever this practice prevails, it seems a departure from the original institution. The property of the whole village, is common to the whole number of proprietors:—Every transaction of revenue; every matter of loss and gain, is common to them all, to the extent of their respective shares; and as they are all jointly, and separately, responsible for the name of the village, according to the strict construction of their tenures, so they are all equally entitled, to any emolument or advantage which may arise therefrom. So serious indeed, are they of this established right, of every village benefit being in common, that a sort of lottery takes place, at stated times, to make a new distribution of

villages

village lands, by which they change owners for a certain period, until the lottery is renewed. By this means, they generally continue to pass from one proprietor to another, so as to exclude effectually indeed the right of any particular spot, but to establish the right of the general body, to the whole village in common.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Land Te-  
nures in the Carnatic,  
Tanjore, and Mysore  
Territory.

94. Secondly, Villages of the pandary vadiky. Though the natives invariably make this distinction, it appears, in fact, more a distinction of cast than of tenure, since the difference is characterized by nothing more, than that the influence of Bramins, and their property, predominates in the agraaharah vadiky: the former rarely allowing soodras to intermix in their villages, for fear their importance and estimation, as a community of Bramins, may be diminished by a connexion with such inferior parties; and on the other hand, the soodras as carefully and zealously avoiding the admission of Bramins, however small, as their property would draw to them too much consideration, usurp all authority, and invade their rights. This mutual suspicion and jealousy, together with religious distinctions, has therefore occasioned that separation of them, which is generally to be observed, and has had force to prevent, what the sale of transfer lands, was so powerfully calculated to bring about,—the indiscriminate existence of casts, in the property of villages. For your special consideration, I shall here annex the translate of a bill of sale from one ryot to another, upon the occasion of disposing of one or more shares in a village of the pandarah, or agraaharah vadiky, and accompanying, you will find translations and copies of similar accounts.—The deed usually commences with a specification of the day of the week, the age of the month, and year of the Malabar andoo, or cycle of sixty years; the year of the sawlivaganah sagarthum; and the calyogum oras; together with the auspicious and happy position of the celestial bodies; and then commonly proceeds, in terms to the following effect:—"I, A. B. of the village of C, containing twenty-eight shares, do hereby execute to D. E. of the same village, this deed of sale; that is to say, having sold to you, in this village, one share of my own six shares therein, I do hereby execute to you this deed of the full and absolute sale thereof; and you having further paid, and I having actually received, one hundred chukkrums, duly shroffed, in full value thereof, you are accordingly, to the extent of the share now transferred and sold to you, fully to possess and enjoy all nunjah, punjah, islands, water, stone, tops, jungles, riches, treasure, and every well which sinks beneath, or every tree that rises above the earth; with every general benefit, of every sort, from father to son, through every generation, as long as the waters of the Cauvery flow, vegetation lasts, or until the end of time, with the fullest liberty, likewise, of alienation by gift, bequest, sale or otherwise, and may you enjoy all prosperity therewith.—Thus, with my fullest approbation, I do hereby execute to D. E. this deed of sale, which is written by Perinall Pally, village Conicopoly; and this requires authentication from all the other proprietors of the village.—Signed—A. B."

Extract Report of Col-  
lector of Southern Pul-  
gar Peshchush; dated  
29 Dec. 1800.

95. This document contains within itself, the best evidence of the sense, which the natives entertain of the right acquired, or alienated, under its sanction, by the comprehensive and absolute terms in which that right is defined; and nothing remains to be remarked, but that while the style is not the style of the present times, so the adoption of such a deed, must have been the consequence of the universal acknowledgment of the right it is meant to convey.

96. Thirdly, The last general division comprizes all those lands, which the inhabitants are not considered as at liberty to sell. They unquestionably form a very large proportion of the country, and are generally occupied by soodra inhabitants. Though frequently confounded with villages of the pandara vadiky; they are very different. Whether in the early periods of Hindoo prosperity, these villages were individual property, like the pandarah vadiky, and escheated to the state, on the demise of all the proprietors; or whether they were barren wastes, before the inhabitants, who now occupy them, were invited to cultivate; it is not possible to ascertain; or, if possible, would any benefit result from it?—It is sufficient for us to know, that the grounds thus occupied, from the time that they were divided among the first settlers, have, in most cases, continued to pass from one generation to another.—That the land of each inhabitant is as well known as his house, and that it has never been customary to disturb his possession, as long as he yielded to the ruler of the country, a certain share of his labours. The distinction of these villages, from those of the genuine pandara and agraaharah vadiky, consists in their not being purchased, and in there being no practices prevailing in them, of punge, caraga, or rushum, for the lands of the village in general; or any right, indeed, in the inhabitants, to dispose of, or alienate in perpetuity, the lands they occupy, as is possessed by the proprietors of the pandarah and agraaharah vadiky.

97. From year to year, each ryot cultivates his own land, unless distress come upon him, or the supply of water be partial:—In the one case, he lends or mortgages his right of cultivation to redeem it, when he has again the means; in the other, (in the case of nunjah land) all the inhabitants of the villages assemble, and having determined the extent of land that may be cultivated, from the quantum of water in the tanks, it is apportioned out to each inhabitant, according to the extent of nunjah land possessed by him in the village. When the crops have been cut, every inhabitant again returns to his own lands.

98. In explaining to you the nature of these tenures, I have not sought to avoid detail, assured that your solicitude to be thoroughly informed of every difficulty to be avoided in the permanent settlement of these countries, will prompt a favourable construction of any apparent prolixity in the details transmitted to you of their present actual state.



Extracts from Reports  
respecting Land Te-  
nures of the Carnatic,  
Tanjore, and Mysore  
Territory

Extract Report of Col-  
lector of Southern Pa-  
tigar Peshawar; dated  
29 Dec. 1800.

99. In tracing their past situation, it is not to be discovered, that during the revolutions of many ages, from the reign of their first princes, until the final downfall of the Hindoo authority, any questions ever existed, in any stage of the Hindoo history, as to the right of the people to the lands of the country, excepting villages or lands totally waste, and that had escheated to government.—On the contrary, they appear to have been transmitted to them, from the most remote era, down to the present time, without interruption: these rights are supported by usages, which could never have prevailed; but for their universal acknowledgment; and in the repositories of their history and their laws, we find the right of the people, to property in lands, repeatedly acknowledged and preserved.

100. It has been the custom to consider the Hindoo governments of old, despotic, and regulated solely by the arbitrary will of the reigning prince:—theoretically received, they were so; but in practice, they had little of this character: the ordinances of their religion, had generally the force and effect of laws; and in their operation, they were beneficent and just.—Even when the country was, in later times, ravaged by mussulman armies, and the adoption of the laws of Mahomed into the Hindoo jurisprudence, created universal confusion, and engendered continual differences in the decrees of justice, no fundamental, material innovations took place in the right to landed property (however grievous the public assessment often proved) such as I have described; and the privilege of tilling the glebe which he first broke, and brought into fertility, it has never been the custom to take from the poorest cultivator, as long as he duly yielded the public share. It is true, that infringements of this right occur more frequently in Shevavunga; and in the Tinnevely polams, than elsewhere; but the frequency of them, has not altered the general sentiment of their injustice.

101. Reflecting, therefore, upon the past and present circumstances of the country, it appears to me indispensable, if we seek to conciliate the affections of the people to the new system, and to ensure its stability, that the right of property in the pundara and agrafah vaddy, be fully recognized; and that the ryot, duly yielding that share of his labours which it has been customary for him to cede to the state, be secured in his possession. The adoption of these suggestions, produce two inconveniences: First, considerable detail. Secondly, less inducement to principal landlords to purchase. The detail would arise from the division of the lands of the agrafah and pundarah vaddy amongst the several proprietors of the villages; in order that each man's portion might be made responsible for the jumma assessed upon it; but if the village, and all the proprietors, were declared answerable for the whole jumma, such separation of interest would not be necessary: and this plan has the advantage of assimilating to past usages. It may be urged, that the country has not flourished under these tenures; and that past usage, is the worst guide that can be followed. The reply to this objection, is anticipated in your board's remarks:—want of improvement cannot be attributed to the imperfection of tenures, but to that worst of all evils, a variable assessment, which has and must for ever prevent land from obtaining its due value, and extinguish every incitement to improvement.

102. Secondly, In regard to the diminution of inducement to the natives to purchase. There can be no doubt that they would be more desirous of becoming principal landholders, if they were authorized to allot, appropriate, and to dispose of the cultivated lands at their own pleasure: but (independent of the just claims of the lower tenantry to the fields) policy requires that no such right should be given to them. The depravity and chicanery of the native character does not need any illustration: we know that when they can obtain immediate advantage, they will not act for distant good; and that it is hence indispensable to the success of the new system, that they can reap no benefit, by defeating it. If a native were put in possession of several villages, with the same right as landed proprietors possess in Europe, his first business would be to take all the best lands from the old ryots, sell them to new settlers, receive as much as he could of the produce of the year, and then fail; leaving to the Company, as security for their revenue, villages worse cultivated than when he received them, and inhabited by strangers, instead of the thrifty and judicious peasantry, whose unceasing labour would soon enrich themselves and the state, if they were certain of reaping the fruits of it. But this can never be accomplished, unless the ancient ryot be secured in his right of occupancy and cultivation; subject only to such demands from the principal landlord, as eastern authorities, or to such other written engagements, as he may voluntarily enter into. To this reservation, I can myself see no weighty objection; but I submit it for your consideration. It is true, that whatever tends to discourage the employment of capital, in the improvement of the country, is to be regretted; and this, the limitation of proprietary rights may do, in a degree; but the ease and security of the cultivators of the soil, is the paramount consideration of a permanent settlement; and I should think that the expectation of bringing the waste lands into cultivation, of which the proprietary right may be wholly given to the principal landlord, and to the poligar, will be a sufficient inducement to many men of substance to employ their capital in agricultural pursuits.

103. If it should appear to your board, that I have judged unfairly of the rapacious spirit which is likely to govern the conduct of the poligars, and of the principal landholders, towards the inferior ryots, provided they be left at liberty to dispose of their property, your observation need only be called to the policy which has long prevailed in the Tinnevely polams, and in Shevavunga, where, in every fertile village, will be found an exclusive proof of the spirit itself, and of the pernicious effects to which it leads. To sell all the best lands of the country, for their own farms, or the farms of their dependants; and to be utterly indifferent to the desertion of the most useful inhabitants of the country, is an imputation

putation from which few can be excepted, and little need be said to prove the miserable state of agriculture in their hands, compared to that conducted by a laborious peasantry, of whose services they have been so little provident. In Shevagunga, the evil still exists in all its inveteracy: but it is gratifying to me to observe, that many of the poligars are endeavouring to repair its consequences, in their pollans, by a greater attention to cultivation. This salutary change in their habits, has been effected by the additional pesheush collected from them in the last year; and I take this occasion of requesting your authority to confirm this disposition, by renewing the same engagements for the present:—more they would be unable to pay.

Extract from Report respecting Land Tenures in the Carnatic, Tanjore, and Mysore Territory.

Extract from REPORT of Mr. HARRIS, to Committee at TANJORE, dated 9th May 1804.

Extract from Report of Collector of Tanjore, dated 9 May 1804.

7. I hereunder describe the stations of the tenantry:—
8. The persons constituting the tenantry are called *meerassadars*.
9. The station of a *meerassadar*, is essentially the same as that of an agricultural farmer in Europe: several circumstances, from custom, occasion a difference between them, and are strong and remarkable. I need mention here only three of those circumstances.
10. First, In Tanjore, a *meerassadar* disposes of his station in any manner he pleases. He disposes of it, too, and quits it, without being bound to give to any one, notice of his transfer and departure. Like him, his successor superintends its cultivation, and pays its revenue. Government know nothing of his relinquishment; and if they knew of it, they would not care about it here, as in Europe. The proprietorship of the land, belongs to government, or to the landlord; and he who is entrusted with the duty of making it productive, lives upon it, and cultivates it, so long as he pays its revenue, and no longer. But this occupation of it, while the superior is satisfied, has been converted by the *meerassadar* into a right. They have made the right, a property; and they retain, sell, lend, give or mortgage, according to their inclination, the whole or any part of it.
11. Secondly, almost every where in Tanjore, the labourers under a *meerassadar*, have a proportioned share in the produce of his land. They are called *paragoodies*: and that share is therefore called *paragoody warum*. In some few places, a *meerassadar's* labourers are slaves, and he allows them, not a proportioned share in his produce, but a daily allowance in money or grain. Therefore the *paragoodies* are interested in every crop: but the slaves do not care whether it be a good or bad one. The *paragoody warum* to the *paragoodies*, and the allowance to the slaves, are granted for the labour of cultivating. In every other work, the *paragoodies* and slaves fare alike, and are considered as *coolies*. When employed on the *circar paramut*,\* they receive from the *circar*; and when employed on the *coodeemaramut*,† they receive from the *meerassadars*, daily hire, at fixed rates. There are some *meerassadars*, but still fewer even than those engaging slaves, whose land is cultivated by their own labour, and by that of their relations.
12. Thirdly, attention is here required only to those *meerassadars*, whose labourers are *paragoodies*, and who are nearly the whole tenantry of the province. In every country, and in every profession, it is usual for the master to find the stock, and for his servants to do the work: but in Tanjore, and in agriculture, the servants do the work, and find the stock too. Therefore, if any calamity fall on the stock, the loss elsewhere, only diminishes the property of the often wealthy master; but it here destroys the whole subsistence and chattels of the impoverished servants. Every accident stops, and every misfortune kills, their industry. The cultivation which, being the source of general life and property, is made in better conditioned countries, to rest on the capital of an established class of men, depends, in this province, on the rude, broken, and fleeting materials of the lowest of mankind. The cattle, seed, and all implements of husbandry, are purchased and maintained by the *paragoodies* alone. From this circumstance, it may be supposed that the share enjoyed in the produce by these people, is large. In other parts of India, according to every information I have been able to obtain, a village is in its ordinary state, when its *meerassadars* supply stock to their land, and cultivate it, either by the labour of themselves and relations, or by that of slaves; and a village is in an unusual state, when some *meerassadars* have in it, land too extensive for them fully to manage; and when others entirely give up their cultivation in it, and engage on the spot, or at a distance, in manufactures, commerce, or the service of government. On such occasions, those who have more land than they can cultivate, derive the full return of their stock and labour, from what they do cultivate; and those who take up another profession, draw from it, more than they would from agriculture. Both these descriptions of people, therefore, regard the land they are unable or unwilling to cultivate, as a possession which they have no longer a natural right to hold; and resign it. They call in *paragoodies*, to whom they deliver it over, with the entire labour, expense, risk, and profit of cultivating it, reserving out of its crops, only a small *tondemurum*, sufficient as an acknowledgment that they are the owners of it, and may resume it when they please. The said assessment is never more, but often less, than 5 per cent. of the net produce. In Tanjore, the name of *paragoody warum* is indeed, those to whom land is relinquished; but this is the ordinary and settled state of the province; and the *meerassadars*, instead of being contented with a payment on the net produce, claim and receive nearly half the *codemurum*. Under the British government, the *codemurum* was 40 per cent. and they had 20, and in some places, even 25 of it. At present, the *codemurum* varies between 50 and 60 per cent. and they receive from 10 to 25 of it. Of these *meerassadars*, nearly all engage in no business, and

\* Report presented, at the expense of the Crown, to the small channels, and to the banks of the paddy fields.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Land Tenures  
in the Carnatic,  
Tanjore and Mysore  
Territory.

Extract from Report of  
Collector of Tanjore;  
dated 9 May 1804.

sic in orig.

The share borne by  
the tenantry in the ex-  
pense of the *moyen*  
*sabita*, or ordinary and  
permanent servants of  
the Circar.

the few who resort to any manufacturing, commercial, official, or military profession, enjoy not only the income of it, but the said exorbitant portion of the produce of the land, which they have abandoned to the labour of others. However, they have some functions which it is necessary to describe. According to their present situation, to pay for the *codemaranut*, and the field lakes, and to see that the cultivation is properly performed, is their peculiar natural and permanent duty; but instead of performing it, they use their endeavours to prevent its being done by the orders and every assistance of the circar. This they do, on account of their contentions, vice and indolence, and principally, because, before the establishment of a rent, they wish their land to yield little, so that the future tax on it be low. They too it is, who pay the regulated *nautsallavoo* and *batta*: but these expenses now are only temporary, and after this fusly, will cease. It is they also, on whom all exactions fall; but they at present submit to none, which they do not pay out of some fraud on the circar. Under the Mahratta government, they were heavily oppressed. In their actual state, they may be looked upon, as men between farmers and landlords, who have raised themselves above the labour and expense of cultivation; who are too idle even to superintend it, and too avaricious to pay for its small works; who obstruct it, by their contentions and policy; who are willing instruments to the public servants, for the plunder of the circar revenue; and who, differently from the custom of every other country, even in India, consume nearly half the subsistence which should go to the strength and population of the most useful class of the people. This peculiar evil arose from the peculiar heaviness in the tyranny of the late Mahratta system. Without relieving themselves from the expense, and taking a large portion of the profit of cultivation, it was impossible for the *meerassadars* to bear the injustice of government. The evil, as it sprang from a defective system of administration, has diminished, and is likely, of its own accord, to fall, during the progress of an efficient one. Violence appears not necessary. During the period of my service, nothing has been taken from the *meerassadars*. On the contrary, they have received numerous and material benefits: but I have assigned a large portion of those benefits to the *paragoodies*. These people will thus acquire a sense of the right of stock and labour. The future renters, whoever they may be, will perceive and demand the right of rent. The *meerassadars* must become either labourers, farmers, or landlords; and their present station, which entitles them to neither of those names, cannot but experience, in the natural course of events, a gradual dissolution. This peculiarity alone seems sufficient to account for the extraordinary degree of vice in Tanjore. The power of the *meerassadars* to acquire property, without working for it, evidently gives them leisure to increase it, according to their education, by fraud and violence of every kind.

13. The *meerassadars*, like other natives of any property, seem to record, with invariable constancy, every thing they receive or issue, whether it be money or a commodity, a gift or a payment, a bribe or an exaction, and an earning or a robbery. Such is their propensity for committing to writing every thing regarding their land, that they provide, in favour of all disbursements made in their villages by government, the same remembrance, from generation to generation.

14. Yet the style of these records is irregular, confused, and, to Europeans, often unintelligible. A *meerassadar*, when he sells or abandons his possession, often uselessly carries his accounts along with him, and when he dies, they are perhaps no where to be found. To deprive relations of the full share due to them in his estate, and to keep from government a knowledge of the value of his land, and of his thefts, he confines, with the most jealous care, his accounts to his own perusal. He usually has a false set, depreciating his property, and omitting his plunder, ready to show, when called upon to answer a charge of embezzlement.

Extract from general REPORT of Board of Revenue at Fort St. George; dated  
1st August 1805.

Para. 279. On the *meerassee* tenure, as existing in Tanjore, we had frequent occasion to address your Lordship. The rights of the *meerassadars*, or *utadies*, and *paracudies*, in Tanjore especially, were particularly explained by Mr. Harris to the Committee, in his Report of the 9th May 1804, and forwarded to us by your Lordship, under date the 22d Sept. last. The tenures under which the former respectively hold their lands, were explained by Mr. Wallace to be, first, *yekab'hogum*, or individual possession: when the whole lands of a village belong to a single person, who cultivates them, either by himself or agents, or entrusts them to *paracudies*, by which tenure, 1,807 villages are held in Tanjore, the *yekab'hogum* proprietor is at liberty to dispose of either the whole, or part of his right of cultivation, by sale or otherwise, at his pleasure. If he dispose of a part only, the tenure becomes *palab'hogum*, or separate possession.

280. The second description of tenure, refers to lands divided between two or more individuals, who are each answerable to the state, for the amount of revenue derivable from their portion respectively, which they cultivate in such manner as they think proper. Of this description, are 2,202 villages. The *palab'hogum* proprietor possesses the same rights in his share, as the persons holding under the preceding tenure, do, in whole villages.

281. The third tenure is called *sanadayum*, or possession in coparturcy, under which, the lands of a village are held by many *utadies*, who may cultivate them jointly, may commit them to one of the partners, or, by general consent, may call in *paracudies*. In either case, the produce is divided among the *utadies*, in proportion to the respective shares they hold; and they are jointly answerable for the public revenue of this description. There are at present, 1,774 villages in the province.

282. The

282. The land proprietors, among whom the villages composing the district, amounting in all to 5,783, are divided, were stated by Mr. Wallace, to be of various casts and description. The Bramins he computed at 17,149. The Shudras, including Hindoos and Christians, 43,442; and the Mahomedans, at 1,457: forming together a proprietary holding, under the several tenures above mentioned, of 62,048 persons. The situation of the sub-tenantry, or *paracudies*, having been already explained to your lordship, we deemed it superfluous to mention them further, than to observe, that of the number of villages noticed in this paragraph, 1,898 were cultivated wholly by them, and 1,923 jointly by them and by the *ulcudies*.

283. The rate of *warum*, or share of the state and the proprietor respectively, is not affected by the nature of the tenure, but by the cast of the proprietor, the Bramin receiving a higher *warum* than the rest.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Land Te-  
nures in the Carnatic,  
Tanjore, and Mysore  
Territory.

Extract from REPORT of principal Collector of TANJORE and TRICHINOPOLY,  
of 8th September 1805.

Without entering on the question of who is proprietor of the soil, I will content myself with stating, that immemorial usage has established, both in Tanjore and Trichinopoly, that the occupants, whether distinguished by the names of *meerassadar* or *mahajanums*, have the right of selling, bestowing, devising, and bequeathing their lands, in the manner which, to them, is most agreeable. Whether this right was originally granted by the ancient constitution of the country, appears to me not worth considering, at the present day. I think it a fortunate circumstance, that the right does at present exist: whether it originated in encroachment of the sovereign's right, in a wise and formal abrogation of those rights, or in institutions coeval with the remotest antiquity. It is fortunate, that at a moment when we are consulting on the means of establishing the property and welfare of the numerous people of these provinces, we find the lands of the country in the hands of men, who feel and understand the full rights and advantages of possession; who have enjoyed them, in a degree more or less secure, before the British name was known in India; and who, in consequence of them, have rendered populous and fertile, the extensive provinces of Tanjore and Trichinopoly. The class of proprietors to whom I allude, are not to be considered, as the actual cultivators of the soil: the far greater mass of them, till their lands by means of hired labourers, or by a class of people termed *pullers*, who are of the lowest, and who may be considered as the slaves of the soil. The landed property of these provinces, is divided and subdivided in every possible degree. There are proprietors of 4,000 acres, of 400 acres, of 40 acres, and of one acre.

Extract Report of Prin-  
cipal Collector of Tan-  
jore and Trichinopoly,  
of 8 Sept. 1805.

Extract from REPORT of TANJORE Committee; dated 22d February 1807.

2. Without entering on a discussion of the nature of the property held by the inhabitants of Tanjore, or of the tenures by which it is held, the committee will adopt the usual designation of that property; viz. *merassee*, in alluding to the cultivators of this province; and, to be clearly understood, they will here state, that the number of villages in Tanjore, are 5,873; viz.

<i>Yeekab'hogum</i> , or villages in which one individual holds the entire undivided lands	Villages.
	1,807
<i>Paulb'hogum</i> villages, the property in the land of which, is held by several persons, each however possessing his own land, as a separate property, and always holding the same spots of land	2,202
<i>Summa'dayum</i> villages, the landed property of which, is held in common, by all the meerassadars of the villages; each, however, possessing his proportion of the common stock; but not possessing a claim to any particular spot of land, beyond the period for which it is usual to make a division of the whole cultivation	1,774
	<u>5,783</u>

3. The number of meerassadars who are Bramins, is computed to be	17,149
Of Soodras, including native christians	43,442
Mahomedans	1,457
TOTAL	<u>62,048</u>

4. The revenue of the government of India, is chiefly derived from a share of the produce of the land. It is the foregoing 62,048 persons, denominated meerassadars, who create that revenue in Tanjore.

Extract from REPORT of Collector of DINDIGUL; dated 24th April 1808.

Para. 5. Previous to this investigation (alluding to the survey rents established some years before), the revenue was collected according to an ancient custom of the country, which





vated, to a stranger of his or their procuring, the meerasadar would consider himself proprietor of the land, claim his sawny bogub, and not consider his title to the land to be invalidated by his temporary inability. By allowing the pyacarry of the circar to cultivate it, subject to the usual small fee, as an acknowledgment of his property in the land, the meerasadar does not preclude either the circar, or the circar's representative, from rendering the land an available resource.

Inability to cultivate, is a very indefinite term, by which to determine a cessation of right. The entire loss of his labourers by contagious disease, or his cattle by a murrain, may produce inability for one year or for two; but it would be a hard case, and an accumulation of misfortunes, if his meerassee was liable to transfer to another under these misfortunes, without his consent. Upon what, are the violent disputes respecting waste lands, founded, if not on some right of the parties disputing, to the occupancy of the ground, or to some kind of property in it? The ground has often no value, at the time of the dispute, to either party, as referring to cultivation; but is of great value, as relates to right in it. It might not always, it is true, be the interest of the zemindar or mootahdar to put in a stranger; but he should not possess the power to do an unjust act, because there are cases where, in a mootah of a single village, the removal of the meerasadars would secure an immediate benefit. If this inference be correct, there cannot exist, more than there does now, two properties in land, as described in a paper sent to the Board of Revenue.

In opposition to this right, long established and enjoyed, not only here, but in other parts of the Carnatic, it has been contended that the zemindar or mootahdar has an exclusive right to all land not under cultivation; and that whatever land the meerasadar may decline, or be unable to cultivate, the circar, or its representative, the zemindar, may grant the meerassee property of that land to another, as an inducement to him to cultivate, without subjecting the new settler to any demand from the original meerasadar.

As the Regulations do not contain any rule regarding this right, I have been induced to bring it forward, in order that the subject may be discussed, in the event of its being at any time proposed to grant an exclusive right in all uncultivated land, to the zemindar or mootahdar. As all meerasadars can establish their right by an appeal to custom, which is the foundation of law, they need not have any regulation passed in their favour, because, if they can prove their right in a court of justice, which I have not the smallest doubt of their being able to do, it will be accorded them, unless a zemindar or mootahdar can show a particular law to the contrary—whether the section above specified, contains a law to the contrary, is doubtful. The terms of the pottahs, would form the ground of refusal: and it is only in case of the meerasadar refusing just terms, or all terms, that he is liable to be ousted: at least, this is the construction I should put on that section. Having ousted the meerasadar, the mootahdar would still be liable to prosecution, and be forced to move the previous question, viz, that the terms of the pottah he tendered, were just and legal, that is, according to established custom: for it was not the intention (indeed, the reverse is distinctly stated to be the object) of the permanent rent, and the establishment of the courts, that the rights of the cultivators should be infringed or injured, on introducing what is called the new system of revenue and jurisprudence.

Extract from Mr. HODGSON'S REPORT on the Revenue of DINDIGUL; dated 28th March 1808.

Para. 32. In Dindigul, as in all the provinces south of Madras, a property in the land, is invested in the resident inhabitants of each village.

40. Much has been said of the boasted proprietary right of the owners of private estates in Canara and Malabar; and elaborate disquisitions of the superior and inferior rights of the *jelmkar guency*, *chally guency*, and *mool guency* of Canara, have been entered into, to prove that we should do an act of injustice, in selling the proprietary right in the lands in Canara, as we have done elsewhere. When this is argued, proprietary right is understood as an unlimited right: and the analogy between the *canalchikadars*, *ool-koodies* and *pyakoodies* with *jelmkar*, *mool guency* and *chally guency*, is disputed.

When I assert, that, in no part of our territories in India, are the lands cultivated by hired labourers paid by government, or by its slaves, I do not fear contradiction. When I say that by far the largest portion of the territory of India is cultivated either by slaves or labourers, I am as little afraid of the position being denied me. If then these slaves or hired labourers who drive the plough, are not in the pay of government, by whom are they paid? They are paid by a description of persons, whose denomination varies with the variation in the local languages, and whom we know, under the general term of cultivator or ryot. In many parts of India, I assert, with as little fear of contradiction, that where a Bramin has the property in the land, which the laws of his religion do not allow of his cultivating with his own hands, three descriptions of persons subsist on the produce of the land.

\* Sect. 20, Regulation XXX, 1804. "When under-farmers, or ryots, may refuse to exchange land, or engage in exchange with proprietors or farmers of land, defining the terms on which such under-farmer or ryot are to hold their lands, and may persist in such refusal for the space of one month, after the prescribed pottahs may have been offered, in the presence of witnesses, by the proprietors or farmers of land; such proprietors or farmers of land shall have power to grant the lands of the under-farmers or ryots so refusing, to other persons." It is believed, that pyacarry

have demanded these conditions, and that it has been granted in some instances.

† *Canalchikadar*, proprietor, or proprietor, and fully answers to *jelmkar*. *Ool pyakoodie* is the tenant for ever, resident cultivator of a village, without property. *Pyakoodie*, means a stranger, or man engaging for a term, being therefore tenant at will. Where the *canalchik* is mortgaged, there will be, in Canara, a fourth description of persons, answering to (sic in orig.)



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- 1st. The Bramin.
- 2d. The Shudra, who undertakes to cultivate the Bramin's property, and to pay him for it, a rent in kind.
- 3d. The slave, or hired servant, who assists the Shudra.

Para. 56. It is not the expediency that I mean to discuss: but I venture to affirm, that the right of the people in Canara or Malabar, would not be injured or infringed by the establishment, in those provinces, of the Permanent System, as established in Bengal, and on this side of India; and that, with a difference in value only, private estates exist as much, in every part of India, as they do, in Canara and Malabar.

Extract from Mr. HODGSON'S REPORT on the Revenues of COIMBATGOR; dated  
Sept. 10th, 1807.

Extract Report of Mr.  
Hodgson on Coimbatour,  
10 Sept. 1807.

Para. 13. It is here worthy of remark, how small a portion of the land of this extensive district, is capable of being occupied as paddy land. Out of a total cultivation of 1,045,116 cawnies, only 37,807 cawnies are *nunjah*, being about 3 per cent. of the whole. With the exception of this comparatively small tract of *nunjah* land, and such land as is capable of being watered by labour from wells or running streams, the annual cultivation of the country, depends on the falling rains. As those rains are scarce or abundant, the crop must be scanty or prolific. It most frequently happened, under the uncertainty of the seasons, particularly of late years, that the ryot must have sown without reaping; while the produce of the crops he did reap, must have varied with every variation of the season. That this circumstance is more or less the case every where, is true; but it must be, in this province, in a greater degree, is not to be doubted, where the whole of the cultivation of the greater part of the ryots, is *punjah* only.

14. In a country where the proportion of arable waste is greater than the land under cultivation, it cannot be expected that land, particularly *nunjah*, should be valuable property, or transferrable by sale or mortgage. It could never be worth the while of an individual wishing to occupy land, to purchase the field already occupied, while so many fields were to be had without premium, on application to the officers of government. A favourable rate of assessment on a field obtained by chance, or other means, or improvements made by the digging of wells, could alone give value to *punjah* land. It is accordingly found, that lands with wells, called and classed as garden land, are a valuable property, and are transferred by sale, or are mortgaged: that the occupancy of *punjah* land, is not a saleable property: yet to deprive the individual of the field he has long cultivated, while he continues to pay the rent, is felt, and complained of, as an act of injustice.

15. The same inhabitants have, however, inhabited the same villages, and ploughed the same fields, time immemorial. The oppressions of the house of Hyder, and particularly the additional assessment made by Tippee Sultaun, may have produced a temporary desertion; but these deserters have returned, from time to time, to their fields. Neither the Hindoo or Mussulman government appear (supposing their right in the soil as proprietors to be indisputable; and proprietary right, to be a right to demand what the proprietor pleases for his land) ever to have exercised the right. What was fair assessment, and what was exaction, was well known to the party governing, and those governed. It is true, where, as under Tippee Sultaun's reign, exaction had no limit, landed property could have no value; but where fraud could not counteract oppression, a hope of change for the better, or inability to resist, produced submission, till the load became too heavy to bear, and emigration the only source of relief.

16. The *nunjah* land having been generally under aumanic, the crop divided between the circar and ryot, and a great portion of it in the occupation of Bramins, and being less liable to a total failure of the crop, than *punjah* land, it became a valuable and transferrable property; and has, in consequence, been transferred at various times, through numerous hands. Since the introduction of the survey rents in the southern division, where the rates are lower than in the northern, the value of the property in *nunjah* land, has considerably increased in that division.

17. It does not appear, on enquiry, that there are in this province any individual farmers who occupy large farms. By farms, are meant, not rents, but land. Rawenachory, a relation of the dewan of Mysore, possesses 3,988 cawnies in the Caroor district, paying an annual revenue of about 20,000 R<sup>s</sup>. Some few head inhabitants hold farms of about 1,000 chuckrums annual rent; but the rent of by far the greater number, does not exceed thirty C. chuckrums, and, on an average, may be eight chuckrums, and of many, is as low as one chuckrum.

22. Many occupiers of land, have no stock or cattle, but let their lands to under tenants, agreeing to give them one-third of the gross produce, they finding seed, cattle, and labour; the occupiers taking the responsibility of the rent, and chances of the seasons. This is an arrangement favourable to poor ryots, who incur no risk, and are not harassed for rent. It is favourable to those occupiers of lands, who have other means of livelihood, or wish to seek them. They need only attend or send an agent, at the time of reaping, and provide for the payment of the dues of government. The rest of the year, they can follow their other avocations.

## Appendix, No. 26.

## MEMORANDUMS OF POLIGARS OF THE CEDED DISTRICTS;

Enclosed in Report of Principal Collector; dated 20th March 1802.

## No. 1.—TIRMUL RAJ, of ANNAGOONDAY:

AFTER the conquest of Bijnuggur by the Mussulman princes of the Deccan, the nominal rajahs were allowed to retain Annagoonday, and some other districts, amounting to the kamul rent of cantaroy pagodas 1,78,725. 9. 54. They held this territory in jageer, free of all rent, for several generations. The time when peshcush was first imposed is not ascertained. It appears, however, to have been previous to 1749; for the Mahratta chiefs, Nana and Sudabah, arriving in that year with an army at Bijnuggur, to pay their devotions at the pagoda of Hunpi, the rajah, instead of waiting upon them, absconded; for which reason they deprived him of some small districts, and still make him pay, it is said, his *old* peshcush of cantaroy pagodas 7,000. In 1775, Hyder raised the peshcush to 12,000 pagodas, and also stipulated that the rajah should serve, when called upon, with 1,000 foot and 100 horse, at his own expense, except batta, which was to be paid by the cirkar. In 1786, Tippoo entered Annagoonday, expelled the rajah, burned his palace, with all his records, and annexed the district to the cirkar lands. The rajah, on the commencement of the confederate war in 1790, against Tippoo Sultaun, again seized the district, but was driven out, in 1792, by Cummur ul Deen Khan. He made himself master of it again in 1799; and did not submit, till he was compelled by the approach of the army. The dewan of Mysore took the management of the country from him, and gave him a monthly allowance of 2,000 rupees, which was reduced to 1,500 rupees, when Annagoondy was given over to the Nizam; and it is now continued at this rate, by order of government.

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The rajah is a man of very mean capacity, little removed from idiotism. His son was so ill treated by him, that, thinking his life in danger, he has fled for refuge to one of the Mahratta zemindars, by whom he is supported; for his father allows him nothing.

## No. 2.—BUSWAPAH, NAIGUE of HARPONHELLY.

The ancestor of the family was Dadapah, the talliar of two villages in Harponhelly, who, on the dissolution of the Bijnugger empire, collected a few followers, and seized a part of the neighbouring districts. He was, however, with most of the petty chiefs who started up at that time, obliged to submit to the king of Bejapoor, to whom he paid a peshcush of 350 pag<sup>a</sup>, and rendered service with 100 men. His successors appear to have taken advantage of the decline of the Bejapoor power to extend their territory; for, before the conquest of that kingdom by Aurengzebe, instead of 37 villages, they had 460, of which the kamul rent was C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 2,70,860, for which they paid a peshcush of only 4,200 C. Pag<sup>a</sup>. In the beginning of the last century, the peshcush was raised to C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 8,208; and about 50 years afterwards it was raised to C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 22,908, which was paid partly to Moraree Row, and partly to the nabob of Sera; but besides the peshcush, the poligars were subjected to frequent exactions by the Mahrattahs, of two or three lacks of rupees at a time. They had, however, in the same time, added considerably to their revenue, by the seizure of 92 villages belonging to the zemindar of Jeninulla, another petty chief. The peshcush was fixed by Hyder at C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 72,000, and continued, without alteration, till 1786, when Tippoo subdued the province, and sent the poligar Buswapah Nair prisoner to Seringapatam, where he died.

In 1792, after the peace of Seringapatam, when Perseram Bhow was on his march to his own country, the present poligar was presented to him as the heir of the family, and was by him directed to be installed: but the poligar, with his party, was obliged to fly a few days after, by the advance of one of the Sultaun's detachments. He again took possession of Harponhelly, on the fall of Seringapatam; but, as he came in to General Harris, with all his followers, upon the first summons, it was thought that his conduct entitled him to particular favour. A jagheer of 20,000 C. Pag<sup>a</sup>, which he solicited, was granted by the dewan of Mysore, on the recommendation of the general; and the arrangement was approved by the Governor General in council.

The present poligar does not appear to have had, previous to this transaction, any well-founded claim to the succession. The father of Dadapah, the first poligar, had, by a second wife, four sons, who obtained from Dadapah the village of Nurjeuhall in jagheer, for their subsistence. When the direct line failed, it was usual to supply the vacancy by taking one of the descendants of the four sons of the second marriage from this village. Buswapah Nair, who died in confinement at Seringapatam, was in this manner adopted in 1767, by the widow of the former poligar, Som Shaker Naig, who had died without issue. The present man is said to be the son of Auyapah, the brother of this Buswapah; which, even if true, would give him no right to the inheritance, because the right of Buswapah was created solely by adoption. The present poligar could have had no title that would not, in a superior degree, have belonged to his father Auyapah; but the father having been set aside, shows that neither of them had any; that the line was extinct; and that the brahmins, who had held

See orig.

the principal offices under former poligars, set up a boy, merely for the purpose of retaining the management of affairs in their own hands.

It is by this means that zemindars are every where to the cirkar, because the chief servants, in order to secure their own situations, which are generally hereditary, whenever the line is extinct, take care to bring forward a child from some quarter or other.

## No. 3.—JENIMULLA, MULLEK AYUN NAIGUE.

The founder of the family, Pennapah Naigüe, for his services in seizing a rebellious chief, was rewarded by Atchet Kayel, of Bijnugger, with a personal jagheer of four sumnats, or maganies, valued at the kamul rent of Mahomed Shahi, pagodas 15,300; and also another jagheer of twelve maganies, of the kamal rent of Mahomed Shahi, pagodas 35,150, for the service of 500 horse, and 300 peons. Four of the maganies were resumed by the Bejapoor kings; and for the remainder, the poligar was to pay a peishcush of 20,000 rupees, and serve with 300 horse, and 2,000 peons. Under Aurengzebe, another maganie was resumed; his service was reduced to 1,000 peons, and his peishcush raised to 50,000 rupees. He made himself master, a few years afterwards, of Sundoor; but Suddajee Gorpuuy, in 1728, took from him both Sundoor and Coortani, and forced him to pay eight years' chout. In 1742, the poligars of Chittledroog and Harponhelly stripped him of all his possessions, except the single maganie of Terramulla, for which he paid a peishcush of 2,000 R<sup>s</sup> to the Mahrattas. In 1752, he was entirely subjected by the poligar of Chittledroog, who obliged him to serve with 500 peons, and to remit his peishcush through him. In 1767, when Chittledroog became tributary to Hyder, the poligar of Terramulla having complained to him of his having been deprived of his inheritance, was, on that account, put to death by the poligar of Chittledroog. The son fled to Solapoor; but returning, and performing some service to Hyder at the siege of Chittledroog, in 1777, he was re-instated in Terramulla, to pay a peishcush of 1,500 Madras Pag<sup>s</sup>, and a nuzzer of 500. He accompanied Hyder into the Carnatic in 1780, with 1,000 peons, and 100 horse, which were paid by the cirkar. In 1787, Tippoo resumed the district, and carried the present poligar to Seringapatam, where he appointed him a bukshi, with a monthly allowance of 300 rupees; but, being alarmed by a report of the Sultaun's intending to circumcise him, he fled next year to Solapoor. He returned, and seized his district during the campaign of 1791, and paid a peishcush of 20,000 rupees to the Mahrattas; but was expelled at the peace. He then went to Hyderabad, where, I believe, he received some pension. When Terrimullah was made over to the Nizam, in 1799, he was allowed to rent that district, at its full value; but having fallen into arrears, and being apprehensive that he would be seized and fined, when the country was about to be transferred to the Company, he took refuge in Mysore. He has since returned, and is now soliciting an allowance for his maintenance.

## No. 4.—BELLARI, VEERAMA.

The ancestor of the family, Balud Hunma Naigue, held the office of dewan under the ryels of Bijnugger. He had five sons, who afterwards established five different zemindaries—Mullapah Naigue, in Bellari; Muddalingah Ramapah Naigue, in Conduppi and Kunnikal; Dewapah Naigue, in Numdial; Mullah Naigue, in Hundi Anuntpoor, who succeeded to the office of dewan; and Ankis Naigue, in Chettapet and Chingleput.

Mullapah Naigue, of Bellari, enjoyed a personal jagheer of 35 villages, and held 75 more, with the employments of sirna gour, and the rissooms attached to it, for the service of 2,000 peons. The Bejapoor princes imposed a peishcush on him of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,750; and raised his service peons to 3,000.

His personal jagheer was resumed under Aurengzebe; his peons fixed at 2,500, and his peishcush at C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 3,500. In Fusly 1132, the Mahrattas imposed a chout of R<sup>s</sup> 5,000. In 1151, the service of peons was remitted, and the peishcush raised to R<sup>s</sup> 40,000. In 1775, when Hyder took Bellari, the poligar made his escape. He returned, and levied contributions, in 1791, but was driven out the year following, and is since dead.

• He was descended from a distant female branch of the family, and was adopted by his predecessor, who had no children. He also has left no issue; and, though some pretenders have appeared, there is, in fact, no heir in existence. His widow, who was forced to abscond under the Mysore government, has returned. She has an adopted son; but, as he is no relation of the ancient line, he can have no claim to inherit any allowance that may be granted her during life.

## No. 5.—KOTCONDAB, CHINNAMAH and TIMAMAH.

Permapah Nair, the ancestor, was talliar of the village of Goncondlah in Causul. On the fall of the Bijnugger government, he collected 500 men, and went to Golcondah, where he was employed many years, and afterwards obtained the kaweli of the districts of Adoni, Canoul, Gudwal, Rachore and Mudgul, and served with 500 men. The rate of kaweli was one per cent. on the cirkar revenue, and one crore of grain from each village. One of his descendants, Mudapah Nair, served under Aurungzebe, and procured from him a confirmation of the kaweli, and the districts of Kotcondah and Kapitral, estimated at kamul C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 15,443, for a rent of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 13,325, and the service of 500 men. Asoph Jah continued the districts to the poligar on the same terms as before. A partition, at this time, took place between two branches of the family, the one getting Kotcondah, and the other Kapitral. In June 1770, Bassalet Jung, being unable to enforce the payment of their peishcush, called in Hyder, who reduced their forts, and delivered them to him. The poligars escaped; but the two brothers, Madapah and Permapah, of Kotcondah, waited on Hyder in 1773, who gave them some enannus in Gootty, where Mudapah died. Permapah accompanied him to the Carnatic, and was appointed one of the Killadars of Arcot,

Arct, in which situation he died. His mother, who had remained in Adoni, obtained in 1777, from Bassalet Jung, the cirkar village of Hulgnerah in jagheer. It was taken from her in 1788, when Mahabut Jung gave her Kotcondah in rent for cantaroy pagodas 13,000: on her death the following year, the widows of her two sons, Madapah and Pennapah, rented it till 1796, when it was placed under the cirkar aumildars, and Hulgnerah was again given to the widows for their maintenance: Its kamul rent is cantaroy pagodas 365. Its present rent is cantaroy pagodas 536; but I have resumed it, and the widows now receive a pension from the rent, of cantaroy pagodas 600. They have also enaums, producing about cantaroy pagodas 78 more.

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No. 6.—KAPITRAL, SEETAMAH and CHINAMAU.

When the district was reduced by Hyder, as mentioned in No. 5, the poligar Chota Madapah, then a boy, escaped; but being brought back by his relations in 1777, Bassalet Jung gave him the two villages of Radalmundeeri and Kunnuk for his maintenance, and both Katcondah and Kapitral continued under the charge of aumildars till 1788, when Mahabut Jung gave Kapitral in rent to Madapah, for cantaroy pag<sup>a</sup> 6,500. Madapah Nair died in 1790, leaving two widows, one of which was with child of Gopaul Nair, who died in 1799. On Madapah's death, the widows were allowed a pension of 100 rupees each; but Kapitral continued to be rented in the name of Gopaul Nair, by his uncle Kishoo Nair, of Pundicondah, till 1796, when it was given over to the cirkar aumildars. In 1798, both Kapitral and Cotcondah were rented by Munsoor ul Doulah, to one Sambayah and Lallmunni, poligar of Pundicondah, who withheld his rent in 1799. Kapitral, when he had fortified himself, was taken; but he escaped to Canoul, from whence he returned after getting cowle, and was restored to the management of the districts, on agreeing to pay up all arrears, and a nuzzer of 12,000 rupees; both districts are now placed under aumildars, and the widows receive their old pension of 100 rupees each.

No. 7.—DOODIKONDAH, PERMAUL NAIR.

Under the Bijnuggur government, Mullapah Nair was kawelgar of Doodikoondah and Pundicondah; he had two sons, to one of whom, Ramah Nair, he left Pundikondah, and to the other, Papah Nair, Doodicondah. Both of them, rented their districts. Papah Nair was rated by the kamul, at cantaroy pag<sup>a</sup> 1,127, for which he paid C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 325, and served with 200 peons. The service was remitted by Asoph Jah, and the peishcush raised to C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,024, at which standard it has ever since remained; but as the kaweli is now stopt, and the district yields only cantaroy pagodas 923; a sum of cantaroy pagodas 450, is allotted for the maintenance of the poligar, and he is to pay the balance to government.

No. 8.—PUNDICONDAH, LALL MUNNI.

This poligar, as mentioned above, is the same family as No. 7.; his ancestor, Ramah Nair, held this district, kamul cantaroy pagodas 1,035 under the Bijnuggur government, for a rent of cantaroy pagodas 162, and the service of 100 peons. The service was remitted, and the peishcush raised, by Asoph Jah, to cantaroy pagodas 300, at which sum it has ever since continued. The poligar now receives cantaroy pagodas 481, from the rent of his district, and pays the rest to the aumildar.

No. 9.—DEWANCONDAH, RAHMAN NAIGUE.

The ancestor served under the Bejapoor government, with 100 peons, and held Dewancondah for a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 812. 5. His son, having been engaged in some disturbances under Naser Jung, was taken and circumcised. Three of his villages were resumed, and the remaining three given to him for a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 812. Basalet Jung restored two of the villages, and fixed the rent of the five at cantaroy pagodas 1,527. 5. He rebelled in 1768, was taken, and kept in prison till 1786, when he was released, and his five villages restored to him, at the old rent, by Mahabut Jung; he died in 1795. The present poligar, Hussien Naigue, is only fourteen years of age; he receives cantaroy pagodas 234, for his maintenance, and the villages are under the management of the potails.

No. 10.—BUSWAPOOR, NUNDIKESHOO NAIGUE.

Panpah Nair, the ancestor of the poligars of Buswapoor Poolalcherroo and Bolapillee, served under the Bijnuggur Rayels, with 450 peons, and obtained the district of Dornal in jagheer, for this payment, of which the rayel valuation was Madras pagodas 8,779. 11 A. On the conquest of the country by the Hyderabad kings, he was allowed to retain his jagheer, on condition of serving with 600 peons. But the kamul, which was then fixed, was only Madras pagodas 6,625. 6., about one fourth below the Bijnaggur assessment, which was probably owing to the ravages of the war. In 1700, the service was reduced by Aurungzebe's officers to 300 men, and a peishcush imposed of cantaroy pagodas 2,275. About the year 1712, the pollam was divided among the three different branches of the family, and in 1789, Buswapoor and Bolapilly were annexed to Canoul, while Poolalcherroo remained under Cuddapah. The Buswapoor division consisted of six villages, kamul rent cantaroy pag<sup>a</sup> 3,861, for which the poligar paid a peishcush of C. pag<sup>a</sup> 1,400. The poligar, Rungapah Nair, who died in 1774, left three sons; but the pollam was seized by his brother, Condapah Nair, who soon after removed, and another brother, Ramapah Nair, appointed by the nabob, on his agreeing to raise the peishcush to cantaroy pagodas 2,100; he was, however, driven out in 1784, by Tippoo Sultan, who took and named Madapah Nair, one of the sons of Rungapah Nair. Another of the sons, Alundakishoo Nair, the present poligar, made his escape, but returned, and was restored by the Nizam's officers in 1791, on con-  
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dition of paying the former peishcush cantaroy pag<sup>a</sup> 2,100. He agreed last year to pay an addition of 1,000 R<sup>s</sup>, but refused to come to the cutcherry. But as he not only failed in his payments, but persisted in his refusal to come in, he was expelled, and his district resumed in January last.

**No. 11.—POOLALCHENOO, JELLI DEWAUKER NAIR.**

This poligar is descended from Paupah Nair, mentioned in No. 10. About the year 1719, the Poolalchenoo poligar, who had only six villages, obtained 49 more in rent. The kamul of the whole together was cantaroy pagodas 4,706, for which he paid only cantaroy pagodas 1,835, probably on account of their desolate condition; and the service of peons was also discontinued. About the year 1729, forty-five of the villages were, by a royal sunnad, given in jagheer to Ackbar Khan and Sher Jeman Khan; and for the remaining eight, he paid a peishcush of Madras pagodas 402½. He rented the jagheerdars, but withheld the rent after 1739; in which he was encouraged by the nabob of Cuddapah, to whom he again paid the former peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 1,855. In 1779, the present poligar was expelled by Hyder, and fled to the Carnatic. He returned, and took possession of his district, in 1791; and he also obtained 16 additional villages in rent from the Nizam's officers, making altogether 71 villages, rated by Tippoo's assessment at cantaroy pagodas 17,833, for which he only paid cantaroy pag<sup>a</sup> 4,037. On the transfer of the country to the Company, the 16 new villages were resumed, and a trifling increase made to the peishcush of the old ones. As he, however, refused to come in last year to the cutcherry; and not only refused to come in the present year, but sent parties of peons, and collected above half the rent of the resumed villages; he has been expelled, and is now among the hills, with a party of his followers. He made an incursion in January last, and plundered two villages, and the aumildar's treasury.

**No. 12.—BOLLAPILLI, JELLI BUSWAPAH NAIR.**

This poligar is a descendant of Paupah Nair, mentioned in N<sup>o</sup> 10; and when the inheritance was divided about 1712, his ancestors obtained for their share 13 of the old villages, and one new one, given by the Cuddapah Nabob. The kamul of the whole was C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 3,791, for which they paid a peishcush of C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,750. No other change happened till 1779, when the father of the present poligar was driven out by Hyder. The son recovered his district in 1791; and at the same time, got eleven additional villages from the Nizam's managers. The whole were valued by Tippoo's assessment at C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 7,042, for which he paid peishcush C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,905, and nuzzer C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 780: Total, C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 2,685. The nuzzer is usually an annual payment, but frequently withheld when government is weak. Buswapah Nair, accordingly, appears to have paid it very irregularly under the late government.

When the country was ceded to the Company, new villages were resumed, and a small addition was made to his peishcush; but, as he persisted, both in the last and present years, in resuming to come to the cutcherry, it became necessary to expel him. He fled, with a few followers, into the Canoul district, but was taken by a detachment in January last, owing chiefly to the exertions of Mr. Græme, the collector of Cumbum.

**No. 13.—SANTAPANYNI, SESACHELPUTTI NAIQUE.**

The ancestor served the Bijnugger rajahs with 500 peons, for the pay of which 18 villages in Butweyel and Pormainilah, amounting to kamul rent C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 5,699, were assigned to him in 1436. The family held the same villages after the conquest of the country by the Hydrabad kings, paying peishcush C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,522, and serving with 300 peons. Aurungzebe raised the peishcush to 2,100 Pag<sup>a</sup>. The nabobs of Cuddapah gave them 38 additional villages, making total 56 villages, kamul rent C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 13,992, for a peishcush of

Rupees - - - - -	7,950
Nuzzer - - - - -	3,000
Durbar Khirch, or fees -	3,500

14,450 Rupees;

or C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 5,057. The whole were resumed in 1779 by Hyder; but the poligar being a man of a quiet disposition, was suffered to rent them for C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 3,892; which, as 28 of them had been waste for many years, was their full value at the time. He held them at the same rate, under the Sultaun; and, in 1791, the Nizam's officers gave him five new villages, and raised his peishcush to 2,588. I continued to him the old 56 villages at peishcush C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 2,571; but, as he had anticipated a great part of his rents to pay military peons to protect him against Buswapah Nair of Bollapilli, who had seized several of his villages, there was a balance against him, at his death, of C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,242. His son now receives an allowance from the rent, of C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 850.

**No. 14.—RAWOOR, SOOBAN NAIR.**

In the time of Aurungzebe, the ancestor obtained 13 villages in rent, valued by the kamul at C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 3,127, for which he paid the full rent, but was afterwards allowed a reduction for waste; and either for this cause, or other, the rent under the Cuddapah nabobs was reduced to C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 803. In 1779, Hyder raised the rent to C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,206, at which rate the poligar, never having joined in any disturbances, was allowed to hold his villages under Tippoo also. In 1791, the Nizam's officers reduced the rent to the old standard, C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 803. Two of his villages, being waste, are resumed. He receives C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 148 from the produce of the others as a pension, and pays the balance of rent to government.

## No. 15.—CHUPPALMURRAGOO BODI MULLANAH.

The family rented seven villages in the time of the Hyderabad kings, at the full kamul rent of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 357. Under Aurangzebe they paid only C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 65, but maintained 50 peons. In 1719, the Cuddapah nabob remitted the service, and raised the rent to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 300, which was raised by Hyder to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 373. The poligar held his polkam privately under the Sultan's government; and, in 1792, the Nizam's officers gave him an additional village, which, together with the old ones, amounted to kamul C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 306, for C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 234. The new village is now resumed, as well as one of the old ones, which is waste. He is allowed C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 53, and pays the balance of rent to the amildar.

## No. 16.—VENCATADRY, PALLIM BODI VEERANAH.

This poligar, and No. 15, are descended from the same ancestor, who, besides the seven villages mentioned above, rented also 18 under the Hyderabad kings at the full kamul rent, C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 448, which went to this branch in the time of Aurangzebe, to whom they paid C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 650. The balance was remitted for the support of 500 peons. The service was afterwards remitted altogether. The poligar fled when Hyder reduced the country; but he returned privately, and rented his villages for C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,137, till the end of Tippoo's government. The rent was lowered under the Nizam to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,014. Seven of his villages, being waste, are now resumed. He is allowed C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 100, and pays the balance of rent to the amildar.

## No. 17.—WOORLAGGONTAH, ANTATAH NAIR.

In 1642, the ancestor, for some services, obtained a jagheer of seven villages kamul, C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 452, for which he was afterwards obliged to maintain 50 peons. The nabobs of Cuddapah remitted the service, and fixed the rent at C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 183. The villages were resumed by Hyder, and rented privately by the poligar for C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 281, until they were made over to the Nizam, when the rent was again lowered to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 183. Three of the villages, being waste, are now resumed. He is allowed C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 36, and pays the balance of rent to the amildar.

## No. 18.—NELLAGOOTLAH, VENCAT NARSOO.

The ancestor served under the Bijnuggur Rayel with 200 peons. On the decline of their power he seized nine villages, but was expelled by the Hyderabad kings, and Aurangzebe; one of his descendants rented the same nine villages kamul 2,763, for rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 325, and the service of 100 peons. The Cuddapah nabobs remitted the service, and, on a count of waste, the rent was only raised to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 543. The poligar fled when the country fell under Hyder; but he returned, and rented his villages privately, for C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 628, till 1791, when the Nizam's servants lowered the rent to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 473. He is now allowed C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 50, and pays the balance of the rent to the amildar.

## No. 19.—HUNDI, ANANTPOOR, SIDDAPAH NAIR.

Siddapah Nair, the ancestor of the family, as mentioned in No. 4, was dewan of Bijnuggur. He submitted to the king of Bejapoor, and obtained a jagheer of kamul rent, C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 45,772. Under Aurangzebe, it was burthened with a peishush of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 11,200, and the service of 1,200 peons, and 150 horse. About 1710, his service was remitted by the nabob of Cuddapah, and his peishush was afterwards reduced by the Mahrattas to 15,000 rupees, in addition to which he paid a chout to Morari Row, of 5,000 rupees. In 1775 Hyder raised his peishush to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 23,625. In 1783, he was sent prisoner by Tippoo with his family, to Seringapatam, but was afterwards appointed a hakshey of Cundachar, with a monthly allowance of 200 R<sup>s</sup>. He was taken at Bangalore in 1791, and being set at liberty, he returned to his district, and was besieging Anantpoor at the time of the peace, when he was driven away by a detachment. He returned after the sultan's death, and took Anantpoor; but, submitting to the Nizam's government, he received the village of Sidrapoor, valued by Tippoo's rental at C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 642 in jagheer, with rissooms in the district of Anantpoor. Sidrapoor, where he resides, is resumed. It might be given to him in part of his pension, without, however, allowing him to make the annual settlement with the ryots.

## No. 20.—NIDAMADDODDI, VENCAMA NAIR.

Chinam Nair served the Bijnuggur rajahs with a few peons, and, on the downfall of the empire, seized his native village, which was continued to him by the kings of Hyderabad for the service of 50 peons, and a peishush of 1,050 rupees. Under Aurangzebe it was raised to 3,000 rupees, and a few years after, to 6,000 rupees, and the service remitted. In 1766, Morari Row fixed it at 6,000 rupees, and nuzzer 1,000. In 1775, Hyder resumed the polkam, but permitted the poligar to remain in it. He enjoyed some small enaums till the year 1792, when the polkam was again delivered over to him by the Nizam's officers for a peishush, or rather rent, of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 2,645. I have since resumed it, and given him an allowance in land.

## No. 21.—RYYDROOG.

The family is descended from the Belivoy of Bijnuggur, who, on the dissolution of that government, seized Pennacondah and Condrippy, estimated at the kamul rent of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,75,174. But Pennacondah was soon after taken from him under the Bejapoor kings; and, in addition to the 75 villages of Condrippy, he obtained 152 in Ryydroog, both together rated at kamul rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,27,385, for which he paid a peishush of R<sup>s</sup> 60,000, and served with 9,000 peons, and 800 horse.

Under Aurangzebe he obtained, or seized, 190 villages in Dharmaven and other districts, which made the total of his possessions C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 2,48,717. His service was remitted, and



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his peishcush raised to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 72,000. Under Asoph Jah he was deprived of some villages, and received others in return; but, as the total rent was less, his peishcush was lowered to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 60,000. No change took place till 1766, when Hyder, having reduced the soubahship of Sera, and wishing to avail himself of the services of the Ryysroog poligar against the neighbouring zemindars, fixed his peishcush at C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 30,000. In 1788, he was seized by Tippoo in camp, and sent prisoner to Seringapatam, where he died a violent death. His son and heir, Vencataputty Nair, who was confined in Bangalore, was killed in attempting to escape, during the assault of that place, in 1791.

Raj Gopal Nair, the son of the daughter of the late poligar, attempted to excite disturbances in 1799, but was taken, and sent to Hydrabad, from whence he was lately transferred to Gootty, where he is now in confinement. Being descended from the female line, he has no title to the inheritance. The male line is extinct. At the same time that Gopaul Nair was made prisoner, three wives of the old poligar, and the wife of his son, were thrown into confinement at Anuntpoor, where they still remain, with several relations and servants. They must still be kept under restraint; for, if they were set at liberty, their names might be employed to raise commotions in the country. They receive one rupee, and Raj Gopal Nair two rupees a day, which is very inadequate to their maintenance.

#### No. 22.—NOSUM, NARSIM REDDY.

The ancestors of this family were, under the Bijnuggur government, principal potails of Chenchamulla, and desmooks of Cumbum, and kept up a body of 2,000 peons, for whose subsistence they were allowed 26,000 cantary pagodas, in part of which they, had an assignment of 54 villages, valued at kamul rent cantary pagodas 10,530. On the decline of the Bijnuggur power, they seized the assigned villages; but being reduced by the Cootub Shahu princes of Hydrabad, two years after, they were permitted to hold their possessions, at a peishcush of cantary pagodas 7,800. They also continued to serve with 200 peons, which, however, were paid by *tnakah*, and not by an assignment of villages. About the year 1709, the head of the family, Gopaul Reddy, and his brother Kisnam Reddy, were deprived of some of their old villages; but as they had rendered some service to Daul Khan, obtained some additional villages, which, with what remained of the last, amounted to the kamul rent of cantary pagodas 26,706, for which they were to pay peishcush cantary pagodas 12,229, and serve with 2,600 peons; but the elder brother had other revenues, besides what arose from these villages, for he had the *haville* and desmooki of certain districts in Cumbum, for which he received 10½ per cent. on the cirkar revenue. It was at this period, that he obtained the office of *kawilgar*; and some accounts say, that his office of desmook was not of an older date.

About the year 1712, the service of peons was remitted; 24 villages were taken from him, and 15 given in return, making a total of 44 villages, kamul rent cantary pgodas 28,243, in his possession, and his peishcush was raised to cantary pagodas 29,750, of which the detail is as follows:

Peishcush	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rupces 80,000
Beebee nuzzer annual to the Begum of the Cuddapah Nabob	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,000
Durbar Khireh, annual fees to the cutcheree	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,000

equal to Cant<sup>y</sup> pagodas 29,750.

87,000.

In 1756, the nabob of Cuddapah was obliged to surrender his country to the merchants. He entered this peishcush at only rupees 44,000, for the purpose of undervaluing his own share; but he collected the full amount. In 1776, Hyder took possession of the zemindarry, and sent the widow of the late poligar, by whom it was then engaged, to Seringapatam. He left her *vakeel* in charge of the district, with an agent of his own to receive the peishcush. She accompanied him to the Carnatic in 1780, and died the year following at Cumbaconum, when the zemindarry was resumed. Comar Vencat Ranna, the son of Narain Reddy of Oopalore, whom she had adopted, died a few years after her.

Jeyram Reddy, the nearest relation, but three or four removes from Prungo Nair, fled to the Carnatic. In 1791, he was appointed to the zemindarry by the Nizam's officers, for an annual peishcush of 80,000 rupees; he however pretended, that he could not pay more than 45,000, and during the five years he held the zemindarry, he paid either the one or the other of these sums, according as the military force in his neighbourhood was strong or weak. In 1795 he died, and was succeeded by his son, Narsum Reddy, who was still more irregular; for he never, in any one year, discharged his peishcush without compulsion. In 1207 and 1208, Assud Alli Khan, having a strong detachment under his command, compelled him to pay 75,000 rupees in each year. In 1209, he again withheld his peishcush; but, being reduced by the assistance of a party of troops furnished by Meer Allum, he agreed to pay the following sums:

Net peishcush of Nosum	-	-	-	-	-	-	R <sup>s</sup> 45,000
Meer Allum, increase	-	-	-	-	-	-	37,500

82,500

Durbar Khurch Nuzzur	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,625
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R<sup>s</sup> 88,125

He paid, however, only	-	-	-	-	-	-	37,000
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Leaving a balance of	-	-	-	-	-	-	Rupces 51,125
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As Chundoo Lell, the Nizam's naib, saw no hopes of collecting this money but by force, he marched against Nosum Reddy, and was besieging him in November 1800, when an amildar, sent by me, arrived in camp; in consequence of which hostilities ceased, without any part of the balance being discharged. I made no demand on Narsim Reddy for any part of it, because I knew that his expenses for military peons had been so great, that whatever was collected from him on account of balances, would occasion a corresponding deficiency in his current peishcush. His peishcush for the Fussy year 1210, was fixed at 45,000 rupees, to be paid in three kists; but as he did not pay the first, till after the last had become due, and as there was not the smallest probability of his paying the rest, it became necessary to deprive him of the management of the district, as the only way of securing a future revenue. He was surprised, and made prisoner, by General Campbell in June last, and now receives 10 per cent. of the net revenues of his district, by order of government.

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## No. 23.—CHITWEYL.

The family derive their descent from Tim Raj, of Mutle in Gorumcondah, who served under Isol Raj with 200 peons and 300 horse. He rented the pergunnahs of Siddoub, Chinnoor, Budweyl, and Permanilah. His descendants, for services rendered to the successors of Isol Raj, were raised to the command of 5,000 peons and 700 horse, and were allowed to rent four more pergunnahs; viz. Door Camilapoor, Hussanapoor, and Denipoor. They paid their establishment of troops from revenues, and remitted the balance to the cirkar. On the conquest of the country by the Hyderabad princes, the eight pergunnahs were resumed, and the zemindar received Chetweyl in jagheer, as follows:—

Pootapnaur	- - - - -	61 mozas	- - - - -	kamul	28,576	3
Poongalour	- - - - -	55	- - - - -		10,395	—
In Siddont, Goondlapilly	- - - - -	1	- - - - -		148	—
Veepuralia	- - - - -	1	- - - - -		692	—
<hr/>				<hr/>		
218 mozas M. P <sup>a</sup>				39,811		3

But Chetweyl was resumed about the year 1644, and from this period, the family of Tim Raj had no territory, but merely the kaweli russooms of the 8 pergunnahs; until 1688, when they obtained Chitugle through the means of Daoud Khan Arungzebe: It was valued as follows:

Polapaur	- - - - -	kamel	28,576	—	3
Deduction for Paymele	- - - - -		4,747	—	13
			<hr/>		
From Gorumcondah Goodloor	- - - - -		23,828	—	6
Pileer	- - - - -		673	—	—
			<hr/>		
Poongalour Kamul	- - - - -	11,304			
Deduction for Paymele	- - - - -	418	—	15	
			<hr/>		
Total			10,885		1
			<hr/>		
Total			Madras Pagodas 35,694		7

The poligar was to serve with 2,830 peons, whose pay was estimated at 24,809. 6. the kamul of Pootapnaur, and the two villages of Gorumcondah; but if no services were to be performed, he was to pay a peishcush of 60,000 rupees, and Poongalour was to revert to the cirkar. He, however, continued to obtain more favourable terms a few years afterwards; for he was permitted to retain the whole district, on condition of maintaining 2,830 peons, and paying a peishcush of 20,000 peons. But the Nabob of Cuddapah in 1712, having obtained the 8 pergunnahs in jaghire, along with their dependencies, he raised the Chetweyl peishcush in 1716, to 30,000 rupees. In 1722, he gave the poligar the village of Multi in Gorumcondah in jaghire, with the havili russooms, and raised the peishcush to 40,000 rupees. In 1720, he raised it to 50,000. In 1756, when Abdul Moyed, the Nabob of Cuddapah, was reported, and killed by the Mahrattas. His successor, Kelem Khan, in the schedule for dividing the country, entered the Chetweyl peishcush at only 40,000 rupees, in order to reduce the apparent amount of his own; but he not only collected 50,000 as before, but, in the same year, added 40,000 rupees to the peishcush, and 17,000 under the head of durbar khirch, making the total 1,07,000 rupees; at which rate it was continued by Hyder after the conquest of Cuddapah. But the soucar who advanced the amount to Hyder, not having been paid, an amildar was sent to Chetweyl, who collected the first year 1,60,000, and the second year 1,75,000 rupees. The poligar Triwengulnet Appaguz was carried by Hyder, in 1780, into the Carnatic, where he died in 1782.

After the death of Hyder, Tippoo fixed the peishcush at 1,20,000 rupees; and he wrote to Venkat Ram Raj, the son of the late poligar, who was then in Chitweyl, that he had confirmed him in the management of the district; but at the same time, invited him to join the army. The poligar excused himself, and paid only about 60,000 rupees in the course of two years; but in 1785, Tippoo having returned from his expedition to the Malabar coast, sent a detachment to occupy Chitweyl, and the poligar fled to the Carnatic. He was restored in 1791. By the Nizam's officers, his peishcush was fixed at 90,000 rupees, but he engaged to pay considerable sums, privately, besides. In 1798, he was removed by Assud Ally, on account of irregularity in discharging his kists, and his younger brother,

Venkat

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Vencat Ragawa Raj, appointed in his room, who was in his turn, soon after displaced by Chundoo Loll, and the elder brother restored; but the younger offering a nuzzer of 10,000 rupees, and to discharge all arrears, was again reinstated. All this happened in the year preceding the transfer of the district to the Company, in which time, the two brothers paid to Chundoo Loll, the Nizam's naib, peishcush 90,000 rupees; balances 65,000; and nuzzer 10,000: Total 1,65,000.

The elder brother having been sent prisoner to Hyderabad, I fixed the peishcush of the younger at one lac of rupees; but being deeply involved in debt, and his revenues almost entirely assigned to his troops, and his creditors, he let the period of his two first kists pass, without paying a single rupee; and, as he was totally incapable of extricating himself, there was no mode left of realizing the revenue, but by dispossessing him, which was done in my last. The two brothers now receive 16 per cent of the net revenue of Chetweyl, by order of government.

#### No. 24.—OWKE, RAM KISHAN RAJ.

The predecessors of the poligar were servants of the Bijnaggur government, from which they obtained a jageer in 1450, of kamul rent cantaroy pagodas 10,514 in the district of Yargui. When the country fell under the dominion of the kings of Hyderabad, the jageer was continued, and an assignment of 33 additional villages was made to the poligar, for the service of 1,800 men. Under Aurungzebe the jageer was resumed, but with other districts, estimated altogether at Madras pagodas 27,682, was rented to the poligars, on account of Pay-mali, at 20,000 rupees; and Owke, rated at Madras pagodas 10,258, was assigned to him for the service of 1,000 peons. In 1712 he went to Delhi, and on paying 50,000 rupees, got his service remitted. In 1719, Yargui was taken from him, and the peishcush of the remaining districts raised to 45,000 rupees. In 1778, the poligar submitted to Hyder, who deprived him of part of his districts, and fixed the peishcush of the remainder at cantaroy pagodas 10,500, which was nearly the full value, at the time. He carried him, in 1780, into the Carnatic, where he died. The peishcush continued, for three years after, to be paid by his vakeel; but the district being resumed by Tippoo, the present poligar Ram Kishan Raj, then a minor, fled to Salapoor. He returned in 1792, and was reinstated in his old districts for a peishcush of rupees 45,000; but was turned out in 1796, for not paying punctually. In 1798 he was again permitted to rent a small district, Mettoor, valued by Tippoo's rental at cantaroy pagodas 5,843, for a peishcush of 2,485 cantaroy pagodas; but as he had considerable influence, and was collecting followers, I have removed him in order that he may be pensioned.

#### No. 25.—HAMNAMUNT & NARSAPOOR.

The founder of this family was one Kimam Reddy, potail of Marsapoor, who, on the decline of the Bijnaggur empire, withheld his rents, and forfeited his village. He submitted to the Hyderabad princes, by whom he was allowed to retain the district he had seized, rated at kamul cantary pagodas 12,734. 4. 13½; for peishcush 2,100 cantary pagodas; and the service of 500 peons. In 1643, the succession devolving on a minor, the district was resumed, and a pension of 300 rupees monthly, settled on the family. In 1708, Mulla Reddy, the heir, was restored by the Mogul fozdar Daoud Khan, on condition of paying a peishcush of rupees 13,000, and serving with 500 peons. The Nabob of Cuddapah, a few years afterwards, remitted the service, and raised the peishcush to 25,000 rupees, and in 1756, to cantary pagodas 9,625. In 1779, Hyder seized the district, and fixed the peishcush at

	Rupees 24,000
Darbar Khirch	3,500
Rupees	27,500

He carried the poligar into the Carnatic next year, where he served with 500 men paid by the circar, but dying in 1781, his district was held by his son Boocla Reddy, till 1784, when he was expelled. He died in exile, leaving two widows, who were restored in 1790, by the Nizam's officers, for a peishcush of 24,000 rupees. One of the widows dying in 1794, Narsapoor, her share was resumed, and rented to a Patan, who found it necessary to let Vencatacheputty Reddy, a distant relation of the poligar, manage under him. The other widow, Ahamah, kept possession of Hamuntgoond, her share, till 1796, when she was expelled. In 1799 she returned from Calastry, to which place she had fled, and rented Hamuntgoond for 10,000 rupees; she also agreed to pay 31,000 for that district and Narsapoor, on condition that the Nizam's officers should drive out Vencatachelaputty; but they were unable to do this, and both districts were completely desolated in the struggle. Vencatachelaputty, having no right to the succession, has been expelled by the Company's troops; and Ahamah, the widow, has been deprived of the management of her district, in order that she may be pensioned.

#### No. 26.—SINGAPUTTAN & KALVADDAH.

This is a branch of the Nosum family, from which it separated in 1644, when Mulla Reddy received 11 villages karzul cantary pag' 8,607 to maintain 300 peons. Under Aurungzebe, a peishcush was imposed of cantary pag' 2,336, and the service raised to 500 peons. The Nabobs of Cuddapah, in 1719, discontinued the peons, and augmented the peishcush to cantary pag' 9,100, at which rate it remained till 1778, when Hyder reduced the poligar, but settled the peishcush as before. He carried him into the Carnatic, where he died in 1781, when the district was resumed. The son was reinstated by the Nizam's officers in 1791, in all his villages but one, for a peishcush of cantary pagodas 7,000, which he

he never paid regularly. I resumed his rissooms and enaums, and settled his peshcush last year, at cantary pag<sup>s</sup> 5,400. He paid none of his kists at the stipulated periods; and in July last, after confining two of the amildar's peons, who had been sent to demand payment, he fled, with a balance against him of cantaroy pagodas 1,141, and his district has, in consequence been resumed.

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## No. 27.—BODYEMENOOR.

The poligars of this village were a branch of the Humnuntgoond family, No. 25, and after their separation from it, about the middle of the 17th century, they held the village rated at kamul rent, 697 cantaroy pagodas to maintain 50 peons. Under Aurunzebe, they obtained four additional villages, making with the former, one total kamul rent cantaroy pagodas 4,662 assessed, with a peshcush of cantary pagodas 1,837, and the service of 300 peons. The new villages were resumed in 1729 by the Nabob of Cuddapah, and the peshcush of the original one, was fixed cantaroy pagodas 175, which was raised in 1756 to cantaroy pagodas 350. In 1778, Hyder expelled the poligar Yerra Tenirah Reddy, who soon after died, leaving no heirs; his widow, Boochamah, was restored by the Nizam's officers in 1792, and paid a peshcush of 1,200 rupees; but she was deprived of the village in 1796, and received some small enaums in land for her maintenance, which she still enjoys. She has an adopted son, who has, however, no right to the inheritance.

## No. 28.—TIPPEREDYPILLI and ADDEPREDYPILLI.

The ancestors, Gopal Reddy, and Narsun Reddy, during the Bijnaggur government, rented Siddout from Chitaveyl zemindarry. They rendered some service to the Mussulman invaders, for which the king of Hyderabad gave them three villages jaghier to maintain 300 peons: Aurungzebe reduced the service to 150 peons, and imposed a peshcush of cantaroy pagodas 1,040. The Nabob of Cuddapah remitted the service, and raised the peshcush to cantaroy pagodas 2,301; but the poligar Nasumnair, not paying his kists, and also committing depredations on the neighbouring districts they expelled him in 1775: he however continued to commit depredations, and was in the district, when it fell under Hyder, and died the following year. Honooramah, his widow, sent a party of peons, who surprised, and killed, Hyder's amildar in 1792. The fear of sharing the like fate, induced Tippoo's amildar to let her rent the villages privately; but she was taken and put to death by the Nizam's officers in 1795, for constant rebellion. Her adopted son died the following year, and was succeeded by Comar Nasumnair Rencatadu, her nephew, who got Tipparedtypilli; and the other villages, Dassaredtypilli and Muddoredtypilli, were given to two other relations of the family. The joint rent was fixed at Madras pagodas 1,877 in 1796, but was lowered in 1799 to Madras pagodas 750. They however paid very little of either; and as they not only refused last year to come in and settle their rents, but also sent parties to levy contributions in the neighbouring villages, they were expelled.

## No. 29.—MOOTIALPOOR.

Runganair Kawelgar of Mootialpoor, served under the Bijnaggur rajahs with 700 peons, and seized that district, of which the kamul is cantaroy pagodas 4,854, on the fall of the empire, and was permitted to hold it by the kings of Hyderabad, for peshcush of 1,500 rupees, and the service of 200 peons; the district was resumed under Aurungzebe, but the poligar still enjoyed the kaweli rissooms. The Nabob of Cuddapah restored it for a peshcush of 2,000 rupees, which was afterwards raised to 3,000 rupees. In 1778 he was expelled by Hyder, but by remaining in the neighbouring Melmul hills, he was enabled to collect the kaweli; and Tippoo's amildars, as the only means of stopping his depredations, allowed him to hold Mootialpoor privately, under them, for 4,000 rupees; he held it openly under the Nizam's officers for peshcush 5,000 rupees: in Fusly 1202 he died, and was succeeded by his son Ragonant Nair, who dying in 1210 without issue, was succeeded by his uncle Narsim Nair, a man of 60, without children. The rents of the district are now fixed by the amildar; but the poligar receives cantaroy pagodas 800, from the amount.

## No. 30.—WHORAPAU, KUGPUT REDDY.

Veswopal Reddy, under the Bijnaggur government, was potail of Racherlah. On the conquest of the country by the Mussulmen, he obtained Whorapaur and some other villages in rent, and was allowed a remission in the rent of cantaroy pagodas 2,600 for the pay of 200 peons, who served under the command of his brother. Under Aurungzebe, the pay was reduced to cantaroy pag<sup>s</sup> 1,554. The Nabob of Cuddapah remitted the service, and raised the peshcush to C. P. 3,920, but lowered in 1756 to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 3,850. A few years before Hyder's invasion, Sonky Reddy, the poligar, had rebelled and been expelled, and returned several times. He was taken by Hyder, and carried off; but released, and returned, and lived privately in his own district, where he died in 1782. Having no children, his cousin, Kinah Reddy, seized the district in 1790, and died in 1792: his peshcush was C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 3,500, but that of his successor was raised to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 4,550; I have resumed Racherlah, leaving him only Whorapaur, from the rent of which, fixed by the amildar, he receives a pension of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 850.

## No. 31.—OAPALPOOR, NARSIM REDDY.

The ancestor obtained the village of Oolapoor kamul rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,217, from the king of Hyderabad, for the maintenance of 100 peons: It was afterwards resumed about 1,650, but was restored to the family by Aurungzebe, on condition of paying 350 C. pag<sup>s</sup> peshcush, and maintaining 100 peons. In 1712 the Nabob of Cuddapah remitted the service, and fixed the peshcush at C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 700. In 1748 the poligar was expelled, and his pollam resumed.

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but he was restored again in 1776; he was expelled in 1779 by Hyder: he returned during the war in 1791, and obtained two other villages in addition to his old one. The kamul rent of the whole was C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 2,517, for which he paid peshcush C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,400: I directed the amildar in February 1801, to resume the two new villages, but the poligar refused to give them up, and drove away his peons. He was, however, forced to relinquish them in June following, when the division under general Campbell arrived at Cuddapah. The poligar was permitted to retain his ancient village; but as he refused, in November last, to come in and settle his peshcush, he was seized by a detachment of cavalry, and sent prisoner to Gootty, where he receives an annual allowance of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 250.

#### No. 32.—TALMURLAH KONAM RAJ.

The ancestor of the family was related to the Bijnuggur Rajahs, and commanded a body of troops, for the payment of which he held several districts of Sawenoor in jageer; on the fall of Bijnuggur, he obtained three villages in jageer, from the king of Hyderabad, amounting to kamul rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,781. 1.; under Aurungzebe he held only one village, kamul rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,350, and was obliged to maintain 100 peons. The Nabobs of Cuddapah remitted the service, and imposed a peshcush of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 700, which was raised by Morari Row to 1,050, who afterwards resumed the village. The poligar in consequence, joined Hyder in 1774, who restored him for the former peshcush C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,050. The Sultan raised the village to the full rent, but afterwards deprived the poligar of the management of it; he, however, retained him in his service, with a party of peons, till 1791, when he returned to his village, which he rented under the Nizam's officers at the full value. I have since resumed it, and gave him an allowance in land.

#### No. 33.—PYAPILLI, KONDAL, NAIR.

The ancestor of the family was raised by the Bijnuggur rajahs, to the command of 10,000 peons, for seizing the Chingleput poligar, who had rebelled. The district of Pyapilli, kamul rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 23,400, was assigned in lieu of the pay of two months; the rest was disbursed from the Treasury. The Hyderabad kings continued the jageer for the service of 1,500 peons and 100 horse; Aurungzebe fixed the service at 800 peons, and imposed a peshcush of 20,000 rupees. The Cuddapah Nabob resumed seven villages, leaving the poligar 37, amounting to kamul C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 18,453, and in reward for his enabling him to take Gunjicottah by treachery, from its poligar Tamsan Nair, remitted his service, and lowered his peshcush to 12,000 R<sup>s</sup>.

In 1767, the poligar Vencatapat Nair, not complying with some demands made upon him by Morari Row, was removed, and his brother Rimgapah Nair appointed; but he also being unable to pay the sums required, was dispossessed; and both brothers fled to Sorapoor. In 1774 Hyder entertained Rimgapah Nair, with a party of peons, to garrison Pyapilli; but the poligar dying next year, the district was resumed. His son Vencatapah enjoyed some rissooms, and was employed in Gootty with a party of 300 peons, upon a monthly allowance of 25 pagodas for himself. In 1785, he was carried to Seringapatam by Tippoo, his men disbanded, and himself murdered. In 1791, his son seized the district, but fled again at the peace next year. In 1799 he returned, and rented two villages at their full value, under the Nizam's officers; but he was allowed to collect rissooms, and to enjoy some small enaums in land. I have taken the villages out of his hands, and left his enaum lands for the present.

#### No. 34.—MUDDIKERAH MULLU, KAYUM, NAIR.

The founder of the family enjoyed three villages of the kamul rent of C. pagodas 2,277, in jageer under the Bijnuggur government. The jageer was continued by the kings of Hyderabad, on condition of his maintaining 130 peons. Under Aurungzebe the poligar obtained the 7 villages of Muddikerah, in addition to the former, making a total kamul rent of C. pagodas 17,505, to pay the peshcush of 9,000 rupees, and maintain 300 peons. In 1712 his district was transferred to Adone, and resumed, but 7 of old villages, with the addition of two new ones, were restored in 1719 for a peshcush of 30,000 rupees. In 1768, Morari Row exacted a chout in addition, of 7,000 rupees. In 1774 Hyder resumed the district, and granted the poligar an annual allowance of 500 Cantary pagodas, and some rissooms; but in 1785, Tippoo confined him in Gootty, and hanged him in 1789, because his brother had escaped. The brother seized Muddikera, during the war in 1790, but was expelled at the peace; he returned again in 1799, and was put in possession of Muddikera for a peshcush of Cantary pagodas 6,412. But I have thought it advisable to remove him, in order that he may be pensioned.

#### No. 35.—KUMMALPOOR, GOORAPAH, NAIR.

The ancestor was a common tallari or kaweligar under the Bijnuggur government, on the overthrow of which he seized his village. He was allowed to retain it by the Hyderabad kings, on condition of serving with 50 peons. It was resumed by Aurunzebe, but restored by the Cuddapah nabobs for the kamul rent, but it was raised by the Marhattas to cantary pagodas 537, on which terms the kaweligar held it till 1775, when he was expelled by Hyder. He was restored in 1799 by the Nizam's officer, for a peshcush of 47 cantary pagodas. He offered me the same rent, but refused to come to the cutcherry; and has, of course, been expelled.

#### No. 36.—GHATTIM, RAGONAUT NAIR.

In 1360 Narsim Nair, for services performed under the Annagoondy rajahs, obtained a jageer of 10 villages kamul, rental cantary pagodas 19,743, on condition of maintaining

at all times 500 peons, and 10,000 during war. The jageer is said to have been held without any material change, till 1718, when the Nabob of Cuddapah imposed a peishcush of cantary pagodas 4,200; and he about the same time rented the village of Tipposamooden to the poligar at 10,000 rupees, for three years, which he however continued to him till 1728, when he took it from him. In 1756, when Ghuttim was ceded to the Marhattas, the Nabob of Cuddapah, previous to the cession, rented Tipposamooden again to the poligar, for the sake of a nuzzer of rupees 1,066; the grandfather and father of Kumer ul deen, who held Gorumcondah in jagheer under the Mahrattas, permitted the poligar to retain his villages on the old peishcush. No addition was made to it, when Meer Saib submitted to Hyder in 1766; but the Mahrattas recovering possession of Gorumcondah in 1771, they deprived the poligar of Tipposamooden, and demanded 6,000 rupees for durbar fees, which, on his not paying, they expelled him; but restored him, on receiving 5,500 rupees in 1774. Hyder having again reduced Gorumcondah, appointed Kubber Beg soobah of the province, who made no alteration in the peishcush; but the country being given in jagheer the year following to Meer Saib, he expelled the poligar, who fled to Venkatgherry, where he died. The present man, his brother, made himself the Ghutt polliam in 1790, but withdrew in 1792, leaving however a party of peons behind, who killed Tippoo's amildar, and continued to make partial collections till 1799, when he returned himself, and obtained from Cumber ul deen his ancient district Ghuttim, with the village of Tipposamooder for a peishcush of cantary pagodas 7,700, and nuzzer cantary pagodas 3,150. Total cantary pagodas 10,850.

I have assumed Tipposamooder, as it was not a part of his hereditary possessions, but left him Ghuttim on more favourable terms than have been allowed to the other poligars, because he furnished some supplies for the army during the campaigns of 1791 and 1792; and has sunnuds from Lord Cornwallis, and Sir Charles Oakley, promising conditionally, to confirm him in the enjoyment of his former rights. He now rents his district, and receives cantary pagodas 2,000 annually from the produce.

#### No. 37.—BUTLAPOOR, OR PEDAPOLLAM.

The ancestor of the family, a servant of the Amagoondy rajahs, obtained three villages for the purpose of maintaining 500 peons. The kings of Hyderabad remitted the service, and imposed a peishcush of cantary pagodas 210. No change took place till 1718, when he got the village of Demalcherreo for a rent of rupees 2,000, which he held till 1766, when the Cuddapah Nabob, at the time of giving over his polliam to the Mahrattas, granted him four additional villages for a private nuzzer. The whole were estimated at kamul rent cantary pagodas 5,597, on which the Mahrattas fixed a peishcush of cantary pagodas 2,450, and made no abatement in 1770, when they resumed Pungahsamooder, the largest of the villages. In 1774, the poligar was expelled by Meer Saib; but he returned, like other poligars, in 1790, and fled again in 1792. In 1799 he seized the 8 villages he enjoyed under the Mahrattas, and also an additional one, of which he had taken possession in 1791, and the whole were confirmed to him by Cumber ul deen for a peishcush of cantary pagodas 4,550; and nuzzer 1,750: Total cantary pagodas 6,300. I have resumed the village he seized during the former Mysore war, and also the four which he obtained at the time of the cession of the country to the Mahrattas, in 1756, and left him only the four which he held under the Cuddapah Nabobs. He is of the same family with No. 36.

#### No. 38.—SAMPIELI, MULLAPAH, NAIR.

The family, during the Bijnuggur government, obtained five villages in jagheer of the kamul rent of cantary pagodas 3,250, to maintain 400 peons. A peishcush of cantary pagodas 910, was afterwards imposed by the Hyderabad kings. The villages were resumed by the Mahrattas in 1756; but relinquished next year for a peishcush of 1,575 cantary pagodas. The poligar was expelled under Hyder's government, by Meer Saib; but again possessed himself of his district, during the Marquis Cornwallis's campaigns; and also in 1790, when Cumber ul deen raised his peishcush to cantary pagodas 1,925. He now rents his villages, and receives an allowance of cantary pagodas 420 from the produce.

#### No. 39.—TOOMALGOONDI, CHINA CONDRIPUTTI.

The ancestor was a common ryot, who, at the request of the potail and curnum of Mundayum, put to death the kawelgar of that village, for which service they gave him a small village in enaum, and another in rent; the kamul of both, was cantary pagodas 50. At this rate, they were held by the family till about eighty years ago, when they obtained two additional villages in rent from the Nabob of Cuddapah; making, with those they held before, a total kamul rent of Cantary pagodas 748, for a peishcush of cantary pagodas 748. In 1756, the Mahrattas gave the poligar two more villages in rent, at the full assessment; but he was expelled in 1775, by Meer Saib, and like the other poligars, returned again during the two last Mysore wars. Cumber ul deen Khan in 1799, confirmed him in the possession of his six villages for peishcush cantary pagodas 1,537, and nuzzer cantary pagodas 1,200. Total cantary pagodas 2,737. I have resumed the two villages given by the Mahrattas, and converted the peishcush of the others, into rent.

#### No. 40.—YELLOOTIAN, VEERAPAH NAIR.

During the Bijnuggur government, the ancestor of this poligar obtained a small tract of jungle in rent for cantary pagodas 16; but as it was found to have been much improved while the country was reduced by the Hyderabad kings, it was assessed at the full kamul cantary pagodas 450, and remained in the family at the same rate, till 1775, when the poligar was expelled by Meer Saib. But he returned in 1791, and again in 1799, when his village was assessed by Cumber ul deen Khan, at cantary pagodas 375. I have continued it to him in rent.



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#### No. 41.—KULLIPUNDAR, CUDDRIPAH, NAIR.

An ancestor of this family, about 1650, under the Golcondah kings, obtained kullipundah in rent at the full kamul assessment, cantary pagodas 1,409; together with the kaweli rassoos of 12 other villages. No change was made in the tenure till 1713, when the Nabob of Cuddapah lowered the peishcush to cantary pagodas 717; probably on account of the decay of cultivation: for even the rental of Tippoo is greatly below the kamul. The Mahrattas, in 1756, raised the peishcush to cantary pagodas 759. In 1773 the poligar was taken, and hanged by Meer Sahib; but his son escaping to Chittoor, recovered possession of his pollam in 1791, and again in 1799; when he also seized three extra villages, of which the kamul, with that of his own, amounted to cantary pagodas 4,327; he engaged to pay Cummur ul deen Khun, a peishcush of cantary pagodas 2,164. I have resumed the new villages, and rented the old one to him.

#### No. 42.—BOANMULLAH, VENKATADRI, NAIR.

The ancestor, like several of the petty poligars of Gorumcondah, at the time of the kamul survey by the Golcondah kings, obtained a village in rent, at the full assessment cantary pagodas 70, which was raised by the Cuddapah Nabobs to cantary pagodas 101. The village was resumed by Hyder; but the poligar remained privately in the country. He recovered his village by force in 1791; and after the peace, was permitted by Tippoo's asophs, to rent it, under another name. In 1799, his rent was fixed, at nearly the full produce of the village by Cummur ul deen. He still continues to be assessed at the full rent, after deducting a portion for his subsistence.

#### No. 43.—KOOTAPOLLEM, NARSIM, NAIR.

The ancestor was a kawelgar, who, under the Golcondah kings, got a village in rent, at the full kamul assessment cantary pagodas 135, which was afterwards raised by the Cuddapah Nabobs, cantary pagodas 169; and by the Mahrattas, to cantary pagodas 182. The poligar's family were almost all taken and hanged, by Meer Sahib, but he escaped himself to the Carnatic; returned, and seized his villages in 1791—remained privately in the country, as a ryot, after the peace of 1792; but took possession of his pollam again in 1799, and was confirmed by Cummur ul deen for a peishcush of cantary pagodas 700; and who rents it under the Company's amildar.

#### No. 44.—YERRAGOONTAPOLLEM, CUDDRIPUTTI.

The ancestors of this family served under the Bijnuggur rayels with 50 peons, at the period of the kamul survey, the service was remitted, and they obtained a village in rent at the full assessment, cantary pagodas 148, with kaweli rassoos. No change took place till the beginning of Hyder's government, when the rent, in consequence of the decrease of cultivation, was reduced to cantary pagodas 111. The poligar was, however, expelled a few years afterwards by Meer Sahib, but he recovered his villages in 1791; and was allowed by the Asoph enaum Beg, to hold it after the peace, at a rent of cantary pagodas 253; at which amount it was also confirmed to him by Cummur ul deen. He now rents it, under the amildar.

#### No. 45.—MADANEYNPOLLEM, MADAH, NAIR.

This is an insignificant poligar, whose family, during the Golcondah government, obtained a village of kamul rent, 5 cantary pagodas in rent, with some kaweli rassoos, which they held without increase of rent, till Tippoo raised it to the full assessment. The village is now continued to the poligar, rated at its actual produce, after allowing him a remission of 12 Pag<sup>a</sup> annually for his support.

#### No. 46.—MADDANPELLI, VENKATAPAH, NAIR.

Nagapah Nair, the founder of this family, for assisting Kishen, rayel of Bijnuggur to take Gurrumcondah, obtained a jagher of 16 villages, kamul rent C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,035, to maintain 1,000 peons. On making the kamul survey, the Golcondah government resumed 14 of the villages, assessed the remaining two at the full rent C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 421, and remitted the service. The Cuddapah nabobs gave the two villages in jagher to their dewan, Sankearjee Punt; but it is said that the poligar was allowed to rent them under the family of the jagheerdar, on favourable terms. When Hyder reduced the country, the jagher was resumed, and the poligar remained privately in the district, and took advantage of the confusion in 1791, to make himself master of the whole 16 villages of his ancient pollam. At that time, received cowle from government through Captain Read; but at the peace of 1792, the pollam was allowed by Tippoo's servants to remain in the country, and to rent C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 253, the two villages which had formerly been given in jagher to Sankearjee. In 1799 he took up arms, and again occupied the 16 villages, which Cummur ul deen found it necessary to let him hold, on condition of his paying a peishcush of C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,450; of this sum, he discharged very little. He revolted, and applied his revenue to the maintenance of a large body of peons; but as he disbanded them, as soon as the country was transferred by the Nizam, and as the Company's cowle, which he received in the former war, gave him some claim to consideration, I have allowed him to rent one of the two villages which he rented between 1792 and 1799, and made a deduction of 450 C. Pag<sup>a</sup> from the rent, as an annual pension for him. This is, in fact, little more than half of what he then got by renting the two villages, because he paid only C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 253 for them; and, though they did not yield the standard assessment C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,218, their produce was probably, at least two-thirds of it.

## No. 47.—PAPYPILLI, PAUPAH, NAIR.

The ancestors of this poligar served under the Bijnugger Rayels with 300 peons, for the pay of which they received annually C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 3,900. They also rented a village at the full valuation. After the kamul survey they obtained another village, and the rent of both, C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,038, was assigned to them to maintain 200 peons. Aurungzebe discontinued the service, resumed the new village, and imposed a rent on the old one, of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 383, which was raised by the Cuddapah nabobs to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 420. The poligar was expelled by Meer Sahib in 1774, but recovered the village in 1791, and after the peace, rented it under a fictitious name for R<sup>s</sup> 1,400, when it was confirmed to him by Meer Sahib. The poligar receives 66 Pag<sup>s</sup> from the produce, and the village is rented by a potail.

## No. 48.—TUTT, SOOBAN, NAIR.

This family were, during the Bijnugger government, dilwaj of the Ghuttim poligar, of whom they held these villages, but under the Golconda Kings, they held it immediately of government; its kamul rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 2,439, for which they paid peshcush C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 700, and maintained 90 peons. Aurungzebe remitted the service, resumed the moza or principal village, of kamul rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 201 in enaum. In 1712 the Cuddapah nabob gave the village in jagher to Golaim ul Deen, one of his own servants, and settled a pension of 500 R<sup>s</sup> on the poligar. The pension was stopt, and the village restored in 1729. It was resumed in 1748, and restored again on the conquest by the Marhattas. The poligar was expelled by Meer Sahib in 1774, returned in 1791, and seized the inferior village; and after the peace, was permitted to rent it for C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 25, which was raised in 1799 to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 60 by Cummer ul Deen. The village is now rented by a potail, and a remission of 48 Pag<sup>s</sup> allowed for the poligar.

## No. 49.—RAMPICHERLAH, VEERAPAH, NAIR.

The ancestors under the Bijnugger government held a village of kamul rent C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 435, to serve with 100 peons. The service was discontinued by the Hyderabad kings, and the full rent imposed. The village was resumed by the Marhattas in 1772, but restored again for a rent of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 805, which, however, was not a third of Tippoo's assessment. The poligar was expelled by Meer Sahib in 1776, regained possession in 1791, and remained privately in the country after the peace in 1792, and received the profits of his village, which was held by the potail, at a low rent. In 1799 he established himself by force, like the other poligars, and held his village under Cummer ul Deen, at a peshcush of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,680, which I have changed to rent.

## No. 50.—MULLYAL, VENKATAPUTTI, NAIR.

The Bijnugger rajahs gave three villages kamul rent cantary pagodas 2,703 in enaum, to the poligar's ancestor, for his service. He had also kaveli-rusooms, for which he was to maintain 400 peons. His villages were resumed by the Hyderabad government, but he continued to rent them with an additional village, rated altogether at kamul rent cantary pagodas 2,883, for the full assessment, and the service was remitted. No further change happened under any of the successive governments, till Hyder, when the poligar was expelled by Meer Sahib. Though he had paid the full kamul rent, yet as his pollam, by Tippoo's assessment, appears to have been worth twice as much, and as he had enjoyed a considerable income from kaweli, it was an object of consequence to him to re-establish himself, which he accordingly effected in 1790. But like the other poligars of government, he was expelled in 1792, and returned again in 1799, and seized his whole inheritance, with two additional villages, of which the total kamul rent was cantary pagodas 3,086, and Tippoo's assessment cantary pagodas 6,159, for which he engaged to pay Cummer ul Deen a peshcush of cantary pagodas 3,850. I have left him his old villages, and resumed the two new ones. The poligar is a minor; but from the abilities of his dilwaj, and the amount of his kaweli rusooms, he was, after the poligars of Vemlah and Ghuttim, the most powerful in Gurruncottah.

## No. 51.—DODIPILLI, BORI MELL, NAIR.

One of the ancestors of this family having fallen in battle, his son obtained from the Bijnugger rajahs, an enaum of four villages of the kamul rent of 1,011 C. pag<sup>s</sup>, to serve with 300 peons; under the Hyderabad government, the service was remitted, and the full rent imposed upon the villages. The Cuddapah nabobs gave the poligar three additional villages, making altogether a kamul rent of cantary Pag<sup>s</sup> 3,045, for a peshcush of 82 Pag<sup>s</sup>, which was raised by the Marhattas in 1756 to C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 1,148, and continued without alteration till 1776, when Meer Sahib expelled the poligar, who again obtained a temporary possession in 1791, and established himself in 1799 in his inheritance; on which Cummer ul Deen imposed a peshcush of C. pag<sup>s</sup> 2,800, for which I have substituted a varied rent.

## No. 52.—MUNDANCHERUHO, BUSWANT, NAIR.

The ancestors of this family, which is a branch of that of Mallyal (No. 50.) having about the year 1720, attended the nabob of Cuddapah's cutcherry, and given some information which was found useful in settling the revenue of Gorruncottah, obtained three villages of the kamul rent of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 739, for peshcush of C. Pag<sup>s</sup> 105. In 1776 he got two more villages from Gopaul Hurry, the Marhatta manager, making altogether kamul rent cantary pagodas 1,697, for which he was assessed in a peshcush of cantary pagodas 210. No other change occurred till Gorruncottah was reduced by Hyder, when

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Meer Sahib seized the poligar, threw him into prison, and fed him on equal quantities of flour and salt, till he died. His children remained privately in the country, and as they never excited any disturbances, Sieb Sahib, when he got part of Gorumcondah in jagheer, in 1792 restored the three to his hereditary villages at the former peishcush, but making him, at the same time, serve him personally with 50 peons. In 1799, he got four additional villages from Cummer ul Deen, which, with those he held before, were rated at kamul rent cantaroy pagodas 2,092, for which he stipulated to pay cantaroy pagodas 1,100. I have resumed both the four villages given to him by Cummer ul Deen, and the two he obtained from the Mahrattas, and left him only the three which he held under the government of the Cuddapah Nabob.

No. 53.—KOKINTI, MULLAPAH, NAIR.

The ancestors of this poligar obtained for their services, during the Bijnugger government, an enaum of ten villages, rated at kamul cantaroy pagodas 18,370, with no other burden than that of maintaining 300 peons, the charge of which was however defrayed chiefly by the kaweli rusees they had in the neighbouring districts; the service was remitted about the middle of the 17<sup>th</sup> century by the Hyderabad government, and peishcush levied of cantaroy pagodas 2,800, which, about 1720, was raised by the Nabob of Cuddapah, to cantaroy pagodas 3,150. The Mahrattas, in 1756, lowered it to cantaroy pagodas 2,800, but raised it in 1765 to Cantaroy pagodas 3,430, at which it continued till Meer Sahib having got Gorumcondah in jagheer from Hyder, took the poligar prisoner, and threw him into confinement, where he died. His son, who had escaped, regained possession of his pollam in 1799, and though expelled in 1792, he contrived, by means of his peons, to levy annual contributions till 1799, when he recovered the pollam a second time, and likewise seized two additional villages, the whole of which were rated by Tippoo's standard assessment, at cantaroy pagodas 6,832, for which he stipulated to pay Cummer ul Deen a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 4,900; but being continually engaged in hostilities against the jagheer of Talpoel, he was unable to fulfil his engagements. I have resumed the two new villages, and left him the ten which anciently belonged to his family. The Kokinti and Sompill (No. 38.) families are of the same origin.

No. 54.—MARRELLAH, RAMAH, NAIR.

The ancestor of this poligar rented, under the Golcondah kings, a village of kamul cantaroy pagodas 141; for cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 56, and served with 50 peons. The rent was raised under Aurungzebe to cantaroy pagodas 86. 5. The Cuddapah Nabobs raised it to cantaroy pagodas 175, and discontinued the service. The poligar was expelled in 1774 by Meer Sahib, but returned, and recovered his village in 1791, and, after the peace, remained privately in the country. He took possession of his village again in 1799, and held it of Cummer ul Deen for cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 445. It is now rented by the potail, and the poligar has a small allowance from the amount for his subsistence.

No. 55.—SHILLIWARPOLLEM, BUSWAPAH, NAIR.

The ancestors were kawelgars of Kotkull, under the Bijnugger government; they afterwards obtained a village of kamul rent cantaroy pagodas 1,004, to pay 75 under the Golcondah princes. Aurungzebe gave them the cowle of their village, and imposed a rent of cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 70. The Cuddapah nabobs raised it cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 245, and discontinued the service, and in 1729 resumed the village; but it was restored in 1756 by the Mahrattas, for a peishcush of cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 288. The poligar was expelled in 1774; returned in 1791, and, after the peace, remained privately in the country till 1799, when he again rented his village under Cummer ul Deen for cantaroy pagodas 60 from the produce.

No. 56. YERRAWARPOLLAM, TIMMAPAH, NAIR.

Under the rayels of Bijnugger, the ancestors of this poligar were talliards of Yerrawarpollam; they rented it under the Golcondah kings, at the full kamul rent cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,135, and they served with 75 peons, for whose maintenance they received an annual allowance of cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,040; Aurungzebe they served with 100 peons, whose annual pay amounted to cantary pagodas 1,500, in part of which the village was assigned. In 1712 the nabob of Cuddapah discontinued their service, and imposed a peishcush of cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 473; but, in 1740, being employed with 50 peons by the amildar of Gorumcondah, their peishcush was reduced to cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 87. They were expelled in 1774, by Meer Sahib; the poligar returned during the two last Mysore wars, and in 1799 held his village of Cummer ul Deen at a rent of cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 552. The potail now rents the village, from the produce of which cantary pagodas 120 are deducted, for the subsistence of the poligar.

No. 57.—MILACHERROO, CHINNAH, NAIR.

One of the ancestors was delwery of the poligar of Midimalapa Condah, before Gorumcondah was built, and served with 500 men, and had for himself a jagheer, of which Milacherroo was a part. But both the delwery and his master were taken by Kishen, Rayel of Bijnugger, and put to death; under the Golcondah kings, a descendant of the delwery served with 100 peons, and Milacherroo, kamul rent pagodas 52, was assigned to him, in part of their pay. Under Aurungzebe, the poligar obtained the village for his personal maintenance, and his peons were paid by the cirkar. The nabob of Cuddapah imposed a peishcush of cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 35, which was raised by the Mahrattas to cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 52. The poligar was expelled in 1774; returned in 1791, and rented his village privately till 1799, when Cummer ul Deen fixed his rent at cantary pagodas 160. He now receives cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 60 from the amount, and the potail rents the villages.

## No. 58.—RUNGINGARGOLLAM, PAPY, NAIR.

The ancestors in the times of the Golcondah government rented a number, or village, for 20 cantary pagodas; under Aurungzebe, they served with 75 peons, for whom they received an annual allowance of cantary pagodas 700, in part of which a grant of more, or superior village, yielding a rent of cantary pagodas 210, was assigned to them. The nabob of Cuddapah discontinued the service, and imposed a peishkush of cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 141, which in 1756, was raised by the Mahattahs to cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 163. The poligar was expelled in 1774, returned in 1791, and, after the peace, was permitted to hold his village under a fictitious name. In 1797, Cummur ul Deen fixed his rent at cantary pagodas 230. He now receives cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 72 from the produce, and the potal manages the village.

## No. 59.—YILLAMUNDAM, MUILAPAH, NAIR.

The ancestors of the present poligar were made kawelgans of Yellamundam, during Aurungzebe's reign, and rented the village at the full kamul cantary pagodas 42. The rent was raised by the Cuddapah nabob to cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 66, and in 1756, by the Mahattahs, to cantary pagodas 148. In 1774 the poligar was expelled by Meer Sahib, but returned in 1791, and, after the peace, continued to hold his village privately, by the connivance of Tippoo's servants. Cummur ul Deen, in 1799, fixed his rent at cantary pagodas 600. He now receives cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 72 from the produce, and the potal manages the village.

## No. 60.—GANGUICENTLAH, MOOSEL, NAIR.

This family, during the Bijnuggur government, were kawelgans of the Naugpalla Ghaut under the Golcondah kings; they rented 50 pagodas of land, and served with 22 peons under Aurungzebe; they rented the village of Ganguicentlah kamul cantary pagodas 460, at the full assessment, but paid only cantary pagodas 174, the rest being remitted to the pay of the peons. The Cuddapah nabobs raised the peishkush to cantary pagodas 202, and in 1740 they resumed the village, and discontinued the service, but the village was restored by the Mahattahs in 1756, at the old peishkush cantary pagodas 202. In the early part of Hyder's government, the rent was lowered, on account of the decline of cultivation, to cantary pagodas 192; The poligar was expelled in 1775, returned in 1791, and continued privately in the country till 1799, when Cummur ul Deen fixed his rent at cantary pagodas 350. He now receives cantary pagodas 50 from the produce, and the potal manages the village.

## No. 61.—MADICHAROO, CHINNAPAH, NAIR.

The ancestors of this family were anciently duffadars of peons, in the service of the Vindh poligar, under the Golconda kings; they rented Madicharoo at the full kamul rent cantary pagodas 73, and were appointed kawelgans of the Ghaut, lending from that place to Triplicott. Aurungzebe remitted the rent for the service of 50 men employed in the Ghaut. The Cuddapah nabob imposed a peishkush of pagodas 87, which, till 1774, when the poligar was expelled by Meer Sahib. He returned, and seized his village in 1791, and was allowed, after the peace, to hold it privately by Tippoo's amildar, but was driven out again in 1799, by Cummur ul Deen. The village is now under the potal, and the poligar receives an allowance of cantary pagodas 72 from the rent.

## No. 62.—WOODHAMUNHI.

The ancestor of this poligar served under the Rayels of Bijnuggur with 150 peons, for whose pay he was allowed cantary pagodas 1,560 annually; and he held the village of Woodhamunhi Rayel, rent cantary pagodas 130 in jagheer. The village was continued by the Hyderabad kings, for the service of 50 peons; it was resumed under Aurungzebe, and raised to the full rent, after allowing a deduction of 100 rupees to the poligar. It was afterwards made over by the nabob of Cuddapah to Chinnayal zamindar, who expelled the poligar; but again restored him for a rent of cantary pagodas 85. He remitted the rest, on account of his being employed in collecting his kawelgans' dues. The rent was raised by the Mahattahs, in 1757, to cantary pagodas 130; and in 1774, the poligar was expelled by Hyder, returned in 1791, and, after the peace, continued to rent the village privately till 1799, when Cummur ul Deen fixed his peishkush at cantary pagodas 605. He now receives an abatement from the full rent, of cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 60 for his maintenance.

## No. 63.—YAGAWAMARAPAHGOONTAH.

The ancestors of this poligar held their village, under the Bijnuggur and Hyder government, for the service of 100 peons. Aurungzebe resumed the village, and the poligar cantary pagodas 650, for 50 peons. The nabob of Cuddapah resumed the service, and gave back the village for rent cantary pagodas 500. It was resumed again restored by the Mahattahs in 1756. The poligar was expelled by Hyder, returned in 1791, rented his village under a fictitious name, for nearly the full value, when his peishkush was fixed by Cummur ul Deen at cantary pagodas 190. He now receives a pension of cantary pagodas 40 from the rent.

## No. 64.—DIGAWAMARAPAHGOONTAH.

One Kisanpah Nair, who served the Bijnuggur rayels with 50 peons, received the village of this village, and cantary pagodas 390 for their maintenance. The village was resumed under Aurungzebe, but the peons continued. The Cuddapah Nabob resumed the village, and rented the village to the poligar for cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 273. The rent was

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and then lowered, by the Mahrattahs; and the poligar was expelled by Hyder. He returned in 1791; and now receives an allowance of cantaroy pagodas 36 yearly from the rent.

#### No. 65.—TALPOOL.

The ancestor of this poligar, who served under the Hyderabad princes with 100 peons, received Talpool in jagheer, and an allowance of cantaroy pag<sup>a</sup> 350 for their pay. Aurungzebe resumed the village, and gave the poligar a pension of cantaroy pagodas 41. 6. The Nabob of Cuddapah restored the village; but again resumed, and hanged the poligar for robbery in 1729. The village was given up by the Mahrattahs to one of his descendants, for a rent of cantaroy pagodas 65; but was resumed, and the poligar expelled by Hyder. He returned in 1791; and now enjoys an allowance of cantaroy pagodas 72 from the rent.

#### No. 66.—TALPOOL, MOHABUT KHAN.

Abdul Kuddans, the predecessor of the present jagheer, obtained Talpool, assessed at the kamul rent of cantaroy pagodas 40,559 in jagheer in the year 1704, from Aurungzebe, for his service. The family held it free of peishcush till 1756, when falling under the dominion of the Mahrattahs, it was resumed; but in 1763, Meer Sahib, the father of Cummur ul Deen Khan, having been appointed keladar of Gorumcondah, and the province having been assigned to him by the Mahrattas, for the maintenance of a body of troops, he restored the jagheer for a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 2,800. It was again resumed and restored by the Mahrattahs in 1770. In 1771 Hyder raised the peishcush to 3,150. In 1773 Meer Sahib expelled the jagheer, who fled to his relation, the Nabob of Cuddapah. In 1799 Mahabut Khan, his son, by the wife of a puckally, took possession of Talpool, on the fall of Seringapatam; and as all the poligars of Gorumcondah, had at the same time seized their respective districts, Cummur ul Deen, on his arrival in that province, being unable to reduce them, confirmed them in their possessions, on their agreeing to pay him a peishcush; that of Talpool was fixed at cantaroy pagodas 8,050, very little of which was paid. When the country was transferred to the Company, the jagheer was summoned to the cutcherry, but refused to attend. He sent me word that he would pay the old Mahrattah peishcush cantaroy pagodas 2,800, and no more. General Campbell, in consequence, marched against him, and surprised him in his fort. He is now a prisoner, and must be kept in confinement for life.

#### No. 67.—KUDDERI, ALLUM KHAN.

Puwerish Khan obtained the jagheer of Kudderi, kamul rent cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 39,228, on the same occasion that Talpool was granted to his relation. The jagheer was free till 1756, when it was resumed by the Mahrattas. It was restored in 1764 by Meer Saib, for a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 2,800; who however resumed it again in 1773. In 1799 Allum Khan, a natural son of the late jagheer, took possession of Kudderi. Cummur ul Deen fixed his peishcush at 8,050 cantaroy pagodas. He paid nothing to the Company's amildar the following year; and as he would not come to the cutcherry, to settle his rent, a detachment of peons was sent against him. They surprised the fortified pagoda, in which he had taken post; but he escaped in the confusion, and the jagheer was resumed. Hashun Khan, the brother of Allum Khan, and legitimate son of his father, obtained two villages from Cummur ul Deen, for a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 760. I have resumed them, and given him yearly allowance of Cantaroy pagodas 59. 7. 6. which I hope government will confirm.

#### No. 68.—VIMLAH.

Buswapah Nair, the ancestor, served the Bijnuggur rayels with 600 peons, for the payment of which he obtained Vimlah, and 25 other villages of Poolevendra, assessed at kamul rent cantaroy pagodas 9,796. The Hyderabad princes imposed a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 1,050, which was raised by Aurungzebe to 2,800 cantaroy pagodas, and the service reduced to 500 peons. The nabob of Cuddapah in 1712, remitted the service, and increased the peishcush to cantaroy pagodas 3,500. In 1752, the poligar having rebelled, Abdul Mijed, the nabob of Cuddapah, made him prisoner; blew him away from a gun; circumcised his son; and resumed his district. In 1756, Vimlah having fallen under the dominion of the Mahrattahs, the son was restored for a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 3,500; but not paying regularly, he was expelled by Meer Sahib; in 1766 he died an exile, having no children. In 1791, when the district fell into the hands of the Nizara; Buswapah Nair, a relation in the 4th remove from the late poligar, was allowed to establish himself, and was driven out the following year. He returned in 1794, and took forcible possession of Vimlah, where he paid nominally a peishcush of cantaroy pagodas 4,500. He was succeeded by his son Conar Nair in 1796; who dying without issue, in 1798, his sons set up Venkatputty Nair, an old man and distant relation of the family. He was regarded as a rebel by the Nizam's officers, and, as I was informed, that he was an idiotical, and merely a tool in the hands of the head peons, who gave him only a nominal assistance, I sent for him, with a view of giving him a pension, and resuming the district. His servants, dreading that his personal appearance would lay open their own conduct, prevented him from coming near me, under various pretexts of sickness, untimely rain, &c.; and as, after a delay of four months, there was no probability of their either bringing him to the cutcherry, or consenting to give up the district, Major General Campbell sent a detachment, which surprised the fort of Medhenlah, in which the poligar made him prisoner. He died lately at Gootty, leaving no family. The poligars are favoured by the natural strength of their country; have always been the most turbulent for their turbulence and depredations of any in the Ceded Districts.

## No. 69.—LOPUTNUTLAH,

## No. 70.—KOMUTNUTLAH,

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Are two petty poligars of Gorumcondah, of whom I have obtained no particulars previous to the time of the Cuddapah nabob, except that they were kawelgars under the Bijnugger government. They have never been engaged in disturbance. The poligar of Lopotnutlah is allowed cantaroy pagodas 24, and the poligar of Komutnutlah cantaroy pagodas 12 annually, from the rent of their respective villages.

## No. 71.—NANGANGOONTAH, NAGGY, NAIR.

This family had no pollam till 1718, when they obtained from the nabob of Cuddapah, kaweli russooms, and four villages of the kamul rent of cantaroy pagodas 2,002, for the reduced rent of cantaroy pagodas 907, on account of their desolate state. The assessment ten years afterwards to cantaroy pagodas 1,307, and in 1756 by the Mahrattahs, to cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,476. In 1775 the villages were resumed, and the poligars expelled by Meer Saheb; he received possession in 1791, and continued privately in the district after the peace, receiving part of the profits of the villages, which were rented in the name of potails. In 1799, Cummer ul Deen settled his peishcush at cantaroy pagodas 1,012, which is now converted into rent according to the actual produce.

## No. 72.—KALOOPILLI, KUDDUPUTTI, NAIR.

Soon after the kamul survey, an ancestor of this family obtained one village in rent, and the kawelli of 34 villages; they paid the full kamul cantaroy pagodas 1,485 for the village, and cantaroy pagodas 535 for the kawelli, making their total rent cantaroy pagodas 2,020. In 1729 they obtained an abatement to cantaroy pagodas 843, for their services against the refractory poligar of Reemlah. In 1756 the Mahrattahs raised the peishcush to C. pag<sup>a</sup> 928. In 1774 the poligar, with great part of his family, were taken and hanged by Meer Saheb; a son, who escaped, recovered his village during the war in 1791, and after the peace, continued privately in the country. He seized his ancient village again with three others, in 1799, and stipulated to pay Cummer ul Deen for them, a peishcush of C. pag<sup>a</sup> 2,254. The new villages have since been resumed, and he now has an allowance from the rent of the old one of cantaroy pag<sup>a</sup> 300.

## No. 73.—CHINTELGOONTAHBUNDAN, NARSIM, NAIR.

The poligar, and the three following on the list, are of the same origin. They obtained their villages in rent, soon after the kamul survey, under the Golcondah kings. The kamul of Chentagoontah-bundah is C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 217, and the rent was fixed at C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 168, which was raised under the Cuddapah government to C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 224, and in 1756, by the Mahrattas to C. pag<sup>a</sup> 253. The poligar was expelled by Meer Saheb in 1775, but recovered his village during the war in 1791; was driven out in 1792; returned in 1799, and was assessed by Cummer ul Deen at Tippoo's standard rent C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 1,776. He now rents the village, from the revenue of which, a deduction is allowed of C. Pag<sup>a</sup> 300 for his maintenance. Though Chenlegoondah bundah has usually been reckoned only one poligarship, yet as it has long been divided into two villages, Chinlagoontah-bundah and Sanipay, held by two different branches of the family, I have let them hold their separate shares, as formerly.

## No. 74.—YEDAMUNEYNOLLIM, MOOSIL, NAIR.

This family is a branch of No. 73, and obtained its village at the same time for the full kamul rent of cantaroy pagodas 168, which was raised by the Nabob of Cuddapah to cantaroy pagodas 223; and in 1756 by the Mahrattas, to Cant<sup>r</sup> pag<sup>a</sup> 261. The poligar was expelled by Meer Saheb in 1775, returned in 1791, and seized his own village and another; he continued privately in the country after the peace, and rented his village under a fictitious name; in 1799 he seized both villages, which were continued to him by Cummer ul Deen, for Cant<sup>r</sup> pag<sup>a</sup> 450. He now rents his original village only, in which a small abatement is allowed for his subsistence.

## No. 75.—NELLAMUNEPOLLEM, VENKATPUTTI.

This family is a branch of No. 3, and got its village at the same period, for cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 99; the kamul is 94. The rent was raised by the nabob of Cuddapah to cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 128. The poligar was killed by Meer Saheb in 1775, but his son escaped, returned, and seized his village in 1791, rented under a fictitious name after the peace of 1791. In 1799 his peishcush was fixed at cantaroy Pag<sup>a</sup> 389 by Cummer ul Deen. He now comes in last year when I sent for him, because I deprived him, like all the other poligars, of kaweli, and some circular lands, which he had seized and converted into cantaroy himself, during the troubles in 1799. He however still attempted to collect the same, and, as the potails objected to giving it up without authority, he sent a party of his men to murder the two potails, and one of the cumrums of the villages in which he had immediately for refuge to the poligar of Culloor depending on Chittoor, but was surprised and taken by a detachment of peons from Gorumcondah, and is now a prisoner. His village has of course been resumed.

## No. 76.—MOTGOOTLAH, SOOBAN, NAIR.

This family is also a branch of No. 73, and obtained his village at the same time for the full kamul rent of cantaroy pagodas 168, which was raised by the Nabob of Cuddapah to cantaroy pagodas 223; and in 1756 by the Mahrattas, to Cant<sup>r</sup> pag<sup>a</sup> 261. The poligar was expelled by Meer Saheb in 1775, returned in 1791, and seized his own village and another; he continued privately in the country after the peace, and rented his village under a fictitious name; in 1799 he seized both villages, which were continued to him by Cummer ul Deen, for Cant<sup>r</sup> pag<sup>a</sup> 450. He now rents his original village only, in which a small abatement is allowed for his subsistence.



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of the decrease of cultivation, reduced the rent to cantary Pag<sup>a</sup> 289, at which rate it continued till Hyder's time, when it was raised to the full standard assessment by Meer Sahib, and was held by the poligar till 1791, when he rebelled; but being forced to conceal himself after the peace next year, he remained privately in the country, and in 1799, recovered his village, and agreed to pay Cummer ul Deen a peishcush of Cant<sup>y</sup> Pag<sup>a</sup> 639. He now rents it, with a small deduction for his maintenance.

No. 77.—KAPUGOONAPPILLI, DASSI, NAIR.

In 1718 the ancestor of this poligar obtained a village in rent at the full kamul assessment, from the nabob of Cuddapah, with kaweli rissouns. The family were never engaged in any disturbances, and have never been dispossessed; but their rent was raised by Hyder to the full standard. I have continued the village to the poligar, with a small deduction in lieu of the kaweli, and of the abatement which he enjoyed under the Sultan's government, by the connivance of the revenue servants.

No. 78.—JELLELMUTTAH, LANGUM, NAIR.

The ancestors under the Golcondah government obtained in rent a village, rated by the kamul survey at cantary pagodas 249, for a peishcush of cantary pagodas 165, which was afterwards raised by the nabobs of Cuddapah and the Mahrattas, in 1756, to cantary pagodas 233. The poligar was expelled by Hyder in 1775; returned, and took forcible possession of his village, in 1791; was deprived of it after the peace in 1792, but remained privately in the country till 1799, when he again seized it, and also another, and was allowed to hold both by Cummer ul Deen, for a peishcush of cantary pagodas 1,432. I have resumed the new village, and left him the old one, with a reduction from the rent for his subsistence.

No. 79.—MOODIAMPAUR, BOMI, NAIR.

The ancestors obtained his village soon after the kamul survey, at the full assessment cantary pagodas 168, which was raised by the Nabob of Cuddapah, on granting kaweli to the poligar, to cantary pagodas 210, and afterwards by the Mahrattas to 227. He was expelled by Hyder in 1775; seized his village again in 1791; and was obliged to relinquish it the following year. He took possession a second time in 1799, and at the same time, annexed to it a cirkar village, both of which he held under Cummer ul deen, at a peishcush of cantary pagodas 2,290. The cirkar village is now resumed, and he holds the other with a small abatement of rent for his maintenance.

No. 80.—RUTTENGHEERY, RAYPAH, NAIR.

Heery Huddleyer, the ancestor of this family, was dessay of Tarwar Bejapoor, and served the Bijnuggur rayels with 1,000 peons, for the maintenance of whom, he obtained twelve villages of Chittledroog in jagher, valued at Soobaroy pagodas 12,500 annual rent. By such records as the family have, and on which I have been obliged to depend for all information respecting their history, till within the last fifty years, it appears that their jagheer was afterwards augmented by several adjacent districts, estimated at a rent of one lac of pagodas, for which they paid 50,000 pagodas peishcush; and that they built the old fort of Sera in the year of Shalwahan 1442. That on the conquest of the country by the Bejapoor kings, they were deprived of their ancient possessions, and received in exchange

Muddugsera	-	-	32 mosas	-	-	-	C <sup>y</sup> P <sup>a</sup>	6,337	—	6
Ruttengherry	-	119	d <sup>a</sup>	-	-	-	-	11,291	—	4

Total - - - Cant<sup>y</sup> Pag<sup>a</sup> 20,628 1 4

for the service of 300 men, and peishcush of cantary pagodas 4,000. That in Fussy 1020, Muddugsera was resumed; the service remitted, and the peishcush fixed at rupees 7,500. That in Fussy 1108, Muddugsera was restored, the service fixed at 300 men, and peishcush at rupees 15,000; and that Asoph Jah again resumed Muddugsera, remitted the service, and lowered the peishcush to Rs 10,000.

In 1741, Marari Row, having reduced Muddugsera, imposed a chout on the poligar of 8,000 rupees. In 1763, Hyder, having taken possession of the Ruttengherry district, raised the peishcush to 15,000 rupees, exclusive of the 8,000 to Marari Row. But the poligar, Rangapah Nair, failing in his payments, was seized with his five sons in 1776, and sent to Seringapatam; a village of cantary pagodas 300 annual rent, was assigned to him for the support of his women. It was continued after his death, and his eldest son Raypah Nair was appointed a tehsildar of Cundachar, with a monthly allowance of 15 cantary pagodas by the Sultan. This son being wounded and taken at the attack of the Sultan's lines in 1792, and released, fled to his ancient district of Ruttengherry, of which he obtained possession; but being driven out at the peace, he retired to Salapoor, where he remained till his issue. His brothers were all hanged by the Sultan, as soon as he heard of his escape. The eldest of them left two sons, who escaped on the fall of Seringapatam, and have been supported by their relations. The eldest is only about 16 years of age. He ventured into the country during the Nizam's government; but he has now obtained, on the restoration of his village, a pension.

(Signed) THOMAS MUNRO,  
P<sup>a</sup> Collector.

## AN ABSTRACT STATEMENT OF THE POLIGARS IN THE CEDED DISTRICTS;

Shewing,—The number of Villages composing their respective **POLLAMS**, with their full Valuation or Rent, according to the Assessments of the *Kamul Survey*, and of *Tippoo Sultan*;—The amount of Tribute they were to pay, and the number of Horse and Foot they were to furnish by the conditions of their Tenures;—The various changes which have taken place in the extent of their Pollams and nature of their Tenures;—From the period of the *Bijnugger Government* till the year 1800:—And also, The Amount of the Allowances in Land and Money, which they now enjoy; together with its future probable Increase:—*Viz.*

	PAGES		PAGES
1.—Under the <i>Bijnugger Rajahs</i> , till about - - - - - A. D. 1600 - - }	854-5.	6.—Under <i>Hyder</i> , The <i>Mahrattas</i> , The <i>Nizam</i> , and Nabobs of <i>Cuddapah</i> ; from - 1765 to 1782 - }	861-5.
2.—Under the <i>Bejapore</i> and <i>Hyderabad Kings</i> ; from - - - - - 1600 to 1690 - - }	856-7.	7.—Under <i>Tippoo Sultan</i> and The <i>Nizam</i> ; from - - - - - 1782 to 1798 - }	866-7.
3.—Under <i>Aurangzeb</i> and his Successors; from - - - - - 1590 to 1718 - - }	858-9.	8.—Under - - D <sup>o</sup> - from - 1792 to 1799 -	868-9.
4.—Under the <i>Soobahs of Deccan</i> and <i>Nabobs of Cud-</i> <i>dapah</i> ; from - - - - - 1718 to 1750 - - }	860-1.	9.—Under The <i>Nizam</i> - - in - 1799 & 1800 -	870-1.
5.—Under the <i>Mahrattas</i> , <i>Soobahs of the Deccan</i> , and <i>Nabobs of Cuddapah</i> ; from - 1750 till 1765 - }	862-3.	10.—Under The <i>Company's Government</i> ; from - - - - - 1800 till 1802 - }	872-3.

11.—With a concluding Column of "REMARKS" on each respective Poligar, - - p. 874.

NOTE 1.—In Column No. 6. (page 855) the *Kamul Assessment* is in general inserted; but as the *Bijnugger Rayels*, in giving a district in *Jageer*, usually noticed it at its supposed Rent, this Valuation, where it could be discovered, has been exhibited instead of the *Kamul*.

NOTE 2.—Wherever the Columns opposite to a Poligar's name are blank from the beginning down to a particular date,—that, for instance, of the *Soobahs of the Deccan*, (pp. 860-1)—it shows that the Poligar not previous to that era, obtained any Territory:—But, where the columns of Villages and Revenue, being filled up under one race of Princes, are left blank under a subsequent one, it denotes that the Poligar had been resumed.

[The Copy of this Table having been drawn out upon several large sheets of paper, joined together and reading horizontally from 4 main columns on the left, to the above mentioned column of extreme of the right hand, no other practicable way occurred, than by dividing it into pages, & Clauses; which has been done, by repeating on each left hand page, the aforesaid 4 main or leading

DISTRICTS		DIVISIONS.	NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.		N <sup>o</sup> of VILLAGES			
			1.	2.	In Ena	In Reg	TOTAL	
			3.	4.	5.			
HAPPONHILLY.		KUMPLI HARONHILLY KODLEAH BELLARI	1	Annagoondy	Timmah Rause			
			2	Hupahilly	B. S. Nair			
			3	J. S. Nair	Mullapah, Nair	300		300
			4	Bellari	Veeramah	75	35	110
			TOTAL		375	35	410	
ADONI.		GOOLLYAH	5	Kotcondah	Ch. N. N. & Temmah			
			6	Kapital	See amah & Chiniamah			
			7	Dodecondah	Permah, Nair			
			8	L. S. Nair	Lili Munne		5	5
		DOOFAUD	9	Dewamcondah	Rahman, Nair		3	3
			TOTAL			8	8	
			10	Buswapor	Nundikishoo, Nair		6	6
			11	Ponal Chenzou	J. S. Dewaker, Nair		6	6
		DOOFAUD	12	Bolapilly	Jelli Buswapor, Nair		13	13
			13	Dornil	Strachchallapute, Nair		18	18
			14	Rowoor	Soonah, Nair			
			15	Kusavaram	B. S. Mullah			
		DOOFAUD	16	Veneti, Polam	B. S. Veeranah			
			17	Wherth, Ontah	Antapah, Nair			
			18	N. S. N. N.	Venkatnarsoo		9	9
			TOTAL			52	52	
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	19	Hundy Anantpoor	S. S. N. N.			
			20	N. S. N. N.	Venkat, Nair			
			21	R. S. N. N.	Venkat, Nair			
			22	N. S. N. N.	N. S. N. N.	255		255
		KOIL KONTLAH	23	Ch. N. N.	Ch. N. N. N.			
			24	O. S. N. N.	Ch. N. N. N.			
			25	H. S. N. N.	Ch. N. N. N.			
			26	Sing. N. N.	Ch. N. N. N.			
		OOWOOR	27	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			28	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			29	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			30	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		S. S. N. N.	31	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			32	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			33	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			34	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	35	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			36	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			37	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			38	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	39	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			40	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			41	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			42	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	43	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			44	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			45	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			46	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	47	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			48	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			49	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			50	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	51	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			52	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			53	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			54	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	55	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			56	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			57	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			58	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	59	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			60	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			61	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			62	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	63	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			64	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			65	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			66	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	67	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			68	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			69	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			70	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	71	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			72	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			73	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			74	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	75	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			76	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			77	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			78	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	79	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			80	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			81	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			82	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	83	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			84	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			85	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			86	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	87	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			88	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			89	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			90	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	91	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			92	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			93	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			94	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	95	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			96	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			97	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			98	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	99	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			100	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			101	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			102	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	103	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			104	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			105	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			106	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	107	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			108	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			109	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			110	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	111	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			112	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			113	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			114	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	115	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			116	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			117	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			118	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	119	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			120	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			121	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			122	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	123	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			124	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			125	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			126	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	127	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			128	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			129	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			130	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	131	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			132	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			133	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			134	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	135	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			136	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			137	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			138	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	139	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			140	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			141	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			142	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	143	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			144	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			145	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			146	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	147	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			148	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			149	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			150	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	151	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			152	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			153	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			154	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	155	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			156	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			157	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			158	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	159	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			160	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			161	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			162	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	163	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			164	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			165	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			166	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	167	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			168	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			169	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			170	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	171	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			172	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			173	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			174	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	175	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			176	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			177	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			178	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	179	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			180	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			181	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			182	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	183	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			184	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			185	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			186	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	187	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			188	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			189	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			190	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	191	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			192	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			193	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			194	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	195	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			196	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			197	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			198	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	199	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			200	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			201	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			202	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	203	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			204	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			205	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			206	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	207	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			208	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			209	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			210	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	211	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			212	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			213	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			214	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	215	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			216	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			217	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			218	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	219	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			220	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			221	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			222	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	223	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			224	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			225	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			226	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	227	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			228	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			229	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			230	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	231	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			232	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			233	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			234	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	235	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			236	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			237	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			238	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	239	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			240	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			241	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
			242	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			
		HUNDY N. N. POOR	243	Bodden	B. S. N. N.			

till about Anno Domini 1600.

ASSESSMENTS.		Polligars Annual Pay from Government.	TRIBUTE.			SERVICE.	
Rajel Kamul.	Tippoo Sultan's.		Peshcawar.	Nuzer.	TOTAL.	Foot.	House.
Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	N <sup>y</sup> .	N <sup>y</sup> .
6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.
(See the Note 1, p. 853.)							
63,062 5 —	1,06,294 — 14 1/2					3,000	500
34,504 3 —	54,107 3 11					2,600	
97,566 8 —	2,60,401 4 8 1/2					5,000	500
1,127 3 7	1,127 3 7		325 —		325 —	200	
1,035 9 6	1,035 9 6		162 5		162 5	100	
2,163 2 12	2,163 2 3		487 5 —		487 5 —	300	
5,109 1 8	4,999 9 12					273	
1,493 9 12	2,386 2 12					45	
4,727 5 12	2,745 6 —					134	
5,699 8 8	1,596 — —					500	
2,763 6 11	628 1 10					200	
10,804 2 3	12,556 — 2					1,150	
1,75,174 8 1	1,32,102 8 15 1/2	26,000 — —				2,000	
1,75,174 8 1	1,32,102 8 15 1/2					5,000	700
		9,200 — —				700	
27,400 — —	39,163 1 8	70,000 — —				10,000	
2,277 6 4	1,557 1 —						
19,713 7 8	12,032 4 12					500	
850 6 4	1,815 2 12					500	
5,250 — —	2,846 1 8					400	
99 — —	199 3 4 1/2		50 6 4		50 6 4		
10 8 12	570 — —		16 8 12		16 8 12		
10,125 — —	17,911 6 12 1/2					1,000	
342 2 4	770 3 —	3,900 — —				300	
455 6 4	2,519 5 10					100	
2,703 — 1	5,028 3 15					400	
1,911 — 15	3,254 5 12					300	
18,370 3 2	6,277 8 3 1/2					300	
52 6 8	378 9 —						
130 — —	813 3 8	3,560 — —					
1,053 3 4	290 1 8 1/2						
9,796 9 10	12,993 9 4						

DISTRICTS.		DIVISIONS.	NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.		Old.	New.	TOTAL.	
			1.	2.	25.	26.	27.	
HARPONNELLY.	KUMPLI HARPONNELLY KOOMBEGAH BELLARI		No.					
			1.	Annagoondy	Timmapah Rauze	114	-	114
			2.	Harponnelly	Busvapah, Nair	37	423	460
			3.	Jerremulla	Mullikoin, Nair	230	-	230
			4.	Bellari	Veeramah	75	-	75
				TOTAL	456	423	879	
ADONI.	GOOLLYAH		5.	Korcondah	Chinnamah & Temamah	-	41	41
			6.	Kapital	Sertamah & Chinnamah	-	24	24
			7.	Dolecondah	Parnal, Nair	5	-	5
			8.	Punicondah	Lili Munne	3	-	3
			9.	Dewandcondah	Mahman, Nair	6	-	6
				TOTAL	14	65	79	
CUMBUM.	DOOPAUD		10.	Busvapoor	Nundikishon, Nair	6	-	6
			11.	Poolal Chenoo	Jeth Dewaker, Nair	6	-	6
			12.	Balapilly	Jelli Busvapah, Nair	13	-	13
			13.	Dornal	Sheshchallapute, Nair	18	-	18
			14.	Rawoor	Soobah, Nair	-	13	13
			15.	Kusaveram	Bodi Muttarah	7	-	7
			16.	Vencadrepoolam	Bodi Veeramah	18	-	18
			17.	Whorlagontah	Antipah, Nair	7	-	7
			18.	Nillagootiah	Vencatnarsoo	9	-	9
						TOTAL	84	13
	HUNDY ANANTAPOOR RY-DROOG NOSUM CHITWEYL  KOIL KONTLAH  DOOWOOR CAMALAPORE YADKI CHINNUMPITTY HUDJER KURROOR		19.	Hundy Anantpoor	Sidlapah, Nair	65	-	65
			20.	Naddamadoddy	Vencamah, Nair	5	-	5
			21.	Rydroog	Vencatapuddy, Nair	227	190	417
			22.	Nosum	Narsim Reddy	22	31	53
			23.	Chitweyl	Comar Vencat. Ragava Rauze	116	2	118
			24.	Owky	Ravakishon Rauze	45	1	46
			25.	Hennumgoond & Narsapoorackamah		41	-	41
			26.	Singaputten & Kalwadah Mujel Mulla Reddy		11	-	11
			27.	Bodiyamanoor	Boochamah	1	4	5
			28.	Tippah Reddy pulli & Audereddy pulli		3	-	3
			29.	Mooteal pair		-	-	-
			30.	Worapaur	Kugput Reddy	-	-	-
			31.	Oopaloor	Narsim Reddy	1	-	1
			32.	Talmuriah	Konam Rauz	1	-	1
			33.	Pvatilli	Condul, Nair	44	-	44
			34.	Muddehera	Mullekaurjun, Nair	3	7	10
			35.	Kummulpaur	Goorajah, Nair	-	-	-
			36.	Ghuttem	Ragoonat, Nair	10	-	10
			37.	Burlapoor	Cuddaiputti, Nair	3	-	3
			38.	Sampilli	Muttapah, Nair	5	-	5
			39.	Teimulgoondi	Chinna Cadroputti, Nair	2	-	2
			40.	Yellootah	Veerapah, Nair	1	-	1
			41.	Kullipundah	Caddrepah, Nair	1	-	1
			42.	Roanmullah	Vencatadiy, Nair	1	-	1
			43.	Kootapollem	Narsim, Nair	1	-	1
			44.	Yerragoonapollem	Cuddaiputti, Nair	1	-	1
			45.	Madaneynpollem	Modah, Nair	1	-	1
			46.	Maddanpili	Vencatapah, Nair	2	-	2
			47.	Papy pulli	Paupah, Nair	1	-	1
			48.	Tutt	Soobah, Nair	1	-	1
			49.	Rampicherla	Veerapah, Nair	1	-	1
			50.	Mullyal	Vencataputti, Nair	4	-	4
			51.	Doodipilli	Bori Muli, Nair	4	-	4
			52.	Mundancheroo	Bu-vant, Nair	-	-	-
			53.	Kohimti	Muttapah, Nair	10	-	10
			54.	Marella	Ramah, Nair	1	-	1
			55.	Shillwaipollem	Busvapah, Nair	1	-	1
			56.	Yerravarpollem	Timmapah, Nair	1	-	1
			57.	Milacherroo	Chinna, Nair	1	-	1
			58.	Rungungerpollem	Papy, Nair	-	1	1
			59.	Yellamundah	Muttapah, Nair	-	1	1
			60.	Ganguichentlah	Musel, Nair	-	1	1
			61.	Madicherroo	Chinnapah, Nair	1	-	1
			62.	Woodyamunki		1	-	1
			63.	Yegavamarapahgoontah		1	-	1
			64.	Digvamarapahgoontah		-	-	-
			65.	Talpoor		-	-	-
			66.	Talpoor	Mohabut Khan	-	29	29
			67.	Koddi	Allum Khan	-	32	32
			68.	Yemla	Vencataputti, Nair	26	-	26
			69.	Loputnuttah		-	-	-
			70.	Komut Nutiah		-	-	-
			71.	Naugengontah	Naji, Nair	-	-	-
			72.	Kailapilli	Kuddrooputti, Nair	1	-	1
			73.	Chinnatgontahbundah	Narsim, Nair	1	-	1
			74.	Yadananeyn Pollem	Vencataputti, Nair	1	-	1
			75.	Nodananeyn Pollem	Vencataputti, Nair	1	-	1
			76.	Motgolah	Soobah, Nair	1	-	1
			77.	Korcondapullil	Dassi, Nair	1	-	1
			78.	Jelamundah	Singurn, Nair	1	-	1
			79.	Moodeampaur	Boml, Nair	1	-	1
			80.	Ruttengary	Rayspah, Nair	1	-	1
						TOTAL	792	331
GRAND TOTAL					1,346	832	2,178	

Kamul.	Tippoo Sultan's.	Annual Pay from Government.	Weshcush.	Nuzzer.	TOTAL.	Foot.	Home.
Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Nº.	Nº.
28.	29.	30.	31.	32.	33.	34.	35.
1,56,285 8 15 <sup>1</sup> 2,70,889 6 8 32,115 15 27,748 9 8	1,01,403 9 4 <sup>1</sup> 1,83,966 5 8 <sup>1</sup> 73,559 1 6 <sup>1</sup> 43,958 3 15	- - - - - - - - - - - -	- - - 4,200 - - 17,500 - - 3 500 - -	- - - - - - - - - - - -	- - - 4,200 - - 17,500 - - 3,500 - -	- - - - - - 1,000 - - 2,500 - -	- - - - - - - - - - - -
4,92,019 5 14 <sup>1</sup>	4,02,888 - 3	- - -	25,200 - -	- - -	25,200 - -	3,500	- - -
10,223 - 6 5,220 3 2 1,127 3 7 1,035 9 6 2,041 4 1	10,223 - 6 5,220 3 2 1,127 3 7 1,035 9 6 2,041 4 1	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	8,775 - 1 4,550 - - 325 - - 162 5 - 812 5 -	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	8,775 - - 4,550 - - 325 - - 162 5 - 812 5 -	300 200 200 100 100	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
19,648 - 6	19,648 - 6	- - -	14,625 - -	- - -	14,625 - -	900	- - -
3 861 1 12 1,111 5 - 3,640 6 - 5,699 8 8 3,127 1 8 357 1 7 4,468 1 - 452 - 2 2,703 6 11	4,999 9 12 2,386 2 12 2,745 6 - 1,596 - - 1,205 1 6 373 8 3 1,137 5 - 281 8 6 628 1 10	- -	1,330 - - 225 - - 720 - - 2,100 - - 3,127 1 8 65 - - 650 - - 325 - -	- -	1,330 - - 225 - - 720 - - 2,100 - - 3,127 1 8 65 - - 650 - - 325 - -	150 50 100 300 50 300 50 100	- -
25,481 2 -	15,355 3 1	- - -	8,542 1 8	- - -	8,542 1 8	1,100	- - -
43,760 - - 2,415 - - 2,48,717 - - 46,706 5 8 51,437 8 7 40,779 7 - 13,734 4 13 <sup>1</sup> 8,607 5 14 4,662 4 - 4,300 - -	46,325 9 9 <sup>1</sup> 4,000 - - 2,14,914 4 6 <sup>1</sup> 44,316 2 14 <sup>1</sup> 2,35,752 4 4 27,756 2 9 16,269 4 - 13,822 6 11 <sup>1</sup> 5,070 - - 6,173 1 4	- -	11,200 - - 1,050 - - 72,000 - - 1,229 8 12 21,000 - - 7,000 - - 4,550 - - 2,336 9 8 1,837 5 - 1,040 8 -	- -	11,200 - - 1,050 - - 72,000 - - 1,229 8 12 21,000 - - 7,000 - - 4,550 - - 2,336 9 8 1,837 5 - 1,040 8 -	2,200 2,600 2,800 1,000 500 500 300 150	150
10,907 6 8 1,217 6 1 1,358 5 - 23,400 - - 17,505 7 15 <sup>1</sup>	1,301 3 - 1,954 3 9 <sup>1</sup> 39,163 1 8 18,046 1 9 <sup>1</sup>	1,554 8 -	5,850 - - 350 - - 7,000 - - 3,150 - -	- - - - - - - - - - - -	5,850 - - 350 - - 7,000 - - 3,150 - -	200 100 100 300	- - - - - - - - - - - -
19,743 7 8 860 6 4 3,250 - - 99 5 10 <sup>1</sup> 409 3 12 1,409 - 10 26 6 2 135 6 10 <sup>1</sup> 148 4 7 5 9 1 421 8 12 342 2 4 201 1 2 <sup>1</sup> 4,5 6 4 2,083 6 12 1,911 15 -	12,032 4 12 1,895 2 1 <sup>1</sup> 2,846 3 8 199 3 4 <sup>1</sup> 320 - - 1,142 4 10 <sup>1</sup> 243 3 14 1,059 3 15 540 9 - 92 5 2 1,218 7 8 770 3 - 2,519 5 10 6,004 2 1 3,254 5 12	- -	210 - - 910 - - 50 6 4 16 8 12 1,409 - 10 76 6 2 135 5 10 <sup>1</sup> 148 4 7 5 9 1 421 8 12 385 - - 455 6 4 2,883 6 12 405 - -	442 5 -	210 - - 910 - - 50 6 4 16 8 12 1,409 - 10 76 6 2 135 5 10 <sup>1</sup> 148 4 7 5 9 1 421 8 12 385 - - 455 6 4 2,883 6 12 405 - -	500 50 75 100 100 75	- -
18,370 3 2 141 8 - 1,004 6 8 1,135 1 - 52 6 8 210 6 - 42 9 - 460 9 - 673 4 - 730 - -	6,277 8 3 <sup>1</sup> 1,196 5 12 999 3 1 <sup>1</sup> 1,392 1 6 375 9 - 309 5 10 947 4 - 536 2 8 3,210 4 - 813 3 2	1,100 - - 1,102 3 8 700 - -	2,800 - - 87 5 - 70 - - 1,135 1 - 42 9 - 174 9 - 695 - -	- -	2,800 - - 87 5 - 70 - - 1,135 1 - 42 9 - 174 9 - 695 - -	50 75 100 75	- -
40,559 5 - 39,228 7 8 9,796 9 10	10,442 9 3 9,740 8 5 12,933 9 4	- - - - - - - - -	- - - - - - 2,800 - -	- - - - - - - - -	- - - - - - 2,800 - -	- - - - - - - - -	- - - - - - - - -
1,458 - - 217 8 3 <sup>1</sup> 168 7 8 94 9 4 494 - 12 <sup>1</sup> 249 3 4 <sup>1</sup> 168 7 8 20,628 1 4	1,272 4 - 1,776 9 2 485 1 8 521 7 7 885 - 8 976 5 - 859 1 - 24,541 6 9 <sup>1</sup>	- -	2,020 2 8 163 7 8 163 7 8 99 5 10 455 6 - 165 8 - 168 7 8 4,875 - -	- -	2,020 2 8 163 7 8 163 7 8 99 5 10 455 6 - 165 8 - 168 7 8 4,875 - -	- -	- -
6,68,828 9 5	6,79,864 8 6 <sup>1</sup>	5,868 7 8	1,74,036 5 - <sup>1</sup>	442 5 -	1,74,479 - - <sup>1</sup>	- - -	- - -
12,09,777 7 9 <sup>1</sup>	11,17,756 2 - <sup>1</sup>	5,868 7 8	2,22,401 6 8 <sup>1</sup>	442 5 -	2,22,846 7 8 <sup>1</sup>	- - -	- - -



[Repeated from page 854.]						No of VILLAGES.		
DISTRICTS.		DIVISIONS.		NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.		O d.	New.	TOTAL.
				1.	2.	36.	37.	38.
HARPONHELLY.	(See Note 2, at page 853)		No.					
	KUMPLI	- - -	1.	Annagondy	- - - Timmapah Rauze	114	-	114
	HARPONHELLY	- - -	2.	Harponhelly	- - - Busvapah, Nair	457	-	457
	KOODLEGAR	- - -	3.	Jerremulla	- - - Mullikoin, Nair	230	-	230
	BELIARI	- - -	4.	Belari	- - - Veeramah	75	-	75
TOTAL						876	-	876
ADONI.	GOOLLYAH	- - -	5.	Kotcondah	- - - Chinnamah & Temamah	41	-	41
		- - -	6.	Kapitral	- - - Sreetamah & Chinnamah	24	-	24
		- - -	7.	Doodcondah	- - - Permal, Nair	5	-	5
		- - -	8.	Pundicondah	- - - Lall Munne	3	-	3
			9.	Dewancondah	- - - Rahman, Nair	3	-	3
TOTAL						76	-	76
CUMBUM.	DOOPAUD	- - -	10.	Busvapoor	- - - Nundikishon, Nair	6	-	6
		- - -	11.	Poolal Chenoo	- - - Jelli Dewker, Nair	6	49	55
		- - -	12.	Polapilly	- - - Jelli Busvapah, Nair	13	1	14
		- - -	13.	Dornal	- - - Shishachalapute, Nair	18	38	56
		- - -	14.	Rawoor	- - - Soobah, Nair	13	-	13
		- - -	15.	Kusaveram	- - - Bodi Mullanah	7	-	7
		- - -	16.	Vencadepoolam	- - - Bodi Veeranah	18	-	18
		- - -	17.	Whorlagootah	- - - Antapah, Nair	7	-	7
			18.	Nillagootah	- - - Vencatnaseo	9	-	9
TOTAL						97	88	185
COLLECTOR'S	HUNDY ANANTAPOOR RY-DROOG NOSUM CHITWEYL  KOIL KONTLAH  DOOWOOR  CAMALAPORE YADKI CHINNUMPITY HUDJER KURROOR   							

ASSESSMENTS.		Pohgare Annual Pay from Government.	TRIBUTE.			SERVICE.	
Kamul.	Tippoo Sultan's.		Peshcush.	Nozzer.	TOTAL.	Foot.	Horse.
Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	N <sup>o</sup> .	N <sup>o</sup> .
39.	40.	41.	42.	43.	44.	45.	46.
1,56,285 8 15 1/2	1,01,403 9 4 1/2	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
2,68,493 6 8	1,82,058 1 7 1/2	- - -	8,208 4 1	- - -	8,208 4 1	- - -	- - -
87,115 - 15	73,559 1 6 1/2	- - -	17,500 - -	- - -	17,500 - -	1,000	- - -
27,748 9 8	43,958 3 15	- - -	3,500 - -	- - -	3,500 - -	2,500	- - -
4,88,643 5 14 1/2	4,00,979 6 2	- - -	29,208 4 1	- - -	29,208 4 1	3,500	- - -
10,223 - 6	10,223 - 6	- - -	8,775 - -	- - -	8,775 - -	300	- - -
5,220 3 2	5,220 3 2	- - -	4,550 - -	- - -	4,550 - -	200	- - -
1,127 3 7	1,127 3 7	- - -	825 3 4	178 7 3	1,004 10 7	- - -	- - -
1,035 9 6	1,035 9 6	- - -	227 8 4	73 1 4	300 9 8	- - -	- - -
1,401 5 10	1,401 5 10	- - -	812 5 -	- - -	812 5 -	- - -	- - -
19,008 1 15	19,008 1 15	- - -	15,210 6 8	251 8 12	15,462 5 4	500	- - -
3,861 1 12	4,999 9 12	- - -	1,400 - -	- - -	1,400 - -	- - -	- - -
4,706 8 12	10,066 - 6	- - -	1,435 - -	420 - -	1,855 - -	- - -	- - -
3,791 4 12	4,773 4 12	- - -	1,407 - -	343 - -	1,750 - -	- - -	- - -
13,092 - 10	3,892 - 11	- - -	2,782 5 -	2,275 - -	5,057 5 -	- - -	- - -
3,127 1 8	1,200 1 6	- - -	803 9 3	- - -	803 9 3	- - -	- - -
357 1 7	373 8 3	- - -	267 6 11	32 5 -	300 1 11	- - -	- - -
4,468 1 -	1,137 5 -	- - -	1,137 5 -	260 - -	1,397 5 -	1,000	- - -
452 - 2	281 8 6	- - -	162 5 -	20 9 -	183 4 -	- - -	- - -
2,763 6 11	628 1 10	- - -	413 2 12	130 - -	543 2 12	- - -	- - -
37,519 6 10	25,359 - 2	- - -	9,809 3 10	39481 4 -	13,290 7 10	1,000	- - -
43,760 - -	46,325 9 9 1/2	- - -	11,200 - -	- - -	11,200 - -	- - -	- - -
2,415 - -	4,000 - -	- - -	1,050 - -	1,050 - -	2,100 - -	- - -	- - -
2,34,795 7 8	1,99,756 8 9	- - -	69,000 - -	- - -	69,000 - -	- - -	- - -
28,143 6 5	39,507 2 3 1/2	- - -	28,000 - -	1,750 - -	29,750 - -	- - -	- - -
57,311 2 2	1,44,633 3 10	- - -	14,000 - -	3,500 - -	17,500 - -	- - -	- - -
39,573 3 -	21,559 8 13	- - -	14,000 - -	1,750 - -	15,750 - -	- - -	- - -
13,734 4 13 1/2	16,269 4 - 1/2	- - -	8,050 - -	700 - -	8,750 - -	- - -	- - -
8,607 5 4	13,822 6 11 1/2	- - -	7,000 - -	2,100 - -	9,100 - -	- - -	- - -
697 4 -	1,105 - -	- - -	175 - -	- - -	175 - -	- - -	- - -
4,850 - -	6,173 1 4	- - -	2,301 9 8	- - -	2,301 9 8	- - -	- - -
4,854 2 -	6,000 - -	- - -	- - -	700 - -	700 - -	- - -	- - -
6,703 3 5 1/2	9,278 4 7	- - -	3,500 - -	420 - -	3,920 - -	- - -	- - -
1,217 6 1	1,301 3 -	- - -	595 - -	105 - -	700 - -	- - -	- - -
1,358 - -	1,954 3 9 1/2	- - -	700 - -	- - -	700 - -	- - -	- - -
18,453 4 4	31,720 1 10 1/2	- - -	3,500 - -	700 - -	4,200 - -	- - -	- - -
15,130 9 15 1/2	17,767 9 10 1/2	- - -	12,021 - -	- - -	12,021 - -	- - -	- - -
390 - -	642 4 8 1/2	- - -	390 - -	- - -	390 - -	- - -	- - -
22,924 6 14	18,615 4 6	- - -	4,200 - -	3,500 - -	7,700 - -	- - -	- - -
1,210 3 6	3,808 4 12	- - -	1,225 - -	- - -	1,225 - -	- - -	- - -
3,250 - -	2,816 3 8	- - -	910 - -	- - -	910 - -	- - -	- - -
743 1 8 1/2	1,709 5 14 1/2	- - -	714 4 - 1/2	- - -	714 4 - 1/2	- - -	- - -
459 3 12	510 - -	- - -	459 3 12	- - -	459 3 12	- - -	- - -
1,409 - 10	1,142 4 10 1/2	- - -	717 1 14	- - -	717 1 14	- - -	- - -
76 6 2	245 3 14	- - -	76 6 2	24 6 6	101 2 8	- - -	- - -
135 5 10 1/2	1,059 3 15	- - -	135 5 10 1/2	33 7 8	169 3 2 1/2	- - -	- - -
148 4 7	540 9 -	- - -	148 4 7	- - -	148 4 7	- - -	- - -
5 9 1	92 5 2	- - -	5 9 1	- - -	5 9 1	- - -	- - -
342 2 4	770 3 -	- - -	385 - -	35 - -	420 - -	- - -	- - -
455 6 4	2,519 5 10	- - -	455 6 4	- - -	455 6 4	- - -	- - -
2,883 6 12	604 2 1	- - -	2,883 6 12	- - -	2,883 6 12	- - -	- - -
3,045 8 14 1/2	4,917 7 7	- - -	895 6 4	- - -	895 6 4	- - -	- - -
739 3 12	742 4 8 1/2	- - -	105 - -	- - -	105 - -	- - -	- - -
18,370 3 2	6,277 8 3 1/2	- - -	3,150 - -	- - -	3,150 - -	- - -	- - -
141 8 -	1,196 5 12	- - -	175 - -	- - -	175 - -	- - -	- - -
1,004 6 8	999 3 12	- - -	245 - -	- - -	245 - -	- - -	- - -
1,135 1 -	1,392 1 6	- - -	437 5 -	- - -	437 5 -	- - -	- - -
52 6 8	378 9 -	- - -	35 4 6	- - -	35 4 6	- - -	- - -
210 6 -	309 5 10	- - -	141 7 8	- - -	141 7 8	- - -	- - -
42 9 -	927 4 -	- - -	96 2 8	- - -	96 2 8	- - -	- - -
460 9 -	536 2 8	- - -	292 3 -	- - -	292 3 -	- - -	- - -
673 4 -	3,310 4 -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
730 - -	813 3 2	- - -	86 6 10	- - -	86 6 10	- - -	- - -
451 3 4	290 1 14	- - -	520 - -	- - -	520 - -	- - -	- - -
238 2 2	203 9 6	- - -	238 7 2	34 3 10	273 - 12	- - -	- - -
40,559 5 -	10,442 9 3	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
39,228 7 8	9,740 8 5	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
9,796 9 10	12,993 9 4	- - -	2,800 - -	700 - -	3,500 - -	- - -	- - -
140 4 -	184 9 8 1/2	- - -	149 5 -	- - -	149 5 -	- - -	- - -
2,092 5 -	2,874 2 13	- - -	1,307 8 2	- - -	1,307 8 2	- - -	- - -
2,485 8 3 1/2	1,272 4 -	- - -	807 7 8	- - -	807 7 8	- - -	- - -
217 8 3	1,776 9 2	- - -	168 7 8	55 6 14	224 4 6	- - -	- - -
168 7 8	485 1 8	- - -	168 7 8	54 8 7	223 5 15	- - -	- - -
94 9 4	521 7 -	- - -	99 5 10	28 6 14	128 2 8	- - -	- - -
494 - 12 1/2	885 2 -	- - -	289 4 1	- - -	289 4 1	- - -	- - -
346 9 8	681 4 12	- - -	346 9 8	- - -	346 9 8	- - -	- - -
249 3 4 1/2	576 5 -	- - -	166 8 -	- - -	166 8 -	- - -	- - -
168 7 8	859 1 -	- - -	168 7 8	42 1 14	210 9 6	- - -	- - -
14,191 14 -	13,384 8 -	- - -	3,250 - -	- - -	3,250 - -	- - -	- - -
2,05,681 5 2	6,84,100 7 8	- - -	2,05,681 5 2	17,284 1 9	2,21,266 1 14	75	- - -
1,00,000 0 0	1,00,000 0 0	- - -	1,00,000 0 0	11,017 4 2	1,11,017 4 2	1,11,017 4 2	- - -

Continued  
on  
the next  
page.

## 5.—Under the MAHRATTAS, SOOBANS of The DECCAN,

[Repeated from page 854.]

[Repeated from page 354.]					No of VILLAGES.			
DISTRICTS.		DIVISIONS.		NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.		Old.	New.	Total.
		1.	2.			47.	48.	49.
		No.						
HARPONHELLY.	KUMPLI HARPONHELLY KODLEGAR BELLARI	1.	Annagoondy	Timmaph Rauze	78	-	78	
		2.	Harponhelly	Busvapah, Nair	457	92	549	
		3.	Jerremulla	Mullikoin, Nair	135	-	135	
		4.	Bellari	Veeramah	75	-	75	
TOTAL						745	92	837
ADONI.	GOOLLYAH	5.	Kotcondah	Chinnamah & Temamah	41	-	41	
		6.	Kapital	Seetamah & Chinnamah	24	-	24	
		7.	Doodcondah	Permal, Nair	5	-	5	
		8.	Pundicondah	Lal Munne	3	-	3	
		9.	Dewancondah	Rahman, Nair	5	-	5	
TOTAL						78	-	78
CUNBUM.	DOOPAUD	10.	Busvapoor	Nendikishon, Nair	6	-	6	
		11.	Poolal Chenoo	Jelli Dewaker, Nair	55	-	55	
		12.	Bolapilly	Jelli Busvapah, Nair	14	-	14	
		13.	Dornal	Shashachallapute, Nair	56	-	56	
		14.	Rawoor	Soobah, Nair	13	-	13	
		15.	Kusavaram	Bodi Mullanah	7	-	7	
		16.	Vencadrepoolam	Bodi Veeranah	18	-	18	
		17.	Worlagootah	Antapah, Nair	7	-	7	
		18.	Nihagootlah	Vencatnarsoo	9	-	9	
		TOTAL						185
SECTOR'S.	HUNDY ANANTAPOOR RY-DROOG NOSUM CHITWEYL KOIL KONTLAN DOOWOOR CAMALAPORE YADKI CHINNUMPITTY HUDJER KURROOR GORUMCONDAN	19.	Hundy Anantpoor	Siddapah, Nair	65	-	65	
		20.	Maddamadoddy	Vencamah, Nair	5	-	5	
		21.	Rydroog	Vencatapuddy, Nair	383	-	383	
		22.	Nosum	Narsim Reddy	44	-	44	
		23.	Chitweyl	Comar Vencat. Ragava Rauze	119	-	119	
		24.	Owky	Ramakishen Rauze	41	-	41	
		25.	Hunmurgood & Narsapoor ackmah		41	-	41	
		26.	Singaporen & Kalwadah Mujel Mulla Reddy		11	-	11	
		27.	Bolyemanoor	Boochamah	1	-	1	
		28.	Tippah Reddy pulli & Audereddy pulli		3	-	3	
		29.	Moortal paur		7	-	7	
		30.	Worapaur	Kugput Reddy	7	-	7	
		31.	Oopaloor	Narsim Reddy	1	-	1	
		32.	Talmurlah	Konam Raus	1	-	1	
		33.	Pyalilli	Condul, Nair	37	-	37	
		34.	Muddehara	Mullekajun, Nair	9	-	9	
		35.	Kummulpaur	Goorapah, Nair	1	-	1	
		36.	Ghuttem	Ragoonar, Nair	11	-	11	
		37.	Buchapoor	Cuddalputti, Nair	4	-	4	
		38.	Sampilli	Mullapah, Nair	5	-	5	
		39.	Tromulgondli	Chinna Cadroputti, Nair	4	-	4	
		40.	Yellootlah	Veerapah, Nair	1	-	1	
		41.	Kullipundah	Caddrepah, Nair	1	-	1	
		42.	Boanmullah	Vencatadry, Nair	1	-	1	
		43.	Koutapollern	Narsim, Nair	1	-	1	
		44.	Yerragontapollern	Cudderputti, Nair	1	-	1	
		45.	Madancypollern	Modah, Nair	1	-	1	
		46.	Maddanpili	Vencatapah, Nair	1	-	1	
		47.	Papy pulli	Paupah, Nair	1	-	1	
		48.	Tutt	Soobah, Nair	1	-	1	
		49.	Rampicheila	Veerapah, Nair	1	-	1	
		50.	Mullyal	Vencataputti, Nair	4	-	4	
		51.	Doodipilli	Bori Mull, Nair	7	-	7	
		52.	Mundancheroo	Busvant, Nair	3	-	3	
		53.	Kolimti	Mullapah, Nair	10	-	10	
		54.	Marella	Ramsh, Nair	1	-	1	
		55.	Shillwarpollern	Busvapah, Nair	1	-	1	
		56.	Yerravarpollern	Timmaph, Nair	1	-	1	
		57.	Milecherroo	Chinnah, Nair	1	-	1	
		58.	Kungungarpollern	Papy, Nair	1	-	1	
		59.	Yellamundah	Mullapah, Nair	1	-	1	
		60.	Ganguichenda	Musel, Nair	1	-	1	
		61.	Madisherroo	Chinnapah, Nair	1	-	1	
		62.	Woodyamunki		1	-	1	
		63.	Yegavamarapahgoontah		1	-	1	
		64.	Digvamsapahgoontah		1	-	1	
		65.	Talpool		1	-	1	
		66.	Talpool	Mahabut Khan	29	-	29	
		67.	Kuddri	Allum Khan	32	-	32	
		68.	Yemis	Vencataputti, Nair	26	-	26	
		69.	Loputnutilah		1	-	1	
		70.	Komat Nulah		1	-	1	
		71.	Naugangootah	Nagi, Nair	4	-	4	
		72.	Kallapilli	Kudrooputti, Nair	1	-	1	
		73.	Chintalgontahbundah	Narsim, Nair	1	-	1	
		74.	Madamany Pollern	Venkatputti, Nair	1	-	1	
		75.	Nolamuneya Pollern	Venkatputti, Nair	1	-	1	
		76.	Morgootlah	Soobah, Nair	1	-	1	
		77.	Kopoggoondapulli	Daseh, Nair	1	-	1	
		78.	Jellelmundah	Singurn, Nair	1	-	1	
		79.	Moodeampaur	Bomi, Nair	1	-	1	
		80.	Ruttengorry	Raysah, Nair	119	-	119	
TOTAL						1,064	9	1,073
GRAND TOTAL						2,008	9	2,017

# The AFFAIRS of The EAST INDIA COMPANY

869

and NABOBS of CUDDAPAH; from 1750 till 1765.

ASSESSMENTS.			TRIBUTE.			SERVICE.	
Kamul.	Tippoo Sultan's.	Poligars Annual Pay from Government.	Peshcath.	Nuzzer.	TOTAL.	Foot.	Monc.
Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	No.	No.
50.	51.	52.	53.	54.	55.	56.	57.
1,53,234 2 15	90,823 4 6	- - -	7,000 - -	- - -	7,000 - -	- - -	- - -
2,78,350 7 -	2,17,300 4 6	- - -	22,908 4 1	- - -	22,908 4 1	- - -	- - -
7,144 3 12	22,664 6 11	- - -	700 - -	700 - -	1,400 - -	- - -	- - -
27,748 9 8	41,958 3 15	- - -	13,000 - -	- - -	13,000 - -	500	- - -
4,60,678 3 13	3,74,236 9 7	- - -	43,608 4 1	700 - -	44,308 4 1	500	- - -
10,223 - 6	10,223 - 6	- - -	8,775 - -	- - -	8,775 - -	300	- - -
5,220 3 2	5,220 3 2	- - -	4,550 - -	- - -	4,550 - -	200	- - -
1,127 3 7	1,127 3 7	- - -	845 3 4	178 7 8	1,024 - 12	- - -	- - -
1,035 9 6	1,035 9 6	- - -	227 8 4	73 1 4	300 9 8	- - -	- - -
1,058 5 15	1,058 5 15	- - -	1,527 5 -	- - -	1,527 5 -	- - -	- - -
19,465 2 4	19,465 2 4	- - -	15,025 6 8	251 8 12	17,277 5 4	500	- - -
3,861 1 12	4,999 9 12	- - -	1,400 - -	- - -	1,400 - -	- - -	- - -
4,706 8 12	10,656 - 6	- - -	1,435 - -	420 - -	1,855 - -	- - -	- - -
3,791 4 12	2,773 4 12	- - -	1,407 - -	343 - -	1,750 - -	- - -	- - -
13,092 - 10	3,892 - 11	- - -	2,782 5 -	2,275 - -	5,057 5 -	- - -	- - -
3,127 1 8	1,206 1 6	- - -	803 9 3	- - -	803 9 3	- - -	- - -
357 1 7	373 8 3	- - -	267 6 11	32 5 -	300 1 11	- - -	- - -
4,468 1 -	1,117 5 -	- - -	1,137 5 -	860 - -	1,997 5 -	- - -	- - -
453 2 -	285 8 6	- - -	162 5 -	20 9 -	183 4 -	- - -	- - -
2,763 6 11	628 1 10	- - -	411 2 12	130 - -	543 2 12	- - -	- - -
37,519 6 10	25,359 - 2	- - -	9,809 3 10	3481 4 -	13,290 7 10	- - -	- - -
43,760 - -	46,325 9 9	- - -	8,050 - -	- - -	8,050 - -	- - -	- - -
2,415 - -	4,000 - -	- - -	1,050 - -	1,050 - -	2,100 - -	- - -	- - -
2,14,795 7 8	1,99,756 8 9	- - -	69,000 - -	- - -	69,000 - -	- - -	- - -
28,243 6 5	39,507 2 3	- - -	28,000 - -	1,750 - -	29,750 - -	- - -	- - -
50,675 8 10	1,38,501 2 10	- - -	31,500 - -	5,950 - -	37,450 - -	- - -	- - -
39,573 3 -	21,559 8 13	- - -	14,000 - -	1,750 - -	15,750 - -	- - -	- - -
13,724 4 13	16,269 4 -	- - -	8,050 - -	1,575 - -	9,625 - -	- - -	- - -
8,607 5 14	13,822 6 11	- - -	7,000 - -	2,100 - -	9,100 - -	- - -	- - -
697 4 -	1,105 - -	- - -	350 - -	- - -	350 - -	- - -	- - -
4,800 - -	6,173 1 4	- - -	2,301 9 8	- - -	2,301 9 8	- - -	- - -
4,854 2 -	6,000 - -	- - -	2,800 - -	1,050 - -	1,050 - -	- - -	- - -
6,703 3 5	5,278 4 7	- - -	595 - -	105 - -	700 - -	- - -	- - -
1,217 6 1	1,101 3 -	- - -	1,050 - -	- - -	1,050 - -	- - -	- - -
1,558 5 -	1,954 3 9	- - -	3,500 - -	700 - -	4,200 - -	- - -	- - -
18,453 4 4	31,720 1 10	- - -	12,025 - -	- - -	12,025 - -	- - -	- - -
15,161 9 15	17,767 9 10	- - -	537 5 -	- - -	537 5 -	- - -	- - -
390 - -	642 4 8	- - -	7,700 - -	373 2 12	8,073 2 12	- - -	- - -
22,924 6 14	18,635 4 6	- - -	2,450 - -	- - -	2,450 - -	- - -	- - -
5,527 1 11	6,380 9 2	- - -	1,575 - -	- - -	1,575 - -	- - -	- - -
3,250 - -	2,446 3 8	- - -	1,437 - 5	- - -	1,437 - 5	- - -	- - -
1,470 7 13	2,477 - 8	- - -	459 3 12	- - -	459 3 12	- - -	- - -
459 3 12	510 - -	- - -	759 3 12	- - -	759 3 12	- - -	- - -
1,409 - 10	1,142 4 10	- - -	101 2 8	- - -	101 2 8	- - -	- - -
76 6 2	245 3 14	- - -	282 9 10	- - -	182 9 10	- - -	- - -
135 5 10	1,059 3 15	- - -	148 4 7	- - -	148 4 7	- - -	- - -
148 4 7	540 9 -	- - -	5 9 1	- - -	5 9 1	- - -	- - -
5 9 1	92 5 2	- - -	420 - -	- - -	420 - -	- - -	- - -
342 2 4	770 3 -	- - -	805 6 4	- - -	805 6 4	- - -	- - -
201 1 2	2,519 5 10	- - -	2,883 6 12	- - -	2,883 6 12	- - -	- - -
455 6 4	6,004 2 1	- - -	1,148 7 8	- - -	1,148 7 8	- - -	- - -
2,883 6 12	4,917 7 7	- - -	220 - -	- - -	220 - -	- - -	- - -
3,045 8 14	1,632 1 6	- - -	3,450 - -	- - -	3,450 - -	- - -	- - -
1,697 5 -	6,277 8 3	- - -	275 - -	- - -	275 - -	- - -	- - -
18,370 3 2	1,196 5 12	- - -	87 5 -	43 7 8	87 5 -	- - -	- - -
141 8 -	999 3 12	- - -	31 4 6	17 5 -	32 9 6	- - -	- - -
1,604 6 8	1,392 1 6	- - -	148 7 8	21 8 8	169 6 4	- - -	- - -
1,135 1 -	378 9 -	- - -	96 2 8	58 5 -	154 7 8	- - -	- - -
52 6 3	309 5 10	- - -	102 3 -	- - -	102 3 -	- - -	- - -
210 6 -	947 - -	- - -	87 5 -	- - -	87 5 -	- - -	- - -
42 9 -	530 2 8	- - -	130 - -	- - -	130 - -	- - -	- - -
460 2 -	3,310 4 -	- - -	520 - -	- - -	520 - -	- - -	- - -
673 4 -	883 3 2	- - -	201 9 6	- - -	201 9 6	- - -	- - -
730 - -	290 1 14	- - -	65 - -	- - -	65 - -	- - -	- - -
453 3 4	203 9 6	- - -	2,800 - -	- - -	2,800 - -	- - -	- - -
238 7 12	1,201 - -	- - -	2,800 - -	- - -	2,800 - -	- - -	- - -
765 4 14	10,442 9 3	- - -	2,625 - -	- - -	2,625 - -	- - -	- - -
40,550 5 -	9,720 5 8	- - -	169 - -	- - -	169 - -	- - -	- - -
39,228 7 8	12,993 9 4	- - -	52 - -	- - -	52 - -	- - -	- - -
9,796 9 10	184 9 8	- - -	1,476 5 10	- - -	1,476 5 10	- - -	- - -
140 4 -	64 5 15	- - -	928 1 4	- - -	928 1 4	- - -	- - -
326 5 7	2,874 2 13	- - -	253 2 4	- - -	253 2 4	- - -	- - -
2,092 5 -	1,272 4 -	- - -	261 5 10	- - -	261 5 10	- - -	- - -
1,485 - -	1,776 9 2	- - -	228 2 8	- - -	228 2 8	- - -	- - -
217 8 3	945 1 8	- - -	229 4 1	- - -	229 4 1	- - -	- - -
168 7 8	885 - 8	- - -	348 9 8	- - -	348 9 8	- - -	- - -
98 9 4	683 4 12	- - -	253 1 4	- - -	253 1 4	- - -	- - -
454 - 12	976 5 -	- - -	227 8 2	- - -	227 8 2	- - -	- - -
346 9 8	859 1 -	- - -	5,850 - -	- - -	5,850 - -	- - -	- - -
249 3 4	23,384 8 -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
168 7 8	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
14,291 - 14	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
6,09,780 - -	6,80,543 8 13	- - -	2,34,067 4 7	18,813 9 -	2,52,881 3 7	100	- - -

## G.—Under HYDER, The MAHRATTAS, The NIZAM, and

[Repeated from page 854.]

No of VILLAGES.

[Repeated from page 854.]				No of VILLAGES.			
DISTRICTS.	DIVISIONS.	NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.		Old.	New.	TOTAL.	
		1.	2.	58.	59.	60.	
HARFONHELLY.	KUMBI HARFONHELLY KOODLEGAR BELLARI	N <sup>o</sup>					
		1.	Annagondy	Timmapah Rauze	78	-	78
		2.	Harfonhelly	Busvapah, Nair	549	3	552
		3.	Jeiremulla	Mullikoin, Nair	135	-	135
		4.	Bellari	Veeramah	-	-	-
		TOTAL		762	3	765	
ADONI.	GOOLLYAH	5.	Kotcondah	Chinnamah & Temamah	-	-	-
		6.	Kapitral	Seetamah & Chinnamah	-	-	-
		7.	Doodcondah	Permal, Nair	5	-	5
		8.	Pundcondah	Lali Munne	3	-	3
		9.	Dewancondah	Rahman, Nair	-	-	-
		TOTAL		8	-	8	
CUMBUM.	DOOPAUD	10.	Buswapoor	Nundikishoo, Nair	6	-	6
		11.	Poolal Chenoo	Jelli Dewaker, Nair	-	-	-
		12.	Bolapilly	Jelli Busvapah, Nair	-	-	-
		13.	Dornal	Shaghachallapute, Nair	56	-	56
		14.	Rawoor	Soobah, Nair	13	-	13
		15.	Kuwveram	Bodi Mullanah	7	-	7
		16.	Vencadrepoolam	Bodi Veeranah	18	-	18
		17.	Whorlagootah	Antapah, Nair	7	-	7
		18.	Nillagootlah	Vencatnarsoo	9	-	9
		TOTAL		116	-	116	
GORS.	HUNDY ANANTAPOOR RY-DROOG NOSUM CHITWEYL KOIL KONTLAH DOOWOOR CAMALAPORE YADKI CHINNUMPITY HUDJER KURROOR	19.	Hundy Anantpoor	Siddapah, Nair	65	-	65
		20.	Naddamadoddy	Vencamah, Nair	-	-	-
		21.	Rydroog	Vencatapoddy, Nair	383	-	383
		22.	Nosum	Narsim Reddy	-	-	-
		23.	Chitweyl	Comar Vencat. Ragava Rauze	116	-	116
		24.	Owky	Ramkishen Rauze	29	-	29
		25.	Hunmuntgoond & Narsapoor ackamah	-	41	-	41
		26.	Singaputten & Kalwadah Mujel Mutia Reddy	-	-	-	-
		27.	Bodeymanoor	Boochamah	-	-	-
		28.	Tippah Reddy pulli & Audereddy pulli	-	-	-	-
		29.	Mooteal paur	-	-	-	-
		30.	Worapaur	Kugput Reddy	-	-	-
		31.	Oopaloor	Narsim Reddy	-	-	-
		32.	Talmurlah	Konam Rauz	1	-	1
		33.	Pyapilli	Condul, Nair	-	-	-
		34.	Muddehera	Millekaurjun, Nair	-	-	-
		35.	Kummulpaur	Goorapah, Nair	-	-	-
		36.	Ghattem	Ragoonat, Nair	-	-	-
		37.	Butlapoor	Cuddaiputti, Nair	-	-	-
		38.	Sampilli	Mullapah, Nair	-	-	-
		39.	Toomulgoondi	Chinna Cadroputti, Nair	-	-	-
		40.	Yelloutlah	Veerapah, Nair	-	-	-
		41.	Kullipundah	Caddrepah, Nair	-	-	-
		42.	Brannmullah	Vencatadry, Nair	-	-	-
		43.	Kootapollem	Narsim, Nair	-	-	-
		44.	Yerragoontapollem	Cudriputti, Nair	-	-	-
		45.	Madaneynpollem	Modah, Nair	-	-	-
		46.	Maddanpilli	Vencatapah, Nair	-	-	-
		47.	Papy pulli	Paupah, Nair	-	-	-
		48.	Tutt	Soobah, Nair	-	-	-
		49.	Rampicherla	Veerapah, Nair	-	-	-
		50.	Muliyal	Vencataputti, Nair	-	-	-
		51.	Doodpilli	Bori Mull, Nair	-	-	-
		52.	Mundancheroo	Busvaut, Nair	-	-	-
		53.	Kohimti	Mullapah, Nair	-	-	-
		54.	Marella	Ramah, Nair	-	-	-
		55.	Shillwarpollem	Busvapah, Nair	-	-	-
		56.	Yerravarpollem	Timmapah, Nair	-	-	-
		57.	Milacherroo	Chinne, Nair	-	-	-
		58.	Runguharpollem	Papy, Nair	-	-	-
		59.	Yellamundah	Mullapah, Nair	-	-	-
		60.	Ganguichenda	Musel, Nair	-	-	-
		61.	Madicherroo	Chinnapah, Nair	-	-	-
		62.	Woodyamunki	-	-	-	-
		63.	Yegsvamarapahgoontah	-	-	-	-
		64.	Digvamarapahgoontah	-	-	-	-
		65.	Talpool	-	-	-	-
		66.	Talpool	Mohabut Khan	29	-	29
		67.	Kuddi	Allym Khan	32	-	32
		68.	Yemla	Vencataputti, Nair	-	-	-
		69.	Lopanutlah	-	-	-	-
		70.	Komut Nutlah	-	-	-	-
		71.	Naugengoontah	Nagi, Nair	-	-	-
		72.	Kalleopilli	Kuddrooputti, Nair	-	-	-
		73.	Ghintalgontahbundah	Narsim, Nair	-	-	-
		74.	Yadamaneypollem	Venkatputti, Nair	-	-	-
		75.	Nollamuneypollem	Venkatputti, Nair	-	-	-
		76.	Morgootlah	Soobah, Nair	-	-	-
		77.	Kopooongoondspilli	Dassal, Nair	-	-	-
		78.	Jelleimundah	Singurn, Nair	-	-	-
		79.	Moodeampaur	Bomi, Nair	-	-	-
		80.	Ruttengerry	Rayspah, Nair	-	-	-
		TOTAL		700	1	701	
GRAND TOTAL				700	4	704	









## 3.—Under TIPPOO SULTAN and the NIZAM;

[Repared from page 854.]

[Reprinted from page 254.]			N <sup>o</sup> of VILLAGES:				
DISTRICTS.		DIVISIONS.	NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.		Old.	New.	Total.
			1.	2.	80.	81.	82.
HARPOONELLY.	KUMBITT - HARPOONELLY KODLEGAR BELLARI	No.					
		1.	Annagooly	Timmalah Rauze			
		2.	Harpoonelly	Busvapah, Nair			
		3.	Jemmulah	Mullah, Nair			
ADONI.	GOOLLYAH	4.	Bellari	Venataah			
		TOTAL					
		5.	Karcondah	Chinnam & Tennam		1	1
		6.	Kapil	Sattanah & Chinnam			
CUMBUM.	DOOPAUD	7.	Doodenah	Pernah, Nair			
		8.	Pundicandah	Lal Mohan	5		5
		9.	Dewancondah	Rahman, Nair	3		3
		TOTAL		5		5	
SECTION'S	HUNDY ANANTAPUR RY. DROOG NOSEM CHITWEYL KOIL KONTLAH DOOWOOR CAMALAPUR YADKI CHINNUMPITTY HUDJER KURROOR	10.	Buwayhor	Nundikishon, Nair	6		6
		11.	Poolah Chencu	Jelli Dewaker, Nair	55	16	71
		12.	Balipelly	Jelli Busvapah, Nair	14	11	25
		13.	Dornal	Slashchallapute, Nair	56	5	61
		14.	Rawoor	Soobah, Nair	13		13
		15.	Kusavaram	Badi Mullanah	7	1	8
		16.	Venkatapoolam	Badi Ve ranch	18		18
		17.	Whorligoontah	Anarah, Nair	7		7
		18.	Nillagootlah	Venkatamsoo	9		9
		TOTAL		185	33	218	
		19.	Hundy Anantapur	Siddipah, Nair			
		20.	Nadammady	Venamah, Nair	5		5
		21.	Ryango	Venkatapudy, Nair			
		22.	Nosum	Naresa Reddy			
		23.	Chitweyl	Comar Venkat. Ragava Rauze	41		41
		24.	Owky	Ramakishon Rauze	116		116
		25.	Hunnamunah & Narasim Reddy				
		26.	Singapur & Kadwah	Mujel Mull Reddy	41		41
		27.	Bodiyamoor	Boochmah	10		10
		28.	Tippah Reddi pulli & Aodreddy pulli				
		29.	Moolah pair		3		3
		30.	Wenapur	Kugput Reddy	7		7
		31.	Oomalour	Nair Reddy	7		7
		32.	Taimuriah	Komar Rauz	1	2	3
		33.	Pypah	Conah, Nair	1		1
		34.	Muddehera	Mullah parjun, Nair			
		35.	Kummulpaur	Goorapah, Nair			
		36.	Ghurtem	Razoonat, Nair			
		37.	Buttapoor	Cuddaputti, Nair			
		38.	Sampull	Mullapah, Nair			
		39.	Toomulgoondi	Chinna Caddaputti, Nair			
		40.	Yelloolah	Veerapah, Nair			
		41.	Kullipundah	Caddapah, Nair			
		42.	Boannullah	Venkatdry, Nair			
		43.	Koonapollen	Narsim, Nair	1		1
		44.	Yerragoontapollen	Cuddaputti, Nair			
		45.	Madameynpollen	Modah, Nair	1		1
		46.	Maddanpiti	Venkatapah, Nair	1		1
		47.	Pary pulli	Paupah, Nair	2		2
		48.	Tott	Soobah, Nair			
		49.	Rangicherla	Veerapah, Nair			
		50.	Mullyal	Venkataputti, Nair			
		51.	Doodipiti	Bori Mull, Nair			
		52.	Munddancheroo	Busvant, Nair			
		53.	Kobinti	Mullapah, Nair			
		54.	Marella	Ramah, Nair			
		55.	Shinwaripollen	Busvapah, Nair			
		56.	Venwaripollen	Timmapah, Nair			
		57.	Mlacheroo	Chinna, Nair			
		58.	Rungingaripollen	Papp, Nair			
		59.	Yellamundah	Mullapah, Nair			
		60.	Ganguichenilla	Musah, Nair			
		61.	Mudicherroo	Chinuapah, Nair			
		62.	Woodyamunki		1		1
		63.	Yegavamarapahgoontah		1		1
		64.	Digavamarapahgoontah		1		1
		65.	Talpool		1		1
		66.	Talpool	Mohabut Khan			
		67.	Kuddri	Allam Khan			
		68.	Yemla	Venkataputti, Nair	26		26
		69.	Loputnolah				
		70.	Komut Nudlah		1		1
		71.	Naugengontah	Nagi, Nair			
		72.	Kalloopiti	Kuadrooputti, Nair	4		4
		73.	Chintalgentahbundah	Narsim, Nair			
		74.	Yedmanayn Pollem	Venkataputti, Nair			
		75.	Nollamuncyn Pollem	Venkataputti, Nair			
		76.	Metgootlah	Soobah, Nair			
		77.	Kopagovinspulli	Dassi, Nair			
		78.	Jelleimundah	Singurn, Nair	1		1
		79.	Moodeampaur	Bora, Nair	1		1
		80.	Ruttengerry	Rajapah, Nair	1		1
TOTAL					279	3	282
GRAND TOTAL					279	3	282

from 1792 - - - to - - - 1799.

ASSESSMENTS.		Poligars. Annual Pay from Government.	TRIBUTE.			SERVICE.	
Kanul.	Tippoo Sultan's.		Peshcush.	Nuzz.r.	TOTAL.	Foot.	Horse.
Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	Cant <sup>y</sup> Pag <sup>y</sup> .	N <sup>o</sup> .	N <sup>o</sup> .
83.	84.	85.	86.	87.	88.	89.	90.
365 6 4	365 6 4	720 — —					
1,127 3 7	1,127 3 7		845 3 4	178 7 8	1,084 — 12		
1,035 9 6	1,035 9 6		227 8 4	73 1 4	359 9 8		
2,858 5 15	1,858 5 15		1,527 5 —		1,527 5 —		
4,187 5 —	4,187 5 —	720 — —	2,600 6 8	251 8 12	2,852 5 4		
3,861 1 13	4,999 9 12		2,100 — —		2,100 — —		
8,473 7 —	17,823 6 12		2,997 8 —	1,040 — —	4,037 8 —		
5,769 3 —	7,142 — —		1,905 8 —	730 — —	2,635 8 —		
10,598 7 4	4,785 8 4		3,013 7 4	975 — —	3,988 7 4		
3,127 1 8	1,206 1 6		803 9 3		803 9 3		
396 7 15	386 8 2		267 1 12	65 — —	332 1 12		
4,468 1 —	1,127 5 —		754 8 —	260 — —	1,014 8 —		
452 2 —	21 8 6		162 5 —	20 9 —	182 4 —		
2,703 6 11	628 1 10		412 2 11	65 — —	477 2 11		
45,916 1 4	38,301 9 4		12,418 9 14	3,205 9 —	15,624 8 14		
2,415 — —	4,000 — —		2,645 2 2		2,645 2 2		
26,205 1 5	37,960 3 7		28,871 — —	1,963 7 8	30,834 7 8		
56,062 5 7	1,50,769 3 8		14,000 — —	17,500 — —	31,500 — —		
13,734 4 13	16,269 4 —		10,250 — —		10,250 — —		
2,344 5 14	12,763 9 3		7,000 — —		7,000 — —		
4,800 — —	6,173 1 4		7,140 1 —		7,140 1 —		
4,854 2 —	6,000 — —		1,400 — —	350 — —	1,750 — —		
6,703 3 5	9,272 4 7		3,500 — —		3,500 — —		
2,517 6 1	2,711 2 —		1,400 — —		1,400 — —		
1,553 5 —	1,954 3 9		1,750 — —	175 — —	1,925 — —		
390 — —	642 4 8		47 2 8		47 2 8		
76 6 2	245 3 14		245 3 14		245 3 14		
148 4 7	540 9 —		253 1 4		253 1 4		
5 9 1	92 5 2		92 5 12		92 5 12		
421 8 12	1,218 7 8		253 1 4		253 1 4		
730 — —	813 13 2		813 3 2		813 3 2		
451 3 4	290 1 24		290 1 14		290 1 14		
218 7 2	208 9 6		171 1 12		171 3 18		
765 4 14	1,201 — —		1,201 — —		1,201 — —		
9,796 9 10	12,993 9 4		2,500 — —	1,050 — —	4,550 — —		
140 — —	184 9 8		184 9 8		184 9 8		
326 9 7	64 5 15		64 5 15		64 5 15		
2,092 5 —	2,874 2 13		2,874 2 13		2,874 2 13		
346 3 8	683 4 12		683 4 12		683 4 12		
248 1 4	978 5 —		978 5 —		978 5 —		
168 7 8	859 1 —		859 1 —		859 1 —		
25,045 1 12	25,045 1 12		25,045 1 12	25,045 7 8	25,045 7 8		

9. Under The N I Z A M, in 1799.—1800.

[Reprinted from page 954.]			No. of VILLAGES:				
DISTRICTS.	DIVISIONS.	NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.	Old.	New.	TOTAL.		
		1. 2.	91.	92.	93.		
HARPONHELLY.	KUMPLI HARPONHELLY KODLEGAH BELLARI	No. 1. Annagoondy - - - Timmapah Raut	-	-	-		
		2. Harponhelly - - - Busvapah, Nair	17	-	17		
		3. Igremulla - - - Kallikola, Nair	135	-	135		
		4. Bellari - - - Veeramah.	-	-	-		
		TOTAL - - -	152	-	152		
ADONI.	GOOLLYAH	5. Kotcondah - - - Chinamah & Temmah	1	-	1		
		6. Kapital - - - Jeetamah & Chinamah	-	-	-		
		7. Doudcondah - - - Permul, Nair	5	-	5		
		8. Pundicondah - - - Lall Monne	3	-	3		
		9. Dewangondah - - - Rahman, Nair	5	-	5		
		TOTAL - - -	14	-	14		
CUMBUM.	DOOPAUD	10. Busvapoor - - - Nandikishro, Nair	6	-	6		
		11. Potal Chenoa - - - Jeili Dewaker, Nair	71	-	71		
		12. Bolapilly - - - Jeili Busvapah, Nair	25	-	25		
		13. Dwal - - - Shashchallaputa, Nair	61	-	61		
		14. Rawoor - - - Soobah, Nair	13	-	13		
		15. Kusavaram - - - Bodi Mullanah	8	-	8		
		16. Vencadreppolam - - - Bodi Veeramah	18	-	18		
		17. Whorlapontah - - - Antapah, Nair	7	-	7		
		18. Nillagootlah - - - Vencatnarsoo	9	-	9		
				TOTAL - - -	218	-	218
		FOR.	HUNDY ANANTAPOOR RY-DROOG NOSUM CHITWEYL  KOIL KONTLAH  DOOWOOR CAMALAPORE YADKI CHINNUMPITTY HUDJER KURROOR   MCONDAN	19. Hendy Anantpoor - - - Siddapah, Nair	1	-	1
				20. Maddamadoddy - - - Vencamah, Nair	5	-	5
				21. Rydroog - - - Vencatapuddy, Nair	-	-	-
22. Nosum - - - Narsim Reddy	43			-	43		
23. Chitweyl - - - Comar Vencat. Ragava Rause	116			-	116		
24. Dwy - - - Ramakishen Rause	10			-	10		
25. Hemuntgoond & Nartapoor atkamah	41			-	41		
26. Sagarputti & Kallwadah Mujel Mulla Reddy	10			-	10		
27. Ballychanoor - - - Boochamah	1			-	1		
28. Tippah Reddy pulli & Audereddy pulli	3			-	3		
29. Moorah pair - - -	7			-	7		
30. Worapoor - - - Kugput Reddy	7			-	7		
31. Gopaloor - - - Narsim Reddy	3			-	3		
32. Tamuriah - - - Konam Rase	1			-	1		
33. Pampili - - - Condul, Nair	2			-	2		
34. Muddehara - - - Mallekarjun, Nair	9			-	9		
35. Kumdivapur - - - Goolapah, Nair	1			-	1		
36. Ghuttem - - - Ragoanah, Nair	11			-	11		
37. Butlapoor - - - Cuddalputti, Nair	8			-	8		
38. Sampili - - - Mallepah, Nair	5			-	5		
39. Tamunigoondi - - - Chigna Cadroputti, Nair	6			-	6		
40. Yalootah - - - Veerapah, Nair	1			-	1		
41. Kallipundah - - - Caddapah, Nair	1			-	1		
42. Boanmallek - - - Vencatadry, Nair	1			-	1		
43. Kootapollam - - - Narsim, Nair	1			-	1		
44. Yerragontapollam - - - Cuddalputti, Nair	1			-	1		
45. Maddayypollam - - - Madah, Nair	1			-	1		
46. Maddanpili - - - Vencatapah, Nair	16			-	16		
47. Pappi pulli - - - Paupah, Nair	1			-	1		
48. Tota - - - Soobah, Nair	1			-	1		
49. Kappicherla - - - Veerapah, Nair	1			-	1		
50. Kalya - - - Vencataputti, Nair	1			-	1		
51. Doodipili - - - Bori Mudi, Nair	4			-	4		
52. Mondancheroo - - - Busvante, Nair	7			-	7		
53. Kohinti - - - Mullaiah, Nair	5			-	5		
54. Marilla - - - Ramah, Nair	10			-	10		
55. Shilwarpollam - - - Busvapah, Nair	1			-	1		
56. Yerravarpollam - - - Timmapah, Nair	1			-	1		
57. Kallacherroo - - - Chigna, Nair	1			-	1		
58. Rungurypollam - - - Pappi, Nair	1			-	1		
59. Yellamundah - - - Mullaiah, Nair	1			-	1		
60. Gangulhentla - - - Musel, Nair	1			-	1		
61. Madicherroo - - - Chinnapah, Nair	1			-	1		
62. Woodyyanki - - -	1			-	1		
63. Yegvamarapagontah - - -	1			-	1		
64. Digvamarapagontah - - -	1			-	1		
65. Thypot - - -	1			-	1		
66. Talpook - - - Mollabat Khan	29			-	29		
67. Kuddri - - - Aham Khan	31			-	31		
68. Venia - - - Vencataputti, Nair	26			-	26		
69. Loputourah - - -	1			-	1		
70. Komut Mulla - - -	1			-	1		
71. Nargengontah - - - Nagi, Nair	4			-	4		
72. Kallhoopili - - - Kuddraputti, Nair	1			-	1		
73. Chintagontahbundah - - - Narsim, Nair	1			-	1		
74. Yadamacheyn Pollam - - - Venc	1			-	1		
75. Nollamvayn Pollam - - - Vencataputti, Nair	1			-	1		
76. Moguronth - - - Soobah, Nair	1			-	1		
77. Kappogondapullu - - - Dady, Nair	1			-	1		
78. Jethelmundah - - - Singam, Nair	1			-	1		
79. Moudarapoor - - - Bomi, Nair	1			-	1		
80. Ruttogery - - - Rappah, Nair	1			-	1		

Under The NIZAM, in 1799--1800.

ASSESSMENTS.		Poligars Annual Pay from Government.	TRIBUTE.			SERVICE.	
Kamul.	Tippoo Sultan's.		Peshcush.	Nuzzer.	TOTAL.	Foot.	Horse.
Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	Cant' Pag'.	N <sup>o</sup>	N <sup>o</sup>
94.	95.	96.	97.	98.	99.	100.	101.
25,740 — —	20,000 — —	5,400 — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —
7,344 3 12	22,064 6 11½	— — —	8,750 — —	— — —	8,750 — —	— — —	— — —
33,084 3 12	42,064 6 11½	5,400 — —	8,750 — —	— — —	8,750 — —	— — —	— — —
365 6 4	365 6 4	720 — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —
1,127 3 7	1,127 3 7	— — —	845 3 4	178 7 8	1,024 — 12	— — —	— — —
1,035 9 6	1,035 9 6	— — —	227 8 4	73 1 4	309 8	— — —	— — —
1,858 5 15	1,858 5 15	— — —	1,127 5 —	— — —	1,575 5 —	— — —	— — —
4,387 5 —	4,387 5 —	720 — —	2,600 6 8	251 8 12	2,852 5 4	— — —	— — —
3,861 1 12	4,099 9 12	— — —	2,100 — —	— — —	2,100 — —	— — —	— — —
8,478 7 —	17,883 6 12	— — —	2,997 8 —	1,040 — —	4,037 8 —	— — —	— — —
5,769 8 —	7,042 — —	— — —	1,905 8 —	780 — —	2,685 8 —	— — —	— — —
16,598 7 4	4,785 8 4	— — —	3,013 7 4	975 — —	3,988 7 4	— — —	— — —
3,127 1 8	1,206 1 6	— — —	803 9 3	— — —	803 9 3	— — —	— — —
396 7 15	386 8 2	— — —	207 1 12	65 — —	332 1 12	— — —	— — —
4,468 1 —	1,137 5 —	— — —	754 8 —	260 — —	1,014 8 —	— — —	— — —
452 — —	281 8 6	— — —	162 5 —	20 9 —	183 4 —	— — —	— — —
2,663 6 11	628 1 10	— — —	413 2 11	65 — —	478 2 11	— — —	— — —
45,916 1 4	38,301 9 4	— — —	12,418 9 14	3,205 9 —	15,624 8 14	— — —	— — —
221 — —	690 8 —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —	— — —
2,415 — —	4,000 — —	— — —	2,645 2 2	— — —	2,645 2 2	— — —	— — —
26,205 1 5	37,060 3 7½	— — —	28,875 — —	1,968 7 8	30,843 7 8	— — —	— — —
5,662 5 7	13,769 3 8	— — —	14,000 — —	17,500 — —	31,500 — —	— — —	— — —
8,444 5 8	5,843 8 12	— — —	1,820 3 8	660 — —	2,485 3 8	— — —	— — —
13,734 4 11½	16,269 4 —	— — —	10,850 — —	— — —	10,850 — —	— — —	— — —
8,342 5 14	12,763 9 3½	— — —	7,000 — —	— — —	7,000 — —	— — —	— — —
697 4 —	1,105 — —	— — —	350 — —	— — —	350 — —	— — —	— — —
4,300 — —	6,173 1 4	— — —	1,140 1 —	— — —	1,140 1 —	— — —	— — —
4,854 2 —	6,000 — —	— — —	1,400 — —	350 — —	1,750 — —	— — —	— — —
6,703 3 5½	9,278 4 7	— — —	3,500 — —	1,050 — —	4,550 — —	— — —	— — —
2,517 6 11	2,711 2 —	— — —	1,400 — —	— — —	1,400 — —	— — —	— — —
1,358 5 —	1,954 3 10	— — —	1,750 — —	175 — —	1,925 — —	— — —	— — —
717 2 3½	844 5 —	— — —	350 — —	— — —	350 — —	— — —	— — —
15,161 9 15½	17,767 9 10½	— — —	5,262 3 —	1,150 5 6	6,412 8 6	— — —	— — —
390 — —	642 4 8½	— — —	47 2 8	— — —	47 2 8	— — —	— — —
22,924 6 14	18,635 4 6	— — —	7,700 — —	3,150 — —	10,850 — —	— — —	— — —
8,719 — 7½	9,157 — 1½	— — —	4,550 — —	1,750 — —	6,300 — —	— — —	— — —
2,713 7 8	2,707 7 4	— — —	1,750 — —	175 — —	1,925 — —	— — —	— — —
1,470 7 13½	2,477 — 1½	— — —	1,537 5 —	1,400 — —	2,937 5 —	— — —	— — —
459 3 12	520 — —	— — —	800 — —	175 — —	975 — —	— — —	— — —
4,320 7 14	4,268 — 8	— — —	1,912 5 4	227 5 —	2,146 4 —	— — —	— — —
76 6 2	245 3 14	— — —	245 3 14	— — —	245 3 14	— — —	— — —
135 8 10½	1,059 3 15	— — —	700 — —	— — —	700 — —	— — —	— — —
148 4 7	540 9 —	— — —	253 1 4	— — —	253 1 4	— — —	— — —
5 9 1	92 5 2	— — —	5 9 1	— — —	5 9 1	— — —	— — —
10,125 — —	17,911 6 13	— — —	10,500 — —	1,750 — —	12,250 — —	— — —	— — —
342 2 4	770 3 —	— — —	490 3 —	— — —	490 3 —	— — —	— — —
201 1 2½	— — —	— — —	60 — —	— — —	60 — —	— — —	— — —
455 6 4	2,519 5 10	— — —	1,680 — —	— — —	1,680 — —	— — —	— — —
386 2 8½	6,459 8 12	— — —	3,339 7 —	510 3 —	3,850 — —	— — —	— — —
345 8 14½	4,917 2 7	— — —	2,476 2 8	323 7 8	2,800 — —	— — —	— — —
2,093 5 8	2,019 9 12½	— — —	1,100 — —	— — —	1,100 — —	— — —	— — —
18,747 9 2	6,832 4 7	— — —	4,100 — —	700 — —	4,900 — —	— — —	— — —
141 8 —	1,196 5 12	— — —	445 — —	— — —	445 — —	— — —	— — —
1,004 6 8	999 3 12	— — —	660 — —	— — —	660 — —	— — —	— — —
1,135 1 —	1,392 1 6	— — —	552 8 12	— — —	552 8 12	— — —	— — —
52 6 —	378 9 —	— — —	169 — —	— — —	169 — —	— — —	— — —
210 6 —	309 5 10	— — —	230 — —	— — —	230 — —	— — —	— — —
42 9 —	947 4 —	— — —	600 — —	— — —	600 — —	— — —	— — —
460 5 —	530 2 8	— — —	350 — —	— — —	350 — —	— — —	— — —
730 — —	813 3 2	— — —	695 8 3	— — —	695 8 3	— — —	— — —
453 3 4	290 1 14	— — —	190 7 4	— — —	190 7 4	— — —	— — —
238 7 2	203 9 6	— — —	240 1 —	— — —	240 1 —	— — —	— — —
765 4 14	1,201 — —	— — —	1,170 8 2	— — —	1,170 8 2	— — —	— — —
40,559 5 —	10,442 9 2	— — —	7,350 — —	700 — —	8,050 — —	— — —	— — —
39,228 7 8	9,740 8 5	— — —	7,350 — —	700 — —	8,050 — —	— — —	— — —
9,796 9 10	22,993 9 4	— — —	3,500 — —	800 — —	4,300 — —	— — —	— — —
140 4 —	184 9 —	— — —	360 — —	— — —	360 — —	— — —	— — —
326 5 7	64 5 15	— — —	59 8 —	— — —	59 8 —	— — —	— — —
2,098 5 —	2,874 2 13	— — —	843 7 8	168 7 8	1,004 5 —	— — —	— — —
2,410 4 4	1,952 9 1	— — —	784 — —	1,470 — —	2,254 2 —	— — —	— — —
217 8 3½	2,776 9 2	— — —	1,776 9 2	— — —	1,776 9 2	— — —	— — —
205 5 —	662 2 9	— — —	350 — —	100 — —	450 — —	— — —	— — —
94 9 4	521 7 —	— — —	364 4 —	25 — —	389 4 —	— — —	— — —
494 — 12½	885 — 8	— — —	529 4 —	50 — —	639 4 —	— — —	— — —
346 9 8	683 4 12	— — —	561 1 —	70 — —	631 1 —	— — —	— — —
283 — 12½	1,519 1 —	— — —	1,022 7 8	420 — —	1,442 7 8	— — —	— — —
361 5 8	2,461 1 —	— — —	650 6 —	1,469 3 14	2,299 9 14	— — —	— — —
32,7512 5 12	3,89,941 7 13½	— — —	1,12,874 1 8	39,243 9 12	1,22,117 2 4	— — —	— — —
4,22,000 5 12	4,74,622 8 —	— — —	2,77,221 2 14	42,201 7 8	2,20,122 8 8	— — —	— — —



## 10.—Under The COMPANY'S Government;

[Repeated from page 354.]

				N <sup>o</sup> of VILLAGES:		
DISTRICTS.	DIVISIONS.	NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.		Old.	New.	TOTAL.
		1.	2.	102.	103.	104.
HARPONHELLY.	KUMPLI HARPONHELLY KODLEGAR BELLARI	No.				
		1.	Annagoondy - - - Timmapah Rause	-	-	-
		2.	Harponhelly - - - Busvapah, Nair	17	-	17
		3.	Jerremulla - - - Mullikoin, Nair	-	-	-
ADONI.	GOOLLYAH	4.	Bellari - - - Veeramah	-	-	-
		TOTAL - - -		17	-	17
		5.	Kotcondah - - - Chinnamah & Temamah	-	-	-
		6.	Kaputal - - - Seetamah & Chinnamah	-	-	-
CUMBUM.	DOOFAUD	7.	Doodcondah - - - Permal, Nair	5	-	5
		8.	Pundicondah - - - Lall Munne	3	-	3
		9.	Dewatcondah - - - Rahman, Nair	-	-	-
		TOTAL - - -		8	-	8
LECTORS.	HUNDY ANANTAPOOR RY-DROOG NOSUM CHITWEYL KOIL KONTLAH DOOWOOR CAMALAPORE YADKI CHINNUMPITTY HUDJER KURROOR	10.	Busvapoor - - - Nundikishee, Nair	-	-	-
		11.	Poolal Chennoo - - - Jelli Dewaker, Nair	-	-	-
		12.	Bolapilly - - - Jelli Busvapah, Nair	-	-	-
		13.	Dornal - - - Shashachalapute, Nair	40	-	40
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	14.	Rawoor - - - Soobah, Nair	11	-	11
		15.	Kusaveram - - - Bodi Mullannah	6	-	6
		16.	Vencidreponlam - - - Bodi Veerannah	11	-	11
		17.	Whortigoontah - - - Antapah, Nair	4	-	4
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	18.	Nillagootlah - - - Vencatnarsoo	9	-	9
		TOTAL - - -		81	-	81
		19.	Hundy Anantpoor - - - Siddapah, Nair	-	-	-
		20.	Naddamaduddy - - - Vencamah, Nair	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	21.	Rydrong - - - Vencarapuddy, Nair	-	-	-
		22.	Nosum - - - Narsim Reddy	-	-	-
		23.	Chitweyl - - - Comar Vencat. Ragava Rause	-	-	-
		24.	Owky - - - Ramakishen Rause	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	25.	Hunnumtgoond & Narasapurackamah	-	-	-
		26.	Singaputten & Kalwadah - - - Mujel Mulla Reddy	-	-	-
		27.	Bodiyemanoor - - - Boochamah	1	-	1
		28.	Tippah Reiddy pulli & Audereddi pulli	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	29.	Mooteal paar	7	-	7
		30.	Werapaur - - - Kugput Reddy	5	-	5
		31.	Oopaloor - - - Narsim Reddy	-	-	-
		32.	Talmurlah - - - Konam Raus	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	33.	Pyapilli - - - Condul, Nair	-	-	-
		34.	Muddehera - - - Mullekaurjun, Nair	-	-	-
		35.	Kummulpaur - - - Goorapah, Nair	-	-	-
		36.	Ghutrem - - - Ragoonar, Nair	10	-	10
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	37.	Butlapoor - - - Cuddaiputti, Nair	4	-	4
		38.	Sampilli - - - Mullapah, Nair	5	-	5
		39.	Toomulgoondi - - - Chinna, Cadroputti, Nair	4	-	4
		40.	Yellatlah - - - Veerapah, Nair	1	-	1
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	41.	Kullipundah - - - Caddrepah, Nair	1	-	1
		42.	Boamullah - - - Vencatadry, Nair	1	-	1
		43.	Kootapollem - - - Narsim, Nair	1	-	1
		44.	Yerragoontapollem - - - Cuddriputti, Nair	1	-	1
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	45.	Madanynpollem - - - Modah, Nair	-	-	-
		46.	Maddanpili - - - Vencatapah, Nair	-	-	-
		47.	Papy pulli - - - Paupah, Nair	-	-	-
		48.	Tutt - - - Soobah, Nair	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	49.	Rampicherla - - - Veerapah, Nair	1	-	1
		50.	Mullyal - - - Vencataputti, Nair	4	-	4
		51.	Doodipilli - - - Bori Mull, Nair	7	-	7
		52.	Mundlancheroo - - - Busvant, Nair	3	-	3
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	53.	Kohimti - - - Mullapah, Nair	10	-	10
		54.	Marella - - - Rama, Nair	-	-	-
		55.	Shiltwarpollem - - - Busvapah, Nair	-	-	-
		56.	Yerravapollem - - - Timmapah, Nair	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	57.	Milcherroo - - - Chinna, Nair	-	-	-
		58.	Rungungarpollem - - - Papy, Nair	-	-	-
		59.	Yellamundah - - - Mullapah, Nair	-	-	-
		60.	Ganguichentla - - - Musel, Nair	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	61.	Madicherroo - - - Chinnapah, Nair	-	-	-
		62.	Woodyamunki - - -	-	-	-
		63.	Yegavamarapahgoontah - - -	1	-	1
		64.	Digvamarapahgoontah - - -	1	-	1
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	65.	Talpool - - -	1	-	1
		66.	Talpool - - - Mohabot Khan	-	-	-
		67.	Kaddri - - - Altun Khan	-	-	-
		68.	Yemla - - - Vencataputti, Nair	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	69.	Loputnuthah - - -	1	-	1
		70.	Konut Nuthah - - -	1	-	1
		71.	Naugengootlah - - - Nagl, Nair	4	-	4
		72.	Kallepilli - - - Kaddrooputti, Nair	1	-	1
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	73.	Chitalgontahbundah - - - Narsim, Nair	1	-	1
		74.	Yedmaneyn Pallem - - - Vencataputti, Nair	1	-	1
		75.	Nollamuneyn Pallem - - - Vencataputti, Nair	1	-	1
		76.	Motgootlah - - - Soobah, Nair	-	-	-
LECTORS.	WAMCONDAH	77.	Kopagoondapull - - - Dash, Nair	1	-	1
		78.	Jellimundah - - - Singurn, Nair	1	-	1
		79.	Moodeampoor - - - Bomi, Nair	1	-	1
		80.	Rutunary - - - Rayapah, Nair	1	-	1

from 1800 till 1802.

875

ASSESSMENT.			KUDPUDDY, or Military Service Peons.		POLIGARS Annual ALLOWANCE.			TOTAL Actual Rent or Amount of Columns 107, 109, & 112
Peshcush.	Nuzzér.	TOTAL.	No.	Estimated Rent of their Enam.	In Enam Lands.	In Money.	TOTAL.	
Cant' Pag.	Cant' Pag.	Cant' Pag.		Cant' Pag.	Cant' Pag.	Cant' Pag.	Cant' Pag.	Cant' Pag.
105.	106.	107.	108.	109.	110.	111.	112.	113.
25,740	20,000				20,000	5,400	25,400	20,000
					80	540	540	
						168 7 8	208	
25,740	20,000				20,040	6,108 7 8	26,148 7 8	20,000
			238	1,301 8 14	78	600	678	
			182	534 5 12	74 7 8	710	794 7 8	
1,127 3 7	1,127 3 7	288 1 2	71	185 3	125 1 4	325	450 1 4	923 5
1,035 9 6	1,035 9 6	44 6 10	42	226 7 11	91 8 2	390	481 8 2	753 2
			6	23 6 2	72	162 5	214 5	
2,163 2 13	2,163 2 13	332 7 12	539	2,272 1 7	441 6 14	2,197 5		1,070 7 2
			188	2,785 1 14				
			199	1,614 1 4				
			123	574 6 12		600	600	
10,536 2 4	3,892 11	2,222 9 6	49	203 1 10		850	850	3,276
3,067 3 8	1,206 4 6	1,032 7	24	156 5		118	118	1,207
318 1 7	373 8 3	342 9	12	69		50	50	451 9
3,523 9 3	1,137 5	1,012 5	30	170 7 8		100	100	1,203 2
356 1 14	281 8 6	248 4	7	27 7		36	36	112
2,763 6 11	623 1 10	560 2 8	23	104 3		50	50	714 5
20,635 4 15	7,519 5 4	5,419 6 14	655	5,705 4		1,804	1,804	7,555
					120	900	900	
						80	200	
			815	5,580 3 5		600	600	
			1,454	2,985 3 14		1,994 8 4	1,994 8 4	
						6,052	6,052	
						810	810	
						1,000	1,000	
697 4	1,305	891	200	411 7 5		67 5	67 5	999 6
			14	41 1 12				
4,854 2	6,000	2,111	77	458 2 14		800	800	3,919 7
3,551 5 8	5,734 3 10	4,443 3 8	58	1,028 7 14		850	850	6,105 9
			102	812 5 8		250	250	
			22	193 8		80	200	
					110	303 7 8	364	
					60 2 8	405	465	
					60			
39,414 6 14	12,032 4 12	4,503 3 15	228	775 5 14		2,000	2,000	7,368 9
1,830 3 6	3,808 4 12	1,000	81	149 6 3		840	840	2,559 6
3,250	2,846 3 8	1,600	48	102 9 13		420	420	2,172 9
748 1 8	1,709 5 14	1,200 1	12	60		240	240	1,500 1
459 3 12	520	309	6	9 5 8		72	72	390 5
1,409 10	1,142 4 10	900	30	97 5		156	156	1,153 5
76 6 2	245 3 14	166 5 12	5	17 5 4		36	36	220 1
135 5 10	1,059 3 15	720	20	58 5		156	156	934 5
148 4 7	540 9	400	10	34		106 9	106 9	540 9
			6	21 9 10		12	12	
						450	450	
						66	66	
						48	48	
455 6 4	2,519 5 10	1,160	81	377 7 1		420	420	1,917
2,883 6 12	6,004 2 1	3,081	312	1,701 9 13		900	900	5,683 4
3,045 8 14	4,917 7 7	2,345 5 1	236	1,355 2 9		750	750	4,450 2
739 3 12	1,076 1 8	350	30	136 5		250	250	716
18,370 3 2	6,277 8 3	1,500	49	301 2 3		600	600	2,401
						72	72	
						60	60	
						120	120	
						60	60	
						72	72	
						72	72	
						72	72	
						72	72	
790	813 3 2	650 1				60	60	720
453 1 4	298 1 14	240 1				40	40	
238 7 2	203 9 6	240 1				36	36	
765 4 14	1,201	848 1				72	72	
						59 7 6	59 7 6	
140 4	184 9 8	179	200	1,154 1 8		24	24	
326 5 7	64 5 15	64				12	12	
2,092 5	2,874 2 13	1,510	60	372		480	480	
1,485	1,272 4	638	25	100		300	300	
217 8 3	1,776 9 2	687 9 6	58	223 1 12		300	300	
168 7 8	485 1 8	280	26	92 7 3		72	72	
494 12	885 8	450	26	103 2 11		150	150	
346 9 8	683 4 12	571	30	42 3 3		70	70	
240 3 1	976 4	601	32	96 5 5		168	168	863
168 7 8	859 1	580 5	25	122 5 11		150	150	853
						240	240	

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## 11.—Abstract Statement of the Poligars in the Ceded Districts—concluded.

[Repeated from page 854.]

DISTRICTS.		DIVISIONS.	NAMES of POLIGAR DISTRICTS.		REMARKS.	
			1.	2.		
HARPONHELLY.	KUMPLI HARPONHELLY KODLEGGAH BELLARI	No.				
		1.	Annagoondy	Timmapah Rauze	Pensioned by Government.	
		2.	Harponhelly	Rusvapah, Nair	Holds a jagheer by order of Government.	
		3.	Jeeremulla	Mulickoin, Nair	Resides, but has no authority in the District.	
		4.	Belati	Veeramah	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
ADONI.	GOOLLYAH	5.	Korcondah	Chinnamah & Temanish	Reside, but have no authority in the District.	
		6.	K. putal	Seetamah & Chinnamah	Pensioned by order of Government.	
		7.	Docondah	Permai, Nair	Manages his District.	
		8.	Pundcondah	Lali Menne	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		9.	Dewandcondah	Rahman, Nair	Resides, but has no authority in the District.	
CUMBUM.	DOOFAUD	10.	Busvapoor	Nun Tikishoo, Nair	Expelled.	
		11.	Phalai Chendoo	Jelli Dewaker, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		12.	Bol-pilly	Jelli Busvapah, Nair	In Confinement.	
		13.	D. nal	Shashachallapute, Nair	Manages his District.	
		14.	Rawoor	Sorbah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		15.	Kusaveram	Bodi Mullanah	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		16.	Vencadepostam	Bodi Veeramah	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		17.	Whorlagootah	Antapah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		18.	Nillagootah	Vencatnarsoo	D <sup>o</sup> .	
DISTRICT PRINCIPAL COLLECTOR'S.	HUNDY ANANTAPOOR	19.	Hundy Anantpoor	Siddapah, Nair	Resides, but has no authority in the District.	
		20.	Nadumadoddy	Vencamah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		21.	Rydhoo	Vencatpuddy, Nair	In Confinement.	
		22.	Nasuni	Narsim Reddy	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		23.	Chitweyl	Comar Vencat. Ragava Rauze	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		24.	Owky	Ramakishen Rauze	Resides, but has no authority in the District.	
		25.	Hummuntgoond & Nariap-ackamah		D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		26.	Singaputen & Kalwadah	Mujel Mulla Reddy	Expelled.	
		27.	Bodiyenaroor	Bouchamah	Resides, but has no authority in the District.	
		28.	Tippah Reddy pulli & Andereddi pulli		Expelled.	
		29.	M. tel pur		Manages his District.	
		30.	Worapaur	Kogput Reddy	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		31.	Opahoor	Narsim Reddy	In Confinement.	
		32.	Talmulah	Konam Rauze	Manages his District.	
		33.	Pyapili	Condul, Nair	Resides, but has no authority.	
		34.	Mudjehera	Mullickutjon, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		35.	Kummulipaur	Goorapah, Nair	Expelled.	
		36.	Ghuttem	Ragoonat, Nair	Manages his District.	
		37.	Batlapoor	Cuddaiputti, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		38.	Sampilli	Mullapah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		39.	Toomulgoondi	Chinna Cadroputti, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		40.	Yellatlah	Veerapah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		41.	Kullipundah	Caddrepah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		42.	Bonmullah	Vencarady, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		43.	Kootapellem	Narsim, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		44.	Yerragootapellem	Coddiputti, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		45.	Mataneyppellem	Modah, Nair	Village managed by the Pottal.	
		46.	Mudianpilli	Vencapah, Nair	Resides, but has no authority in the District.	
		47.	Papy pulli	Paupah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		48.	Tutt	Sorbah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		49.	Ramicherla	Veerapah, Nair	Manages his District.	
		50.	Mulval	Vencatputti, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		51.	Doodilli	Bori Mull, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		52.	Mundancheroo	Bucvant, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		53.	Kohinti	Mullapah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .	
		54.	Mirela	Rama, Nair	Resides, but has no authority in the District.	
		55.	Shillwaripellem	Busvapah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		56.	Yerragootapellem	Timmapah, Nair	Manages his District.	
		57.	Molacheroo	Chinna, Nair	Resides, but has no authority in the District.	
		58.	Runnaripellem	Papy, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		59.	Yellamundah	Mullapah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		60.	Ganguichentla	Muel, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		61.	Madicherloo	Chinnapah, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> d <sup>o</sup> .	
		62.	Woodamunkl		Manages his District.	
		63.	Yagavampahgoontah		D <sup>o</sup> .	
		64.	Digamarapahgoontah		D <sup>o</sup> .	
		65.	Talpoor		D <sup>o</sup> .	
		POOLEVENDRA		Talpoor	Mohabut Khan	In Confinement.
				Kuddri	Allum Khan	Expelled.
				Yemla	Vencatputti, Nair	Confined, and since dead.
				Loputhudish		Manages his District.
				Komut Nuthah		D <sup>o</sup> .
		RAYCHOTTY		Yagavampahgoontah	Nag, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .
				Kallapilli	Kuddaputti, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .
				Yagavampahgoontah	Narsim, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .
				Yagavampahgoontah	Vencatputti, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .
				Yagavampahgoontah	Vencatputti, Nair	In Confinement.
				Yagavampahgoontah	Sorbah, Nair	Manages his District.
				Yagavampahgoontah	Dandi, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .
				Yagavampahgoontah	Singam, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .
				Yagavampahgoontah	Boni, Nair	D <sup>o</sup> .
		MUDDUGSERAH		Yagavampahgoontah	Rayapah, Nair	Resides, but has no authority in the District.

## Appendix, No. 27.

## REPORTS respecting PERMANENT SETTLEMENT of the SOUTHERN POLLAMS.

REPORT from Collector of Southern Poligar Peshcush, to the President and Members of the Special Commission, Fort St. George; dated 30 Sept. 1802.

GENTLEMEN,

1. I HAVE now the honour to lay before you, the statements upon which I conceive that the permanent assessment for the zemindarry of Ramnad, may be satisfactorily regulated by the Commission. The delay which would inevitably arise, from any endeavour to submit those documents in a more detailed shape, will, I hope, be a sufficient justification of the abstract form in which they now appear before you; and whatever may be additionally required for hutauns and villages, shall be furnished with all possible expedition.

Collector's Report  
respecting Permanent  
Settlement of the South  
ern Pollams; dated 30  
Sept. 1802.

2. (No. 1.)—The first statement shows the public revenue, under every different head of Nunjah, Nunjahmel, Punjah Soornaday-um, and Chank, and Chaya, from the assumption of the country (exclusive of the first broken months), until the end of the last Fusly. No. 2, is a statement of charges hitherto incurred by the Company, which will cease upon the establishment of the permanent assessment. No. 3, is the proposed permanent jumma and kistbundy. No. 4, an allotment of pergunnahs, as pledges for the due payment of the several kists.

3. Although the collections of my own management, are much higher than those which preceded, they do not appear to me entirely a proper basis for the assessment now to be established in perpetuity: I shall therefore compare their average, with the receipts to the Company in former Fuslies, and add such remarks as appear to me to justify this opinion.

Collections of the Ramnad Pro- vince, exclu- sive of Sayer and Salt.	For Fusley.			1205:			1206:			1207:			1208:		
	S. Pag <sup>a</sup> f. c.			S. P. f. c.			S. P. f. c.			S. P. f. c.			S. P. f. c.		
	1,31,207. 16. 27½.			1,33,391. 16. 15.			94,882. 33.			65,127. 31. 33½.					
	1209:			1210:			1211:								
	1,52,315. 13. 44½.			1,55,181. 28.			1,85,625. 14.								
Revenue of the years				1205	-	-	-	1,31,207	18	27					
preceding Mr. Lush-				1206	-	-	-	1,33,391	16	15					
ington's manage-				1207	-	-	-	94,882	33						
ment.				1208	-	-	-	65,127	31	33½					
Collections of Mr.															
Lushington				-	1209	-	-	-	1,52,315	13	44½				
					1210	-	-	-	1,55,181	28					
					1211	-	-	-	1,85,625	14					
Fusley				1209	-	-	-	1,52,315	13	44½					
Average of the preceding four years								1,06,152	14	19					
Increase in 1209				-	-	-	-	46,162	41	25½					
Fusley 1210				-	-	-	-	1,55,181	28						
Average of the four years				-	-	-	-	1,06,152	14	19					
Increase in 1210				-	-	-	-	49,029	13	61					
Fusley 1211				-	-	-	-	1,85,625	14						
Average of the four years				-	-	-	-	1,06,152	14	9					
Increase 1211				-	-	-	-	79,472	41	61					
Average of Mr. Lushington's three years								1,64,374	4	41½					
Average of the four years preceding				-				1,06,152	14	19					
Average increase				-	-	-	-	58,221	32	22½					
TOTAL Increase of Mr. Lushington's								46,162	41	25½					
three years								49,029	13	61					
								79,472	41	61					
Star Pag <sup>a</sup>				-				1,74,665	12	67½					

5. From this statement, it will appear to the Commission, that the revenue progressively increased, during the three years in which I have been charged with

Collector's Report  
Respecting Permanent  
Settlement at the South-  
ern Polanah; dated 30  
Sept. 1802.

ment of Ramnad, in the following proportions:—In the first year, 43½ per cent. upon the average of the preceding years; in the second, 46 per cent.; and in the last Fusley, the augmentation, upon the average of former years, rose so high as 74 per cent. making the average increase of my own three years, upon the revenues of former years, more than 54 per cent.

6. As this revenue has been punctually realized, without complaint, it might be presumed that no means had been practised to undermine the growing prosperity of the country; but an evidence, more substantial than this presumption, will be found in the circumstance which I have the satisfaction of stating to you; that the ryots have benefited by the last settlement, in no less a sum than 30,374. 20. 4. star pag<sup>a</sup>.

7. In 1209, the season was moderately favourable. In 1210, nearly the same. In 1211, the rain fell in due time; and with unusual abundance: considering, however, the extraordinary uncertainty of seasons in Ramnad, two moderate and one favourable year cannot be deemed a proper foundation for a permanent assessment. I have therefore added to them two of Mr. Powney's, and one of Mr. Jackson's Fuslies; and I think no circumstance can occur to render a peshcush, fixed, according to the zemindary principle, upon this foundation, either burthensome to the Rance, or oppressive to the inhabitants, protected as they will be, by the judicial courts, in the enjoyment of those rules and rates of assessment by which the revenues have been collected during the last three years. The detail of these rates, has been given in my previous reports, and they are contained in every talook cutcherry. In cases, therefore, where specific pecuniary engagements shall not have superseded the necessity of further enquiry, the previous mamool can be at once distinctly ascertained.

8. The permanent peshcush which, upon these grounds, I have suggested for your consideration, amounts to star pagodas 94,733, exactly two-thirds of the gross receipts of the province during the six years, from which the average is taken. It is also within a thousand pagodas of the average net revenue derived by the Company, during their whole management of Ramnad. It is more than the net revenue preceding my management, by 33 per cent.; and it exceeds the peshcush paid by the former zemindar, more than 50 per cent. or in the sum of pagodas 33,875. 15, exclusive of salt and aayer, to be retained in the hands of government, or abolished, according to their pleasure.

9. Such are the terms, which the experience that I have acquired of the resources of Ramnad, suggest to me, as equitable and moderate; and in this consideration, I have attentively weighed the expediency of augmenting the jumma to government, upon the presumption of an increase of revenue, under the system of property and security about to take place; but the enjoyment of advantage, from any improvement in the repair of tanks, &c. is so precarious, in consequence of the extraordinary variation of the seasons in Ramnad, that I should not feel myself justified in recommending any increase upon such uncertain expectations.

10. In Ramnad, there is no class of people possessing any rights of the nature of talookdars, and therefore, in confirming the proprietary right of the Rance to the lands (with the exception of those alienated, and not paying public revenue), the right of no other individual will be violated. The ryots will of course be firmly maintained and protected by the judicial court, in their privilege of cultivating the soil, and of receiving their accustomed share.

11. The registers of curnums, are now making out, and shall be immediately forwarded. These are the only revenue officers in Ramnad. Of police, with the exception of cawelgars, there are none; nor indeed any nominal allowance in land, for such an establishment.

12. Notwithstanding the pressure of severe indisposition, and the occurrence of other unavoidable obstructions to my public duties, the opinions now offered to your consideration, might have been submitted at the time I promised; but I waited to have the satisfaction of laying before the Commission, a record of the resources of the country, founded upon actual measurement.—Such a document I am now enabled to submit to them; and I have no doubt it will convey to their minds that conviction, which I myself feel, that the large increase of revenue derived to the Company during the last three years from Ramnad, has been drawn from the fair resources of the country; and that the continuance of the Company's administration in Ramnad, has fully answered the important objects which led to its introduction; namely, relief to the people from the oppression and cruelty of the poligar; and the establishment of a regular government, equally beneficial to the agriculture, manufactures and commerce of the country.—When the revenue has been delivered to the possession of the Rannee, I would suggest that the allowance to the poligar and his family, be paid by the Company, so long as they collect the revenues; and when the aayer is abolished, the province will receive so much additional revenue, that the Rannee will be fully able to discharge the allowances from her own revenues, through the medium of the collector.

#### SHEVAGUNGA.

I have already had the honour of stating to the Commission, that the impossibility of obtaining a knowledge of the revenues of Shevagnunga, whilst it was in the possession of the poligar, rendered a particular and personal communication with the new zemindar necessary, before I could venture to mention any time as the probable period of my being able to furnish the information required by them for the permanent settlement of

that I might judge how far reliance might be placed on the success of my endeavours, and in the sincerity of his own inclination, and the disposition

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tion of his servants to bring forth the real accounts of his country, I required from him an estimate of the revenues of the current year, which, by the statement he then delivered, amounted in the whole to no more than 2,65,829 Shoooley chuckruns, or star pag 28,600  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

13. The general knowledge which I had obtained, through different channels, of the revenue of Shevagunga, left me no reason to believe that this account nearly approached the truth. I therefore stated to Woya Taver my conviction of its errors; and that the old accounts of the country, if faithfully laid before him, would show the average receipts to be considerably more than the amount of this statement.

16. With the final declaration of Woya Taver, at this interview, you are already acquainted, namely, that he was heartily disposed to bring forth the accounts of the country; that he was sensible of the efforts that would be made to counteract him; of the vigilance that would be necessary to give success to any enquiry; and that the collision of two authorities, would defeat the objects of both; that my letter had encouraged him to look to my advice, as the certain means of relieving him in every difficulty, and of establishing him permanently in that enviable situation, which the proclamation of his Lordship in Council, had promised to him: secured from future distress by a peshcush, which it would be easy for him to pay; and maintained, without fear of interruption, in his possessions, by the unalterable regulations of a just government. With these feelings, he did not hesitate to promise his concurrence in whatever arrangements I might recommend to him, and you might approve; and that even to the temporary transfer of the country, he should be satisfied to agree, trusting that it would be done in such a manner as to show, that the Company had not withdrawn their favour from him.

17. Being clearly of opinion, that Woya Taver's means of enquiry were not at that time, adequate to expose to my view a satisfactory account of the real resources of the country, within any reasonable period; but that an investigation, embarrassed by this collision of authorities and interests, would not only prove abortive, but disorder the current management of the country, in every step of its progress; I submitted to the consideration of the Commission, the expediency of the temporary transfer of power in Shevagunga, or the interposition of their authority for the appointment of some person who might be approved by the zemindar, and be duly qualified to promote the objects of the enquiry.

18. My own opinion decidedly inclined to the transfer, as the duly measure adequate to remove all present difficulties and future doubts; and if you concurred in the expediency of it, I suggested the propriety of tempering the assignment with the feelings of the zemindar, and with the policy which placed him in possession of the country, by issuing, under his lordship's authority, such proclamation as might leave no doubt upon any mind, in respect to the temporary object of the transfer.

19. The Commission were pleased, in reply to this letter, to express their confidence in the success of my endeavours to obtain information sufficient to enable them to settle the permanent assessment of the zemindarry of Shevagunga, on principles of moderation and justice, and relieve them from the necessity of having recourse to a measure, which, though sanctioned by the zemindar's concurrence, might create impressions unfavourable to our government, and to the introduction of the system of permanency and security, about to be established.

20. Aware of the extreme delicacy of every question involving the remotest reference to the public faith; and feeling very forcibly, the flattering confidence thus reposed in me by the Commission; I should be most seriously concerned to disappoint it. Hitherto, the increasing pressure of other duties, and a declining state of health, have absolutely precluded a personal examination of the villages and accounts of Shevagunga; but I have bestowed every leisure moment to the correction of all the general statements and information received at various times, since I became collector; and I shall now briefly explain the opinion which I have formed upon the amount of settlement to be made for this zemindarry.

21. The Commission are aware, that the country now called Shevagunga, was originally a part of the Ramnad Raj; that Curta Taver, the Rajah of Ramnad, having divided the whole of his possessions into fifths, gave to Shasavurna Taver two-fifths, reserving three fifths for himself.—The knowledge of this transaction, combined with the accurate information since obtained of the actual value of Ramnad, forms a ground for judging of the resources of Shevagunga. There are, however, other equal circumstances, which require to be examined. A very general impression prevails in these countries, that Shasavurna Taver (who, in comparison with Curta Taver, was of considerable personal address) contrived to practise unfair means for his own advantage, with the sumperdies, who regulated the division: But this design of Shasavurna Taver, is understood to have extended to the capability of the portion he obtained for future improvement, not to the actual past value of the ranj, which was too well known to Curta Taver and his ministers, to render any collusion practicable. But on the other hand, are to be remembered the many advantages Ramnad has, since that time, in consequence of its maritime situation, from the progressive increase of its commerce, and the permanent establishment of a large public investment of capital, consuming the whole of its manufactures, maintains a considerable capital circulating in the country. Shevagunga participates but in a small degree, in these advantages; hence the sale of its produce possesses not the same certainty and advantages. In judging, also, of the future value of Shevagunga, allowance must be made for the diminution of demand for its grain, in consequence of the greater abundance in the neighbouring villages of Madura, arising from the change of government.



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22. Taking therefore into consideration these disadvantages, and maturely considering the statement which I have now the honour to lay before you, of the actual collections and resources of Shevagunga in the last year, as compiled by me from the zemindar's own accounts; I am inclined to recommend the sum of 75,000 star pagodas, as a proper annual jumma for Shevagunga.

23. The Commission will observe, that it considerably exceeds two-thirds of the peshcush I have submitted for Ramnad; and I am inclined to think that an actual investigation and measurement of the lands, might not, after much anxiety and inquietude, be attended with a better result; but if the Commission should judge this information to be too general for a permanent settlement, I would recommend a lease of five or ten years; in which time, there will be ample leisure for enquiry and correction.

24. In the latter case, a proper establishment of servants from the collector, should be in constant attendance at the zemindar's cutcherry, to report to the collector, the progress of cultivation and collection, during this period of experiment. But after attentively weighing all the advantages of a permanent settlement; the motives of intrigue and alarm, and the causes of disorder which it lays at rest; the new springs of general improvement and happiness which it opens; I am inclined to recommend this sum, as a permanent jumma for Shevagunga; liable to no future change. This proposed settlement is 25,000 star pagodas above the annual receipts from Shevagunga, since it came under the Company's management, or an increase in the annual revenue to be derived therefrom, of fifty per cent.

#### TINNEVELLY POLLAMS.

25. The several reports which I have submitted to his Lordship in Council, through the Board of Revenue, as noted in the margin,\* describe so particularly the whole course of that reform, which has been happily effected amongst the poligars of Tinnevelly, that it is now unnecessary to enlarge upon the subject.

26. In my Report to the Board of Revenue of the 31st Jan. 1800, preparatory to an increase of the peshcush of the Tinnevelly poligars, I submitted to them the best accounts which I had been able to procure, of the resources of the pollams. These statements were obtained principally from the canongoes of Tinnevelly, and were corrected by my own enquiries. The suspicion with which I had been accustomed to regard the documents of a canongoe's office, and especially of one, subject to the controul and irregularity of a mussulman government, would have led me, at any period, to place no great reliance on accounts received through such a channel; but at that time, I was the less inclined to put much faith in the statements delivered, knowing that the fouzdar of Tinnevelly was latterly averse to the canongoes affording any information from his office; and that I could afterwards obtain none but what appeared confused and mutilated. In submitting the statements previously received from the canongoe, I therefore remarked, that I could not pledge myself for their particular accuracy, although, from the frequent enquiries I had made to amend their errors, I considered them sufficiently correct for regulating the increase of peshcush then to be established. These statements embraced as well the amount of the cawel privileges of the poligars, then to be assumed, as the resources of their own villages, and an additional column showed in what degree the latter ought, in my judgment, to be then additionally assessed: to these, I annexed such short remarks as the particular circumstances of each poligar seemed to require.

27. The settlement recommended upon these accounts, received the approbation of government. By what means, the principal poligars endeavoured to obtain a diminution of it, and by what arguments, it was attempted to reconcile them to a measure, upon which the hope of that reform, so long desired in their conduct, was principally built, are known to the Commission. That their acceptance, though reluctant, was sincere, will have been demonstrated, by my progressive reports, for nearly three years, and by the circumstance, which I have the satisfaction of stating, that the increased jumma of the two last years, was completely collected in the course of them.

28. Always holding in my remembrance, their former irregular payment of a very inadequate tribute, and the diminution of their means, by the rigid assumption of the desha cawel, I had scarcely hoped for the complete reform I have witnessed: but it is an act of justice due to the Tinnevelly poligars, on this important occasion of fixing in perpetuity the foundations of their future happiness, to bring fully to the notice of the Commission, that every principal poligar, since the establishment of the increased assessment, has been faithful to his allegiance, and punctual in his public payments: nor can it be justly concluded, that disobedience has arisen solely from the terror of military power; or their punctuality, from superabounding resources. The period which has elapsed since the commencement of the reform, has not been wanting in temptations to turbulence; whilst the statements I have the honour of laying before you, convey the best evidence procurable by any other process, that of actual measurement, of the extent of their revenues;—they show that the resources of the poligars, were generally computed by the canongoe, with accuracy; and that the results of my former general enquiries, were nearly correct.

That the canongoe's information should approach the truth (except in the particular error explained in the statements), will appear as extraordinary to the Commission, as it first, to me: but the extreme accuracy of his estimate of their cawel privileges, the extent of which, were ascertained by me, beyond all doubt, together with the result of my enquiries in those pollams, which were surrendered to me for that purpose, show the error indeed be accounted for, by remembering that the pollams were chiefly usurped from a very ancient date, from the circar lands; that the whole of them had come, at that time, under the management of the fouzgars, who knew perfectly well their resources, and that they were disposed rather to exaggerate than to conceal, the extent of

their encroachments and violences, in order to account for failures and disappointment in the circar lands.

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30. In some instances, it will accordingly be seen, that the canongoe's estimate exceeded the present actual resources of the pollams, particularly that of Shevagherry, in consequence of a much higher valuation having been placed upon the grain, than it can ever produce. Shevagherry itself, abounds with nunch cultivation, and is encompassed with some of the most fertile of the circar lands. The valuation which I put upon the grain of those lands, in my jummaundy of the last year, was ten fanams, and some part of it, still remains on hand. It is very evident therefore, that if the paddy of Shevagherry were to be valued in perpetuity, at 15 fanams per cottah, the ends of the permanent settlement would be defeated, by the failure of the poligar, and the oppression of the people. In the few instances where this error has been made in the canongoe's statement, I have therefore corrected it; and with those exceptions, as explained particularly in my remarks, I have recommended the present increased jumma, as a permanent assessment of their lands, in the conviction, that it is equitable and moderate.

31. The nature of the permanent settlement, and of the system of law and security, by which it is to be enjoyed by themselves, and handed down to their posterity, has been repeatedly explained to the poligars; and they now await with anxious solicitude, the confirmation of a blessing, which is to soften to them the remembrance of former sacrifices. The local information indispensably necessary to pronounce upon this important question, will, I trust, be found in the accompanying statement; and other details of less importance, shall immediately follow.

32. The foregoing remarks and statement, regard the principal pollams of Etiapoor, Shevagherry, Wootmally, Chokumputty and Peryoor, and the lesser pollams of Talavencottah; Cadumboor, Purvally, Gollaputty, Yarlomedday and Alagapoory: it remains for me, therefore, to offer some explanations upon the small pollams surrendered to my own management, by the poligars of Nadavacoorchy, Maniachy, Soorunday, Chennelgoody, Mailmundeh, Autengherry, Sandyoor, Woorcaud, Singumputty, Manarcottah, and Avadeyapoor, in the conviction, which they professed to feel, of being unable to pay the increased peshcush.

33. The natural aversion of every poligar, to the transfer of his estate to other hands, and the readiness of these poligars to submit their pollams to any scrutiny I might desire, certainly suggested, at the time, that their professions of deficient means, had a just foundation. With two or three exceptions, experience has shown this presumption to have been warranted, but not to such an extent as might have been expected. The value of the seven first pollams, according to the estimate forwarded on the 30th January 1800, amounted to 22,700 C. C.: their resources, as taken on the spot, have amounted to 22,171 C. C. There are, however, particular local considerations explained in my remarks upon these several pollams, which induce me to be of opinion, that the aggregate of the permanent settlement of them, should fall very little below the increased peshcush formerly recommended; and I have no doubt that the poligars will be able to pay the jumma proposed, with ease to themselves, and justice to the inhabitants under them.

34. In the remarks annexed to the statements, which accompanied my Report to the Board of Revenue of the 30th January 1800, I mentioned, that by "the assumption of the desha cavel, the resources of the poligars of Woorcaud and Singumputty, were completely taken away." In that estimate of the revenues of these poligars, the two villages of their own names, which they have enjoyed at a certain rent, subject to an indefinite nuzzer, were not included; but in the consideration of their length of possession (about sixty years) and of their total want of other subsistence, since the resumption of the cavel, I have now proposed the acknowledgment of their claims to the enjoyment of these villages, upon the full principle of zemindarry assessment. If you should approve of this arrangement, I would recommend that the accounts of the villages, for the time they have been under assumption, be adjusted upon this principle; namely, two-thirds of the gross revenue to the Company, and one to the poligars, by whom the expenses of management must also be borne.

#### AVADIAPoor.

35. When the desha cavel of the pollams was generally assumed in January 1800, the hamlets in the possession of the poligar of Avadiapoor, named Pureyacolum and Annacolum, were also assumed as usurpations from the circar. Their ayakut, or revenue measurement in nunch, is 50 cottahs verapaud, from which 25 cottahs, and 117½ measures and a half of seed ground, were cultivated in 1800,—deduct, for enaups, six and 27 measures of verapaud, and from the produce of the remainder, 19 cottahs of measures; the mailwarum came to 166 cottahs, and 40½ measures, or 249 chus fanams; add 198 chus for Punjeh and Soornadayam, and the aggregate birez of hamlets may be calculated at 447 C. C. 7½ fanams.

36. The final resumption of these hamlets, has always been most earnestly desired by the poligar, as the ancient possession of his family; and as they have remained in enjoyment for nearly sixty years, this length of occupancy, added to the venerable character of Pooley Tawer; the smallness of his pollam, consisting of two villages; the former affluence of his family, and his own present depression; incline me to commend that these two hamlets, of Paraykolum and Annamankolum be confirmed

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The total jumma of his lands, may then be stated at - - - star pagodas 2,117 18 10  
Deduct ten per cent. therefrom, for expenses of management - - - 211 51 17

Remaining net jumma - - - - - 1,905 28 73  
Two-thirds thereof, as a permanent peshcush, would be - - - 1,270 19 22  
The former peshcush, was - - - - - 680 7 —

37. Thus the application of the zemindarry principle of assessment, upon the Teerwa of 1209, Fusly, would augment the peshcush payable by the poligar nearly one hundred per cent.; but in consideration of the great change in the price of grain since that period, and the little capacity of this pollam for improvement, I beg leave to recommend, that the permanent jumma of this pollam be fixed at 1,000 star pagodas, which the poligar will be able to pay with facility.

#### MANARCOTTAH.

38. The constant irregularity of this poligar in the payment of his peshcush, and the estimates formed of the value of his resources, led to a suspicion that far too great a portion of them had been dissipated in his pleasures.—His early age, (23)—his repeated promises of better conduct, and especially, the examples exhibited to him of the destructive consequences of profligacy and disobedience, called for forbearance in the early part of the reform; but his continued failure in his payments, and uniform assurances of deficient means, accompanied by the tender of his lands for examination, led to that investigation of the resources of Manarcottah, which I have now the honour of presenting to the Commission.

39. The value of Manarcottah, according to the estimate transmitted on the 31st January 1800, was star pagodas 3,333. 14 fanams. This statement was founded upon the canongoe's accounts, and approached very nearly to the truth: but some of the resources included in this pollam by the canongoe, have been since carried back to the pollam of Colarputty, from whence they were forcibly wrested by the father of the present poligar, some years ago.

40. This deduction being made, and regard being also had to the difference in the price of grain, and the decayed state of the tanks, I cannot now estimate the jumma of Manarcottah, exclusive of enaums, at a higher sum than - - - star pagodas 2,480 30 27

Deducting from this sum, ten per cent. for expenses of management - - - 248 3 2

Remaining net jumma - - - - - 2,232 27 25  
Two-thirds of this sum - - - - - 1,488 18 16

41. The original peshcush of this pollam, was so high as star pagodas 1,411. 4 53; and although the variation of seasons, and the delay and difficulty of the poligar in making good this payment, might suggest the inexpediency of any increase; yet when I compare the capabilities of this pollam with that of Avadiapote, and advert to the large tracts of waste dry grain land, which may be brought into cultivation, by the exertions of the poligar; I feel no disposition to recommend a greater relaxation from the zemindarry principle of assessment, than the deduction already made of ten per cent. from the gross jumma.

42. If the Commission shall adopt this proposition, in fixing the permanent settlement, it will be necessary that the poligar be particularly warned against the hope of future indulgence, in order to impress fully upon his mind, that a prudent management of his estate, can alone prevent its ultimate transfer into more provident hands.—This conviction will, I trust, stimulate his attention, and thereby secure to him the happy possession of his pollam.

#### SHATOOR.

43. The Commission are aware that the office of the Board of Revenue, contains a very able report of the resources of this pollam. The estimate which Mr. Harris formed of the value of these lands, was so high as C. C. 14,726; and it was an early object with me, after my appointment, to institute such enquiries as should enable me to pass an opinion upon Mr. Harris's Report, which had been so materially impeached by my predecessor.

44. The inclosed abstract from Mr. Harris's estimate, will show to the Commission, the grounds of that valuation, and of that which I offer, as more applicable to the present actual condition of the pollam, under the complete change of circumstances which has since happened, and which must be the basis of every estimate formed of the value of any country.

45. In Mr. Harris's estimate of the value of Shatoor, the extent of ground capable of cultivation, is accurately stated; but allowance does not appear to me to have been made, in sufficient degree, for variation of season, and the infirm condition of men and cattle. The produce of the seed sown, is justly stated; the price of each cottah, is formed upon the solid test of the years preceding the formation of Mr. Harris's estimate; and would be a very proper basis, if the produce continued as it had heretofore been, and the means of sale had remained the same; but both have undergone material alteration, and especially the latter. When the price of grain is increased, the price of a given quantity must fall, in proportion to that in 1813 fanams per cottah having been the rate of sale, for the years upon which Mr. Harris's estimate is formed, is an incontrovertible reason why it should be reduced, under the present cultivation which has since arisen, from the repair of tanks: but this is a cause which has no influence in the value of the Shatoor grain, not entitled to so much consideration, as the change of circumstances, which has since taken place, in regard to the means of sale. The system of monopoly, which had prevailed for so many years, in the sale of grain in the villages bordering upon Shatoor, did not allow Mr. Harris to judge what would be the price, when the market should be completely opened, and the cultivation largely increased, as in the pollam as in the circar lands. It was a case which was not required, for him to investigate; but when it fell to my lot to form a general arrangement

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range ment for renting the whole of the Tinnevely province, this difficulty was immediately forced upon my consideration. Such of the records of the former government, as had then come under my examination, did not afford me any information upon which I could rely, of the relative fertility of the lands; and the system of embargo upon the sale of grain, left me no correct means of judging what would be its price when the market should be opened, and the cultivation increased. To ascertain these essential points to every rent, it became indispensable to reap the ear crop by aumany, in order that the information thereby obtained of the quality of the lands, and value of their produce, might be applied with just consideration to the condition of the ryots, in forming a rent at a more advanced period of the year. With this knowledge, the price of grain which I fixed upon the produce of the talook of Shevelpatore, encompassing the pollam of Shatoor, as well as Shevagherry, on every side, was ten fanams per cottah, and some part of it, remains unsold to the present time. It is therefore very evident, that an estimate of the resources of Shatoor, which should value the grain at 13 fanams per cottah, "must, as in the case of Shevagherry, defeat the salutary objects of a permanent settlement, by leading to the ruin of the poligar and the oppression of the people."

47. Adverting, indeed, to the very large proportionate quantity of punjeh produced in Shatoor, beyond the consumption of its own inhabitants;—considering, also, that their means of subsistence are generally drawn from the punjeh lands, and the production of the hills; and reflecting upon the difficulty of disposing of the produce of Shatoor, in the villages of Shevelpatore, of which I had a personal knowledge, in the last year; I am inclined to make some deduction from the price of grain in Shevelpatore, in order that something may remain to defray the charges of bullock-hire from Shatoor into the Company's villages. Upon an average, one fanam per cottah appears to me, to be a just deduction; and Mr. Harris's estimate, admitting its accuracy in every other particular, will appear as in the statement.

48. These allowances being made, I would recommend to the Commission, that two-thirds of this estimate, after deducting ten per cent. for expenses, be taken as the permanent settlement for the pollam, in the conviction that it will be found equitable and moderate.

#### SAPATOOR.

49. In submitting to the Commission, the measures which appear to me most expedient for the permanent settlement of the lands of this pollam, it may be useful to take a short retrospect of its past management.

50. In the Fusley 1205, Mr. Powney represented to the Board of Revenue, the misconduct of Cawnia Naigue, poligar of Sapatoor, for withholding his tribute, and other irregularities; and was instructed to dispossess the poligar of his pollam, and retain it under his own immediate management. In consequence of this resolution, Cawnia Naigue established himself in the neighbouring mountains, and completely intimidating the inhabitants of the pollam and the public servants in charge of it, distracted the management, and participated in its revenues.

51. Such was the state of this country, when I received charge of it, in 1799; and as it was obvious that the surrender or seizure of the poligar, was indispensable to the security of a future revenue from the pollam, and the return of tranquillity to its long harrassed inhabitants. I took an early occasion of requesting the instructions of government, which of the two I should attempt to accomplish, and by what means. At that period, I had reason to believe that Cawnia Naigue would resign himself to the mercy of government, if he were assured of personal protection, and a small subsistence: but such a compromise, after the commission of so many enormities, and after the public resentment had been so frequently declared against him, might, I apprehended, shake that opinion of the force and energy of government, which, in these countries, it should ever be the primary object to maintain. Upon this principle, I was of opinion that no overtures to a reconciliation with Cawnia Naigue ought to be made, or received, nor any of his family be put in possession; for the restoration of the pollam, after the circumstances which had occurred, would be solely imputed to inability of maintaining it.

52. Upon these grounds, I recommended the offer of a reward for his person, which was approved; and in July 1800, I had the satisfaction of seizing him.—Charges were subsequently given against the prisoner, before the board of officers appointed by his Lordship in Council to try him; and in the month of October 1800, he was condemned, and capitally punished.—From that period, the pollam has remained in tranquillity, and management has been comparatively advantageous; but many of the principal inhabitants, who fled into other countries during former distractions, from the equal of the poligar's vengeance, if they did not submit to it, or of public punishment, if conciliated it, feel no particular attachment to return; and hence the lands of the pollam, cannot expect to regain that high state of cultivation which they enjoyed. Cawnia Naigue's father, whose good qualities were as well known, as the vices of the

53. Adverting to the examples which have been exhibited to the poligars in during the last two years, I have no longer that fear which I formerly professed acknowledgment of any part of the poligar's family, should be imputed to error; and considering the singular unhealthiness of the lands of that pollam, its tainous situation, its peculiar disadvantages for aumancee management, and the dis of many of the principal inhabitants, who as much respect the memory of Cawnia father, as they execrate that of the late poligar himself; I am of opinion that the blishment of the pollam upon a secondary tenure, has become an expedient

54. The father of the late Cawnia Naigue, had three wives, by each of whom one son; the eldest, Cawnia Naigue, has been executed; the second, War

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Naiguc, is about twenty years old, and enjoys a pension from the Company; the third, Taddy Cawna Naiguc, is about 18 years old.

55. Warra Cawna Naiguc enjoying the right of primogeniture, and having separated his interest, at an early period, from the late rebel, has the preferable claim to the favour of government; and if the reasons I have stated, shall appear to render his appointment expedient, I would recommend, in consideration of the great extent of uncultivated land in the pollam, that two-thirds of the gross revenues received by the Company during their management of it, a long period of destruction and failure, be assessed as a permanent tribute.

56. The cawel and sayer of this pollam, constituted very near half of its value, as you will observe from the accompanying statements; and as both will remain in the hands of government, the young poligar cannot be misled, by any overgrown resources, to improper thoughts of his dependent condition.

57. The sum which, upon this principle, would be payable by the poligar of Sapatoor, as a permanent jumma, amounts to star pagodas 2,582; and I have no doubt the young poligar, who is likely to succeed in bringing back some of the old inhabitants, would be able to pay it, with facility.

#### THE SIX SEQUESTERED POLLAMS OF TINNEVELLY.

58. When the Tinnevelly poligars were transferred to the Company, an hope was entertained that, by establishing a moderate peshcush, and by the exercise of just measures towards them, their obedience and services would be secured to the state. The rebellious conduct of some, and the licentious habits of all, soon led to a very different expectation; and in the system adopted, to prevent future insurrection, it was not judged expedient to make any exceptions.

59. The increase of peshcush, the deprivation of cawel, the interdiction against the future use of those implements which had been so long regarded by the poligars with such fond attachment, were extended to all; and the arguments by which it was attempted to reconcile the poligars to these privations, were by none more strenuously combated, than by the poligar of Etiapoor; upon the ground of that fidelity which he had ever testified towards the Company;—but the mortification he suffered, in being treated with the suspicion of a disaffected tributary, had no influence upon his public conduct; for he paid the increase of peshcush with punctuality, and gave no cause for a single complaint against him.

60. Such was the conduct he had observed, prior to the rebellion of Panjalamcouchy and Shevagunga. During the progress of it, he conducted himself with uniform attachment, manifesting, upon every occasion, a sincere desire to aid the efforts of our troops, to the utmost of his power. Besides the assistance derived from this poligar, in the reduction of the rebels, his example had the most happy influence upon the other poligars; and adverting to the justice and policy of rendering the situation of a tributary, who, had thus conducted himself, eligible and easy, I proposed to the Board of Revenue, that this poligar should receive some lasting mark of the Company's approbation.

61. I was the more disposed to this opinion, by the pains which had been taken by the rebellious Murdoos, to impress the poligars of these countries, with an apprehension that the assurance I had so repeatedly given them, of the fixed determination of government, to maintain them in all their just rights and privileges, were mere professions, depending upon our convenience and power; and which, in consequence of the large resumptions that had been made from them during the last two years, they had a temptation to adopt. The reward of those who had conducted themselves with fidelity, would, I observed, counteract this impression, and tend to establish another, more beneficial to the existing state of affairs, and more favourable to the permanent interests of the Company.

62. From these considerations, I took the liberty of submitting the propriety of transferring to the poligar of Etiapoor, upon a reasonable jumma, the lands of Panjalamcouchy immediately bordering upon Etiapoor; and from similar motives, I recommended the grant of the two southern inagauus to the poligar of Maniachy, and those of Candulgoody and Colatoor, to the poligar of Mailmundeh.

63. This plan of dividing the lands of the rebellious poligars, amongst those who had manifested attachment and allegiance, during the troubles in the southern provinces, was recommended by the board of revenue, and approved by government. The board, however, were of opinion, that the country would have sufficiently recovered, after a period of three years, to admit of a permanent increase of about one-sixth in the jumma at first granted to be settled for these lands; and in compliance with these instructions, the lands were tendered to, and received by, the poligars, upon these terms. I however very much doubted, that they really regarded the arrangement, not as one of benefit to themselves, but as a measure of expediency, for the convenience of the Company.

I thought that these impressions proceeded from an avaricious disposition in the poligars, or an arrogant estimate of the services they had rendered, no person would have supposed than myself to countenance them. But I have seen the havoc occasioned by the sword, and by the devastation of contending bodies in arms, throughout these vil-  
I know, also, that many of the inhabitants who settled themselves to their cultivation in the circar lands at that period, are never likely to return to their original habitation a much longer period than three years must elapse, before the lands can be given up to the poligars of Etiapoor, Mailmundeh and Maniachy, can be restored to their former value.

Collectors Report,  
Respecting Permanent  
Settlement of the South-  
ern Pollams, dated 20  
Sept. 1802.

65. The two principal objects of the transfer I recommended, were, that the poligars in general, might have an instance constantly to refer to, of the disposition of the Company to reward fidelity and service; and that the condition of those who had these claims upon us, might be enviable and happy. The jumma, which in my judgment, will secure these important views, exceeds the peshcush formerly received from the poligars of these pollams, no less than 105 per cent., exclusive of cawel resumptions; and I beg leave to recommend it to the Commission, for their adoption.

66. In my first plan for the division of the magans of Panjalumcouchy, I proposed the transfer of Poodiumpotoor to the poligar of Maniachy, and of Carcoorchy, to the poligar of Etiapoor: but having ascertained that several of the villages of Carcoorchy are closely intermixed with those of Maniachy, I apprehend that the management of them by the poligar of Etiapoor, might become a source of future discontent and litigation. I beg therefore to suggest, that Carcoorchy be given up in perpetuity, to the poligar of Maniachy, and that Poodiumpotoor, which is mixed with the lands of Etiapoor, be transferred in lieu thereof, to the poligar of that pollam. As the two poligars have no particular objection to this transfer, I have assigned them accordingly, and have made the necessary alterations in the accompanying statement, for the permanent settlement of those lands, which will, I hope, receive the approbation of the Commission.

67. In the three sequestered pollams of Naglepore, Yellarumpunny and Colarputty, the proportion of dry grain lands is very large, and the improvements of which the tanks are capable, not very considerable. The produce and capability of the lands, have been correctly ascertained, during the three years of the Company's management; and the teerwa and terbuddy, shown in the accompanying statements in abstract, will afford to the Commission, the detailed information relating thereto.

68. From the gross jumma realized by the Company, I have made a deduction of 25 per cent., and recommended, that the residue be declared the permanent assessment upon these lands. Such a statement will produce to the Company, 10 per cent. above the peshcush formerly paid by the poligars; and it provides for the ease and happiness of the cultivators of the soil, which should be the paramount consideration of a permanent settlement; but in order that this deduction from the gross jumma, may reach those whom it is intended to relieve, I beg particularly to recommend, that the rates of tax upon the dry grain lands, which I originally recommended for Colatoor, in my Report of the 29th December 1800, may be adopted throughout these pollams; namely, for every kire of punjeh land, being a square of 145 yards, of Kershul. Veppul. Puttul. Shewul.

land.	K. F.	K. F.	K. F.
C. 3. 2.	2. 3.	1. 9.	1. 1.

The establishment of these rates, will diffuse comfort through every cottage in those pollams, and will not discourage the principal natives from purchasing the villages, for the expectation of bringing large tracts of excellent, though uncultivated land, into fertility; together with the proposed deduction from the gross jumma, will make these lands, a desirable acquisition to many of the better conditioned inhabitants. In the accompanying statements, I have divided them into such portions, as appear to me to conform with the original instructions for the sale of the havelly lands; and I recommend, that offers for the purchase of these lots be invited accordingly.

#### COLLUMCONDUM.

69. By the assumption of the cawel, this poligar's means of subsistence were brought within such narrow limits, that it became necessary to relinquish the small tribute previously received from him; and his Lordship was also pleased, in consideration of his poverty and numerous family, to confer upon him four small tanks, and the little spots of nunjeh watered from them, free of rent, as a means of living. A sunnad will, therefore, be necessary for his enjoyment of these lands in perpetuity, and his name is inserted in the list of poligars, for this purpose.

#### CONCLUSION.

70. In closing my Report upon this important subject, it can scarcely be necessary to urge, as the motive of any apparent prolixity, my anxiety to satisfy the Commission upon every doubtful point. Indeed I now only desire, in the belief, that nothing material for the information has been omitted. The subject is indeed of so much consequence, and so important has been the share allotted to me, in eradicating those accumulated evils which distracted the poligar countries at the time I received charge of them, that the details of it, might be swelled to any extent. I shall, however, conclude it for the present, by declaring, and I do so with that confidence which an eventful superintendence of the Company's interests in those districts, for nearly four years, is calculated to inspire, that it appears to me to be now waiting to consolidate the foundations of internal peace, but the establishment of the settlement herein recommended, the abolition of customs and the regulation of the police. By the energy and justice of government, rebellious have been subdued; the oppressed have been upheld and exalted; the faithful have been liberally rewarded; and the extinction of a divided authority, has restored the fairest province of the Carnatic, from an acknowledged state of anarchy and confusion, to a state of subordination and prosperity. To this complete revolution of affairs, the Company owe the solid and permanent advantages of the settlement now recommended, the extent is shown distinctly in the accompanying statement; and I trust that the Council in Council may consider them so ample, as not to deny himself the satisfaction of abolishing the extraordinary contrivances by which the customs are now collected, and of appropriating the cawel receipts to a more beneficial use.



Special Report,  
concerning Permanent  
Settlement of the South-  
ern Provinces; dated 3d  
Sept. 1803.

system of policy upon which all the promised success of a permanent settlement in Tinnevelly must finally depend.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

S. R. LUSHINGTON,

Collector of Tinnevelly and the Marawars.

Tinnevelly, 30th Sept. 1802.

REPORT from SPECIAL COMMISSION to the Governor in Council, Fort St. George; dated 5 April 1803.

MY LORD,

Special Commission to  
Government, on Per-  
manent Settlement of  
the Southern Provinces;  
5 April 1803.

Para. 1.—THE extensive enquiries which have been instituted, and the information which has in consequence been submitted to the Honourable Court of Directors, and to your Lordship in Council, relative to the government and condition of the poligar countries, render superfluous the intrusion on your Lordship's time, of any elaborate discussion from us, with respect to the principles of the poligar tenure, or with regard to the most advisable mode of improving that part of the British possessions in the Peninsula.

2. The inconvenience arising to the government of the Carnatic, from the indefinite and oppressive exercise of the power of the nabobs of Arcot over the poligars, and from the occasional resistance opposed by those feudatories to the authority of the state, during periods of public calamity, having rendered the interference of the British government requisite to suppress so fruitful a source of violence and distraction; it was provided by the treaty of 1792, concluded with the late nabob Mahomed Ally, that the poligars dependent on the sovereignty of Arcot, should be transferred to the exclusive authority of the British government.

3. The terms and conditions under which this arrangement was effected, proved to be incompatible with the objects of the policy on which it was founded. The poligars retained, as it was natural for them to retain, a strong desire to continue the exercise of military and independent power. The substitution of a lenient and equal government, for the irregular and arbitrary violence of the Mahomedan administration, offered a feeble inducement to the poligars to abandon the habits of their feudal institution. The exact adherence to treaty, on the part of the British government, left to the poligars the possession of their principalities, on the conditional payment of a tribute utterly disproportionate to the extent of their resources. The means of a superabundant wealth, which, under the government of the nabobs of Arcot, had enabled the poligars to appease the resentment of the Mahomedan power, and to expiate rebellion against the state, by satisfying the rapacity of local officers, became, under the British administration, the source of personal aggrandizement and ambition to the poligars. The limits of prudence, and the degrees of difference in the change of circumstances, were indistinctly perceived under such flattering encouragement of those inflammatory passions; and the poligars of the south, exhibited a practical example of the insufficient restraint imposed on the appetites of men, by the chains of gratitude, or by the hope of contentment in the enjoyment of limited good. The poligars rebelled against the authority of the Company, as they had rebelled against that of the nabob of Arcot; and the diminution of the appointed force of the provinces, became the signal of revolt, under the moderate demand of the ordinary peshcush, as well as under the capricious exaction of a claim, regulated by power alone.

4. The general history of the poligars, as far as records go back, has been described to your Lordship in Council by the late collector of poligar peshcush, Mr. Lushington, in his letter of the 30th August 1793, and in our Report of the 15th August 1802. These documents include the traditional origin of the poligar tenure, and of the nature of the service which they were bound to render to the state. In their Report of the 14th March 1797, the late Board of Revenue described, with great accuracy, the actual condition of the poligars in their relation to the British government under the treaty of 1792; and in a very extensive commentary on that report, the late Right Honourable Governor, Lord Robert, pointed out to the Honourable Court of Directors, the defects of the engagements contracted with the nabob Mahomed Ally, with respect to the government of the poligar countries. In their dispatches of the 10th June 1795, and 5th June 1796, the Court of Directors have reviewed the principle of those engagements; and have prescribed the means of rendering the poligars useful subjects and obedient tributaries to the British government. In the attainment of these objects, the Honourable Court have uniformly insisted on the preservation of the military power of the poligars; and on the substitution of a tribute more proportionate, than the ordinary peshcush, to the resources of the poligar countries, and more adequate to the public demand, for defraying the expenses of their protection and government.

5. The circumstances connected with the rebellion of the poligar of Panjalamcourthy; the commotion excited in the southern provinces, subsequently to the defection of the poligar of Panjalamcourthy; the punishment of the rebels, and the confiscation of their lands; the destruction of the poligar forts; the discontinuance of their military services; the consequent diminution of the public revenue; and the several proclamations published by the Court of Directors, and your Lordship in Council, are steps which serve to mark the progressive improvement of the administration of poligar affairs, indicated by the Court of Directors, and enforced by the necessity of providing for the internal tranquillity, and the external defence of the authority of government over that part of the British territory. We proceed accordingly to submit to your Lordship in Council, the result of our conference with the late collector of poligar peshcush, Mr. Lushington, on the subject

of determining the amount of revenue to be permanently assessed on the southern zemindaries and pollams.

#### RAMNAD.

6. The circumstances which led to the rebellion, and to the subsequent deposition of the Rajah of Ramnad, have been the subject of ample discussion on the records of government. The agreement in consequence concluded with his highness the late nabob of Arcot, for the administration of the affairs of Ramnad, by the means of the Company's officers, having been submitted to the Honourable Court of Directors, the Honourable Court have expressed their sentiments on the subject. The sister of the deposed Rajah Mungul Eshwar Nancheyan, having been formally acknowledged, in conformity to the terms of the above-mentioned agreement, to be the proper successor to the zemindary, the District of Ramnad has, with the permission and approbation of your Lordship in Council, been transferred to the authority of the Rany, under conditional terms, for the permanent settlement of the revenue; and it now remains for us to submit to the consideration of your Lordship in Council, the grounds on which we propose to fix the future revenue of Ramnad, on a permanent zemindary tenure.

7. The document furnished by the collector, shows the state of the revenue of Ramnad during the seven years of the British administration. This period of time, includes two years of the management of Mr. Jackson, and three years of the management of Mr. Lushington. — Your Lordship in Council will observe, that during the two first years, the revenue amounted to star pagodas 1,32,800 on the average; that during the third and fourth year, it sunk so low as star pagodas 75,704 on the average; and that during the three last years, the revenue has rapidly increased from star pagodas 65,127. 31. 33, to star pagodas 1,55,625. 14; making the average revenue of the three last years star pagodas 1,54,374. 24. — But the collector justly observes, in our opinion, that neither of these periods of time, taken separately, can be considered to afford a proper criterion for the determination of the permanent revenue. For it might be difficult to assign any adequate reason for the extraordinary depression of the revenue, during the third and fourth year of the British administration; while the extraordinary success which has attended the able administration, during the three last years, might lead to dangerous errors, if adopted as the basis of a fixed settlement. — Although, therefore, the revenue has been punctually realized, during the last three years; and although the result of actual measurement in the last, which was the most productive year, has satisfied the collector that the difference between the computed quantities, and measurement on which it produced, has left to the inhabitants a surreptitious advantage, to the extent of pagodas 30,374. 25. 4; we yet concur in the prevalence of his opinion with respect to the expediency of qualifying the abundant produce of the last years, by including in the calculation of a general average, a portion of the less productive seasons.

8. The average gross collections from Ramnad, during the stated period of the British administration, amounts to star pagodas 1,31,404; from which the average gross disbursement (including the provision of the Runnee) being deducted, the average net revenue has been star pagodas 95,568. — But considering the extraordinary defalcation of the revenue during the third and fourth year, connected with the circumstances now depending in the Supreme Court, we consider the proposition of the collector to be reasonable, for calculating the average revenue on the produce during two years of Mr. Powley's management, during one year of Mr. Jackson's management, and during the three years of Mr. Lushington's management. The result of this calculation, gives a gross average revenue of star pagodas 1,42,101; and we think that the permanent assessment of Ramnad may, on these grounds, be fixed with great safety, according to the usual terms of zemindary assessment in the proportion of two-thirds of the gross revenue upon the average of the above-mentioned six years. — This amount, is something less than the average net revenue received from the province during the whole management of the Company's officers; and it exceeds the amount peshcush paid by the late zemindar, by the sum of star pagodas 33,875. — We accordingly recommend that the revenue to be permanently assessed on the province of Ramnad be fixed at the sum of star pagodas 95,568.

9. Notwithstanding this proposed augmentation of the peshcush formerly paid by the zemindar, we are of opinion that the accounts now submitted to your Lordship in Council furnish abundant proofs of the revenue of the province being adequate to the permanent assessment, on the period of time for which the average is calculated, and included the transitions of authority, and has partaken, to a certain degree, of the effects of the revolutions in the southern provinces. It is further to be observed, that under the institution of the government, the zemindar will be entirely relieved from the military sibberdy; and as the allowance granted for the support of the Rany's has been included in the account of the gross charges deducted provisionally in the calculation of net revenue above stated, we can have no doubt that the zemindar, in the discharge of his duties, will always be found consistent with those principles of moderation and economy on which it is the immediate policy of the British Government to provide for the receipt of the territorial revenue, and for the comfort of those who pay it.

10. The orders of your Lordship in Council for the constitutional institution of the Rany in the possession of the zemindary, having been carried into effect, we have great pleasure in submitting to your Lordship in Council, the report of the acting collector Mr. P. as provision has been made for all the material points of the arrangement, by the engagement of the Nancheyan, it only remains for us to recommend that the permanent property may be furnished to the acting collector, for the purpose of being situated for the general code under which the zemindary has been transferred to the

Special Committee on Government of the Southern Provinces  
5 April 1800.

Special Committee to  
Determine, on Per-  
manent Settlement of  
the Southern Poligars;  
8 April 1861.

11. Your Lordship in Council will have the satisfaction to observe, that your instructions have been carried into effect with great prudence and care by Mr. Parish; and that the adjustment arranged by the acting collector, of the balance of the preceding year, as well as of the account current for the present year, is entirely conformable to our intentions and wishes in this respect.

12. The permanent revenue having been settled, exclusively of the salt revenue, and of the customs, it becomes requisite to provide for the separate administration of those branches of revenue; and we beg leave to recommend that the establishment of servants proposed by the collector, amounting monthly to P. N. pagodas 440. 26. 76, may be confirmed by your Lordship in Council.

13. The collector has recommended that the allowances granted for the support of the deposed poligar and his family, should be defrayed by the Company, as long as the customs shall be collected by the British government; but that when the collection of the internal duties shall have been abolished, the expense of supporting the deposed poligar, be transferred to the Ranny, in consideration of the general benefit which the zemindarry may be expected to derive from the discontinuance of the customs.

14. That the zemindarry will receive the supposed advantage, we have great pleasure in believing to be true; and we should have no hesitation in concurring in the recommendation of the collector, if the question was determinable exclusively by pecuniary considerations; but it is of importance, in our judgment, to refrain from any measure calculated to disturb the idea of permanency, which it is desirable that the Ranny, and the people of Ramnad, should be encouraged to attach to the present arrangement. We therefore recommend that the charge of maintaining the deposed poligar and his family, shall continue to be defrayed by the Honourable Company.

#### SHEVAGUNGA.

15. The circumstances connected with the province of Shevagunga, having been recently brought under the consideration of your Lordship in Council, by the usurpation, rebellion and death of Chinnia Murdoo; it is unnecessary for us to detain your Lordship in Council, further than to observe that Woya Taver, appointed by your Lordship's Proclamation of the 6th July 1861, to be zemindar of Shevagunga, has been instated in the possession of his zemindarry; and has superintended in his own right, the administration of its affairs, since the suppression of the late commotion. It is sufficiently obvious, that during the time when the province of Shevagunga remained under the control of the usurper Murdoo, it has not been practicable for the officers of government to obtain that minute information of the revenues and resources, which, in other instances, has enabled us to submit to your Lordship in Council, conclusive grounds of calculation for the permanent settlement of the revenue. Since the establishment of the rightful zemindar Woya Taver, a sufficient period of time has not elapsed, to enable us to compare the accounts of the productive powers of the country, under the effects of different modes of management.

16. Under this impression, the late collector of poligar peshcush was induced to suggest to us, the expediency of negotiating an arrangement with the present zemindar, for the purpose of transferring, during a limited time, the administration of the revenues of Shevagunga to the hands of the Company's officers, with a view to the ascertainment of the value of the province. We have no doubt that the zemindar would have manifested his gratitude and his confidence, by a ready and even by a cheerful acquiescence in such a plan; but we deemed the object to be obtained, utterly disproportionate to the disadvantage which could not fail, in our judgment, to have been produced, by the agitation of the public mind, in the southern provinces, in consequence of the revocation of the zemindar's authority, so formally established, and so recently proclaimed in the province of Shevagunga.

17. The historical points stated by the late collector Mr. Lushington, with respect to the separation of this district from Ramnad, are calculated to throw considerable light on the relative proportion of the value of those provinces. Additional means of comparison may be drawn from the rate of peshcush paid by those zemindaries respectively, at the time when the poligar countries were transferred to the authority of the British government; and if the grounds are accurate on which we have calculated the gross revenues of Ramnad, at star pagodas 1,42,105, on the average produce of six years, much credit appears to be due to the correctness of the accounts furnished by the present zemindar of Shevagunga, for the year 1851, which state the gross revenue at star pagodas 1,35,620, exclusively of the salt revenue.

18. Mr. Lushington, having bestowed every leisure moment to the correction of all the statements and information received at different times since he became collector; and having maturely considered the statement of the actual resources and collections in Shevagunga during the last year, has recommended that the permanent assessment of Shevagunga should be fixed at the annual sum of star pagodas 75,000.

19. Although the state of the information, which we are enabled to submit to your Lordship in Council, is neither so mature, nor so extensive as we undoubtedly consider to be desirable; yet, comparing the inconvenience of further delay, with respect to this zemindarry, at the time of arranging the permanent assessment of the other southern poligars, we are of opinion that the diffidence and intrigue so to be apprehended during the prosecution of further investigation, are liable to be attended with more inconvenience to the interest of the zemindar of Shevagunga, than can be compensated by the probable result of further investigation. We concur therefore in the opinion of the late collector, that to protract the settlement of this zemindarry, is inadvisable; and we think that abundant reason exists, in the facts and collateral information stated by Mr. Lushington, for believing that the proposed

proposed assessment, while it provides for an augmentation of the public revenue to the extent of 50 per cent. on the former peshcush, is entirely compatible with the revenues of the Zemindarry. The amount considerably exceeds the proportion of two-thirds of the assessment proposed to be fixed for Ramnad; but the grounds of the disproportion, are satisfactorily explained in the Report of the collector, and confirmed by the relative proportion of the former peshcush; for your Lordship will observe, that the augmentation of the proposed assessment in Ramnad, is from star pagodas 60,857 to star pagodas 94,733, which is in the proportion of 55½ per cent. to the former peshcush; and in Shevagunga, the proposed augmentation is from star pagodas 50,000, to star pagodas 75,000, which is in the proportion of 50 per cent. to the former peshcush:

20. On these grounds, we have the honour to recommend to your Lordship in Council, that the permanent assessment of Shevagunga may be fixed, and that a sunnud of permanent property may accordingly be prepared, for the purpose of fixing the zemindar, without further doubt or suspense, in the possession of his zemindarry.

21. The foregoing assessment is, exclusive of the salt and of the sayar, stated by the late collector, at star pagodas 7,610; which being added to the permanent assessment, the future revenue from this zemindarry, will amount to star pagodas 82,610, being an augmentation, in the proportion of more than 65 per cent. to the former peshcush.

22. If it should please your Lordship in Council to adopt this recommendation for the permanent assessment of Shevagunga, we shall instruct the acting collector to provide for the separate collection of the customs and salt revenue; and to furnish a kistbundy, for the purpose of being inserted in the sunnud of the zemindar.

#### TINNEVELLY.

23. The several Reports from Mr. Lushington, the late collector of Poligar Peshcush, submitted to your Lordship in Council (as noted in the margin) described so particularly the whole course of that reform, which has been happily effected among the poligars of Tinnevely, that it must be superfluous for us to revive the subject.

24. Mr. Lushington's Report of the 31st January 1800, and that which we have now the honour of submitting to your Lordship in Council, with the documents which accompanied them, contain, in our opinion, ample materials for determining the amount of the revenue to be permanently assessed on the pollams of Tinnevely; and we have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship in Council, that the use of those materials has been considerably improved, and extended, by the personal explanations and suggestions of the collector, since his arrival at the presidency.

25. The statements now furnished by the collector, confirm with sufficient precision, after the experience of three years, the accounts submitted by him in the year 1800, on which the existing settlement of the poligar revenue was founded, with the permission and approbation of your Lordship in Council. On this point, we have particular pleasure in requesting the attention of your Lordship in Council to the sentiments stated in the present Report of the collector—With respect to the terms of that settlement, Mr. Lushington observes, “that the acceptance of them by the poligars, though reluctant, was sincere, “will have been demonstrated by my progressive Reports for nearly three years, and by “the circumstance which I have the satisfaction of stating; that the increased jumma of the “last two years, was completely collected in the course of them.”

“Every principal poligar, since the establishment of the increased assessment, has been “faithful to his allegiance, and punctual in his public payments: nor can it be justly concluded that their obedience has arisen solely from the terrors of military power, or their “punctuality, from any superabounding resources. The period which has elapsed since “the commencement of this reform, has not been wanting in temptations to turbulence; “while the statements convey the best evidence procurable by any other process than “that of actual measurement, of the extent of their revenues.”

26. Under these circumstances, we can entertain no doubt that the southern poligars are in a condition to receive the permanent possession of their lands on zemindarry tenure; and Mr. Lushington informs us, “that the nature of the permanent settlement, and of the “system of law and security, by which it is to be enjoyed by themselves, and handed “down to their posterity, has been repeatedly explained to the poligars; and they now “went with anxious solicitude, the confirmation of a blessing, which is to soften to “the remembrance of former sacrifices.”

27. It only remains therefore for your Lordship in Council to complete the reform of the poligar administration in the province of Tinnevely, by determining the amount of the permanent assessment; and in proposing that amount to your Lordship in Council, it is necessary to explain, that our judgment has been governed by the actual resources from the poligars, the means of supporting military establishments, and the policy of combining, with that privation, the enjoyment of domestic comfort, and maintenance of public respectability.

28. Without pursuing, in this place, the detailed calculations arising from this, we request to refer your Lordship in Council generally to the materials furnished by Mr. Lushington, and, in a particular manner, to the statement which we have prepared, for the purpose of exhibiting at one view, the operation of that principle in the permanent assessment of the pollams of Tinnevely.

29. The statement shows the valuation of the several pollams, at four different periods of time, with a general average drawn from the whole, which we consider to be a criterion of the present value of the respective pollams; the amount of the fixed jumma as it is stated in the schedule of 1799, appears to have been nearly disproportioned to the computed resources of the poligars: the increase of peshcush, proposed at a

Special Commission  
Government, on  
the Southern Poll  
5 April 1800.

Special Committee to  
consider the  
Permanent Settlement of  
the Southern Poligars;  
8 April 1863.

11. Your Lordship in Council will have the satisfaction to observe, that your instructions have been carried into effect with great prudence and care by Mr. Parish; and that the adjustment arranged by the acting collector, of the balance of the preceding year, as well as of the account current for the present year, is entirely conformable to our intentions and wishes in this respect.

12. The permanent revenue having been settled, exclusively of the salt revenue, and of the customs, it becomes requisite to provide for the separate administration of those branches of revenue; and we beg leave to recommend that the establishment of servants proposed by the collector, amounting monthly to P. N. pagodas 440. 26. 76, may be confirmed by your Lordship in Council.

13. The collector has recommended that the allowances granted for the support of the deposed poligar and his family, should be defrayed by the Company, as long as the customs shall be collected by the British government; but that when the collection of the internal duties shall have been abolished, the expense of supporting the deposed poligar, be transferred to the Ranny, in consideration of the general benefit which the zemindarry may be expected to derive from the discontinuance of the customs.

14. That the zemindarry will receive the supposed advantage, we have great pleasure in believing to be true; and we should have no hesitation in concurring in the recommendation of the collector, if the question was determinable exclusively by pecuniary considerations; but it is of importance, in our judgment, to refrain from any measure calculated to disturb the idea of permanency, which it is desirable that the Ranny, and the people of Ramnad, should be encouraged to attach to the present arrangement. We therefore recommend that the charge of maintaining the deposed poligar and his family, shall continue to be defrayed by the Honourable Company.

#### SHEVAGUNGA.

15. The circumstances connected with the province of Shevagunga, having been recently brought under the consideration of your Lordship in Council, by the usurpation, rebellion and death of Chinna Murdoo; it is unnecessary for us to detain your Lordship in Council, further than to observe that Weya Taver, appointed by your Lordship's Proclamation of the 6th July 1861, to be zemindar of Shevagunga, has been instated in the possession of his zemindarry; and has superintended in his own right, the administration of its affairs, since the suppression of the late commotion. It is sufficiently obvious, that during the time when the province of Shevagunga remained under the controul of the usurper Murdoo, it has not been practicable for the officers of government to obtain that minute information of the revenues and resources, which, in other instances, has enabled us to submit to your Lordship in Council, conclusive grounds of calculation for the permanent settlement of the revenue. Since the establishment of the regular zemindar Woya Taver, a sufficient period of time has not elapsed, to enable us to compare the accounts of the productive powers of the country, under the effects of different modes of management.

16. Under this impression, the late collector of poligar peshcush was induced to suggest to us, the expediency of negotiating an arrangement with the present zemindar, for the purpose of transferring, during a limited time, the administration of the revenues of Shevagunga to the hands of the Company's officers, with a view to the ascertainment of the value of the province. We have no doubt that the zemindar would have manifested his gratitude and his confidence, by a ready and even by a cheerful acquiescence in such a plan; but we deemed the object to be obtained, utterly disproportionate to the disadvantage which could not fail, in our judgment, to have been produced, by the agitation of the public mind, in the southern provinces, in consequence of the revocation of the zemindar's authority, so formally established, and so recently proclaimed in the province of Shevagunga.

17. The historical points stated by the late collector Mr. Lushington, with respect to the separation of this district from Ramnad, are calculated to throw considerable light on the relative proportion of the value of those provinces. Additional means of comparison may be drawn from the rate of peshcush paid by those zemindaries respectively, at the time when the poligar countries were transferred to the authority of the British government; and if the grounds are accurate on which we have calculated the gross revenue of Ramnad, at star pagodas 1,42,105, on the average produce of six years, much credit appears to be due to the correctness of the accounts furnished by the present zemindar of Shevagunga, for the year 1861, which state the gross revenue at star pagodas 1,25,626, exclusively of the salt revenue.

18. Mr. Lushington, having bestowed every leisure moment to the correction of all the statements and information received at different times since he became collector; having maturely considered the statement of the actual resources and collections in Shevagunga during the last year, has recommended that the permanent assessment of the poligars should be fixed at the annual sum of star pagodas 75,000.

19. Although the state of the information, which we are enabled to submit to your Lordship in Council, is neither so mature, nor so extensive as we undoubtedly consider to be desirable, yet, considering the inconvenience of further delay, with respect to this zemindarry, and at the same time arranging the permanent assessment of the other southern poligars, we are of opinion that the diffidence and intrigue to be apprehended during the prosecution of further inquiries, are liable to be attended with more inconvenience to the interest of the zemindar of Shevagunga, than can be compensated by the probable result of further investigation. We concur therefore in the opinion of the late collector, that to protract the settlement of this zemindarry, is undesirable; and we think that abundant reason exists, in the historical and collateral information stated by Mr. Lushington, for believing that the proposed



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proposed assessment, while it provides for an augmentation of the public revenue to the extent of 50 per cent. on the former peshcush, is entirely compatible with the revenues of the zemindarry. The amount considerably exceeds the proportion of two-thirds of the assessment proposed to be fixed for Ramnad: but the grounds of the disproportion, are satisfactorily explained in the Report of the collector, and confirmed by the relative proportion of the former peshcush; for your Lordship will observe, that the augmentation of the proposed assessment in Ramnad, is from star pagodas 60,857 to star pagodas 94,733, which is in the proportion of 55½ per cent. to the former peshcush; and in Shevagunga, the proposed augmentation is from star pagodas 50,000, to star pagodas 75,000, which is in the proportion of 50 per cent. to the former peshcush:

20. On these grounds, we have the honour to recommend to your Lordship in Council, that the permanent assessment of Shevagunga may be fixed, and that a sunnud of permanent property may accordingly be prepared, for the purpose of fixing the zemindar, without further doubt or suspense, in the possession of his zemindarry.

21. The foregoing assessment is, exclusive of the salt and of the sayer, stated by the late collector, at star pagodas 7,610; which being added to the permanent assessment, the future revenue from this zemindarry, will amount to star pagodas 82,610, being an augmentation, in the proportion of more than 65 per cent. to the former peshcush.

22. If it should please your Lordship in Council to adopt this recommendation for the permanent assessment of Shevagunga, we shall instruct the acting collector to provide for the separate collection of the customs and salt revenue; and to furnish a kistbundy, for the purpose of being inserted in the sunnud of the zemindar.

#### TINNEVELLY.

23. The several Reports from Mr. Lushington, the late collector of Poligar Peshcush, submitted to your Lordship in Council (as noted in the margin) described so particularly the whole course of that reform, which has been happily effected among the poligars of Tinnevelly, that it must be superfluous for us to revive the subject.

24. Mr. Lushington's Report of the 31st January 1800, and that which we have now the honour of submitting to your Lordship in Council, with the documents which accompanied them, contain, in our opinion, ample materials for determining the amount of the revenue to be permanently assessed on the pollans of Tinnevelly; and we have the satisfaction of informing your Lordship in Council, that the use of those materials has been considerably improved, and extended, by the personal explanations and suggestions of the collector, since his arrival at the presidency.

25. The statements now furnished by the collector, confirm with sufficient precision, after the experience of three years, the accounts submitted by him in the year 1800, on which the existing settlement of the poligar revenue was founded, with the permission and approbation of your Lordship in Council. On this point, we have particular pleasure in requesting the attention of your Lordship in Council to the sentiments stated in the present Report of the collector:—"With respect to the terms of that settlement, Mr. Lushington observes, "that the acceptance of them by the poligars, though reluctant, was sincere, "will have been demonstrated by my progressive Reports for nearly three years, and by "the circumstance which I have the satisfaction of stating; that the increased jumma of the "last two years, was completely collected in the course of them."

"Every principal poligar, since the establishment of the increased assessment, has been "faithful to his allegiance, and punctual in his public payments; nor can it be justly concluded that their obedience has arisen solely from the terrors of military power, or their "punctuality, from any superabounding resources. The period which has elapsed since "the commencement of this reform, has not been wanting in temptations to turbulence; "while the statements convey the best evidence procurable by any other process than "that of actual measurement, of the extent of their revenues."

26. Under these circumstances, we can entertain no doubt that the southern poligars are in a condition to receive the permanent possession of their lands on zemindarry tenure; and Mr. Lushington informs us, "that the nature of the permanent settlement, and of the "system of law and security, by which it is to be enjoyed by themselves, and handed "down to their posterity, has been repeatedly explained to the poligars; and they now "await with anxious solicitude, the confirmation of a blessing, which is to soften to "the remembrance of former sacrifices."

27. It only remains therefore for your Lordship in Council to complete the reformation of the poligar administration in the province of Tinnevelly, by determining the amount of the permanent assessment; and in proposing that amount to your Lordship in Council, we deem it necessary to explain, that our judgment has been governed by the new reasoning from the poligars, the means of supporting military establishments, and policy of combining, with that privation, the enjoyment of domestic comfort, maintenance of public respectability.

28. Without pursuing, in this place, the detailed calculations arising from the same, we request to refer your Lordship in Council generally to the materials furnished by Mr. Lushington, and, in a particular manner, to the statement which we have prepared, for the purpose of exhibiting at one view, the operation of that principle in the permanent assessment of the pollans of Tinnevelly.

29. The statement shows the valuation of the several pollans, at four different periods, with a general average, drawn from the whole, which we consider to be a criterion of the present value of the respective pollans; the amount of the fixed jumma as it is stated in the schedule of 1792, appears to have been utterly disproportionate to the computed resources of the poligars: the increase of peshcush, proposed at an



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time by Mr. Powney, compared with the amount actually collected by the late collector and with the amount of the permanent assessment recommended by Mr. Lushington, is elucidated by the centage produced, by those modes of calculation; and the whole forms, in our opinion, a satisfactory foundation for determining the amount which we now propose, with the sanction of your Lordship in Council to establish.

30. The divisions of the general statement, exhibit the several pollams in the different conditions in which they have been placed, during the course of the recent events in the southern provinces. The eleven pollams of Ettiapore, Shevagherry, Wootannally, Chokumputty, Pareyoor, Talavencottah, Cadumboor, Panvaly, Gollaputty, Zailmurreh and Allugapoor, have not been subjected to the immediate management of British officers; the former peshcush paid by those poligars, being compared with their computed resources, appears to have been as low as ten per cent., and in no instance to have exceeded thirty-three per cent. The permanent assessment of those pollams proposed by us, is, with few exceptions, less than the peshcush settled, or the revenue collected by the collectors in the year 1800. That which we recommended for the large pollams, varies, in its proportion to the computed resources, from 54 to 57 per cent.; and that which we recommend for the smaller pollams (the expense of management being, relatively, less in the large than in the small pollams), varies from 41 to 49 per cent. of the computed resources. According to the mode of calculation adopted by us, the permanent assessment of the land revenue, in the eleven pollams above enumerated, amounts to star pagodas 54,070: the salt revenue and sayer, is computed at star pagodas 3,388. 37. 29, making the future amount of gross resources from these pollams, star pagodas 57,458. 37. 29; which sum exceeds the former peshcush, by star pagodas 33,179. 7. 29.

31. The poligars of Nadavacoorchy, Maniachy, Soorunday, Chinneelgoody, Mailmunleh, Autungherry, Sundyoor, Woorcaud, Singumputty, Manarcottah and Avadyapoor, having professed to feel a conviction, that the resources of their pollams were unequal to the payment of the increased peshcush, proposed the surrender of their pollams into the hands of the collector, for the purpose of ascertaining the actual condition of these lands. They were accordingly subjected to the immediate management of the Company's officers; and the information on which we are now enabled to propose the permanent assessment of those lands, may be considered to be the result of a fair experiment.

32. On the result of this actual experiment, with respect to the seven first pollams, it appears that the revenue estimated by the collector, in his Report of the 31st January 1800, exceeded the amount actually produced, by the sum of 529 Cully chuckrams; but the local considerations applicable to those several pollams (for which we request to refer your Lordship in Council to the Reports of the collector,) have induced us to concur in his opinion, that these poligars will be able to discharge the proposed jumma, with ease to themselves, and with justice to the people.

33. The statement proposed by us, exhibits the same points of information, with respect to the seven pollams in question, as with regard to the eleven pollams which had not been brought under the immediate management of the Company's officers. The average valuation of those pollams, taken from the valuation of four different periods of time, amounts to star pagodas 14,234. 9. 20; the former peshcush amounted to star pagodas 5,260. 18; and the centage of the peshcush to the average valuation, varied from 23 to 50: The information acquired under the immediate management of Mr. Lushington, has enabled him to propose a more equal rate of assessment; and the permanent revenue which we in consequence recommended to be fixed on those seven pollams, bears the proportion of 60 per cent. to their gross resources respectively. The proposed permanent jumma amounts to star pagodas 7,210, to which the salt revenue and sayer, amounting to star pagodas 271. 37. 62, being added, the future revenue from the seven pollams, will be star pagodas 7,481. 37. 62, which is an increase of the former peshcush, to the extent of star pagodas 2,221. 19. 62.

34. It appears from the accounts furnished by the collector, that the gross revenue of the small pollams of Woorcaud and Singumputty, amounted, under his immediate administration, the former to star pagodas 5,675. 22, and the latter, to star pagodas 3,749. 4. The resources of those poligars having been considerably diminished by the resumption of the cawelly, the collector has recommended, that the two villages, which they have possessed during a period of sixty years, subject to a certain rent, and an indefinite nuzzer, should be confirmed to them, on the usual terms of zemindarry tenure. The peshcush of Woorcaud, amounted to star pagodas 169. 12, which was in the proportion of 2 per cent. to the gross revenue. The permanent jumma, which we propose to assess on the pollam of Woorcaud, amounted to star pagodas 3,783. 33; and that, we propose to assess on the pollam of Singumputty, amounts to pagodas 2,366; the former, being in the proportion of 66 per cent., and the latter, 66 per cent. to the gross revenues of these pollams, and affording a permanent increase of revenue, comparatively with the former peshcush, to the extent of star pagodas 5,906.

35. For the reasons stated in the Report of the collector, we concur in his opinion, and accordingly submit to your Lordship in Council, our recommendation, that the two villages of Pareycollam and Ammanacollam, which were resumed with the cawelly lands in the year 1800, but which appear to have long been in the possession of the family of the poligars of Avadiapoor, may be restored to him. In this event, the assessment of his pollam on the teerwa of Rsly 1200, according to the principle of zemindarry assessment, amounts to star pagodas 1,270. 19. 22; but in consideration of the local circumstances described by the collector, with regard to this small pollam, we recommend that the permanent assessment be fixed at star pagodas 1,000, which sum bears the proportion of

of 47½ per cent. to the gross revenue of the pollam, and affords an augmentation, comparatively with the former peshcush, of star pagodas 320.

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36. The lands forcibly wrested from the pollam of Collarputty, by the predecessor of the present poligar of Manarcottah, having been restored to their former possessors, the gross revenue of Manarcottah, has been stated by the collector, on the result of his immediate management, at star pag<sup>a</sup> 2,480. 30. 27, of which the peshcush formerly payable by this poligar, amounted to star pag<sup>a</sup> 1,411. 4. 53. The mode of assessing the permanent revenue in this pollam, proposed by the collector, appears to us to be entirely reasonable, and we accordingly recommend that an allowance of 10 per cent. being made for the charges of management, the jumma be fixed in the proportion of two-thirds of the remaining gross revenue. According to this plan, the permanent jumma will amount to star pag<sup>a</sup> 1,488. 18. 16, which bears the proportion of 60 per cent. to the total gross revenue of the pollam; and affords a small augmentation of resource, comparatively with the former peshcush, of star pag<sup>a</sup> 77. 13. 43.

37. It is sufficiently known to your Lordship in Council, that the pollam of Shatoor has afforded at different times, a subject of much interesting enquiry. An able and minute Report by Mr. Harris (the present collector of Tanjore) is on record; and the experience since acquired by Mr. Lushington, in his immediate management of that pollam, has enabled him to state his opinion of the resources, with confidence and accuracy. For the observations of that gentleman on the present state of the pollam, we request to refer your Lordship to the Report.

38. According to Mr. Lushington's present valuation, the gross revenue is stated at star pag<sup>a</sup> 5,971; the former peshcush amounted to star pag<sup>a</sup> 2,822. 8; the peshcush received during Mr. Lushington's management, amounted to star pag<sup>a</sup> 3,333. 14. We think the mode proposed by the collector, for the future assessment of the land, to be entirely reasonable, by allowing ten per cent. of the gross revenue for the charge of management, and by fixing the assessment in the proportion of two-thirds of the remaining resources. According to this principle, the future permanent assessment of the Shatoor pollam, will amount to star pag<sup>a</sup> 3,383; and we recommend that rate, may be confirmed by your Lordship in Council. It is in the proportion of 56½ per cent. to the gross revenue, and affords a permanent increase of resource, comparatively with the former peshcush, to the extent of star pag<sup>a</sup> 560. 36.

39. The insurrection of Cawnia Naig; the distraction introduced in consequence, into his pollam of Sapatoor; his subsequent apprehension and capital punishment, are matters fully recorded on the proceedings of the time, and are succinctly recited in the Report of the collector, now submitted to your Lordship in Council. For the reasons stated in the Report, we entirely concur in the opinion of the collector, that it is now advisable to establish this pollam, upon the terms of a zemindary tenure; and we recommend that Warra Cawnia Naig, the second son and surviving heir of the late respected poligar, be constituted zemindar of Sapatoor.—This measure will, in the judgment of the collector, be extremely acceptable to the people of the pollam, who are stated to have held the late rebel poligar, in as great a degree of detestation, as they respected his father.

40. Although this pollam suffered considerable injury during the rebellion of the late poligar, the collector considers it to be capable of extensive improvement, from the quantity of dry grain land at present uncultivated, and from the return of the inhabitants expelled by the violence of the late poligar. The affairs of the pollam during the immediate management of the collector, have been liable to much perturbation; and an estimate of the produce taken during that period of time, may, we think, be justly considered to exclude the apprehension of an excessive valuation. We concur therefore in the opinion of the collector, that the permanent assessment should be fixed, in the proportion of two-thirds of the gross revenue collected during the immediate management of Mr. Lushington. The gross revenue being stated by the collector at star pag<sup>a</sup> 3,875, the permanent assessment, on the principle we have proposed, will in future amount to star pag<sup>a</sup> 2,584, which we accordingly recommend, may be confirmed by your Lordship in Council. This sum is less than the former peshcush by star pagodas 623; but as the cawelly and sayer (which will now remain in the hands of government) formed a large portion of the revenue of the Sapatoor poligar, the amount of the former peshcush was not determinable by the amount of the land revenue.

41. The amount of the sayer and salt revenue to be drawn from the six pollams of Woorcaud, Singumputty, Manarcottah, Avadiapoor, Shatoor, and Sapatoor, amount to star pagodas 441. 19. 1, which being added to the permanent jumma to be in assessed on those pollams, the total gross income will amount to star pagodas 15,365. 1, which is an increase, comparatively with the former peshcush, to the extent of star pagodas 8,474. 13.

42. In consequence of the entire resumption of the cawel, the resources of the pollam of Collumcondun were so much curtailed, that it pleased your Lordship in Council to quish the small tribute formerly received from him, and to confer on him a small portion of nunjah land, as the means of supporting himself and his family. The former peshcush paid by him, amounted to star pagodas 203. 8; and we recommend that a deed of permanent property may be granted to him, for the possession of his present lands, at a nominal peshcush.

43. In consequence of the rebellion of the poligars, the six pollams of Panjalamcouchy, Colatore, Cadulgoody, Yellarumpung, Colarputty, and Naglepore, were sequestered, in conformity to the orders of your Lordship in Council. It further pleased your Lordship in Council to direct that the pollams of Panjalamcouchy, Colatore, and Cadulgoody, should be declared to be, for ever forfeited by the families of the late poligars; and that the same should be divided, for the purpose of conferring a distinguished reward, and a perpet-

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mark of public favour, on the poligars of Etiapoor, Maniachy, and Mailmundeh, for their particularly good conduct, fidelity, and assistance, during the late rebellion. According to that intention, the lands of Panjalumcouchy, with the exception of two magauns, have been transferred to the poligar of Etiapoor, and incorporated with his zemindarry; the two southern magauns of Panjalumcouchy, have been transferred to the poligar of Maniachy, and the lands of Colatore and Cadulgoody, have been incorporated in the zemindarry of Mailmundeh.

44. The poligars in question, received these proofs of the approbation of government, with the demonstrations of respect due to such a concession; but we apprehend, from the present Report of the collector, that the terms on which it was at that time, proposed to establish the tenure of the transferred lands, were more calculated to impress on the minds of the poligars, the expediency of the arrangement, with respect to the management of these pollams, than to excite those sentiments of gratitude, which ought to be produced by a distinguished mark of public approbation.

45. We consider this result, to be totally repugnant to the views and sentiments of your Lordship in Council, with respect to the distribution of the forfeited lands; and are of opinion that it will be highly conducive to the satisfaction of the public mind, in the southern provinces, and to the confidence of the poligars, in the principles of the permanent settlement, that a portion of the pecuniary advantage to be derived from the confiscation of the rebellious pollams, should be converted into a substantial and honourable reward of allegiance.

46. The convulsions in the rebellious pollams, have prevented the collector from completing the information respecting the value of those lands, in the satisfactory mode observed in the other pollams. The valuation of Panjalumcouchy, is stated by Mr. Lushington, for the year 1802, at star pagodas 23,472, of which the former pesheush amounted to star pagodas 6,208. The increased pesheush recommended by Mr. Powney, amounted to star pagodas 14,111; and that which is now recommended by Mr. Lushington, in the actual state of the lands of Panjalumcouchy, amounts to star pagodas 12,185, and bears the proportion of 51 per cent. to the valuation of the gross revenue.

47. The valuation of Colatoor, is stated by the collector for the year 1802, at star pagodas 1,961, of which the former pesheush amounted to star pagodas 564. The increased pesheush recommended by Mr. Lushington, in the actual circumstances of the lands of Colatoor, amounts to star pagodas 1,046, which bears the proportion of 53 per cent. to the valuation of the gross revenues.

48. The valuation of Cadulgoody, for the year 1802, is stated at star pagodas 4,259, by the collector; the increased pesheush recommended by Mr. Powney, amounted to star pagodas 2,257; and the assessment recommended by Mr. Lushington, on the actual condition of that pollam, amounts to star pagodas 2,271, which bears the proportion of 53 per cent. to the gross valuation.

49. The permanent jumma proposed by Mr. Lushington, for the pollams of Panjalumcouchy, Colatoor, and Cadulgoody, will in his judgment, secure the objects intended by the distribution of those lands: but your Lordship in Council will observe, that Mr. Lushington has seen "the havoc occasioned by the sword, and by the devastation of contending bodies in arms throughout those villages; and he knows, also, that many of the inhabitants who settled themselves to their satisfaction in the circar lands at that period, are never likely to return to their original villages."

50. If the object of your Lordship in Council, in distributing the lands of the forfeited pollams, appeared to be limited to the assessment of a reasonable jumma, we should concur in the moderate sum recommended by the collector: but, under the peculiar considerations which attach to the case, we are of opinion, that it is extremely advisable to reduce the assessment to be imposed on the forfeited lands, and to commence the system of permanent revenue in the southern countries, by transmitting to the poligars and to their descendants, a memorable example of public justice, in the punishment of rebellion, contrasted with that of gratuitous generosity, in the reward of fidelity.

51. On these grounds, we recommend that the permanent assessment on the distributed lands of Panjalumcouchy, Colatoor and Cadulgoody, be fixed in the proportion of 30 per cent. to the gross valuation of 1802; and that the assessment of Panjalumcouchy be accordingly settled at star pagodas 7,042; that of Colatoor, at star pagodas 589; and that of Cadulgoody, at star pagodas 1,277.

For the reasons stated in the Report of the collector, we recommend, that on the final distribution of the sequestered lands of Panjalumcouchy, the village of Poodiumpatoor be incorporated in the zemindarry of Etiapoor, and the village of Carcoochy, in the zemindarry of Maniachy.

It should please your Lordship in Council to acquiesce in this recommendation, and to your judgment, the expediency of announcing to the poligars of Etiapoor, Maniachy, and Mailmundeh, the resolution of your Lordship in Council, to reward their attachment to the British government, in a manner more formal and impressive, than by the ordinary channel of communication through the collector.

54. The salt revenue and sayer derivable from the lands of Panjalumcouchy, Colatoor and Cadulgoody, amount to star pagodas 716. 14. 69, which being added to the proposed permanent assessment of the revenue, the total resources from these lands, will amount to star pagodas 9,624. 14. 69, which is an increase, comparatively with the former pesheush, of

55. In the three sequestered pollams of Naglepore, Yellarumpunny, and Colarputty, the produce of the lands appears to have been correctly ascertained, during the three years of the collector's immediate management; and we concur in the rate of assessment which Mr. Lushington has proposed to fix on those lands, as the permanent revenue, by deducting 25 per cent. from the gross valuation.

56. According

56. According to the detailed accounts furnished by the collector, the gross valuation of Yellarumpunny, is stated at star pagodas 7,194, of which the former peshcush amounted to star pagodas 3,386, the permanent assessment which we propose to fix on the lands, amount to star pagodas 5,396; which is an augmentation of resource, to the extent of star pagodas 2,010, comparatively with the former peshcush.

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57. The valuation of Colarputty, states the gross revenue at star pagodas 6,313, of which the former peshcush amounted to star pagodas 4,735, which is an augmentation of public resource, to the extent of star pagodas 1,578, comparatively with the former peshcush.

58. We recommend to your Lordship in Council, that the assessment of revenue on the lands of Yellarumpunny, Colarputty, and Naglepoor, be permanently fixed, at the rates above mentioned; and that the collector be instructed to advertise the lands for sale by public auction.

59. The amount of sayer and of salt revenue, in the pollams of Yellarumpunny, Colarputty, and Naglepoor, is star pagodas 1,152, which being added to the land revenue, the total increase from those lands, will be star pagodas 5,373.

60. Mr. Lushington's general acquaintance with the state of the revenues under this presidency, and his successful experience in the practical administration of them, during the last four years, in the province of Tinnevely, entitle his opinions to the greatest degree of respect; and as we have had the most satisfactory proofs of the zeal with which he has devoted his labour and talents to the public service, we deem it to be our duty to inform your Lordship in Council, that the information submitted to us by that gentleman, has been satisfactorily digested; and that in the opinions which he has suggested for our consideration, he has manifested an intimate knowledge of the principles and operation of the system of permanent revenue.

61. Upon a review of the whole arrangement submitted to your Lordship in Council, we have the honour to observe, that the vigorous measures adopted for the subjugation of the poligars of Tinnevely, Shevagunga, and Rampad, appear to have been effectual; and that the firmness and perseverance with which those measures have been pursued, have actually produced that change in the state of the provinces, which was indispensably requisite to convert the ferocious and turbulent character of the poligar tenure, into the peaceful and beneficial condition of zemindar. Under the former description, these valuable lands contributed the sum of pagodas 1,68,304, to the purposes of general government, whilst the maintenance of their armed retainers, instead of contributing to the preservation of internal tranquillity, demanded a constant and vigilant attention to the means of augmenting the regular force stationed in the southern provinces. Under the proposed plan of settling the Pollams, the permanent assessment of the lands, which we have proposed, combined with the resumption of the cawelly, which has been already carried into effect, will be attended with an augmentation of the public resources, to the extent of star pagodas 1,76,378 per annum; while the necessary operation of the change, by directing the attention of the zemindars to the improvement of agriculture and the arts of peace, must daily tend to diminish the former jealousy of their military condition, and to discharge the government from the expense of those armaments, which have been repeatedly attended with heavy disbursements of the public treasury, and with severe loss of its soldiers and subjects. Impressed with these sentiments, it is with peculiar satisfaction that we direct the attention of your Lordship in Council to the concluding declaration, which the superintendence of the southern provinces, during the eventful period of the last four years, has enabled the collector to pronounce with confidence, "That nothing appears to be wanting to consolidate the foundations of internal order and peace, but the establishment of the settlement recommended, the abolition of the customs, and the regulation of the police."

"By the energy and justice of government (the collector proceeds to observe), the rebellions, have been subdued; the oppressed, have been upheld and exalted; the obedient have been liberally rewarded; and the extinction of a divided authority, has restored the fairest province of the Carnatic, from an acknowledged state of anarchy and confusion, to a state of subordination and prosperity."

62. The immediate cause of this beneficial change, is the permanent settlement of the revenue, on which we trust your Lordship will signify your determination, at an early period of time; the abolition of the customs, we have no doubt, will be highly advantageous to the interests of the southern countries; but until the advantages of the intended change shall have been attained, and until sufficient security shall have been established against the exaction of the inland duties in another form, it will be premature, in our judgment to relinquish so considerable a portion of the public income: And with regard to the establishment of an efficient police, we consider it to be dependent on the institution of zillah courts; an institution which the southern pollams and zemindarries will, in our judgment, indispensably require, as soon as your Lordship in Council may have settled the future revenue of those lands on a permanent foundation.

We have the honour to be, with great respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble servants,

Fort St. George,  
5th April 1803.

W. PETRIE.  
J. WEBBE.

## STATEMENT ENCLOSED IN REPORT

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
NAMES of the POLLAMS.	NAMES of the POLIGARS.	Number of Villages in each Pollam.	Total of the Pollams, as estimated by Mr. Landon.	Value of Pollams, as estimated by Mr. Powney.	Value of the Pollams, as estimated by Mr. Lushington, on the 31 <sup>st</sup> Jan. 1860.	Value of the Pollams, as estimated by Mr. Lushington, on the 1 <sup>st</sup> Sept. 1860.	Average of Columns 4, 5, 6, and 7.
THE ZEMINDARRY OF RAMNAD	Sathoputti Rane Mungle Isevery Nautchyar	2,152	S. Pag. F. C.	S. Pag. F. C.	S. Pag. F. C.	S. Pag. F. C.	S. Pag. F. C.
THE ZEMINDARRY OF SHEVAGUNGA	Mootoo Visia Ragouada Gawoory wulla Worria Taver	1,937	- - -	- - -	- - -	1,42,100 0 0	- - -
UNASSUMED POLLAMS OF TINNEVELLY:		4,089	- - -	- - -	- - -	2,67,726 0 0	- - -
1. ETTIAPOOR	Ettappah Naick	110	24,147 35 0	24,054 6 0	24,053 33 0	24,166 0 0	24,105 24 1
2. SHEVAGERRY	Varagona Ramala Vanien	103	28,888 32 0	33,431 12 0	35,666 24 0	35,777 0 0	33,705 24 1
3. WOOTAMALLY	Mudappah Taven	61	15,042 18 0	15,042 18 0	15,042 18 0	15,000 0 0	15,021 37 1
4. CHOCUMPUTTY	Vellengapooly Taven	55	15,017 28 0	13,450 11 0	13,888 32 0	13,323 0 0	13,722 19 0
5. PAREYOOR	Tombichy Naick	24	15,777 28 0	7,809 12 0	7,222 8 0	6,600 0 0	7,799 0 0
6. TALAVENCOTTAH	Indra Talaven	5	1,823 12 0	1,823 10 0	1,666 24 0	1,777 0 0	1,772 27 4
7. CADUMBOOR	Taddeija Talaven	14	2,755 24 0	2,700 4 0	2,222 8 0	2,666 0 0	2,555 0 0
8. PAUVALY	Auvalluppa Naick	14	1,944 16 0	1,944 16 0	1,944 16 0	1,914 0 0	1,924 16 0
9. GOLLAPUTTY	Gylaluppa Naick	9	2,807 18 0	2,751 17 0	2,222 8 0	1,904 0 0	2,411 14 0
10. YAILMURRAH	Yerra Chinnama Naick	20	2,758 32 0	2,758 32 0	1,944 16 0	2,222 8 0	2,555 4 0
11. ALLAGAPPOORY	Ketta Cerry Vanien	7	615 12 0	615 12 0	388 32 0	610 0 0	571 20 0
ASSUMED POLLAMS, &c. (NOT SEQUESTERED).		425	1,03,210 3 0	1,06,060 35 0	1,07,263 2 0	98,101 0 0	1,03,675 7 0
NADAVACOORCHY	Cootalla Taven	11	1,442 0 0	2,038 8 0	1,666 24 0	1,515 0 0	1,605 18 4
MANIACHY	Chockh Talaven	9	2,651 18 0	2,444 30 0	2,500 0 0	1,515 0 0	2,487 23 0
SOORUNBY	Shaulava Taven	7	1,788 32 0	2,558 32 0	1,388 32 0	405 0 0	1,185 13 4
CHINNALGOODY	Dodappah Naick	6	1,924 6 0	1,896 14 0	2,388 32 0	2,360 0 0	1,892 13 0
MAILMUNDY	Konjah Naick	9	2,725 0 0	2,725 0 0	1,500 0 0	907 0 0	1,664 10 4
17. AULENGERRY	Jeddanah Naick	6	2,400 10 0	2,344 26 0	1,944 1 0	1,670 0 0	2,089 10 2
18. SUNDEYOOR	Juppah Naick	14	3,333 12 0	3,333 12 0	2,222 8 0	2,125 0 0	2,753 10 4
19. WOODCAUD	Shattoo Royen	1	- - -	- - -	- - -	5,675 0 0	5,675 22 0
20. SINGUMPUTTY	Nellacooty Taven	1	- - -	- - -	- - -	3,549 0 0	3,549 4 0
21. MANNARCOTTAH	Chinnama Naick	18	3,980 20 0	3,925 0 0	3,333 0 0	2,440 0 0	3,422 32 7
22. ALLAGAPPOORUM	Pooly Taven	3	3,099 10 0	3,915 24 0	3,055 23 0	2,117 0 0	3,296 32 69
		85	24,144 24 0	24,221 20 0	18,999 8 27	21,512 0 0	24,142 15 70
	Teroovana Taven	3	8,706 8 0	8,656 24 0	5,140 38 15	5,074 0 0	7,120 38 04
	Vera Camia Naick	47	13,888 32 0	13,888 32 0	3,375 41 64	3,337 0 0	8,832 5 30
	Vainda Taven	4	388 32 0	555 20 0	277 28 0	- - -	417 12 0
		54	22,983 30 0	23,100 34 0	9,303 23 79	6,828 0 0	22,983 14 0
		104	23,380 0 0	21,295 12 0	- - -	23,457 0 0	22,983 36 0
		10	1,389 30 0	1,389 30 0	- - -	1,501 0 0	1,389 9 2
		19	6,177 28 0	6,116 28 0	- - -	4,259 0 0	6,177 46 5
		132	23,947 16 0	23,801 28 0	- - -	29,697 0 0	23,947 1 76
		55	9,879 32 40	9,879 32 12	- - -	7,193 0 0	9,884 24 0
		70	9,397 12 0	9,008 16 0	- - -	6,343 9 0	8,239 34 0
		40	7,807 26 0	7,424 28 0	- - -	7,554 0 0	7,722 9 20
		171	27,084 28 40	26,292 34 12	- - -	21,400 0 0	24,946 25 20
		4,957	107,170 17 40	108,477 25 12	1,33,565 34 26	1,51,190 0 0	1,04,389 22 0

SPECIAL COMMISSION; DATED 5<sup>th</sup> APRIL 1803.

9.		10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.
Difference between Columns 6 and 7.		Amount of Perush prior to the Change of the Condition of the Police, or prior to Fyly 1209.	Per Centage of Columns 10 to 11.	Excess of Pesheush recommended by Mr. Powney, but not settled.	Per Centage of Columns 12 to 13.	Pesheush settled by Mr. Lushington, for Fyly 1209.	Per Centage of Columns 14 to 15.	Permanent Jomma recommended by Mr. Lushington.
Column 6 more.	Column 6 less.	S. Pag. F. C.		S. Pag. F. C.		S. Pag. F. C.		S. Pag. F. C.
-	-	60,857 30	-	-	-	95,562 36 61	-	94,733 0 0
-	-	50,000 0 0	-	-	-	75,000 0 0	-	75,000 0 0
-	-	1,170,562 0 0	-	-	-	1,705,562 0 0	-	1,697,733 0 0
112 10 0	-	6,221 32 0	25 12	9,413 12 0	58 10	11,528 37 27	57 9	13,000 0 0
-	3,829 24 0	6,221 32 0	19 9	16,953 12 0	51 0	16,663 28 0	52 9	16,000 0 0
-	42 18 0	6,515 20 0	30 0	6,773 12 0	15 0	6,777 32 53	51 11	7,777 0 0
-	556 32 0	6,515 20 0	26 5	7,557 28 0	52 11	7,777 32 53	55 27	7,300 0 0
-	556 0 0	1,051 14 0	25 2	3,712 27 0	50 3	3,888 37 27	52 12	3,500 0 0
110 18 0	-	318 21 0	11 0	677 18 0	33 2	555 23 27	31 5	800 0 0
443 34 0	-	564 16 0	21 1	826 24 0	32 11	833 14 0	32 3	1,100 0 0
-	0 16 0	649 4 0	31 0	5,135 34 0	56 6	649 4 53	33 6	800 0 0
-	273 8 0	641 6 0	11 0	973 28 0	40 0	1,111 4 53	45 11	1,000 0 0
177 0 0	-	1,041 16 0	25 5	800 4 0	37 12	1,000 0 0	44 11	1,050 0 0
177 10 0	-	60 14 0	10 0	125 23 0	39 6	111 4 53	19 7	200 0 0
1,221 14 0	1,322 22 0	25,179 30 0	-	48,765 32 0	-	54,263 3 26	-	52,527 0 0
-	1,124 0 0	571 32 0	52 8	774 32 0	52 8	874 37 27	52 7	874 0 0
-	985 0 0	564 16 0	24 10	926 24 0	36 15	564 18 54	24 10	874 0 0
-	953 32 0	282 8 0	13 13	564 6 0	47 5	282 9 27	23 12	200 0 0
971 10 0	-	942 18 0	49 12	942 18 0	49 12	1,111 4 53	58 11	1,300 0 0
-	593 0 0	564 16 0	28 11	1,124 32 0	57 7	564 18 54	28 11	564 0 0
-	27 1 0	959 20 0	45 14	959 20 0	45 14	959 23 26	45 14	1,000 0 0
-	97 8 0	1,072 16 0	38 11	1,608 24 0	58 6	1,388 37 25	50 6	1,000 0 0
-	-	169 12 0	2 15	254 0 0	4 7	169 14 0	2 15	3,700 0 0
-	-	174 16 0	4 3	261 24 0	7 5	174 18 54	4 14	2,300 0 0
-	853 14 0	1,411 4 0	41 1	1,411 4 0	41 1	1,411 4 53	41 1	1,428 18 16
-	938 23 27	680 6 0	22 5	1,360 12 0	44 10	680 7 0	22 5	1,270 19 22
971 10 0	4,876 18 0	7,694 38 0	-	10,211 23 0	-	8,180 25 53	-	14,670 37 38
821 3 65	-	2,828 8 0	39 10	2,822 8 0	39 10	3,333 14 0	46 13	3,583 0 0
-	18 41 64	3,217 12 0	36 3	4,826 4 0	54 5	3,217 14 0	46 3	2,582 0 0
-	-	203 8 0	49 14	203 8 0	49 14	203 8 0	49 14	-
821 3 65	18 41 64	6,242 28 0	-	7,851 20 0	-	6,753 36 0	-	6,165 0 0
-	-	6,208 32 0	27 5	14,111 4 0	62 5	6,208 37 26	27 4	12,185 10 0
-	-	564 16 0	35 11	564 16 0	35 11	564 18 54	35 11	1,046 0 0
-	-	733 28 0	13 4	2,257 28 0	40 14	733 32 54	11 11	2,271 30 0
-	-	7,506 34 0	-	16,933 6 0	-	7,507 4 54	-	15,502 40 0
-	-	3,386 24 0	37 11	3,386 24 0	37 11	3,386 28 0	37 11	5,394 30 0
-	-	3,668 32 0	44 8	5,503 12 0	66 2	3,668 37 27	44 8	4,734 18 0
-	-	3,668 32 0	47 8	5,503 12 0	71 21	3,668 37 26	47 8	5,065 0 0
-	-	10,724 4 0	-	14,393 6 0	-	10,724 18 53	-	16,094 6 0
3,013 27 65	15 117 40 11	1,68,305 38 0	-	98,156 8 0	-	2,57,991 41 7	-	2,74,692 41 38

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## STATEMENT enclosed in Report of SPECIAL COMMISSION; dated 5th April 1803—continued.

(Reprinted from the preceding Page.)			20.	21.	22.	23.	24.	25.	26.
1.	2.	3.	Permanent Jumma proposed by the Commission.	Per Centage of Col. 50 to 7	Per Centage of Col. 50 to 8.	Add Estimated amount of Revenue to be derived from the resumption of Saver, Salt, and Abluary.	Total Gross Revenue to be in future derived from the Southern Pollams.	Increase on the Pesheush, payable, prior to Fusly 1209, to Fusly 1209, or Col. 10	Decrease in the Pesheush, payable, prior to Fusly 1209
NAMES of the POLLAMS.	NAMES of the POLIGARS.	Number of Villages in each Pollam.							
THE ZEMINDARRY OF RAMNAD	Sathopery Rane Mungle Isevery Natchiyar	2,152	S. Pag <sup>s</sup> F. C. 94,733 0 0	56 10	- -	S. Pag <sup>s</sup> F. C. 8,000 0 0	S. Pag <sup>s</sup> F. C. 1,02,733 0 0	S. Pag <sup>s</sup> F. C. 41,875 12 0	-
THE ZEMINDARRY OF SHEVAGUNGA	Mootoo Azia Ragonada Gawooru wulla Worria Taver	1,937	75,000 0 0	59 11	- -	7,610 0 0	82,610 0 0	32,610 0 0	-
UNASSUMED POLLAMS OF TINNEVELLI.		4,089	1,69,733 0 0	- -	- -	15,610 0 0	35,113 0 0	7,485 12 0	-
1. ETTIAPOOR	Ettappa Naick	110	13,000 0 0	53 12	53 12	853 14 0	13,833 14 0	7,624 24 0	-
2. SHEVAGERRY	Varagoo Rainah Vanden	103	16,000 0 0	57 9	50 7	535 25 27	16,555 23 27	10,346 33 27	-
3. WOOTAMALLY	Murdappa Taven	64	7,777 0 0	51 13	51 1	555 23 27	8,332 23 27	3,847 3 27	-
4. CHOCUMPUTTY	Vellengapooly Taven	55	7,300 8 0	51 12	52 7	555 23 27	7,855 23 27	4,186 33 27	-
5. PAREYPOOR	Tombally Naick	24	3,500 0 0	52 8	47 8	555 27 27	4,055 23 27	2,244 9 27	-
6. TALAVENCOTTAH	Indra Taven	5	800 0 0	45 0	45 7	55 23 27	855 23 27	516 41 27	-
7. CADUMBOOR	Taddeja Talaven	14	1,100 0 0	41 4	42 8	55 23 27	1,155 23 27	591 7 27	-
8. PAUVALY	Auvalappa Naick	14	800 0 0	41 2	41 2	55 23 27	55 23 27	266 19 27	-
9. GOLLAPUTTY.	Gyjalappa Naick	9	1,000 0 0	51 7	41 2	55 23 27	1,055 23 27	46 17 27	-
10. YALMURRAH	Yerra Chumama Naick	20	1,050 0 0	45 4	17 0	111 4 53	1,161 4 53	596 30 53	-
11. ALLAGAPOORY	Ketta Conty Vannien	7	200 0 0	50 0	35 0	- -	200 0 0	139 28 0	-
ASSUMED POLLAMS, but NOT SQUENTERED:		425	52,527 0 0	- -	- -	3,358 37 29	55,915 37 29	30,636 37 29	-
12. NADAVACOORCHY	Cootalla Taven	11	874 0 0	57 11	52 7	10 0 0	884 0 0	9 10 0	-
13. MANIACHY	Chockah Talaven	9	874 0 0	57 11	38 3	58 25 53	932 25 53	368 9 53	-
14. SOORUNDY	Shaulava Taven	7	200 0 0	49 6	10 14	- -	200 0 0	- -	82 S C
15. CHINNULGOODY	Dodappa Naick	6	1,300 0 0	55 1	68 11	12 24 17	1,312 24 17	370 6 17	-
16. MAILMUNDY	Konjah Naick	9	564 0 0	62 2	28 11	109 40 9	673 40 9	109 24 9	-
17. AUTENGERRY	Peddanna Naick	6	1,000 0 0	59 14	47 13	24 27 10	1,024 27 10	65 7 10	-
18. SUNDEYPOOR	Golappa Naick	14	1,100 0 0	51 12	39 15	56 4 53	1,156 4 53	83 30 53	-
19. WOORCAUD	Shattoo Roven	1	3,700 0 0	65 3	65 3	- -	3,700 0 0	3,530 30 0	-
20. SINGUMPUTTY	Nellacooty Taven	1	2,300 0 0	64 12	64 13	- -	2,300 0 0	2,125 26 0	-
21. MANNARCOTTAH	Chinnama Naick	18	1,488 0 0	60 0	43 5	36 7 15	1,524 7 15	113 3 15	-
22. AUVADY POORUM	Pooly Taven	3	1,270 0 0	59 15	41 10	11 5 7	1,281 5 7	600 41 7	-
		85	14,670 0 0	- -	- -	319 3 4	14,989 8 4	75,76 20 4	32.8 c
3. SHATTOOR	Teroovuna Taven	3	3,583 0 0	60 0	50 5	13 15 22	3,596 15 22	774 7 22	-
4. SAPATOOR	Vera Camia Naick	47	2,582 0 0	66 15	29 1	380 36 37	2,962 36 37	- -	254 17 43
5. COLLUNCONDEN	Vainda Taven	4	5 0 0	- -	1 3	- -	5 0 0	- -	198 8 c
SQUENTERED POLLAMS forfeited and given away:		54	6,170 0 0	- -	- -	391 9 59	6,564 9 59	774 7 22	452 25 43
6. PANJALUMCOURCHY		104	7,242 0 0	30 0	31 0	521 8 48	7,563 8 48	1,354 18 48	-
7. COLLATOOR		10	530 0 0	30 0	37 0	79 25 54	608 25 54	104 9 54	-
8. CADULGOODY		19	1,277 0 0	30 0	29 2	115 35 47	1,392 35 47	659 7 47	-
TO BE SOLD:		133	8,908 0 0	- -	- -	716 27 62	9,624 27 69	2,117 35 69	-
9. YELLARUMPUNNY		55	5,394 0 0	75 0	60 1	307 16 27	5,701 16 27	2,314 34 27	-
10. COLLARPUTTY		70	4,734 0 0	75 0	57 7	483 37 27	5,217 17 27	1,549 5 27	-
11. NAGLEPOORUM		46	5,665 0 0	75 0	77 4	361 4 53	6,326 4 53	2,657 14 53	-
		171	16,093 0 0	- -	- -	1,152 16 27	17,245 16 27	6,521 12 27	-
		4,957	1,68,101 0 0	- -	- -	21,581 15 28	2,89,682 15 28	1,11,911 40 71	534 33 43
Add, on account of Desha Cawul resumed							55,000 0 0		
GRAND TOTAL							3,44,682 15 28		

Office of the Special Commission,  
5th April 1803.E. E. Per (Signed) J. HODGSON,  
Secretary to the Commission.

## Appendix, No. 28.

## Extract from REPORTS respecting TALLIARY POLICE.

Extract from REPORT of Collector of SOUTHERN POLIGAR PESHCHU;  
dated 1st May 1800.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Tallary  
Police.

Southern Poligars.

IN the instructions which I gave to my tchilldars in January last, for the assumption of the *desha-cavel* privileges, I purposely made no allusion to the *tallam cavel*, having had no opportunity to gain information on which to found any system for its regulation or collection. The relative duties of these two services, the past and present situation of the persons performing them, would, I knew, be ascertained, at a very early period, from the representations on the spot; and as, upon the system to be adopted, greatly depended the future tranquillity of the province, there could not be a stronger motive for proceeding with great caution, and with a thorough knowledge of the real situation of the several parties to be affected by it;—But as the disorders of the country will daily increase, until some measures be taken for their suppression, I cannot longer delay submitting, for your consideration, the draft of an advertisement, which I propose to publish, as the foundation of an efficient system of watching service throughout the country.

The power of the poligars has been so completely humbled, that the tallam cavel carrahs have no longer any dread of them; and from their interference, I have no apprehension of any serious obstruction to the well ordering of the watching service; but there are other circumstances, which, if suffered to take their course, would place the province in a greater state of confusion and insecurity of property and life, than it was in the plenitude of the poligar power. I refer to the injuries which the cavel carrahs, no longer protected by, or connected with, the poligars, receive from the circar servants, by the withholding of their russooms, and being made responsible for losses and thefts which have never happened.

Under the pressure of such injuries, it is obvious that men who have arms in their hands; who are well acquainted with all the lurking places in the country; whose line of duty favours nightly excursions, and to whom the hereditary office of protector, as well as their long connection with the poligar, has naturally given a spirit of enterprize and independence, will plunder and rob, rather than starve.

No vigilance, on the part of the Company's servants, exercising the duties of *desha cavel*, can prevent, nor would the whole military force in the province avail, against such secret and extensive depredation. To disarm them, would not be effectual; for a large bamboo with a piece of iron stuck on the top of it, is all sufficient for the purposes of robbery and plunder.

It would be certainly regular, that whatever measures were adopted to restore the tallam cavel carrahs to their ancient fees and privileges, could be taken in concert with his highness's manager; but the excessive weakness and corruption of the Nabob's administration, compels me to abandon the hope of co-operation. Where the cavel carrah is weak, his just dues (like the just dues of all others in the country, who have not the power of resistance) are taken for the benefit of the circar servants; and where he is strong enough to collect a few vagabonds to plunder the inhabitants, the monigars render his russoom, and participate in the fruits of his depredation.

These and other such acts of tyranny and injustice, have so confounded the proper right and duty of every man, that they are scarcely any longer known even to himself. It is from that reflection, that I have made this advertisement more detailed than may at first appear necessary; but my object has been, to make the people at large understand what duties they have a title to expect from the cavelgar, to soften the animosities subsisting between the inhabitants and the cavelgars, by showing that the past neglect and perversion of those duties, is not attributable entirely to the cavelgars; and to point out to them (for they require every such comfort) the benefits they may expect from the future faithful performance of the watching service.

To effect this object, by restoring the tallam cavel carrah to the intention of its institution, and the enjoyment of the fees and privileges justly due to that service, to the collectors of the duty; it appears to me indispensable, that the tallam cavel carrahs should receive their russooms immediately from my servants, employed in the collecting service of the *desha cavel*, and be held accountable exclusively to the Company, for their conduct. If this arrangement receives your sanction, I anticipate the greatest benefit to the country from its adoption; and, on the other hand, no conviction is stronger in my mind, than that, so long as the cavel carrahs are liable to receive injuries (such as state this letter and its enclosures) from the circar servants, no peace can be expected in the province.

The silence which I have hitherto observed upon the affairs of the forfeited poligars will not, I trust, expose me to any suspicion of inattention to this important part of my charge. Indeed I hope the diaries I have lately had the honour to submit, of my proceedings in those countries, will show that I have spared no pains to inspire the inhabitants with a confidence in the justice of government, to break the irregular habits of forming sharogars and peons, &c. to render their labours, like those of the people, in general profitable to the Company.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Talhary,  
Police.

Tinnevely.

Extract from REPORT of Mr. JOHN HOBGSON, on TINNEVELLY; dated  
24th Sept. 1807.

THE security of the persons of travellers and traders, which has followed from the assumption of the *cawelgy* from the poligars, from the punishment of the rebellious, and transfer of the country to the authority of the Company; can only be estimated by those who were witnesses of the previous scenes of insecurity, robbery, plunder, and murder.

Extract from REPORT from principal Collector of the CEDED DISTRICTS  
dated 20th March 1802.

Ceded Districts.

THE system of *cawelgy*, which pretends to make good, stolen property, is a kind of tribute imposed on government by its own feudatories, as the price of forbearing to oppose its authority; for it never fully indemnified losses, unless by the produce of robberies in another quarter. It furnished the *cawelgar* with the means of maintaining a greater force than he could possibly do from the resources of his own hereditary district; and this renders him more capable of contending against government, when he finds it convenient to revolt. The spreading of his adherents too over the country, to make his own collections of this tribute, impresses the inhabitants with terror, and gives him more sway over them, than the civil power; facilitates his depredations, by procuring him a perfect knowledge of the habitations of the men of property in every village; and enables him to single out for vengeance, whoever is hardy enough to accuse him or his agents.

It seems strange that it should ever have been believed, that any good could result from such an institution. Even if all thefts were made good, which never was the case, the contributions paid by the district to the *cawelgar*, were always more than the equivalent of this loss, and greatly exceeded any that would probably have been sustained, from ordinary thieves. In districts immediately under *cawelgars*, or in those adjoining to them, there is always the greatest number of robberies; and in proportion as they are more remote from such proprietors, are less common. The whole of the allowances granted to these men, can be regarded in no other light than as a fund set apart by government for the support of a number of seminaries for training regular thieves.

I resumed all *mutany and nayel cawelgy*, on my first entering the country, on the principle of their having been formerly resumed by the Mysore government, and of the allowance naturally ceasing when the service was no longer required; and its abolition even, would undoubtedly contribute greatly to the security of property. If it is objected that there would be no means of apprehending thieves, or recovering stolen effects, it may be answered, that this would be fully as well executed by the common village *talhars* and *amildar's* peons; because, by the change of system, the number of thieves would be lessened, and their concealment rendered more difficult. At present, it is among the *cawelgar's* peons, that almost all thieves are sheltered; for it is to that body, that all the most skilful adepts belong, who therefore rob, as it were, under public authority. Though they are always suspected, when a robbery is committed, it is difficult to fix it upon any individual of the gang, not only from the dexterity in eluding discovery, which they have learned from long practice; but also from the dread in which the inhabitants stand of them; for were any person to inform against them, he would most likely be either robbed or murdered. But when the *cawelgars* and their peons are disbanded, there would be no safe refuge for thieves. They could only be concealed in great cities, of which there are none, in this part of India. The constitution of all villages is such, that no gang of thieves, nor even any single thief, could long remain undiscovered, in any of them. The potail, curman, and other public servants, know every man residing within the limits of their village; and were any man to take up his abode in it, without any visible means of subsistence, he would attract their attention, and would be seized the instant that any robbery happened. Besides, thieves would then consist not of men who followed the profession by inheritance, and were trained to it, from their infancy; but of men who were driven into it, by want; and as they would be less expert, they would be so much more easily detected. It is not from solitary unconnected thieves, that any serious mischief can ever arise. It is only when they compose a fraternity, too strong for the civil authority, and the *cawelgar* and his peons, that they become formidable.

It may be urged, that if the institution of *cawelgars* had been found to be so detrimental, it would never have become so common; and would have been long ago suppressed. But it is to be considered, that *cawelgars* originally were in general rather self-appointed, during times of disorder, than appointed by the sovereign; that Indian governments are usually too weak and fluctuating, to give themselves much trouble about rectifying abuses; that the *cawelgars*, when established, could only be reduced by a military force; and that the *foujdars* and other officers to whom that force was entrusted, being themselves every moment liable to removal, had no permanent interest in the prosperity of the country; and were therefore rather disposed to protect the *cawelgars*, for a share of their booty, than to expel them.

Many princes have no doubt seen the propriety of getting rid of them; but they probably had not the means of effecting it; for all native governments are little more than an assemblage of poligarships, under a superior chief, who though he has a general control over the whole, possesses very little authority, in the interior management of their several provinces. Hyder Ally was the only Indian sovereign we know of, who ever subdued all his petty feudatories, and was really master of his country. He knew all the advantages to be derived from *cawelgars*; and he thought it wise to abolish them.

The

The chief argument against such a measure is, that it would be depriving a great number of men of every means of livelihood, and turning them loose to rob the inhabitants; but this might be obviated by leaving the cawelgar a portion of his land, sufficient for his maintenance; and his peons, their lands, either in enaum, or at a low quit rent, either during one or more lives; and dispensing with all service.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting Taltary  
Police.

Extract from Mr. THACKERAY's Report; dated 4th August 1807.

THE Ceded Districts have improved very much under the Company's government, in spite of bad seasons, in spite of a numerous population of turbulent peons, and in spite of many obstacles. About the great improvement, no doubt can exist; but whether this great improvement, be owing to the ryotwar system, or to the excellent police, or rather the complete establishment of the authority of government, some doubt may arise. It appears to me, that this excellent police, which has secured tranquillity, has been established by the proper administration of the ryotwar system; that all the ability of collector Munro, could not have produced it, under any other system; and that nothing but his ability, could have produced it so soon, under the ryotwar system.

Ceded Districts.

## Appendix, No. 29.

Extracts from REPORTS, as to the Difficulty of recovering ARREARS OF REVENUE, by the JUDICIAL PROCESS under RYOTWAR SETTLEMENTS.

Extracts from REPORT of principal Collector of Coimbatore; dated 30th Nov. 1806.

THERE is great reason to doubt, whether all the benefits of its resources can be obtained from the Ryotwar Settlement, with a separate court of judicature existing at the same time; or that the collection can be made, with that regularity and promptitude, which might be otherwise expected.

Extracts from Reports  
respecting the recovery  
of Arrears of Revenue  
under Ryotwar Settlements.

The natives, even when conscious of the justness of their debts, it is well known, are always averse from discharging them, and ever seek delay. The disposition to that delay, which is seen daily in the proprietary zemindars in other districts, must be supposed inherent, in most individuals of the lower class; and when the case is applied to so many thousand ryots now holding pottahs, my apprehensions may not appear extraordinary. To cause a delay in the collections of a whole village, it is only necessary that one ryot proceed to the zillah court, to enter complaints, however frivolous, or engage in suits, to set aside his agreements with the tehsildar and monigar to cultivate. It will be difficult, under the multiplicity of business which must engage a zillah court, that summary decisions can be granted to the parties. The operations of the monigar must, in the interim, be suspended; and it appears a very probable consequence, that the government revenue cannot be regularly collected, in the pause which those suits may occasion.

It may further be expected, that much further inconvenience will be felt, from the blunders and ignorance of the lower class of revenue servants, in regard to the Regulations; and with which, it will require some time before they can become acquainted.

In a country where there exists so great a quantity of waste land as in Coimbatore, land, so far from being an object of request, must be tendered by the circular to the cultivating class, who consider rather that they are conferring, than receiving, a favour, in the acceptance. The Hindoo institution insisted upon the industry of their subjects, in order to add as much to the labour of the community, as the revenues of the state. The Mahomedan disposition left no alternative, for the slothful were obliged to pay, whether they cultivated or not.

Under the British government, every means of encouragement, by way of advances, persuasions, and the endeavours of the native servants, have been used, to the ultimate object of guiding their industrious labours, to the advantage of themselves, and the increase of the public revenue. Such as have been in the habit of seeing the lower class of ryots, must be sensible of the real necessity, of some hand to direct those labours.

The frequent release from their engagements which they have experienced, when they have suffered misfortune, has impressed the ryots with a general idea, that they always expect it; as soon as it once comes to be considered as a right, every ryot will be had to litigation and delay, to avoid their fulfilment.

From this persuasion of being able to obtain a release from their engagements from government, under the circumstances mentioned, many more ryots enter into the beginning of the season, than would be the case, were they conscious that the amount dues would, without exception, be rigorously exacted. Many instances, however, occur, where the security is obliged to fulfil engagements entered into under persuasion, merely from the subsequent fault on the part of the ryot, whose indolence releases him, without the means of acquitting himself of them.

If the country be at once disposed of by rent or sale, the farmer, or zemindar, can have no obstacle to the payment of his kists, equal to the difficulty Annamany servants will experience in the collection: should the former fail in collecting within the stipulated period, it is generally in his power either to mortgage, or to dispose of such property as may answer the fulfilment of his agreements. It is scarcely necessary to say, that Annamany servants can have no such opportunity; and that if there be resistance to their demand, and summons served from a separate court, the collection of the amount must be delayed, until the pro-

Extracts from Reports  
respecting the recovery  
of Arrears of Revenue  
under Ryotwar Settle-  
ments.

be gone through, from the case of a ryot paying five fanams, to one paying 500 pagodas per annum.

Extract from REPORT of Collector of Dindigul and Madura, of 8th July 1807.

THE Regulations for enforcing arrears, are too intricate for a native to comprehend: and the smallest deviation from the forms, entails endless disputes and heavy penalties.

Extract from REPORT of Mr. HODGSON on Coimbatore, of 10th Sept. 1807.

IF a ryot fails to pay his rent, the whole process of distraint laid down in Regulation XXVII. 1802, must be resorted to; and the same forms be gone through, with the ryot who pays a rent of six fanams, as with him who pays 1,000 pagodas. If the process is not enforced against each defaulter, as soon as he falls in arrear, the evil spreads; and those who are able, and those who are not, equally withhold their rent.

## Appendix, No. 30.

### REPORT of BOARD of REVENUE;

And PROCEEDINGS of MADRAS GOVERNMENT, as to the measure of establishing TRIENNIAL VILLAGE LEASES, in the unsettled Countries; dated 25th April and 25th May 1808: and circular Instructions to the Collectors in consequence.

REPORT  
of Board of Revenue,  
25 April 1808, on Tri-  
ennial Village Leases.

READ the following Letter from the Board of Revenue,—

To the Hon. Sir. G. H. Barlow, Bart. K. B. Governor in Council.

Hon. Sir,

Para. 1.—WE have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the orders of government, conveyed in Mr. Secretary Greenway's letters, dated 28th Nov. and 5th Dec. last, enclosing copies of the reports of Mr. Hodgson on Coimbatore and Tinnevely.

2. On some of the subjects discussed in those Reports, and referred for our consideration, we had anticipated the orders of the Honourable the Governor in Council, respecting them; and we adopted the necessary measures to enable us hereafter to report, with regard to others.

3. On the same occasion, we were directed to state our sentiments as to the expediency of changing the detailed system of revenue economy, which has now been prosecuted for several years in the new territorial acquisitions of the Company, with a view to the more complete development of their resources; according to which system, the rents assessed by survey, were collected from each ryot by tahsildars, paid by the collectors of government; and to consult the propriety of substituting a plan of settlement, approximating more nearly to that of estates permanently assessed; of farming out the lands for a term of years, to men who should be interested in preserving and improving the resources of the country.

4. Our sentiments on this point, constitute the subject of this address. The topic, indeed, has been so amply and ably discussed on former occasions, that we now enter upon it with diffidence, and more from the necessity of obeying the commands, and procuring the orders of government, than with the idea of illustrating it, with new observations.

5. The provinces subject to the government of Fort St. George, with the exception of Canara, Malabar, and other districts, in which the traces of private property still existed when they came under our government, exhibited nearly the same system of landed property and revenue policy. The land was the property of the circar and of the ryots; the interest in the soil was divided, between these two; but where the circar share absorbed nearly the whole landlord's rent, the ryots possessed little more interest in the soil than that of hereditary tenancy.

6. The country was divided into villages. A village, geographically, is a tract of country comprising some hundreds or thousands of acres of arable and waste land;—a village, politically, is a little republic, or rather corporation, having within itself, its municipal officers and artificers: its boundaries are seldom altered; and though sometimes injured, or isolated by war, famine, and epidemical disorders, the same name, boundaries, and even families, continue for ages.

7. The circar share, or land-rent, was generally received from paddy land in kind, at rates from 40 to 60 per cent. of the gross produce, after deducting certain portions distributed before the threshing commences. The share or tax of the circar from dry grain was generally received in cash, either at so much for a fixed measure of land, or so much for the same measure of land, but varying with the produce.

8. We have observed that the circar rent or share generally absorbed the whole net produce of the landlord's rent, because, in bad years, a remission became necessary, and the assessment was in many places so heavy, that the circar officers were more fearful of losing what the present occupant paid, than hopeful to get more, from a new ryot.

9. There appears to be three modes of collecting this share or rent, which have existed prior to the introduction of the system of permanent rents.

10. Of the three former modes, the first is the *ryotwar kulwar*, or individual settlement; the second is the *mouzarwar ganganah*, or village settlement; the third is the *jjarah*, *mootah*, or *indary*, or farms of several villages.

Under the *ryotwar* settlement, the officers of government were supposed to settle and collect the rent from each farmer.

Under

12. Under the *mouzarwar*, the officers of government farmed out the lands of the whole village to an individual, who again sub-rented each field, and settled with each ryot; or to the community of the village, who settled among themselves, the land and rent they were respectively to occupy and to pay.

13. Sometimes, neither individual nor village rents were adopted; the circar farmed out tracts of country containing several villages, to great farmers, who were sometimes strangers, soucars who had advanced money, or persons who made this kind of farming their profession. Sometimes, they were revenue officers of various descriptions, but generally termed *zemindars*.

14. Previously to the introduction of the permanent settlement, the ancient hereditary *zemindars* were farmers of this description; because their cowles were annual, or for the period of a few years; because government, at its discretion, raised or reduced the amount of the tribute, and because government, when necessary, exercised the power of removing an obnoxious member of the family, or, on just cause, even the whole family, from the management of the *zemindary*. These ancient *zemindars* however, as they were more permanently connected with the land, and less liable to removal, than more farmers, were less oppressive in their exactions from the cultivators.

15. The government seeing the evils of these temporary settlements, introduced the permanent system of revenue, which was perpetuating the third system on an improved principle, by making the farm hereditary, and limiting the demand on the hereditary farmer of the revenue.

16. Because the *zemindars*, thus confirmed or created, have, in the new revenue and judicial Code of Regulations, been styled proprietors of their respective lands, some have supposed that the rights of the people, have been thereby impaired. But those rights, on the contrary, as we conceive, have been strengthened, rather than invalidated, by that code.

17. Among numerous papers which have been composed on this subject, we received, and have the honour herewith to submit, a Report from Colonel Munro, written a short period before his departure for Europe, in which he has proposed a new plan for the permanent settlement of the Ceded Districts.\* Of this plan, we shall offer a concise account, without discussing all Colonel Munro's arguments for and against the permanent settlement hitherto established.

\* For this Report, vide Appendix 34.

18. He begins with stating his opinion respecting the property in the soil; and we concur with him in thinking, that the government is virtually the proprietor in the Ceded Districts, and in other provinces where the circar demand has been raised so high as to absorb the whole landlord's rent; in fact, that a low rate of assessment, is the sole cause of actual property in land.

19. The Company, by the present assessment in the Ceded Districts, draw the full landlord's rent, which may be calculated, on an average, at 45 per cent. of the gross produce; but in order to constitute property in the soil, it would be necessary to remit such a portion of rent, as should reduce the demand of government, to about one-third of the gross produce.— This remission, which would amount to about 25 per cent. of the present survey rent, would give the persons constituted proprietors, such an interest in the soil, as might be justly termed landed property; viz.

Total gross produce	- - - - -	100.
Government rent, according to the present assessment, is	- - - - -	45.
Deduct 25 per cent. as the remission proposed	- - - - -	11½.
Government share, or land-tax by the proposed assessment	- - - - -	33½.

20. The principles of this plan for a permanent ryotwar settlement of the Ceded Districts, are to remit 25 per cent. on the survey rate of assessment, with a still greater remission on lands watered by machinery; to permit the ryot to retain or relinquish land, according to his circumstances; and to consider each ryot the absolute proprietor of the land he occupies, so long as he pays its revenue.

21. No remissions, for bad crops or other accidents, are proposed to be allowed. On ordinary occasions, should failures occur, which cannot be made good from the property of the defaulter, the village in which they happen, shall be liable, for the loss, to the extent of 10 per cent. additional assessment, but no further, on the revenue of the village.

22. The waste land should be retained, as the property of government; and the rent, more properly speaking, the land tax, of such as might hereafter be occupied, should be added to the public revenue.

23. The repairs of all tanks not rendered private property, should be made by government.—Tuccavi should be gradually discontinued; the village officers to remain, as heretofore, under the collectors; private creditors, who might distrain the property of ryots, should charge the public demands against such ryots, and give security for doing so, before they were allowed to begin the distraint.

24. This is the outline of the plan proposed by Colonel Munro, for the settlement of the Ceded Districts. He then endeavours to show, by calculation, that a settlement, on the principles, would not only tend incalculably to invigorate the agricultural resources of the country, but would actually afford a greater immediate revenue to government, than the present *zemindary* system, formed on the principles of that already introduced into other districts.

25. Colonel Munro shows, by a calculation to which we refer your Honour in Council, that if a permanent *zemindary* settlement be formed on the principle hitherto observed, it would amount to

If a ryotwar settlement be formed on the principle proposed, the amount of the settlement will be

26. But even if the net revenue, which is immediately expected from either system, be reckoned the same, on account of the charges incident to ryotwar, or to answer any mistake in the calculation, yet still the *zemindary* rent would be no more, ten years hence, than



## REPORT

Board of Revenue,  
25 April 1806, on Tri-  
ennial Village Leases.

is at first, whereas the ryotwar would have risen, within that period, about three lacs of pagodas, from the encouragement which the remission would afford to agriculture.

27. It is the high assessment upon the land, which Colonel Munro justly considers the chief check to population. Were it not for the pressure of this heavy rent, population, he thinks, ought to increase even faster than in America; because the climate is more favourable, and there are vast tracts of good land unoccupied, which may be ploughed at once, without the labour and expense of clearing away forests, as there are above three millions of acres of this kind, in the Ceded Districts. He is of opinion, that a great increase of population, and consequently of land revenue, might be expected in the course of twenty-five years, from the operation of the remission. But a remission to a few zemindars, he apprehends, would not remedy the evil, nor remove the weight which at present depresses population.

28. Under the system proposed, Colonel Munro conceives that cultivation and population would increase so much, that in the course of twenty-five years, lands formerly cultivated, amounting to star pagodas 5,55,962, would be retrieved and occupied, together with a considerable portion of waste, never before cultivated. The extension of cultivation, however, would not make the farms larger, and thereby facilitate collection. The enlargement of farms or estates, is at present prevented, by the want of property: hereafter, it would be prevented, by its division.

29. This is the outline of Colonel Munro's plan, which is not less applicable to all the districts as yet unsettled, than to the Ceded Districts; and if the exigencies of government allowed of so great a sacrifice, as a remission on the present standard rents to the extent of 25 per cent or even of 15 per cent we should consider the measure highly advisable, and calculated to produce great ulterior advantages. Indeed it would be absurd to dispute, that the less we take from the cultivator, of the produce of his labour; the more flourishing must be his condition.

30. But if the exigencies of government do not permit them to make so great a sacrifice; —if they cannot at once confer the boon of private property, they must be content to establish a private interest in the soil, as effectually as they can, under the farming system. If they cannot afford to give up a share of the landlord's rent, they must be indulgent landlords.

31. Under such circumstances, the transition from ryotwar to village-rents, as suggested by Mr. Hodgson, appears to us best adapted to secure the revenue of the state, and the prosperity of the country.

32. Our sentiments on this occasion, will equally apply to the reference made to us on the 30th April 1806; on which our opinions were required, with respect to some objections which had occurred to the establishment of large zemindaries in perpetuity, and with regard to arguments then advanced in favour of making the ryotwar system permanent.

33. In provinces newly subjected to the Company's government, whose resources had not been ascertained, where judicial tribunals had not been established, and where the collectors, unfettered by the restrictions of law, were free to follow their discretion in retrieving the energies of the country, and reforming the manners of the people, no policy could be better calculated, than that of ryotwar rents, for effecting a survey, classification, and assessment of the lands; for detecting alienations of revenue; frustrating the interested confederacies of the inhabitants; emancipating the inferior, from the thralldom of superior, ryots; developing the capacity of the country; and, by a firm and summary, yet a just and prudent mode of proceeding, remedying the inveterate abuses of the Mahomedan government.

34. This course of proceeding has been accordingly pursued, in all unsettled districts, from the periods of their acquisition, until the present time; and it is hoped that the objects above mentioned, have, by this time, been in a great degree, attained.

35. Whatever room there might be for a difference of opinion, as to the preferable policy of these two modes of revenue economy, anterior to the introduction of the constitution of internal government recently prescribed, as a general system, in these territories, it is unnecessary for us, as we imagine, at this time, to discuss.

36. Very strong reasoning has been advanced, in favour of each; but it occurs to us, under the new code of revenue and jurisprudence, a plan has been propounded, which the ryotwar mode of administration could not be brought to assimilate, and which, it would be inconsistent, if not unsafe and impossible, now to deviate; for the difficulty, if not impossibility, of one collector being able to attend to all the formalities prescribed by the new code, on the various occasions, real or fictitious, which would occur for resorting to them, among the numerous inhabitants of a province under ryotwar leases; the danger of delegating authority to an unfeeling, or perhaps corrupt tehsildar, the general incompetency of individual tenants to pay, in all seasons, the money rents assessed on their fields; the constant change of occupants, and consequent probable deterioration of agriculture; the expense to the government, the trouble to the courts, the difficulty of collection, the interference with the private concerns of the cultivators, and with the public functions of the officers of government under such a detailed system; would, we apprehend, be found insurmountable embarrassments to a ryotwar mode of administration.

37. The village (Mozawar) system, is at least as old, as the age of Menu. That venerable legislator alludes to the disputes about village boundaries, just as they occur at present; and directs a space of 400 cubits wide, round small villages, and of 1,200 round large ones, to be left for pasture. This could not have been done, had land been exclusive private property; for in that case, the owner would have made the most of his land, and not left

left it waste, for the public use of the inhabitants; and boundaries of fields and farms, rather than of villages, would have been disputed.

38. Every village with its twelve *ayazadees*, as they are denominated, is a petty commonwealth, with the *moruddin*, *potail*, *kapoo*, *reddy*, or chief inhabitant, at the head of it; and India is a great assemblage of such commonwealths. The inhabitants, during war, look chiefly to their own head inhabitant: they give themselves no trouble about the breaking up and division of kingdoms. While the village remains entire, they care not to what power it is transferred: on whomsoever it devolves, the internal management remains unaltered; the head inhabitant is still the collector and magistrate and head farmer.

39. From the age of Menu to the present day, the settlements have been made either with or through, the head inhabitant. When the revenue was thought to be high enough, and the head inhabitant agreed to it, he was usually left to settle with the ryots. If it was too low, and the head inhabitant objected to an increase, the *amildar* settled with the ryots, in his presence. This system has stood the test of time; and as, under it, whole provinces have often been in a highly cultivated state, it must certainly be well calculated for the great object of promoting agriculture.

40. When the *circar* was moderate, and satisfied with a reasonable assessment, villages often remained for many years at the same rent; and the ryots knowing that no increase had been demanded by the *circar*, paid none to the *potail*; and by enjoying their land at a fixed rent, they were enabled to improve them greatly. In this case, the situation of the ryots was nearly what it would be under a permanent ryotwar settlement; but it had this great disadvantage, that the ryots had never any security for its lasting another year.

41. Under a village system, when once completely established, there could not be the smallest danger of internal disturbances, unless the country were over-assessed; a circumstance, which, under any system, would excite discontent. The influence of the head inhabitant among the people, is much greater than that of a *zemindar* or *poligar*; and when he is not over-assessed, he will always exert that influence in favour of government, for he is properly one of its officers, and feels that he is of more consequence, and is more secure in the enjoyment of his rights under it, than under a *zemindar*.

42. A principal objection to village estates is, that the influence of the head inhabitants may be exerted, to the oppression or injury of the common ryots.

43. We trust, however, that the security provided by the law, is quite sufficient to shield the latter, from this danger.

44. We hesitated, whether to recommend a period of three or of five years. A farm for five years would encourage improvement; but a farm for three years, will not depress the spirit of agriculture, while it will admit easily of a transition to a permanent settlement, or to an extended term of lease.

45. The amount payable by each village, should be fixed on the average collections of former years, except in those districts where the survey rent has been completed, and can be depended upon. In such districts, the rent of the village should be fixed, with a reference to the payments under the survey rent.

46. We fully explained to government, on the 15th September last, the principles upon which Colonel Munro had completed the survey of the Ceded Districts. Where a survey has been conducted properly on those principles, it must be the best possible standard for assessment; because all the intellect, all the accounts, all the experience of the country, were drawn out to assist the collector in forming the survey. The rent was not fixed upon the supposed fertility and produce of the land, so much as upon what it had actually paid.

47. The chief advantage which we expect from the plan of village-rent, is facility of collection.

48. In other respects, the plan which we propose, is adapted to the customs of the country, and the constitution of a village, as we have described it.

49. The sum to be paid is fixed; the chief ryot is the renter, and the corporation of the village are left to settle among themselves, the land and rent which they are respectively to occupy and pay. In case of disputes, the collector in the first instance, if he cannot settle them, the court must decide, according to custom and the survey rent.

50. The most striking objections which have been urged against the *zemindarry* system cannot be made to this village settlement; because the advantages will not be diverted, from the land.

51. The chief cultivators will be the renters; and any advantages (and we hope the of the farm will be moderate enough, to allow of advantages) will go to increase agricultural stock.

52. Under a village rent, we estimate that a considerable reduction of the collections, will be found practicable; but we must also admit, that there will be a reduction of revenue, to a certain extent:—We hope, however, that, on an average of years, the revenue will rise, above the present amount.

53. The protection of the ryots, will be transferred to the Courts of Judicature; and we confide in the zeal of the judges for justifying our recommendation of a system, in which so much must depend upon the prompt and efficient administration of justice.

54. The observations of Colonel Munro, on the Courts of Justice, are, we think, worthy the full consideration of Government; but, on the whole, we hope that the defects and inconveniences of the judicial system, pointed out by Colonel Munro, may be remedied by good judges, and especially by a liberal construction of the Regulations, and the adoption of an equitable, rather than a strictly legal, or formal rule of enquiry and decision in the civil courts.

REPORT  
of Board of Revenue  
25 April 1809, on the  
Village Revenue.

REPORT  
of Board of Revenue,  
23 April 1808, on Trian-  
nal Village Leases.

55. As far as we may be allowed to speak on the administration of justice, and as every individual, still more a public board, entrusted with the immediate superintendence of the public revenue, has a natural privilege to discuss the question of right and wrong; to blame or to praise the administration of justice; to suggest improvements, and point out errors; we take the liberty to observe, that our system of courts compose one great Court of Equity:—that they are not to be confined, by narrow maxims; but should take an enlarged view, and be allowed a considerable latitude in their proceedings. Under a liberal construction of the Regulations, we think that able and zealous judges would soon find remedies for the inconveniences, and supply the defects pointed out, by Colonel Munro. Under this impression, we recommend a village-rent, because we trust the court will protect the body of the ryots from the oppression of the renters; and that under Section XLI, Regulation XXVII, A. D. 1802, the zillah court will be able to give prompt redress.

56. For the foregoing reasons, we shall, with the permission of the Honourable the Governor in Council, exercise our discretion in establishing a lease village-rent, in the several unsettled districts, from the commencement of the ensuing Fusly.

We have the honour to be, Honourable Sir, Your most obedient humble servants,  
Fort St. George, (Signed) A. FALCONAR.  
25 April 1808. J. HODGSON.  
W. THACKERAY.

Resolutions of Govern-  
ment as to Triennial  
Village Leases.

Resolved, to acquaint the Board of Revenue, that as the foregoing letter recommends a considerable change in the system of revenue management, which has been lately observed at this presidency, the board have considered, with particular attention, the opinions which they have submitted on a question of so much importance to the prosperity of the country, and to the financial resources of the government.

From the great ability and success which distinguished the administration of the late principal collector of the Ceded Districts, the board concur with the Board of Revenue, in attaching weight to the observations of that officer, on the subject of this discussion; and as the Report of Lieutenant Colonel Munro appears, on the whole, to contain (according to his conception of the subject) a distinct view of the relative advantages of the two modes of settlement, which he has described in that paper, it is satisfactory to the board to be enabled to proceed to a decision, under a full knowledge of all the arguments which appear applicable to the question.

The board think it probable that a temporary ryotwar settlement, under the vigilant management of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, may have been attended with considerable benefit to the country, and in the advancement of the public revenue. But after the fullest consideration of the opinions stated by that officer, the board feel no difficulty in recording their conviction, that a permanent ryotwar settlement, on the plan proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, would be impracticable, without incurring a sacrifice of revenue, incompatible with the demands of the public service; and even under such a sacrifice, the practicability of effecting a settlement of that nature in perpetuity, appears more than questionable.

The board observe, that the whole system proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, involves a constant exercise of that domiciliary controul on the part of the officers of revenue, which it is a leading object of the permanent settlement to exclude. It is at the same time obvious, that Lieutenant Colonel Munro has not sufficiently appreciated the advantages of a zemindary settlement, which has been attended with great benefit, and to have been free from most of the objections supposed by that officer.

The board are disposed to impute, in a considerable degree, the partiality evinced by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, in favour of a ryotwar settlement, to the effects of long habit, and to the success with which that mode of management was attended, while in his hands; but independently of the immediate diminution of revenue, which a permanent ryotwar settlement would occasion, it is evident that there could be no adequate security for the future payment, even of the reduced revenue; and that the whole collections would probably, for a long period of years, continue subject to continued fluctuation, and to the heavy charges incidental to a detailed system of revenue administration.

The board observe, that considerable weight has been attached by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, to the advantage to be derived from the future improvement of waste lands, under the supposition, that it will form a direct augmentation of the public revenue. It has been ever established, on the principles of the permanent settlement, that the government does not look to any advantage of that nature, beyond the general benefit of increasing the amount of the public taxes, in proportion to the increased resources of the country. In the improvement of the waste lands, will be undoubtedly an object of great advantage; but the board are satisfied that the attainment of it, will be best secured under the operation of a permanent settlement, by removing as much as possible, any controul or exercise of private rights; as the experience of all ages has sufficiently evinced, that the extension of population and agricultural improvement will be generally proportioned, to the degree in which these sources of national strength and wealth, may be freed from public restriction.

Under this view of the subject, the board have no hesitation in deciding, that the attempt to conclude a perpetual ryotwar settlement, would be improper, and probably impracticable; and as the board have great doubts whether even a temporary settlement of that nature, can in most cases be deemed desirable, particularly under the present system of management, it appears advisable that it should be entirely abandoned.

The board fully concur in the reasons which the Board of Revenue have stated in favour

favour of the measure of concluding a village-rent in the Ceded Districts, as also, in the other districts not permanently settled, for the period of three years. This mode of settlement, appears to accord with the long established usage of the country, to be compatible with its progressive improvement, to be adapted to the established system of internal judicature, and to have the advantage of facilitating the future introduction of the permanent settlement.

Resolved, accordingly, to authorize the Board of Revenue to carry into effect the measure which they have proposed on this subject, so soon as it may be practicable.

Resolved, to desire that the attention of the Board of Revenue may be in the mean time directed, to the preparation of the materials to enable them to propose an arrangement for effecting a permanent settlement at the end of three years, in the districts which may admit of the introduction of that system; and the board are willing to hope, that the system of village-rents now sanctioned, will afford the means of effecting an early considerable reduction in the charges of collection.

With respect to the observations of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, regarding the effects of the new system of judicature, the board trust that actual experience has sufficiently evinced, that the operation of the judicial regulations, is not liable to the most material of the objections which have been pointed out. It may be proper, however, to call on the collectors of the Ceded Districts, to report whether the inconveniences that have been described, have, or have not, been experienced, in that part of the country.

Resolutions of Government as to Triennial Village Leases.

**EXTRACT** Proceedings of the Board of Revenue, at Fort St. George, the 11th of July 1868.

READ the following Letter from the Chief Secretary to Government:

To the President and Members of the Board of Revenue.

Letter from Government to the Board of Revenue, in answer to their Report on Triennial Village Leases.

Gentlemen,

1. I AM directed by the Honourable the Governor in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo.

2. As that letter recommends a considerable change in the system of revenue management, which has been lately observed at this presidency, the Governor in Council has considered with particular attention the opinions which you have submitted, on a question of so much importance to the prosperity of the country, and to the financial resources of the government.

3. From the great ability and success which distinguished the administration of the late principal collector of the Ceded Districts, the Governor in Council concurs with you in attaching weight to the observations of that officer, on the subject of this discussion; and as the Report of Lieutenant Colonel Munro appears, on the whole, to contain (according to his conception of the subject) a distinct view of the relative advantages of the two modes of settlement, which he has described in that paper, it has been satisfactory to the Governor in Council to be enabled to proceed to a decision, under a full knowledge of all the arrangements, which appear applicable to the question.

4. The Governor in Council thinks it probable that a temporary ryotwar settlement, under the vigilant management of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, may have been attended with considerable benefit to the country, and in the advancement of the public revenue. But after the fullest consideration of the opinions stated by that officer, the Governor in Council feels no difficulty in recording his conviction, that a permanent ryotwar settlement, on the plan proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, would be impracticable, without incurring a sacrifice of revenue, incompatible with demands of the public service; and even under such a sacrifice, the practicability of effecting a settlement of that nature in perpetuity, appears more than questionable.

5. The Governor in Council observes, that the whole system proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, involved a constant interference with the cultivators, and a constant exercise of that domiciliary controul on the part of the officers of revenue, which it is a leading object of the permanent settlement to exclude. It is at the same time obvious, that Lieutenant Colonel Munro has not sufficiently appreciated the advantages of a zemindari settlement, which has been proved by experience to have been attended with great benefit, and to have been free from most of the objections, supposed by that officer.

6. The Governor in Council is disposed to impute, in a considerable degree, the partiality evinced by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, in favour of a ryotwar settlement, to the effects of long habit, and to the success with which that mode of management was attended, while in his hands; but independently of the immediate diminution of revenue, which a permanent ryotwar settlement would occasion, it is evident that there can be no adequate security for the future payment, even of the reduced revenue; and the whole collections would probably, for a long period of years, continue subject to continual fluctuation, and to the heavy charges incidental to a detailed system of revenue administration.

7. The Governor in Council observed, that considerable weight has been attached by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, to the advantage to be derived from the future improvement of waste lands, under the supposition that it will form a direct augmentation of the public revenue. It has been, however, established, on the principles of the permanent settlement, that the government does not look to any advantage of that nature, beyond the general benefit of increasing the amount of the public taxes, in proportion to the increased resources of the country. In this view, the improvement of the waste lands

Letter from Govern-  
ment to the Board of  
Revenue, in answer to  
their Report on Trien-  
nial Village Leases.

will be undoubtedly an object of great advantage; but the Governor in Council is satisfied, that the attainment of it, will be best secured, under the operation of a permanent settlement, by removing as much as possible any controul from the exercise of private rights; as the experience of all ages has sufficiently evinced, that the extension of population and agricultural improvement, will be generally proportioned to the degree in which those sources of national strength and wealth, may be freed from public restriction.

8. Under this view of the subject, the Governor in Council has no hesitation in deciding, that the attempt to conclude a perpetual ryotwar settlement, would be improper, and probably impracticable; and as the Governor in Council has great doubts whether even a temporary settlement of that nature, can in most cases be deemed desirable, particularly under the present system of judicature, it appears advisable that it should be entirely abandoned.

9. The Governor in Council entirely concurs in the reasons which you have stated in favor of the measure of concluding a village-rent in the Ceded Districts, as also in the other districts not permanently settled, for the period of three years. This mode of settlement appears to accord with the long established usage of the country, to be compatible with its progressive improvement, to be adapted to the established system of internal judicature, and to have the advantage of facilitating the future introduction of the permanent settlement. The Governor in Council accordingly authorized you to carry into effect the measure which you have proposed on this subject, so soon as it may be practicable.

10. The Governor in Council desires that your attention may be in the meantime directed, to the preparation of the materials, to enable you to propose an arrangement for effecting a permanent settlement at the end of three years, in the districts which may admit of the introduction of that system: and the Governor in Council is willing to hope, that the system of village-rents now sanctioned, will afford the means of your effecting, an early and considerable reduction in the charges of collection.

11. With respect to the observations of Lieut. Col. Munro, regarding the effects of the new system of judicature, the Governor in Council trusts, that actual experience has sufficiently evinced, that the operation of the judicial regulations, is not liable to the most material of the objections which have been pointed out. It may be proper, however, to call on the collectors of the Ceded Districts, to report whether the inconveniences that have been described, have, or have not, been experienced, in that part of the country.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen, Your most obedient servant,

Fort St. George,  
May 25th, 1808.

(Signed)

G. BUCHAN, Chief Sec. to Government.

Resolutions of Board  
of Revenue, as to the  
introduction of Trien-  
nial Village Leases.

Resolved, under the authority conveyed in the foregoing letter, that orders be issued for discontinuing the system of annual settlements with individual ryots, in those districts wherein that system continues to have effect, and for establishing, in its stead, village-rents on lease, for a term of three years.

The collectors having before them, the accounts of the extent of cultivation, of the jumina, and of the actual collections of each village, for a series of years past, will not, it is presumed, experience any difficulty in determining an adequate, moderate and equitable rent; at the same time, in the correct and successful application of these data, much will necessarily depend on the judgment and attention of the local authorities.

The amount of the rents, when determined upon, must be understood to be payable under all circumstances, extraordinary calamities excepted; in which case, remission may be necessary to a certain extent, and will be granted, at the direction of government, but not until after a full and satisfactory enquiry shall have been made, and authority obtained for the purpose.

It may occur, in particular villages, or perhaps in particular talooks, the effects of adverse seasons, or other contingent calamities, may have been experienced, in so extraordinary a degree, that the accounts of former years may not furnish a result sufficiently favourable, to be adopted as the basis of a rent on lease; while the means of the people, under such circumstances, would not be likely to ensure the due discharge of a rent on higher terms, even should they be disposed to accede to it.

The collectors, in such cases, will be permitted, if they should deem it advisable; to make the rent progressive, to defer the lease, to limit the term of their engagements to one year, including them either with the ryots of the villages, collectively, or individually, as before, upon such conditions as may appear to them, to be best calculated to guard against any necessary sacrifice of revenue.

For the engagements for the rents on lease shall have been concluded, the execution of ordinary repairs for the security of the revenue will be left to the renters; but repairs of extraordinary nature, or new works calculated to increase the revenue, will, when found to be necessary, be taken at the expense of government, on due consideration of the advantages to be derived from them, and on the condition of a proportionate increase of rent.

It is reasonable that the village renters in general, will be readily disposed to enter into engagements of this nature, tending, as they must, to the mutual benefit of themselves and of government; but should they refuse, in any case, to advance their rent, in an equitable proportion to the projected expenditure, and expected advantages, such works must then necessarily be deferred, and others executed in villages, whose renters may be more reasonably disposed.

It is desirable, in the districts where the right denominated merassée right, is understood to exist, that the rents should, in every practicable case, be concluded with all the merassadars of the respective villages, and that they should be, jointly and separately, responsible for the amount; it being at the same time understood, that the personal and real property of individuals defaulting for their proportion of the rent, is in the first instance, liable for the balances.

balances, and the difference only (in the event of their property being insufficient to answer the demand) to be made good, by the other merassadars of the same village, under their joint agreement with the circar.

In cases where any of the merassadars may refuse to accede to reasonable terms of rent, the collectors will, at their discretion, enter into engagements with one or more merassadars or should the whole of them refuse, the collectors will, in such case, conclude engagements with any other individual, though he be not a merassadar, who may be willing to undertake the rent, or he will make the rent, ryotwar. It should, however, be an object with the collectors to avoid giving occasion to future complaint on the part of any merassadar, of having been refused a share in the rent.

In districts where merasse right is not understood or defined, the collectors will have no difficulty in determining to whom the rent should preferably be granted, such as *Potails*, *Mahajens*, *Nantumcars*, *Gours*, *Kadeem*, *Kanpoours*, &c. by whichever of these names the heads of villages, in the various provinces, are distinguished, and even to the common resident inhabitants, in preference to strangers. *Pyccarries*, whether *oolcoodic* or *paracoodie*, cannot be considered to have a right to a share in the rent, without the consent of the head inhabitants, as above described; but may be admitted, in all cases where these inhabitants may not object to their admission.

In all cases, with whomsoever the rent may be concluded, pottahs must be issued by the renters to the cultivating ryots, for their mutual security, against loss on the one hand, and oppression on the other.

The system of village-rents, has been recently introduced with advantage in Tanjore, and in the districts of Dindigul and Madura; and as the muchelkas taken from the renters in these districts, may in some degree, serve as a guide to others, it is resolved to circulate them for that purpose; it being fully understood, that it is not the intention of the board to confine the collectors to the observance of these, or any other forms in particular, farther than may be consistent with the general principles prescribed.

In the opinion of the board, it is desirable that the process for the recovery of balances, as also all prosecutions which may hereafter arise, with relation to the rent, should be grounded chiefly on voluntary agreements of this nature, preferably to the promulgation of any general regulations; because there is much difficulty in providing, by a general regulation, for the various local peculiarities; while it cannot be doubted, that agreements of the nature adverted to, bearing the signature of the parties, would be received as evidence of their engagements, and be binding upon them; the collectors will also, by these means, be enabled to provide, in separate clauses, for any special conditions which may be required from the inhabitants of any particular village, regarding the distribution of water, partial repairs, and for any other object of the like nature.

The board have only further to remark, that the establishment of village rents on lease, will not preclude the prosecution of the survey, or equalization of the rates of assessment, to a conclusion, in districts where that work may not have been already completed; but lest any obstacles might be opposed by the leaseholders, it may be proper to provide for this object, by a separate clause in the muchelka to be taken from them.

It will be proper to insert a clause in all the muchelkas, binding the renters not to exact a higher rate of assessment from the cultivated land, than that fixed by the survey; or where there has been no survey, higher rates of warum or of teerwa, than that taken by the circar in Fusly 1217; but there is no occasion to restrict the renters from reducing the rates of assessment of warum or of teerwa, where they may find it their interest to do so.

The board will furnish the collectors with separate orders respecting the duties to be required from curnums, during the lease.

It is desirable that the board should have the means of judging of the equitableness of the rents concluded by collectors. Collectors will accordingly prepare, for transmission to the board, as soon as may be in their power, statements in books, of the actual collections, from each village in each talook, from the date of the acquisition by the Company, of their respective districts.

(No. 1.)—Form.—Translation of a Muchelka, taken from all the Merassadars of the Village of \_\_\_\_\_, authorizing the principal Merassadars thereof to act as Kariakarema for the Village; dated \_\_\_\_\_

"We, the undersigned merassadars, of the village of \_\_\_\_\_, do hereby appoint \_\_\_\_\_ and authorize \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, principal merassadars of \_\_\_\_\_ village; to proceed to the cutcheree of the principal collector, and perform such agreement or muchelka, regarding the jumabundy settlement of our village, from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_, being three years, as may be required by the \_\_\_\_\_; and we do hereby bind ourselves to agree to any amount \_\_\_\_\_ village, that may be settled by them, personally with the circar, and to not accede \_\_\_\_\_ We give the muchelka with our free will and consent: in witness whereof, \_\_\_\_\_ unto set our signature."

(No. 2.)—Form.—Translate of a Pattiam, or Cowle, \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_, Renters of \_\_\_\_\_ Village, in the Talook of \_\_\_\_\_

"1. You \_\_\_\_\_ having jointly and severally agreed to rent the \_\_\_\_\_ village, named \_\_\_\_\_, and the hamlets under mentioned, dependent thereon, for three years, viz. Fusly \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ having thereby, jointly and severally, become liable to the profit and loss arising \_\_\_\_\_ therefrom."



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- “ therefrom, and responsible for the amount rent of each year, you engage to abide by the conditions of this your written muchelka to the Company.  
 2. “ Your rent consists of the village , and following hamlets; viz.  
 3. “ For the above village and hamlets, you bind yourselves and your heirs to pay the circar, the following rent per year, according to kistbundy annexed.

	S <sup>r</sup> P <sup>r</sup>	F <sup>r</sup>	C.
“ For Fusly - - - - -			
“ Ditto - - - - -			
“ Ditto - - - - -			

4. To ensure the circar against any loss, by your failure in the afore-mentioned monthly payments, you will engage to pay interest for arrears, at the rate of one per cent. per month: as also, all charges the circar may incur, in realizing the rent from your under-tenants, according to the Regulations provided for the collection of arrears from revenue defaulters.

5. In order that there may be no cause for dispute between you and your ryots, you will engage, according to the Regulations, to issue pottahs and receive razanamahts, either for warum, or for teerwah, from each individual paying rent to you. You are aware that unless such agreements exist, your demands for rent are illegal; and that, on reference to the zillah court, your complaints will not be recognizable.

In addition to the penalty prescribed by law, you will bind yourselves to pay a fine to the circar, of 24 star pagodas, in every instance where it can be proved that your rents have been collected, without previously issuing pottahs, and receiving razanamahts from each individual ryot. The fine to be realized from you, the same as an arrear of revenue, as enacted by the Regulations.

6. You will further engage to make no collections from the under ryots, on any account whatever, but the amount specified in the pattiom. Should it be proved that you have acted contrary to this your engagement, you will bind yourselves, not only to refund such additional receipts with interest, but also to pay a fine to the circar, of 24 star pagodas, for every offence: for this purpose, the collector will establish an early investigation into the actual collections of the village, and compare them with the pallioms given by you to your ryots. The fine to be realized from you, the same as an arrear of revenue, according to the Regulations.

7. The charges on account of *warakom* and *murramut*, required in the village and hamlets under your rent, shall be defrayed by you; but as the repairs of all extensive works can only be accomplished by the circar, you will then apply for assistance.

8. As the *reooliom mannum* is fixed, you will allow to each enaumdah, his enaum, as has been continued and entered in the circar dulters; receive from each a receipt, and employ them in their respective duties. Whenever they act improperly in the circar concerns, you will state the same to the circar, prove their misconduct by two good witnesses, and abide by the orders given: you are not to disobey any of them, without authority.

9. You will engage to deliver to the naut curnum, all and every account connected with your village, &c. and to furnish the circar with such accounts as may be required.

10. You will engage to continue the *davudayem*, *brumudayum* and *chillary mannum*s, as hitherto, to the present possessors of those enaums, and to receive their receipts. In the event of the death of any enaumdah, to whomsoever the circar shall deem proper to grant a sunnud, as rightfully entitled to the enaum of the deceased, you will grant it to such authorized person accordingly.

When an enaumdah dies, you will report the same to the circar, within three days: you are not to suppress the report, or either grant the enaum of your own accord to any other person, or secure it to yourselves.

Should you have acted contrary to this engagement, and it be proved, you will not only be answerable to the circar (or to the person rightfully entitled to the enaum in question) for the revenues thereof, with interest due thereon, but also submit to such fine as may be imposed on you, for such violation of your engagement.

11. In the event of failure to discharge the amount of your rent, you will bind yourselves to become liable to all the penalties prescribed by law, for revenue defaulters, under written engagements to the circar. Should an arrear of revenue be due from you at the expiration of the first (or any succeeding) Fusly, it shall be at the option of the circar, to give the rent to another person, and you will bind yourselves to be responsible (under the penalties of the law, for revenue defaulters) to be answerable for the loss, should any occur, between the first and second amount rent.

For every payment made by your ryots, you will engage to pass receipts immediately in the hand-writing of the naut curnum, and countersigned by you; and you are bound to pay your rent to the circar, in no other coins but those fixed under mentioned. (the coins, and their relative exchange.)

12. Should a ryot refuse to come to a settlement with you in the proper season, for the occupancy of land, you will obtain a document showing his reasons, attested by four respectable witnesses, and deposit it with the curnum; and you shall then either make over the land in dispute, to another inhabitant of the village, or retain it, under your immediate cultivation. This circumstance, whenever it occurs, you will report to the tehsildar, within three days. The responsibility of this measure rests with you, and you will be answerable to the adawlut, for any infringement of the Regulations. At the same time, you will engage not to demand a higher teerwah for lands under cultivation, than was established by survey; in consideration whereof, you are declared at liberty to make such arrangements with your ryots, for the cultivation of all waste lands, as you may mutually agree on.

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14. As the welfare and prosperity of the ryots placed under your protection by the present engagement, demands a strict observance of every clause of the foregoing mocheika, you will consider the circar to be authorized, by this your agreement, to remove you from the situation of renters; should it be established, to the satisfaction of the collector, that you have wilfully neglected to obey the terms of your mocheika: and you will further bind yourselves to consider the judicial regulations, as the sole guide of your conduct towards your ryots, as well as all other regulations which hereafter may be enacted by government. Should the ryots of your village, fail to pay the demands on them according to kistbundy, after the 30th of the month, you are authorized to cause the property of such ryots to be distrained, according to regulations, and sold by the commissioner for the recovery of the arrears.

Ordered, That the foregoing proceedings of the board, relative to the substitution of village rents on lease, in lieu of the system of annual settlements with individual ryots, be transmitted to the different collectors.

The board do not deem it to be necessary to enter at length into an exposition of the reasons which induced them to recommend, and government to approve, the change of system proposed. It may be proper, however, to state, that the measure has been greatly influenced by considerations connected with the established system of judicature, to which the ryotwar mode of administration could with difficulty, be brought to assimilate.

The principal objection which has been urged against village rents, is, that the influence of the head inhabitants may, under that system, be exerted to the oppression or injury of the common ryots; but when the measures are considered, which have been already taken for defining the demands on the ryots; the precautions which will continue to be used for securing them against exaction, by the issue of pottahs; the additional security which the courts afford, and the appointment of commissioners, which the board hope will soon take place, aided by a vigilant superintendence on the part of the local officers of revenue:—All these circumstances considered, the apprehensions of danger from oppression, are, in the opinion of the board, very materially diminished.

Neither is the system of village-rents, as some have supposed, incompatible with the progressive improvement of the country and increase of revenue. On the contrary, the principle of the system, evidently holds out great advantages to the renters, and to the ryots, from the extension of cultivation during the lease: advantages to which government must, in all cases, ultimately partake, and in many cases, immediately, where that effect may be produced, by means of public assistance, in the execution of repairs.

Although in the foregoing proceedings, the principle is laid down, that the public aid, when afforded, should be repaid, with a proportion of the advantage resulting from it, it may possibly be found to be advisable, in certain situations, that the ordinary aid of tuccavy and maramut should not be discontinued altogether, even though unattended with any immediate return. In short, the collectors will observe, that the transition proposed, from ryotwar to village-rents, upon the principles which have been stated, by no means involves a dereliction of the fundamental principles of the former system of management; the change is calculated chiefly to diminish the detail of interference with the private concerns of the cultivators, to give an additional impulse to industry, to approximate, by means of this change, to the formation of estates on permanent rents, and especially to induce a greater facility of collection and consequent reduction of charges, on that account; to which latter object, their particular attention will be directed.

In all practicable cases, it is desirable that the issue of tuccavy should be made with caution; and not without satisfactory evidence of its necessity.

They will observe, from the foregoing proceedings, that a discretionary authority is granted to them, to defer the establishment of a lease, if they should deem it to be advisable; but in the opinion of the board, the exercise of this discretion needs not to be resorted to, unless in very particular cases, because the same end may generally be attained by means of a *russud*, or progressive increasing jumma, in each year of the lease.

On any point of doubt or difficulty, connected with the introduction of the system of village-rents, they will consult with the board; and it is necessary that the arrangements which they may conclude, shall not be considered final, until they may have received the board's sanction.

Ordered, That the Forms adverted to in the proceedings foregoing, be transmitted to the several collectors.

With reference to the concluding paragraph of the chief secretary's letter, which it is agreed to forward to the collectors in Bellary and Cuddapah: Ordered, that their attention be called to Colonel Munro's Report, dated 15th August 1807; and that they be desired to state whether the inconveniences which are there described, as connected with the operation of the judicial regulations, have, or have not, been experienced; and if they have, to what extent.

The collector in the northern division of Arcot, will understand these orders as extending to the district of Satewaid, in common with the rest of the unsettled districts under his management.

If any offer could be obtained from an unobjectionable person, to take the estate of Cuddalore, at the permanent rent proposed by the board, the board would be disposed to grant it, without the purchase nuzzerana; but otherwise, the collector in the southern division of Arcot, will consider the orders for establishing village-rents, as applicable to this part, in common with the rest of the districts under his management.

## Appendix, No. 31.

DOCUMENTS illustrative of the Question,—Whether ZEMINDARRY or RYOTWAR SETTLEMENTS are most expedient to be adopted, *as a permanent System*, in the unsettled Provinces subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George.

[*Fide* Extract from REPORT of Collector of POLIGAR PESHAWAR; dated 29th December 1800; inserted in Appendix, No. 25.]

Extract from REPORT of Collector of DINDIGUL; dated 31st March 1800.

Documents relative to  
Zemindarry and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Dindigul

\* of Instructions to Col-  
lectors, dated 15 Oct.  
1799.

THE resolution of government to dispose of the proprietary right in the circar lands, by sale, according to the manner and amount specified in para. 58\*, I conceive to be generally impracticable, from the poverty of the description of people they expect to become the purchasers; as well as from the objection these very people would have, to purchase a proprietary right, in what prescription had already made their own.

The Nautamcars certainly consider the farm they cultivate, as their own property; and no government, save the Mussulman, appears to have considered the soil its own, or itself at liberty to deprive the inferior subject, at its will. In forming the present benevolent system, this solitary precedent surely will not operate as an example to act upon; but where no written document is found, what has been known, as usage, will be established, as law. This would confirm the prescriptive right of many industrious natives to the lands they have long occupied; and be the certain means of making them comprehend, whence these advantages were derived.

Extract REPORT of Major MUNRO, principal Collector of CANARA; dated 9th November 1800; containing his Sentiments on the PERMANENT SETTLEMENT of that Province.

Para. 17.—After having given my sentiments as to the amount of the assessment that ought to form the basis of the Permanent Settlement, it now only remains to offer a few observations on the mode which it would be most eligible to follow, in dividing the country into estates, so as both to promote improvement, and ensure the collection of the revenue.—In countries where private property in land is unknown, because the whole is the property of government; and where the general poverty of the cultivators, disables them from making any improvements; the dividing the land into estates of about five or six thousand pagodas, public rent, and giving them away, or disposing of them for a price to men of property, where such can be found, may possibly have some advantages; but in Canara, where almost all land is private property, derived from gift or purchase, or descent from an antiquity, too remote to be traced; where there are more title deeds; and where the validity of these deeds have probably stood more trials, than all the estates in England; great proprietors cannot be established, without annihilating all the rights of the present landlords; nor do I believe that, by any arrangement for placing a number of small estates under the collection of one head landlord, any facility in collection, or any security for revenue, would be obtained, that may not be obtained, from letting the estates remain, as they now stand.

It may be objected, that the smallness of estates, involving as a consequence, want of property, incapacitates the owners from bestowing upon them the due degree of culture, and subjects the public revenue to frequent failures; but I am convinced that these objections, are groundless. If we wish to introduce a system that shall be permanent, we must consider not only what the state of property now is, but also what it is likely to be hereafter. The benefits expected to result from the formation of large estates, are, no doubt, the saving of detail in accounts; the improvement of the country; and the security of revenue, from the lands being in the possession of a few wealthy owners, instead of a great number of wealthy cultivators. Supposing that the system of great estates, does really produce all these advantages, they can only be temporary; for where there are no entails nor artificial restraints on the transfer of land; where there are no exclusive rights of primogeniture; where the progress of population is urged on, by early marriage and abundance of food; and where it is common to supply, by adoption, the want of children; every great estate must in a short time, be divided into a number of small ones. A widely extended division of property, is the point to which things are of themselves, continually hastening, and to which, they must finally arrive, unless obstructed by violent regulations. Superior industry, several successions concentrating in one person, or other causes, may keep up a few large estates; but such instances will be rare, and will bear no comparison to those of the small ones, which will be continually formed, by the operation of unrestrained transfer, and of division among all the sons of every succeeding generation. Small estates may therefore be considered, as the arrangement of nature. To think of dividing Canara into great estates, would only be attempting to carry it backwards, a century or two; and forcing it from that state to which, it must again inevitably return. The effect of the Bengal system on the provinces of Coromandel coast, and probably on Bengal itself, will be no more than, after a long period of time, to make the condition of the great body of the inhabitants, that which those of Canara, now is.

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With respect to the expediency of having great substantial landholders, who may be responsible to government for the revenue, there seems to be no reason to conjecture that it might not be collected, with equal ease and regularity, from small proprietors. A tyrannical government has drained the resources of this country, and left the inhabitants less able than they formerly were, to cultivate their lands; but the same evil, would have taken place, and in a much greater degree, had the lands been divided among great owners of estates, of from five to ten thousand pagodas each; because it would have been much easier to have impoverished the country, by extorting an exorbitant assessment from a few who possessed all its wealth, than it would have been, had it been divided among a multitude of small proprietors. Though there can be no very rich owners where estates are small; yet the aggregate produce of the land may be, and probably always is, greater than when the whole belongs to a few principal landholders; and government have therefore, a greater fund as a security for their revenue.

It may be said, that there must be a certain limit, beyond which, estates cannot be subdivided, without leaving so little surplus a rent, as to be insufficient for the subsistence of the landlord, and that he would then be forced to withhold a part of the public demand, in order to make up the difference. Should such a case ever happen, the remedy might always be found, in selling the estate: the very existence of the case, however, supposes a fullness of population, not likely to be soon experienced, and which, if it were, would compensate in a thousand ways, for such accident.

The division of lands in Canara, however it may have affected individuals, does not seem ever to have injured the public revenue. Though it has no doubt sometimes reduced the descendants of independent landlords, to the rank of tenants, and even of labourers; it has most likely, by employing more labour, increased the gross produce of the soil: it has not disabled the owners from providing for every expense which the best cultivation requires. It has diminished their property, but it has also, in the same proportion, diminished the lands which they are to cultivate with that property; and by confining their personal management to a narrower space, it has rendered it more efficacious. The wealth accumulated in the hands of great proprietors, may be supposed to enable them to undertake extensive improvements, and to carry on agriculture with a spirit, beyond the power of petty landholders; but even allowing, what may be doubted, that the wealth of a great landholder is greater than the aggregate wealth of a number of small proprietors, whose estates together are equal in extent to his, it is not likely to be so productive; for it never can be managed with either so much skill or economy. Whatever superiority he may have over them in fortune, is more than counterbalanced, by the deep interest which every one of them feels, in looking after his little spot; and by the unremitting attention which both his attachment to it, and his necessity, impel him to exert, in order to extract from it, its greatest possible produce.

The expenses of Indian, must not be measured by those of European husbandry. Exclusive of tanks, there is hardly any expense which may not be defrayed, by the smallest, as easily as by the greatest proprietors; and even tanks themselves are unnecessary in Canara. The small estates are in general better cultivated than the great ones; and their owners are as regular as the great owners, in discharging their kists. Among the numerous instances which have come before me, of their having been violently dispossessed of their lands, or of their having fled and left them waste, on account of balances under the late government, there is not one, in which these balances can fairly be attributed to the rent alone, nor in which they have not arisen, from fines, anticipations, and other acts of oppression. In whatever way I view the question of great and small proprietors, I am perfectly satisfied that the preference ought to be given to small ones, and that government ought to make its settlements, immediately with them. Under such a system, the gross produce of the country will be greater, and the collection of revenue will be as regular, as under that of great landholders. Men who have been accustomed to see the frequent failures among the lower classes of farmers, in other parts of India, will not readily admit that a mass of small proprietors can be punctual; experience, however, in this province, has demonstrated, that the regularity of payment is not affected, by the smallness of the estate.

Though my own opinion is decidedly in favour of small proprietors; yet as government have determined to introduce every where, the system of Bengal permanent settlement, it becomes my duty to point out in what manner it may be accomplished, in Canara.—It is evident, that as the lands of Canara have for ages been private property, that we are not at liberty to make the same disposition of them, as might be done where they belonged to government. If it is argued that no such difficulty has occurred in Bengal, it may be answered, that the landed property of Bengal is most likely, of a very different nature from that of Canara, which is both more antient and more perfect than that of England; because it is more widely diffused, and less clogged with conditions. If in Bengal, the circular grants of enaums are for lands, and not for money; and if the lands are held by a few great, instead of a multitude of small, proprietors; it may with certainty be pronounced, that its landed property is of modern date, and that it is an usurpation of revenue officers and head inhabitants together. The very circumstance of the existence of such a property, having been doubted, is a strong argument against its being of long standing. No man who has ever been in Canara, can ever entertain any doubt with regard to its land, being private property. As the property must therefore remain as it now is, all that can be done is, to divide the country into a certain number of great tracts, formed by the union of several small ones, under one head. The most convenient arrangement would be, the antient one of maganies or grams; and the size of estates to be, from one hundred to five thousand pagodas jamma. To break in upon antient boundaries and landmarks, for the sake of ideal advantages to be derived from squaring

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estates, would occasion much trouble to the collector, and no small discontent among the inhabitants, because these boundaries, serve not only to divide lands, but also particular tribes or families, who form distinct communities in their respective villages. Where nagarias are about five thousand pagodas jumma, they ought to be divided into two or more estates; and where they are small, two or three, ought to be formed into one estate. The average ought to be, about one thousand pagodas jumma. It could answer no good purpose, and might produce mischief, to make any estates above five thousand pagodas, because the proprietors might in time, become a kind of petty poligars. All past events in this country show, that great landed property has always had a tendency to excite a turbulent spirit in the possessor, which has been favoured, by the inaccessible nature of the hills and woods among which he resides. An estate of ten thousand pagodas, in most parts of Canara, and in every part of Soonda, would place under the landlords so large a district, furnished with retreats so strong, that were he to become refractory, it would be difficult to reduce him to obedience. Such precautions, may be said to be unnecessary, because gratitude for the benefits he has received from the British government, and the impossibility of his bettering his condition, will preserve him in his allegiance; but the love of distinction and independence, is a much stronger and more universal passion, than gratitude; and though it might be supposed, that the hopelessness of success, and of course his own interest, would deter him from any opposition to authority, yet it is well known that men, on such occasions, do not always maturely weigh distant consequences; and it would therefore be the more prudent plan, not to hazard an arrangement, whose stability is to rest on gratitude.

After dividing the country into great estates, each of these estates, ought to be made over to the potail or principal proprietor of the small estates, of which they are respectively composed, in perpetuity. As he has no property in any of the lands composing the great estates, except those which were before his own, he can only be constituted a kind of lord of the manor; but as he must be responsible for all failures, he ought to be allowed the following advantages, in order to enable him to perform his engagement:—1st. He ought to have an allowance of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the jumma, to be included in the reduction which I have already proposed; leaving the remaining per cent. to go as an abatement to the mass of inferior proprietors and farmers.—2d. He ought to be vested with proprietary right of all waste lands, to which there are no owners, on condition of his paying the Bednore assessment, the second year after they are brought into cultivation. 3d. All inferior estates which, on failure of heirs, have heretofore been accustomed to revert to the circar, must now revert to him; and become, in every respect, as much his respective property, as his own original estates.

Though the establishment of these Regulations will, I am convinced, answer the end of ensuring the easy realization of a permanent revenue; yet it is obvious that the influence of the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. in facilitating this operation, must every day diminish; because, if it follow the laws of other property, though it now belongs to one man, it must, on his death, be divided, with his estate, among his children. We shall then have several persons, instead of one, to be responsible for the revenue; and as every succeeding generation will increase the number, we shall at last have almost as much detail with the superior landlords, as if we had made a direct settlement with the inferior proprietors. If, with the view of averting this evil, as it is supposed to be, we confine the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. to the eldest son of some single heir, and make him solely responsible, we lessen the security of revenue, because, as we cannot prevent the division of the lands among all the heirs, we have now only the security of a part, instead of that of the whole of them, together with the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for its realization. If we restrict the division of lands to the original estate, and determine that all subsequent acquisitions, whether from the reversion of inferior estates, or the cultivation of circar waste lands, shall go with the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. we introduce the law of entail; and even this can hardly be effected at some unknown remote period, in the many estates in which there is no waste. All system of Indian revenue must, I imagine, end, in making a direct settlement with every independent landholder, without the intervention of any superior lord; and in making every one of them, answerable for his own rent; and the whole of the estates, composing a village or district, answerable for the failure of any particular estate therein, by a second assessment.

Supposing, however, that it may be expedient, for the present, to adopt the system of great estates; the Regulations I have recommended will apply to every part of Canara, and to the greater part of Ankalah, Soondah, and Belghy; but in many villages of Belghy and Ankalah, and throughout the whole of the villages in Soondah, running along the Mahratta frontier, the land belongs to the circar, and may therefore be divided into estates, and given away at the pleasure of government. These villages, are in general in such a desolate state, that a permanent settlement of them, would now be made under very great disadvantages. It would, for many reasons, be best to defer the settlement, not only for them, but of Canara, for at least five years. The collector can hardly, in a shorter period, gain the requisite knowledge of the country, for carrying into execution so important a measure. Time should also be allowed to let the inhabitants become familiarized to their new master, and shake off all distrust and apprehension of change, and to enable them to understand the scope of the system intended to be introduced; and it should also be allowed, in order to let the country recover, after the long series of oppression under which it has suffered. The remissions already granted, have removed every impediment in the way of a desirable end; and in five years, they will work a wonderful improvement in the condition of the inhabitants. Judging from the confidence which they have already shown in our moderation and good faith, I have little doubt that within that period, the value of land will rise so much, that there will scarcely be a single estate which will not find a purchaser, should it be necessary to sell it to pay a balance.

In disposing of the great estates at the final settlement, no price ought to be demanded for them, because, as they were all before private property, upon which the superior landlord has no claim, there is no new advantage attached to his tenure, except the two and a half per cent. nor any in immediate expectation, which can make it worth any valuable consideration. We have no ground to imagine that there will be any such competition for them, as to raise their price. Soncars, and other men of property, are too cautious to lay out their money in land, on the strength of the duration of a new system, and on the faith of a government, to which they have but lately become subject. In provinces which have been near half a century under the Company's authority, they may consider the property which they vest in land, as secure from danger; but here, they will not readily believe that it can be safe; for nothing but the experience of many years will persuade them, that another war may not transfer them, to the dominion of another power. As we must therefore expect no candidates for estates, except among the landholders themselves; and as, from the minute division of land, very few of them can be supposed to be rich, no considerable sum can be expected from them, for great estates. But though they have not the means of making great advances as purchase money; the realization of the revenue, will not be the less secure. It is the wide diffusion of landed property, by which almost every field has a different owner, who is anxious to increase its produce, and who pays his rent with a regularity unknown among tenants at will, that constitutes this security, which will be every day strengthened, by the effect of the abatements which have already been made. These, will operate, both in augmenting the gross produce of the land now in cultivation, and in enabling the owner to obtain, a better price for it:—they will encourage him to enlarge his cocoa-nut plantations, which in a climate so favourable, would have been ten times more numerous than they are, had not the dread of additional assessment, restrained their cultivation; and they will furnish him with the means of cultivating completely, the higher and more unproductive lands of his estates, which, in many of the greater estates, have lain waste almost ever since the Mysore conquest. Canara will probably never be a manufacturing country, because it produces none of the raw materials necessary to render it such; and because the heavy rains, which last so great a part of the year, are an insurmountable obstacle to all operations which require to be carried on, under a clear sky, and in the open air; but the same rains which deny it manufactures, give it a succession of never-failing crops of rice, which place its revenue and its future prosperity, on the firmest foundation; for there can be no danger, that the existing demand for its surplus produce will ever diminish. The province of Malabar, Goa, Bombay, and Arabia, can be no where else, so well supplied; and there is every reason to conclude, that their consumption, by the abolition of all regulations in favour of particular countries, and the reduction of duties, will be increased.

Extract REPORT of Mr. RAVENSHAW, Collector Southern Division of CANARA; dated 30th April 1802; as to the PERMANENT SETTLEMENT of that Division.

IN fixing a permanent land rent in countries that have before been used only to a variable one, as true and equitable as can be defined; being the most just, would certainly be the most eligible plan to follow. Where landed property, however, has been firmly established for ages, and the land tax has been fixed, it is probably the more politic plan, to leave rents nearly in that state, to which the various changes of countries have brought them. As the aggregate here, is certainly low enough for every wished-for purpose, care may be taken, should it, notwithstanding the many objections to the plan, be at last determined to place a number of small estates under one landlord, to make the land tax of the whole, tolerably equal; but to attempt to equalize the rents of the numerous landlords and tenants in the several districts, would cause very great discontent, and might justly be complained of, as an oppressive act. It would in fact, be a tax on industry, by which, chiefly, the gross produce of some, can have increased more than other lands. Besides, any additions now made to those rents which are very low, would fall directly on the present occupants, who may probably have paid a price for the purchase of the estate, equal in proportion to the supposed net produce; and allowing that the estate remains in the hands of the meritorious landlord, who by his own manual labour and the sweat of his own brow, has raised its produce above the level of his neighbours; with what justice can we tax his industry, and at the same time, grant a remission to his neighbour, whose lands, through indolence or other causes, have been and are in so declining a state, as to require it? Some have obtained unimpaired or waste lands, at inferior fixed rents, from some of the preceding governments; others, have had them granted through favour; and, from various other causes, now hold them, at moderate rates: to increase which now, would be to tax the good fortune or conduct of their ancestors.

There is generally as great, or greater irregularity, in the amount net rent derived from landlords from their estates, as in the portion of the gross produce valuation they pay to government as land tax. By the register of lands, which have become the subject of dispute during my late circuit, it appears the landlord's portion of his gross rent varies greatly. This register, however, is by no means to be confided in, that is, as to its statement of the produce of the lands. It seldom becomes necessary, in ascertaining a mere question of right to land, to go into any particular enquiry of the produce, having no time to delay any investigation, merely for that purpose. The register kept by a native I have found, on comparing with my jumrahundy accounts, very incorrect. Some people would appear, even lose by their lands, though in all cases, they must probably have obtained them a large share of the gross produce: for it is contrary to all reason and common sense to suppose they would waste their time and money in the hope of gaining, what a statement, would involve them in loss.



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Major Munro, in his letter of 9th November 1800, after delivering his sentiments very fully in favour of small estates, in which I perfectly concur, has explained, if not the only, certainly the most eligible mode of forming large estates in Canara, by placing a number of small ones under the collection of one head landlord, who would in fact, be little more than a potail of a village is at present; for, without annihilating all the just rights of the present landholders, which they have enjoyed for centuries, I see no way whatever of conveying a proprietary right to a great landlord, to any small estates placed under his collection; nor do I believe any of the objects government have in view, by forming large estates, would be answered thereby. All the claims such a person would have on the petty holders, would be for the amount of land tax payable from their estates. The only inducement any one would have to take on him such a charge, would be the allowances in money, remission of rent, or other remuneration granted him by government: such allowances, together with the great landlords private estates, would be the only security we should have for the land tax, because the only real property he has in the whole estate; for, so long as the small landlords under him, continue to pay their rent, no power can make them answerable for their superior's defalcation; and, as nothing but the right of collecting from the inferiors, could be disposed of, which people would rather avoid than otherwise, it follows that the whole estate of the superior, together with his allowances, must be sold, in most cases, for any thing more than a trifling defalcation.

The number of landlords at the time of Hurry Hur Roi's settlement, was considerably less than at present, and all estates were from 15 to 50 pagodas land rent per annum. From the natural division of property which has succeeded, the number has now increased to 22,709, and the land tax of estates averages from one fanam to 450 pagodas; there are however now, many more under than above 10 pagodas, yet no inconvenience whatever has ever been complained of, nor does any exist in Canara, from the smallness of estates; and perhaps in no part of India is the revenue realized, with greater punctuality or with less trouble. As, therefore, without annihilating the rights of the present proprietors, large estates cannot be constituted; and as resorting to harsh measures, on the grounds of only ideal advantage, would I am convinced, by no means tend to the improvement of the province, in my humble opinion, it would be better to drop the attempt altogether, and to continue the collection from the present small proprietors. Collecting in such detail, must be attended with far greater difficulty and expense to a large proprietor than to government. The farmers know that the sole business of the circar servants is to collect their rents, and which done, that he has no further claim on them; but there are many reasons why they would rather permit a head landlord, when taught to look up to him as their superior, to impose on them, than any public servant, who is with them only for a time. Any one proprietor of land, or other respectable resident, in every space of country yielding one or two thousand pagodas land rent, might be authorized to collect it, from the inferior landlords within his bounds, with an exact register of what he is to collect, and from whom. With an establishment of a shambogue, and a few peons to every magauny, he might do this, with punctuality, and might be recompensed for his trouble by a per-centage on his collections, and by a grant of all the waste land of his collectorate, which however should be liable to forfeiture, in case of his committing any act which might authorize such punishment; otherwise his situation, together with such land, should be hereditary; but the succession confined to such of his heirs as may appear best qualified to hold it. To make larger collections than two or three thousand pagodas at most, would answer no good purpose; and as one person could not so well look to a great charge, it might be attended with many inconveniences. With an establishment of this sort, and two native tehsildars stationed one on either side of the collector's residence, merely to receive the money forthcoming from those quarters, and remit them, I am sure the land tax of my district might be duly realized: All the landlords, within twenty miles on either side the collector's treasury, might pay their money into it.

\*EXTRACT Fort St. George Revenue Consultations, the 22d January 1806.

THE Right honourable the President records the following Minute;

It has always appeared to me, that the exact plan of the permanent settlement of the revenues adopted in Bengal, was not applicable to those territories.

It was apparent to me, that the creation of zemindars, where no zemindaries before existed, was neither calculated to improve the condition of the lower orders of the people, nor politically wise, with reference to the future security of this government. I have thought that the principle of the ryotwar annual settlement, from which such vast advantage has been derived, should form the basis of the permanent settlement. It is a question of vast importance; it demands the greatest consideration.

I have already begun to enter into the enquiry, by correspondence with the collectors, but it is my intention to visit in person every collectorship, for the purpose of carrying on upon the spot, such investigation as will best enable me to satisfy my own mind upon the subject.

My time does not permit me to wade through the voluminous revenue records, which must be examined, in order to collect every information that may bear upon this question. I am prevented also, by a want of knowledge of the languages, to make enquiry, separately and independently of the local authorities.

I therefore require the assistance of an intelligent civil officer, who has had experience in management, and is a good linguist.

William Thackeray is the officer whom I am desirous of selecting as my assistant. With the approbation of the Board, I propose that he may receive six months leave of absence from his station, for this duty.

I recommend, also, that Mr. John Byng be placed in charge of the Zillah Court of Mulsipatam.

Port St. George, January 22d, 1806.

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The Board concurring in the recommendation of the President,  
Ordered, That the necessary information may be communicated to these gentlemen.

•EXTRACT Fort St. George Revenue Consultations, 29th April 1806.

•MEMOIR of Mr. THACKERAY, addressed to the Right Honourable Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, in favour of RYOTWAR PERMANENT SETTLEMENTS.

My Lord,

•ACCORDING to your lordship's command, I have written down the thoughts which have occurred to my mind, respecting the Permanent Settlement. Inexperience, and want perhaps of perception, of all the parts and relations of each system, has prevented my forming a satisfactory opinion on the grand question,—Whether an immediate settlement with the ryots, or the introduction of zemindars, be best. Indeed, as these thoughts have arisen from what I have seen in the Circars and Ceded districts only, it is impossible for me to give any opinion on so important a subject; however, the ideas which have sprung up in my mind, such as they are, are now written down, according to your lordship's orders.

Mr. Thackeray's Memoir.

#### Objections to Permanent Zemindarry:

1. The power of government, will be curtailed.
2. The division of the attributes or qualities of property between proprietary zemindar and occupant ryot, is bad.
3. The remission goes, to the wrong person,—it should go to, the ryot.
4. The ryots will, in some cases, be liable to oppression,—the zemindars, in some cases, to imposition.
5. A ryotwar may be converted into a zemindarry, at any time; but a zemindarry cannot be so easily altered, if found unsuccessful.
6. The government loses the waste.
7. The selling the land, is bad.
8. The inhabitants would dislike being transferred to zemindars.
9. A ryotwar settlement has succeeded here, and will therefore most likely succeed again, better than any innovation to the prejudice of the ryot.
10. The loss of all revenue knowledge, after the zemindarries are sold.

These are the objections to zemindarry, that have occurred to me; and I will discuss them separately.

1. *The power of government will be curtailed.*—In all countries, it may be good to limit the power of the prince; but here, the government must keep as much power as is consistent with private rights, in its own hands. It will therefore be right to limit the demand on the land; but still to keep up as much communication and connection with the people, as possible. It may be considered an axiom, I think, that all internal government is connected with the revenue; that whosoever the people of India pay, him, they regard as their superior, and is the most important person, in regard to themselves. It may be said, that this will wear away in time; however, I do not see that it will. The circar will be removed from the immediate sight of the ryot, and a certain portion of authority, power of getting information, influence, and command of resources, will be transferred to the zemindar, without a sufficient counterbalancing advantage. This will happen, in regard to the ryots, peons, and inhabitants at large, even though they get pottahs from the zemindars; but much more will the waste, give influence. The waste is the grand means of improving the people,—turning the peon into the husbandman. The waste lands afford a great patronage, and particularly affecting the peons, who swarm over the country. If a zemindar is appointed, he becomes the patron of every man, without subsistence. The revenue servants, the cutchere peons, the village officers, must always exist. Would it not be better that all these people, should look up to the circar, and in as much as regards the support of our authority, that the influence, information, and assistance which these people can afford, should be at the service of the government?—If the situation of the Ceded Districts and the Circars be compared, the difference will strike one; that one has been 40 years under our government, and has been subject to continual rebellions and deficiencies of revenue, to this day. The Ceded Districts have been five years in our possession, and although full of turbulent zemindars, and peons, and poligars, who have always been in rebellion against their own native circar; peace has been preserved, the authority of government completely established, and a large revenue collected, and gradually augmented, in spite of two bad seasons. The ryotwar settlement has done this, in the Ceded Districts.

The first thing is to govern this country; then, to govern it well. We must try to unite strength and justice, and to keep as much power in our own hands, as is consistent with justice and the happiness of the body of the people. Why then create zemindars, where none existed before? They had zemindars in Bengal, in the Circars, and some other places; and the opposition which they made to the collectors, was one reason for putting them in; perhaps the strongest reason. Nobody will deny, that the less power the government gives up the better, consistent with proprietary right; and nobody will deny, that in making zemindars, none existed before, we do give up a certain degree of power,—means of information and communication with the people, and command of resources.

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war settlements.

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a right to the cultivation of a certain field, while he continues to cultivate it, and pay the usual rent or rate; but this is hard upon the zemindar, who pays the land tax; because, his management is encumbered with the rights of the ryot, while he is considered to be the proprietor, and must pay the circar rent regularly. It is not therefore, a real landed property: it is an undefined something. Even in making the pottah regulation, they do not seem to have come to any decision on the subject, because that regulation may be construed in favour of either zemindar or ryot; and no provision is made for setting the merassee right of defaulting ryots. Now if he possessed the merassee right, it ought to be sold for arrears, on the same principle that the zemindarry is sold for arrears of revenue. This division of the qualities of property, will, I should think, obstruct improvement; and perhaps it would be better to consider zemindars, land-holders in the full extent of the term: their own interest would prevent great oppression, and they would feel the full pride interest and satisfaction which possession of property conveys, and would be more likely to make improvements. But the zemindars will possess the full absolute property in the waste, and will therefore hold it, on a different tenure from land cultivated at present by ryots. All this, will I think produce trouble and confusion, which the zemindar and ryot will both feel. Besides, property of every kind is liable to a division, and must dwindle every day. Now in the zemindarry system, two kinds of property will go on dividing at the same time; zemindarry property and occupancy property. This may in time, create confusion, and produce a breed of starving proprietors, while it keeps down the increase of occupant cultivators, who would otherwise multiply on what has been set aside to feed the zemindars; nor will the 15 per cent. keep the proprietors, and make up for deficiencies in the course of time, after many subdivisions, unless indeed a great deal of waste is brought into cultivation. But had the waste been kept by the government, the land rent would have come to them; so that, even supposing the waste will go on keeping the families of the proprietors, and making up for deficiencies after subdivisions of estates, still it is bad, because at the expense of government. What does the zemindar now possess, according to the principle on which the motadarry system has been introduced here, but the waste, the 15 per cent. and some sundry advantages? and the waste and the 15 per cent. are just what he should not hold,—the waste, because he holds it for nothing,—the 15 per cent. because it ought to go to the actual cultivators.

3. *The remission goes to the wrong person,—it should go to the ryot.*—The zemindar is not the cultivator, he does not even superintend cultivation, if the ryot be independent of him; and it is more likely that the remission will be applied to marriages and idle expenses, than if given to the ryots. The husbandman in India is the most industrious, parsimonious creature in the world; a stranger to vice, thinking of nothing but cultivating his field, maintaining his family, and paying the circar rent. Why then shall the remission, the main spring of future industry and improvement, be made to a stranger, perhaps a ferocious poligar—an avaricious speculating soucar, or an intriguing dubash, merely to enable him to grow fat, and pay the revenue, in case a bad year should come? Would it not be better to make the remission to the ryot? It would equally tend to the security of the revenue, or perhaps more so; because it would be more likely to be directly applied to the extension and improvement of cultivation. In case of unforeseen misfortunes, the relations of the ryot would assist him; he could mortgage his land, and go on paying his revenue. The ryot is the man who feels as it were, married to his field. What an effect the sense of a property in the soil would have upon him! As it is, under oppression, he still sticks to his field as long as he can. The people in Canara feel this; and every man builds his house in his own field. It is said, a remission to the ryot is applied immediately to the land and farming stock of the country; a remission to the zemindar is applied indirectly, through many channels of soucars, securities, renters, &c. Besides, we talk a great deal about the happiness of the people; how can we increase the happiness of the bulk of the people so much, as by making their possessive, proprietary right, and giving them all the advantages of property and permanency? It may be said, that the rights of the inferior ryots will be secured, at any rate; but if it is admitted that a remission is necessary to convert the lands they cultivate, into saleable property, it must follow, that we withhold the property from them, until we give up the remission to them. Indeed, it seems to me contrary to the benevolent intentions of the Court of Directors, to give all the advantages of the new system, to a set of men, to be created on purpose to enjoy them; and to place in thralldom, those industrious people who constitute the bulk of the people, and by whose labours our armies are in reality paid, our investments provided, and our whole government supported.

4. *The ryots will, in some cases, be liable to oppression; the zemindars, in some cases, to imposition.*—Fifty means might be mentioned, in which this might happen, according to the nature of the men and place, even when pottahs have been given. The zemindars will make collusive engagements, and get ryots to do so; *bujeh kherck* and village expenditure will go on, at a terrible rate, as it does in the Circars; and where, from the little I can learn, and what I can guess, I have no doubt but that there are farmers, and under-farmers, and securities, and all the confusion that arises from them; that pottahs are not given; and that village charges are assessed on the ryot, as formerly.

5. *A ryotwar settlement will be easily converted into a zemindarry, at any time; but a zemindarry cannot so easily be altered, if found unsuccessful.*—After the ryotwar settlement is made, the government may easily turn it into a zemindarry. In this case, the government have only to take 50,000 pagodas jumma of country, and sell, or give it away. In this case, the government will transfer the right of collecting the land-tax from perhaps 3,000 freeholders, the waste, and sundry interests, such a reversion of lands, without owners or heirs. The greater the estate the better, because a per-centage on a great sum, will pay charges, collection, and provide for deficiencies, better than the per-centage on a smaller sum; and therefore the subdivision of the estate hereafter, the operation of land and partition, will be rather hurtful, should such a plan even take place.

place. It would also be right to give up to the zemindar the balance of remission not given up originally to the ryots, but withheld, enable the circar to keep up the additional servants required for a ryotwar settlement; this, which will be a small commission on the revenue, the waste, and the chance of reversions, and the consequence of the station, will induce people to become zemindars most likely; and in this case, the lands of the ryots will be liable to sale for arrears, and would constitute the security for the revenue. The tehsildars of the collectors might become the zemindars, on this plan; if such a system should ever be adopted.

6. *Government loses the waste.*—The loss is considerable; but the loss in actual power is perhaps of more importance. The waste is the means of converting the peons into husbandmen. The government could not give waste to the peons, who swarm all over the country; and if the zemindar did give it to them, and get them to take it, they would be at his service, and look up to him rather than the circar;—but the actual giving away property, without sufficient compensation, is a reason strong enough to prevent giving up the waste in perpetuity, except to actual cultivators, or persons who would take it on speculation, at a rent; more particularly, because other modes of taxation have many objections. Now if the country gets rich, and the wants of government require a greater revenue; they will find it difficult perhaps to invent a tax in any other shape, which will not press harder on the people.

7. *The selling the land is bad.*—Selling the lands, appear to me like the lottery, and to be encouraging gambling. It may be a proof of confidence in government; and the sale of the lands at Masulipatam, was a proof of confidence in the government; but still it always appeared to me like selling the ryots. The only good I could see in it was, that the purchasers being men of great influence, could contrive to keep out plunderers, better than the collectors and magistrate.

8. *The inhabitants would dislike being transferred to zemindars.*

We profess to make the happiness of the people, our great object. Now, the inhabitants in general would not only feel, but would in reality be more secure, if they held their lands immediately from government. In short, unless the settlement be made with them, and the remission be given up to them, they cannot be the secure tenants, which every body seems desirous of constituting them. I have no doubt but that they would prefer a settlement direct with the circar; and in the course of our tour, your Lordship will be able to discover what their own sentiments are; that is, if it be possible to explain the nature of the proposed settlement to them, and to convince them that the government is sincere in its professions, regarding remission and fixed rent. It would be a very difficult thing to explain the nature of property to men, who have been for years subject to oppression, and versed in consequent fraud; and in many places it would be harder still to convince them, that the government would give up the lands for ever, at a low rent; but when they comprehend the full benefit of the proposed system, they would acquiesce in it, with gratitude.

9. *A ryotwar settlement has succeeded here, and will therefore most likely succeed again.*—A ryotwar settlement has succeeded in Canara, Ceded Districts, Barramah, and every other district, where it has been attempted. A permanent ryotwar system exists and prospers, considering the bad government it has been subject to for many years under Hyder and Tippon, in Canara; although the remission has not been allowed. There is therefore, every prospect of success in a permanent ryotwar settlement, supported by advantages, which the present ryotwar settlement, has not. It was thought that it could not be effected in Bengal, I have heard; but as it has been done here, and government are resolved at any rate, to make a ryotwar settlement the basis of any system to be adopted, those objections which may be urged, as arising from the difficulty of the task, are entirely removed. It may be said, that the revenue will not be secure, under a ryotwar settlement; however, if the ryots be put on such a footing that their lands are saleable, and that they ought to pay, whether they cultivate or no, the revenue will be secure, and their lands will be the security: no other variations will arise, but from waste being brought into cultivation. It is a practice to give up their old lands, and take waste, because the cultivation of waste under a cowle, is often more favourable to the ryot than the cultivation of their old lands on the full rent; but as the ryot will be obliged to pay his rent, whether he cultivates or no, he never will take waste, till he can afford to cultivate both the old land and the waste. It may be said, that the Board of Revenue cannot exercise controul, over a ryotwar system; but this is no good objection. The government might as well shut up the courts, because they cannot inspect the proceedings of every cause, themselves. The existence of zemindars there,\* and the difference between the ryots here, and there, makes so great a difference between Bengal and the Coast, that I think the Court of Directors and the Bengal government, had they known the state of the ryots here, would have settled here, with them. They never, in any minute or order that I have seen, express a desire to introduce a new order of men, or to innovate; they wish to stick to the usage of the country, and therefore settled with the zemindars there, where they were. Here, there are no zemindars, and the Court of Directors, had they known the customs, would not have created a new order of men, but have followed old usage, in settling with the ryots;—indeed, I have a belief, that in some parts of Bengal, where no zemindars existed, they actually made a kind of ryotwar settlement, in Syhet particularly. Where I heard or read of this, I forget, but I did hear it. I have then some reason to think, that the creation of mootahdars here, is contrary to the spirit of the Court of Directors and Bengal government, and their meaning in their minute and orders. If it is an innovation here, this is worth investigating, and would be a strong argument in favour of a ryotwar here, as far as the intentions of the Court of Directors and Lord Cornwallis could

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10. *The loss of revenue knowledge, after the zemindar system takes place.*—The collectors, registers, and assistants, will have no opportunity of learning revenue affairs, after the country is thrown into the hands of the new created zemindars.

It may be said, that the lands of proprietors under the charge of the Court of Wards, will give them an opportunity of learning revenue management; however, it will be found, that the native managers will be some men of influence, who will, it is true, send long accounts, and write long letters to the collector and the Court of Wards, but who will take good care, to prevent their interfering in the detail; most likely, the lands will be let out in great farms, to renters, and in the end, it will be found that the collector will have very little more real interference than in zemindarry lands. Indeed, considering the sacredness of private property, the less interference (except to prevent great irregularities) the better. In short, we shall lose all communication with the country, knowledge of its resources, agriculture, and internal management. I do not think that any collector in the Circars can give a just account of the state of his district, in any one respect, of cultivation, its increase or decrease of population, of casts, of houses, of grievances, of opinions, of interests, of the coin, or any thing else, except from former documents, or from general conversation, what any individual may take the same advantage of. The collector will generally give himself no further trouble, than his own business obliges him to take: he will not go out of his way to make enquiries; indeed he ought not, under the Regulations. Reg. XXIX, 1802, respecting curnums, shuts out the collector from that channel of information; besides, he would only make himself disliked, by making enquiries. The same with the judge; he must wait for a complaint, and he ought to wait for a complaint,—he ought to see nobody,—know nobody, but in court; and in proportion as he is an active, inquisitive magistrate, may he seem a partial judge. Besides the impropriety of his making investigations, except in court, he has too much business on his hands to attend to any thing else: his register is the same, and therefore there is nobody in the district who can or will keep up information;—moreover, the accounts of the curnums will be fabricated; and if the zemindars have the appointment and controul of curnums, I see no means which there will be, in ten years, of ascertaining any thing relative to the resources or payments of the country.

These appear to me, to be the chief objections to zemindarry, and, consequently, advantages of ryotwar. The advantages of zemindarry may be said to be,—

1. Security of revenue.
2. The detail of ryotwar would overwhelm the government officers.
3. The fear of indolent, corrupt, or incapable collectors.
4. The indulgence which the zemindar would probably show to his ryots, in time of distress.
5. The fear of remissions becoming necessary.
6. The interest which zemindars would have, in promoting improvement.
7. The difficulty and detail of tuccavi and tank repairs. All these, I will consider separately, in every way that occurs to me.

1. *Security of revenue under zemindars.* The land is security for the revenue, it is said; but in a ryotwar system, the absolute property in the land, uniting both proprietary and occupancy rights, would be sold to make up for deficiencies of revenue; but in a zemindarry, where the occupancy of the tenant is admitted, nothing but 15 per cent. will be sold, together with waste.

It may be said that the ryots are poor; but the zemindars will be sometimes poor also. As far as industry and economy promise success, the chance is, that the ryot will proportionably enrich himself as much, as the zemindar. All depends on the industry of the ryots, in any system. If they all fail, the zemindar must fail at last, though his private wealth may enable him to go on for a year or two; and what security will there be, in a ruined estate? If the ryots all fail in a ryotwar system, the rent must fall, and their lands may not sell; but the chance is, that the full property in their fields, on a low rent, will make the body of ryots, collectively, richer than the 15 per cent. will make the zemindar. This is proved by experience. Take any collectorate where there has been a ryotwar settlement, and it will be found, that the revenues have been more secure, than in other districts. An account of the annual demand, collection and balance in each collectorship, for the last five years, will show whether this is true or false; and yet this comparison between ryotwar collectorates and other collectorates, is partial, because the rents to government are raised higher in ryotwar collectorates than in others. In the Circars, and every where else, where there is no money rent, 10 or 15 per cent., I dare say, is spent in the village, and embezzled by the revenue servants; but in ryotwar countries, very little, not above 3 or 4 per cent. or not so much, is lost; the former peculations and expenditures, have been added to the jumma. If therefore where a higher rent is taken, and greater strictness used in making the settlement, the balances are less than where the circar collections are less, and the rent low, surely the system must be good.

The collection of a land-tax from the actual proprietors, is admitted to be the simplest way; though more hands the revenue pass through, the greater the loss, pillage, and insecurity. Just as the remission will be applied to improvement through zemindars, security to renters, and sub-renters; so will the rent be paid, through the same hands. A little stuck to the fingers of each, in the transit; all which profit, given to the ryot, will be in the land, and contribute to its value, and consequently, to the security of the land. If the ryot be made independent of the zemindar, he is virtually the proprietor. If the zemindar is merely an intermediate agent, consequently the land-tax will not be direct from the proprietor, under a zemindarry system. But the zemindar will not be any intermediate agent there will be, and are now, in the Circars. I know in the other

other provinces, I believe most sincerely, farmers, securities, renters, and all that tribe, in almost every zemindarry; but the more intermediates of this kind, the less secure is revenue. Again, in the course of time, the zemindars will be subdivided into small estates, most likely in a greater proportion than waste will be brought into cultivation; so that the wealth of the zemindars will become less, and the security consequently weaker; for, on the zemindarry principle, the larger the estate the better. It is like an insurance office, in some measure; a per-centage on a great sum, will cover the expense of living, managing the estate, and providing for bad years, much better than the same per-centage, on a smaller sum.

The household expense will be much the same, and the charges collection of 10,000 pagodas per annum, will be nearly as great, as of 20,000 pagodas. It will be found that great zemindars thrive more, make greater proportionate improvements, and pay more regularly, than small mootahdars. If therefore we must have zemindars, I should wish them to have a very large tract of country. Again, the division of the qualities or attributes of property,—the proprietary right, as it is called, with one man,—the occupancy, as it is called, with another man, is bad, and depreciates its value.—A field, the full absolute property of one individual, would, I should think, have a greater intrinsic value than the aggregate qualities of occupancy and proprietary would have, if divided between two individuals; therefore, would be a greater security for its land-tax; but, *a fortiori*, would it be better security than where the proprietary right, as it is called, was only saleable?—at all events, full absolute property in one man, is what produces improvement and attachment.

Again, as zemindarry right and occupancy right go on dividing, from the effect of the Hindoo law, and other causes; what a variety of tenures, estates, and occupancy rights, there will be! what difficulties and irregularities attend the sub-division,—how much the security of the revenue will depend, on an accurate apportionment of jumma to estates! If the zemindars thrive, this sub-division will go on frequently, and this alone will give nearly as much trouble of detail, as a ryotwar settlement; but the sub-division, or union, of ryotwar estates, would be done at once, by line and measure, and by entering the transfer in the register. Besides, zemindars have often failed, and therefore it is likely that they will fail again: in this case, the estate must be sold; but what difficulties will the new purchaser find in managing the estate, when opposed by the interest of the ejected proprietor!

2. *The detail of ryotwar would overwhelm the government officers.*—The detail must be carried on by somebody; the question is, therefore, whether it had better be carried on under collectors, or zemindars. The detail will not be very complicated, after the rents have been permanently fixed. The making of the jumma bundy, is the grand source of fraud and trouble and difficulty: when that is done, the collection will go on of itself. The ryot, if moderately assessed, will in a few years grow rich, and pay regularly; if not, their lands will be sold. There is no great detail difficulty in this. There should be general rules in each district for letting out waste, according to the mode of cultivation, the soil, and water in each district; and if their rates were too favourable, it would not signify, and it would be easy to make rules that need not be altered; and as the ryots got rich, they would take waste; the establishment which this detail would require, might be paid by a deduction from the remission; so might any commission which it might be found expedient to be given to the collector. It may be necessary to ascertain exactly, what establishment is necessary to carry on this detail. I would have tehsildars to every 50,000 pagodas; but a sketch of a district should be made out separate, showing the whole system, the court establishment, the collector's establishment, the duties of each, &c.

3. *The fear of indolent, corrupt, or incapable collectors.*—This is much the same as the other objection, about the detail; but there is no greater chance of their being bad collectors than bad zemindars; and if they are rather weak men, I do not see any very great harm that will ensue. I do not see that it will require any wonderful share of genius, integrity or activity, to sell lands by auction, for arrears, and to collect rent already fixed, and to give waste at certain rents: wherever this is fixed, detail does not much signify, because it is only the business of a few additional writers. The detail of a large army, is in this way; and the pay and concern of each individual in an army of 100,000 men, is easily known and arranged, so that a mistake hardly ever happens; yet it is generally some clerk, that keeps all these things right. As for waste, the ryots will take it as they get rich and advantages\* just as soon under the cirkar as under a zemindar. As for tank watercourses, and all grand works of that kind, the collector must inspect and superintend them; at any rate, the village people and tesildars will take care of the small tanks. What then requires such extraordinary talent or virtue? But every thing depends on men, every where, in every line—a bad zemindar would do as much harm, as a bad collector.

4. *The indulgence which the zemindars would show to the ryot, in times of distress.*—This is an uncertain good, because it depends on the goodness of an individual. If the assessment is moderate, there will be no need for such indulgences; besides, if occupancy is admitted, it will be the zemindar's interest not to assist, but ruin the ryot, that he may eject him from his right of occupancy, and put in some one else, on a raised rent: this will often be his interest, as the country thrives, and labour gets cheap.

Besides, it is likely that giving the remission to the ryot, and making him the full absolute proprietor, would put him on such a footing, that he would not want such indulgence. If it is good that zemindars should indulge the ryots, it is still better that government, should at once put the ryot on such a footing, that they need not. If the land is rendered saleable property, the ryot will not want such indulgence: he will be an idle fellow: when his land will be sold to a more industrious man, who will be able to buy it.

5. *The fear of remissions becoming necessary.*—I have a strong belief, as to the



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to tell, that there is no greater danger of failures and balances in ryotwarry than in zemindary. If, indeed, the country is depopulated by a famine or hostile army, some remission must be made, in proportion to the loss—even all the revenue may be lost. However, the same remission, it would be necessary to make to zemindars; however, if after making the lands saleable, and giving up the per-centage, any doubt should still remain respecting the security of the land-tax, a *zunger zamin*, or several and joint security, may be entered into with the ryots of villages, who may be made responsible for each other, *villages for villages*, *pergunnahs for pergunnahs*. This system is termed unjust, and may be thought too complicated for permanency. Respecting the justice of it; if it is absolutely necessary to establish it, in order that the ryots may have the enjoyment of the benefits proposed to be given to them, it is done for their sake, and they ought not to complain, nor would they, when they understood it. It is no hardship to make a man give security, and let him out of prison. In respect to the policy of the *zunger zamin*, it makes the bulk of the people interested in the skill, exertion, and economy of each individual. They will assist him, to prevent his falling, and to avoid being called on to fulfil their security. If he does fail, they take care that there are no tricks, that his property be discovered, and sold to the best advantage; and they will generally prevent the necessity of an assessment to make up his deficiency. If, however, he has no property, and their ingenuity can discover nothing, and hit on no means of settling the demand without an assessment is laid on fairly, that there are no tricks, and no unequal imposition. But I think that the assessment to make up deficiencies, would hardly ever take place, and I fancy seldom does now. Shame, and fear of being a burthen on his neighbours, makes him economise and exert himself. The quick-sightedness of his neighbours, make his pretended losses easily seen through; and if, after all, real loss should have happened, to prevent his paying, his securities will lend him the money, rather than that the sub-assessment of his deficiency, should be actually levied. This would certainly prevent the necessity of remitting, in common cases. In case of drought, invasion, and plague, and such public calamities, *Nero* and *Nader Shaw* used to grant remissions. It is practised in all countries; and we must grant remissions.

6. *The interest which zemindars would have, in promoting improvement.*—This may be supposed to involve the question,—whether small farms or great estates are best. I believe that it is said by authors, that agriculture has been improved and extended in Europe, since cottagers and small farmers were done away; and perhaps those noble times, when every rood of ground maintained its man, have been too highly celebrated. One skilful farmer perhaps, with good tools and cattle, and half a dozen labourers, could do more than a swarm of cottagers on a highland estate. But there is a great difference in agriculture here, and there,—in the husbandmen here, and husbandmen there. We find a set of men here, occupying the land, who have carried agriculture to the requisite degree of improvement, and who could not well be turned out, even if the zemindar had the power; but if occupancy is admitted, it would not be in his power to turn out the occupants, and let his fields to a speculative farmer, who might, by superior skill, industry, or tools, raise more produce: for these causes, the zemindar must go on in the old way, with the ryots; and the improvement of the lands now held by them, will depend upon themselves, not on the zemindar. Besides, improvements in lands now under cultivation, can only arise from the superior management of the occupant, from their setting all their people to work, grubbing up roots, weeding, &c. and performing all those operations of the land, with the greatest care; and I do not see how the zemindar can improve the lands now occupied. The occupants can and will improve their lands to the highest pitch of cultivation; they will manure, dig wells, and carry on smaller improvements themselves, as well as with the aid of a zemindar. Great improvements (if any are made) must take place, in the waste lands; and when the people get rich, and adventurers, government may give up as much waste as may be asked, to any man who has stock and inclination to employ himself in improvements; and waste given up in this way, would constitute a real estate.

In some cases, indeed, a zemindar would seem a very useful man, where three or four villages are watered from one tank or watercourse; a zemindar who had the whole under him, might keep up, improve, or enlarge the water-works, might distribute the flow of water, and carry it where it would produce the greatest advantage, and would take on himself, the trouble and care which such a concern must occasion to the supervisor; he might strike out great improvements, and convert the country into a garden. This is certainly a great advantage in the zemindarry system, and almost makes me approve of it. However, in this case, to reap the full benefit of the extended estates, the zemindar ought perhaps to be a landlord, in the full extent of the term; he ought to have power to do what he pleased, unembarrassed by any supposed rights of his tenantry, and he ought to be an enlightened, scientific, enterprising landlord, not such as usually become the zemindars. If the ryots are to have their occupancy, and the zemindar to be merely an hereditary tehsildar, I do not see any scope for improvement, further than what the ryots may themselves execute; but after all, I must confess that I see great advantage in having villages watered by one tank or watercourse, placed under the superintendence of one zemindar. In dry lands and well lands, the ryots may carry on cultivation to the highest pitch of improvement themselves; but uniting all the lands watered by one channel or tank, under one zemindar, has certainly advantages which require discussion. After all, the government must superintend all grand works of this kind; and where two or three estates are watered by one channel or tank, there are disputes, which will prevent, instead of encouraging improvement; and if zemindars are divided, such divisions will take place, and eternal disputes, not to be ever settled in justice, will ensue. This appears to me the only advantage of introducing zemindars, to arrange, improve, and direct tanks, channels, and the lands watered by them; but this advantage is not counterbalanced by the other disadvantages of zemindars; and whether

whether the nature of the people likely to become zemindars, the subdivision of estates, and the abuses that will take place under zemindaries, may not obstruct these advantages, is very doubtful. On the whole, it seems to me that improvement must take place in waste, if any where, that is, grand improvements; that it will take place under a ryotwar system, as fast as it can, when the stock and spirit of the country enables the people to make improvements. I hardly think that any of the new zemindars have or will apply other capital, which before was employed in different ways, to the improvement of the lands. Improvement must, I should conceive, arise from the stock and spirit of the cultivating inhabitants.

7. *The difficulty and detail attending tuccavie and tank repairs.*—Respecting tuccavie, it may seem inconsistent with permanency, to issue tuccavie; however, I do not see any objection to continue these indulgences, for a few years. It has hitherto been allowed; and the same people who have hitherto issued it, and collected it again, will be able to carry on the details respecting it for a few years, if it be found absolutely necessary. It seems to me impossible to make a remission for the purpose of replacing and repairing the loss of this advantage equally, and accurately; because the remission must be general, must be made to all, on the same principles, whereas only a few ryots in a district, require tuccavie; for instance, one ryot pays 10 pagodas on a surveyed land, and wants tuccavie; another ryot pays 10 pagodas on a surveyed land, does not want tuccavie. In this instance, a remission to both, in lieu of tuccavie, would be an indulgence to the man that wanted, but a very great indulgence to the man, that did not want it.

The necessity of advancing tuccavie, arises from the poverty of the people, and their want of credit, from having no property;—remove the cause, and the effect ceases,—give up the remissions to the ryots, and make their lands, saleable property, and they could always borrow on them, and will not require tuccavie until the lands are saleable. Tuccavie may sometimes be useful, and may be given for a short time,—however, there are great abuses, and but few benefits, from the issues of tuccavie. Tassildars, ryots and all, are fond of getting tuccavie, because they all like to get hold of a little ready money; but I suspect that very little is applied to cultivation. It goes to pay debts, to loans to others, sometimes; and most commonly, to pay the last kists. I do not believe that more than three per cent. of the jumma is issued, where, in poor countries, and a little property on which to borrow, would soon enable the poorest ryot to do without tuccavie; until then, what objection to the issue of tuccavie? even if the poorer ryots are obliged to act as labourers, in consequence of a want of the assistance of tuccavie, no great harm will arise. The rent being low, all the seed, bullocks, and hands that the country possesses, will some way or other, be brought into play. I suppose that the survey is in progress, that the just rent of each field will be ascertained under the orders now in force, and that the warum has been converted into money rent; all this being, I should think, the first step to improvement under any system. I have now, according to your lordship's orders, written all the thoughts which occurred to me about Permanent Settlements; and only hope to have an opportunity of getting such knowledge as shall enable me to ascertain and fix my own judgment, whether ryotwary or zemindary, be best.

I am, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and faithful Servant,  
W. THACKERAY.

#### EXTRACT Fort St. George Revenue Consultations, the 29th April 1806.

##### The President delivers the following Minute:

I HAVE the honour to lay before the board, a paper drawn out by Mr. Thackeray, under my own inspection, containing some of the principal objections to the settlement of the lands in perpetuity, according to the present system; as well as a refutation of the arguments which may be adduced, against the plan of making permanent the ryotwar settlement.

The more I consider this important question, the stronger my conviction is, that the present system, is not the best which might be adopted. I am satisfied that the creation of zemindars is a measure, incompatible with the true interests of the government, and of the community at large. When I differ in opinion with persons of the greatest experience and ability, I do so, with feelings of great diffidence, but without reluctance to pursue the dictates of my own judgment. I am not at all at variance with the principles of the permanent settlement, which I admire, and which I believe to be applicable to this, and to every part of the world. The principle of that settlement, was a limitation of the demands of the Circar. I venture to differ only, as to the detail operations of the system, which has been founded on these principles. So little do I differ with the original founders of it, that I fully concur in the application of the system, to the existing circumstances of Bengal. I regret that such circumstances, did require such an arrangement: but I feel that they could not have been set aside, without a great violation of justice. Here, the same circumstances do not exist, and therefore the same objections do not occur to a departure from the same rules. I however do not wish at present, to enter into the discussion. I am anxious previously to be in possession of every possible objection and difficulty that can be offered, to the plan proposed to be substituted for the present system. I wish to have the opportunity of ascertaining upon the spot, the truth of my own ideas, and the reality of the objections suggested by others. It is with this view, and for the purpose of provoking discussion, that the paper now presented has been drawn up.

It is my wish that this document should be transmitted to the Board of Revenue, request and directions of government, that each member may record his sentiments upon the opinions which it contains. I wish the subject to be thoroughly discussed in all its views. I have no object in view, but truth and the public good; my intention

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judgment may be deceived, but I fancy, and am fully persuaded, that the happiness of millions depends upon the decision of this question. (Signed) W. BENTINCK.

Fort St. George, 29th April 1806.

The Board concurring in the recommendation of the President, it is Resolved, that a letter, conformable to the following draft, be dispatched to the Board of Revenue:

To the President, &c. Members of the Board of Revenue:

Gentlemen,

Para. 1. I am directed by the Right honourable the Governor in Council, to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a paper on the settlement of the revenues in perpetuity, containing the principal objections to the establishment of large zemindaries, and arguments in favour of making the ryotwar system permanent.

2. The Governor in Council considers the decision of this question to be of the utmost importance; and is therefore desirous that it should receive the amplest discussion. His Lordship in Council has accordingly directed me to communicate his Lordship's desire, that each member of the board will state his individual sentiments upon the opinions, which the enclosed paper contains.

EXTRACT Fort St. George Revenue Consultations, the 28th November 1806.

THE Right honourable the President records the following Minute:

The state of public affairs will necessarily oblige me to relinquish the intention of visiting some of the distant provinces. I regret this necessity, both as it prevents me from benefiting by that best of information, which is obtained by personal communication with the local authorities, and also, from the belief that the occasional presence of persons in authority, is calculated to have a salutary influence over the conduct of subordinate officers. I feel this disappointment the more particularly upon the present occasion, when the object in view was, the satisfaction of my mind upon a point of great national importance,—the best system for a permanent settlement of the revenues.

Though prevented from undertaking in person, the investigation I had proposed, I trust the Board will concur in the request I am about to submit; the object of which is, to enable me to obtain the information required through a different and perhaps a more efficient channel. I have to recommend that Mr. Thackeray be deputed for this purpose.

The route I had proposed for myself, was Malabar, the Ceded Districts, and Canara. The latter province was to form the first object of investigation. From the first transfer of Canara to the British authority, it has continued a solitary example, I believe, of tranquillity; of an easy and regular realization of the revenue, and of general prosperity. The causes of such happy effects, are, in my opinion, to be found in the tenure of landed property, peculiar to that province; and in the moderation with which the rights of the circar to a proportion of the land revenue, have been exercised. The local situation of Canara is no doubt favourable to the advantageous disposal of its produce, and a strong secondary cause of its state of agricultural improvement. But the two first circumstances I conceive to be the primary causes of the prosperity of Canara. These causes, appear to me to contain the certain principles of prosperity, wherever they may be introduced.

I had been very early impressed with the great advantages of the ryotwar settlement, as an annual settlement. Those advantages, consisted in the equal distribution and the defined amount of the land tax, and upon the security afforded the poor against extra assessments from head inhabitants. Every man knew his exact obligations to the Circar, and was assured of the quiet enjoyment of the surplus produce of his labour. Hence arose, the true encouragement to industry; and from this principle has flowed increased cultivation; and, contrasted with former times, the easy realization of the public revenue.

From an attentive consideration of these effects, it appeared to me, that if an annual settlement with the ryots, founded upon fixed principles, the essential part of which, was to secure to the ryot, for a year, the fruits of his industry, had actually been productive of such decided advantages; a permanent settlement, founded upon the same principles, but carried to a greater extent in regard to the benefit of the ryot, would produce the same effects, in an increased ratio. It is not my intention at present to argue these positions; but to present to the board the progress of my own ideas upon this particular question. I had been struck with this opinion, before I became acquainted with the exact nature of the tenures of land in Canara; with the average extent of separate estates; and with the rate of the circar assessment. When these circumstances were made known to me, I was astonished with the close resemblance between the actual state of property in Canara, and the proposed permanency of the ryotwar settlement. Among other peculiarities, the greater part of the estates, though fully assessed, pay less than ten pagodas per annum to the circar. I shall not enter into further details; I shall only state my satisfaction in finding theory reduced to practice, and speculation proved by the test of the most successful experiments. Canara has become the great land-mark by which I hoped to trace out those principles and regulations which might be applicable to the unsettled districts, where permanent tenures are to be introduced. I have reason to believe, though I cannot speak with any positive assurance, that the same tenures as in Canara, existed originally throughout every part of the country. In other parts of the boundaries, individual rights have been trodden down by the power and avarice of despotic authority; but still there exists, almost in every part, a remnant of hereditary rights, or hereditary cultivators; now the hereditary rights to certain lands, and to reap the benefit of that cultivation, seems to be the same thing, with the right in the land, called property.

Lord W. Bentinck's  
Minute, dated 25th  
Nov. 1806.

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Lord W. Bentinck's  
Minute, dated 25 Nov.  
1806.

Between man and man, these rights have an equal value and security. But before the sovereign, who assesses and taxes at will; neither one or the other right is good for much. To what circumstance Canara may owe the preservation of its original tenures, handed down through many ages, I cannot at present say; but that they still exist, is certain; and it therefore naturally became a primary object of enquiry, how far these permanent tenures in Canara, have been conducive to the prosperity of the country; how far the existing conditions of property, may afford the means of ascertaining and restoring elsewhere, the original constitution of landed property; and how far the same constitution, if not originally belonging to other parts of India, may be suitable to the unsettled provinces.

From Canara, I proposed to have gone to Malabar, no less remarkable for its landed tenures, and more so, from the peculiar customs of its inhabitants. This province cannot be held out, as an example of tranquillity or happiness; but I have always been of opinion, that under a just administration of its affairs, order and content would be permanently restored. As far as we have had an opportunity of judging, these expected effects have been realized. Independent of the curiosity excited, in the arrangement of a system of permanency, a personal communication with the public servants, all strangers to this government, was anxiously wished for by me. I hoped to have derived much knowledge of the state of affairs, from the various sources of information to be found upon the spot; and to have enabled myself to decide hereafter more easily, between the various and contradictory opinions that have contributed so much to the change of Malabar affairs.

The information and advice of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, was considered by me to be essential and indispensable to the trial and ultimate adoption of any opinion, which the result of all my enquiries might have led me to form.

I would recommend therefore that Mr. Thackeray be directed to follow the same route; and that instructions, according to the following general purport, be given to him.

First, To ascertain the present state of the country; the sources of revenue, especially land revenue; the principle on which the assessment on the lands is formed; the quantum of produce payable by the landholders; the security taken for the due collection, and the mode of collecting the land revenue; the nature of landed tenures; the right of the landholders; the state of agriculture; the state of the police, and of the administration of justice, as far as it affects revenue; the defects of the present revenue management; the state of commerce, as it affects revenue; the controul which the government and board of revenue possess over their officers; the condition, opinions, and wants of the ryot; the present state of the country, in respect to the comfort of the people; authority of government, and amount and security of revenue, compared with other times and governments.

2dly. These enquiries should produce an opinion on the best mode of administering the revenues in future, especially of introducing the permanent settlement: this opinion must be stated, with every opinion for, and objection to, particular systems.

That Mr. Thackeray be directed to discuss fully every part of this subject, with the collectors and revenue servants; to have free communication with the people: and when it may appear expedient, to enter into an investigation of village accounts.

Mr. Thackeray will consider himself under the orders of the government, and will correspond with government, through the Governor immediately. Mr. Thackeray, as a member of the Board of Revenue, will communicate to his colleagues such information as it may be important to them to receive, and will attend to such suggestions as he may receive from the Revenue Board.

I recommend that he may be permitted to draw the tent allowances, at the same rate as collectors; and to entertain such establishment of native servants, as the object of his enquiry may render necessary.

It will be necessary that a copy of his instructions may be sent to every collector and magistrate; and that they may be required to pay the greatest attention to his suggestions; and to assist him, by every means in their power, in the execution of these orders.

Fort St. George, 25 November 1806.

(Signed)

W. BENTINCK.

Mr. PETRIE records the following Minute:

I beg leave to record my entire approbation of the motives and intentions of the Right Honourable the President, in recommending the enquiry so fully explained in his Lordship's Minute; and also my concurrence in the favourable opinion entertained by the Right Honourable the President, of the merits and attainments of Mr. Thackeray.

With those sentiments, it is with much regret that I add my conviction, that the talents of any one individual, however great his abilities, will be found inadequate to embrace all the points of an investigation, which is intended to comprehend every subject of importance, in the interior administration of government.

Madras, 26 Nov. 1806.

(Signed)

Wm. PETRIE.

The Board concurring with the Right Honourable the President, in the recommendation contained in his Minute above recorded, the following letters are ordered to be copied and dispatched to Mr. W. Thackeray, and to the Board of Revenue.

Sir,

To W. THACKERAY, Esq.

CIRCUMSTANCES having rendered it necessary for the Right Honourable the Governor to resign his intention of personally inspecting the state of the provinces under his Lordship in Council has judged it expedient to entrust to an individual whose experience and acquirements appear to qualify him for the task, the investigation of the points connected with the internal administration of the provinces, on which the Council has deemed correct information to be particularly desirable, with

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ultimate establishment in permanency of that system which may be decidedly best calculated to promote the prosperity of the country.

2. The Governor in Council has been pleased to select you for this duty; and I am directed to acquaint you, that it is the intention of his Lordship in Council, that you shall proceed, in the first instance, to the province of Canara; and having completed the enquiry entrusted to you in that province, you will prosecute similar researches in the neighbouring province of Malabar; from whence you will visit the Ceded Districts, for the purpose of perfecting your investigation.

3. The objects of your research in these provinces, will be,—to ascertain the present state of each province; the sources of its revenues, especially the land revenue; the principle on which the assessment on the lands is formed; the quantum of produce payable by the landholders; the security taken for the due collection; and the mode of collecting the land revenue; the nature of landed tenures; the right of landholders; the state of agriculture; the state of the police, and of the administration of justice, as far as it affects the revenue; the defects (if any) of the present revenue management; the state of commerce, as it affects the revenue; the controul which the government and the Board of Revenue possess over their officers; the condition, opinions, and wants of the ryot; the present state of the country, in respect to the comfort of the people; the authority of government and amount and security of the revenue, compared with other times and governments.

4. To the result of these enquiries, you will add your opinion on the best mode of administering the revenues in future, and on the mode of introducing the permanent settlement in particular; and you will accompany your opinion with every argument which may be stated in favour of, or in objection to, particular systems.

5. You will discuss fully every part of this subject with the local revenue servants; and you will communicate freely with the people; and where it may appear expedient, you will enter into an investigation of village accounts.

6. You will consider yourself under the immediate orders of government; and your correspondence with them will be conducted through the channel of the Governor; but you will communicate to the Board of Revenue such information as may appear to you, in the progress of your deputation, important for them to know; and you will attend to such suggestions as you may receive from them.

7. You are authorized to draw the same rate of tent-allowance during your deputation, as is received by collectors; and to entertain such establishment of native servants, as the objects of your enquiry may render necessary.

8. The objects of your investigation have been communicated to the several magistrates and collectors in the provinces included in your prescribed tour, with instructions to pay strict attention to your suggestions, and to assist you, by every means in their power, in the execution of the duties confided to you.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed)

E. C. GREENWAY,

Secretary to Government.

Fort St. George,  
29th November 1806.

## MEMOIR of Mr. HODGSON, on the ADVANTAGES of a PERMANENT ZEMINDARRY SETTLEMENT, 1806.

### PART FIRST:

*Being an examination of the relative Rights of Zemindar and Ryot; and of the Law, as it relates to those Rights.*

Para. 1. THE question which I have been desired to discuss, is,—“What are the objections to a ryotwar permanent settlement? This subject is of much importance, and the consideration of it, appears to embrace the further question of,—What has led to the opinion, that a change is expedient in the system hitherto followed, in settling permanently the revenues of this presidency? It must be presumed, either that experience has shown that one system has defects, from which the other, is free; or, that superior advantages have been demonstrated to exist, in that proposed to be established. What are the supposed defects of the one system, and what the supposed advantages of the other, will therefore be here investigated.

2. Previously to entering on the question immediately under consideration, a few preliminary observations will be stated, in the hope that they will facilitate the investigation.

3. Two descriptions of persons appear to be immediately connected with the subject. The first is the *zemindar*: the second, the *ryot*. With the former, I must be permitted to class all persons receiving the rent of government from the ryots, and paying it to government, whether placed in that situation by inheritance, by purchase, or by gift. With the latter, all persons cultivating land, whether by their own labour, or by means of hired servants or of slaves; all talookdars, shotriumdars, and jageerdars of one or more entire villages, may, without great impropriety, be classed in the first description: and all tenants and occupiers of small portions of land, in the latter. By this arrangement, the subject is simplified, and transition may be permitted to an examination of the relative situation.

the richer part of the ryots, merely super-  
of their land. Persons of this descrip-  
tion be correct, have been created and  
in Bengal, as also the poorer sort of ryots,

and even artificers paying quit-rent. The want of a distinc-  
tion between such opposite extremes, as a zemindar paying  
three lacs of rupees jumma, and a zemindar paying a jumma  
of less than the eighth of a rupee, will, I think, be admitted.

situation of these two descriptions of persons. Their relative rights need not here have names assigned them; it would lead to an unnecessary discussion of the terms "*proprietary right*," "*mercenary right*," "*and right of occupancy*;" in the length and intricacy of which, slight would be lost, of the question under examination. It is not very material, what name the rights of each party bears, provided the extent and value of their relative rights be explained, and be proved, to be defined. But that an explanation is necessary, will be admitted, when it has been stated, and the opinion has been recently supported<sup>(a)</sup>, that "if the *zemindars* are restricted from raising the assessment fixed by government, and at the same time liable to all losses, they have not the free management of their estates, and hardly deserve the name of owners<sup>(b)</sup>." Colonel Munro having drawn a conclusion from this supposition, unfavourable to the permanent system as now established, and much of his argument, in support of a ryotwar settlement, appearing to arise, out of the supposed power vested in a *zemindar* to raise his rents, and oust the ryots; I shall proceed to show that the supposition is contrary to the declared and recognized principles of the permanent settlement, and at variance with the existing law.

4. It will be assumed here, that the revenue economy of all Hindoostan is the same. The assumption is justified by the detailed information contained in the Minutes of Sir John Shore,—the work called the Husbandry of Bengal; and the following extract from the letter of the Governor General in Council, of the 19th July 1804, para. 10:—"According to the ancient usages \* of India, the government is entitled to a share of the produce of the lands. The share varies in its proportion, and may be levied in money or kind, according to local custom; and the government is entitled to realize its share of the produce, through the agency of its officers, from the immediate cultivator of the soil; or to farm it for a sum of money annually, or for a term of years; or in perpetuity to the *zemindar* or other description of landholder; or where there are no landholders, or where landholders in possession, will not agree to pay the sum, which it may deem adequate to the value of its share of the produce, to any person whatever."

5. Having justified the assumption of the foregoing position, I may now be permitted to bring under observation, all that passed on the conclusion drawn by Colonel Munro. If the quotations which it is necessary to introduce, should render the paper voluminous, it will be excused, under the necessity which appears to exist, that all that is brought forward, should be attentively considered. The long discussions which the subject, now revived, has undergone at various times, may not have been read by all who are interested in the question, or may have been obliterated from the memory of others. The subject is of that importance, that assertions should not be admitted as argument; and arguments, however specious or plausible, if not supported by facts, should not be looked upon, as conclusive.

6. Sir John Shore, in his Minute of 21st December 1789, stated, para. 13, That "the necessity of some interposition between the *zemindars* and their tenants, is absolute; and government interferes, by establishing regulations for the conduct of the *zemindars*, which they are to execute, and by delegating authority to the collectors, to enforce the execution: if the assessment of the *zemindaries* were unalterably fixed, and the proprietors were left to make their own arrangements with the ryots, without any restrictions, injunctions or limitations, which indeed is a result of the fundamental principle, the present confusion would never be adjusted.

"This interference, though so much modified, is in fact an invasion of proprietary right, and an assumption of the character of landlord, which belongs to the *zemindar*; for it is equally a contradiction in terms, to say that the property in the soil is vested in the *zemindar*, and that we have a right to regulate the terms, by which he is to let his lands, as it is to connect that avowal, with discretionary and arbitrary terms. If the land is the *zemindar's*, it will only be partially, his property, whilst we prescribe the quantum he is to collect, or the mode by which the adjustment of it, is to take place between the parties concerned."

7. The reasoning of Colonel Munro being the same as that of Sir John Shore, the arguments of Marquis Cornwallis, in refutation of Sir John Shore's opinion, will apply with equal weight, to those of Colonel Munro,—they are as follows:

"I agree with Mr. Shore, that some interference on the part of government, is undoubtedly necessary for effecting an adjustment of the demands of the *zemindars* upon the ryots; nor do I conceive that the former, will take alarm at the reservation of this right of interference; when convinced that government can have no interest in exercising it, but for the purposes of public justice. Were the government itself to be a party in the cause, they might have some grounds for apprehending the result of its decisions.

"Mr. Shore observes, that this interference is inconsistent with proprietary right; that it is an encroachment upon it, to prohibit a landlord from imposing taxes upon his tenant; for it is saying to him, that he shall not raise the rents of his estates; and that if the land is the *zemindar's*, it will only be partially his property, whilst we prescribe the quantum which he is to collect, or the mode by which the adjustment is to take place between the parties concerned.

"If Mr. Shore means, that after having declared the *zemindar* proprietor of the soil, in order to be consistent, we have no right to prevent his imposing new *abwabs* or taxes on

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*zemindary* and *Ryot-*  
*war* Settlements.

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\* In a Paper sent to the  
Board of Revenue.

<sup>b</sup> Para. 7 of Colonel  
Munro's Report, 25th  
August 1803.

\* From the remotest times of which there is any record, till near the middle of the fourteenth century, all land was assessed in rice, at a quantity equal to the quantity of paddy sown.—Major Munro's Report on Canara, 31st May 1800, para. 6.

\* The revenue was sometimes collected in kind, sometimes in money, at the discretion of the Circar.—Ibid.

"And Joseph made it a law over the  
this day, that Pharaoh should have the  
land of the priests only, which he had  
Genesis, chap. xlvii, ver. 26.



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Mr. Hodgson's  
Memoir.

"the lands in cultivation, I must differ with him in opinion. Unless we suppose the ryots to be the absolute slaves of the zemindars, every begah of land possessed by them, must have been cultivated, under an express or implied agreement, that a certain sum should be paid for each begah of produce, and no more. Every abwaub or tax imposed by the zemindar, over and above that sum, is not only a breach of that agreement, but a direct violation of the established laws of the country. The cultivator, therefore, has in such a case, an undoubted right to apply to government for the protection of his property, and government is at all times bound, to afford him redress. I do not hesitate, therefore, to give it as my opinion, that the zemindars neither now, nor ever could, possess a right to impose taxes or abwaubs upon the ryots; and if, from the confusion which prevailed towards the close of the Mogul government, or neglect, or want of information, since we have had possession of the country, new taxes have been imposed by the zemindars or farmers, that government has an undoubted right to abolish such as are oppressive, and have never been confirmed by a competent authority; and to establish such regulations, as may prevent the practice of like abuses, in future.

"Neither is the privilege, which the ryots in many parts of Bengal enjoy, of holding possession of the spots of land which they cultivate, so long as they pay the revenue assessed upon them, by any means incompatible with the proprietary rights of the zemindar. Whoever cultivates the land, the zemindar can receive no more than the established rent, which in most places, is fully equal to what the cultivator can afford to pay. To permit him to dispossess one cultivator, for the sole purpose of giving the land to another, would be vesting him with a power to commit a wanton act of oppression, from which he could derive no benefit. The practice that prevailed during the Mogul government, of uniting many districts into one zemindary, and thereby subjecting a large body of people to the controul of one principal zemindar, rendered some restrictions of this nature, absolutely necessary. The zemindar, however, may sell the land, and the cultivators must pay the rent to the purchaser.

"Neither is prohibiting the landholder to impose new abwaubs or taxes on the lands in cultivation, tantamount to saying to him, that he shall not raise the rents of his estate. The rents of an estate, are not to be raised by the imposition of new abwaubs or taxes on every begah of land in cultivation; on the contrary, they will in the end be lowered, by such impositions; for when the rate of assessment becomes so oppressive as not to leave the ryot a sufficient share of the produce for the maintenance of his family, and the expenses of cultivation, he must at length desert the land. No zemindar claims a right to impose new taxes on the land in cultivation, although it is obvious that they have clandestinely levied them, when pressed to answer demands upon themselves; and that these taxes have, from various causes, been perpetuated to the ultimate detriment of the proprietors who imposed them.

"The rents of an estate can only be raised, by inducing the ryots to cultivate the more valuable articles of produce, and to clear the extensive tracts of waste land, which are to be found in almost every zemindarry in Bengal. It requires no local knowledge of the revenues of this country, to decide whether fixing the assessment, or leaving it liable to future increase, at the discretion of government or its officers, will afford the greatest encouragement to the landholder to have recourse to these means, for the improvement of his estate."

8. The foregoing were the sentiments of Marquis Cornwallis; and the following is the law of Bengal:

#### BENGAL CODE.

EXTRACT from Regulation VII. A. D. 1793, for re-enacting, with modifications and amendments, the rules for the Decennial Settlements of the public revenue payable from the lands of the Zemindars, independent Talookdars, and other actual Proprietors of land in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa.

"LII.—The zemindar or other actual proprietor of land, is to let the remaining lands of his zemindarry or estate, under the prescribed restriction, in whatever manner he may think proper; but every engagement contracted with under-farmers, shall be specific as to the amount and conditions of it; and all sums received by any actual proprietor of land, or any farmer of land, of whatever description, over and above what is specified in the engagements of the persons paying the same, shall be considered as extorted, and be repaid with a penalty of double the amount. The restrictions prescribed, and referred to in this section, are the following:

"LIII.—No person contracting with a zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor, or employed by him in the management of the collections, shall be authorized to take charge of the lands or collections, without an aumilnamah, or written commission, signed by such zemindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor.

"LIV.—The impositions upon the ryots, under the denomination of abwaub, mahatoot, and other appellations, from their number and uncertainty, having become intricate to adjust, and a source of oppression to the ryots, all proprietors of land and dependent talookdars shall give the same in concert with the ryots, and consolidate the whole of the assessment into a specific sum. In large zemindaries or estates, the proprietors are to commence the reduction of the rents of their ryots, in the pergunnahs where the impositions are excessive, and to proceed in it gradually, till completed, but so, that it be effected by the end of the Bengal year 1198, in the Bengal districts; and by the end of the Welhatty year 1198, in the Behar and Orissa districts: these being the years for the delivery of pottahs, as hereafter specified.

LIV.—No

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"LV.—No actual proprietor of land, or dependent talookdar, or farmer of land, of whatever description, shall impose any new abwaub or mahatoot upon the ryots, under any pretence whatever. Every exaction of this nature, shall be punished by a penalty equal to three times the amount imposed; and if at any future period, it be discovered that new abwaubs or mahatoots have been imposed, the person imposing the same, shall be liable to this penalty for the entire period of such imposition."

"LVI.—It is expected that in time the proprietor of land, and the ryot, will find it for their mutual advantage to enter into agreements, in every instance, for a specific sum, for a certain quantity of land, leaving to the option of the latter to cultivate whatever species of produce may appear to them likely to yield the largest profit: where, however, it is the established custom to vary the pottah for lands according to the articles produced thereon, and while the actual proprietors of land, dependent talookdars, or farmers of land, and ryots in such places, shall prefer an adherence to this custom, the engagements entered into between them, are to specify the quantity of land, species of produce, rate of rent, and amount thereof, with the term of the lease, and a stipulation that in the event of the species of produce being changed, a new engagement shall be executed for the remaining term of the lease, or for a longer period, if agreed on; and in the event of any new species being cultivated, a new engagement, with the like specification and clause, is to be executed accordingly."

"LVII. (First).—The rents to be paid by the ryots, by whatever rule or custom they may be regulated, shall be specifically stated in the pottah; which, in every possible case, shall contain the exact sum to be paid by them."

"LVII. (Second).—In cases where the rate only, can be specified, such as where the rents are adjusted upon a measurement of the lands after cultivation, or on a survey of the crop, or where they are made payable in kind, the rate and terms of payment, and proportion of the crop to be delivered, with every condition, shall be clearly specified."

BENARES LOCAL.

EXTRACT from Regulation LI. A.D. 1795, entitled, a Regulation respecting Ryotty Pottahs; and being, as the preamble states,—“To prevent undue demands being made on the Ryots, or Cultivators of the Soil, by the Aumils, Zemindars, Farmers, or others entitled to levy from them the *Hakmee*, or government proportion of the produce.”

Sect. IX. “If a dispute shall arise between the ryots, and the persons from whom they may be entitled to demand pottahs, regarding the rates of the pottahs (whether the rent be payable in money or kind) it shall be determined in the dewannee adawlat of the city or zillah, in the jurisdiction of which the lands may be situated, according to the rules established in the pergunnah, or tuppah, or talooka, for lands of the same description and quality, and for the same class of cultivators, as those respecting which the dispute may arise.”

X. “The rules in the preceding Section, are to be considered applicable not only to the pottahs, which the ryots are entitled to demand in the first instance, but also to the renewal of pottahs, which may expire or become cancelled; and it is declared that no proprietor or farmer of land, nor any other person, shall require ryots, whose pottahs may expire or become cancelled, to take out new pottahs at higher rates than the established rates of the pergunnah for lands of the same quality and description, due consideration being had, as far as may be required by the custom of the district, to the alteration of the species of culture, and the cost of the cultivator. Under this rule *khodkash* or Chupparbund ryots, will be entitled to have their pottahs renewed at the established rates, upon making application for that purpose, to the person by whom the pottahs are to be granted, as are also *paykash* ryots, provided the proprietor or farmer chooses to permit them to continue to cultivate the land, which they have the option to do or not, as they may think proper, on the expiration of the paykash leases, whereas *khodkash* ryots cannot be dispossessed, as long as they continue to pay the stipulated rent.”

MADRAS CODE.

EXTRACT from Regulation XXX. A.D. 1802, entitled, A Regulation prescribing Pottahs to be used between Landholders, their Under-farmers, Tenants, and Ryots.

Sect. II. “Proprietors and farmers of land shall enter into agreements with the inhabitants and cultivators of land, on the terms on which they respectively occupy such lands; and the contracting parties shall be mutually bound to exchange their agreements in writing; the engagements of the proprietor being denominated pottah, and the engagement of the ryot being denominated muchelka.”

VII. “Proprietors, or farmers of land, shall not levy any new assessment or tax on the ryots, under any name, or under any pretence. Exactions, other than those consolidated in the pottah, or otherwise authorized by the government, shall, upon proof, subject the proprietor or farmer to a penalty equal to three times the amount of each exaction.”

VII. “Under-farmers and cultivators of land shall be free to demand of proprietors or farmers of land, pottahs for the descriptions of land they may respectively occupy; and where proprietors or farmers of land may refuse or delay to execute, or cause to be executed, pottahs so demanded, such proprietors or farmers of land shall, after the expiration of six months, calculating from the settlement of the permanent land on their estates, be liable to prosecution in the courts; and shall, on proof of refusal or delay, be also liable to pay such damages, as the Court shall adjudge equal to the trouble and expense incurred by the under-farmers or cultivators in consequence of such refusal or delay.”

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• Madras Regulation.

See Sect. 9, Reg. XXV,  
1802, above quoted

• Robertson's India.

Strobel, lib. 15. A.  
Div. 1. Sec. lib. 2.

IX. "Where disputes may arise respecting rates of assessment in money, or of division of kind, the rates shall be determined, according to the rates prevailing in the cultivated land in the year preceding the assessment of the permanent jumma on such lands; or where those rates may not be ascertainable, according to the rates established for lands of the same description and quality, as those respecting which the dispute may arise."

9. Having quoted the opinion of the first founders of the permanent system; having stated what the law is, in Bengal, and what it is, on the Coast; the following conclusion will be expected, be conceded:

10. That the right granted to a zemindar, does not include the power to demand what he pleases from the land under cultivation in his zemindarry, because he is not at liberty to impose "new abwabs, or mhatool, or to levy any new tax or assessment;" and that therefore, where a new tax is not permitted to be levied, there must have existed an old and a known tax; and because all the Regulations which have been quoted, contain internal evidence of a right having been confirmed to the ryots, to pay their revenue according to their pottahs; while the law, at the same time, defines how the terms of the pottah shall be regulated, and how accommodated, to local usages and customs.

11. If this conclusion be correct, it may suggest the propriety of attentively considering this part of the subject; and of enquiring whether the ryots of Canara, whether the ryots of the Ceded Districts, of Tanjore, or of any part of our territory, where they have been called proprietors, and a permanent settlement immediately with them has been proposed; whether, I say, those ryots, can claim more, or wish for more. They are by law, confirmed in the possession of their land; the rent of the land is fixed; and no increase can be demanded from them, under any pretext.

12. It is of no moment to the ryot, whether his ancestors acquired their rights, by purchase or by gift; whether the right be, only a prescriptive right, or whether it be, a right lately granted. It is unimportant, whether the ryots be called proprietors\* or tenants, *jeumkars* or *mecrassadars*, provided the law has preserved to them what they have always possessed.—"A subject in England has only the usufruct, and not the absolute property in the soil; or, as Sir Edward Coke expresses it, he hath "*dominium utile*, but not *dominium directum*;" and if the strongest and highest estate that any subject can have in England, "is no more than the usufruct,"—(Blackstone)—the ryot of India may rest contented, with an usufructuary right.

"According to the ideas which prevailed among the natives of India, as we are informed by the first Europeans who visited their country, the sovereign is considered as the sole universal proprietor of all the land in his dominions; and from him, is derived every species of tenure by which his subjects can hold it. These lands, were let out to the farmers who cultivated them, at a stipulated rent, amounting usually to a fourth part of their annual produce, paid in kind. In a country where the price of work is extremely low, and where the labour of cultivation is very inconsiderable, the earth yielding its productions almost spontaneously, where subsistence is amazingly cheap, where few clothes are needed, and houses built and furnished at little expense, this rate cannot be deemed exorbitant or oppressive. As long as the husbandman continued to pay the established rent, he retained possession of the furm, which descended, like property, from father to son.

"These accounts, given by ancient authors, of the condition and tenure of the renters of land in India, agree so perfectly with what now takes place, that it may be considered almost as a description of the present state of its cultivation. In every part of India, where the native Hindoo princes retain dominion, the ryots, the modern name by which the renters of land are distinguished, hold their possessions by a lease, which may be considered as perpetual, and at a rate fixed by ancient surveys and valuations. This arrangement has been so long established, and accords so well with the ideas of the natives, concerning the distinctions of cast, and the functions allotted to each, that it has been invariably maintained in all the provinces subject either to Mahomedans or Europeans; and, to both, it serves as the basis on which their whole system of finance is founded. In a more remote period, before the original institutions of India were subverted by foreign invaders, the industry of the husbandman, on which every member of the community depended for subsistence, was as secure as the tenure by which he held his lands was equitable."

13. The collector of the Ceded Districts does not I believe take any notice of the numerous poligars in his district, who, according to the declared principles of the permanent system,

\* "That there be a separation or distinction of possessions, and that this separation be steady and constant: this is absolutely required by the interests of society, and hence the origin of justice and property.—What possessions are assigned to particular persons; this is, generally speaking, pretty indifferent and is often determined by very frivolous views and considerations. We shall mention a few particulars.

"Were a society formed among several independent Men, the most obvious rule which could be agreed on, would be, to leave property to present possession, and leave every man to what he at present enjoys; the relation of possession takes place between the person and the object, and draws on the relation of property. Reason, occupation, or first possession, becomes the basis of property.

"When man bestows labour and industry upon any object, it becomes his property, and no other person can be supposed to have a claim upon it, as in cutting down

"or shaping a tree, in cultivating a field, &c. the alterations which he produces, causes a relation between him and the objects, and naturally engages him to annex it to himself, by the new relations of property. This cause, here concurs with the public utility, which consists in the encouragement given to industry and labour.

"Perhaps, too, private humanity towards the possessor, concurs, in this instance, with the other motives; and engages to leave with him what he has acquired by his sweat and labour, and what he has flattered himself with the constant enjoyment of. For though private humanity can by no means be the origin of justice, since the latter virtue so often contradicts the former; yet when the rule of separate and constant possession is once formed by the indispensable necessities of society, private humanity, and the aversion to doing a hardship to another, may, in a particular instance, give rise to a particular rule of property."—*Adam's Essays*.

tem, would be made zemindars; his proposed settlement would then be wholly ryotwar, to the exclusion of the poligars; if not, it would be only, partially ryotwar.

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14. The collector of Tanjore and Trichinopoly proposes a permanent ryotwar settlement of Tanjore, and of a part of Trichinopoly, and contemplates the reinstatement of the poligars of Warriore, Terriore, and Arialore, in the latter district, as zemindars, and on zemindary tenure.

15. It must appear a strange inconsistency, with reference to measures of permanent and uniform government, to deprive the poligars of the Ceded Districts, of that which has been given to those of Tinnevely, Rammad, Dindigul, &c. and to make a permanent settlement with the ryots; and at the same moment, to place the ryots of Warriore, Terriore, and Arialore poligars, under zemindars, while the ryots of the neighbouring, and even intermixed villages of those poligars, are to have a permanent settlement concluded with them.

16. Neither Colonel Munro, Mr. Wallace, nor any other person, will argue that the rights of the ryots of one part of Trichinopoly, and of the other part of the Ceded Districts, ought to be different.

17. The situation of the ryots of Malabar and Canara, and their rights, have long been supposed to differ essentially, from those of other ryots in other provinces. Before, however, a permanent system, differing from that established elsewhere, is introduced into either of these provinces; before a particular constitution or law is framed for these provinces; it may be highly expedient to analyse this supposed difference, to enquire how the existing law would affect the rights of the ryots there; and whether the principles of the permanent system, as now established, would, if introduced, infringe any of those rights.

18. I shall here assume, because, if the assumption is doubted, it can be established by the public records, that the rights of the ryots of Canara, of Malabar, and of Coorg, are similar. Private estates, as they are called, exist in all these countries, and the public revenue is of the same nature. Any shade of difference that may exist, is not material in the present state of the question.—I mean only here to draw attention to the following principal facts.

1st. That the ryots of Malabar were long under rajahs, and paid the rents of their private estates to those rajahs; that the collector of Malabar has stated the practicability (laying aside the ancient rajahs, now pensioners) of creating new zemindars, as a medium of collecting a temporary or a permanent revenue.

2d. That the ryots of Canara did at one period† of time, either throughout the district, or in a part of it (which is sufficient for my purpose), pay their rents through rajahs, zemindars, or poligars.

3d. That we have transferred to the rajah of Coorg, from Canara, a portion of private estates, which yielded an annual revenue to government of about 20,000 star pagodas, whereby the proprietors, as the ryots of Canara are called, now pay their revenue, not direct to government, but to a rajah or zemindar. It does not alter the case, that I am informed, the rajah of Coorg pays no revenue to government. He gives an elephant annually; and whether his tribute is an elephant, or two-thirds of the government rent of the estates made over to him, is of no consequence. The difference between the two-thirds and the value of the elephant, is what government have conceded, under considerations of a political nature.

19. Having stated the law, and adduced facts, I would argue as follows:—

1st. That all the rights claimed for the ryots of Malabar and of Canara, are confirmed to them by the law, as it now stands.

2d. That the same rights are guaranteed to all ryots§ under the presidency of Fort St. George.

3. That forming a permanent settlement with existing zemindars, or with zemindars to be created, will not infringe those rights in Malabar, Canara, or in any other province under this government.

4. That the act of creating zemindars to collect the rents of the ryots, is not repugnant to the prejudices of the ryots; because the ryots have for ages paid their rents through a medium agency, established by the sovereign.

20. Whether the agent was a permanent officer, a temporary officer, a soubahdar, zemindar, poligar, tehsildar, or whether a jaghireddar, enaumdar or shotrindar, or any other description of person, is of little consequence, as it in no respect affects, the rights enjoyed by the ryots.

21. From

\* Compare para. 23 of Colonel Munro's Report from Canara, dated 31st May 1800, with Major Walker's Letter on the Tenures of Land in Malabar, dated 20th July 1801, and the Report of the Commissioners in Malabar, dated 28th July 1801.

† While engaged in this business, I received letters from the poligars of Bilgha, Soondah, Viteel, and Comlah, all to the same purport; congratulating me on the success of our arms, and expressing their confidence that they would be reinstated in their ancient domains. I knew that there were pretenders, either open or concealed, to almost every district in Canara.—Major Munro to the Board of Revenue, 31st May 1800. para. 3.

‡ The Beddalore family made no additions till 1618, when they imposed an additional assessment of 50 per cent. on the whole of the jumma, except in what is called the Hobly of Mangalore, which comprises about one-third

of Canara, and which being at that time mostly held by tributary poligars, was only partially subjected to this assessment.—Ibid. para. 9.

§ The putt, or extra assessment, of 1718, in column 10, was imposed by the Rajah of Soondah, for the purpose of discharging the Mogul Vashesh, at the rate of 30 per cent. on all gardens, and from 2½ to 12½ per cent. on rice fields. The addition under this head, in Beitwal, was made by the Adgil poligars, who then rented part of the land.—Ibid.

¶ Two-thirds is the proportion of the ryots lands, generally paid by zemindars; the zemindars pay to Government two-thirds collections from the ryots.

§ It will be seen, in a subsequent part of the Memoir, that the same rights were claimed by many poligars, for the ryots of this side of the peninsula.

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21. From the foregoing discussion, it appears that the rights are the same, in all the provinces under this government (I firmly believe over all India); that these rights, are defined by law, and unalterable, by any intermediate agency of any description which may be employed to realize the dues of government. That the revenue must be collected through the medium of some agency, will not be denied; as it is not to be supposed that any person will contend for advantages conferred on a ryot, by a system which would compel him several times in a year, to quit the immediate concerns of his farm and family, and travel fifty or a hundred miles, for the purpose of paying every kist into the treasury of the collector. The expenses of such journeys, independent of the consideration of the detail of such a system, would perhaps more than equal the amount of the public assessment on the individual. An agency must therefore be resorted to; and it remains for investigation, whether it would be most politic to employ zemindars, who have a direct interest in the prosperity of their under-tenants, or hiring servants of government, entirely divested of such interest. I shall therefore proceed to the arguments which have been stated on the subject of zemindary agency; and to examine, whether it unites the greatest advantages both for the government and ryot.

## PART THE SECOND:

*Being on the Advantages of the Zemindary Agency, with reference to Government; and on its Advantages, with reference to the Ryot.*

22. THE proposition for making a permanent settlement with the ryots, is not new. The subject was investigated and discussed in the years 1780, 1790, 1791 and 1792, by Marquis Cornwallis and Sir John Shore. The plan was rejected; and the rejection of it, approved by the Court of Directors.\*

23. The proposition was again revived by the members of the Board of Revenue at this Presidency, in the years 1798 and 1799; and all that had passed to that period, on the subject, was again brought forward. The subject was referred to Bengal, where the plan of making a permanent settlement immediately with the ryots, was again rejected. The rejection was pointed; for under the experience† which had been derived in Bengal, during a period of ten years, the Bengal government authorized and directed the demesne or havelly lands to be formed into estates; and a Regulation was made, that no estate should be a separate estate, "unless (Sect. 10, Reg. XXV. 1802) the public assessment thereon amounted to 500 pagodas or upwards."

24. The instructions furnished to collectors on the 15th October 1799, for the purpose of preparing materials for forming a permanent settlement of the revenue, were framed from the Report of the Board of Revenue, and the orders of the Governor General in Council. They stated, that "government has come to the resolution of transferring to native land-holders, in all practicable cases, the property which they now hold in the havelly lands; and, with this view, it is their intention to parcel it out into lots, competent to bear a fixed annual jumma of from one to ten thousand pagodas, and to put them up to public sale."

25. Major Macleod, then collector of Salem, and Mr. Hurdis, then collector of Dindigul, in replying to these general instructions ‡, proposed a permanent ryotwar settlement, and stated the ryots to be as much proprietors of the land, as those intended to be created. It may be here not unimportant to request attention to the remark, that two collectors on this side of India, claimed for their ryots, what was, at the same period, claimed by Colonel Munro for the ryots of Canara; that Mr. Wallace has since preferred similar claims for all the ryots of Tanjore, and for a part of the ryots of Trichinopoly; and that Colonel Munro, without discussing the rights of the ryots of the Ceded Districts, has nevertheless recommended a settlement immediately with them. What rights were to be confirmed to the ryots; were not

\* See Letters from the Court, dated 19 September 1792, and 11 February 1801.—"The leading principles of the measure have already received our sanction, in our Letter to the Bengal Government, of the 19th September, 1792. "when the business, with the luminous information which attended it, were fully before us, and materially considered by us, 15th February 1801."

† See Proceedings of the Board of Revenue, of the 3d September 1799, para. 363. "It is evident, from the foregoing, that the detail and minutiae alluded to, were considered a cause of great perplexity; and the Board observe, by Regulation XVI. passed in Bengal in 1797, that very serious inconvenience is experienced from a multitude of inconsiderable landholders, &c.—"Landed property, in the district of Chittagong, is, for the most part, distributed into very small parcels, and the numerous proprietors, of which, and to many disputes continually rise, regarding the boundaries of their respective tenures, that the assistance of the Zillah Judge, and his revenue, found insufficient to bring them to an early conclusion, when by one of the primary objects of the Regulation, the speedy administration of justice is materially obstructed in the above described party, despatching of timely redress to the courts of law, has, in some instances, had recourse

"to violence and other illegal means, to redress himself. To remedy these evils, so incompatible with the security of property and good order of society, established in other parts of the Company's provinces, and which is equally the desire of Government to establish universally; the Vice President in Council has thought proper to enact the following Rules, for the more speedy administration of justice, "in the cases referred to, which are to be considered in force "in the Zillah of Chittagong only, from the date of their receipt by the Judge of that district."

‡ Para. 5.—"Your Board will observe, from what has been said in the preceding paragraph, that every farmer is already a sort of proprietor of the lands he may possess; and that he is secured, by the patta he receives, against any unfair demands being made from him."—Major Macleod to Board of Revenue, 11th Nov. 1800.

"The Resolution of Government, to dispose of the proprietary right in the Circar lands by sale, according to the manner and amount specified in paragraph 38, I conceive to be, generally, very impracticable, from the poverty of the people they expect will become the purchasers, as well as from the objection, that those very people, would have to purchase a proprietary right in what prescription had already made their own."—Mr. Hurdis to the Board of Revenue, 16 March 1800.

not then thoroughly known; they appear still to be imperfectly understood. The subject of creating zemindars, was new to these gentlemen; they appear to have connected the establishment of an intermediate class of people between government and the ryot, with the subversion of the established rights of the latter; and actuated by a praiseworthy regard for the welfare of the inhabitants, in the districts under their charge, they supported the priority of their claims to the new rights which they believed it to be in contemplation to bestow on the zemindars. The error of this conclusion has been sufficiently exposed: it may perhaps be accounted for, by the various interpretations which have been applied to the term "proprietary right:" but a further discussion of the subject, is not now necessary.

26. Colonel Munro has stated, and the opinion will be generally concurred in, that the complete abolition of an ancient revenue system, can never be advisable, until it has been fully proved that that which is intended to supplant it, is better. In order to decide whether the new is preferable to the old, it should first be ascertained whether it is practicable; whether it will be liked by the inhabitants; and whether it will ultimately augment the revenue of the country, and the resources of government. He proceeds to add, that a judgment cannot easily be formed upon these points, without previously considering the actual state of the country, and of the people by whom it is cultivated. From the state of the country, and of the people, Colonel Munro argues that the settlement ought to be, ryotwar.

27. It will be my endeavour to show, that the permanent settlement ought to be made with zemindars, where zemindars exist; and that zemindars ought to be created, where none are found. Because I have already shown, that an intermediate agency has always existed between the government and the ryots; and that the establishing of a permanent one, is not a complete abolition of the ancient revenue system, not even an encroachment on it, but a confirmation of it; and because, in great estates, the proprietors have a deeper interest than revenue officers, in the improvement of their lands: that being better judges both of the nature of the soil, and of the circumstances of the ryots, they will be more likely to regulate their rent fairly, so as to enable the better sort of ryots to thrive, and the poorer sort to avoid the distresses and failures, which are so often the consequence of over-assessment: that if they are wealthy, their own interest will urge them to employ more stock in cultivation, than can be expected under the present system: that if they are not wealthy, they will soon become so, from the accumulation of the remission of rent; and the result will be the same; that a degree of mutual confidence will arise between the landlord and tenant, which can never take place between the ryot and the revenue servant; and that from this source, the private dealings among the inhabitants, will be increased and facilitated, greatly to the advantage of the country. That the ryot will have a greater certainty of holding his land at a moderate rent, because the proprietors will be restrained from over-assessing him, by the fear of his throwing up his farm, and going off to another estate: while the revenue officer is in a great measure exempted from this check, for he can follow the fugitive ryot, and assess him wherever he ploughs a field. That the ryot will be less likely to suffer oppression, under a landholder, than under a revenue officer; because, although the law may be supposed to protect him as effectually in the one case, as the other; yet he will be more influenced by his fears and his ignorance, when he is a tenant of government, than when he is that of an individual, to submit in silence. That the raising up of a respectable body of *land-owners*, will introduce that just gradation of rank, which is so essential to the existence and prosperity of every well-ordered society. And, finally, that the inhabitants will be relieved from the constant and vexatious interference of revenue officers in all their transactions; and government, of a great part of the expense of maintaining them.

28. The foregoing are benefits of great magnitude. They comprize almost all that can be said in favour of the zemindarry agency; and are, in abstract, what Marquis Cornwallis and Sir John Shore\* urged, would be the result of that system:—they are not my words, but verbatim the words of Colonel Munro. I shall now give the Colonel's reasons for doubting that these effects, would naturally flow from great estates. "If such benefits should flow, there can be little doubt, he adds, as to the expediency of its adoption: But there are many reasons to induce the belief that the consequences of that system, would not be so beneficial, as might at first sight be expected. The potails of villages, and the principal cultivators, who are the only description of people likely to become owners of estates, have never heard of private landed property, or of any landlord but the circar. It would be almost impossible to persuade them, that government has transferred its right in the soil to them. Nothing but the experience of a great number of years would convince them that they themselves were actually its proprietors; they would therefore, as long as they entertained doubts of the stability of their tenures, act as if they were in daily expectation of a change. They would endeavour to make the most of their estates while in their possession; they would press heavy on the ryots, and they would not employ much stock, even if they had it, in improvements; and the objects of speedy improvement, would hence be lost. As they are in general as poor as the common cultivators, they could make no advances from their

own

\* Para. 17. "The humane and liberal sentiments, which dictated the instructions upon which the present plan is founded, will prompt you to receive the highest gratification, if my hopes of its producing wealth and happiness to the intelligent and industrious part of the individuals of this country, shall be realized: and, independent of all other considerations, I can assure you, that it will be of the utmost importance for promoting the solid interests of the Company; that the principal landholders and traders, in the

"interior parts of the country, should be restored to the same circumstances as to enable them to support the decency, and to give a liberal education according to the customs of their regions; that a regular gradation of property, which is no where more necessary, for preserving order in civil society, be restored to the Court of Directors, 2d August 1793."



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"own funds. Neither is it probable that they would make any from the remission which government might deem it advisable to make, in order to secure the permanency of the settlements. They would employ a part of this fund, in making good deficiencies; and looking forward to the supposed danger of losing their tenures, they would hoard up the rest for their private use, and bestow no part of it, on the promotion of agriculture. They would no doubt at last, when they became persuaded of the stability of their tenures, appropriate their savings to the cultivation of their estates; but it would be long before this change could take place in their opinions; and they would certainly, in the mean time, have reduced the ryots to a much worse state than that in which they found them. I make this conclusion, upon the supposition that they are to be at liberty to raise their rents, like land owners in other countries; for if they are restricted from raising the assessment fixed by government, and are at the same time, liable for all losses, they have not the free management of their estates, and hardly deserve the name of owners."

29. It has been already shown, that this description is incompatible with the existing laws, and therefore, while they remain in force, the conclusion drawn from it, must be without foundation; and the advantages which Colonel Munro stated, in an opposite description of a permanent settlement concluded with individuals, for a considerable extent of landed property, would appear to be ensured.

30. It has further been shown, that the constitution established in 1802, for the internal government of the provinces subject to this Presidency, confirms, instead of infringing, the rights and usages which have been enjoyed and observed by the inhabitants. Where there already existed an higher class of society, who received the rents of the ryots, and paid a consideration for the aggregate collection to government, the confirmation of that class, in the situation in which they were found, has followed as a matter of justice. It is only where such persons do not exist, that the policy of creating them, can come under discussion. Perhaps the arguments which have been urged against the measure, tend in a great degree, to support it. The necessity of gradations in society, is too generally admitted, to render it necessary that it should be particularly insisted on here. Apprehensions for the stability of the gradations already established, form a strong feature of the objections above quoted, to a zemindarry agency, and of the reasoning on which a preference has been given, to a ryot war system: but when it has been shown, that the zemindarry agency does not involve the destruction of the "rank, influence and privileges" claimed for the ryots, but that it is not only connected with their preservation, but extends and enlarges the relations of society; may it not with reason be asked,—whether this additional link in the chain of society, does not tend, in a material degree, to unite the great body of the people more strongly to the government?

"Next in dignity to the laird, is the tacksman, a large taker or leascholder of land, of which he keeps part as a domain in his own hand, and lets part to under-tenants. The tacksman is necessarily a man capable of securing to the laird the whole rent, and is commonly a collateral relation. These tacks or subordinate possessions, were long considered as hereditary; and the occupant was distinguished by the name of the place at which he resided. He held a middle station, by which the highest and the lowest orders were connected. He paid rent and revenue to the laird, and received them from the tenants. This tenure still subsists with its original operation, but not with the primitive stability.

"I have found, in the higher parts of Scotland, men not defective in judgment or general experience, who consider the tacksman as a useless burden on the ground, as a drone who lives upon the product of an estate, without the right of property, or the merit of labour, and who impoverishes at once, the landlord and the tenant. The land, say they, is let to the tacksman at sixpence an acre, and by him to the tenant, at ten-pence. Let the owner be the immediate landlord to all the tenants,—if he lets the ground at eight-pence, he will increase his revenue by a fourth part, and the tenants' burden will be diminished by a fifth.

"Those who pursue this train of reasoning, seem not sufficiently to enquire whither it will lead them, nor to know, that it will equally show the propriety of suppressing all wholesale trade, of shutting up the shops of every man who sells what he does not make, and of excluding all whose agency and profit intervene between the manufacturer and the consumer. They may, by stretching their understandings a little wider, comprehend, that all those who by undertaking large quantities of manufacture, and affording employment to many labourers, make themselves considered as benefactors to the public, have only been robbing their workmen with one hand, and their customers with the other.

"According to these schemes, universal plenty is to begin and end in universal misery. Hope and emulation will be utterly extinguished; and as all must obey the call of immediate necessity, nothing that requires extensive views, or provides for distant consequences, will ever be performed."

31. "Rank, influence and privileges," it has been observed, "are valuable possessions in all countries, and in none more so, than this." The purchase of a zemindarry right, confers all three: the two first, need not any explanation; the third, consists in the difference between the remission of government and what the zemindar can collect, according to law, the state of the land, and in the progressive increase of that difference, from an extended occupation, and from the improvement of the land now cultivated, by all the ways and means which self-interest will suggest. That these are not imaginary rights, but rights of real value, we have had abundant evidence of, not only from the valuable consideration which has in many instances been paid for them, but from the anxious desire of all who have acquired such property, whether by confirmation, by gift or by purchase, to retain their possession under all the disadvantages of a succession of unfavourable seasons.

32. These circumstances are incontrovertible evidence of a positive good, which, it has been shown, has been obtained without infringing any of those rights proposed to be conferred on the cultivators by a permanent ryotwar settlement.

"The greatest misfortune of a country, is an indigent tenantry. Whatever be the native advantages of the soil, or even the skill and industry of the occupier, the want of a sufficient capital, confines every plan, as well as cripples and weakens every operation of husbandry. This evil is felt, where agriculture is accounted a servile or mean employment,—where farms are extremely subdivided, and badly furnished with habitations,—where leases are unknown, or of short or precarious duration. With respect to the encouragement of husbandry, in this as in every other employment, the true reward of industry is in the price and sale of the produce. The exclusive right to the produce, is the only incitement which acts constantly and universally—the only spring which keeps human labour in motion; all therefore that the laws can do, is to secure this right to the occupier of the ground, that is, to constitute such a system of tenure, that the full and entire advantage of every improvement, go to the benefit of the improver—that every man work for himself, and not for another; and that no one share in the profit, who does not assist in the production. By the occupier, I here mean, not so much the person who performs the work, as him who procures the labour, and directs the management; and I consider the whole profit as received by the occupier, when the occupier is benefited by the whole value of what is produced; which is the case with the tenant, who pays a fixed rent for the use of land, no less than with the proprietor, who holds it as his own. The one, has the same interest in the produce, and in the advantage of every improvement, as the other. Likewise the proprietor, though he grant out his estate to farm, may be considered as the occupier, inasmuch as he regulates the occupation, by the choice, superintendence, and encouragement of his tenants, by the disposition of his lands, by erecting buildings, providing accommodations, by prescribing conditions, or supplying implements and material of improvement; and is entitled, by the rule of public expediency above-mentioned, to receive, in the advance of his rent, a share of the benefit which arises from the increased produce of his estate. The violation of this fundamental maxim of agrarian policy, constitutes the chief objection to the holding of lands by the state, by the king, by corporate bodies, by private persons, in right of their offices or benefices. The inconvenience to the public, arises, not so much from the unalienable quality of lands, thus holden in perpetuity, as from hence,—that proprietors of this description, seldom contribute much either of attention or expense, to the cultivation of their estates, yet claim, by rent, a share in the profit of every improvement that is made upon them. This complaint can only be obviated by long leases, at a fixed rent, which convey a large portion of the interest to those who actually conduct the cultivation. The same objection, is applicable to the holding of land by foreign proprietors, and, in some degree, to estates of too great extent being placed in the same hands."

Now the principal expedient by which such a purpose, namely, increasing the number of the people, can be promoted, is, to adjust the laws of property, as nearly as possible to the following rules:—First, "To give the occupiers, &c. the property over the soil which is necessary for its perfect cultivation." Secondly, "To assign the whole profit of every improvement, to the persons by whose activity it is carried on. What we call property in land, as hath been observed above, is power over it: now it is indifferent to the public, in whose hands this power resides, if it be rightly used. It matters not to whom the land belongs, if it be well cultivated."

33. I must now be permitted to refer to the experience gained in Bengal, where the ryots have the same privileges as those of the peninsula, as appears proved by the authorities which I have quoted. Under this experience, the Governor General in Council, on the 31st December 1799, being a period of nearly ten years subsequent to the establishment of the permanent settlement under that government, informs the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, that "government has always been under the necessity of employing its own officers, or of having recourse to farmers for the management of these lands. These agents and farmers having no permanent interest in the improvement of the lands, often found a temporary advantage in committing frauds and abuses; and it was invariably found, that the lands belonging to the government, although very advantageously situated, were worse cultivated than the contiguous lands of individuals."

"It was on these grounds, as well as in consideration of the injustice committed against the original zemindars, in the grant of these lands to the Company, that we restored to the zemindars the twenty-four pergunnahs or districts, commonly called the Company's Lands, which surround Calcutta; the zemindarry right in which, was granted to the Company (to the exclusion of the former proprietors) by Jaffer Alli Khan."

"No consideration could with justice have been demanded by the Company, from those zemindars for the restoration of rights, of which they were originally deprived, by an act of injustice."

"With regard to the havelly lands under your presidency, as detailed in the 321st, 322d, and 323d paragraphs of the Report of your Board of Revenue, we entirely concur in opinion with that board, that these lands should be parcelled out into estates, and that they should be disposed of gradually, as may be found practicable, and converted into permanent tenures, subject to the payment of a definite and perpetual revenue."

"If no purchasers for these lands should appear, we are satisfied that it will be in the interest of the Company, of the occupants and inhabitants of those lands, as well as to try at large, that the lands should be granted to individuals of acknowledged ability, who would take them, as zemindaries, subject to the payment of a fixed revenue in perpetuity."

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"It is also our desire, that these orders, with regard to the disposal of the havelly lands, and the conversion of them into zemindaries at a fixed revenue, should be extended to the countries lately conquered from Tippoo Sultaun, as soon as a satisfactory statement shall have been obtained of the resources of those conquests."

34. At a much later period, the foregoing orders have been repeated by the Governor General in Council, in a letter of the 19th July 1804, as follows:

"The instructions of the Governor General in Council, under date the 31st December 1799, and the order of his Excellency in Council of the 18th June 1801, respecting the annexation of the provinces of Malabar and Canara to Fort St. George, state the principles, conformably to which, the settlement of the land revenue of the districts, in which no settlement has been formed, must be regulated. Where the necessary enquiries for forming a permanent settlement, have not been completed, the settlement should be made for such term of years as local circumstances may render advisable. In all cases, it is desirable that the settlements should be formed with the zemindars, or other description of landholders. Where no such descriptions of persons exist, it would be proper to form the lands into estates, and to dispose of them to persons who will attend to their cultivation. These persons, as well as all other landholders, should be permitted freely to transfer their estates by sale, gift, or in any other manner. It can never be desirable that the government itself should act as the proprietor of the lands, and should collect the rents from the immediate cultivators of the soil. The rates of rent payable for the different descriptions of produce, must vary in every district, and often in every village. Where any proprietors may be found, they will generally collect those rents, agreeably to the specific engagement, which they may conclude with their tenants, or according to the established usage of the country. If any differences should arise between the landholders and tenants regarding those engagements or usages, the courts of judicature will form the proper tribunals for deciding such differences. These questions, are of private right, in which the executive authority cannot interfere, consistently with justice, policy, or its own interests. The difficulties experienced in Malabar, in regulating the assessment on the pepper vines, and other articles of produce, and the evils which have resulted from the measures adopted for that purpose, afford most convincing proof of the bad policy of a system of revenue which requires the executive authority of the government to assume every where the character of a proprietor of land, and to interfere in details, which cannot be conducted in a manner favourable to the interests of the cultivator of the soil, and to the extension of agriculture, excepting by the proprietors of the lands.

"The cultivation of the country must depend, on the exertions of the land-holders. In order to encourage them to employ those exertions, and to conduct themselves with moderation and justice towards the immediate cultivators of the soil, the annual payments of the land-holders to government, should be fixed upon a scale of equity and moderation, & regulated, with reference to the receipts of government, from the lands or estates of the different land-holders, for a period of years; and all the authorities, of every description employed in the collection of the revenue, including the executive authority of the government itself, should be rendered amenable for their acts, to the controul of the laws, according to the rules already established in those parts of the country to which the new constitution has been completely extended. The early extension of these principles to the unsettled districts, will combine the interests of the state, as connected with its revenues, with the welfare of every class of its subjects concerned in the cultivation of the lands. It will rest with your Lordship in Council to apply these principles to local circumstances in Malabar, and other districts in which a permanent settlement, has not yet been concluded."

35. Thus, then, repeated orders have been received to convert all the havelly or demesne lands under this government, into estates, and dispose of them to zemindars to be created: which orders have been given, under the experience afforded, during ten and fifteen years in Bengal, of the benefits of the zemindary system, and of the inconveniences of a more detailed system of management. The zemindary system is, then, a system ascertained by experience, to be a good system. The supposed advantages of a ryotwar permanent rent, have not undergone this test.

36. Proofs should be adduced, in support of every assumed position; and as I possess proof of the success of the zemindary system in Bengal, I shall introduce it here, without apology. It was procured for me, by a member of the Special Commission, of which I was secretary, and who may be supposed to have had an interest in satisfying himself that the measures recommended by the Commission, were calculated to secure the benefits which their appointment was intended to produce.

"The documents which I have sent to you, contain, I am willing to believe, abundant proof of the great advantages which have resulted from the establishment of a permanent settlement of the revenue of the provinces under the presidency of Bengal, where, from the information I have been able to collect from gentlemen in the civil and military service, and from gentlemen out of the service, the improvements are most extensive: wastes have in every direction, been converted into fields of grain. The spirit of improvement has, however, been much more actively employed, since the expiration of the term of the decennial settlement; and the people have had proof, that the declaration of an unlimited tenure, was not a deception. Marquis Wellesley found the idea of change so alarming partly to the evil reports of the worst classes of natives, that he found it necessary to counteract it by a Proclamation, which produced a re-establishment of confidence in the government. Those who have always viewed the subject through the same medium,

"medium, may be deceived. What I have to offer, are those stubborn evidences, called  
"figures."

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• Extract of a Letter from the Board of Revenue, at Calcutta, to the Governor General, in Council: dated

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“ Your Lordship in Council will perceive, that this statement is a continuation of that  
“ prepared by our late accountant to the end of 1798-9, and forwarded with our letter of the  
“ 27th May last; but the present statement is more complete, as including the year 1799-  
“ 1800, and consequently the entire period of the decennial settlement.

By this statement it appears, that the collections of the last ten years, on account of the ordinary land and sayer revenue of the four provinces, and the customs included in the jumma of Benares, exceed the collections on the same accounts, during the preceding ten years, in the sum of Sicea Rupees 1,38,28,720. 3. 10. 2; or deducting from this amount, the estimated proportion arising from the Benares revenue, not being included in the former period prior to October 1781, namely, Rupees 51,00,612. 4, the net excess collected in the last ten years is S<sup>r</sup> R<sup>s</sup> 86,20,108. 3. 62.

" The comparison may be further exhibited as follows :

1st. Total collections from 1780-1, or 1187-8, to 1789-90,

or 11907	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29,01,30,433	3	19
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Add estimate for Benares in 1780-1, and five months of 1781-2.	}	-	-	-	51,99,612	-	4
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Total of first 10 years	-	-	-	-	-	29,53,30,045	4	3
Or annual average	-	-	-	-	-	2,95,33,004	8	8

2d. Total collections from 1790-1, or 1197-8 to 1799-1800, or

1206-7	-	-	-	-	-	30,39,59,153	7	9	%
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Or.annual average	-	-	-	-	3,03,95,915	5 11
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3d. Excess of the last ten years in the total collections, as above - - - - -

In the annual average collected	-	-	-	8,62,910	13	3	0
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“ We have great satisfaction in submitting this comparative statement to your Lordship in  
 “ Council, as it proves that notwithstanding the abolition of the greater part of the sayer  
 “ in the year 1790, the first year of the decennial settlement, the actual collections during  
 “ that settlement, have considerably exceeded those of preceding years.

"The above is a comparison of actual collections of ten years preceding, and of ten years subsequent to the decennial settlement; the actual receipts of the latter period exceed by Sicca Rupees 86,29,108, those of the preceding period, being upwards of eight lacs per annum. When the settlement took place, the country was reduced to the lowest ebb, absolutely going to ruin, and overrun with sayer or inland chokies. What is the picture now?—It more resembles a garden; abundance is diffused among the people; no apprehensions of famine are entertained; while several of the seasons have been such since the decennial settlement, as would, under former circumstances, have produced this dreadful calamity.

• "The annexed statement (No. 2.) bears ample testimony to the regularity with which  
 "the revenue is realized. The amount of the balances of revenue outstanding on the 30th  
 "April 1802, is only in the proportion of  $2\frac{1}{4}$  per cent to the gross jumma; and at the close  
 "of the Fusly year, which here ends on the 30th of September, the aggregate balance is  
 "only  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent to the jumma, while it was expected that the whole, with the exception of  
 "the amount due from the lands under aumani, would be realized. Greater regularity does  
 "not exist in the collection of the revenue of any state; nor can greater regularity, be  
 "expected.

"The statement (No. 3.) exhibits the proportion that the charge of collection, in the provinces of Bengal, Behar, Orissa and Benares, bears to the gross jumma.—The nature of the permanent settlement in Benares, is similar to what it would be with us, if the merassadars had been constituted proprietors of their respective merassacs; a tehsildar is appointed to collect the revenue from these numerous zemindars, and to superintend the police, with a contract allowance of 10 per cent on the jumma, for being answerable for the due realization of the revenue, and the restoration of all property plundered or stolen. This per-centage allowed to the tehsildars, is deducted from the gross revenue, before entering the jumma; so that while the charges only stand in the revenue books at 11½ per cent. they are actually 21½, including allowance to the Rajah, and pensions. The tehsildar, under this arrangement, receives the same income as a proprietor would do, while he has no interest in the soil, nor any inducement to perform any other duty than that specified in his contract; the profit he gets by the contract, is most likely carried off to another quarter of the world."

"No. 4. is an extract from the register of estates in Tirhoot, where it will be observed that there are subdivisions of estates so low, as a jumma of sicca-rupees 40. estates of even a rupee annual jumma, have existence. This minute subdivision of property, has been attended with much inconvenience, and was a great error in as introduced at first,—originating in too great a desire to divide and diminish of great zemindarries: By two great an attention to the accomplishment of

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"the evils that would arise from too many small estates, on the other hand, were over-looked. The consequences have been, much collusion in the sale and transfer of estates. Some few estates are not now to be found. The zemindars procured the separation of a portion of their talook, in the name of a person who appeared; the parties agreed to an assessment on their separate estates, which were registered as separate zemindaries, and no more was said or done. For a few years, the agent of the zemindar (thus become an artificial proprietor) paid his jumma regularly, and then disappeared, or was reported dead; the jumma of the estate fell into arrear; but when ordered to be attached and sold, no estate could be found corresponding with the registry. By this trick, the zemindar had got the jumma of his portion reduced, in proportion to the amount of the jumma assessed on the estate, returned *non est inventus*; or if the estate actually existed, in the proportion that the jumma assessed thereon, exceeded its actual resources: This abuse was remedied in the year 1799. No separation can now be made for a jumma less than 500 rupees."

37. The period which has elapsed since the establishment of the permanent settlement in such part of the territory \* of Fort St. George as was acquired previously to, and in the year 1792, does not admit of reference to the experience derived under this government, of the benefits of the zemindarry system. It may, however, be satisfactory to state,

First, That up to this period, no zemindarry, or part of a zemindarry, in existence at the time the permanent settlement was made, has been sold for an arrear of revenue.

Secondly, That comparatively few, out of the number of estates disposed of on zemindarry tenure, have been sold for an arrear of revenue.

Thirdly, That the revenue has consequently been collected to this time, with the facility and punctuality expected from the new system; and in the southern and western countries, under the particular disadvantages of a succession of unfavourable seasons.

Fourthly, That nearly the sum of seven lacs of pagodas, (7,00,000,) has been received by government for the zemindarry right of the small portion of demesne or havelly lands which have hitherto been sold.

38. It has been urged against the zemindarry system, that many of the existing zemindars are improvident landholders, and some, rebellious subjects. The question is not here, what a few zemindars may be; but whether the system of measures, as now established, be calculated to provide against the evil consequences which may be supposed to result from the improvidence, or any other bad quality, of the existing zemindars. Whatever may be the good or bad qualities of the existing zemindars, they have not resulted from the permanent system,—they are effects from pre-existing causes.

"With regard to the ignorance and incapacity of the zemindars, admitting these defects to exist in that class of people to the extent supposed, I have already given it as my opinion, that they are to be attributed greatly to the system of collecting the public revenue from their lands, which has long prevailed in this country. To keep them in a state of tutelage, and to prohibit them from borrowing money, or disposing of their lands without the knowledge of government, as we do at present, with a view to prevent their suffering the consequences of their profligacy and incapacity, will perpetuate these defects. If laws are enacted which secure to them the fruits of industry and economy, and at the same time leave them to experience the consequences of idleness and extravagance, they must either render themselves capable of transacting their own business, or their necessities will oblige them to dispose of their lands to others, who will cultivate and improve them. This I conceive to be the only effectual mode which this or any other government could adopt, to render the proprietors of the land, economical landlords, and prudent trustees of the public interests.

"It has sometimes been objected to these arguments, that the revenue of the sovereign, was sacrificed to the comfort and prosperity of the subject:—this is perhaps impossible. The interests of both, are too closely and inseparably connected. The security of the subject will always enrich him, and his wealth will always overflow into the coffers of the sovereign. But if the objection were just in point of policy; it would be the highest tribute to the virtue of the government. To sacrifice revenue to the well-being of a people, is a blame of which Marcus Aurelius would have been proud."

### PART THE THIRD:

*Being on the Disadvantages which must result to Government from a Ryotwar Settlement as a measure of Permanency; and particularly on the Disadvantages of it, as regards the Ryots.*

39. IN the first part of this paper, it was my object to demonstrate, that the rights of the ryots had been confirmed to them, by law; that the placing any person between them and government, to receive their rents, would not infringe those rights; and that the rents paid, not being liable to increase, they have all the benefits intended to be granted to them by the proposition of making a permanent settlement with each individual, as far as regards a permanent rent. That a remission of fifteen or twenty per cent. of their present rents would not be a further benefit, is not meant to be disputed; but that the object of a permanent

\* Part havelly, remainder zemindarry.

—All havelly.

—All havelly.

—Part poligar, part havelly.

Southern Pollams.—All poligars.

Western Pollams.—All poligars.

The whole are now settled, on zemindarry tenure.

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manent rent would be secured to government by that remission, has not even been attempted to be proved. Colonel Munro does not propose a ryotwar rent, as a permanent rent\*.

40. In the second place, I have endeavoured to show the benefits which have resulted from the zemindarry permanent settlement, and the expediency of that system. I shall now proceed to explain the objections as they regard the interests of government and the ryots, against a system of collecting in permanency the rents of the government immediately from the cultivators of the soil.

41. Although the rent to be paid by the ryots, has long been, fixed, as regards them, it is not possible that a system providing for the collection of detailed fixed rents from each field of each ryot, by the immediate officers of government, can ever secure a fixed *unfluctuating* revenue to government.

42. That the rent will in some cases increase, from an extended occupation of waste land, I do not dispute; but it may also decrease, as I shall show. When the rent of government is liable to increase or decrease, the revenue is no longer permanent. The quantum of increase or decrease, must depend on individual character. A system which rests its success on individual character, will not, experience has shown, answer as a permanent system.

"The fluctuation in the members of government, as well as in the officers employed in the subordinate departments, renders the establishment of principles, indispensably necessary; for as experience cannot be transmitted with officers, the discretion of the agents will never cease to operate in the expectation of real or fancied improvement, unless it be restrained by rule. The characters of individuals, even where the same system is pursued, must have a considerable influence, upon the success of it; but where no system is established, the evils will far exceed the partial benefits resulting from the talents, knowledge, and zeal of a few.

"The skill and success which the natives display, in applying to the defects of our personal characters, and in rendering them subservient to their own views and interests, are well known: what one man refuses, another is disposed to grant; the system rejected to day, is again brought forward with new arguments in support of it, at another period. What has been once tried, and found to fail, is again revived, under plausible reasons assigned for its failure. They study our dispositions, inclinations, aversions, enmities, and friendships, and with the cool caution so familiar to them, seize the favourable opportunity to introduce propositions for new systems and measures, or for reviving those which have been exploded. With the most upright intentions, our caution and experience are liable to be misled; but experience is not the lot of all, and the judgment will often yield to the suggester or adviser, where it ought to be guided only, by the propriety of the measure suggested or proposed. In the stability of system alone, we must look for a remedy against evils which can never be thoroughly eradicated or corrected; and this consideration is of the greatest importance."

43. In the Northern circars, for instance, the ryots there, have paid a fixed revenue for ages; that is, they have given fifty per cent. or more or less of their produce, according to local circumstances, either in money or in kind. Could government, by its immediate officers, have collected a permanent revenue during the three years of famine †, from 1790 to 1793; or of superabundant produce, from 1790 to 1799? In one case, the total want of rain, and death of thousands of ryots, annihilated the very source of revenue; in the other case, the want of a market for the superabundant produce of the earth, rendered that produce of no value. In either of these cases, a ryotwar rent, if exacted, would have ruined the greater part of the ryots; but if it had been a permanent ‡ ryotwar rent, and had been exacted, the exaction of it, would have been still more ruinous. If a rent §, under such circumstances, be not exacted, there is no permanency in it; because the severity of the famine, the extent of the superabundance of produce, the quantity of remission, the person to receive the remission; are all points to be ascertained by individuals, and individuals not certainly so deeply interested in the result, as a zemindar and a landholder: If all ryots are to be exempt, the exemption would be ruinous to government; if only a part, to whom is the scrutiny into such details to be entrusted; or who is to pay, and who not to be trusted? To native officers of government? By collectors, it cannot be executed,—they can only superintend and direct; and the degree of vigilance or ability exerted in the superintendence must depend on the character of the individual. Does experience tend to convince, that such scrutinies will be conducted *always* with justice towards government, and justice towards the people? Has experience shown us, that confidence can *always* be placed in the

\* "It is the system which has always been followed, and is therefore that which is best adapted to the manners and prejudices of the inhabitants. It is well suited to the narrowness of their circumstances, because it does not insist on the same amount of revenue being paid every year; but regulates it by the extent of cultivation, which increases or diminishes as the seasons are favourable or otherwise. It seldom injures the revenue by any considerable failures; because the failures are only those of individual ryots, who soon recover their losses by cultivating smaller farms, and being allowed to hold them for two or three years below the standard rent."

From Colonel Munro, 25 Aug. 1805.

† Ver. 19. "Wherefore shall we die, before thine eyes, both we and our land? buy us and our land for bread, and we and our land will be servants unto Pharaoh: and give us seed, that we may live, and not die, that the land be not desolate."

Ver. 20. "And Joseph bought all the land of Egypt for Pharaoh; for the Egyptians sold every man his field, because the famine prevailed over them: so the land became Pharaoh's."—Gen. chap. xlv.

‡ There is a great difference between a ryotwar rent and a permanent ryotwar rent. Under the first, only the land actually cultivated is paid for; under the second, the engagement must be entered into to pay a specific money for a specific quantity of land, and in all seasons.

§ Sec. 6. Reg. XXV. A. D. 1802.—"The landholder shall regularly pay, in all seasons, in the current year of their respective provinces, the amount of the permanent revenue rent fixed on their lands; the remission of revenue has occasionally been granted, according to the state of the country, on account of drought or other seasons, shall cease, and never be revived."



Documents relative to  
Zemindari and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Mr. Hodgson's  
Memoir.

the integrity, or even in the ability of native officers? \* Is there then no difference in such cases, between a scrutiny conducted by a man into the state of his own affairs and property, and that made by an uninterested native individual, or rather by an individual whose interest is greater to be a rogue than to be honest? The servants of the most careless private person, are perhaps more under the eye of their master, than those of the most careful prince, says the celebrated author of the *Wealth of Nations*.

44. It is very well known, that since the permanent settlement of Salem was made, the seasons have been uniformly bad: that in that zillah where the estates are of the smallest extent of any hitherto sold, several failures have taken place. A reduction of fifteen or twenty per cent. on the permanent rent of Salem, would not have covered the deficiency of produce, in numerous cases; and the exaction of even that reduced revenue, immediately from the ryots, must have caused partial emigration. Tehsildary Agency, would in this case have produced partial, perhaps considerable distress. The establishment of zemindars, has produced an opposite and happy consequence: attention to the situation of the ryots, whether excited by self-interest or by any other motives, has induced the zemindars to lower the rates of the pottahs, and preserve the ryots in possession of their lands.

45. It may be doubted whether the present ryotwar rents in Canara, although the most moderate of any under this government, can be confirmed in permanency. They are paid now with great facility, owing to the operation of two causes,—the low land rent, and high price of grain. From the demand for exportation, the exportation has considerably diminished, in the last year: it may cease; the land rent may then, in time approach nearer to the proportion, which the rents paid by ryots on this side of India, bears to the value of the produce of their lands. If the produce of Canara, and of the neighbouring districts, should increase without an increased demand, it might prove difficult to collect even a *permanent ryotwar rent* from Canara.

46. It may, I think, be likewise argued, that a permanent ryotwar settlement, will in its operation, prove injurious to ryots, not generally perhaps, but certainly proportionately to the inequalities which may exist, at the time the rent is declared permanent; and in proportion as the present moderate rents become, through various causes, unequal. It will not be denied, that inequalities must exist in arrangements embracing such detail. A diminution of fifteen or twenty per cent. on the present ryotwar rent, would, as I have admitted, be a great *immediate* benefit to all ryots; but it would be a much more extensive benefit to those ryots who are under-assessed, than it would be to those who are over-assessed. It might enable the first class to pay, in some instances, for land held by them, and not cultivated; but not, for all the land held by them, if all the land should remain uncultivated. The reduction of fifteen or twenty per cent. which, in the other instances only, reduced the rent of over-assessed land, would not enable the holders of that land to pay for any part, much less for the whole of their unproductive land.

"A land-tax assessed according to a general survey and valuation, how equal soever it may be at first, must, in the course of a very moderate period of time, become unequal. To prevent it becoming so, would require the continual and painful attention of government to all the variations in the state and produce of every different farm in the country. The governments of Prussia, of Bohemia, of Sardinia, and of the Duchy of Milan, actually exert an attention of this kind,—an attention so unsuitable to the nature of government, that it is not likely to be of long continuance; and which, if it is continued, will probably, in the long run, occasion much more trouble and vexation, than it can possibly bring relief to the cultivator."

"In 1666, the generality of Montauban was assessed to the real or predial *taille*, according, it is said, to a very exact survey and valuation. By 1727, this assessment had become altogether unequal. In order to remedy this inconvenience, government has found no better expedient than to impose upon the whole generality, an additional tax of a hundred and twenty thousand livres. This additional tax is rated upon all the different districts subject to the *taille*, according to the whole assessment. But it is levied only upon those, which, in the actual state of things, are by that assessment, under-taxed; and it is applied to the relief of those, which, by the same assessment, are over-taxed. Two districts, for example, one of which ought, in the actual state of things, to be taxed at nine hundred, the other at eleven hundred livres, are, by the old assessment, both taxed at a thousand livres. Both these districts are, by the additional tax, rated at eleven hundred livres each. But this additional tax is levied only upon the district under-charged, and it is applied altogether to the relief of that overcharged, which consequently pays only nine hundred livres. The government neither gains nor loses by the additional tax, which is applied altogether to remedy the inequalities arising from the old assessment. The application is pretty much regulated according to the discretion

"I acknowledge, that I consider the necessity of introducing zemindars, or native collectors, which is essential to the proposed plan, as a principal inconvenience attending the substitution of native officers between the inferior tenants and the collector, supplying the place of a sudder farmer. I do not think the substitution attended with the great advantages it may apparently have,—Government can never reward the zemindars in a degree sufficient to prevent corruption, and must rely upon its coercion over them. Coercion cannot be exercised, without understanding the detail of the duties committed to their management. It may be contended, that the zemindar is liable to be removed, and that therefore the principle of coercion is not applicable to him, than in the case of a farmer,

"who cannot be dismissed; on the other hand, it may be observed, that extortion, in the latter, may be punished by fine and damages; and that he has, in self-interest, under the supposition of a permanent system, a greater motive to restrain him, than a native collector. The latter, will regulate his conduct by the estimate which he forms of the abilities of the collector under whose authority he is placed: if he knows him to be vigilant, active, and well-informed, he will be cautious, diligent, and honest: if he supposes him to be otherwise, and that he can misbehave with impunity, he will intrigue with under-renters, abuse his influence, withhold true knowledge, and impose upon his principal, by misinformation."—Sir John Shore's Minutes.

"discretion of the intendant of the generality, and must therefore be in a great measure arbitrary."

Documents relative to Zemindary and Ryotwar settlements.

Mr Hodgson's Memoir.

† Smith's Wealth of Nations.

47. The interest of the native tehsildar of government, and of all the officers of government, (for it has been shown there must be officers of government to collect so detailed a rent as a permanent ryotwar rent) is, to compel the ryot to pay his entire rent, whatever may be his circumstances, whether the payment would ruin him or not. The ruin of ten, or of a thousand ryots, produces no ruin to the officers of government, although it does to government, but the ruin of ten ryots, or of a thousand ryots, would be productive of serious loss to a zemindar: they are his stock, his productive labours: it is as much his interest to cherish and preserve them, as it is the interest of the ryots to cherish and preserve the bullocks of their plough. "What is any man's interest, he will not mistake." Either native officers of government, or zemindars, are, then, necessary to collect the revenue of government immediately from the ryots. Can they be put in opposition to each other, where a system of permanent measures, and not of temporary expedient, is under discussion?

"The attention of the sovereign can be at best but a very general, vague consideration of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part of his dominions. The attention of the landlord is a particular and minute consideration of what is likely to be the most advantageous application of every inch of ground upon his estate. The principal attention of the sovereign ought to be to encourage, by every means in his power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer, by allowing both to pursue their interest in their own way, and according to their own judgment; by giving to both the most perfect security, that they shall enjoy the full recompense of their own industry."

48. It is not by tehsildars, that we are to expect improvements will be made in the appearance of the country. They will not build substantial houses, plant gardens and topes, make roads, erect choultries and bridges, or build pagodas. Whenever we observe such improvements, they will generally be found to have been made by that middling class of people, standing in society between the manufacturer and cultivator, that is, by merchants, land-holders, and men of property. That the disposition of the natives of India is favourable to this mode of disposing of their superabundant wealth, is abundantly evident. To perpetuate their names, by acts of general benefit, of the nature above described, is the first wish of all. By the creation of zemindars, therefore, we raise up those intermediate gradations in society, the want of which, form such well-grounded complaints. These zemindars will acquire property, and spend a part of it, in improvements of general benefit. The ryot will, under the zemindar, also acquire property; and when protected in the possession of it, and not afraid to display it, will lay it out, first,—in bettering his condition;—secondly,—in personal comforts;—and lastly,—in local improvements, of the nature above described.

49. The Court of Directors have declared, that "the nature of our dominion in India, renders it expedient, that our revenue system should be simple in its principles, and uniform in its operations;"—and have remarked, that "(such) frequent changes must necessarily be productive of disquiet to the inhabitants of any country, still more to an indolent submissive people."

50. The sentiments of Sir John Shore, on the impolicy of frequent changes, are so much in point, that I must beg permission to introduce them.

"Our administration," he observes, "has heretofore been fluctuating and uncertain. An idea of improvement has been hastily adopted, unsteadily pursued, and afterwards abandoned, from a supposed defect in principle; new measures have been substituted, followed and relinquished with the same facility; and the natives, from these variations, with every succession of men, expect a change of system."

"Measures in the detail, must be always subject to variation from local circumstances and contingencies, which no foresight can provide against; but principles should be fixed, if possible."

51. With these sentiments I shall conclude, and leave for decision, whether the objections to a zemindary permanent rent, and the supposed advantages of a ryotwar permanent rent, outweigh, in so great a degree, the benefits of the present system, as to warrant, under the progress which has been made, a change in the principle of settling the revenue permanently in the territories subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George.

(Signed) JN<sup>o</sup> HODGSON.

\* When Peter the First thought proper to follow the custom of Germany, and to demand his taxes in money, he made a very prudent regulation, which is still followed in Russia: the gentleman levies the tax on the peasants, and pays it to the czar. If the number of peasants diminishes, he pays less; if it increases, he pays no more; so that it is in his interest not to worry or oppress his vassals.—M. Page 126. Vol. I.

## APPENDIX.

(No. 1.)

General STATEMENT of LANDS ordered to be put up for Sale in the Province of *Bengal*, during the year Bengal Style; and in the Provinces of *Behar*, *Orissa*, and *Benares*, during the year 1206, Fussuly Stylé.

DISTRICTS.	Balance due from defaulting Proprietors.		Jumma.		Gross Amount of the Sales.	Number of Years purchase, reckoning the Proprietor's profit at 10 per Cent on the Jumma.	REMARKS
	Of Lands for Sale, but not Sold.	Of Lands actually Sold.	Of Lands ordered for Sale, but not Sold.	Of Lands actually Sold.			
BENGAL PROVINCE.							
Beerbhoom -	57,303 14 9 3	14,146 1 11 3	75,936 3 5 -	36,603 9 5 2	16,439 13 15 2	4 5 27	* These sales in consequence of the Zillah collector's order in 1206 (B. S. collectorship).
Bardwan -	1,324 7 9 -	1,002 3 1 -	2,348 19 2 -	3,432 7 7 3	1,333 - - -	3 10 18	
Calcutta -	- - -	1,379 1 1 3	- - -	10 5 12 -	1,056 - - -	1,020 3 14	
Chittagong -	41,602 7 10 1	6,721 1 4 2	26,501 15 17 1	2,175 5 7 2	8,008 8 - -	36 9 26	
Cooch Behar -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	
Dacca -	85,449 7 5 2	2,26,179 13 9 2	1,27,924 7 12 12	1,14,983 13 6 2	51,212 6 14 -	2 4 7	
Dinapore -	717 9 17 2	1,15,935 7 5 2	992 10 5 -	72,244 5 9 -	62,520 - - -	8 7 25	
Jessore -	15,901 5 5 1	1,185 6 8 -	17,413 4 17 1	1,888 2 8 -	1,723 - - -	13 4 15	
Moorshedabad -	28,914 5 17 3	1,24,274 6 6 3	43,782 13 15 -	57,253 - 18 -	90,077 10 - -	15 8 23	
Mymensingh -	25,232 10 13 1	10,276 12 13 1	25,409 4 5 3	11,729 12 3 -	7,275 13 - -	6 2 13	
Nuddea -	43,395 9 4 1	1,83,577 4 4 3	88,740 - 12 1	1,75,865 6 10 2	1,35,772 14 14 -	7 8 19	No statements been received in shaly or Rajmel
Purnea -	28,891 4 11 2	- - -	34,183 8 17 2	30,220 10 - -	27,700 - - -	9 2 -	
Rajshahoe -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	
Rajmehal -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	
Rungpoor -	9,182 - - -	11,623 8 - -	12,925 3 11 3	12,627 8 18 2	15,379 - - -	12 2 5	
Sylhet -	11,554 13 7 3	3,36 9 5 1	27,747 2 18 -	4,784 5 16 1	6,482 2 5 3	13 6 18	
Tipperah -	23,181 12 3 2	13,294 11 16 2	31,005 13 - 3	14,410 12 10 2	9,483 - - -	6 6 29	
24 Pargunnahs -	51,670 12 25 -	9,394 2 3 2	55,247 14 8 -	9,461 12 - 1	9,435 8 - -	9 11 27	
TOTAL { S <sup>r</sup> R <sup>r</sup> }	4,24,322 8 16 3	7,19,406 8 1 2	5,70,658 8 5 3	6,47,091 3 13 1	1,43,898 2 19 2	6 10 9	
BEHAR PROVINCE.							
Bahar -	- - -	- - -	1,40,886 8 9 2	21,099 10 15 2	135,753 - - -	16 11 12	* On a minute of the state of Behar, it would be that the two first are erroneously with perhaps the merits of the Jan written to the for explanation, not thought it no delay this state longer for his ans † No lands or sale in 1206 (F. collectorship). † A similar reply to the state of Saurun, as to 1 Behar. The collector's unrealized profits in the sales, likewise to be erroneous up; the collector's written to for action.
Bahar -	17,564 3 2 1	- - -	16,551 12 12 -	31 14 14 -	16 - - -	5 - 6	
Bahar -	5,281 9 5 -	10 - - -	6,343 1 2 2	- - -	- - -	- - -	
Bahar -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	
Bahar -	- - -	- - -	1,60,079 13 5 1	17,669 13 14 -	19,494 - - -	51 9 10	
Bahar -	11,965 4 8 2	11,528 12 7 -	20,078 10 - -	6,550 - 1 2	11,356 - - -	17 11 1	
Bahar -	1,90,786 7 12 -	12,727 2 11 1	12,20,631 - 2 -	12,684 11 15 -	19,495 8 - -	15 4 15	
TOTAL { S <sup>r</sup> R <sup>r</sup> }	1,15,997 8 7 3	24,265 14 18 1	5,61,570 15 11 -	1,58,036 3 - 1	1,58,119 8 - -	27 2 28	
ORISSA PROVINCE.							
Hudgallee -	- - -	- - -	2,612 8 4 -	- - -	- - -	- - -	No statements been received in shaly or Rajmel
Midnapore -	47,304 13 1 -	65,239 12 16 -	61,475 4 18 -	45,748 - - -	7 5 9	7 5 9	
TOTAL { S <sup>r</sup> R <sup>r</sup> }	49,181 13 1 -	47,304 13 1 -	66,922 5 - -	61,475 4 18 -	45,748 - - -	7 5 9	
BENARES PROVINCE.							
Benares, B <sup>r</sup> Rupee -	- - -	11,055 11 9 -	57,350 6 - -	11,364 15 6 -	6,450 - - -	5 8 3	No statements been received in shaly or Rajmel
TOTAL { S <sup>r</sup> R <sup>r</sup> }	- - -	82,626 7 8 -	6,88,343 10 11 -	1,30,876 7 4 1	2,10,317 8 - -	16 - 25	
TOTAL { S <sup>r</sup> R <sup>r</sup> }	7,31,165 4 17 2	2,02,032 15 9 3	12,59,502 2 17 -	7,77,967 12 17 2	6,54,215 10 19 2	8 4 27	

## Appendix, (No. 2.)

**A STATEMENT of the Demands, Receipts, and Balances, of the Land Revenue of the Province of Bengal, Behar, Orissa, and Benares, agreeably to the Collectors Account; on account of the Year 1208-9, or 1801-2;—commencing on the 1st May 1801, and terminating on the 30th of April 1802.**

Jumma, or Demand, on account of 1801-2, corresponding with 1208, B. S. and with the 5 first Months of 1208, and the 7 first Months of 1209, F. S.	Collected, as per Collector's Treasury Accounts, for the Year 1801-2.	Gross Balance at the End of the Year 1801-2; viz. on the 30 <sup>th</sup> April 1802.	D E D U C T I O N S.			Net Balance standing against the Country.	Proportion of the Net Balance suspended, agreeably to the Toujees.
			Established and authorized Remissions, agreeably to the Toujees.	Kallary Suspensions standing against the Salt Department, as stated in the Toujees for Chisite 1208, B.S.	TOTAL Deductions.		
307,56,645 15 11 3	2,72,76,899 8 12 2	3,34,79,748 12 19	27,169 1 11 2	1,26,583 8 13	1,53,752 10 4 2	33,25,990 2 14 2	71,064 15 4 1
Total - - C <sup>1</sup> S <sup>1</sup> R <sup>1</sup>							

Net Balance, as above - - - - - 33,25,990

Deduct Amount realized to the 30th September - - - - - 25,79,832

Balance outstanding on the 30th - D<sup>o</sup> - - - - - 7,46,158, or less than 2½ per cent. on the Jumma.

Of this Balance also, a farther part will be realized. •

## Appendix, No. 3.

PROVINCES.	ORDINARY RECEIPTS.				EXTRAORDINARY RECEIPTS.		TOTAL Gross Revenue		
	Land Revenue.		Sayer Revenue.		Interest collected on arrears of Revenue and on	Actual Batta, fees and for- future, refunded charges of four years' sale of Beshiland, &c. &c.			
	Collected on account of the jumma or demand on the proper account of the year 1202-3 or 1801-2.	Surplus collections, or revenues of land not included in the jumma.	Collected on account of the balances of the year 1207-8 or 1800-1.	Collected on account of the balances outstanding prior to 1207-8 or 1800-1.				Collected on account of Abkany, including Toddy and Drugs.	Collected on account of Sayer, exclusive of abkany.
BENGAL - - -	1,74,27,856	60,702	18,46,083	2,89,857	2,43,565	1,414	12,05,274	72,450	2,00,79,606
BEHAR - - -	53,49,808	1,05,456	5,77,513	27,622	3,82,568	1,38,624	41,107	17,913	66,40,615
ORISSA - - -	13,05,904	-	2,61,159	1,913	7,545	-	14,801	2,501	16,10,926
BENARES - - -	31,93,329	42,271	3,770	8,735	1,72,523	-	-	18,554	34,39,185
TOTAL } C <sup>s</sup> S <sup>s</sup> R <sup>s</sup>	2,72,76,899	2,08,430	26,83,528	3,45,228	8,06,002	1,52,639	1,81,184	1,11,419	3,17,70,333
Presidency - - -	-	-	82,739	-	-	-	1,799	715	85,254
GRAND TOTAL } C <sup>s</sup> S <sup>s</sup> R <sup>s</sup>	2,72,76,899	2,08,430	27,71,268	3,45,228	8,06,002	1,52,639	1,82,984	1,12,134	3,18,55,588

## Appendix, No. 4.

## REGISTER of ESTATES paying Revenue to

Pargunnah, and other Districts.	N <sup>o</sup> of the Talookdarry Estates.	NAMES of the Estates.	PROPRIETORS.	Farmers.
Pargunnah Balagutch	- - -	Bochaha, &c. -	Gerdaree Sing, and Caniah Sing, &c. -	- - -
			Khaydam and Sevenaree, and Caniah Sing } Mortgage	- - -
		Banjumapore Khas -	Anand Sing, grandson of Payher Sing, and Assuck Sing, &c. -	- - -
		Byesunapore -	Baushdeen Tuvany, &c. -	- - -
		Bangrah, Naf -	Piary Lal -	- - -
		Bishunpore -	Ajeet Sing, and Khamroja Roy -	- - -
		Chuck Bantjee- goongevah -	Gotum Gow, &c. -	Dedar Hosse

## Appendix, No. 3.

CHARGES.			EXTRAORDINARY CHARGES.		TOTAL Disbursements within the year 1208-9, or 1801-2.	Net Amount, after deducting the Charges.	REMARKS.
ORDINARY, for 12 Months			Appears of fixed charges on amount disbursed beyond the ordinary charge of one year.	By remittance and law suits surplus revenue of four years, &c. &c.			
Charges genl. viz collector, tehsildary, sibsbandy, shikary, zemindary, postbandy, and ordinary contingence.	Pensions, stipends, and charitable allowances; also, Madrassa charges.	Compensation paid to the Proprietors of Sayer, is abolished.					
7,98,149	2,70,390	41,403	22,445	12,181	11,14,151	1,89,35,055	Centage of Charge on the Gross jumma.
3,76,807	1,59,101	92	90	31,495	5,95,668	60,43,946	5 5.
12,06,945	8,156	- - -	- - -	174	1,35,275	14,75,650	9 10
1,04,940	2,30,251	- - -	- - -	35,373	4,20,570	30,18,025	7 2
							11 10
14,05,812	7,47,560	41,496	22,555	70,231	28,97,066	2,91,73,267	Exclusive of the 10 per cent. paid to the Tehsildar, on being responsible for the collection of the Revenues and Police.
3,17,425	6,2267	- - -	1,955	15,162	3,08,311	- - -	
17,23,267	8,12,223	41,496	24,491	94,393	26,95,877	2,91,52,710	

## Appendix, No. 4.

Government, in the Zillah of Tirhoot.

VILLAGES, &c. in each Estate.					Revenue assessed on the Estates.	Reference to the N <sup>o</sup> of the Page of the preceding Register of intermediate mutations.
Villages and Kinnuls, (i. e.) Parts of a Village by Portion of Inheritance, as I understand it.	Fractional Parts.	Gross Measurement.	Gross Produce in Sicca Rupees.	Assessment on each Portion.		
Bochapa, Javepore, Rodder kisk, Rajapore kisk, Surdevery kisk.	N. B. All these Columns blank in the original.				595 15 —	
Bishunpore Berry	-	-	-	-	587 14 10	
					1,183 13 10	
Banjuntpore Khas	-	-	-	-	677 15 14	
Bysunatpore	-	-	-	-	2470 11 10	
Bangrah Nisf	-	-	-	-	100 — —	
Bishunpore	-	-	-	-	42 8 15	
Chuck Bunjee Goon-gevah	-	-	-	-	34 9 —	



Documents relative to  
Zemindarry and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Plan of Principal Col-  
lector of Ceded Dis-  
tricts, for a Permanent  
Ryotwar Settlement,  
15 August 1807.

**EXTRACT** from Report of Principal Collector of the Ceded Districts; dated 15th August 1807; proposing a Plan for permanently settling those Districts on the Ryotwar principle; and on the Advantages of that mode of Settlement, compared with Zemindarry Assessments.

THE survey of the Ceded Districts having been completed, it now only remains to consider how they are to be permanently settled: what remission will be required for that purpose; and whether the immediate tenants of government ought to be the ryots or zemindars.

The assessment of Akbar is estimated by Abul Fazel at one-third, and by other authorities, at one-fourth of the gross produce; but it was undoubtedly higher than either of these rates, for had it not been so, enough would have remained to the ryot, after defraying all expenses, to render the land private property; and as this did not take place, we may be certain that the nominal one-fourth or one-third, was nearly one-half. This seems to have been the opinion of Aurungzebe, for he directs that not more than one-half of the crop shall be taken from the ryot: that where the crop has suffered injury, such remission shall be made, as may leave him one-half of what the crop might have been; and that where one ryot dies, and another occupies his land, the rent should be reduced, if more than one-half of the produce, and raised, if less than a third. It is evident, therefore, that Aurungzebe thought that one-half was in general enough for the ryot, and that he ought in no case to have above two-thirds. The mode of assessment in the Ceded Districts, and the Deccan, still limits the share of the ryot to those proportions, but makes it commonly much nearer to one-half than two-thirds of the produce. If by fixing the government rent at one-third, he were allowed to enjoy the remainder, and all such future increase as might arise from his industry, he would never relinquish his farm; and all cultivated land would soon become private property. If more than one-third is demanded as rent, there can be no private landed property, for it is found that when land, which has formerly been encum, is assessed, that as long as the rate is not more than one-third of the produce, the land is regarded as a private estate, and can generally be sold; but that whenever the rate exceeds one-third, the land is scarcely ever saleable,—is no longer reckoned private property, and is often abandoned. It is also found by experience, that one-third of the produce is the rate of assessment at which persons, who are not themselves cultivators, can rent land from government without loss; for it enables them, after paying the public demand, and being reimbursed for all expenses and stock employed, to obtain a small portion of land-rent. As one-third of the produce is therefore the highest point to which assessment can in general be carried, without destroying private landed property; and as it is also the point to which it must be lowered, before persons who are not cultivators can occupy clear land without loss; it is obvious that unless the assessment is reduced to this rate, land can neither be occupied by all classes of the inhabitants, nor ever become private property; nor can any permanent settlement be made, calculated to improve the condition of the ryots, or of the public revenue. I am therefore of opinion, that in a permanent settlement of the Ceded Districts, the rent of government should be about one-third of the gross produce. The present assessment is about 45 per cent. To bring it to the proposed level, would require a remission of 25 per cent., as may be seen from the following example:

Total gross produce, say	-	-	-	-	100
Government's share, by the present assessment	-	-	-	-	45
Deduct 25 per cent. of assessment	-	-	-	-	11¼
Government's share, by proposed permanent assessment	-	-	-	-	33¾

Supposing that this remission is allowed, its being granted to zemindars or to ryots, would make a very material difference to the country. I have stated fully, in former letters, what appeared to me to be the respective advantages and disadvantages of the zemindarry, or moondarry and ryotwarry systems; and all that I have now to offer on the subject, is little more than a recapitulation of arguments, already adduced at different times. It may be said, in favour of the zemindar or moondar, that he becomes at once a great proprietor, and relieves government from the trouble of making settlements with the ryots; that having a deeper interest in the cultivation of the country than the revenue officer, he is better qualified to direct it; that being more intimately acquainted with the circumstances of the ryots, and having greater inducement to prevent their failure or desertion, he is more likely to grant such remissions as may occasionally be necessary; that he will grow rich himself; that by granting favourable terms to his tenants, will gradually raise up a body of substantial owners; that he will require no remissions in his rent to government, as he is able to make up for his loss in one place, by his gain in another: that he will stand between government and the cultivator; and finally, that by conducting most of the duties formerly entrusted to the revenue officer, he will greatly lessen the number of accounts and the charges of collection.

Against the zemindarry system, it may be urged, that the moontahdar will endeavour to secure all advantages to himself, by giving only short leases, and making the ryots pay the rent, according to custom; that if he fails in this, and is obliged to lower their rents to induce them to remain in his estate, he lessens his own means of discharging the public dues;

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dues; and if he is constrained to give up the whole advantage usually allowed to himself by government, or 15 per cent. remission to them, his estate becomes in fact ryotwar; that by being restricted from raising his rents, he loses one essential quality of ownership; and by being hindered from alienating his estate in smaller portions than 500 pagodas rent, he loses another; that if he cannot raise the rent, or turn out ryots, he has not the advantage which is sometimes ascribed to the adoption of large farms, for he will not even if he has the means, attempt to improve where he cannot raise the rent; that the great zemindar defies all authority, and will keep the ryots as poor as they have always been, and the small one, or mootahdar, will endeavour to imitate him in his state and armed followers; that though most of the mootahs will finally resolve into ryotwar farms, many of the greater ones, will assume the character of zemindaries or poligaships; that the country will be filled with petty armed chiefs, who may hereafter combine to disturb the public tranquillity; and that the system is, on the whole, detrimental to the country and dangerous to government.

In favour of the ryotwar system, it may be observed, that it is the system which has always prevailed in India,—that no other can be permanent; and that however different any new one may be, it must resolve itself into it, at last, because the duration of great property in any family, is opposed by early and universal marriage, by the equal division among all the sons, and by adoption, where there are none; that it is more simple than the mootadarry plan, because it requires no artificial restraints contrary to custom, and the laws of inheritance, to prevent the division of estates; because it admits of all gradations of large and small farms, as there are ryots who pay from one, to one thousand pagodas; because the owner of the land where he has tenants, may raise or lower the rent at pleasure, which cannot be done by the mootadary; that it is better adapted to preserve simplicity of manner and good order; because every ryot will on his own estate, be at once proprietor, farmer, and labourer; because the division of property, by engaging men in labour for their maintenance, is favourable to quiet; because a great body of small proprietors, instead of a few zemindars or mootadars, will be interested in supporting government; and because it facilitates the establishment of the authority of the courts of justice, which can seldom reach zemindars, particularly armed ones. It may be also said, that it is better calculated to promote industry, and to augment the produce of the country; because it makes more proprietors and farmers, and fewer common labourers, than the zemindary or mootadary scheme; because the ryot would be more likely to improve his land, as a proprietor than as the tenant of a zemindar; and as he would enjoy the whole remission, instead of a small part, or perhaps none, he would be more able to do it; and because the small proprietor, being a better manager and farmer, and more immediately interested than the great one, in the cultivation of his land, would bestow more pains upon it, and make it yield a more abundant crop; that supposing the amount of property to be the same, it would be better that it should be in the hands of forty or fifty thousand small proprietors, than of four or five hundred great ones; that by the remission going at once to the ryots, it would improve the circumstances of the class of men from whom the revenue is principally drawn, and would enable them to raise a greater quantity of food, and thus to favour the increase of population; that by allowing the revenue to increase or diminish, according to the extent of land in cultivation, it eases the farmer, without occasioning, on an average of years, any loss to government: that this fluctuation would lessen every day, as the ryots became more wealthy, and would at last, be confined to tank lands; and that the ryotwar system, by retaining in the hands of government all uncultivated land, gives it the power of gradually augmenting the revenue, without imposing any fresh burden upon the ryots, as long as there is an acre of waste in the country.

The chief arguments against the ryotwar system, are, the great detail of accounts, and the consequent difficulty of management; the interference of revenue officers in cultivation; the expense of collection; and the fluctuation in the annual amount of the public revenue. But there seems to be nothing very serious, in these objections. When a country is surveyed, and the rent of every field fixed, the accounts become perfectly simple: they are nothing more than a list of ryots and fields; and if the ryots do not next year, take new or throw up old land, the same register will serve again; and as returns must always be kept, there is no more difficulty in getting from them an account of a hundred ryots, than of one mootadary. The accounts of the customs, which yield so small a portion of revenue, are infinitely more intricate and troublesome, than those of the land-rent. If such a remission is granted as will leave the ryots a private rent, after discharging the public one, the interference of revenue servants will be unnecessary. Their own interest will stimulate them to cultivate; as in Canara, where no revenue officer ever thinks of calling upon the owner to plough or sow his fields. The additional expense of collection in the ryotwar system, would be gradually compensated, by the rent of waste lands brought into cultivation. The fluctuation in the annual amount of the revenue, would be gradually lessened, as the become attached to their farms, by the benefits of a low assessment, and retaining as a lasting possession, instead of changing them, partly or wholly, almost every year.

The only matters of real importance, in a comparison of the ryotwar and zemindary systems, are the amount of the remission to be granted, and the mode of its distribution. If the sum is in both cases equal, the direct loss to revenue, is also the same; but in the one case, the whole remission goes immediately to the ryots, by whom all land-rent is produced, while in the other, it may never reach them. The zemindars will keep it from them for ever, and the mootadars for a long period of years. In the one case, the whole of it, will be immedi-  
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to be applied to the improvement of the country. In the other, either none, or only a small portion will be allotted to that purpose. It seems extraordinary, that it should ever have been conceived, that a country could be so much benefited by giving up a share of the public rent to a small class of zemindars or moofudars, who do not yet actually exist, as by giving it to the ryots, from whom all rent is derived. When the settlement of a great province is in view, the prosperity of the body of the people should be the grand object to which every thing else should be made to yield; and as it is plain that the ryots must reap infinitely more advantage from a remission granted to themselves, than from a similar one to zemindars and moofudars, the ryotwar system, with all its supposed inconveniences, ought undoubtedly to be adopted, in preference to every other. The zemindar is a kind of contractor, who undertakes to get a greater fixed rent for government from the ryots, than can be done, in any other way. He engages for 15 or 20 per cent. to make the ryots always pay what they now do. He can remit nothing to them without loss to himself; and he will therefore keep their rents as high as ever, as long as he can. The advantages of this system may be comprehended in a few words. The zemindar undertakes to pay, every year, exactly the same amount of revenue, to relieve the public servants from the fatigue of thinking about it; and to settle with the ryots in such a manner, that government shall never hear any thing about them.

It has been objected to the ryotwar system, that it leaves no person between the cultivator and the revenue officer; but this objection is made, from not understanding the condition of husbandmen, for in this country, the landlord and cultivator can never be permanently separated, as in England. The minute division of property will always render them the same person, with very few exceptions. The landlord must always cultivate his own fields; and hence the collections must always be made directly from the cultivator in his quality of landlord, and hence there can be no person between the cultivator and the revenue officer, without a creation of zemindars, who must themselves in time become, either petty princes, or cultivators. If the whole system of English and of India collection is examined, it will perhaps appear that the interference of revenue officers is greater, and more vexatious in England, than in this country. The land-tax of England is so light, and is so small a portion of the public revenue, that the landlord cannot be supposed to suffer any vexation from its collection; but then, there is the excise, for which every house is entered; and the property of every person subjected to as much inspection and interference, as the land of the Indian ryot. Were there no excise in England, it would be necessary to draw a greater revenue from the land; and to investigate its produce more narrowly. Land-rent is to Indian, what the excise and customs are to English revenue; and hence it becomes necessary to give particular attention to it, and to employ a large establishment of servants, to secure every part of it, that is justly due to government.

The annual fluctuation in the amount of revenue, has likewise been brought as an argument, against the ryotwar system. But this fluctuation will never be so great, as to cause any serious inconvenience. It would never in any one year, exceed ten per cent. in an aggregate of six or eight collectorates, though it might be more in a single one. It would gradually diminish as the ryots became proprietors; and would, in ten or twelve years, scarcely ever be above five per cent. As the inequality too would arise, as often from an increase as a decrease of revenue, government would lose nothing by it, and the deficiency, when it occurred, might always be provided for, either by reserving the surplus of former years, or by a loan.

I shall now proceed to state the manner in which I think a permanent ryotwar settlement in the Ceded Districts may be made. I shall then endeavour to show, that it will yield as much revenue, on an average of years, as the zemindari system; and that, as it will also be more beneficial to the great body of the inhabitants, it ought to be adopted. The following articles contain the principles on which the settlement should be formed:

- 1st. The settlement shall be ryotwar.
- 2d. The amount of the settlement shall increase and decrease annually, according to the extent of land in cultivation.
- 3d. A reduction of 25 per cent. on all land shall be made, in the survey rate of assessment.
- 4th. An additional reduction in the assessment of eight per cent. or 33 per cent. in all, shall be allowed, on all lands watered by wells, or by water raised by machinery from rivers and nullas; provided the cultivators keep the wells or embankments, (dilloas) in repair at their own expense. A similar reduction shall be allowed on the lands watered by small tanks, so long as the cultivators agree to bear the expense of repairs.
- 5th. Every ryot shall be at liberty, at the end of every year, either to throw up a part of his land, or to occupy more, according to his circumstances; but whether he throw up or occupy, shall not be permitted to select, but shall take or reject, proportional shares of the good and bad together.
- 6th. Every ryot, as long as he pays the rent of his land, shall be considered as the complete owner of the soil, and shall be at liberty to let it to a tenant, without any limitation as to rent; and to sell it as he pleases.
- 7th. No remission shall be made, on ordinary occasions, for bad crops or other accidents, which cannot be made good from the property of land of the defaulters, the

the village in which they happen, shall be liable for them, to the extent of ten per cent. additional on the rent of the remaining ryots, but no farther.

8th. All unoccupied land shall remain in the hands of government, and the rent of whatever part of it, may be hereafter cultivated, shall be added to the public revenue.

9th. All taxes on houses, shops, and professions; all duties, licenses, &c. shall belong exclusively to government. The ryot on whose land, houses or shops may be built, shall not be entitled to receive a higher rent from them, than the equivalent of the survey rent of the ground which they occupy.

10th. The repairs of all tanks which are not rendered private property by an extra remission or desivundum enaun, shall be made at the expense of government.

11th. Tuccavie shall be gradually discontinued.

12th. Potails, carnunis, and all other village servants, shall remain, as heretofore, under the collector.

13th. Private creditors who may distrain the property of ryots, shall discharge the rent which may be due from such ryots to government, and shall give security for it, before they begin the distraint.

It may appear at first sight, that a reduction of 25 per cent. will occasion a heavy loss of revenue, but I imagine that it will not be greater, than what has been suffered in all districts where a permanent settlement has been effected. *It is to be considered, that the decrease of revenue will not be proportionate to the reduction of 25 per cent. because that reduction is not to be made on the average of former collections, but on the survey assessment, which never has been, nor ever can be completely realized, as long as there are bad crops and poor ryots.* In the board's letter of the 27th December 1864, the average profit to the owners of estates in settled districts, is estimated at 15½ per cent. but it is not explained whether this profit is upon the land-rent only, or upon the land-rent and village-taxes. I shall suppose, however, that it is restricted to the land-rent, and calculated upon an average of preceding years, and examine whether the reduction of 25 per cent. upon the survey assessment, will cause a greater diminution of revenue, than a remission of 15½ per cent. upon the average of former collections. The collections of land-rent for the last seven years, amount (per Statement No. 1.) to - star pagodas

The seventh part of which, or the average yearly, is - star pagodas

Deduct the profit of 15 per cent. allowed in settled districts - -

Balance, or permanent land-rent to government - - -

A reduction of 25 per cent. on the land, will afford so much immediate relief to the ryots, that they will easily be able to keep up the cultivation of Fusly 1215, except when the tanks are not filled. I shall therefore consider the collections of that year, after making an adequate allowance for the loss from the tanks, as the average amount of the settlements that may be expected in the early part of the ryotwar system.—

The collections of land-rent in 1215, are the highest, that have been realized, either under the Company's or the Mysore government, and amount to - - - star pagodas

Deduct proposed remission of 25 pr. cent. 3,73,647 1 35

Deduct additional remissions to wells, } 11,333  
for repairs - - - - - }

84,33,353 14 70

12,04,765 2 10

1,80,714 31 66

10,24,050 12 24

14,94,588 5 50

3,84,980 1 35

11,09,608 4 15

74,000

10,35,608 4 15

85,000 - -

11,15,608 4 15

The rent of land in 1215, under tanks and nullas which are not filled by great rivers, and whose supply of water is therefore uncertain, was star pagodas 2,96,000; allow one-fourth for deficiencies of water, one year with another - - - - -

This sum of star pagodas 10,35,608. 4. 15, is what remains after making the proposed remissions in the survey assessment, and a full allowance for the loss on tank lands, from the failure of rain. But as it will not be necessary, after remitting 25 per cent. to make any deductions for bad crops to poor ryots, bramins, peons, &c. who cannot pay the full rent, the remissions usually allowed under these heads, must now be added to the settlement. They amount to - - - - -

Total expected land-rent under the ryotwar settlement -

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Difference in favour of the ryotwar system, - - - star pagodas  
But from this sum, the excess of charges collection under the ryotwar, above  
those of the mootadar system, must be deducted. As wells, and some  
of the smaller tanks and nullas, will in future be repaired by the ryots;  
and as many of the greater tanks must, under any system whatever, be  
repaid by government; the expense that will be incurred for tank repairs,  
by the ryotwar system exclusively, will not exceed star  
pagodas - - - - - 10,000 — —

To this sum must also be added, the difference of the mo-  
yen zabtahs, or charges collection in favour of the  
mootadar system. These charges, under the ryotwar  
settlement, would be - - - - - 95,000

Under the Mootadar, supposing the number of  
servants reduced, but the scale of allowances  
the same, they would probably be - - - - - 22,000

Difference against ryotwar - - - - -

73,000 — —

84,000 — —

Difference remaining in favour of ryotwar, - - -

star pagodas

8,557 36 71

This is the amount that would probably be in favour of the ryotwar system, during the first two or three years; from the third to the fifth year, the increase, from new cultivation, and low-rented lands, would be a lac of pagodas; from the fifth to the seventh year, it would be a lac more; and by the tenth, it would have amounted in all, to about three lacs. It may be said that such calculations, are uncertain. I am confident, however, that the estimate is not too high; because, as the cultivation increased nearly one-half, from 1210 to 1215, notwithstanding the gradual raising of the rent by the survey, there can be no doubt that when the rent is lowered 25 per cent. that cultivation will still continue to extend rapidly, though perhaps, from the inadequacy of the population, not in the same degree as before: because there are now actually in cultivation, lands lately taken from the waste, paying sixty thousand pagodas less than the fixed assessment, which sum will be added to the jumina in the course of four or five years, but could not without the proposed remission; as in that case the ryots would, whenever the new land came to the full rent, throw up an equal quantity of the old, from want of the means of paying for both; and because the reduction of rent would facilitate the employment of many additional hands in agriculture. If a permanent zemindarry or mootadar settlement of the land-rent is now made, it will amount, as has already been stated, to - - - star pagodas 10,24,050.

If a ryotwar one is made, by remitting 25 per cent, it will amount to - - - 11,15,608.

If it is even allowed that the net revenue from both these sums, will be nearly the same, in consequence of the superior expense of the ryotwar system, yet the zemindarry rent will be no more ten years hence, than it is now, while the ryotwar will, in that time, have arisen, about three lacs of pagodas; and there will be a difference in its favour, equal to nearly a third of the whole land-rent. As the object is great, and as no mischief can arise from making the experiment, it ought certainly to be tried. The result would most likely show that one-fourth or one-third more land-rent might have been derived from all the districts permanently settled; and that a similar increase, may be expected from all those which are yet unsettled. This increase would take place with the present population; but it would of course become still greater, as the population augmented. The highness of the land-rent is, in this country, the chief obstacle to the increase of population. A remission of rent in favour of a few zemindars or mootadars, would be no remedy for the evil; but a remission to the ryots, by enabling them to extend their cultivation, and augment the produce of food for their families, would, in a great measure, do it away. Were it not for the pressure of the land-rent, population ought to advance more rapidly in India, than in America; because the climate is more favourable; and because there are every where great tracts of good land uncultivated, which may be ploughed at once, without the labour and expense of clearing away forests. As there are above three millions of acres of this description in the Ceded Districts, it cannot be doubted that a very considerable addition will be made in twenty or twenty-five years, to the population, and also to the land-rent, beyond the highest estimate which has been made of it.

The profit to the land-owners in the Salem Districts, is 16½ per cent, which is 1½ per cent more than I have deducted from the average collections of the Ceded Districts. As the assessment is perhaps higher in them, than even in Salem, I might, in the preceding comparison, have deducted 16½, in place of 15 per cent, from the average of ryotwar. This difference may however be left to counterbalance any error into which I may have fallen, in estimating the charges collection of settled districts, from not having any statement of them for my guidance.

Though the revenue at first should be the same, or should be even greater under the mootadarry, it has this disadvantage, that the revenue is limited at once, and cannot grow with the resources of the country; whereas in the ryotwar, it keeps exact pace with them, rising or falling, as there is more or less cultivation. It is no loss, on the whole, to government,

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and must be much easier for the ryots, while they have so little property, that this fluctuation should continue; for they cultivate most when the season is favourable; and government thus draws from the country the greatest revenue, in those years when the gross produce is the greatest; and the land-rent of India may be said to resemble, in this respect, the principal sources of British revenue,—the excise and customs,—which increase or diminish yearly with the commerce of the nation, the fund from which they are derived. The public ought certainly to be regulated, in some degree, by the private revenue of the country; but nothing can be more contrary to this principle, than the mootadar system; for it fixes the public demand now, which must remain the same thirty or forty years hence, whatever addition may have been made to private property in that time. It does not accommodate itself to the circumstances of the country; and because it cannot raise the revenue hereafter, it makes it too high at first, as in the Baramahl and other districts, whose whole resources have been brought to light by survey; and in order to realize this revenue, it is obliged to authorize the mootadars or middle-men to exact the former high rents from the ryots. On the other hand, the ryotwar system enables the public, to advance with the private revenue, as long as there is any waste land in the country; and in doing this, it adapts itself perfectly to the means of the inhabitants; for there can be no juster measure of their means, than the decrease or increase of cultivation. It also, by making the remission upon the assessment of the land, gives the whole of it, at once to the ryots; and by enabling them to raise more food for the maintenance of their families, facilitates the increase of population, the occupancy of waste for its subsistence, and the augmentation of revenue. The assessment of lands formerly cultivated, and waste never cultivated, amounts to star pagodas 10,10,842. It would be idle to imagine that the whole can ever be brought into cultivation; but I am persuaded that nearly all the land formerly cultivated, amounting to star pagodas 5,55,962, together with a considerable portion of the waste, will be occupied, in the course of twenty-five years.

The increase of cultivation will, however, have no sensible effect in augmenting the size of farms, and thereby lessening the detail of collection. The farms will probably always remain as at present, comprehending all sizes, from five acres to fifteen hundred; and paying from one to a thousand pagodas. Their enlargement is prevented at present, by the want of property; and will be hereafter prevented, by its division. In the Ceded Districts, and throughout the Deccan, the ryot has little or no property in land,—he has no possessory right; he does not even claim it. He is so far from asserting either a proprietary or a possessory right, that he is always ready to relinquish his land, and take some other, which he supposes is lighter assessed. All land is supposed to revert to government at the end of every year, to be distributed as it may think proper; and land is accordingly sometimes taken from one ryot and given to another, who is willing to pay a higher rent. If this power is exercised with caution, it is not from the fear of violating any possessory right, but of losing revenue; for the assessment is generally so high, that if the ryot is dispossessed, the same rent can seldom be got, from a new one. The only assessed land that is not annually at the disposal of government, is that which pays a quit-rent, and is either enaums that were formerly free, or ground belonging to tanks and wells, constructed at the expense of individuals, who are on that account, allowed a remission from one-fifth to one-half of the rent. Even in this case, however, private property in land, has always been viewed with so much jealousy, that instead of a permanent quit-rent, it has been much more usual to allow the person who digs the tank or well, to hold the land rent-free, until he is reimbursed for all his expenses and labour, and then to regard it as government land, and assess it at the full rate. The ryot of India unites in his own person the characters of labourer, farmer, and landlord;—he receives the wages of the labourer, the profit of the farmer on his stock, and a small surplus from one to twenty per cent. of the gross produce as rent, but on an average, not more than 5 or 6 per cent. The smallness of this surplus prevents him from letting his land to an under-tenant, because the rent would not be equal to his subsistence; and also, because no tenant would give him even this rent, for as there is every where plenty of good land lying uncultivated, which any person may occupy, on paying the sircar rent, it is evident that no ryot will hold land of another, and pay an addition of 5 or 6 per cent. upon the sircar rent, when he may get land of the same kind without paying any such increase. As long, therefore, as government have uncultivated land of a tolerably good quality to dispose of, ryots can have no tenants, and hence there never has been in India, with the exception of a very few districts, any class of land-owners receiving their rents from tenants. The tendency of the Indian system of casts and laws of inheritance, always has been, and must be, to keep land divided into small portions among the ryots, and to make the same person labourer, farmer, and landlord. Why, then, attempt to subvert an ancient system, which places the great body of the ryots above want, renders them industrious, frugal, and comfortable, and preserves the simplicity of their manners and their respect for public authority;—but it has been said that there can be no subordination, without just gradations of rank in society; and that zemindars are requisite in Indian society, to accomplish this desirable end: but this opinion is completely contradicted by experience; for there is no people on earth among whom there is greater subordination, than among the Hindoos, who never saw proprietary zemindars, until they were created by the Company's government.

The plan which I have proposed for forming a permanent ryotwar settlement, is so plain, that it can require no further elucidation, except with regard to house-rent, which ought undoubtedly to remain under the immediate direction of the collector, as a source of increasing revenue. The tax which is generally denominated house-rent, is more properly a tax upon



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Ryotwar Settlement—  
1st Aug. 1807.

income. In the case of labourers, and other poorer orders of the inhabitants, where it does not exceed one or two rupees, it may be called house-rent; but even here, it is rather a tax upon income, equal to the produce of a certain number of days labour; for the house or hut itself is probably not worth more than five or ten rupees. In the case of weavers and other tradesmen, it is usually termed a professional tax; but as the weaver is rated according to the estimate produce of his loom, and the number that he employs, the tax is evidently upon his income; and in the case of merchants, who often pay a tax of fifty pagodas for a house, which would not sell for so much, the tax is clearly an income one, and is so considered by themselves. There is no difficulty in fixing the amount of the tax with regard to labourers and tradesmen; but it is not so easy to ascertain it, with respect to merchants, who, though they are supposed to be assessed, in some places, at 15 or 20 per cent. of their income, in others, pay little or nothing. Under the native governments, there were many reasons for this indulgence. The merchants usually supplied, without payment, the demands of the revenue servants for cloths and other articles; they were also obliged to furnish at a low rate, whatever articles were required for the public service, and to take the circar share of the crops, damaged stores, &c. at 10 per cent. above the market price; and also, in times of exigency, to pay occasional contributions. These demands having ceased under the Company's government, there can be no reason for the merchants being more favoured, in one place than another, or for their not being every where assessed, in the same proportion as the other classes of the inhabitants. It would be vexatious to attempt to discover the income of individuals, but a tolerable estimate of the aggregate income of the merchants of a district, may be made from accounts of the exports and imports, the population, the produce and consumption, and the usual profits of trades; and 15 per cent. upon the sum resulting from these calculations, might be imposed upon the merchants, leaving them to distribute it in detail, according to the income of the several individuals. In the district of Rydroog, where the house-tax is higher than in other parts of the Ceded provinces, and where it is supposed to be about fifteen per cent. upon income, a new distribution was made last year by the merchants and shopkeepers themselves. The total sum was not increased, because it was already sufficiently high; but the shares of many individuals were reduced one half, and those of others, doubled and quadrupled. A few of the principal merchants from all the chief trading towns of the Ceded provinces, were at the same time assembled. They were informed that the house or income-tax would be raised, and were directed to state, not what their income was, but what the rate of the tax upon it was, in their respective districts, compared to Rydroog. They debated among themselves for several weeks; and at last produced a statement, to which they all agreed, as containing the fair rates of their districts. The Rydroog merchants who were present, took care to see that the neighbouring districts were rated as high as their own, in order to prevent any additional assessment from falling, upon themselves. The tax might, by the same process, be extended to every place where it is not yet established, and make a considerable addition to the public revenue. An idea of this increase may be formed, from comparing the house-rent of the Ceded provinces, with that of the richer provinces below the ghauts.

	S <sup>r</sup> P <sup>s</sup>
House-rent of the lower classes of the people, tradesmen, &c.	63,946
Ditto of merchants and shopkeepers	33,124
	<hr/> 97,070
Ditto to be laid on in Fusly 1217 to 1220, to raise the other districts to the level of Rydroog	21,000
	<hr/> Star Pagodas 1,18,070

Where merchants are exempted from this income-tax, they contribute little more to revenue than common labourers: they pay no direct taxes; and those which they pay indirectly on betel, tobacco, cloth, &c. are very trifling. It is contrary to every just principle of taxation, that the richer should be more lightly assessed, than the poorer classes of the people; and as no additional demand can be made upon them, if the house-tax is permanently included in the land-rent, it ought certainly to be kept separate, in order that it may yield an increasing revenue, as the circumstances of the country improve.

I have proposed that villages shall, in ordinary cases of failure, be liable to an extra assessment of 10 per cent. This will, I am convinced, on all common occasions, be sufficient. It is also, in many places, another source from which deficiencies may be made up. In villages, the enaums of the potails and curnums are equal to a fifth, a fourth, and to a third of the circar revenue. By far the greater part of these enaums has undoubtedly never been authorized; for where there are sunnuds, the enaum scarcely ever exceeds five per cent.; and where it is more, it was always, under the native government, made liable for deficiencies in the village. I would recommend that the same principle shall still be adopted, to a certain extent; that in villages not exceeding 250 pagodas rent, the enaums of the potail and curnum respectively, shall be free as far as ten per cent. of the village-rent; and that the whole of their excess above this rate, shall be liable for deficiencies; that in villages from 250 to 500 pagodas rent, the enaums shall be free as far as 7½ per cent., and their excess above this rate, be liable for failures; and that in villages above 500 pagodas, the enaums shall be free as far as 5 per cent, and the excess shall be liable for losses. Though the revenue under a ryotwar system, must annually fluctuate with the extent of cultivation, yet it is not necessary that any abatement should be allowed for losses.

upon the actual cultivation; for all such losses easily may, and ought to be made good, in the first instance, by the excess in the potails and curnums enaums above the usual standard; and where this excess does not exist, by an extra assessment upon the ryots. This extra assessment is limited to 10 per cent., but it will scarcely ever amount to half so much; and it will seldom be requisite to have recourse to it, at all.

Documents relative to Zemindarry and Ryot-war Settlements.

Plan of principal Collector of Ceded Districts, for a permanent Ryotwar Settlement; 15 Aug. 1807.

If the survey assessment is reduced 25 per cent. and the ryotwar system introduced, the following is the average amount of revenue, from every source that might be expected, during the first two or three years:—

	Star P <sup>a</sup>
Land-rent as before stated	11,15,608
Village taxes, house, rent, &c.	1,01,781
Quit-rent	60,585
Venkatgeery peshcush	4,342
Kurnoul peshcush, reduced to one lac of Chillawanny rupees, from Fusly 1218	22,916
	<hr/> 1,80,624
Frontier duties	40,000
Licences	65,000
Betel and tobacco	40,000
	<hr/> 1,05,000
	<hr/> 14,50,232
Add proposed increase of house-tax	21,000
	<hr/> 14,71,232
Deduct allowance of house-rent received by poligars	19,000
	<hr/> 14,52,232
<b>TOTAL Star pagodas</b>	<hr/> <b>14,52,232</b>

At the end of four years, the land-rent would have risen at least a lac of pagodas, and the revenue would then be 15,50,000; and at the end of 10 or 15 years, the land-rent would probably have increased to such a degree, as to make up for the original remission; and the revenue would then be from 17½ to 18 lacs of pagodas. It is one advantage of the ryotwar system, that it leaves room for the land-rent to increase with the population and wealth of the country; and it is another, that by making the remission every where equal, it will fix the ryots to their several farms as proprietors, instead of keeping them, as hitherto, for ever unsettled; without attachment to their lands; without any wish to improve them; and wandering from one Zemindarry or mootah to another, in quest of more favourable terms. As long as the public exigencies require a higher revenue, the present assessment may be released, after making the usual allowances for bad seasons, &c. When government is in a situation to relinquish a part of its demand, the proposed remission is that which would place the Ceded districts, on an equality with those provinces where the permanent settlement has already been established. It would, in the mean time, however, be advisable to grant the remission, without delay, to wells, in order to induce the ryots to repair them; for it is chiefly by the cultivation of well-lands, that the country is secured against scarcity.

## STATEMENT OF SETTLEMENTS OF THE CEE

LAND RENT.									
N <sup>o</sup> YEARS.	Jyen.	Poonaganoor Pollams.	Poligars Share of Rent.	TOTAL.	Village Taxes.	Jore, or Quit Rent.	Venkelgurry Peshkush.		
	S' P <sup>a</sup> f. c.	S' P <sup>a</sup> f. c.	S' P <sup>a</sup> f. c.	S' P <sup>a</sup> f. c.	S' P <sup>a</sup> f. c.	S' P <sup>a</sup> f. c.	S' P <sup>a</sup> f. c.		
1. Fully 1210	8,91,382 15 33	- - -	- - -	8,91,382 15 33	75,859 15 72	34,979 4 51	4,322 32		
2. — 1211	10,90,002 25 59	5,643 36 27	12,766 4 65	11,08,412 24 71	98,059 28 42	50,465 35 44	4,321 38		
3. — 1212	11,13,577 28 36	16,672 — 41	20,443 17 5	11,50,693 4 2	90,206 26 45	54,944 39 2	4,321 38		
4. — 1213	11,36,503 36 18	17,632 5 72	19,129 15 25	11,73,265 15 35	94,766 8 1	54,944 39 2	4,321 38		
5. — 1214	13,36,668 15 22	19,225 5 61	19,929 13 10	13,75,822 34 12	97,148 14 54	56,220 34 35	4,342 17		
6. — 1215	14,52,723 8 70	22,553 25 40	19,311 13 14	14,94,588 5 56	1,01,781 39 46	60,585 17 23	4,342 17		
7. — 1216	12,06,056 1 36	15,942 2 16	17,192 37 54	12,39,190 41 26	1,03,785 14 73	60,985 1 30	4,342 17		
TOTAL Star Pag <sup>a</sup>	82,26,914 5 40	97,668 34 17	1,08,772 17 13	84,33,355 14 70	6,61,607 22 13	3,73,126 3 27	30,315 32		
Average for one year, as per seven years account above				12,04,765 2 10					
Deduct at 15 per cent.				1,80,714 31 66					
BALANCE				10,24,050 12 24					

The Affairs of The EAST INDIA COMPANY.

RICTS, FROM FUSLY 1210 TO 1216 INCLUSIVE.

				TOTAL								DETAILS OF TOTAL															
				Land Rent, Village Taxes, and P. sikush.																							
TOTAL.								Licences.				Sayer				GRAND TOTAL.				Pohgara Allowances in Rent.				Rent to Government.			
f. c.				S' P' f. c.				S' P' f. c.				S' P' f. c.				S' P' f. c.				S' P' f. c.				S' P' f.			
1,15,161 10 43				10,06,543 25 76				27,170 — 12				69,057 15 50				11,02,770 41 58				-				11,02,770 41			
1,52,847 19 5				12,61,260 1 76				39,349 39 59				96,671 7 29				13,97,281 1 4				12,766 4 65				13,84,514 38			
1,49,473 20 46				13,00,166 24 48				52,940 39 17				80,930 35 26				14,34,038 15 11				20,443 17 5				14,13,614 40			
1,54,033 2 2				13,27,298 17 37				57,954 — 55				83,412 26 73				14,68,665 3 5				19,129 15 25				14,49,535 29			
31 71 1,90,272 14 23				15,66,095 6 36				63,907 41 64				69,237 11 72				16,99,240 18 12				19,929 13 10				16,79,311 5			
35 — 1,95,335 15 12				16,89,943 30 62				59,838 39 25				56,790 30 32				18,06,573 16 39				19,311 13 14				17,87,262 3			
35 — 1,97,755 26 46				14,36,949 25 72				72,485 34 70				41,686 32 76				15,51,122 9 58				17,192 37 54				15,33,923 14			
17 71 11,54,901 34 17				95,88,257 7 7				3,73,647 27 62				4,97,806 28 38				1,04,59,711 21 27				1,03,772 17 13				1,03,772 17 13			

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO,

Principal Collector.

STATEMENT

## STATEMENT OF CULTIVATION IN THE CEDED

DIVISIONS.	DISTRICTS.	FUSLY 1210.		FUSLY 1211.		FUSLY 1212.		FUSLY
		Dry Acres.	Wet Acres.	Dry Acres.	Wet Acres.	Dry Acres.	Wet Acres.	Dry Acres.
1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
PRINCIPAL COLLECTORS DIVISIONS.	Gornumehlah - - -	1,41,099	20,250	1,26,154	56,853	1,20,756	26,507	84,239
	Roolwendrah - - -	1,08,088	8,199	1,28,287	12,605	1,63,758	12,594	1,65,603
	Paychotty - - -	57,201	9,685	73,419	9,449	51,015	7,967	60,219
	Jermulmudgoo - - -	56,302	4,985	67,988	5,427	69,908	5,750	74,431
	Doowoor - - -	74,325	5,118	80,802	5,687	81,257	5,679	84,563
	Koil Coontlah - - -	55,146	1,845	65,865	2,263	51,475	3,781	59,590
	Goety - - -	96,274	4,946	89,893	4,751	1,12,106	6,047	1,22,109
	Yarkki - - -	39,699	5,259	55,090	6,415	50,958	5,786	52,296
	Chennempelly - - -	60,401	1,337	60,226	1,820	59,199	1,921	54,142
	Tauput e - - -	85,594	2,804	96,642	3,134	99,275	4,747	1,02,507
	Sammurrie - - -	61,196	7,512	64,933	7,949	68,603	8,928	61,325
	Hundi Anantapoor - - -	22,571	9,499	31,609	11,181	49,820	6,778	47,469
	Pendondah - - -	31,419	7,276	37,619	10,672	42,490	9,924	38,918
	Koordi Conduh - - -	29,984	11,819	30,860	14,439	22,202	9,178	21,283
	Muddugferah - - -	32,337	6,001	32,552	9,292	31,690	7,561	28,091
	Dhumawer - - -	80,310	6,811	66,540	14,439	1,00,120	13,942	85,987
	Rydroog - - -	91,552	10,156	1,06,748	10,917	1,14,468	11,838	1,17,345
	Nosum - - -	22,069	79	24,912	151	25,330	147	25,684
	Chitweil - - -	9,708	21,766	16,907	24,181	12,003	20,556	17,554
	Siddout - - -	7,422	5,176	11,517	6,801	16,134	6,848	10,410
	Chenore - - -	22,451	3,106	27,890	3,619	37,397	2,864	28,635
	Chintgoetah - - -	20,543	3,026	40,629	3,553	48,178	3,715	44,416
	Camapoor - - -	44,077	3,468	55,661	3,511	59,287	4,382	56,959
	Tonganoor - - -	22,215	5,035	20,218	4,854	37,057	4,947	42,853
	TOTAL	12,71,983	1,71,158	14,06,871	2,07,873	15,27,486	1,92,337	15,12,068
SHARPOH D.	Bellari - - -	75,169	2,545	89,261	2,405	97,615	3,682	1,18,325
	Kumpli - - -	15,318	5,265	17,326	5,541	19,624	5,609	23,027
	Harponhelly - - -	1,07,028	2,486	1,18,091	2,693	1,29,063	2,812	1,30,067
	Koodlegah - - -	79,816	7,115	86,764	7,516	85,665	7,726	92,382
	Horoenharagully - - -	90,165	2,692	96,321	3,147	1,07,960	3,237	1,13,651
	TOTAL	3,67,496	20,103	4,07,763	22,902	4,39,927	23,066	4,77,452
ADWANI D.	Adoni - - -	32,450	663	64,901	885	67,810	890	71,828
	Naugoldinnah - - -	20,713	1,140	41,427	1,527	45,561	1,919	52,180
	Goodiam - - -	39,178	90	78,357	110	84,846	175	89,598
	Punchalollem - - -	57,324	1,615	63,215	1,975	67,180	2,103	70,515
	TOTAL	1,49,665	3,508	2,47,900	4,497	2,65,397	5,087	2,83,921
CUMMINS D.	Cummins - - -	21,612	5,436	26,139	6,929	27,234	7,265	30,124
	Doonah - - -	50,312	6,440	69,424	7,635	84,660	8,188	80,970
	Bellari - - -	20,230	6,893	25,082	7,927	29,956	8,812	30,634
	Chintgoetah - - -	19,752	1,227	21,252	1,429	23,664	1,526	24,175
	TOTAL	1,11,906	19,556	1,41,847	23,920	1,65,514	25,791	1,65,923
GRAND TOTAL ACRES		19,01,050	2,14,325	22,04,381	2,58,592	23,98,324	2,46,281	24,99,864

The Garden was included in the Wet Land until Fusly 1214.

## DISTRICTS, FROM FUSLY 1210 TO 1216.

10.	FUSLY 1214.			FUSLY 1215.			FUSLY 1216.		
	Dry Acres.	Garden Acres.	Wet Acres.	Dry Acres.	Garden Acres.	Wet Acres.	Dry Acres.	Garden Acres.	Wet Acres.
10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.
1,381	1,16,011	2,507	20,067	2,06,272	2,378	26,411	1,37,839	2,129	12,690
3,074	1,65,838	6,273	7,415	1,77,698	6,043	6,981	1,48,514	5,980	4,622
6,433	58,835	2,354	4,584	79,791	2,102	7,791	74,296	2,125	4,365
5,895	81,667	3,439	3,410	75,545	3,528	2,358	83,889	3,261	2,606
5,970	96,326	4,055	3,405	97,517	3,855	3,413	88,866	3,582	2,768
5,976	67,734	1,078	1,345	65,813	1,120	1,626	67,002	1,154	1,001
6,168	1,43,983	1,728	4,195	1,43,997	1,612	4,317	1,24,966	1,739	3,046
6,561	58,230	2,512	5,126	61,124	2,720	4,003	61,378	2,707	3,988
745	59,939	483	1,178	59,243	421	1,137	55,185	366	926
5,266	1,91,501	3,540	1,790	1,07,966	3,405	1,565	1,07,975	3,281	1,557
584	62,866	3,582	6,930	74,674	3,434	6,781	60,554	3,228	4,998
9,010	65,045	1,659	8,653	71,795	1,449	8,215	65,520	1,525	6,228
11,034	41,604	3,712	7,472	51,354	3,239	7,018	44,803	3,324	4,885
9,019	26,512	2,736	8,174	33,850	3,267	8,744	31,123	2,357	6,604
7,962	31,690	1,605	7,199	35,066	1,578	6,786	26,031	1,417	4,750
13,260	1,06,406	3,635	13,216	1,21,870	3,813	11,529	87,344	3,319	9,375
11,255	1,76,066	3,675	11,637	1,76,066	3,262	12,050	1,59,400	2,932	9,018
126	31,319	505	18	31,270	522	34	31,423	521	30
21,674	16,941	11,375	4,398	22,449	12,583	8,928	10,705	10,429	3,629
8,674	12,605	5,637	4,926	16,931	6,165	4,238	13,231	5,160	2,328
5,211	39,056	4,583	2,920	40,836	4,356	2,992	37,683	3,815	1,849
3,661	56,387	2,715	1,060	58,713	2,742	1,306	55,468	2,570	997
6,724	59,675	2,959	3,547	61,995	2,911	3,691	61,691	3,024	3,726
5,419	42,999	451	5,311	42,755	422	7,255	19,493	124	2,034
2,00,262	17,25,435	76,639	1,37,549	19,14,590	76,927	1,49,190	16,54,764	70,868	98,166
3,715	1,31,271	1,613	2,382	1,40,139	1,625	2,495	1,13,231	1,518	2,117
5,787	29,251	1,624	4,322	32,348	1,761	4,497	26,299	1,468	3,556
3,068	1,38,264	594	2,512	1,41,391	671	2,631	1,36,788	683	2,246
9,011	97,324	2,726	6,915	1,11,825	2,851	7,626	1,08,763	2,798	5,437
3,789	1,29,724	1,373	2,356	1,37,117	1,542	2,562	1,29,089	1,307	1,787
25,811	5,25,834	7,930	18,487	5,62,820	8,500	19,861	5,14,175	7,974	15,132
686	75,214	598	630	82,851	740	767	81,623	732	501
1,312	55,160	1,155	1,478	59,275	1,387	1,483	50,780	1,193	1,348
187	96,325	175	95	1,01,000	180	106	1,05,606	150	56
2,245	79,654	315	2,010	88,031	486	2,215	81,811	470	1,973
4,400	3,06,353	2,243	4,213	3,31,137	2,793	4,511	3,22,520	2,243	3,878
7,278	36,852	2,477	5,120	37,982	2,665	5,208	27,940	2,665	1,540
3,212	87,516	7,801	2,145	90,527	8,376	2,368	76,150	7,801	725
7,843	40,255	2,892	5,925	54,819	3,066	6,539	41,200	2,892	3,030
1,533	26,329	694	917	28,432	742	922	26,955	694	612
24,866	1,90,952	13,864	14,107	2,11,780	14,849	15,237	1,75,245	13,820	5,997
2,39,322	27,48,574	1,00,676	1,74,356	30,20,327	1,02,069	1,38,599	26,67,004	92,007	1,23,157

(Signed)

THOMAS MUNRO, P. Collector.



Documents relative to  
Zemindarry and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Report from the Com-  
mittee at Tanjore;  
22 Feb. 1807.

Sic in orig.

Extract FORT ST. GEORGE Revenue Consultations, the 10th April 1807.

Extract REPORT from the Committee at TANJORE; dated 22d February 1807.

PAR. 12. A PERMANENT system, with reference to the cultivators, may, in a few words, be defined to be a fixed mode of management, under which the cultivators, whatever be their denomination, shall be declared entitled, either to an invariable share of the produce, or to pay a fixed sum for that produce, in lieu of dividing it with the government. That these rates, being declared permanent, shall continue to be the *character* of the cultivators, and in which the courts of justice shall by the laws, be bound to protect them. This mode admits a variation in the extent of the payment; but fixes the rate.

13. A permanent system, as regards the government, has hitherto been considered a mode of management, under which government, for the advantages of a defined rent payable in all seasons, deprived itself of the power of increasing its share of the produce, whether rendered in kind or commuted; defined the amount of its revenue, and transferred the immediate collection of that share from its officers to an individual, who either purchased, or had this right, with other advantages, conceded to him. The rent of government is thus a fixed rent, and the same in all seasons.

14. Such has been, we believe, the mode hitherto adopted in settling, permanently, the revenue of the government: but, as the committee observe, permission must be received from the Court of Directors before such a mode of settlement can be adopted in this province; the recommendations which may arise out of their investigation must be confined to the adoption of such an arrangement, as shall, for the present, secure the revenues, and facilitate the ultimate introduction, should it be deemed necessary, of the permanent settlement or ~~the~~ plan before alluded to.

15. The members of the committee are not ignorant that it has lately been a question, under the consideration of the Governor in council, whether it be not desirable, that, in particular cases, the intermediate agent should be excluded, and the cultivators become answerable individually for a fixed rent, in all seasons, for the whole of their lands, or for such part as might be cultivated? It will therefore be proper to consider the expediency of this mode of settlement for the province of Tanjore.

16. Under what has been above stated, the committee will proceed to consider how many modes of management, introductory to a settlement in permanency of the revenue of government, can be adopted in Tanjore, and to offer such observations on each mode, as have occurred to them.

**A Ryotwar Rent:**—First. A settlement may be made with each meeraffadar, at a fixed rate, for the land he may annually bring under cultivation, or for all his land.

**Village Rent:**—Secondly. A rent may be settled with all the meeraffadars of each village jointly, for a fixed sum of money for a period of years.

**A Mootah, or Zemindarry Rent:**—Thirdly. A rent may be settled with individuals for a number of villages to be united in one rent, for a fixed sum, for a period of years.

Two other modes of collecting the revenue have been known in Tanjore; viz.

**A Grain Rent:**—A grain rent on the meeraffadars, agreeing for a given quantity of grain, and contracting to take the share of government, at a given price; and

**Aumany, or a Division on the Field of the Produce:**—Aumany; a division of the produce with the cultivators; who, taking their share, enter into no engagements with government.

17. The committee have considered themselves at liberty to exclude from consideration the two last stated modes; because they have been pronounced, by the first authorities, to be radically bad.

18. The two first modes may at any time, by an adequate reduction, be made fixed rents, payable in all seasons.

19. The third mode may also at any time, and perhaps without a reduction, be made a fixed rent, payable in all seasons.

20. The consideration of the first mode of settlement, will lead particularly to an examination of the average standard produce, and commutation price, assumed in the settlement of Fusly 1215; but the consideration of either must have reference to the warum, or share. These are the three principal points referred to the committee for investigation; they will ~~con-~~ mence with the share,

#### RYOTWAR RENT.

The objects of a ryotwar rent appear principally to be, to secure the inferior ryots from the oppression of the head ryots; to stimulate industry, by not imposing such a tax on government, as a division of the produce is supposed to be; and to relieve the industrious from the burthen of paying the tax of the indolent, which is supposed to result from a violent rent. The committee will not here go into a consideration of the policy or practicality of the measure, of making a permanent ryotwar rent. They consider their investigation to be confined to a recommendation of a mode of management introductory either to that mode, or to a permanent rent with mootahdars, should that measure be deemed at a future period, proper. A ryotwar rent is much more easily established than a permanent ryotwar rent. In the first case, the ryot only pays for the land he actually cultivates; and always for that, if it should prove unproductive. In the second case, he must pay a fixed sum in all seasons, for all the land he occupies, either in his meeraffee or other right.

See Letter from  
Board of Revenue to  
Gov<sup>r</sup> 30 Sept. 1806,  
para. 50.

116. The success of a ryotwar rent depends on the moderation of the land-tax: the ryot must be able, in all seasons, to replace his seed, to pay his labourers, and to defray the expense of his cattle; if from unfavourable seasons, or a season affording only a  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{1}{3}$ , or  $\frac{1}{4}$  crop, or other proportions under a full crop, the payment of the land-tax absorbs all his produce, he must be ruined; if it falls less severe, his means of cultivating in the next year, will be proportionably reduced. Capital cannot be acquired by a ryot, in the first year of the ryotwar rent; the inequality of a land-tax on each field in India, must always be great; it must be fixed by a reference to the varieties in the seasons, to the different degrees of productive power in the soil, and its means of irrigation; to the variation of produce, and to the fluctuations in price, arising out of the seasons. This is a combination of circumstances which must render the attainment of accuracy, very doubtful. The land-tax will, in the first instance, be unequal; and the longer it continues, the greater will be its inequality. In districts where there is more land, than can always be brought under cultivation in the year; and in districts where land is not watered from tanks and rivers, but dependant on falling rains for water, the ryots may exercise their own discretion, in selecting land which is most moderately assessed: land over-assessed will be waste; and its assessment will in consequence, some time or other, be reduced; but where land is every year nearly all under cultivation; where it is valuable and transferable property, an over assessment must ruin a portion of the ryots; and an under assessment be productive of loss of revenue to government. In the one case, government cannot participate in the profits of the ryots; while, on the other, it must bear the loss, on the over-assessed land. The land-tax is meant to secure government, from the thefts, frauds, and loss of aumanees; and the ryots, from the interference, persecution, and oppression, of native revenue officers, and from being taxed according to their produce: but if the land-tax is founded on erroneous principles, which, if reference be had to the persons who must form it, it is more likely to be, than on correct ones, the evils will exceed the benefits.

1st. Because, to establish a ryotwar rent, a considerable reduction must be made to enable a ryot to pay the loss of  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{1}{3}$ , or  $\frac{1}{4}$  crops when they occur, which they will do often, either on the whole of his land, or on a part; land entirely barren only is remitted to him.

2ndly. Because this deduction will unavoidably be, unequally distributed; and government will have to make up, at one time or another, the inequality of reduction, by a further remission of rent on over-assessed land.

3dly. Because where there is no waste land, or but a small proportion of waste land to be occupied, as is particularly the case in Tanjore, government cannot recover in the occupation of waste land, the first remission to the ryot, while it must bear all the loss of droughts, inundations, or other calamity, which may diminish the quantity of the annual cultivation.

117. Although the best writers on revenue economy have declared, that for government to divide the produce with the cultivator is to tax improvement, yet it may be a question, for discussion, whether the reasoning applies to the farmer of India. If the season be more uncertain in India than in Europe; if the articles of produce be more confined; and if the actual produce be more uncertain, and its price extremely variable, it seems not so injurious in a country where  $\frac{3}{4}$ ths of the revenue of the state are from the land, that the government and the cultivator should participate in the risks produced by the foregoing circumstances. If the cultivator's share be liberal, his profit in good seasons, will be considerable; in bad seasons, his loss comparatively trifling. If government farms out its share, but leaves the ryot to receive his share in kind, the situation of the ryot is not altered.

118. If reference be had to the system of taxation in India before the Mahomedan conquest, there is abundant reason to conclude that it was determined by those considerations which have regulated the taxes of other governments. A land-tax was known in many parts, but in most, it was confined to dry grain land, not fixed on the soil, but varying with the nature of the produce; why? because the productive power of the soil is of inferior consideration, where much more depends on the season, and the expected supply of water. It is not, in India, in the option of the cultivator to adopt the European system of a rotation of crops; his lands may one year yield him a produce of the value of 100, and lose none of its fertile powers; yet in the next, yield him not more than 20, because he is compelled, by the season, to change the article of culture. Where a land-tax is found, it is determined on this principle; but no where in India, the committee believes, is a land-tax on each field collected in all seasons, good or bad, whether the land is cultivated or not.

119. Unless in countries where a fixed demand exists for almost all the produce, a division of the nunjah produce will be found the practice; or, if a rent, it will have been regulated late in the year, and have been determined by the actual circumstances of the year: the division of the nunjah produce appears, therefore, to have been applicable to the circumstances of climate, and to the nature of the government of India. How far it is at this period applicable to this part of India, will be enquired into hereafter:

#### VILLAGE RENT.

120. A village rent on lease for a certain number of years, which is the next rent to a ryotwar rent, is so far favourable to the ryot, that the loss and the profit are equally participated by the other partners of the village; that the chances of his being treated with moderation are more in his favour than in a ryotwar rent; that there is less apprehension from an over-assessment, because the rent may probably be determined by the offers of the villagers themselves, or by what they have paid for a continuance. The loss, one year with another, cannot be great; and, unless oppression is exercised, the loss of the inferior ryots can only be proportionate, and therefore not ruinous. Land in India is seldom a separate farm. All land belongs

Disputes relative to  
Zemindarry and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Report from the Com-  
mittee at Tanjore;  
22 Feb. 1807.

\* This practice is  
universal in the Paul-  
bhogum or Adekary vil-  
lages in Tanjore.

belongs to some village or another, whether it be cultivated or waste. This property, parti-  
cularly in nunjah land, is watered by a common stream. In the water, in the pasture, and  
waste, there is then always, in the arable and cultivated land generally, a community of  
interests: lots are drawn in many \* villages for the annual, triennial, or decennial occupation  
of land: all disbursements for the repair of tanks, and water-courses leading from these tanks;  
all labour for village works of general utility; all contribution for religious ceremonies; all  
the pay and labour of the village artizans and officers, are regulated by this communion of  
interest. A ryotwar rent may separate the villager's stock from that usually clubbed for public  
rent; but all the power of government could not separate the joint interest in the water, the  
pasture, and waste land, from his contribution to village charges, which, while moderate, it is  
a source of his happiness to make.

121. The advantages to government from a village rent on lease are, as follows:

1st. The government is relieved from the loss, corruption, and fraud of an aumanie  
management.

2nd. It is secured from all the loss which may arise, from the establishment of an unequal  
land-tax.

3rd. The annual rent will not depend on the correct ascertainment of the cultivation and  
produce; and, therefore, be not annually exposed to deterioration by the corruption or  
incapacity of native revenue officers.

4th. A village rent will be much easier changed into a zemindarry rent, than a ryotwar  
rent, and at a less loss of revenue to government.

5th. The charges of collection will be considerably reduced.

122. It has been argued against this mode of settlement, that the obligation for the whole  
rent among the inhabitants of the same village is unjust, because the neglect of one partner  
may be wanton, or resistance to fulfil his share of the general engagement, wilful. A few such  
cases may occur; but the frequency of them must, where they result from a neglect of individ-  
ual interest, be limited. Villages will generally settle among themselves the best way of  
paying the rent of government, and will either engage for specific shares of the rent, or for  
the clubbing of the circar share of the produce. To many ryots, an exemption from a con-  
tinual demand for rent which the union of the circar share affords, and the time thereby left  
them to follow their agricultural or other pursuits in their own way, are of more value to them,  
than a separate assessment on their lands, which compels them to become the retail or whole-  
sale sellers of their own grain, and to give constant attendance on the officers of govern-  
ment.

123. A village rent supports that connection and unity of interests which exist among the  
meerassadars of the same village, and which, for reasons already given, it is more desirable to  
preserve than to destroy.

#### MOOTAH RENT.

124. A rent of a certain number of villages to an individual, on a lease, has the following  
advantages:

1st. It lays the foundation for a permanent rent, at an early period.

2nd. It diminishes the expenses of cultivation.

3rd. It leaves the cultivator to pursue his own interest, in his own way, and at liberty  
either to rent, or divide the produce, as may be agreed on between him and the  
mootadar.

4th. It determines the revenue of government by competition; and affords the best  
chance of recovering all suppression of cultivation or produce.

5th. It relieves the officers of government from all details in a greater degree, than the  
village rent, which, since the establishment of courts of justice, may be considered an  
object of some importance.

125. Such a mode of rent, under laws competent to protect the people from manifest  
injustice, ought not to be oppressive to any person. The meerassadar would either take his  
share, and render in kind to the mootshdar, the government share, or engage to commute it.  
His right would be his coodewarum; his commutation of it, the act of his free-will. In a  
political point of view, such a rent may be liable to objection, because it may remove the  
people from under the immediate authority of the government officers, and place them too  
much, under the influence of the mootahdar. In a moral point of view, it may be objection-  
able, as leaving to the people the choice of dividing the produce, and placing before them  
temptations to the practice of fraud and corruption. Under a mootahdar, the people might  
be harassed, but could not be openly oppressed, incurring no risk unless by choice. Their profit  
might gradually increase; their profit, never excessive; their loss, never great.

The committee have heard the danger of a monopoly of grain urged against such a  
system, provided the mootahs are not too extensive, and a free transit for grain, as at  
present, is preserved throughout the country, this apprehension would prove not well founded.  
If the country were rented out for a certain number of years to a few individuals, and an  
exclusive privilege allowed to the meerassadars, the temptation to a combination among the  
mootahs, to keep up their grain, might be too strong to be resisted.

Another objection is urged against the introduction of mootahdars into Tanjore. It is,  
that the possession of land is so desirable, and sought after by all ranks with such avidity, that  
the mootahdar would have great temptation to take advantage of his situation, to get posses-  
sion of a great portion of the meerassadar's right in his mootah. He would try to effect this, not  
by any open act of violence and injustice, but by practising every kind of vexation on the  
poorer meerassadars, which his influence would afford him an opportunity of doing, and which  
the interposition of public authority, might find it difficult to prevent.

128. The committee having given the foregoing explanation on the different modes of rent which have occurred to them, will now state the materials which exist for the formation of a rent, on either of the modes which have been stated.

#### RYOTWAR RENT.

129. A field rent, and a village rent, having been unknown in Tanjore previously to the cession of the provinces to the Company, there is no record before that period, of the relative fertility of the different fields, nor any particular account of the actual produce of the whole land of each village. The actual produce then, of Fusly 1210-11, 12, and 1213, being four years of aumany, with the estimated and actual produce for Fusly 1214, are the only materials for a ryotwar rent.

#### VILLAGE RENT.

130. This mode of rent never having been practised before Fusly 1214, there is no account on record of the produce of each village since the introduction of the puttuckdars, in 1782. A few scattered accounts of the estimated or caboolat produce of villages might probably be obtained for one or more of the years from 1776, to that period: but the result could not be satisfactory. The puttuckdars either have not, or would not, give true accounts of their collection from each village. The aumany management furnishes accounts, it is true, of the actual produce of each village, but no account exists of the value or sale price of the grain; no particular account of the sales of the grain of each village was preserved; the grain was sold at depôts. The price of grain must vary in each village, from two causes, the situation of the village, and the quality of the grain. A calculation might, no doubt, be made of the revenue of each village, but it would be liable to much error, from the fictitious price which must be assumed for the grain. The rent in Fusly 1214, having been a village rent, the accounts of that year, show the actual collections from each village. In Fusly 1215, although the rent is the result of the standard produce, and has no relation to the actual produce of the year, the accounts will nevertheless exhibit the actual collection from each village. In Fusly 1216, the rent is a village rent, and the accounts at the end of the year will show the actual collections from each village. There will then be three years of actual collections by which to regulate a village rent, and the actual produce of four years, to apply the selling price to, if more years are required, of the value in money of the revenues of each village.

#### MOOTAH RENTS.

131. In this mode of rent, it is of course understood, that proposals will be invited, and if reference be had to the information of the collective revenue of the province, which the committee have entered in different parts of their reports, there appears abundant materials by which to estimate the fairness of the proposals which may be received.

132. In the examination of the detailed accounts, of which abstracts are inserted in this report, the committee were early led to adopt an opinion, that the ryotwar rent in Tanjore presented no benefit to government, or to the ryot, proportionate to the risk of loss, because the great fluctuations in the extent of cultivation, in the produce, and in the market price of the produce, rendered it extremely difficult to adopt a standard for assessment; because the reduction which must be made, to enable the ryot to undertake the risk of the market, and of bad and indifferent crops, would cause a very considerable diminution in the revenue, without a positive security being obtained for the payment of the residue; because the extent of waste land is so insignificant, that the reduction on the present revenue, necessary to form a ryotwar rent, would not be counterbalanced by any proportionate increase from extended cultivation; so that a ryotwar rent in Tanjore would entail a permanent loss of revenue.

133. It may be argued, that in a district where land is so valuable as to sell at a high price, security would always exist in the land, for the revenue; but when once land is over assessed it loses its value, and is no longer saleable. In Tanjore, the changes which are liable to occur in the channels of the rivers, and the loss of water by the breaking of banks, must occasionally produce great deficiency. A village rent may support that loss, a single ryot could not.

134. It has been stated, that the government can, where the land-tax has been fixed, recover, by the means of duties on the articles of produce, what may have been remitted to form a land-tax; but if reference be had to what the articles of culture chiefly are, no very great addition of revenue can be expected from this mode of taxation, without recurring to the oppressive mode of levying internal duties.

135. It ought perhaps to be urged, that the very extensive remission of warum, and of other assessments, which, as noticed in para. 70, have been made in favour of the inhabitants, go a considerable way, towards enabling them to pay a land-tax for all the land that they have, whatever might be the proportion of the crops, below a full crop; but the committee have furnished evidence, that the fluctuation is greater than an individual ryot can take to be responsible for, while the chances of inequality in the assessment are in the government.

136. Under the foregoing circumstances the Committee were at an early stage of their proceedings disposed to recommend the immediate establishment, for a certain number of years, either of a mootah rent, or of a village rent, according to circumstances might, during their investigations, induce a preference to one or the other mode.

137. The committee will here remark, that very extensive property in land is held by the meerassdars. Many possess from three to four thousand acres, not always a separate and distinct property in whole villages, but in various proportions of the meerass of different villages.

Documents relative to  
the history and progress  
of the settlements

Report from the Com-  
mittee of Tanjore;  
24 Feb. 1807.

villages. But the property of a much greater number, is very small; many of those whose property is extensive were formerly *puttuckdars*, and are said to have acquired the property, by means not always justifiable.

138. On a subject so interesting to the future welfare of the inhabitants of the province of Tanjore, the committee did not fail to consult the wishes of the people on the mode of rent best suited to their interests, customs and prejudices, giving them to understand, however, that a division of the produce with government would never again be resorted to, for reasons which they were not ignorant of, and have not forgot. The nature of the mootah rent, village rent, and of the ryotwar rent, were accordingly explained to a large body of meeraffadars, and an unreserved communication of their sentiments invited.

139. The result of this conversation was, that the meeraffadars had no objection to a mootah rent, provided they were left in the enjoyment of their present advantages, and one village not compelled to pay the losses of another, or each village assessed separately and arbitrarily, for sabbendy or other expenses of management. They seemed not free from suspicion that the mootahdar would evince a desire to possess himself of their property, in the manner the puttuckdar had done; and it was only on a full explanation, that they would be left at liberty to rent, or not, as best suited their interest, that they admitted a mootah rent would be so far free from objection.

140. The meeraffadars, who had been formerly puttuckdars, seemed rather unwilling to be placed under the controul of a mootahdar; but the prospect of a division of the produce got the better of their disinclinations, so that they did not urge far this objection. The preference given to a village rent on lease was, however, unanimous, and a period of five years was fixed on, as the most eligible for the duration of the lease.

141. Under the foregoing circumstances, combined with those stated by the committee in their observation on each mode of rent, they have no hesitation in recommending the immediate establishment of a *village rent* on lease, in the province of Tanjore, wherever such a rent can be introduced on equitable terms to the government and to the people.

142. If there should exist any reason for doubting the correctness of the accounts of Fully 1212, or for supposing that those of Fully 1210 and 1211 are on the aggregate too high, it might be expedient to invite proposals from the meeraffadars of each village; or where the meeraffadar may decline proposing, to form the villages into mootahs, and invite proposals for the rent of each mootah. As there can exist no doubt that the meeraffadars would prefer a division of the produce to any rent whatever; so it is necessary to be prepared for the endeavours they will make to obtain this mode of management. If the country be divided into mootahs of from 4,000 star pagodas to 10,000 star pagodas annual value, and proposals are invited for the mootahs, as well as for each village, the meeraffadars, where they may prefer renting their own villages, will most probably make offers adequate to the just expectations of government, which, without such competition, cannot be calculated on, under the known disposition of the people of Tanjore to combine in their opposition to any measure not exactly conformable to their wishes. Such a measure, will facilitate the early establishment of the rent, and will probably bring to light a part of those undue gains, which there is some reason to think the meeraffadars have enjoyed, from the suppression and concealment of the frauds committed in Fully 1212. Strangers and adventurers may be excluded from giving proposals, and only persons of known landed property be admitted to hold a mootah.

143. Recurring to the subject of warum, the committee are of opinion that the advantage enjoyed by the meeraffadars under this head, are so considerable, that unless a system of rent is introduced, which involves them in a certain risk, the committee would be disposed to recommend a general reduction of warum, permitting the meeraffadars, however, to enjoy a portion of those benefits which have been bestowed on them by the bounty of the British government, leaving their warum at a higher rate than that which existed on the cession of the province; but they recommend the continuance of the present rates, where the meeraffadars may undertake the risk of a village rent. And they beg leave to submit, how far it might be expedient, under what has been stated, to reduce the rates of warum, in instances where meeraffadars may decline every invitation to rent, in the hope of receiving their full share, by a division of the produce from a mootahdar. Such a proposal may, in the first instance, appear unjust; but when the immoral practices are considered, to which a division of the produce opens the door of temptation, an incitement to relinquish such a mode, from motives of personal interest, is perhaps a duty of the government. The meeraffadars would still be left in the enjoyment of very considerable advantages, as may be seen on reference to para. 70, while at the same time, a certain degree of incitement to rent their villages, is held out to them. In all measures of this kind, the recommendation must arise out of a knowledge of the state of the people, and under this knowledge, the committee beg leave to recommend the proposition be adopted.

Whether the rent to be established be eventually a village rent, or a mootah rent, that which has existed in the demand of the circar from *ponjah*, *foornadayam*, or *foornadayam* land, during the last six years, renders it expedient that the demand should be for ever, not only as a measure of justice, but in order that each meeraffadar, who takes a village rent, may know what he has to pay for his land of either of the above, and that the mootahdar or meeraffadar, or meeraffadars collectively, may know their proportion.

Extract FORT ST. GEORGE Revenue Consultations, the 27th November 1807.

Extract Mr. Hodgson's Report on the Province of COIMBATORE; dated 10th September 1807.

Documents relating to Zemindary and Ryotwar Settlements.

Mr. Hodgson's Report on the Province of Coimbatore; 10th Sept. 1807.

74. The principal collector having submitted to the Board of Revenue an arrangement for dividing the Northern division into estates, and for settling the revenue permanently, or on lease, it may be expected that I should state such opinions on the subject, as local inquiry may have enabled me to form. I shall accordingly venture to communicate a few observations on the proposed arrangement.

75. If there be any truth in the observation, that "the attention of the sovereign can be at best but a very general and vague consideration of what is likely to contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part of his dominions;" and if the reasoning on which a permanent settlement of the revenue of India was recommended to the Court of Directors, and approved by them, be not erroneous, it would seem to be at once a settled axiom of revenue management, that, as soon as the resources of a country have been ascertained, and the rights of the cultivator and of government defined; government ought to withdraw from the immediate and detailed management of its revenues, and introduce the agency of landlords, intermediate between them and the cultivator; because the attention of a landlord is a particular and minute consideration of what is likely to be the most advantageous application of every inch of ground upon his estate.

76. Applying this train of reasoning to the province of Coimbatore generally, but at present more particularly to the Northern division, it will have been seen that the resources of that division have been ascertained by a survey of all the land cultivated, arable, and waste; that the rights of the government, and of the cultivators, have been defined and fixed by the assessment of a rent, in money, on all the gradations of soil; that by the interchange of muchelkas and pottahs, the cultivator has been familiarized to a limit of demand, and to the practice of securing himself from exaction, by the possession of a written voucher†.

77. This practice, and this fixed rent on land, has continued in the Northern division for several years; during which the revenue has risen, or fallen, according as the seasons have been favourable or otherwise. The rate of assessment has not varied.

78. Now, it is an important question for discussion, whether it is politic or expedient to continue any longer this mode of management, or whether any other mode, better calculated to promote the prosperity of the country, can be introduced? because the establishment of courts of justice, while it has introduced forms inimical to detailed management, holds out to the ryot, security against the oppression of landlords or head inhabitants, which may render detail on the part of government, which was one of the chief objects of it, no longer necessary.

79. By the mode of management now existing, it is necessary to the circar, or sovereign power, to ascertain, annually, the extent of land occupied, and the gradation of soil under occupation by each individual. The register of gradations and of assessments on each field, are in the custody of the curnum; it is he who registers the occupation of land, and informs the cultivators of the assessment on it.

80. On the honesty, therefore, of the curnums it depends, whether the land of the ryot be classed in its proper class, or rated to its proper assessment. He may place the land in a lower scale, rate it to a lower assessment, or omit a part of the cultivation altogether: that curnums will do such things, there exist abundant proofs, in the detection which the examiners, annually employed to discover suppressed cultivation, make. It is much easier, however, to detect an erroneous return of the quantity of land cultivated, than it is to find out whether the true rate of assessment has been fixed on the land, or the land classed. The whole interest of the village is against the circar in a ryotwar rent; the curnum runs generally less risk in defrauding government, than in disobeying a superior.

81. The necessity of annually sending out examiners, or of taking the accounts, to render true accounts, is another evil arising out of a ryotwar rent. These examiners, in excess of zeal, or with a view that their severity of examination should be more imposing, harass the ryots, and torment the revenue officers; they often return a false account of suppressed cultivation, or are accused of bribery: both acts, lead to vexatious investigations; and which, under the establishment of courts of justice, are referred to them, and to a distant period for adjudication.

82. These scrutinies, and these annual exposures to fraud, are necessary consequences of a ryotwar rent, under the immediate superintendence of the officers of government.

83. If a ryot fails to pay his rent, the whole process of distraint laid down in regulation XXVIII. 1802, must be resorted to, and the same forms be gone through with the ryot who pays.

Extract of a letter from the Governor General in council, dated 19th July 1804.

Para. 31. In all cases it is desirable that the settlement should be formed with the zemindars, or other descriptions of landholders; where no such descriptions of persons exist, it would be proper to form the lands into estates, and to dispose of them to persons who will attend to their cultivation; these persons, as well as all other landholders, should be permitted freely to transfer their estates by sale, gift, or any other manner. It can never be desirable that the government itself should act as the proprietor of lands, and should collect the rents from the immediate cultivators of the soil; the rates of rents payable for the different descriptions of produce, must vary in every district, and often in every village; where any proprietors may be found, they will generally collect those rents agreeable to the specific engagements which they may conclude with their tenants, or according to the established usage of the country. If any difference should arise between landlords and the tenants regarding these engagements or usages, the courts of judicature will form the proper tribunals for deciding such differences. Those questions are of private right, in which the executive authority cannot interfere consistent with justice, policy, or its own interests.

† The number of pottahs issued in the N. Div. - - - - 85,068 in the S. D. - - - - 32,809

117,877

† Colonel Munro has declared, from his experience, that the curnums give a true account.



Documents relative to  
Zimindari and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Mr. Hodgson's Report  
on the Province of  
Coimbatore, 30 Sept.  
1807.

pays a rent of 6 fanams, as with him, who pays a rent of 1,000 pagodas: the number of ryots holding pottahs in Coimbatore cannot be less than sixty or seventy thousand; the number of pottahs issued has been stated at 17,877.

84. If the process of Regulation XXVIII. is not enforced against each defaulter as soon as he falls in arrear, the evil spreads; and those who are able, and those who are not, equally withhold their rent.

85. By a rule belonging to this mode of management, it is considered, that, when land is once occupied, the rent must be paid on, whether it is cultivated or not.

86. From this rule, however, frequent deviations are made, and remissions have been annually granted for land occupied, but not cultivated; or if cultivated, only partially productive.

87. It is not meant to be denied that this mode of management may continue as long as it may be the pleasure of government, but the success of it, must depend on the character of the individual superintending it; because on him, depends the quantum of remission to be granted. This quantum must be ascertained, in the first instance, from the returns, and their false accounts be corrected, by subsequent investigation. It is more than probable that in a country where, like Coimbatore, there is so much waste land, the revenue would, under such

mode of management, ultimately increase, although liable to fluctuation according to the goodness or otherwise of the season. It must still depend, however, on the ability of the collector to ascertain the growing prosperity of the country. The question is, however, whether it is desirable to continue this detail; and whether it is calculated to promote the real welfare of the people, and the true prosperity of the country?

88. That the future prosperity of the country, depends on the correctness of the survey rates of assessment, if a ryotwar rent is to continue, will not be denied; because, wherever they are too high, the land will be abandoned, or the ryot must be ruined. The combination of calculation, from which a survey and assessment are formed, have been shown in a former part of this paper. On the correctness of these combinations, as applied to each field of each village, it depends whether the cultivator, on an average of years, either loses or gains by the occupation of the field or fields which collectively compose his farm.

He has the remedy of giving up a field which, in his opinion, or from his experience, may prove over assessed, but perhaps the minutes of the survey and rates of assessment, may not have been much more favourable in such of the other fields of his village, as remain unoccupied: if they have not been, he contracts his farm, leaving out one or more fields, and takes an advance of money to enable him again to try his fortune.

89. That a cultivator must often, or sometimes, lose by this mode of management, will not be denied by the greatest advocates for the system; because such is the fluctuation in the seasons, and in the prices of grain, that a departure from what is, I believe, called the true system, is frequently resorted to: remission for lands occupied, but not cultivated, and even for parts of fields which have been sown, but have not proved productive, are occasionally made, and annual advances of tucavay are required.

90. The examination into the extent of land occupied; the correct application of the survey rates of assessment to such land; the investigation into the circumstances of individuals claiming remission, and the determination of the quantum of remission;—all these details

must be gone into annually under a ryotwar rent, by the native revenue officers of the circar. As these officers cannot be very deeply interested in the result, unless by corruption made parties: it may happen that the examination and investigation may not be favourable to the cultivator, or, if favourable to him, greatly disadvantageous to the circar.

91. It is the object in entering into this detail, to shew the liability to error which a survey rate of assessment is susceptible of, the practice of fraud by which the collections of the revenue is annually endangered, and the exposure to loss and distress which the cultivators are, under it, subjected to. It is not meant to detract from it, as a system well calculated to develop the sources of a newly acquired country, or to give to cultivators a security against the oppression of head ryots, where courts of justice are not established; but to adduce from this reasoning, arguments in favour of leaving it to individual interest to correct the irregularities of the survey, which, under the best conducted survey, must exist in a certain if not in a considerable degree; to extend relief to individuals, and to pay that minute consideration to the advantageous applications of every inch of ground, which individual interest will not fail to suggest, and can alone account

92. Without questioning the correctness of the survey of the Salem country, it is an ascertained fact, that the mootahdars of the estates in that district, have found it to their advantage to alter the survey rates of assessment; and in many villages, of which I had an opportunity of examining, both the returns and the proprietors of the estate, the alteration had extended

• Para. 16. Collector's Report, 30th September 1805;

The causes are, the contraction of farms from the badness of the seasons, and the remission of rent to the ryots in instances where the crops had failed, after ploughing and sowing the lands engaged for. It would have been useless, as well as impolitic, to have called for the fulfilment of sums which was prevented by the seasons alone, and not by the indiscretion of the ryots.

† The assessments in Salem are of three kinds, in the three divisions into which it was divided under Col. Read.

The 1st division high; the 2d division lower; the 3d different, but not ascertained: one division is higher assessed than both north and south Coimbatore, as they stood before the assessment in the latter was reduced. These countries are only divided by the river Cavery.

They are only on monthly pay, and always liable to removal.

Letter from the Judge of Salem, to the question whether the courts for his jurisdiction was in a state of improvement?

As it is upwards of ten years since I was first appointed to this district, I can confidently assert, that the improvement with respect to agriculture, commerce and commerce is very great. I have travelled over many parts of the district, and have frequently observed that it has improved. The district, in the proportion of the cultivation large number of ryots, and I can assure you, that the assurances of improvement are not unfounded.

to various proportions of the land under cultivation, to some as far as to half. These alterations, were all in favour of the cultivator; because the proprietor has not the power of raising the survey rates of assessment, and in the cases alluded to, had no disposition to do so. Here, then, is a proof at least that a survey rate of assessment cannot reach all the minute circumstances of detail, which individual interest can.

93. On examining the register of complaints filed in the court at Salem, few have been found preferred, against mootahdars by ryots. It will not be said that the ryots there, are afraid to complain, when it is known that in that country, they had been in the habit of laying their grievances before the European authority, long before the establishment of courts of justice. It may therefore be concluded that the mootah system has not proved injurious to the ryot; on the contrary, that he has experienced great relief under that system in the Salem country, during the severity of the late seasons.

94. Moderate, as the rates of assessment in the Northern division of Coimbatore are admitted to be, there is such abundance of waste arable land, that the reduction of them still lower would not probably, in the first year, diminish the revenue, and might ultimately augment it; but such a revision by government, after the rates have been so long established, would be very impolitic, for obvious reasons; but the fact, if admitted, will point out how individual interest may be exerted in the improvement of the country.

95. There is one remark, however, to which it is necessary to attract attention, as particularly applicable to a district in which the rent is fixed on the fields, viz. that an extensive cultivation may, unless the demand for grain be co-extensive, be productive of great inconvenience to ryots, under a ryotwar rent, if not of ultimate loss. The price of paddy has been known to fluctuate 50 or 60 and 100 per cent.; of other grains, proportionately. The price of paddy must always fall considerably below the general average, whenever the panjah produce shall be greatly augmented; and from favourable seasons, no markets should be found for it in the eastern provinces. A suspension of the investment at Salem, a diminution of the number of troops, are also circumstances which contract very materially, the demand for grain. On this subject, I propose saying a few words hereafter; but at present, will only to observe, that in such years, it is in the power of a mootahdar, by taking part of the produce in commutation of his rent, to afford seasonable and sensible relief to his ryot, with a prospect of advantage to himself; because he can most probably afford to wait for a market, which not one in ten thousand ryots, could do.

96. The proportion of nanjah land has been explained to be small, in this province; the waste in nanjah is not considerable. The extent of panjah land is extensive, and the arable waste, much more. The panjah cultivation depends on the falling rain. The waste is in a great degree, free from jungle. It is only therefore an augmentation of capital and stock that is required, to enable the cultivators to increase considerably their farms, and a circulation of specie, and an increase of population, to consume the increased supply.

97. Under the conviction arising out of the foregoing investigation, I concur in opinion with the principal collector, that it is a most desirable measure that the estates into which the Northern division has been formed, should be at an early period, transferred to the management of individual persons, and that as soon as practicable after the alteration of the teerwas in the Southern division, the same system be extended to that division.

98. In the present state of these districts, where so much waste arable land exists, it may not be necessary to settle at this period, the revenue permanently; and it would be inexpedient to sell the estates. The purchase-money would, where the means of the individuals likely to become proprietors, are small, deprive them of those resources which would enable them to improve their estates, and meet the contingencies of adverse seasons. The assessment of an equitable permanent revenue would also be much facilitated by the experience which would be gained of the result of the management of the renters during their lease, and under the courts of justice.

99. There are exceptions to the foregoing statement, with regard to the property of individuals; for some of the gours of the province, particularly in the Southern division, are possessed of considerable wealth, obtained by improper means, during the anarchy\*, which prevailed at various periods while the province was under the dominion of the house of Hyder. By adopting a system of rent on lease, a portion of this ill-begotten wealth will, in all probability, be appropriated to purposes of agricultural utility, particularly if good behaviour, and punctuality in the payment of the rent, during the lease, shall be declared to be a positive claim to the estate on a permanent rent, whenever it may be resolved to fix, for ever, the land revenue of the country. It will have the effect, very probably, of identifying the interest of the restless and turbulent gours with that of government, and give them a pre-eminence they have frequently held, and have ceased to hold, with regret. This pre-eminence connected with a property, which a renewable and transferable lease would be presumed, under the establishment of courts of justice, prove detrimental to the country.

\* The gours, during frequently fought against each the government. Many, ders of banditti.

100. Whether or not the rent shall be progressive at the expiration of the lease, what should be the period of the lease, may be considered subordinate parts of the plan, also, the best means of effectuating the gradual improvement which the country may be capable of, at the expiration of the first lease, an increase of rent should be deemed advisable.

101. During the lease, such improvements as the country is still capable of, may be carrying on, and such provision made for an increase of revenue from those improvements, as the renters and collectors agree upon.

102. If the propositions for renting the estates into which the Northern division has been divided, be adopted, and the same plan afterwards extended to the Southern division, a reduc-

Documents relative to  
Boundary and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Mr. Hodgkin's Report  
on the Province of  
Coimbatore; 10 Sept.  
1837.



30. The following Abstract of the cultivation of Nunjah, since the acquisition of the province, will show the fluctuation, during a period of six years:—

Documents relative to Zemindary and Ryot war settlements.

### NUNJAH CULTIVATION IN TINNEVELLY.

Mr. Hodgkin's Report on the Province of Tinnevelly 14 Sept. 1867.

	Fusly 1211.	Fusly 1212.	Fusly 1213.	Fusly 1214.	Fusly 1215.	Fusly 1216.
<b>NUNJAH LAN</b>	Cawnies.					
Share and Share - - - -	95,558	95,601	97,386	73,042	79,188	85,389
Cowle lands on a grain rent - -	10,085	9,214	9,790	6,949	6,321	6,886
Poronpoo, or a land paying a fixed money rent - - - -	2,248	2,100	2,254	1,649	1,758	1,812
Nunjah and Punjah - - - -	17,267	11,792	9,379	5,890	14,135	16,832
Vampar lands - - - -	4,316	3,576	4,273	4,223	4,456	4,538
Total classed as Nunjah - - -	1,29,474	1,22,283	1,23,082	91,753	1,05,858	1,15,457
<b>PUNJAH</b> - - - -	3,15,377	3,24,585	3,30,562	2,62,600	3,00,890	3,07,066
Total cultivation - - - -	4,44,851	4,46,868	4,53,644	3,54,353	4,15,748	4,22,523
* Garden land.						

31. The difference between the greatest extent of nunjah land cultivated during the above six years, and the least extent, is about 24 p<sup>r</sup> C<sup>t</sup>. The difference between the greatest extent of punjah land cultivated, and the least, is about 19 p<sup>r</sup> C<sup>t</sup>. These fluctuations are not, perhaps, considerable; but it will be remembered, that the produce does not always correspond with the extent of cultivation. The cultivation may be greater, than in any former year; while the produce may prove, much less.

32. The following Statement of cultivation and produce will exemplify the foregoing observation:—

### NUNJAH.

YEARS.	Extent of Nunjah Cultivation productive.	Gross Produce before any deductions, except Hand Fee.	Average Produce per Cawny.
	Cawnies.	Garce. M <sup>r</sup> . M <sup>r</sup> .	Mercal. M <sup>r</sup> .
Fusly 1211 - - - - -	95,558	30,256 352 —	126 5½
— 1212 - - - - -	95,601	27,472 69 1	114 7½
— 1213 - - - - -	97,386	29,582 241 1½	121 4
— 1214 - - - - -	73,042	21,942 252 5	120 1½
— 1215 - - - - -	79,188	26,075 264 —	131 5
— 1216 - - - - -	85,389	25,713 38 7	120 3½
TOTAL - - - - -		1,61,043 17 6½	—
Average Produce - - - - -		26,840 202 7	122 4

33. The average produce per cawny given above, is low, compared with the average produce, in other districts. The first sort of lands in the Durmaianu talooks will produce about 167½ mercals per cawny; the second sort, about 146 mercals; and the third sort, about 120½ mercals.

Under watercourses, the

1 <sup>st</sup> sort will produce on average	146 mercals.
2 <sup>d</sup> - d <sup>o</sup>	119 d <sup>o</sup> .
3 <sup>d</sup> - d <sup>o</sup>	97½ d <sup>o</sup> .

Under tanks,

1 <sup>st</sup> sort	97 d <sup>o</sup> .
2 <sup>d</sup> - d <sup>o</sup>	86 d <sup>o</sup> .
3 <sup>d</sup> - d <sup>o</sup>	75½ d <sup>o</sup> .

34. It is the averaging of the whole cultivation on all the land cultivated, part of which is only partially productive, which causes the average produce to appear so low, when reduced to a general average per cawny. The nunjah lands of this province do not, however, appear to yield so great a produce on an average, as they do, in other provinces: the reason is said to be, that the tillage of the land is but indifferently attended to.

Deposits relative to  
Zamindari and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Mr. Hodgson's Report  
on the Province of Pin-  
navelly; 24 Sept. 1807.

35. As the produce of punjah land is never divided, the following Abstract of the annual cultivation and revenue will shew the fluctuation during six years, and average tax on the land:—

### PUNJAH CULTIVATION.

YEAR,	Extent of Cultivation.	Amount of Teerws.	Average per Cawny.
	Cawnies.	S.P. F. C.	S.P. F. C.
Fusly 1211 - - - - -	3,15,377	71,206 41 13	— 9 38½
— 1212 - - - - -	3,24,585	52,670 14 3	— 8 48½
— 1213 - - - - -	3,30,562	69,880 25 62	— 8 70
— 1214 - - - - -	2,62,600	55,376 26 26	— 8 68½
— 1215 - - - - -	3,09,890	1,04,192 26 58	— 13 50½
— 1216 - - - - -	3,07,066	96,337 37 18	— 13 16
TOTAL - - - - -	- - -	4,49,665 3 20	—
Average - - - - -	- - -	74,944 7 43	— 10 35

36. It must here be remarked, that the assessment on nunjah land has undergone frequent alterations, since the acquisition of the province. It is not, therefore, possible to draw any conclusion, from the fluctuations in the revenue, as exhibited above: the nature of these changes will be noticed hereafter.

37. Nunjah Mail Punjah is a species of punjah cultivation carried on, in the stubble of paddy land, or on paddy land for which there is not sufficient water, to enable the occupier to sow that grain; but on which, availing himself of the moisture remaining in the ground, or of the water that may be at hand, which can be drawn by picotals to the fields, he is able to sow the best of the kinds of dry grain.

38. The extent and value of this kind of cultivation is shown hereunder:—

### NUNJAH MAIL PUNJAH.

YEAR,	Cultivation.	Revenue.	Average per Cawny.
	Cawnies.	S.P. F. C.	S.P. F. C.
Fusly 1211 - - - - -	17,267	14,598 18 30	— 35 4
— 1212 - - - - -	11,792	9,328 32 30	— 33 1½
— 1213 - - - - -	9,379	7,641 9 37	— 34 17½
— 1214 - - - - -	5,890	5,135 — 44	— 36 49
— 1215 - - - - -	14,135	16,828 7 45	1 8 —
— 1216 - - - - -	16,832	19,157 23 62½	1 5 64

39. The assessment on the nunjah mail punjah land, has also undergone various changes.

### VANPYAR LANDS, OR TOTECAL.

YEAR,	Cultivation.	Revenue.	Average per Cawny.
1211 - - - - -	4,516	10,973 3 23½	2 22 54½
1212 - - - - -	3,576	10,290 6 67	2 36 68½
1213 - - - - -	4,273	13,839 16 57	3 10 2
1214 - - - - -	4,233	11,919 24 72	2 34 43½
1215 - - - - -	4,456	13,724 18 35	3 41 —
1216 - - - - -	4,458	12,205 29 47½	2 28 77

40. *Vanpyer* land is the *totical*, or *garden* cultivation in backyards, or select spots cultivated with plantains, sugar cane, tobacco, chillies, &c. The extent is not great, but the assessment has recently been increased, and requires modification.

41. The *soornadayem*, or what is called the ready money collections, are independent of land, but are always classed under land revenue; they need not be separately stated. The following Statement exhibits the Revenue from Soornadayem and all the foregoing heads, from the province, for each year:—

Documents relating to Zemindary and Revenue Settlements.

Mr. Hodgson's Report on the Province of Tinnevely; 24 Sept. 1807.

STATEMENT of the Ordinary Revenue of the Province of TINNEVELLY.

	Fully 1811.	Fully 1812.	Fully 1813.	Fully 1814.	Fully 1815.	Fully 1816.
	S'P. F. C.	S'P. F. C.	S'P. F. C.	S'P. F. C.	S'P. F. C.	S'P. F. C.
Nunjah Proper -	3,65,791 35 64	3,36,553 34 71	3,59,226 40 30	2,79,004 19 78	3,29,279 8 53	3,60,558 38 62
Porooood Nunjah -	1,807 19 58	1,281 38 52	1,927 29 79	1,142 8 35	1,504 21 6	1,826 — 73
Total -	3,67,599 13 42	3,37,835 31 43	3,61,154 28 29	2,80,146 28 33	3,31,383 29 59	3,62,384 39 55
Nunjah Mail Punjah -	14,598 18 30	9,328 32 30	7,641 9 37	3,135 — 44	16,828 7 45	19,157 23 62½
Vanpyer land -	10,963 3 23½	10,290 6 67	13,834 16 37	11,919 24 78	15,724 18 55	12,205 29 47½
Punjah -	71,206 41 13	52,670 14 3	69,880 25 62	55,376 26 26	1,04,192 26 58	96,337 37 18½
Soornadayem -	68,523 19 —½	78,124 37 31	76,102 35 28	68,768 16 78	68,896 22 13	78,566 12 7½
Total -	5,32,891 11 36	4,88,249 38 14	5,28,613 31 33	4,21,346 13 19	5,37,025 20 70	5,68,554 16 31
Deshcawel -	27,561 20 22	24,832 26 58	38,224 19 4	28,082 6 —	- - -	160 37 5½
GRAND TOTAL -	5,60,152 40 58	5,10,882 40 58	5,66,838 8 37	4,49,428 19 19	5,37,025 20 70	5,69,316 11 36½

42. In the assessments under the head of Soornadayem, alterations have been made since the cession of the province to the Company; and in the last two years, an increase of the tax has taken place, which has given rise to a great number of complaints.

43. The following Statement will show the actual collections from the province of Tinnevely, for a long series of years. The remarks will explain the changes which, during that period, have occurred in the assessment by warum, by rent, or by extra taxes on the nunjah land; to which, being the principal object of investigation, it is confined:—

STATEMENT of the Revenue of the Province of Tinnevely, with the changes in the Nunjah Assessment, from A. D. 1738 to A. D. 1806.

Fully.	A. D.	MANAGER.	Annual Revenue Actually collected.	EXPLANATIONS.
			S'P. F. C.	
1148	1738	Not known.	Not known.	In the government of the Hindoos, it was not the custom to measure the land of the gross produce of every cottah. From four to five cottahs were paid to the circar in kind; and in some villages from 40 CP, 45 CP, and 50 CP per cottah of land, was collected in money. This assessment compared with the average price have been very low.
1149	1739	Budha Sahib.		
1150	1740	Dalawoy Comaradany.		The land was measured of 6½ cubits, instead of 7 cottahs of grain were required for every cottah of land watered by Tamrapany river, or under new digging watercourses; for lands watered by tanks, half the above, or 3½ cottahs for every cottah, was required. In some villages, the grain was commuted for money; in others not.
1151	1741	Appages Naick.	Not known.	
1152	1742	Dalawoy Comaradany.		
1153	1743	Moodaly.		
1154	1744	Aniver Cawn.	6,24,738 26 45½	

During



Documents relative to  
Landreary and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Mr. Hodgkin's Report  
on the Progress of  
Tinnevely, 24 Sept.  
1867.

Fuſy.	A. D.	M A N A G E R	Annual Revenue Actually Collected.		EXPLANATIONS.
			S' Rs	P. C.	
1155	1745	Meer Gholam Hufſam	5,96,246	34 29	During this period, 8 cottahs of the groſs produce was rendered for each cottah of land under regularly ſupplied watercourſes, and 4 cottahs for land under tanks, and 22 C <sup>t</sup> yawannah, or ice, was collected for iyapillah, the ma- nager's Sumperty. This is the origin of the yawannah.
1156	1746		5,01,360	33 7	
1157	1747		7,56,613	11 36	
1158	1748	Hufſain Mahomed Khan	6,56,809	18 69	Eight cottahs of produce was paid during this period, for 1 cottah of feed land, and the land was meaſured by a 7 cubit rod; 22 C <sup>an</sup> yawannah was paid.
1159	1749		4,24,522	33 65	
1160	1750		4,85,966	9 6	
1161	1751	Alum Khan	4,42,424	34 51	
1162	1752	Teetarapah Moodely	4,01,617	16 70	
1163	1753	Hundi Meyah	3,70,514	22 9	
1164	1754		3,69,515	5 14	
1165	1755	Maufoos Khan	4,39,442	17 66	
1166	1756	Dr Alagaraph Moodely	3,85,112	28 77	
1167	1757	Mahomed Ifoof Khan	3,53,786	— 18	
1168	1758		4,02,148	9 —	
1169	1759		4,69,139	16 15	
1170	1760	Mahomed Ifoof Khan	6,24,588	39 12	The portion to be given of the groſs produce, was the ſame as before, but the ready money taxes were increaſed; viz. yawannah as before, C <sup>t</sup> — 22
1171	1761		7,54,260	36 23	The Peſhcar's yawannah — 15 C <sup>t</sup>
1172	1762		6,91,646	34 42	Channel marah — — — 2½ d <sup>o</sup>
1173	1763		6,38,323	28 51	39½
					During this period, the rent was col- lected in money, according to the cur- rent prices.
1174	1764	Rajah Hockmit Ram	8,31,674	— 64	For each cottah of land, 8 cottahs of produce yawannah 37 C <sup>t</sup> , as before;
1175	1765		7,51,405	3 2	channel fees 2½; and nuzzer of 1½ C <sup>t</sup>
1176	1766		5,80,785	3 27	per 10 chuckrums. The grain was commuted for a money rent, according to the current price,
1177	1767		5,25,126	27 4	
1178	1768		4,96,827	7 13	
1179	1769		6,03,929	17 2	
					During this period, the circar took 60 per cent, the inhabitants receiving 40 per cent; the yawannah was ex- cused. Channel marah was collected in Fuſy 1180, at the rate of 2½ C <sup>t</sup> and nuzzer, at the rate of 1½ C <sup>t</sup> per 10 chuck- rums. This continued till Fuſy 1185. From Fuſy 1181 to Fuſy 1183, the cir- car grain was put on the inhabitants, and the value collected in money, ac- cording to the current price. The land was meaſured with a rod of 7½ cubits. From 1184 to 1185, the circar grain was partly forced on the inhabitants, at the rate of 2½ cottahs of grain, per cottah, at the rate of C <sup>t</sup> 2 p <sup>t</sup> cottah above the ſelling price. From 1186 to 1187, the circar grain was alſo in part forced on the inhabitants, but ac- cording to the ſelling price, at 2 cottahs per each feed cottah.
1180	1770	Shakemahommed Aly, for ſix months	4,47,900	16 73	
1181	1771	Syed Mahomed Khap	6,02,606	8 47	
1182	1772		6,28,199	2 78	
1183	1773		6,36,838	26 4	
1184	1774		6,86,853	22 15	
1185	1775		5,01,070	17 47	
1186	1776	Mahomed Ettabar	5,40,546	32 10	
1187	1777	Khan	4,10,887	43 2	
1188	1778	Tremalapah Moodely	5,60,380	20 26	
1189	1779	Allynawas Khan	4,23,772	2 24	
1190	1780	Delwoy Tremalapah Moodely	2,44,261	26 17	
1191	1781	Delwoy Tremalapah Moodely	2,16,610	18 40	
1192	1782	Mr. Irwin	3,16,348	25 39	
1193	1783		4,68,066	23 31	
1194	1784		5,17,789	1 31	
1195	1785		5,01,621	24 15	
1196	1786		4,93,048	28 57	
1197	1787	Mahommed Ettabar Khan	5,24,013	34 17	
1198	1788		5,64,010	20 29	
1199	1789		5,67,993	31 56	
1200	1790	Mr. B. Torin	5,34,644	34 4	
1201	1791		4,79,037	— —	

The circar, after deducting the ex-  
penſe of reaping, &c. allowed 50 per  
cent. to the inhabitants. The yawa-  
nah was ſettled at ½ cottahs of produce  
for one of land in karr; and in peſha-  
num, ½ cottah of produce for one cot-  
tah of land; and from 1198 Fuſy ½ C<sup>t</sup>  
per cottah of land was collected as ya-  
wannah; channel marah, 1½ C<sup>t</sup> per  
cottah; nuzzer ½ C<sup>t</sup>. During this pe-  
riod, the inhabitants were allowed 40  
per cent. deducting reaping, &c. ex-  
penſes.

Yawannah

Fully.	A.D.	MANAGER.	Annual Revenue Actually Collected.	EXPLANATIONS.
			S <sup>r</sup> P <sup>r</sup> . F. C.	
1202	1792	Mahommed Ettabar Khan	6,23,388 14 73	Yawanah $\frac{3}{4}$ C <sup>r</sup> per cottah.
1203	1793		7,06,344 8 15	Channel marah $\frac{3}{4}$ d <sup>o</sup> .
1204	1794		6,14,875 4 55	Nuzzer $\frac{1}{2}$ per 10 chuckrums.
1205	1795		4,74,644 13 71	In this period, after deducting the
1206	1796		4,35,498 28 7	charges of reaping, 50 per cent. warum
1207	1797	D <sup>r</sup> Ramafawmy Moodely Coopaniengar	4,30,129 16 25	was allowed to the inhabitants; and yawanah collected as follows:
				Karr produce $\frac{1}{2}$ cottah per cottah
1208	1798	Mahommed Jaffier Khan	4,41,923 10 5	of land; pesbanum $\frac{1}{2}$ cottah per
1209	1799		4,24,312 40 52	cottah of land; yawanah money,
1210	1800		4,71,289 17 56	$\frac{3}{4}$ C <sup>r</sup> per cottah.
				Channel Very $1\frac{1}{2}$ d <sup>o</sup> .
				Nuzzer - - $\frac{1}{2}$ d <sup>o</sup> per 10 chuck.
				The land was measured in Fully 1212
				with a rod of $7\frac{1}{2}$ cubits, and 50 per cent.
				allowed as warum to the inhabitants,
				after deducting reaping charges:
				Yawanah in grain:
				Karr $\frac{3}{4}$ cottah per cottah.
				Pesbanum $\frac{1}{2}$ d <sup>o</sup> - d <sup>o</sup> .
				In money:
				$\frac{3}{4}$ C <sup>r</sup> per cottah.
1211	1801	Mr. Lushington	5,11,027 36 73	Nautmahjan and Nuzzer 3 C <sup>r</sup> .
1212	1802	Mr. Parish	4,60,475 8 72	Mutteddy Tahereen - $\frac{1}{2}$ d <sup>o</sup> .
				Straw - - - $\frac{1}{2}$ d <sup>o</sup> .
				New Tax - - - $4\frac{1}{2}$ d <sup>o</sup> .
				Altogether - - - 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ .
				Channel marah - - - 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ .
				Nuzzer $\frac{1}{2}$ per 10 chuckrums.
				In Fully 1214, 50 per cent. was al-
				lowed, as warum, to the inhabitants of
				the several villages in the districts of
				Nellrambalum and Bramadashum, as
				they had before enjoyed only 40 per
				cent. The other demands continued
				the same.
1213	1803	Mr. Cochrane	5,17,005 39 14	
1214	1804		4,00,003 13 34	
1215	1805		4,87,220 17 5	

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44. An attempt has been made to explain the reason why the produce of the nunjah land has been found to have been so generally divided. It will now be observed, from the foregoing explanations, that the practice has not been often changed in this province, previously to the cession in July 1801. During the Hindoo government, which showed so much favour to the Bramins, the possessors of grants in the *Durmaseenum* lands were only required to render a given quantity of grain, and to pay a small sum of money for each cottah of land sown. This portion of grain, or the amount of the payment, may, perhaps, have been not much more than is paid by the proprietors of estates in Canara and Malabar, or it may have been less. The revenue of government from this province, tradition says, amounted, at one time, to only one-sixth of the gross produce. In the first years of the Mahomedan conquest, the grain proportion was 8 cottahs, and an extra tax in money, likewise was demanded. During the period of Mahommed Ifoof's management, and for a few years subsequent thereto, the grain rent was commuted for money, according to the market price; but this can hardly be called a rent; it was little more than making over the circar \* grain, as it was cut, to the inhabitants to sell, and collecting the amount of the sales from them. During part of the time Ifoof Khan was in charge of the province, the price of grain was high, and a large body of troops was in the country; the revenues are therefore, unusually high, in his management. Various changes in the warum and share, and in the extra demands, took place during a succession of Mahomedan managers from 1730 to 1780, till at length about 1781, the warum became fixed at 50 per cent. (with the exceptions of the period of the company's assumption in 1790) for all the *Durmaseenum* lands. The extra demands continued variable, sometimes being increased, and at others diminished. In the assumption of the Carnatic in the year A.D. 1783, when Mr. Irwin was collector, the land was rented, not by villages, but by mootahs. The same plan was adopted, during the year 1790, when Mr. Torin was collector; none of the inhabitants subrented to mootahdars, during the period of these rents.

45. In later periods, from 1793 to 1799 inclusive, the country has been under the management of the nabob, and the nunjah crops been divided with the inhabitants. From Fully 1210, the nabob rented out the districts to 7 mootahdars for three years, from Fully 1210 to Fully 1212 inclusive. From Fully 1211, the first year of the Company's government, to Fully 1215 inclusive, the same share, as allowed the inhabitants for the nunjah produce during the latter period of the nabob's management, has been continued; but the additional tax in money, has been increased, from an increased measurement of the land. During this period, the country has been nomi-

nally

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nally rented by villagers; I say nominally, because, in the first place, the car harvest has always been divided by the inhabitants, such part only as remained unfold at the time of forming the dowe, being added to the rent: in the next place, because the circar has always taken, in kind, about  $\frac{1}{3}$ ths of the circar share in the pehanum crop. The rents have never been concluded, before the end of February, and have sometimes not been finished, before the end of May; so that there has always been an aumanie management, for seven months; in one case, for nine months; and in two instances, for nearly eleven months; and although there has been a rent, sabbendy have annually been employed to superintend and estimate the pehanum crops, before permission has been granted to the cultivators to reap it.

46. It is not necessary to detail what must be the vexation, the trouble, and the loss, under such a system. The produce of the car harvest may be estimated, on an average, at cottahs 2,64,269. The harvest begins in the beginning of September, and continues, till the middle of December. During this period, it must happen, from the nature of the management, that the pehanum grain of the former year, has not been disposed of. The pehanum harvest begins about the latter end of January, and ends about the beginning of June. The time required to make the estimate of the car crop, and to send the accounts; the time required to examine those accounts, and to determine the price at which the car grain shall be sold, precludes the possibility of carrying on the sales, expeditiously.

47. At the time of forming the dowe accounts, in order to conclude the rent, there is then the whole of the pehanum crops, and much of the car, on hand. For example, the following Memorandum will show the amount of grain on hand, at the periods mentioned.

Remained on hand, as follows:

YEAR.	DATE.	CAR.	PECHANUM.
Fusly 1211	- - -	Cottahs cannot be ascertained here.	
1212	1st April	29,846 17 2	1,98,562 7 —
1213	} The accounts, are not at hand.		
1214			
1215	20th April	- - -	1,71,344 17 6
1216	30th April	19,732 9 6	2,07,042 1 —

48. When it is considered, that so large a quantity of grain, is thrown at once into the market, it will not create surprise that the revenue cannot be collected, within the Fusly, or that superabundance, and partial scarcities, should exist in one and the same year. Accordingly, it appears by the accounts, that the collections have been made in arrears, as follows:

	S. P.	£.	C.
Amount collected in Fusly 1212, on account of Fusly 1211	- - -	1,00,160	8 4
Amount collected in Fusly 1213, on account of Fusly 1212	- - -	1,32,060	41 42
Amount collected in Fusly 1214, on account of Fusly 1213	- - -	1,74,443	41 38
Amount collected in Fusly 1215, on account of Fusly 1214	- - -	1,40,928	41 69
Amount collected in Fusly 1216, on account of Fusly 1215	- - -	1,93,795	17 26

49. From the foregoing circumstances, it must be evident that the mode of management in the province of Tinnevelly, has been very little better than aumanie; that therefore, an immediate change, for a system of greater permanency, and of less annual vexation to the officers of government and to the people, is highly expedient.

50. Although the average produce of each nunjah village for a series of years, is procurable, if a field rent on nunjah land be deemed expedient, no account of the average produce of each field, can be obtained; the inhabitants must be left to assess the fields among themselves, or the assessments must be regulated by native revenue officers. In both cases, there is much injustice to one party, or to the other, to be apprehended, from partiality on the part of the head inhabitants, or corruption, or an excess of zeal on the part of the native revenue officers. These acts of injustice are difficult to remedy, even when discovered; and, if field rents should be fixed, with tolerable correctness, that part of aumanie management, which requires the annual extent of cultivation to be ascertained, still remains, with the difficulty of ascertaining the sorts of land of which the cultivation of each individual is regulated. For the detail of the inconveniences attending this annual scrutiny, I beg leave to refer to my report on Coimbatore.

It is not necessary that I should go into any detail on the subject of the assessment of land. The variations in the assessment have been very numerous, and do not, as yet, appear to have been revised, for the purpose of fixing them. In four districts, an assessment has been begun; but further experience has shown the necessity of a modification, before settling them fixed. During the latter part of the nabob's government, the whole of the land of a village, was generally given up for a fixed sum called *kulgootawa*, which sum the inhabitants divided among themselves on the lands they proposed to cultivate, or had cultivated. Under such an indefinite mode, various irregularities must have existed; these irregularities are only partially corrected. But, as the collector has found it expedient to make an immediate reference to the board of revenue on the subject, it is not necessary for me to give

give any detail of the changes the panjah assessment, has undergone. It will, I hope, be thought sufficient, if I state that frequent personal communication and investigations have produced an union of opinion on the subject; and that I concur in the recommendation made by the collector to the board of revenue.

52. The loomdayem taxes, and the taxes on trees, have also been investigated, and the nature of the reform to be submitted for the determination of the board of revenue, and of government, will be stated by the collector to the board of revenue. The amount \* of these taxes will, on reference to para. 41, be found to have been very considerable. They certainly partake, at present, of the nature of a professional tax; but may be easily modified to a definite quit rent, which may be made light, in comparison with the former tax. The people of Tinnevely have, already experienced the relief of an abolition of the customs and town duties, amounting to between thirty and fifty thousand star pagodas; and a proportion of them, will experience still further relief, by the proposed reduction of the panjah teerwa; and if that reduction produces an increase of cultivation, as is anticipated, the price of the dry grain will fall, and be a great relief to the manufacturing and labouring class of the community.

53. By an order of government dated it was directed, that all weavers working for the Company, should be exempted from the payment of loom tax or house tax, by which it was understood, that this relief should not extend to other weavers, not so employed. In the Salem district, all loom tax was, I believe, abolished, and a stamp duty on cloth, levied in lieu of it. In this district, in the present contracted state of the investment, those weavers who have no longer employment from the company, and little from others, are, by the foregoing interpretation, assessed with the loom tax as now existing in this district, because they are not working for the company. It seems desirable either that all should pay a defined quit rent, like other classes of inhabitants, or that all should be exempt. There are more weavers in this province, than the company are ever likely to find employment for, at one period. The demand will, therefore, always exist for employment, and no exemption is necessary to secure workmen for the company. Under the nabob's government, such an indulgence might have had a favourable effect.

54. It is now necessary to consider, whether the present mode of realizing the public revenue in this province, shall be continued; if not, what mode shall be established.

55. Under the explanations which have been given in the statement, showing the revenue for a succession of years, it will have been observed, that, in addition to the large share of the produce received in the first instance by government, various taxes have been levied, either in money or grain, from the inhabitants, on the panjah produce; viz.

Yawanah in grain,  
Do - in money,  
Paiskar's yawanah,  
Channel marah, and  
Nuzze.

56. Of these taxes, the yawanah in money, and in grain, still continue. The yawanah in money was levied upon each cottah of land cultivated; the size of the cottah differed, according to the size of the rod with which it was usual to measure the land. The demand still continues on the cottah; but as the number of cottahs has increased in account, by the uniform rod which was used in surveying the land in Pully 1212, the tax has increased, without any increase of benefit to the people, and forms an increased assessment, founded on no rule or principle, and which causes great complaints. It is desirable that this tax should be modified; and if government would, at the same time, grant the further indulgence of commuting the whole of the yawanah, which has, at all times, formed an unpopular impost on the people for a curru and tank marah, there is reason to be confident that the arrangement would prove of considerable relief to the people, and of great ultimate benefit to them and to government.

63. In this province, an ammanie management, a rent by villages, and a mootah rent, have all obtained, for a shorter or a longer period. The mootah rent under the management of Messrs. Irwin and Torin, although undertaken in a country just assumed for a temporary period, and during actual war in the Northern provinces, does not show an unfavourable appearance, compared with the revenue, at any other time. The village rent under Iffat Khan's management, and subsequent thereto, certainly exhibits a higher revenue than at any other period; but whether this is to be attributed to a more prosperous state of things, to Iffat Khan's energy, to extortion, or to the mode of rent, it is difficult to determine at this distance of time.

64. It is said, however, to have originated from the high price which grain bore, and number of troops at that time, in the province.

65. I have already remarked, that a considerable diminution of revenue must result from the establishment of a ryotwar rent on panjah land; that under ammanie, every ad high produce and low price, and low produce and high price, is turned to the advantage of government. Where individuals are to undertake these risks, much must be given to the reduction be made on each field, adequate to the securing the occupier from loss, under circumstances of variations in the produce and price. It is true that, as there is no panjah land in this province, than in Tanjore, there is a prospect that an extended cultivation might result from a low fixed rent in money on each panjah field, which would counterbalance the first loss; but if the necessary repairs be made to secure an abundant supply of water, which is in the contemplation of the collector immediately to undertake, little difficulty will exist of getting the land, now waste, cultivated under the terms of the present ryotwar.

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on the Ryotwar of Pun-  
jab, 1867.

Report on Cui-  
balout.

66. A survey is merely a measurement of the land; a measurement has been made in this province, of both the nunjah and punjah land; the survey is, therefore, complete. The produce of the nunjah has been divided with the inhabitants, for more than half a century, or the accounts of the gross produce preserved for that period; the value of the nunjah revenue is, therefore, as well known now, as an assessment by fixed rent on fields, can determine it. The punjah land has been classed as well as measured, and if the propositions submitted to the Board of Revenue by the collector, for modifying the rates of money rent on each class, be adopted, all the knowledge of the revenue of the country which can be obtained, will have been procured, and the only questions remaining for discussion will be,

1st. Is it desirable to continue any longer, the detail of collecting the punjah rent from each ryot, through the agency of native revenue officers?

2nd. Is it desirable to change the system of dividing the nunjah produce with the ryot, now obtaining, and which has obtained for so long a period, in order to establish a rent in money on each nunjah field?

67. It is necessary, first, to premise, that it does not follow that a field rent in money, must be introduced, to avoid the detail and mischiefs of auzanie management, or the circur dividing on the field the produce with the cultivators. It has been shown in a former report, that rents by villages, or rents by mootahs, are calculated, effectually, to prevent the necessity of recurring to that system.

68. It is presumed that great detail, as in ryotwar rents, must have some object; that it cannot be intended, for a permanent system. If the revenue of the country, with all its resources, has been ascertained by a detailed management for six successive years, the object of detail may be said, to have been effectually accomplished.

69. If the process laid down in Regulation XXVIII. A.D. 1802, for the collection of the revenue from the cultivators, and the forms required be referred to, and the severity of the law, when all the forms are gone through, be taken into consideration, they will demonstrate that the necessity of recurring to that law for the enforcement of payment, cannot, consistent with the permanent prosperity of the country, be entrusted to uninterested native revenue officers. A renter under a renewable lease, or a village renter, (I speak not of speculators in rent, for a short period) while they have the powers of the Regulation to controul the refractory, will not exert them, to persecute the unfortunate. A cultivator, against whom the rigours of the Regulation have been enforced, in the disquiet of his property, and confinement of his person, is a productive labourer lost to the estate, or to the village. The satisfaction obtained by payment in the person, which cannot be obtained from the purse, is a ruinous expedient to the proprietor of an estate in India, or to a village farmer, who has a valuable and transferable lease.

70. Regulation XXVIII. A.D. 1802, does not appear to have been compiled under the idea that the officers of government would, at any time, be in the situation in which proprietors or farmers are placed in, by that Regulation. Regulation XXVII. of the same year, is the Regulation by which the officers of government are supposed to collect the revenue, and in that regulation, it is contemplated, that the revenue will be received, either from proprietors, or farmers.

71. It is true, that although this Regulation is taken from the Bengal code, there does exist a species of ryotwar rent in two districts in Bengal, viz. in Sylhet and Chittagong. Such information as I possess of the state of those districts, and the difficulties the collectors experience in realizing the revenue, are here inserted.

#### Extract of a Letter from the Collector of Sylhet.

Para. 7.—“ Lastly, with regard to the petty talooks, the jummas of which do not exceed cawns + 10 per annum, the greatest part of which have proved unsaleable; it is necessary to explain, that these estates in general, are no more than bheets, or elevated spots by nature or art, upon which barrages, or habitations, have been erected by individuals following some mechanical profession, who go out to service, and are not constant residents of the place: such as artificers, bearers, boatmen, dandees, manglees, &c. These bheets, some of which have a trifling quantity of land attached to them, were assessed, and formed into separate talooks, at the time of the decennial settlement; as long as these talookdars, or, as they are termed, khoshabashan, continue on the spot, the revenues are punctually paid; but when they emigrate, to follow their different occupations, and are dispersed, their talooks fall into arrears, which cannot be well recovered by attachment, since there are no rents to be collected, and which, when exposed for sale, few or no individuals appear inclined to purchase; since every person, almost, has his own barrer, or home, and may not find it convenient to alter his place of abode, without necessity, or some particular view. In the mean time the family of the talookdar, if he has any, retire, leaving an empty bheet, with some empty hut upon it; the proceeds of which, if separately sold, would scarcely pay the *reputation of a person*.

In the address above alluded to, I find that I had omitted to state one principal cause of the irreconcilable disputes of the inosul proprietors. A talook, which probably pays a jumma of cawns, 100 per annum, and often is registered in my books, in the name of a single proprietor, whilst in the inosul there are no less, perhaps, than 5 payeees, shirecks, or copartners, by right of co-ownership of the lands, who are all, in the actual possession of their respective raddas, or portions of lands. They usually collect the rents from the ryots of their own lands, and pay their revenue, in the established proportion, to the ostensible proprietor aforesaid, who discharges the same to, and receives a receipt in the name of, the talook, as publicly registered, from

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"from the tehsildar. It often occurs, that these copartners quarrel amongst themselves, when some of them, are alternately dispossessed by each other; the payment of their respective quota is immediately suspended, and, if the arrears be not recovered in time by attachment, the estate is brought to a sale, if not reduced at last to ruin: for no ryots feel inclined to settle upon, or cultivate the lands of a talook, which is so warmly disputed by the occupants. The first action such occasions, on the part of the person who has signed the settlement, is to seize the ryots of his copartners, and to demand the rent on the grounds of the estate being registered, in his name; the farmer, having given no engagements to him, thinks proper to decline, and at last absconds. When estates in this predicament, are attached, some of the copartners, or their ryots, frequently prefer vexatious complaints, as in a recent instance in the sonjedarry adawlut, and cause the tehsildar, or kooruckdar, to be summoned, to the great detriment of the public service, and their individual annoyance. In such cases, I think it my duty immediately to instruct the tehsildar to attach the lands, by which measures, although the dues of government are generally realized, the evil is not remedied, nor is the estate benefited."

72. The collector of Chittagong states, "The Regulations, in my opinion, are not calculated to realize the public demand, with promptitude and facility, from the petty zemindars of this district. The minute subdivisions of the landed property in this province, arising from the prescriptive right which the occupants have enjoyed, since the formation of the first jumabundy by Mr. Verelst, of transmitting their lands by inheritance, mortgage, or sale, and from the recognition of that right in the practice of the dewanny adawlut since its first institution, has fixed a value on real property here, which is not attached to it in other parts of Bengal, and has given existence to a numerous body of landholders, unknown elsewhere; they feel themselves confirmed by custom, and a series of precedents of the civil courts, as the actual proprietors of the soil; of even the smallest portion into which land can be divided. Secure in their possession, and independent, they despise control; and in general, only pay their revenue, when convenient to themselves; if recourse be had to attachment, the concomitant expense is excessive, in proportion to the arrear and value of the estate; and it has been found ineffectual to adopt the system of distraining their personal property, as it is only productive of causing the elopement of the defaulters and concealment of their effects; all depositions, therefore, made with a view to the distraint and sale of personal property, tend only to harass the incumbents, without any real advantage to government. As these zemindars in general, follow their own ploughs, and are the immediate cultivators of the soil, they differ only in name, from inferior tenantry, and therefore might be rendered subservient to the same rules; and it would contribute much to the punctual collection of the revenue, if the collector of this district was authorized, without any previous application to the dewanny adawlut, to proceed against defaulting proprietors, whose annual revenue may be under 50 rupees, in the same manner as he is authorized, by section 25 of Regulation VII. 1799, to proceed against the untenants of an estate that may become subject to a khas collection on the part of government."

"The proprietors of land in this province complain, that the rule of attachment and sale is severer than personal restraint, upon a principle, that temporary coercion is less oppressive than inevitable ruin; and I am of opinion, that there should be some gradation of punishment; for although the arrears are, in most instances, ascribable to want of good faith on the part of the landholders, immediate attachment, which is generally accompanied with ruin, is a punishment disproportioned to the crime."

73. That any consideration of commiseration, arising from self interest, can ever enter the breast of a native revenue officer, is hopeless. That a collector can enter, although more alive than a native officer to the distress of individuals, into the particular misfortune of each, in an unfavourable season, in an extensive district, is a vain expectation. Those who know the native character, know well, that all who complain, have not always injuries to complain of; that a readiness to listen to complaints, produces an accumulation of representations of imaginary grievances.

74. To discriminate, therefore, between those who ought to come under the penalties of Regulation XXVIII. and those who ought not, would be impracticable on the part of the collector; and could not, with safety or justice to the individuals, be entrusted to a native revenue officer.

75. Under a rent of the nature above described, or in a village rent, the individual cultivator would be secured, by the courts of justice, from the oppression of his equals; this oppression has been one of the principal arguments, in favour of field rents. His interest of the rest of the community in a village rent, or of the renter of against being driven to the extremity of distress, even if the ties of relationship, or ship, should obtain no claims on the humanity of the head villagers.

76. The situation of a cultivator, therefore, in seasons of calamity, or in individual distress, must be better under a village rent, or under a mootah rent, than under a war rent. Of this there is strong proof in the last unfavourable season, in every province where either of those modes of rent have prevailed.

77. Without quoting the authority of the best-informed and most celebrated authorities to show that intermediate agents are productive of no mischief, but of much good, in all the transactions of life, whether in revenue or commerce; they are known to exist in every country which can be said to be in a state of prosperity in its manufactures, commerce, and agriculture.



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the Ryot and Ryot  
and Settlements.

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\* I know of no other ground of apprehension, or of any inducement that a proprietor of an estate can have, to resist the authority of government.

78. If by creating proprietors of landed estates, an apprehension be entertained that we shall rear a race of poligars, who will rebel against the government; the apprehension must be accompanied by a belief, that the government have appointed courts of justice, which will not be able to enforce their decrees, or to punish crimes; that the weakness of the government will always be equal to the weakness of the native governments which produced poligar independence and revolt. Does not the history of this country, as well as that of every other, show, that the subject, whether a baron, a poligar, or the head of a banditti, or any terms of similar import, were only lawless, when the government was weak? It will not be said that the persons who will become renters, or mootahdars, have been bred up like poligars, in independence, in a false sense of their own importance, or will have had their imaginary bravery excited to seek martial fame, by the exaggerated, but constantly recited deeds of valour, of their ancestors.

79. That we have had rebellious poligars, and turbulent zemindars, is true; but it does not appear to me a natural conclusion, that, by creating mootahdars or proprietors, we are adding to the number of this description of persons. Till very lately,

† A man who had his hand and foot cut off for thieving, or suspicion of theft, by the Wootacettah poligar, about 10 years ago, came lately to represent a civil complaint of a depredation of his office of cawelgar to the collector. This is only one of many instances.

‡ The southern poligars were in open rebellion several times under the Hindoo, Mahomedan, and English government; besides acts of individual contumacy, before the just punishment of their crimes fell on them.

the poligars of many of the smallest tracts of country exercised not only civil but criminal jurisdiction within their pollums. The services, as well as the lives of their subjects (as they may be called) were at their disposal; the punishment of rebellion or murder never fell on the agent, seldom on the principal. Now, both are liable to punishment, and the experience of every day must convince them, that the period of crimes going unpunished is past. So far then from the poligar giving waste lands for peons on service tenure, he is much more likely to give waste land, like the mootahdar, for revenue, and to commute his service land for a payment in money, because he has no longer any service, for his peons to perform. It is not, therefore, in my humble opinion, at all probable, that the creation of mootahdars

will rear a new race of poligars; on the contrary, there is every reason to think that the present poligars will become peaceful subjects and frugal landholders, through the force of example set them by the new mootahdars, of obedience to the laws, and of justice, in their transactions with individuals.

80. The inhabitants in every district would, no doubt, prefer an aumanie division of the produce; but it is admitted that such a system cannot, with safety, be adopted for any length of time. They can, however, under Regulation XXX, obtain their share in kind from a mootahdar, if unwilling to rent. In a village rent, the community will most probably club the share of government for the payment of the public revenue; they will, therefore, under that system of rent, have their full share, more than their share, or less than their usual share, according as the circumstances of the rent, or the season, or the price of grain, may operate to diminish, or increase, the extent and value of the share of the grain they have contracted to rent.

81. It has been before remarked, that in field rents, a ryot must sell his grain almost as soon as he reaps it, in order to procure money to pay his rent; that he cannot afford to wait for a market. This must also be the case with a village rent, to a certain extent. In some villages, they may have the means of advancing the kilns, and of keeping their grain for a better market; a mootahdar, whether he manages his estate by aumanie, or by subrents, will always find it to his advantage to advance the rent from his own resources, to secure himself leisure to dispose of his grain, or to collect his rent from his subrenters.

82. The chief objection which the inhabitants of this province would probably urge to taking their villages in rent, would be, the difficulty they would experience in disposing of their produce, for money. The observations which have been made in para. 48. on the present mode of management, and its effects on the grain market, will show, that it is difficult to determine whether the objection would be well founded or not.

83. That the grain market has never been free for many years, is certain; the circular has always had grain of its own in store, and constrained the markets; the system of a village rent on doyle, has also impeded the regular supply of the market, or overstocked it. The collector finds it difficult, at this period, to sell the remaining grain of the pethanum crop. The new crop is now cutting. The price of the grain is fixed at the time of forming the doyle; it will be difficult at that period to fix, for several months, what is liable to fluctuate in every

result of my inquiries have proved, that a very small proportion of the produce of this district is exported, either by sea or by land; on the contrary, that, in unfavourable seasons, rice is sometimes brought from Travancore. The price of paddy, in Travancore, may be fixed at 28 star pagodas per garce, which is, deducting expense of carriage into rice, between 60 or 70 star pagodas per Madras garce for rice; in the present season, even supposing boats could have been procured, which was not practicable, the grain of this province, could not have been imported into Madras, at the rate allowed by the Government, it would have cost, when landed at Madras, from 110 to 120 star pagodas per garce, without making any allowance for wallage.

84. From the foregoing circumstances it is clear, that the produce in grain of this province, is all consumed on the spot; but whether a village rent, or a mootah rent, is calculated to reduce the price of grain, or to increase it, it is difficult to decide. It is probable that there would be, under a village rent, an increased number of sellers, at all times in the mar-

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on the Province of Tin-  
nevelly; 24 Sept. 1807.

ket, which would decrease the price of grain; but, supposing this result to be admitted, and that an allowance should become necessary to village renters, in consequence of their representation on this head, still a village rent on lease, with this deduction, appears to me likely to be more productive; because the loss by wastage, theft, and neglect, while the grain remains under charge of the native officers of government, must be considerable, and would be so much saved to the village renters; while a diminution of charge, would result to government under such a rent, equivalent, or nearly so, to any reduction which it might be necessary to make, for a reduced price of grain.

86. In this province, there is not the same cause for rejecting mootahdars, as exist in Tanjore; the same inducements to deprive individual ryots of their right of occupancy does not prevail; land is not so desirable a property here, as in Tanjore; the same security has not existed; the acts of violence and plunder of the southern poligars are not yet forgotten. There can be no danger of a monopoly either, if there be no interference on the part of government in fixing the price of grain, and a free transit is allowed into, and from, all the surrounding countries. If the inhabitants be willing to rent their village, there is no great objection to a village rent. I certainly give a preference to a mootah rent, but am not so zealous an advocate for that system, as to wish to see it introduced, contrary to the wishes of the people; but I feel a conviction which I have stated, and which has been confirmed by observation, that the true interest of the people, and of government, is best secured and provided for, by this mode of management. Under any opinion of the superior merits of either of these modes of rent, a general concurrence will, I imagine, be given to the opinion, that a detailed ryotwar rent, where the revenue and resources of a country have been ascertained, and where courts of justice have been established for the protection of all ranks of people from oppression and injustice, cannot be longer expedient or necessary.

87. Under the impression of the foregoing sentiments, I beg leave to recommend, that the collector of the province of Tinnevelly may receive authority to enter into engagements with the inhabitants for the rent of their villages, on a lease for a period of years, or, in the event of their declining to undertake the responsibility of a rent, with mootahdars. The lease should not fall short of three, but had better be for five years. There is no want of accounts in this province, on which to regulate the terms of the lease.

88. If the proposition of letting out the country to mootahdars be thought preferable,

I should recommend that the estates be not of less value than 5,000, not higher than 15,000, according as local circumstances may appear advisable; the lease to be transferable, and renewable, at the expiration of the first lease; the term to be not less than five years: three years, is too short a period for the mootahdars to make arrangement with the inhabitants, to settle their accounts, to sell their grain, and to collect their balances.

89. It is absolutely necessary that a system of village rents, or of mootah rents, should be resorted to, previously to the introduction of a permanent system immediately following a ryotwar rent. The moderation, or otherwise, of a field assessment in all seasons, cannot otherwise be determined. A ryot cannot, under a ryotwar rent, seek for a low assessment in a neighbouring village, if that in his own village should be high; because the same principle of rent has extended over the whole district, and the native officers assist each other, in sending back emigrants. The introduction of mootahdars induces a consideration of the best means of improving his estate; and a reduction of the circar teerwa often presents a ready resource. All mootahdars must do the same, to a certain extent, or a part of their ryots will leave them, and resort to the low-assessed mootahs. Under mootahdars, therefore, there is a demand for ryots. This demand must be favourable to them, and not injurious, in the end, to the mootahdars; because a great increase of cultivation may result, from the increased energy given to the labours of the people by this reduction.

90. Under a ryotwar rent there is no demand, no competition for the labour of a ryot; he cultivates only what he pleases, and the inducement for him to extend his cultivation must depend, on the success of the past year. The rent is naturally, under a ryotwar rent, collected with less attention to the situation of individuals, for reasons already given, than it is, under a mootah rent. The average, therefore, of collections from a ryotwar rent for a period of years, is not such satisfactory data by which to determine a permanent rent, as the result of the experience of what mootahdars have paid, compared with what has been collected under a ryotwar rent. More estates have been advertised for sale in Salem, Diudigul, and the Rayachoti, all districts on a ryotwar rent, before they were permanently settled, than have been advertised in the Janger, Mugletore Havelly, Vizagapatam Havelly, Ganjam Havelly, Masulipatam Havelly, where rents by mootahs, or by villages, had been customary, and ryotwar rents had not been known.

“ Ryotwar rents have, as yet, been introduced only in countries yielding dry grain, and having much waste land. In a country where there exists so great a quantity of waste land, so far from being an object of request, it must be considered by the circar to be a cultivation which who consider rather that they than receiving a favour, in the

From collector of Coimbatore  
November 1807.

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war Settlements.

Mr. Hodgson's Report  
on the Province of  
Dindigul, 28 March  
1808.

Extract FORT ST. GEORGE Revenue Consultations,  
the 10th August 1808.

Extract Mr. HODGSON'S REPORT on the Province of DINDIGUL; dated 28th March 1808:

Para. 5. THE whole lands of a province in India, whether cultivated, arable, waste, jungle or hills, have been from time immemorial apportioned to a particular village; so that all lands are within the known boundary of some village. The total boundary of all the villages of a province, forms the whole landed surface of that particular province.

6. The villages in Dindigul are distinguished by the terms "Circar village," and "Pollaput;" the former, denoting that no other intermediate agency existed for the receipt of the circar share of the produce or revenue, than the immediate officers of the circar; the latter, denoting an alienation of the revenues of entire villages, and the transfer of their revenue jurisdiction to individuals, styled poligars, either for a feudatory or cawel service, or a tribute called *peshcush*, this tribute being less than the circar share of the produce in proportion to the service to be rendered by the feudatory poligar, or the cawelgar. Independent of the pollams, the poligars frequently held cawelly mauniams in the circar villages. These poligars had, at the time of the transfer of the villages, no property or occupancy in the land, and seldom assumed any; the most cultivated villages, and the most jungly or frontier situations, were frequently assigned to poligars for cawelly service. They sometimes had a *kummatum*† of their own, either to increase their resources, or for the purpose of rearing a superior kind of grain for domestic use. They sometimes had the power to compel the inhabitants of the circar villages to cultivate their mauniams, in preference to the circar lands. This happened, when the government was weak; and poligar power strong. The peons, they were under their tenure obliged to maintain, either for purposes of external war, or internal police, had land assigned to them, for a proportion of their pay. An assignment of land, when the desolate state of most of the pollams is considered, the poligar could easily make, without ejecting any of the original cultivators; if ejectment by force, was ever practised, it was always considered an act of injustice. It follows then, that the transfer of villages to form a pollam‡, was no more than the assignment of a certain portion of the government revenue of those villages to an individual, for particular purposes, in preference to giving monthly pay. The practice of assigning the revenue of land for the payment of service, was universal in India. It was practised, as well for the maintenance of fighting men, for the endowment of religious establishments, in provision of the expense of the kitchen, as for the payment of the betel bag carrier; as well in reward of civil and military services, as for the support of concubines.

7. The number of villages in Dindigul, are as follows:

	Circar Villages.	Pollam D <sup>e</sup> .
Mouza - - -		
Muzrahs - - -		
Total - - -		

8. In the villages of Dindigul, the same internal policy is found, as in other provinces. A certain portion of the inhabitants holding the title of *Nautemar gours*§, or *mahajens*, are in the enjoyment of a portion of the land rent free, and are the hereditary occupiers of the remainder, certain principal officers, such as the curnum (or register accountant of the revenue affairs of the village) ironsmith, carpenter, barber, washerman, village watcher, potmaker,

that the inhabited place where the servile class and where many husbandmen reside, is named village, and it is situated in the midst of fields and woods. Thus, on all sides of the villages, there are the fields, and round this again, should be the fields. The residence of priests, soldiers, and merchants, is best in the open air, and that is intimated in a preceding chapter of the Hindoo Law, vol. 2. p. 351.

§ These men watch and protection from thieves and

¶ *Kummatum* is the name used to designate the farming stock of an individual, such as his ploughs, bullocks, slaves or servants.

‡ So the *Ramnad Polam* or *Zemindarry* was granted to

the ancestors of the present family, with the title of *Sethaputris*, for the defence of the road, and protection of pilgrims resorting to the sacred pagoda at *Ramanwarum*; and to most of the southern poligars, for keeping up a certain body of men for the defence of *Madara*, and for the havelly of certain tracts of country. So, the western zemindars of *Venentagharry*, *Calcutty*, and *Bomaraust*, at no distant period, were made *maharajahs* of the *Mogul* empire and established in the countries they now hold, on the condition of performing military service, and having a body of troops always ready to attend the summons of the emperor.

§ These titles vary in different provinces. *Mahajens*, *Potahs*, *Guramans* are designations of the same nature. ¶ I use the word hereditary, to prevent any misunderstanding respecting the word "proprietor."

potmaker, dancing girls, nurguaty, or distributor of water, &c. Sometimes all, and more than those enumerated, are found in each village; sometimes, only a portion of them. They have the circar produce of a portion of the land assigned them for their livelihood, but no claim to cultivate the land; from the occupation in life of many of the incumbents, it may be imagined they seldom had the wish: a portion of the produce is given to them in addition, both from the grain in ear, and from the heaps when thrashed. It is after these deductions, variously denominated, but existing in each province, that the produce of paddy land is divided with the circar, or the cultivator is allowed to remove the harvest from dry grain land.

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Extract Mr. Hodgson's  
Report on the Province  
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9. These deductions, generally denominated *sotuntrums*, are stated to have been prior to our acquisition of Dindigul, 61 in every 100 of the gross produce, leaving 39 to be divided between the circar and cultivator. In 1794, these deductions were estimated at 40 in the 100, leaving only 60 to be divided\*: This would give the circar - - - - - 30

Ryots	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
Sotuntrum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
Total Ryot share	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70

100.

10. But in latter years, they were regulated at about 12 in the 100; leaving 88 per cent of the gross produce, for division, share and share.

11. In Dindigul, the produce of paddy was always, before our acquisition of the province, divided after deducting the allowances in kind above referred to, between the cultivator and the circar in equal portions, and received by the circar in kind. I have found the practice of dividing the produce of paddy land, to have been general in all the districts I have visited, prior to the introduction of the system of ryotwar rent, or a fixed field rent in money. This practice continued in Dindigul till the establishment of the survey, and introduction of field rents in Fusly 1210, or A.D. 1800.

12. The circar of Hyder and Tippoo generally took the whole circar share from the paddy land, in kind, and seldom made it over for a money payment to the villagers. Under the company's government, since the conquest in 1792, to the establishment of field rents in 1799-1800, the villagers were generally contracted with, to take the circar share, or a portion thereof, for money, and the rest was received into store. At one time, the district was rented by divisions, composed of several villages, to one man. When this mode of realizing the circar share was adopted, the villagers were at liberty to take their share in kind, or to contract with the renter to take the whole produce, paying him a value agreed on, for the circar share. This system is favourable to the cultivator, when redress from exaction is obtainable; because it leaves him, without risk or responsibility.

13. The share of the circar, or the produce of dry grain land in Dindigul, was, before our acquisition of the province, received always in money, at so much for a given quantity of land of a given quality; the rates of assessment to the quality of the land, and the extent of the land measure differed in each village, or if not in all, in a very large proportion of them; the nominal extent of the land was generally exceeded by the actual extent; and although the denomination of the rod used to measure the land, might be the same in each village, the number of inches to the foot or feet to the rod, and size of the foot, differed in many. It was by this intricacy, and by these indulgencies, that the arbitrary imposts of despotic rulers were evaded, or rendered less oppressive. An order might be issued to increase the assessment, and the revenue officer might obey, to outward appearance; but if he was sensible the increase would not be collected, or was bribed to betray his trust, he allowed a favourable rate of measurement. This once granted, became *mamool*, and would always be claimed as a right.

14. It is not I imagine possible, otherwise to account for the increase in Dindigul of the assessment on certain dry grain lands, called ghitty, during Syd. Suheb's management, from 6½ cully fanams per cooley, to 16½ cully fanams; being at once more than 100 per cent.

15. The mode of collecting the revenue from dry grain land, thus described, continued till the introduction of the survey; and where the villages were rented to the villagers, was productive of no inconvenience; they knew what each ought to pay, and settled the portion of rent among themselves. When the villages were consolidated, and several, given to a renter in farm, he might experience difficulty, in ascertaining his right, and in collecting his rents, from this intricacy of assessment; but the circar, suffered none. The survey and assessment, established an uniform land measure, and an uniform rent, varying with the variations in the soil, to the extent of a given number of sorts. This was no great change on the dry grain land, on former custom; it was still collecting the tax in ready money, in lieu of a share of the produce of those lands. This change, provided the new rates of a uniform land measure, bore the same proportion to each other that the old rates bore to the old land measure; might not be unjust, or might even leave a larger share to the ryot: if they did not bear the same proportion, there must have been, either an over-

I am inclined to think this must have been an error, or it was evidently a fraud.

Note. In Puddalore excepted. See my Report on that province, dated 1805. It was so, in

Burampah, S. D. Arcot,  
Cumbalur, N. D. Arcot,  
Nellore, Annapuram,

Mysore,  
Trichinopoly.

Ceded Districts.

It is so, in

Tanjore, Zilla Tanjore,  
Tinnevely, Zilla Chingleput,  
Mysore,

It is so, in Mysore.



"would have, to purchase a proprietary right, in what prescription had already made their own."

"The Nautumcars certainly consider the farm they cultivate, as their own property; and no government, save the Mussulman, appears to have considered the soil, its own, or itself, at liberty to deprive the inferior subject at its will. In forming the present benevolent system, this solitary precedent, surely, will not operate as an example to act upon; but where no written document is found, what has been known as usage, will be established as law: this would confirm the prescriptive right of many industrious natives to the lands they have long occupied, and be the certain means of making them comprehend, whence their advantages were derived."

34. The foregoing reasoning is equally applicable to the Nautumcars and Gours of Dindigul, or rather to the *Puttookut* ryots, as they were denominated prior to the survey.

35. It was not at that period known, and I regret much to say, is not now generally admitted, that two rights could, under the words "proprietary right," in the Regulations, exist; that the cultivators could possess, one right, and the zemindars, another; yet both be distinct rights. It was argued, that the words "proprietary right," so frequently used in the Regulations, and so formally confirmed by Sumad Mulkit Istemur on all zemindars, hereditary or by purchase, was an unlimited right; that is, an undefined power, or a power to be exercised, according to the direction of the proprietor, over all the land of the zemindary or estate. It is declared to be inconsistent with "proprietary right," that the proprietor should be guided by any other rule than his own will, in demanding his rent; and emigration, under this interpretation, is admitted to be the only relief from an excessive rent. This mode of reasoning would not, perhaps, have gained so much ground, if it had been within the means of all, to have obtained the perusal of the interesting discussions on the subject, between the Right honourable Marquis Cornwallis and Sir John Shore, the Bengal Regulations, and the proceedings of the board of at Madras, on proposing the introduction of the permanent system. If general access to these documents could have been obtained, or means had been taken to circulate them, or at least the part which bears on this subject; it would have been distinctly seen, that the first principle of the permanent system was, to confirm and secure the rights of the cultivators of the soil. To confirm and secure, are the terms which must be used, because no new rights were granted, or any doubt entertained upon the following leading features of their right; viz.

1<sup>st</sup>. That no zemindar, proprietor (or whatever name be given to those persons) was entitled by law, custom, or usage, to make his demands for rent, according to his convenience; or in other words,

2<sup>d</sup>. That the cultivators of the soil had the solid right, from time immemorial, of paying a defined rent, and no more, for the land they cultivated.

3<sup>d</sup>. This right is inherent, in all the cultivators; from the most northern parts of India, to Cape Comorin. I shall have occasion hereafter to show, how the right came to be of more or less value in different parts of the Indian empire.

37. The "proprietary right" of zemindars, in the Regulations, is therefore no more than the right to collect from the cultivators, that rent which custom has established, as the right of government; and the benefit arising from this right is confined, first, to an extension of the amount, not of the rate of the customary rent by an increase of cultivation;—secondly, to a profit in dealings in grain, where the rent may be rendered in kind;—thirdly, to a change from an inferior to a superior kind of culture, arising out of a mutual understanding of their interest, between the cultivator and proprietor.

38. Such is my interpretation of zemindary proprietary right; and such it stands proved to be, in all the documents I have referred to.

39. Paley, in his Philosophy, defines property in land, to be a power to use it, and to exclude others from it.

40. Much has been said of the boasted proprietary right of the owners of private estates in Canara, and in Malabar, and elaborate disquisitions of the superior and inferior rights of the *jehmkar*, *chalie gueny* † and *mool gueny* of Canara, have been entered into to prove, that we should do an act of injustice, in selling the proprietary right in the lands of Canara, as we have done elsewhere. When this is argued, proprietary right is understood as an unlimited right, and the analogy between our *Canatchkar* § *oolkoodies*, *oul pya koodies*, with *jehmkar*, *mool gueny* and *chalie gueny* is disputed.

41. When

\* Note.—The *Puttookut* Ryots were considered the hereditary owners of the land, and responsible for the revenue. There were other descriptions of Ryots in each village called *Vellala*, *Yerandus*, and *Poodugoodies*.

† Note.—By the ancient system of India, the situation of a ryot was much superior to that of a tenant at will; nor was he subject to arbitrary exactions at the pleasure of the zemindar, while he continued to pay the rent, and fulfil the conditions to which, by the custom of his village, he was bound. He could not legally be dispossessed; and if cases authorised by the government or by the usage of the district, were demanded, the Courts of the capital, as well as those of the province, were open to his complaints; for the protection of the cultivators of the soil was described as the first duty and often became the first subject of the magistrate.

Even in the views of this system, traces of its principles are easily discerned; for among the numerous settlements

that now burden the lands of the ryots, a tax, called the original rent, invariably takes the lead, and the semblance of governing the rates by which the branches of the land tax are determined, is seen in 1786.

‡ Note.—*Gueny* - - - - - tenant.  
*Chalie Gueny* - - - - - tenant at will.  
*Mool Gueny* - - - - - tenant for years.

§ Note.—*Canatchkar*, or possessor, proprietor, and *oolkoodie* - - - - - fully answer to each other.  
*ool pya koodies* - - - - - is the tenant for years, and is the cultivator of a village, and out property.  
*Pyakoodie* - - - - - means a stranger, or engaging for a term, being the tenant at will.

Where the *Canatchkar* is mortgaged, there will be a fourth description of persons answering to

Documents relating to Zemindary and Ryot war Settlements.

Extract Mr. Hodgson's Report on the Province of Dindigul; 22 March 1808.



Documents relative to  
Zemindarry and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Extract Mr. Hodeson's  
Report on the Province  
of Hindugul; 20 March  
1808.

41. When I assert, that in no part of our territories in India, are the lands cultivated by hired labourers paid by the government, or by its slaves, I do not fear contradiction; when I assert, that by far the largest portion of the territory of India is cultivated, either by slaves or hired labourers, I am as little afraid of the position being denied me. If then, these slaves and hired labourers who drive the plough, are not in the pay of the government, by whom are they paid? They are paid by a description of persons, whose denomination varies with the variation in the local language, and whom we know, under the general term of cultivator, or ryot. In many parts of India besides Canara, I assert, with as little fear of contradiction, that where a Bramin has the property in the land, which the laws of his religion do not allow of his cultivating with his own hands, three descriptions of persons subsist on the produce of land:

1<sup>st</sup>. The Bramin.

2<sup>d</sup>. The shudra, who undertakes to cultivate the Bramin's property, and to pay him for it a rent in kind.

3<sup>d</sup>. The slave or hired labourer, who assists the shudra.

42. Again: the government in India no where finds the seeds, the implements of husbandry, or cattle for the plough. The government has never been in the practice of granting leases for rent; and leases for land, are, in India, distinct subjects. The collection of the rent of a village, of a number of villages, of a talook, or of a province, has usually been granted on lease; but we no where find that the cultivators, each and all, ever held leases for their particular fields. In most instances, the land is not even a separate property of each individual, but the joint property of the society of the village, and held in shares; the occupation of the lands being changed, by casting of lots at stated periods, but always in the fixed shares.

43. It must then, I think, be admitted, that the circar or government, or the representatives of government, the zemindars, never could have been the absolute proprietors of the soil.

44. The property in land, of those who cultivate the soil in Canara, or the proprietors of the private estates, as they are frequently called, is represented to be of the most valuable kind; because the land pays a fixed rent, and because it can be sold and mortgaged.

45. It appears from the records of the Board of Revenue, previously to the conquest of the province of Canara by Hyder Ally Khan, it was divided into small estates, considered the actual property of the holders, assessed at a fixed and moderate rate; that on his taking possession, Canara was an highly improved country, filled with industrious inhabitants who enjoyed greater advantages than their neighbours, above the Ghauts; but that the system of management, subsequently introduced, had impoverished it, and greatly reduced the population.

46. Now I would ask, if this description will not apply to every part of India, and whether the system of management introduced at one period or another, by Hindoo or Mussulman rulers, has not impoverished, at one period or another, more or less, every province of India? If this be admitted, I deduce the following conclusions; viz. that land will be, and is, more or less valuable; first, where arable land is scarce or abundant; secondly, where the assessment is high or low.

47. In Canara the standard assessment (for every province in India has its standard) was at one period, very low; an addition was however made to this standard, during the government of the Hindoo rajahs and rajah of Byjnugger and Bednore; a further addition was made by Hyder Ally Khan; and a still further by Tippoo Sultaun: so that when the British government gained possession of the province, the rent, as established by the antecedent rulers, was nearly double the *reka*, or standard rent.

48. "Had such an assessment," observes Colonel Mauro, "as that introduced by Hyder and Tippoo, existed in ancient times, Canara would long ago, have been converted into a desert; in a country so rocky and uneven, where cattle are not only scarce, but even where they are to be had, cannot always be employed; where every spot, before it can be cultivated, must be levelled, with great labour by the hand of man; the expense of the first preparation of waste ground, must have been so great, that it never could have been attempted, unless the assessment had been extremely moderate; and even after land has been brought into cultivation, if it is neglected for a few years, it is soon broken up by deep gullies formed by the torrents which fall during the monsoon."

It is, I think, demonstrated from the foregoing extract, that the two causes above viz. a scarcity of arable land, and a low assessment, constitute the value of private property in Canara. Contrast with this, the state of things in the provinces of Coimbatore, in the districts, in Salem, or any of the countries which I have classed, as dry grain districts, in

49. The Bramin share in kind, varies from 50 to 60 per cent. of the gross produce, after deducting *Syatuntrams* for seed, and reaping the produce; the difference is the share of the Bramin, and is the landholder's rent.

50. Zemindars, Rajahs, Poligars, Jageerhats, are representatives of the government, to whom the collection of the government rent has been transferred, not the absolute property in the land, and right to demand any rent.

\* Note.—Leases for waste land, for encouraging the growth of any particular produce, are exceptions which prove the rule.

§ Note.—Leases to individuals, where they exist, are reductions of the standard rent granted on cowle to favoured individuals, rather than leases of land. The issuing of individual pattas is a new practice, introduced under the new system of Ryotwar Rents.

in all those provinces, the arable land is more than quadruple, the land under cultivation. The expense of preparing this waste arable land is inconsiderable; hence there is no scarcity of land; quite the reverse, there is a superabundance;—and the collector of Coimbatore candidly observes, that the cultivators consider that they are conferring a favour on government, not receiving one, by occupying land. In all these districts, we have, with very little variation, continued the assessments of former governments, and to those assessments have superadded a strictness of collection, and of scrutiny into accounts, hitherto unknown. In these provinces, then, there is neither scarcity of land, or low assessment, to give value to landed property. But, as in dry grain provinces, water, because a scarce article, must be of some value; so, paddy land is often, and fields with wells are always, a valuable and transferable property. In the sale of the latter property, the sort and productive powers of the well determine the price, not the extent of the field; because such a part of the field as cannot be watered from the well, is of no more value comparatively, than in any other field.

59. I make the following inductions, from the foregoing reasoning.

1<sup>st</sup>. That the cultivators have a right every where, without the exception of a single district or province, to pay a fixed tax for the land they occupy.

2<sup>d</sup>. That they have the right, universally, to occupy this land, so long as they pay the standard rent.

3<sup>d</sup>. That they have the right, the standard rent being the only right of government, to sell or transfer by deed, gift, or otherwise, the land they occupy, subject always to the condition of paying the standard rent.

4<sup>th</sup>. That they exercise the right stated in the 3<sup>d</sup> position, wherever the standard rent has not been increased, so as to absorb all the profit on cultivation, or arable land is sufficiently scarce to be of value in the acquisition.

51. Had the state, of things, described by Colonel Munro continued in Canara, the owners of private estates, or the private property in estates, would have been of no more value than the land in other provinces; in fact it was not of equal value, for Colonel Munro observes, “Canara has, however, now completely fallen from this state of prosperity. The evils which have been continually accumulating upon it, since it became a province of Mysore, have destroyed a great part of its former population, and rendered its remaining inhabitants, as poor as those of the neighbouring countries. Its lands which are now saleable, are reduced to a very small portion, and lie chiefly between the Cundapore and Chandergherry rivers, and within five or six miles of the sea. It is not to be supposed, that the whole of this tract, can be sold; but only that saleable lands are scattered over every part of it, thinner in some places, and thicker in others, particularly in the Mangalore district. There is scarcely any saleable land even upon the sea coast, any where to the northward of Cundapore, or any where inland, from one end of Canara to the other, excepting upon the banks of the Mangalore, and some of the other great rivers. In the vicinity of the Ghauts, the lands are not only unsaleable; but the greatest part of them is waste, and overgrown with wood. It is reckoned that the population of the country has been diminished one-third within the last forty years, and there can be little doubt but its property has suffered a much greater reduction; Gesoya, Ankala, and Cundapore, formerly flourishing places, contain now only a few beggarly inhabitants. Honawer, once the second town in trade, after Mangalore, has not a single house, and Mangalore itself is greatly decayed. It may be said, that this change has been brought about by the incursion of Hyder, by the four wars which have happened since that event, by Tippoo himself destroying many of the principal towns upon the coast, and forcing their inhabitants to remove to Junlebad and other unhealthy situations near the hills; by his seizing in one night all the christians, men, women, and children, amounting to above sixty thousand, and sending them into captivity to Mysore, from whence one-tenth of them never returned; by the prohibition of foreign trade, and by the general corruption and disorder of his government, in all its departments: these circumstances certainly accelerated the change; but, taken altogether, they probably do not contribute to it so much as the extraordinary augmentation of the land-rent.”

52. At the period alluded to by Colonel Munro, when so large a portion of the private estates, or private property in land in Canara, was of no value at all, the whole landed surface of the province of Tanjore, and a great deal of land in other provinces, was, to the cultivators, a highly valuable, saleable, and transferable property, and sales of that property were at that period, going on. The Board of Revenue, at an early period of its establishment, prior to the introduction of local collectors, have been frequently required, as the then only court of justice, to decide on disputes between cultivators, respecting landed property, or the right of occupancy, or whatever may be the proper name; i. e. to decide to whom belonged the valuable right which has been attempted to be defined; and in proceedings, on the proposed plan of a permanent settlement for the territories under government, they fully acknowledged these rights.

\* Note.—In Coimbatore the wet cultivation is little more than three in every 100 of the total cultivation. In Salem it is about six; and in Ceded Districts it is not seven in the 100; while in Tanjore, the dry grain cultivation does not amount to 50 in the 100.

† Note.—By means of Ryotwar rents, or taking an account of the cultivation of each individual, and giving each individual a pottah for that cultivation, defining the rent on each field.

‡ Note.—Sales of land, and decrees of Court transferring

land from one cultivator to another, take place in the following districts:

N. Arcot.	S. Arcot.
Tanjore, now Zilla Chingleput.	
Tanjore.	Madrass.
Tichinopoly.	Raymond.
Dindigul.	Travancore.

Paddy lands and wells are transferred by sale, in Coimbatore, and wells in Salem.

§ See the voluminous proceedings respecting the mercuries of the village of Strupramdoor, and of many other villages.

Documents relative to Zemindary and Ryotwar Settlements.

Extract Mr Hodgson's Report of the Province of Dindigul; 28 March 1802.

Documents relative to  
Zemindary and Ryot-  
war Settlements

Extract Mr. Hodgson's  
Report on the Province  
of Dindigul; 20 March  
1808.

53. Colonel Munro has stated, that he knew there were pretenders, either open or concealed, to almost every district in Canara, and he received letters from the poligars of Bilghi, Soonda, Vettil, and Coomlah. Here then is an admission at once, that the owners of private estates in Canara did, at no distant period, pay the rent of their estates to zemindars, rajahs, or poligars; persons placed between them and the government. They now pay their rent to a tehsildar, and not direct to the collector.

54. Provided the property in private estates, that is, the standard rent, and no more, be paid by these owners of private estates, I hold it to be a matter of very secondary importance to them, whether the rent is demanded of them, by the ancient rajahs or poligars, the officers of Byjnagger or Bednore government, the rajah Coorg, the tehsildars of the Company, or the, to be created zemindars of the Company.

55. It is well known, that in Malabar, where there is also a private property in land, and owners of estates, that the ancient zemindars or rajahs were set aside, and pensioned. I believe the rebellion in that province, was never attributed to the injustice of making the owners of these estates pay their rent to officers of the government, when they had heretofore always paid it, to rajahs; but the intrigues of the rajahs to get back the collection of the rent, or the quantum of rent demanded, or mode of collecting the rent by the officers of government, may, or may not, have been partly the cause of rebellion.

56. It is not the question of expediency that I mean to discuss; but I venture to affirm, that the right of the people in Canara or Malabar would not be injured or infringed by the establishment in those provinces, of the permanent system as established in Bengal, and on this side of India; and that, with a difference in value only, private property\* and private estates, exist as much in every part of India, as they do in Canara or Malabar.

Extract, FORT ST. GEORGE, Judicial Consultations,  
the 20th December 1805.

Extract REPORT of Mr. JOHN HODGSON, on PEDDAPORE, in Northern  
Circars; dated 23d November 1805.

Para. 23. AT some former period, but when, cannot now be ascertained, the whole land of the zemindary was either surveyed, or its extent estimated, and a tax fixed on each field, according to its size, and the fertility of the soil. Where this mode of settling the revenue obtains, it is called *vissabuddy vissum*, being a land measure equal to about 1½ cawnies. In the progress of time, as alterations took place in the extent of population, value of money, or price of grain, the *sist*† became either disproportionate to the means of the ryots, and a reduction in the amount resulted, or in other cases, the profit derived under the original *sist*, was such as to attract the attention of the renters; consequently, having in one instance been compelled to allow a reduction in the *sist*, from want of resources in the ryots, they considered themselves equally entitled to participate in an augmentation of those resources, and to raise the *sist*, or rather make an additional assessment; for the actual *sist* of each village is always preserved. The remission, or addition, follows in all adjustments of rents between the ryots and renters: the additions, it may be supposed, were more frequent than the reductions: the former is termed *malu-verty*, and the latter *moojra*.

24. It is this fluctuation in the land rent, which renders a permanent settlement with the immediate cultivators, if not impracticable, at least impolitic, because no increase can be made, under defined laws, to the fixed rents; while a reduction must be given to all ryots, from various causes which time would produce, to occupy their fields, or to pay the full rent thereof. Thus the security derived from creating intermediate proprietors would be lost, and the annual settlements, the investigation of claims to remissions, and the collection of so detailed a revenue, immediately by the officers of government, would leave the mode of management liable to all the inconveniences of temporary settlements; while the first features of the permanent settlement are, to combine, as far as possible, individual with the public interest; to limit the duties of revenue officers, and leave them to be discharged, under defined regulations. In the zemindary of Peddapore, for instance, where the period when the land rent was fixed is not known; where the population is abundant,

*Vissam*.—He who has mortgaged even a bull's head to his creditor, and, without having redeemed it, transfers it to another, shall be corporally punished by the government; if the quantity be less, he shall be fined. —Vol. 1. p. 209.

*Vollam*.—That land, whether little or much, on the produce of which one man can subsist for a year, is called the *vollam*. —Vol. 1. p. 210.

*Vollam*.—If the land has been mortgaged to two creditors, at the same time, that no priority can be claimed by either to that mortgaged, by whom it was mortgaged without force. —Vol. 7. p. 211.

*Vollam*.—If any land, or other immovable property, and others are mortgaged to the same person, a man shall neither give nor sell, or even though he acquired them himself, shall he mortgage all his sons. —Vol. 2. p. 113.

Land is conveyed by six formalities: by the ascent of the townsmen, of kindred, of neighbours, and of heirs, and by the delivery of gold and of water. —Vol. 2. pp. 161.

*Parnsara*.—Giving a sixth part to the king, a twenty-first to duties, and a thirtieth to priests, a husbandman is exempt from all sins incident to agriculture. —Vol. 2. p. 168.

*Vysa*.—But at a time of distress, for the support of his household, and particularly for the performance of religious duties, even a single coparcener may give, mortgage, or sell the immovable estate. —Vol. 2. p. 169.

*Mona*.—On all sides a village or small town, let a space be left for pasture, in breadth five hundred cubits, or three easts of a large stick, and thrice that space round a city or considerable town. —Vol. 2. p. 174.

dant, and the revenue nearly stationary, the difference between the original *sist* and the present rent is, in many instances, considerable; so that if a law was published, declaring the *sist* to be what the ryot ought only to pay, the zemindar might be a great sufferer\*.

25. With the present mode of adjustment, all parties seem content; the *sist* is the basis of the adjustment, and circumstances of season, determine whether it shall be receded from, or added to, and how. It has been established by law, that a written agreement shall be exchanged between proprietors or renters, and the ryots; the latter, have every security they either wish or expect.

26. I have subjoined, in the Appendix, a complete detail of the internal revenue economy of two villages, to elucidate what has been stated above.

27. From these details of village accounts, referred to in the Appendix, and on a perusal of the examinations of the *sumums* of the *cusbah* of Peddapore and of Cuttamor, it will be observed, that the occupancy of the land of particular villages in the zemindary of Peddapore, is a right vested in the ryots of those villages; it partakes more, however, of what is termed in the Southern Provinces the *pushangary* tenure, in which no sale of the right of occupancy is customary, than of the *ardacarry* tenure, under which the right of occupancy is considered a property transferable, subject to the obligations annexed to the possession of it.

Documents relative to Zemindary and Ryotwar Settlements.

Extract Letter from Mr. Hodgson on Peddapore, &c. 25 Nov. 1803.

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Extracts from REPORT of MR. THACKERAY on MALABAR, CANARA, and the CEDED DISTRICTS; dated 4th August 1807, as far as relates to the comparative advantages and disadvantages of Ryotwar and Zemindary Settlements as a permanent System.

WHEN the permanent land tax on each estate has been fixed, it is possible to introduce the mootahdary system with some modifications, nearly in the mode suggested in Major Munro's letter of the 9th November 1800. In this case, the government would do to the mootahdars, what the former sovereigns of Canara did to the *enamdars*; assign to them the land tax payable from such and such lands, without giving them any interference with the landholders. A commission of 6 per cent. would, perhaps, be sufficient to cover the risk and expense of the mootahdar. Where one *magany* is large enough to constitute a mootah, it might be made over to the chief man in the *magany*. Where the *maganies* were small, two or three might be united; so as to make the mootahs run, from four to five thousand pagodas annual *jumma*. However, the larger the mootah, the greater the security of the land tax; just as the man who ensures a great many houses or ships, will care less for petty losses, and be less likely to fail; so the great, will be less likely to fail than the small mootahdar. Major Munro's plan appears, in every respect, well adapted to the purpose, except that the commission of 2½ per cent. seems hardly enough. The mootahdar must keep peons, and accountants, and a shroff; he must collect and remit the money to the cutcherry; he must stand all losses, and defray contingent expenses. Six per cent. would be necessary, at least, to enable him to do all this easily. It seems also contrary to the plan which has been introduced elsewhere, to oblige him to pay any increase upon the extension of cultivation. With these exceptions, a mootahdary settlement might be introduced into Canara and Malabar. It would be a financial operation, something like the mortgage or sale of the land tax, and attended with all the advantages and disadvantages of the farming system; except, however, that as the farmers are to be hereditary, they will not be so oppressive as temporary farmers usually are, and who always ruin a country. The chief advantages would be, that the Board of Revenue, and the collector, would be relieved from a good deal of trouble, which the detail now occasions; that the collector will be less liable to be sued in court by the landlords, whose property he may distrain, or whose persons he may confine for arrears; that collectors will not be so skilful, nor take so much pains as mootahdars, in the management of the revenues; that all men of talents and experience will look to judicial situations; and that as none, perhaps, but young men, will be found to take collectorships, attended with so much risk and trouble, the business will, perhaps, not be so well conducted; and that suits, and arrears and confusion, will ensue, which the mootahdars would have prevented; that the vexatious interference of circar servants will be precluded; that the people will have greater confidence in the permanency of the tax; that the mootahdars will exert themselves to get the waste land cultivated; that a good deal of the capital of the towns, which is in the hands of soucars and rich merchants, will flow into the country, and produce improvement; that the land tax on each estate having been previously fixed, no interference or danger can result to the landlords; that the sovereigns of Canara have often assigned the land tax of certain estates or villages to *enamdars*, and that they have had them in Malabar, Soondah, and in the southern part of Canara; and that, therefore, the mootahdary system is not entirely inconsistent with former usages; and finally, that it would assimilate the revenue administration of Canara and Malabar, to that of the other provinces.

There are advantages, certainly, which demand attention. However, it may be stated the disadvantages of such a system. It is impolitic to limit the land revenue.

Extracts from Report of Mr. Thackeray, 4th August 1807.

\* It is estimated to amount in the whole zemindary, to about - - - - - Rs. 2000000

Documents relative to  
Zemindary and Ryot  
land settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray; 4th  
August 1807.

great province, especially of one in which there is much waste land; though it may be absolutely necessary to limit the demand on individual estates. It may be expected that a good deal of land may be brought under cultivation in 50 years of our mild government, and be liable to pay a land tax, like those estates now assessed. In the event of war, of the public necessities increasing, the government, under the mootah system, will be prevented from levying an additional and equal land tax. If, in such a case, they lay on two annas in the rupee, as they laid on two shillings in the pound in England, it will fall very heavy on the lands now under cultivation; but be nothing comparatively on those which may hereafter be brought under culture. Government will be forced to double the burthen of those who now pay, to make up for the deficiency on those lands which do not pay the old land tax. This objection, however, applies to the whole country, and has therefore been considered, and refuted. However, I must confess that I see no easy way of raising an additional land revenue from the provinces already settled, in Mootadarry.

Another objection to the mootahdarry system, is, the influence and patronage which it gives to the mootahdar, to the diminution of the interest and authority of government. Both Malabar and Canara are very strong wild countries, which have frequently been the theatres of dreadful civil wars and rebellions; and the traveller passing through the country wonders how they are kept in subjection. This objection has been already amply discussed; but it applies with such peculiar force to those two provinces, that I cannot help mentioning, how it operates on my mind. Another objection is, that the revenue would not be so secure. The land which pays a light fixed land tax, is the surest pledge for its realization; but when the land tax is transferred to a farmer, the security is weakened; because the pledge is put into his hands, and the money passes through an additional channel. The whole value of the whole lands of a mootah will be a more valuable pledge, than the real, personal, and constructive property, of the mootahdar. Besides, as the situation of the mootahdar is rather an office than a solid estate, the division of it among his sons, according to the Hindoo law, would cramp the efficiency, and weaken the security which government originally expected from the office. This is an argument, generally applicable to mootahdars, but in Canara and Malabar, where the mootahdar would so especially be a farmer of revenue, an hereditary tehsildar, it is particularly applicable to these provinces. This objection has been fully stated before.

The argument in favour of mootahs, that the stock of the towns will flow into the country by the speculations of soucars, is not strong. When a land tax is once fixed, and the people are sure that only a certain known light share of the rent will be taken by government, every man who has spirit and means to speculate in agriculture, will do so. He will not consider whether he (if he improves himself) or the ryot to whom he lends (if he does not mean to improve land himself) pay the land tax direct to government, or through a mootahdar; he will only consider the expense, and the probable profit, and will accordingly turn his attention and his capital, to agriculture or other pursuits, as they may promise advantages. The soucars now lend money upon the security of the lands; even though the land tax be not absolutely fixed. No mootahdar can give them greater security; nor will they be more inclined to lend, nor the ryots more able to borrow, because government have farmed the land tax.

In respect to the objection, that men of abilities will get into the judicial line; I think that good salaries will secure the services of men, sufficiently able to carry on the business of a collectorship.

Respecting the vexation occasioned by the interference of circar servants; it may be easily believed that the heartburning and jealousies which would arise between the mootahdar and his former equals, over whom he would probably show his importance, and disgust, by the insolence of office, would more than counterbalance the vexation occasioned by circar servants.

The easiest, but not the best way of settling these provinces, would be to divide them into mootahs at once; to take an average of the collections of former years, and fixing the summa on that average, sell the mootahs, without any more ado; as we have done, in the Circars and Baramahl: but in this case, if the land tax were not previously fixed, we should, in reality, give the mootahdar legislative powers, if not confer upon him the actual property in the lands of those who are now, independent proprietors. Such a measure, would be, I should imagine, as unjust as it would be impolitic; indeed, it would be impossible, unless we at least established a rate at which the lands were to be assessed. But even where a rate was fixed, and it were left to the mootahdar to carry it into effect, no body can suppose he would do it, impartially. The mootahdars, if they were left to assess the land tax, would favour their own friends; relieve the greater part of the burthen on the lower proprietors, and manage in such a way, that their own lands, and those of their friends, should

be exempted from iniquity, and at all events of altercation, would ensue, which could never be so well settled in court, as it would be prevented in the cutcherry of the collector. If the collector cannot, in the first instance, fairly settle the tax on each estate; there is little hope of it being done in court, after every thing has been thrown into confusion, by the action of the parties.

I have sat a long time in a Zillah Court, I may be supposed to know, how difficult it is to settle a dispute, in settling revenue causes. As a collector, a man may settle more, in a year, than as a judge, in a month perhaps. The forms and appeals, occasion a great deal of delay, and the simpler and poorer sort would be ruined; the richer and cunning would shield themselves.

selves behind the ample target of a rejoinder. There is at present no standard, in either Malabar or Canara, which could be prescribed to the mootahdar, as a rule for him to make his sub-assessment. If government fixed his jumma at an average of former years collections, it would be fair that he should be guided by the same rule, in subdividing it among the proprietors; but this latitude would give him an arbitrary power, which government, alone, should exercise. The present proprietors would most likely consider the mootahdars as men put over them; eventually to engross their rights. The settlement of Malabar is not yet made; and there would be ample scope for the arbitrary proceedings of a mootahdar. The settlement of Canara is made annually upon an imaginary settlement of Tippee, which is at least one lack of pagodas more than the country can pay; and as the collector annually raises or lowers the assessment, according to circumstances, and to the means of the ryots, upon this inadequate standard, his settlement is as arbitrary, as if there was no standard. The assessment is also very unequal in the whole, and in the parts of which it is composed; so that whether the *shist* with a per-centage of the shannul, or the old standard with a per-centage on the Bednore and subsequent assessments, or a per-centage on the standard, be taken as a general rule, the inequality will still exist. The only rule which could be prescribed to the mootahdar would be, a per-centage of the rent or *gueni*; and if government think that the mootahdar could settle the land tax on this principle, better than the collector, I think that they ought to adopt mootahdary in these provinces immediately; but in my humble opinion, the land tax ought to be formed, direct with the landlords. I wish to untie, not to cut this gordian knot. If government are resolved to have mootahdars, it may be done hereafter; but to do it at once, would, I should imagine, strike at the root of private property. But if government wish the collector to settle the land tax direct; if they wish to have a just and equal assessment levied; they ought, I think, to encourage and support the collectors, as much as possible. The courts of justice ought not to interfere, until the land tax is fixed, and declared permanent by government. If the collector is checked, or discouraged or alarmed by prosecution, his zeal will damp; his caution will degenerate into timidity. While personal responsibility, and the fear of the courts hang over him, he will, it is true, go on, the best way he can, so as to avoid being removed; but no vigorous exertions, without which this kind of land tax cannot be introduced, can be expected from him. The poor will pay more; the rich less, than their share. The cunning will escape; the simple will pay. The chicanery, delay and multiplicity of causes, will prevent the courts from being useful, while they will act *in terrorem*, to prevent the collector venturing on measures, which may be highly equitable and expedient. The collector has an immediate interest in protecting the ryots; and there is little danger of his oppressing them; and if he cannot prevent the temporary oppression of the native servants, it is not likely that the courts, will be able. For these reasons, I think that the courts ought to have no interference, ought to take no cognizance of revenue affairs, until the permanent land tax is confirmed: then, indeed, they will be absolutely necessary to defend the rights of the proprietors. The courts have a great deal of business, in deciding causes between individuals. There are many such, relating to land, which are objects properly cognizable by them; but for the collector to be interrupted in the middle of an intricate settlement, such as I have described, will not only be very inconvenient, but will defeat the plan. The courts have a great deal of business, which even the zeal and industry of the judges cannot entirely keep down; because private property in the soil is not so readily admitted, nor well established, in other zillahs. Indeed the people complain generally of the delay, which seems an unavoidable attendant on the courts of justice. However, every thing ought to be done, to settle the civil suits.

The people of Soondah, Bilghi and Wynaad, complain of the hardship of going below the Ghauts. I should think, that the courts might benefit agriculture, by gradually adopting rules which may facilitate the alienation of land. The registry of all deeds, leases and mortgages would also be proper, for the reasons I have already stated. The Regulation 18 does this in some measure, it is true; but it may not be sufficiently rigorous. I would make all such deeds invalid, unless registered in some public office. A merchant has a plain complaint if he is forced to register his transactions; but not, one would think, a landlord, whose property is seen, known, palpable: no one can be mistaken respecting his income, the general value of his estate, and the amount which may be safely advanced upon it. Secrecy does not seem necessary, unless the landlord means to deceive, by a secret alienation or double mortgage. The courts might also simplify the various deeds, conditions, and gradations of mortgage, lease and sale; and establish certain forms, which would facilitate decisions, and render transactions more certain. The gentlemen in Malabar can do this; the more easily; since they are so well acquainted with the language, customs, agriculture, and laws of the country.

The atrocious deeds which were formerly so frequent in Malabar and Canara, are to be less common. The rebellions of Malabar were not objects of police, but of war, which burst with a raging or smothered flame, ever since the Company got that province. Mr. Baber cannot be too highly commended or rewarded, in my humble opinion, for his activity, and success, in suppressing the Pyche rebellion, which has cost the lives of a great number of brave officers and troops, and enormous sums of money; all which, had not destruction, must have continued, had not Mr. Baber finished the rebellion by the death of the Rajah.

The Moplah rebellion was suppressed by the patriotism, talents, and activity, of Mr. Watson and his Kolkar corps, which has suffered more, and merited more, than any other regular corps. Indeed, considering the strength of the country, the dread of the climate, and the long impunity, I may say, which the rebels enjoyed; I think it is a great credit to the British arms.



Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray; 4th  
August 1807.

ners and institutions, the arguments and instances produced by Arthur Young in favour of large farms, in his comparison of French with English husbandry, do not, I think, weaken the force of these ~~my~~ observations; because I shall show it is a general want of stock, and general poverty, which keep farms small at present; and the Hindoo institutions will always have a tendency to keep them small, even after stock has accumulated.

The law of ejectment; the evasion of entails; the invention of long leases; the conversion of sub-tenants into sub-proprietors; the emancipation of the smaller landholders from feudal services, which all seem to have been effected between the times of Henry VII. and Charles II. are supposed to be the chief causes of the prosperity of England.

Documents relative to  
Zemindary and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Buckner; 4th  
August 1837.

The agriculture of France, and other continental countries, has been confessedly checked, by the laws which enabled the great to keep together vast estates. Where estates are very large, they must be managed, either through the agency of rapacious bailiffs, or leases to farmers. The great landlord is usually a proud noble, an expensive trifler, or an idle equi; and they are full as likely to be so (and where they exist, are as much so), in India, as in Europe. If such a landlord manages any part of his estate himself, he generally does it badly, and consequently occasions a loss both to himself and to the public; because, the better a farm is managed, the greater the produce, and greater the rent. The farming of gentlemen is a losing concern. In England, indeed, some noblemen and gentlemen of great estates, are not only skilful farmers, but philosophic improvers, who have brought down all the secrets of chemistry to assist mother earth, in performing her task. Where there are such landlords, no doubt the argument does not hold good; but in general, few such men will be found, in great estates, especially in India. They in general, either farm badly through the agency of bailiffs, or they let their land to farmers. Farmers are not so anxious to improve the land, as proprietors. Even long leases do not give a man such an interest in the soil, as actual property. If long leases are allowed to be a great source of improvement, how greatly must actual property excite industry? When a man knows that the land is his own; that his son will succeed to it; that he has no lord, no superior, none to share in the fruits of his industry; that he and his posterity, are to reap the full harvest of his labours; his exertions must be greater than those of the farmer, whose lease expires, in a few years. In India especially, where professions, and that of husbandry, are hereditary; when a man's first duty is to get a son to succeed to his place in society; the hereditary possession of a small estate has every charm that human passions, and Indian prejudices, can inspire. In other provinces (i. e. except in Malabar and Canara) the only landholders are enaumdars, who show the greatest attachment to their enaum lands. The laws and customs which keep great estates together, originated in pride and fear. They were only suited to, and admitted into countries, where the sovereign power was weak. The great improvements in the police, as well as agriculture, of Europe, have chiefly resulted from breaking up those overgrown estates. It may be said, that great estates never existed in India; but the same kind of policy which kept them united so long in Europe, produced poligars, rajahs, and zemindars. Force, official convenience, and defence under weak governments, seem to have produced these monsters in civil society; but as they were all officers of government, or pensioners, or petty princes, they seem neither to have claimed nor exercised the rights of property in the government, nor did they interfere further than to receive the circular rents from the ryots; they affected, and still affect, the style of princes. Where such people existed, it was very proper to keep them quiet, and convert a dangerous chieftain, if possible, into a country gentleman of large estate; but it was in itself, inconsistent with prospects of agricultural improvement. It might be state policy; but it was not of itself, immediately adapted to increase the produce of the land, or the general opulence. To make a petty prince, a great military or police officer, the landlord of an immense tract of country, including towns, and rivers, and forests, and mountains, and roads, might have been prudent, just as war, as expense, as sacrifices of territory, are sometimes prudent; but it could never immediately effect the improvement of agriculture, or increase the general prosperity, except indirectly, by securing the state from the opposition, and even rebellion, which those chieftains might have excited. It indeed produced advantage to the country, by limiting the demand of government; but demand may be limited, without creating great landlords, or rather great farmers, of revenue. To convert an hereditary office, jurisdiction, or military district (an office which, at most could be considered a kind of incorporeal property) into a parcel of land, into absolute partible property in the land, appears to be doing what the policy of Europe has been labouring for ages, to undo.

It would be equally contrary to that policy, to introduce mootahdars into these provinces with a view to condense property, to unite small and create great estates; except that the policy, which may have justified the measure in the Circars, where those chiefs existed directly opposes it, in these districts; and that no great advantage, but very great disadvantages, would probably result from so unjust an operation.

Unless the rights of the present proprietors are secured, by a fixed land tax, assessed by government itself, they must fall into vassalage. They will become mere tenants, of proprietors; instead of cultivating their own, they will cultivate their masters' land, according to the usual course of things, will cultivate worse.

Some people may imagine, that mootahdars are better than small proprietors; but large farms are supposed, by some writers and farmers in Europe, to be better than small. But the slightest attention to the subject, convinces one, that this great question, which has employed the pens of theorists, and the ploughs of practical speculators in Europe, is not connected with the subject of mootahdary and ryotwarry\*.

\* Arthur Young's precise investigations and deep reasonings apply to the agriculture in England and France, but not to mootahdary and ryotwarry.

Documents relating to  
Remissions of Ryot-  
war Settlements

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray, 4th  
August 1837.

Whether there are mootahdars or not, the same cultivators who have cultivated the earth hitherto, must go on cultivating it, hereafter. The mootahdar is a farmer of revenue; not a farmer of land. He may have some bullocks, and be a ryot himself, too; but as a mootahdar, he can never cultivate, and hardly ever superintend, even the cultivation of his own mootah. He must, and will, let out his land to the present occupants; even though he were constituted by law, lord of the soil. No others, could pay so much rent; because they could not, generally speaking, cultivate with so much success. Therefore, even though he could, and were, to turn them all out, and undertake the cultivation with his own bullocks, slaves, and labourers, had he stock to do it; he would most likely be ruined.

Agriculture has been extended and improved in Europe, since cottagers were turned out of their small farms. I believe, that one good and skilful farmer, with good implements and cattle, and half a dozen able labourers, could do more than an hundred families of idle highland cottagers could do formerly; but this is, because the cottagers in ancient Europe, and now, in some parts of it, were idle, ignorant people, whose farming was bad. They did not make the land produce half what it could, and has since produced, by better management; yet they consumed more, than a few better farmers would require. But the improvement did not result from the mere union of small farms. It arose from turning out ten people, who could produce but little; and putting in one good farmer, whose skill and industry, and stock, enabled him to raise more produce than all the ten, could do before, at so much less expense, and therefore to pay so much more rent. These cottagers, were originally slaves, and retainers of the great landlord, and were a very ignorant, idle, turbulent set of people, from whom no great exertions could ever be expected; but the ryots of India are a very different set of men, who have reclaimed waste, and practised husbandry with skill and success, from the most remote period. The mootahdar could not pretend to teach them their business, and instruct them in that noble art, which is their patrimony. The hereditary profession of husbandry, and occupation of certain lands, gives them an hereditary knowledge of the soil and seasons, and proper mode of culture, which no stranger could possess. The mootahdar has no more skill than any of them; and could not, therefore, improve the husbandry by superior knowledge.

Another advantage, usually attributed to great farms; is the scope which a great capital affords. The great farmer may keep certain fields under particular crops and management; he may have fallows and routines of crops; he may reserve his grain, for a good price; he may make every thing turn to account. The great farmer no doubt, in India, as well as in Europe, has great advantages; and is enabled to make a greater profit in proportion to his rent, than the small farmer. About 400 acres in the upper country of India, as well as in Europe, seems the best size.

A farmer for instance, in the Ceded Districts, who pays 200 pagodas per annum, makes a greater profit, and raises a greater produce in proportion to that rent, than the poor farmer who only pays 100 pagodas. However, in this case, the profit of the great farmer will not be more, than the interest of his capital employed in his farm. The poor farmer has no stock of value employed, at least none to signify; while the great farmer has a great many bullocks, a great deal of stock, a good deal of ready money to pay his expenses; all which constitute his stock, and which must be replaced, with a profit. His original stock must be renewed, his annual expenses repaid with interest; so that were the accounts of the great and small farmer fairly balanced, it would most likely be found, that in proportion to the stock, skill, and labour employed, the great farmer had not raised more produce, nor derived a greater profit, than the small farmer. If a farmer has stock sufficient for the field he occupies, his produce and profit will be, in the same proportion, whether his farm be small or great. The earth generally produces, in proportion to the labour and expenses bestowed on it. The division of labour, so important an advantage in manufactures, has little to do with agriculture. If this is the case in Europe (and the best authors, especially Adam Smith, seem to think so) great capitals can do little in Indian husbandry, by promoting the division of labour; even in Indian manufactures, circumstances render the division of labour almost unnecessary; at least there are few manufactures, in which the division of labour is carried far. If therefore, the division of labour, which does so great things in the manufactures of Europe, is in a great degree unnecessary in the manufactures of India; and if the division of labour does so little in the agriculture of Europe, how shall we expect any great advantage from it, in the husbandry of India? It seems evident indeed, that in Europe great farmers have improved the breed of cattle, have gone to great expense in improvements and improvements. They may do so here too, as they get gradually and naturally increased by the increase of their stock under a light land tax; but they will, perhaps, never be like the great farmers of England, who are like great ship-owners. The one, have a large stock, the other, nautical tonnage. It is the same to both, in what parish or country they live, they find employment. Their stock will find employment, and the owner will be benefited by it, but to such farmers and ship-owners, the sea and earth are alike indifferent. It is to farmers of this kind, that are the greatest improvers and breeders of cattle. Their stock and spirit incite them to improve. Here, stock and spirit are in general depressed by a heavy rent or tax; improvement is therefore slow.

Great capitals, lodged with a few, promote improvement, more than when they are shared among many small farmers; it would not signify, in respect to improvement, where they are proprietors, not farmers. I will admit, that had I a great estate, I should rather let it out to a few rich, than to many poor farmers; not so much, as I thought that they could raise a great produce, and pay more rent, as because

because my rent might be more secure. But the question is, whether great proprietors are better than small? and I think it evident, that a number of small proprietors, are better, in every respect, than the same land and capital in the hands of a few great landlords.

Document relative to  
Zemindari and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Blackeray; 4th  
August 1807.

Where a great noble or a great rajah draws the rent, or even great part of it, from a large extent, it enables them to live in leisure and affluence, and to employ many idle servants, and consume many foolish articles of luxury. The whole rent which they draw, goes to feed the idle and unproductive; for, footmen and peons, opera girls, and dancing girls, giving great dinners to country parties, and giving treats to Brahmins, are expenses which bring back nothing. They are all their consumption, there is no reproduction; and they are consumed, in a great degree, upon worthless domestics, and in waste. So it is, if their rent is spent in trifling articles of luxury, because they feed those artists, the manufacturers of those trifling articles which they delight in so much; but it were better that such artists received no encouragement, for if they did not, they would be forced to betake themselves to other more useful occupations. Thus, rent enjoyed by great nobles, and great rajahs, is spent on menials and ministers of luxury and ostentation, and the country is doubly impoverished. It is impoverished, by being obliged to support this swarm of drones; it is impoverished, by having so many hands withdrawn from useful labours. Keeping 5,000 of these idle hands, is as great a burthen as keeping 5,000 soldiers. Many of our provinces groan under this burthen. The landlords rent in the Northern circars is divided between the government and the zemindars. The government expends a great part of this rent in supporting the judicial, revenue, and military establishments; but besides, the country supports an host of rajahs, with all their dependant relations, Brahmins, peons, elephants, chobdars, and servants. They are supposed to render an equivalent, by their skillful management, and clever arrangements respecting the landed property of which they are termed proprietors; but did their share of the rent, be it great or small; did the sums which are idly expended or hoarded by them, go at once to the tribe of husbandmen the ryots; how great an increase of general comfort, agricultural stock, and improvement, would ensue. I do not imagine that it can ever go to them, now. It will enable the rajah to keep an elephant, perhaps, if he had none before; or half-a-dozen, where he had but one before; but it will not go to increase the stock of the ryots. The rajah will, to the end of the chapter, get as much from them as ever. It must be always kept in mind, that remissions granted to ryots, are like money lent out, at interest; they must come back, with a profit. Where the rent goes to a small proprietor, it is immediately added to the agricultural stock; applied to the improvement of the land; to the support of productive industry. It is the great advantage of small estates, (by small, I mean such as can be managed, by their owners) that the rent is not diverted from the land. I have attempted to trace the expenditure of the rent drawn by great landlords. I will try to show, how it will most probably be disposed of, by a small proprietor.

The farmer pays his rent, the net produce of the land, to the great landlord from whom he rents, and begins his next year's cultivation with the same, or at least with but a small increase, of stock. The rent would be spent by the landlord, and would not in general be added to the agricultural stock, not, at least, until the ostentatious or frivolous wants of the great landlord had been supplied. But the proprietor (were this farmer converted into a proprietor of the same land for instance) would keep the rent himself, and dispose of it according to his disposition. Frugality and moderation are, in general, among the virtues of a small landholder; at least, there is more chance, of finding those virtues among a set of men who have been celebrated in all ages and nations for them, than among the great, who are notorious for the contrary vices.

If a small proprietor is very frugal, he will save the whole landlord's rent, not spend one farthing on his personal expenses, but invest it in that kind of stock which he considers most profitable and secure; and his situation agricultural stock will be the most obvious. He will, therefore, apply the landlord's rent to the purchase of more bullocks, if he has none; he will plant a few trees; he will give his land a better manuring, or clear a part of it; he will know the certain profits which must arise from his secure possession of the land, he will most likely expend all the rent upon his land, as far as it is susceptible of improvement. If he has saved more than he can readily and probably employ, in increasing his stock, or improving his estate, he will lend it to some others, to employ in the same way; for a man of his turn will not lend to a spendthrift.

If the proprietor should not be quite so frugal, or rather so pennywise as the one I have described, he will expend part of the landlord's rent, in wearing a good cloth, in purchasing toys for his children; he will marry his daughter, and thus get rid of half his rent in a way which tends to general advantage; because, the wants and enjoyments of a man of his moderate circumstances, are not luxurious nor ostentatious; he encourages and employs manufacturers of articles of necessity. The half of the rent which such a man saves, will be vested in agricultural stock, or in the improvement of land; or if his estate and stock are not susceptible of improvement, will be lent out to some other, who may want it. The generality of small proprietors will be of this way of thinking, and will most likely act in this way.

If the small proprietor be idle and extravagant, he will no doubt spend the whole rent in personal gratification; and this habit will at last ruin him, and force him to sell his estate to some thrifty proprietor, such as I, at first described, who will take possession of it.

Document relative to  
Zemindary and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray; 4th  
August 1807.

But among small proprietors whose moderate circumstances oblige them to habitual economy, such spendthrifts will seldom be found. Circumstances form habits; and small estates, would form frugal swains.

Here are three probable results from the different dispositions of three small proprietors; whose estates were just large enough to employ their skill and stock; and the farmers profit and wages of labour on which, would be sufficient to support them, as tenants.

If the estate be much larger than the small proprietor can manage, from want of stock, he will let part, and apply the rent to the accumulation of stock, which will soon enable him to cultivate the whole himself; or if it be too large to be managed by one person, he must continue to let part, until the Hindoo law of succession, or other event, may cause a division and diminution of it.

If the estate be very small (so much so, that the wages of labour, profit of stock and reward of skill, be not sufficient to support the proprietor) he must, whether he be prodigal or frugal, break in upon the rent, and endeavour, by great frugality and industry, to improve his land and his condition.

If he has had luck, and can go on no longer, he must, like poor proprietors, poor tradesmen and poor farmers in all countries, sell his land and stock, and turn labourer; but while a man has a spot of his own, to labour upon, nothing but very great imprudence, or unusual misfortune, can reduce him so low. The climate in Malabar and Canara will generally secure him from the misfortunes which usually ruin farmers, in other parts of India, bad seasons; and it may be expected that his habits of frugality and prudence, which all small proprietors, and especially Indian proprietors have, will generally preserve him from the bad effects of folly and extravagance. Although the ryots are liberal, if not profuse; they care little about money; because, accustomed to pay the circar, and because an industrious ryot can always borrow; he can always pledge his labours, mortgage his skill in husbandry, and borrow money. His industry is a stock which seldom fails; he has therefore credit. But this is no reason for drawing a heavy rent from him. His charity is great, and in most parts of the country, a certain proportion of his profit is supposed to be expended in charity; and an allowance is accordingly made: but charity begins at home, and he will take care of himself, and not to expend his whole profit, when he has the means and the incitement to increase his stock, and add to his own comforts.

If great landlords are better than small, on account of the capital, government must be the best of all; because no individual, however wealthy, can vie with government in point of capital, nor will any individual be more inclined, or better able, to promote extensive plans of improvement. But it is confessed on all sides, that any thing is better than to have government, the landlord: and by the same reasoning, it would appear, that as a great landlord is better than the greater sovereign: so the small proprietor is better than the great landlord. The economy, attention, and intimate knowledge of the soil, its capability, the proper mode of culture, are much greater advantages in husbandry, especially Indian husbandry, than a great capital. Where there are tanks, indeed, a capital is necessary; but government must superintend great tanks at all times. But in Canara and Malabar the small proprietor will pick up every stone, root out every weed which can stand in the way of, or draw nourishment from, a plant; he will cut away the sides of hills; he will dig manure, turn the soil, plant a cocoa nut here, a pepper vine or pumpkin there, as petty convenience may suggest; he will bestow on his little spot, all that minute labour and attention which is so important in Indian husbandry, and especially in Malabar and Canara. Each man lives on his estate; and the enclosures, the neatness of the culture of each small spot, show the attention with which the proprietor improves, I may say embellishes, his little ground. In the vicinity of great towns on the Malabar coast, where there is a good market, property is secure, the estate of each proprietor is enclosed with high banks formed at great expense; and all within this mud boundary, shows that every inch has experienced the care of its master. I never saw so much neatness, attention, and enclosure, in the neighbourhood of our largest towns, on this side the peninsula. I have, indeed, sometimes seen fields enclosed with briars, as the crops were rising; and in the Ceded Districts, particularly, the remains of milk hedge enclosures, for a long way round the village, show its former prosperity. These enclosures, however, generally surround the enaun lands of the village officers, and are consequently, private property; but I never went far, without seeing spaces overrun with grass between the field and the road; sometimes, great clumps of bushes and long grass, in the middle of a field; sometimes, a solitary field, overrun with brush, although as fit for cultivation, as the cultivated fields which surrounded it; all these things, in Indian husbandry, show that it is circar-land, not private property; that the land is cultivated by poor farmers, not by proprietors.

To return to the question of great and small farmers, or great and small estates: for the next argument I shall use, will apply to both. It will be found, that all over India, it is want of stock, not want of land, that keeps down improvement. Indeed, it appears so absurd to discuss the question of great and small farms, in a country where farms must be small, because farmers are poor, that I do it merely to convince people who may suppose that it is so in India.

It neither applies to Indian husbandry, nor to zemindars and mootahdars; for, though I have engaged myself in arguing against great landlords, yet zemindars are never, either private landlords or great farmers. Few zemindars in India, have ten bullocks employed in cultivation. Every man who takes the trouble to read my paper, will remember this. A Zemindar is merely a farmer of Revenue; not of Land.

Documents relative to  
Zemindari and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray; 24th  
August 1807.

In Canara, the proprietors have not capital to manage their estates, small as they are; they are obliged to let out part, though they admit, what is evident, that it would be more profitable to keep them, in their own hands. They now keep as much as they can, and if they had stock, they would keep more; so that, it would seem, that the estates, small as they are, are already too great, in some instances; and that a further division and diminution, rather than an union of estates, would promote improvement. It is the general want of stock, rather than an improper distribution of the little there is, which keeps down improvement. A light land tax in Canara and Malabar, is the only thing to increase the stock of the country; to make those who are now thriving proprietors, opulent; and those who are now poor, thriving. In other provinces, a light assessment, which shall leave to the farmers a share of landlord's rent, will have the same effects. But collecting the rent through the medium of an hereditary bailiff, such as the mootahdar, who seldom has half a dozen bullocks of his own; who is a mere farmer of revenue, can do no good to the country, by increasing agricultural stock. If indeed, the sunnud of permanent possession, Milkut Istimrar, had a magic operation; if it at once doubled the agricultural stock of the country, it would be far superior to the philosopher's stone, and I should acquiesce in its immediate and general introduction into these provinces; but no person will mistake so far as to believe, that we can create property, by a stroke of the pen; without making some sacrifice. We must either give up a share of the advantages now drawn by government, or we must transfer individual rights, to do any material benefit to the mootahdar. If we set up a mootahdar, he must be raised either, at the expense of government, or of the ryots. If it be done at the expense of government, the capital of the country will be increased, in proportion to the sacrifice made by government. If it be done, at the expense of the ryots, the general stock and property may be in some measure transferred, but not generally increased.

In Malabar and Canara, where there are no tanks, I do not see how great capitals could be employed, even though we could make them. Some expense is incurred by damming up rivers to prevent their flooding, or to preserve their water for cultivation. This expense should be considered, and deducted from the rental of the estates in which it is usually incurred. The land tax will consequently be lighter. Stock may be expended, in planting gardens in particular situations; but of all kinds of husbandry, gardening is best managed by a small proprietor. The minute attention, local knowledge, and petty hand work, which a garden requires, can be given much better by a small proprietor, than by any other person. The same cause which makes the labour of hired labourers cheaper and more efficient than that of slaves, makes the exertions of the farmer still more efficient than that of the labourer, and the proprietor's labours again more efficient than those of the farmer. The more their interest is concerned, the harder they work; and with the greater effect is their labour applied, whether it be that of the head or of the hand.

The issue of tucavay in Malabar is not usual, though it is in Canara and the other provinces. But there it would become unnecessary, if the proprietors were not in some cases over-burthened with the land tax. But if the old custom of receiving tucavay should still make the people expect it, I see no good reason why government should not assist its poorer subjects, with an occasional loan. The issue of tucavay does not prove that great farms are necessary, that mootahs are great farms on great estates, and therefore better than small. It only proves that there is but little stock in the country; that poor men have no money, and must either borrow or beg; that the assessment is too high; for if the land tax or rent of a poor ryot, who is forced to take tucavay, was lowered, his private rent, which he himself keeps, would be increased, so that he could do without tucavay. It cannot be said of such a man, that he would spend any remission of rent in extravagant pleasure, not save it to carry on his cultivation; for the collector is satisfied with his industry and frugality, before he trusts him with an advance of tucavay; and the same honesty and frugality which gives him credit to borrow of the circar, would make him apply his increased share of the rent, to the accumulation of stock. Where the land is private property, and the proprietor draws a good share of the rent, the issue of tucavay is not absolutely necessary, because he could always borrow of an individual on the security of his land, as a great many landholders and ryots now do; but even though he can borrow of an individual, he will sooner apply for tucavay, because there is no interest to pay. As government are interested about the ease of the people, and always have a few thousand pagodas lying idle in the cash chest; and as they must have collectors and accountants, whether they advance it or no; and as such collectors and accountants have hitherto safely transacted the business relating to tucavay; I see no reason why government should refuse a loan to its poor subjects, when they have money lying in their cash chest. I fancy, that some of the petty princes, and even the great Prussia, did not think this piece of policy beneath them in Europe.

I have said a good deal about great and small farms and estates, not because it relates to the question of ryotwar and mootawar, but because, from the inaccuracy of the English language, the term, farm, applies to farmers of revenue, and farmers of land. One of our chief faults in India, is the considering things according to their English terms, which are indeed ambiguous, as applied to English affairs; but when applied to Indian concerns, are sometimes unintelligible. A farm in some of our regulations, seems to be judged of by the same rules, whether it be a farm of land, or a farm of revenue. The arguments applicable to a farm of land, are used, in respect to a farm of revenue; these arguments



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war Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray; 4th  
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to a farm of revenue, to a farm of land; and those applicable to either of them, to great and small estates.

As we generally see Indian affairs with English eyes; and carry European notions into Indian practice; it may be necessary to say a little respecting the gradation of ranks, or in other words, the inequality of condition, which is supposed by some to be necessary in a well ordered society, and may be urged as an argument against the general distribution of land, among a great number of small proprietors. Our veneration for wealth is very proper, perhaps, because it tends to the security of property; but sometimes we seem to carry it so far, as to imagine that opulent men enrich society, instead of society enriching them. When a man has acquired wealth by superior industry, or talents, or good fortune, or when his ancestors have acquired it, his wealth entitles him to respect. It is the great end of civil compact, to secure it to him. Were it not secure, industry would not only be damped; but a general confusion would take place. This is all evident; but for us, to set about a scheme to make a certain set rich, at the expense of the public, with a view to public benefit, is to commit injustice, without obtaining any equivalent advantage; and the least evil it will occasion, will be the hastening perhaps the chief evil of opulence, the inequality of conditions; for though the rich and great, especially in the East, sometimes imagine that their wealth and grandeur promote the public prosperity, yet it will be found, without a very close enquiry, that this inequality of condition is an evil, although a very necessary evil, which always accompanies, and is therefore by superficial observers thought to be the cause of national prosperity: but although it be like some other evils, the constant companion of opulence, it is still an evil both in India and Europe. If one rich man engrosses many of the good things of life, many poor must go, without them. One fat rajah supposes fifty-two ryots. These inequalities are the consequence of opulence, and are on the whole, evils, which will follow of themselves, as far as the customs of the Hindoos allow them. We need not hasten them. If any of the landed proprietors of Canara, or Malabar, and the rest of the Peninsula (if we make them all landlords) should by industry and good fortune increase their estates, so much the better. I heartily wish they may. I should never propose an Agrarian law. I would never interfere with their estates, acquired in this natural and gradual manner; but when we are settling a country, we must not try to introduce inequalities, by positive regulations; we must let them all start fair; and leave the rest to fortune, and their own industry. If any become rich, buy land, and raise a great estate, it will probably be divided at their decease, and as many more estates as there are heirs, will spring up from the ashes of the rich old man; but the generality will remain more nearly on an equality, than in most other countries; because the climate of Malabar and Canara yield a surer harvest than in other countries, and because their industry and parsimony are nearly the same.

This equality of condition, in respect to wealth in land; this general distribution of the soil among a yeomanry, therefore, if it be not most adapted to agricultural improvement, is best adapted to attain improvement, in the state of property, manners and institutions, which prevail in India; and it will be found still more adapted to the situation of the country, governed by a few strangers, where pride, high ideas, and ambitious thoughts, must be stifled. It is very proper, that in England, a good share of the produce of the earth should be appropriated to support certain families in affluence, to produce senators, sages, and heroes for the service and defence of the state, or, in other words, that great part of the rent should go to an opulent nobility and gentry, who are to serve their country in parliament, in the army and navy, in the departments of science and liberal professions. The leisure, independence, and high ideas, which the enjoyment of this rent affords, has enabled them to raise Britain to the pinnacle of glory. Long may they enjoy it;—but in India, that mighty spirit, independence, and deep thought, which the possession of great wealth sometimes gives, ought to be suppressed. They are directly adverse to our power and interest. The nature of things, the past experience of all governments, renders it unnecessary to enlarge on this subject. We do not want generals, statesmen, and legislators; we want industrious husbandmen. If we wanted rank, restless and ambitious spirits, there are enough of them in Malabar, to supply the whole peninsula; but these people, are at least an incumbrance, if nothing worse; they can never do good, and at all events, consume a good deal, without rendering any equivalent service to the public. We must therefore avoid the creation of more; though we submit to the necessity of supporting those who now are.

Politically therefore, the general distribution of land, among a number of small proprietors, who cannot easily combine against government, is an object of importance. Power and patronage, and receipt of the circuit rent, will always render the government formidable, but more or less so, according to the military strength and reputation of the government. It is difficult to foresee what may happen in the course of a few years, and it is in our interest to retain in our own hands, as much power and influence as is consistent with the preservation of the rights of the people. By retaining the administration of the revenues in our own hands, we maintain our communication and intimate acquaintance with the people at large. We keep in our own hands, the means of obtaining information, the knowledge of which alone the resources of the country can be drawn out, and the policy administered with effect; and perhaps the body of the proprietors

Our first object is to govern India; and then, to govern it well;—and in these provinces, it would seem that both these objects, a strong government, and the security of private rights, would be attained, by a settlement such as I have proposed.

The general distribution of land among a great number of small proprietors, will also contribute to the general happiness of the people. I say happiness, because it is our duty to consider the happiness of the mild, industrious race, which Providence has placed under the British government, before revenue or any other objects. The domestic happiness, independence, and pleasure of a country life; which the distribution of landed property alone can confer on the multitude, makes this far superior to any system. It may be considered an Utopia by some; however, I think that government can and ought to extend this happy system to these provinces. The people of this country are peculiarly adapted to thrive, as small proprietors. All their customs, opinions and virtues, are suited to this sort of life, and adapted to make them succeed in it. No people are fonder of a house, ground, and place of their own, of their families, of fame among their equals, of their hereditary occupations, and of the profession of agriculture, than the Hindoos. Had they a field for a display of the industry which these feelings would excite, this great country would have a different appearance.

The ryots are laborious, and in some respects, parsimonious, inherit their skill and attachment to husbandry. We sometimes, especially those among us who know least of them, affect a contempt for the natives; they are indeed, objects of pity, if our contempt for their character, suggests ideas of arbitrary government: but considered as husbandmen, who have understood and carried to perfection that primeval business of man (the cultivation of the earth) for thousands of years, they are very respectable. A few centuries ago, the peasantry of England, and even now, the peasantry in many parts of Europe, are considered as inferior beings by their proud masters, the great landholders, (the zemindars) who urged their idleness, ignorance, and brutality, as a reason for keeping them in vassalage. Some great philosophers have affected to attribute to them indolence, not to be excited by any inducement; want of mental and bodily strength, which fitted them only for slavery to the people of hot climates.

They attributed to climate, what is rather owing to the nature of the country, open and subject to invasion, than to the natural character of the people. It would be impertinent to show that the people of hot countries have been conquerors, sages, and statesmen, merely to prove that the ryots are capable of becoming independent proprietors; but I cannot help observing, that Europe, now so industrious, when abused by petty tyrants, distracted by civil wars, and invaded by barbarians, was worse cultivated than this country perhaps ever was, since the days of Menus, who is said to be Minos; and that is carrying their cultivation far enough into antiquity.—The farmers of Europe seem to have been far less skilful, industrious, and respectable, for many centuries, than those who have survived the calamities which have now for so many years, been heaped upon these provinces. The people of India cannot be accused of neglecting their own interest; we see instances of industry and parsimony, which Jews might boast of. The people of the towns in which property is secured by courts of justice, take as much pains, run as great risks, and succeed as well as any people in the world, in acquiring property. It would be monstrous in us to lay it down as a rule, that they must be stimulated to industry by an heavy assessment; driven like slaves, not led like men by a sense of interest; that they are incapable of property, and must be urged by a heavy rent, and then justify our rule, by a quotation from Montesquieu or Aristotle, that the natives of hot countries are only fitted for slavery. Several wise statesmen and fine scholars have thought otherwise, when they knew their language, works, and qualities. Their superstition may be lamented; but it is the superstition of government, not of the people, that ruins or depresses national prosperity; the same desire of gain, the same self-interest, which urges Jews, and Turks, and Christians, will stimulate their industry. The Moors of Spain were, and the Moplas of Malabar are, a most industrious people; the Turks of Europe, the Moormen of the Carnatic, are a most lazy people;—yet they are of the same religion. The Hindoos, who formerly embellished, were a different set from those who now vegetate in many parts of the country; whether they worship domestic devils, as they do in Canara, or big-bellied gods, like Guenies, or monkey-gods, as Hancock, they will attend to their own interest, as soon as security and property are bestowed upon them. The innocent polytheism of the vulgar Hindoo, the sublime metaphysical system of the Bramins, discourage industry, marriage, and the domestic virtues, which produce population and opulence. The same kind of superstition promoted the agriculture and population of ancient Egypt, and China and India. Those sages, whose works are read in our schools, who were a great measure, form the minds of our statesmen, learnt their wisdom from Egypt and Egypt. We judge of the high-spirited rajah, the ferocious poligar, the ambitious Achari, the long-headed Nizam Shahi accountant, the industrious ryot, and the cunning artificer, from those wretches who are introduced to our fine acquaintance, as slaves. The natives have clear heads, powers of application and perseverance, in a greater degree than Europeans raised in India; and these are qualities particularly suited to business, and calculated to produce individual and general opulence. Our superiors in most respects than natural. When they were a polished people, as, in Britain, were the Romans, would have thought the people on the banks of the Ganges far more civilized than the Thracians: these golden days may return, if we take the proper measures, and desire the ultimate advantages. I have been led to this digression on the Hindoos.

Documents relative to  
Zemindarry and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Flockerty; 4th  
August 1867.

observing how common it is for us to undervalue their virtues, and exaggerate their vices.

In whatever way it be done, the settlement ought to be moderate; as long as the people are not oppressed with a heavy land-tax, it little signifies how it be collected. Whether a light land revenue be collected through the medium of collectors, or mōtāhdars, the country will thrive; but no systems, no cookery, can make a heavy land revenue easy; and under any system, a light land revenue will produce improvement and prosperity. This is a truth, which every enquiry I could make, only serves to confirm.

Having now, I think, said enough respecting these sister provinces, Canara and Malabar, I shall proceed to the Ceded Districts, and begin with some general observations on the revenue systems, which have hitherto prevailed in this peninsula.

So much has already been written respecting the provinces of Malabar and Canara, by people of greater abilities, and more local experience, than myself, that I am loth to treat a subject, already so much better discussed than I can possibly do it; I have gleaned what little they seem to have left, and have compared and considered their opinions wherever I found it convenient.

All this Peninsula, it may be said, except, perhaps, only Canara, Malabar, and a few other provinces, has exhibited, from time immemorial, but one system of land revenue. The land has been considered the property of the circar and the ryots; the interest in the soil has been divided between these two, but the ryots have possessed little more interest than that of being hereditary tenants. If any persons have a claim to participate with government in the property in the soil, it is the ryots; the men who originally reclaimed and cultivated the lands. The country is divided into villages; a village, geographically, is a tract of country, comprizing some thousand acres of waste and arable lands. Considered politically, it is a little republic, or rather corporation, having its municipal officers, and corporate artificers; its boundaries are hardly ever altered. There it stands for centuries; and though occasionally injured, or even desolated, by war or famine, the same name, boundaries, interests, and perhaps even families, remain the hereditary tenants of the land for centuries.

The government collects the rent of the village from the farmers who cultivate it. Some of these farmers, have a thousand, but generally less, often under a hundred acres. There seem to have been, at all times, three temporary modes in which government collected its rent, and one permanent one, which we have introduced. Of the three temporary modes, the first is the *ryotwar-kulwar*, or individual settlement; the second is the *monzawar-gangana*, or village settlement; the third, the *ijarah*, or farm of several villages. These are temporary. The fourth, is the *mōtāhdarry*, or permanent settlement, introduced by us.

Under the ryotwar settlement, where government is supposed to settle and collect the rent from each farmer, the ryots usually, under native governments, pay a rack-rent; at least so heavy a rent, that at the end of the year, they are little better, if not worse, than they were at the beginning. Under the Company's government, the whole landlord's rent, that is, the whole net produce, is usually paid by the ryots. In the zemindarry countries, the ryots did not pay so much perhaps to the circar; but they paid a great deal in *gram-kirch*, or village expenditure. This is considered by some persons to be usually an indulgence; but it has every where been carried such lengths, that it in reality became a fraud on government, by a deduction or an oppression on the ryot, by an addition to the rent.

In districts under the immediate management of able collectors, this expenditure took place, in a smaller degree; not more, than 5 or 6 per cent. perhaps. In the Circars and other unsurveyed districts it might, and perhaps now exceeds 10 per cent. In Polaveram, I remember, the private expenditure exceeded the public rent. In the Ceded Districts, there is, probably, but little private expenditure: but whether it was brought to account in revenue, or privately expended, it was all the same to the ryot; since the revenue and village servants, took care at any rate, to get full rent out of him. The government however, suffers by this clandestine expenditure, not so much perhaps on account of the actual loss sustained, as because, as it is kept in ignorance of the real resources and expenses of the state; it is supposed that the revenues are collected in one province much cheaper than in another, and government is sometimes apt to blame the most frugal collector as extravagant, because he has been more vigilant or candid than others, in having every thing publicly brought to account. I formerly thought, that by a proper investigation into unauthorized collections and disbursements, that a considerable sum, which is now spent in this way, might be partly added to circar rent, partly remitted to the ryots in the Northern circars; but that is impossible. When the revenue administration is vigorous, private assessments are small; when it is weak, they are heavy and frequent, sometimes enormous, as I have instanced in the case of Polaveram. This is one strong reason to wish that the courts had no interference till the permanent settlement was made, and that the *curnums* be kept under the controul of the collector. Any regulations checking collectors in this respect, seem adapted to shield speculators of revenue. Between the court and *cutcherry* there will be no means of stopping private collections, unless the *curnums* be kept under the collector.—To return from this digression, to the rent of the ryot; it is evident that in a country, where stock and population are at a low ebb, a greater share of the produce should go to the ryot, to encourage agriculture. In some parts of the Company's country, he may perhaps keep

to, or even twenty per cent. of the landlord's rent\*; but very seldom so much of the rent sticks to the land; and if bad seasons, during which the ryot can raise no produce at all, be taken into the account, it will perhaps be generally found, that he pays the full landlord's rent. Even though the rent of bad seasons be remitted, the ryot still loses by them, because he must subsist himself and his stock in idleness, upon the profits of former years.

Documents relative to Zemindary and Ryot-war Settlements.

Extracts from Report of Mr. Thackeray; 4th August 1807.

In many places, the trouble and difficulty of settling with each farmer, induced the officers of government to let out the lands of the whole village in a lump to a farmer, who again subrented each field, and settled with each ryot to the community of the village, who settled among themselves the amount of their respective rent. The farmer might be partial in distributing the rent of the whole village among the ryots; but they generally settled it among themselves, pretty fairly.

This custom, for the village community to farm the whole village for a certain sum, is common in the Circars; and seems the best mode of management they have there. The zemindars frequently let whole villages in this manner, to the village community, and now sometimes for a term of years. This is the system upon which our permanent settlement should be founded. We ought to make a permanent settlement with the whole inhabitants, for the whole lands of the village.

In some cases, neither individual nor village settlements were resorted to. The circar or zemindar, farmed out tracts, comprizing several villages, for one or more years, to great farmers, frequently unconnected with the land; they were often soucars, who had advanced money to the circar, or persons whose profession it was to live by concerns of this kind, and who were like revenue servants, except that their services were compensated by the profits of a farm, instead of wages. The zemindars themselves, were farmers of this description; for their leases were generally annual, and the rent was liable to increase, at the renewal of the cowl.

They were generally more attentive indeed to the interests of the country, than mere farmers; because, as government generally continued them, or were unable to remove them from their situations, they considered themselves more interested in the prosperity of the country. Under the great zemindars this practice will always continue, perhaps because the cheapest way of managing large tracts of country, in size, and other circumstances, more like principalities than private estates. Such zemindars, if they do not farm out in this mode, usually have tehsildars, on the footing of those in the Company's own districts. In some cases, the men who were tehsildars under the collector, remained in the same situation, when the country was made over to the zemindar.

On such large estates, therefore, it would seem improbable that the ryot will derive any benefit from the permanent settlement, any further than that as he is free to remove his stock, and labour to another zemindar, he will probably do so, unless he is well treated. The court is a check also to exactions of the aumildars and farmers.

These three, seem to be the only systems which have ever been adopted, previous to the permanent settlement; and under none of them, did the country rapidly improve. This slow advance to improvement was owing to two causes, high rent, and annual settlements. These are the real causes of the general depression of agriculture; and while they exist, no great improvement can be expected. The government, seeing the evils of these temporary settlements, with a view to remedy them, introduced the permanent, or mootahdary settlement, which, in case of zemindars, who were in actual possession at the time of the settlement, seems to admit of little objection: but when the country was divided into mootahs and sold, it may be urged against this system, that it was an ingenious attempt to confer advantages without making sacrifices; that it was an attempt to create property, without rent. It is said by the enemies of this system, that it did not constitute private property in the soil; for that government merely farmed out the landlord's rent to certain contractors, who undertook to collect and pay it regularly, for a certain commission; that the government share of the produce derivable from the waste lands and some sundry advantages, were, it is true, ceded to the mootahdar; but that government were determined to get a compensation for these advantages, which they transferred; so they sold the mootahs; that the price at which they were sold, might be considered high to the farmer who bought, but low in respect to government which sold; because the waste, the chief advantage disposed of, is like bales in the company's godown, when there is no demand in the market. In such a case, it may happen that no private merchant can afford to give the Company's price; but still it may not be worth their while to sell for less, because they have perhaps better means of keeping and disposing of them, than any individual. The sum was therefore inadequate to the Company, but very heavy to the purchaser, and must, at all events, have diminished his means of improving his new purchase. Some sensible natives who have been for years, in revenue situations under our and under native governments, and have had concern in mootahs, seem at a loss to understand the policy of selling the mootahs, which they say gives rise to such a scene of gambling that ruins many individuals, and must occasion a loss to agriculture. Low people, shopkeepers, gomastahs and others, often borrow, clubbing their credit together and pledging the future profits of the mootahs, for the security of the loan: this money so borrowed, they pay to government, as nuzzeranah, or purchase money, and are obliged to strain every nerve to repay their creditors. The natives are at a loss to guess what we would

\* Note.—Where this is the case, the land becomes saleable property; or, if considered circar land, the officers of government get something for permitting the farmer to hold it.

Documents relative to  
Boundary and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray; 14th  
August 1807.

be at. Government used formerly, to find it their interest to issue tuckavy, but now on a sudden, without any apparent increase of stock, they not only refuse tuckavy, but (say the natives) by a gambling scheme, drain great part of the ready money out of the hands of those very persons, to whom they had entrusted the lands, in order to improve them, by increased industry and capital.

Whatever system is adopted, let us not sell the mootahs. This bargain we termed, the permanent settlement; but it was in reality, a contract, an insurance, a farm; it was like a young landlord (say the opposers to this system) who to save trouble, or ease himself of a burden, which he could not support, exchanged the solid property in his estate, for a sum of money paid down, and a rent charge, or annuity secured upon the land. In such a case, the new purchaser might manage better than the first proprietor, and the estate might be improved; so far the public, and even the first proprietor too might benefit; because as he was unqualified to manage his estate himself, his rent might have been less secure, than his annuity; but every one would condemn the laziness which prompted, or the inefficiency which made such a bargain advantageous to the landlord.

The necessities of government, it would appear, obliged them to reserve the whole landlord's rent; their supposed incapacity to manage, made them exchange their solid property, for a rent charge secured on the land, that is, on the rent payable by the ryots. But the government did not transfer the actual property in the soil to the mootahdar, and at once make them landlords; because they kept as much rent as they could, and only remitted so much, as seemed absolutely necessary to ensure the realization of it. The price at which the mootahs were sold, shows that the property disposed of, was not valuable: the Salem mootahs originally sold for 10 per cent. on the annual jumma. What kind of an estate is that which sells for 10 per cent. of the land tax, for one year. In England, where the rental is £.2,000. the land-tax at 4 shillings in the pound is £.400.: what would be said to a man who sold such an estate for £.76.; which is 10 per cent. on £.400. But the land-tax of England, in many cases is not in reality sixpence in the pound; so that the estate in England is a very different thing from the mootah in India; as different as a farm is from an estate\*.

The per-centage drawn by the mootahdar, is a commission to ensure him against losses, and to compensate for his trouble and skill of superintendence. Until the net produce of the mootah is nearly doubled, there will be no landlord's rent for the mootahdar. When it is doubled, the mootahdar will pay half to government, and keep half himself, as rent. This increase, may not take place these fifty years, and until it takes place, the mootahdar cannot be a landlord, properly speaking, because he will not enjoy half the rent, but the net produce; the rent must be trebled before the ryots can possibly become small proprietors, and draw a share of the rent. The first increase, must certainly go to the mootahdars, to give them a rent; and even though the net produce be trebled, it is not likely that the second increase will go to the ryots, to give them a landlord's rent.

The mootahdar cannot alienate land, he cannot even legally let land for a term of years at less than the customary rent; because, did the law allow him to do so, he might clandestinely transfer the pledge which government must always keep, as security for the due performance of his engagements to them. The rents of the lands are the security for the government demand; and they cannot be alienated. The ryot has, therefore, no chance of ever becoming a small proprietor, in the way in which free tenants and villains became copyholders. There are other circumstances which concur to keep the body of ryots in their present dependent state under mootahdars, and render their situation very different from that of the tenants in Europe, who have become freeholders. They become freeholders or copyholders in Europe, by encroachments upon the landlords, or by improving their lands to such a degree, that the old service or fee, or rent, which still continued the same, became trifling in comparison to the net produce raised on the land, and which became the copyholder's rent, and gave him so great an interest in the land, that he became the actual proprietor. But here, the government, by drawing the rent which is now the full landlord's rent, will prevent the ryot from raising a rent for himself by improvement, and will oblige him to interfere by laws, to prevent the alienation of rent from the mootahdar, who is answerable for his rent. The government must oblige the mootahdar to keep the rent, even against his own consent; for he being but an hereditary farmer, his mootah being security for his rent to government, he can never, ought never, to be permitted to alienate land, or, what is the same thing, remit rent. He may indeed do it, for a time. He may do it, as long as he holds the mootah, but as the favoured lessee will be always liable to the full rent, he can never consider himself fixed on his land, as a proprietor. Thus the mootahdar system (say its enemies) clinches the farming system, and crushes the hope of ever making the body of the people small proprietors, and fixing them on estates, such as those in Canara and Malabar; and as it stands at present, it certainly is a farming system, from top to bottom; but of hereditary farming. The smaller tracts of country disposed of in this way, are termed mootahs; the larger, zemindarries. There is no other difference, not in respect to their extent. The mootahs must, by the operation of the Hindoo law, divide; and in time, would dwindle to small freeholds, did not the Regulations prevent the division. Mootahs would in time, come down to ryotwar estates, were it not for this arbitrary

\* Many estates will not sell, at a price like transmutation. Our system of landed property is like transmutation. We see with declaration in the preamble to Reg. XXV. the Mootahdars and proprietors; we say, *Hoc est corpus*; but by the operation of the courts, and general sentiments held on the

subject, it appears that they are merely hereditary farmers of revenue; that the qualities of property, at least, in the valuable part of the estates, are divided; and that the mootahdar, who is held out in the Regulations as the proprietor, has but a very limited interest in the land.

arbitrary law. If the Regulations did not interfere, a mootahdar who had four sons, and a mootah paying 1,000 pagodas annual jumma, would divide it among them, and each would, according to the law, take a portion from which 250 pagodas were payable to government. But the Regulations prevent the existence of any independent estate, paying less than 500 pagodas annual jumma. This arbitrary law, (say those natives who disapprove of the system and consider the mootahdars, actual proprietors), tends to fetter the division and alienation of land. It is true, that it will not prevent entirely the division of estates, because it will be done under hand; but it has that tendency. The four brothers will in spite of the law, divide the estate, and two of them will club together, enter their estate under one name, and pay the 500 pagodas rent conjointly; but, say the objectors to the system, the estate will be less valuable which is subject to the difficulties, dispute, and intricacies, which a law imposing such a forced co-partnership, must produce.

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Zemindary and Ryot-  
war Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray, 4th  
August 1807.

Indeed, the objections urged against the limitation of 500 pagodas annual rent, seem pretty well founded. If the mootahdar be considered a proprietor, not an hereditary collector of revenue, it acts apparently like those feudal laws, like entails and other institutions destructive of improvement, which the wisdom of England has been gradually abolishing.

Indeed this law, seems dictated by principles very different from those which suggested every popular law, in support of the yeomanry of England. What would be said in Parliament, if it were proposed to have no independent landed estates, paying a less land tax than £200. per annum?—All the endeavours of the popular party in Parliament, since Edward III.'s time, seem to have tended to remove the obstacles to the free transfer of land; and in this country, where the landed property must be divided, as fast as the multiplication of mankind; where prosperity must produce the general distribution of property, as it produces families of children; in this country, a law which limits, or even tends to limit, the division and transfer of land, is contrary to the nature of things. It is to make the immutable nature of things, give way to supposed official convenience. It is trying to make things fit themselves to laws; instead of trying to make laws, adapted to circumstances. Such a regulation might answer, perhaps, in Poland, where none but a great nobility holds vast estates; but in this country, the interests of agriculture and population must, one would imagine, be injured, by so arbitrary a regulation. By thus fixing a maximum, or rather minimum, of 500 pagodas annual government rent, we prevent many of the better sort of ryots, from becoming government tenants. They would often take 1,000 acres at once from government in perpetuity, but that this regulation restrains them, and throws the mootah into the hands of an adventurer\*.

The mootahdarry system, as it stands at present, comprises an unnatural mixture of corporeal and incorporeal, of occupant and proprietary rights, as they are termed; or rather it is a division of the substance, a separation of the attributes of property (which its enemies say) must produce confusion, law suits, and a progeny of tenures, more intricate than those which sprung up in Europe, from the absurdities of the feudal system. Why, it may be said, must we introduce a bastard kind of feudal law, when we have so simple a system as that which has at all times existed in this Peninsula?—As government still remains the landlord, the mootahdar, for many years at least, will be nothing more than a fixed farmer. Real substantial ownership in the soil, cannot therefore exist. A farmer can never bestow proprietary rights. The ryots therefore do, and will, consider themselves as much tenants as ever; they will wander about perhaps more than ever. The advantages which they derive from the system, seems to arise from the market, which the competition among the mootahdars opens for their labour; for the ryots, now, can remove from one mootah where they think that bad terms are offered them, to one, where they get better; they can carry their labour and stock to a fair market, which they could not do, under any native, not, perhaps, under the Company's government, in some places. But it seems to be the general protection which the husbandman, in common with the other subjects of the Company, derive from the justice of government, that secures them this fair market for their stock and labour. In the Barahmah, the ryots have this way, extorted better terms from the necessitous mootahdars. Those who were rich, indeed, and could afford to lose a year's revenue, it is said would not remit a dub from the customary rent; but those who were poor, were obliged to offer good terms, and the ryots consequently may be said to have derived advantage from the system. But still it seems doubtful whether this frequent removal, this migration from farm to farm, may not, on the long run, do as much harm, as good terms to the ryots, may produce advantages; because temporary farmers can never raise so much produce from the same land as fixed tenants, still less than small proprietors.

From all my enquiries, this seems the chief advantage resulting from the system to the bulk of the ryots. It secures them, the free full enjoyment of their limits, their skill in husbandry; they have a fair market for their labour and stock. This is a great advantage, it is true; and has tended to increase cultivation, in the mootah districts; but this free market may be secured, without farming the land revenue. A fixed rent, and liberty to throw up or cultivate what land they please, would secure it; but this is not enough to give them that spirit which I am anxious to see diffused among them. They must have increased means of supporting their families, and augmenting their stock. If humanity, to which

\* If indeed the Mootahdar be considered merely an hereditary Collector, these arguments do not apply, as to an agent.



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we pretend so much, be the spring of our actions; if policy, which we equally boast of, direct our measures, let us remit to the ryot such a portion of rent, as shall fix him at once to his field; as shall put him above the uncertain forced indulgence of a mootahdar. It is admitted, that a remission, if not absolutely necessary to the existence of the ryots, would increase their comforts, and augment their stock: why then shall we refuse it to them, and grant it to a set of men, to be created on purpose to enjoy it, in the hope of their giving up a little of it, to the ryots? Let us do it, direct. Why must we take the roundabout, instead of the strait road? It is admitted, that upon the industry and stock of the ryots, the hereditary farmers, not only the public revenue, but the public subsistence, depend; why then must we refuse to them, what we gave up so freely to the mootahdar, in the hope of its reaching them, by that roundabout course?—Under the mootahdarry system, the remission will perhaps filter through mootahdars, renters, and subrenters; and a little of it, may reach the ryots; but had we not better pour it upon their heads, at once. The ryot pays 45 per cent. of the produce in the Ceded Districts, give him up 12 or 15 per cent. more; and he will become a proprietor; at least, his interests in the land, his situation will make him more like, what we usually call a proprietor, than the mootahdar. He will then buy another bullock, then dig a well, and apply the share of the rent, which he draws, to the increase of his stock, and improvement of his land; for he feels, fixed in it; he feels, a property in it. The remission is applied immediately to increase and encourage his stock and industry. It is vested in the soil; it is made direct. If therefore, we pretend to be guided by humanity, there is no disputing the advantage of this system. Of its policy, to my mind, there seems little doubt, except as to the immediate diminution of revenue.

In regard to the cheapness and facility of collection; the mootahdarry system is, no doubt, a little cheaper than even a fixed ryotwarry settlement; but still (say its adversaries) we could suggest, a cheaper and simpler still; suppose for instance, government divide the Ceded Districts, or any other large province, into great farms, of two or three laes of pagodas each, and advertise for sealed proposals, promising to give these farms, to the highest bidder, many adventurers would come forward, and would not only offer, but would perhaps actually collect and pay the revenue, at a much less expense than it could be collected, under any other system. Such a plan would also (say the friends of the ryotwarry) be attended with many other advantages, attributed to the mootahdarry system. Accounts would be simplified. The board of revenue, and the collectors, would not be plagued, with the settlements, with the troublesome details of maccavy and tank repairs. If the mootahdarry system is good, because simple; this plan is still better, because more simple still. If good, because cheap; this is better, because cheaper still. That a ryotwarry system, is attended with some detail, and that the revenue officers must think and act a little, to carry it on well, is true; but all governments, all human affairs, are attended with some difficulty and trouble; and the more pains that are bestowed upon them, the better are they in general conducted. However (continue the advocates for ryotwarry) a fixed ryotwarry system will not, on the whole, be more difficult or intricate than the mootahdarry system, when estates begin to diminish, by the operation of the Hindoo law of succession. The various intricate tenures, law suits, the distribution of government rent, upon divided portions of mootahs, will at least produce as much trouble, in one shape as another; to one person or another, as the ryotwarry. If the collectors are a little relieved, the courts of justice will be overwhelmed; and law suits and delays will tend to lower the value of land. There indeed, seems to be some justice in this objection to mootahs, and in the representations of the advocates for ryotwarry, who say, that when the rent of each field is fixed at so low a rate, that the ryot becomes a fixed farmer, and in time, a proprietor, the register of a collector will in time, be like the roll of an army; he will collect, as easily from 20,000 small land-owners, as the paymaster pays 20,000 soldiers: at least, allowing for the difference between the difficulty of getting men to pay, and easiness of getting them to receive, their proper quota of money. In England the land-tax is light, and fixed, and I believe, does not involve much detail or difficulty: but the window-tax, the excise, the customs, must be full as intricate; must require as many accounts, must involve as much trouble, as a ryotwar settlement. Even here, the customs in any frontier district, require more attention to accounts, and more intricate details, than the whole ryotwarry detail of land revenue. It appears extraordinary to many people, and among others, to me, that under a government like ours, where there are so many boards, secretaries, collectors and civilians; so many gentlemen of the pen, well paid and well qualified to conduct this formidable detail; men who have conducted it successfully for some years; that the trouble should be urged, as an argument in favour of mootahs.

I have often heard men, very able (and with proper encouragement and support) willing to conduct any detailed settlement, object to the ryotwarry settlement on this very account; but the commander in chief might as well order family chits, monthly abstracts, or any other useful documents to be discontinued on account of the detail; as for a civil government, so well furnished with officers, and with such means of making those officers zealous and able, to object to a system, because it involves a good deal of trouble and detail.

Our government ought to be a more enlightened, civilized government, than that of the natives; and therefore more able to carry on the details, by which alone any taxes can be equally and correctly assessed and collected. A Gothic chieftain, on the conquest of a province, might have objected to the forms of a Roman prefecture, and might have ordered the revenues to be collected, without any accounts at all; but the Tartars, who conquered India, barbarous as we may term them, were more politic than to do so. They were

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were very particular about accounts; established wise regulations and checks upon the different revenue officers; and it is their system, which now exists in most parts of this peninsula, as well as in almost every part of Asia. A man, it might be said, might as well object to any curious piece of machinery in a great manufacture, that it was liable to get out of order, that it was very intricate, and that it would therefore be better to break it to pieces, and carry on the work without it. In every department in war, in trade, in revenue, there must be accounts and details. The Company might as well burn their books, on account of the detail and trouble attending the keeping them, as order a mootahdary system, because their servants cannot manage the detail. The sales of tea at the India-house, we are say, involve more difficulty respecting accounts, than all the details of the land revenue of the ryotwar collectorates on the coast. Government have only to give their revenue servants good salaries, to turn out those who are idle or incapable, to support and encourage those who are clever and industrious; and men will easily be found to manage this formidable detail. Annual settlements, it is true, are very troublesome; but when each ryot has a fixed and light rent, there will be but little difficulty. The expense after all, is nearly the same in both cases. We must either keep revenue servants of our own, or must make an allowance to the mootahdar to keep them. In respect to the trouble, I own that every person has an interest in introducing the mootahdary system, because it saves every body a great deal of trouble. I consider that I need not have made this long journey, nor written this long paper, had not your Lordship suggested the possibility of making a permanent settlement, direct with the ryots; but I am sure, that with the generality of my brother civilians, the trouble will not be a reason for opposing any system.

It is supposed, by some considerate persons, that government ought not to collect its rent at once from the actual cultivators: that some one, should stand between the mighty sovereign and lowly cultivator: and they are therefore led to approve of some middle man, some go-between. In this peninsula, however, the ryots appear to have been always the tenants of government. Whether government collected its rents through the medium of hereditary officers of different descriptions (but all classed under the term of zemindars) or through temporary collectors, merely termed amils, or tehsildars or tanahdars, the ryots were still government tenants; and therefore the system, from being general, and from having produced general prosperity, seems to be well adapted to the country. In this peninsula, the ryot is both landholder and farmer; the poor ryot is labourer too: in some districts, general poverty, occasioned by bad government and exactions, have reduced the great body of ryots to this threefold condition. However, the division of property among all the sons in a family, will always perhaps keep the bulk of the ryots, either small farmers, or small proprietors. Any set of men introduced between them and the government, which receives their rent, must be a description of bailiffs, stewards, contractors, by whatever name they be called, or under whatever conditions, permanent or temporary, they may act. It signifies little, either to the government, or to the ryot, whether the rent is paid direct to a collector, or through a zemindar to a collector, so long as the proper rent, and neither more or less, be paid. That mode of payment, which promises most security to government and to the ryot, is the best; but all middle men, farmers, contractors, and other intermediate agents, must get a profit, and generally a very great one, either openly or clandestinely; and the more of them there are, the greater sum must be divided among them. But in India particularly, they are hardly ever content with their legitimate profit; they will always keep a little of the money that passes through their hands. In the same way that the benefit of the permanent settlement must filter through the intermediate objects, before they reach the ryots; so must the public revenue pass through many channels, before it reaches the public treasury. The more channels, the more hands, through which it passes, the greater is the danger; the less the security of revenue. In the same way that they intercept the benefits of the remission; so may these intermediate farmers intercept the public revenue. The lands are no security for the public revenue, unless they are occupied by ryots, with industry and stock to cultivate them. There is land enough to afford ten times our present revenue perhaps; but ryots and stock are wanting, and the security of revenue must depend, on their prosperous condition. The mootahdar, I have observed, is seldom a ryot; if he is a ryot, has stock, and cultivates, he is neither more nor less a ryot; he has neither more nor less stock; he neither increases nor diminishes the stock of others, by his becoming a mootahdar: but, properly speaking, a mootahdar is a man to manage settlements and collections; he is a revenue officer; he cannot, therefore, introduce more stock than there was before. The system appears to affect agriculture no further than, as a financial measure. It is not even imagined by any person, however inattentive to these matters, that the mootahdar, on purchasing a mootah, comes down, a team, a dozen labourers, and a thousand pounds, to improve his farm, like a great Norfolk farmer, to take possession of a large farm which he has rented. No; perhaps he may think his dignity, now that he has become a mootahdar, requires an equipage; if, therefore, he formerly walked a-foot, he may take possession in state, mounted on a pariah horse, set down in the choultry of the village, and settle the ryots with the ryots, just in the same way, that the circar officers settled them before. Perhaps (for this is sometimes the case) he was a gomastah, or circar officer, before, on five or ten pagodas monthly

\*And perhaps ought not to be a farmer himself, since his attention would be distracted, by having two occupations, and he might neglect one or both of his trades.

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monthly pay, and settled the rents and managed the collections of the mootah, before;— and thus, being acquainted with its resources, had been induced to purchase it. Revenue cannot be secured, by the intermediate agency of such a man; as this. The land, it is said, is the security for the government rent, but so it was before. The mootahdar appears to offer no collateral security; he must go to jail if the mootah has been so impoverished during his management, that it will not sell for enough to pay his arrears to the circar. If he, by bad management, drives away the ryots, who will buy the ruined mootah? It is the stock on the mootah, that makes it so valuable. This stock belongs to the ryots, very seldom to the mootahdar. It is only when a great ryot becomes a mootahdar, that he has stock and land of his own: but, as it has been already observed, the law which keeps mootahs above 500 pagodas annual rent, prevents the ryots from taking mootahs, because so great a concern as a farm above 500 pagodas, is considered a revenue farm, a durbar concern, and attended with greater risk and management, than an individual ryot can incur. The greatest zemindar offers no better security than the rents of the zemindarry, or private fortune, derived from those very rents, which will generally be out of reach. How are the arrears against the zemindars, who have not paid regularly, to be recovered, but from the zemindarry lands? but lands were there before, and the ryots, who render them valuable. Before, nobody but the ryot could fail; now, not only the ryot, but the mootahdar, may fail: the rent may stop between the ryot and the cash chest. If the mootahdar fails, it may be said that the security consists of the incorporeal property of 25 per cent. of the rent clogged with the service of collection, and the risque of the farm, and of the property in waste. This property has not been clearly defined, nor is as yet clearly understood; but whatever it may be, it is put up to auction, and sold for the recovery of arrears: but it would seem, that the remission ought, if possible, to go to the ryots, to be applied to the land in such a way, that each farm might, as nearly as possible, be gradually converted into a little estate. It ought to go in retail, to the ryots; not in wholesale, to the mootahdar. In such case, the land of each ryot would in time, become saleable, and the whole land of the whole ryots of a mootah, would be far more valuable, than the mootahdar's interest in the same lands, with the same remission. Under a mootah, as now constituted, two hundred little estates, the actual property of two hundred small proprietors, who enjoyed the solid property, the full rights, privileges, and powers, which constitute absolute property, even though it consisted only of 15 per cent. of the landlord's rent, would be more valuable than two hundred such plots of land, where the qualities of property are divided between government, the mootahdar, and the ryot, and where (say the adversaries of the system) government is forced, by an unnatural farming system, to impose arbitrary restrictions upon the transactions relating to land. Supposing the lands to be equally valuable, the full absolute property, in the one case, would render them more valuable than the divided property, in the other. But the great point is, to fix the ryot to his farm, to marry him, as it were, to a certain field; to give him such an interest in it, as to improve it to the utmost. The two hundred small proprietors would improve their land much more, it may be supposed, than the temporary farmers under the mootahdars, would improve theirs. The estates of the small proprietors would therefore be more valuable, and afford greater security to the revenue. It must, I should imagine, be always kept in view, that this peninsula is almost depopulated; that under our government a great increase of population may be expected in this mild climate, among a people with whom marriage is a religious duty; that, luckily for the government of the country, the great body of the people are husbandmen by profession, I may almost say, by instinct; men who consider agriculture their only business, the only thing they came into the world to perform.

These men, will always extend and improve the cultivation if properly encouraged; and therefore a great revenue may be expected from the waste lands, when the stock and population of the country has increased to such a degree, as to occupy them. Government, by keeping this waste in their own hands, may manage the market of lands, just as the Dutch are said to have done that of spices; by refusing waste, they will raise the value of occupied land; by giving it up, they will keep down the value of occupied land. They may manage this way, until the improvements which, it may be supposed, will take place under our government, have given certain lands an intrinsic value; for if the ryots once find that they are settled on certain fields by a light fixed rent, they will set about improvements; digging wells will be the chief improvement; wells on the high and dry parts of the country are the chief objects of husbandry; for they not only increase the usual rent, but in time of drought they, in a great degree, alleviate the distress of scarcity. At all events, unless times are very bad indeed, they avert the danger of famine. Suppose a ryot, who has a field, for which he now pays 40 pagodas annual rent, gets the perpetual lease of it, for 34 pagodas, he gets 25 per cent. of the landlord's rent. Supposing that he paid the full rent before, he will first set about increasing his stock, to give his land the best culture of which it is susceptible, in its present shape. He will next set about improving the land itself, where the situation allows of it; digging wells will be the most obvious way. When his wells are dug, he fears bad seasons but little; they must be bad indeed, to exhaust his wells. He will most likely raise produce enough to pay his land-tax to government, to feed himself and cattle; for though he raises less in a bad season, he gets a better price. It may be supposed that the mootahdar will do so, too; however, it will be found most likely, that neither he nor his tenants have so palpable an interest in improvement, as the small proprietor would have. The tenants would not, and though the mootahdar might feel as much anxiety for the general improvement of his mootah, as any small proprietor

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proprietor could do for that of his estate; yet he is but one man; he could not oversee every thing, do every thing, know or apply his judgment to every thing. He and his ryots might be quarrelling about the rent, while the independent proprietors, or rather the whole body of them, would be silently and seriously setting all their wits, their labour, and their stock, to the grand work of improvement; because each man would be tied down to a certain spot, in which he would possess and feel the full ownership. In short, to divide the qualities of property in the soil, between the government, and the ryot, in the way proposed by this system, is treating mother earth like a Nair lady, and giving her half-a-dozen husbands to neglect her, while one good man would cherish her with affection.

However, notwithstanding all these objections, which may perhaps be justly urged against the mootahdar system, there is no doubt, but that it will produce improvement, by fixing the demand, and giving individuals a greater interest in the land, than they had before. The limitation of the demand of government is so great a blessing, that it compensates for the faults of the system: however, it would seem, that government might fix the demand direct, without the intermediate agency of mootahdars. The fixing the demand is independent of the farming principle of the system; and, therefore, does not prove it altogether a good system, any more than some very good institutions, prove the Mahomedan law an excellent system of jurisprudence.

Another advantage of the mootahdarry system, is the cheapness of it. It might be necessary to allow the farmers a greater remission to constitute them small proprietors, than to enable the mootahdars to carry on their mootahs successfully: if we give 15 per cent. to the mootahdars, it may be necessary to give perhaps 20, or even more, to the bulk of the ryots, with the view of making them small proprietors, to pay regularly. It will therefore, be right to weigh well, whether or not the loss, which this difference will occasion, will be compensated by any equivalent advantages. The chief pecuniary advantage, which will arise from a ryotwar system, would be the increased revenue derivable from waste, as the stock and population increased in consequence of the light rent.

After the lands at present occupied, are completely cultivated, the ryots will turn their superfluous stock to the improvement of waste; perhaps for eight or ten years, their present lands may afford sufficient occupation for all the labour and stock of the country; but, after that period, it is likely that the public revenue will be rapidly augmented, by the occupation of waste. Revenue increased, from those genuine sources of stock and population, is more to be depended on, than that raised from the lottery-like resource of mootahs: but the revenue may in time be augmented from other sources, perhaps; and it seems politic to throw the burthen from the land, as much as possible. The 32 millions annually raised in England, would ruin the country if levied directly upon the land, or even that part which is indirectly paid by the land.

Our conduct in regard to the (I may take them at) six millions of persons, who are concerned in the decision of this question, will show our principles. There are perhaps six millions of persons engaged in agriculture, who will be affected by the settlement which is made with them. These persons must live by agriculture; their instinctive application to husbandry, I may say, is what supports the scheme of government. Without it, this country had long ago been reduced to a desert, by war, bad seasons, and bad government. These husbandmen pay our armies, support our costly establishments, provide our investments, and, under good management, could support a British army in Germany to fight the battles of the state. Shall we leave these men to struggle under a heavy, in some cases, a rack rent? Shall we transfer them with this burthen on their shoulders to the mootahdar, like so many cattle? Or shall we excite their industry, and increase their stock, by giving them a share of the rent, and look for a compensation, in an increased revenue derived from augmented stock, population, and industry? This may be said to be all theory, not to be put in practice; but it is practicable. The result will follow the cause, as certainly as any other moral effects result from their causes. It is a perfect syllogism—as light rent increases the comforts and stock of the farmer; comforts and stock increase population and cultivation; population and cultivation increase the public revenue: nobody will deny this: but there always seems some difficulty attending the practice. We have instituted courts of judicature at a great expense, to protect private rights; but where is there so great a cause to be settled as this—between government and the great mass of cultivators? It little signifies either to government, or to the body of the people, whether Vinkoo or Mootoo, have their cause rightly decided; but it signifies very much, whether many thousand hundred thousand farmers have a light or a heavy rent to pay, whether a light and equal assessment is made, to the immediate benefit of the people and the ultimate benefit of government, or whether a high unequal rent is exacted by the necessities of the state.

	Acres.	Rent in K <sup>y</sup> pagodas.
Waste land 20 years in the Ceded Districts	21,31,663	6,69,218
Old waste overgrown	21,29,933	5,43,430

A ryot may pay circular rent M.P. 178. 8. upon a farm producing 354. 2. a remission of 12 or 15 per cent. will therefore be of great relief. He goes now borrowing frequently; his reputation for industry is his paper money, and he pays his rent somehow or other, living from hand to mouth. A remission might be thrown away on the idle and extravagant; but it would benefit the generality. The idle and extravagant would not retain their lands, and most probably the land in which there was a property of 15 per

cent. of landlord's rent, would ultimately fall into the hands of the industrious. It is said by some, that a high rent stimulates industry, and in the Ceded Districts where the rent, if not very high, is the full landlord's rent, the people are exceedingly industrious. The women especially are constantly at the spinning wheel; but I think that these industrious habits would not be maintained, by giving them a share of the rent.

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state, or imposed by a careless, rigid, or a too cautious collector. The sources of prosperity are immediately affected, by the conduct of the collector; the effects of the court, the slow and circuitous. The one, like a copious blood-letting: the other, like the local application of a leech; that is, where too high an assessment, or an unjust decision occurs. The courts indeed, are perhaps at present, a source of trouble to the ryots; they are generally the debtors; the banians, and townsmen, the creditors. The townsmen talk about and know about the courts, and bring forward their old bonds; but the ryot, who lives in a distant village, never thinks about justice, till he is served with a summons.

This operation of the courts, will, perhaps, in some degree, impede the collection of the revenue; and all I fear is, that the remission, if granted, may for some years, go to the debtors, rather than benefit the ryots. In the end, however, this will not much signify, because it will still increase the general agricultural stock, whether it be borrowed and employed, or employed and enjoyed by the ryots themselves. As the remission or rather share of the landlord's rent will stick to the land under all transfers, it will be valuable property, and will, in the end, fall into the hands of some industrious person.

Courts however, are not only beneficial, but actually necessary. However, I maintain, that a light rent in the present state of the country, is still more necessary; that government ought to try to lighten the burthen as much as possible; that 10 or 15, or even 20 per cent. is no object, in competition to the improvement of the country. We must adopt that system, which tends to promote general comfort and population, to raise the greatest produce from the earth. If we flatter ourselves that we in reality increase the resources, invigorate the agricultural stamina of the country, by creating a set of farmers to collect this heavy rent; that we thereby benefit in any great degree, the bulk of the people, inasmuch as we grant a remission to the mootahdars to ensure the payment of their rent, and compensate for their risque and trouble of collection; we are certainly deceived. It may be said, that things go on well, that the mootahdars pay, that the country improves; but under our honourable government, defended by our army; a country so fertile; a people so industrious, will thrive, in spite even of a bad system, just, as a stout child grows and becomes a sturdy youth, in the midst of rags and poverty. I do not mean to say the system is bad. I only mean to say, that in spite of its faults, the country will improve; because for many thousand years, it has been a rich populous country, whenever 30 or 40 years of peace allowed it to rise into its natural state. But if the country thrives, it is from other causes; not because the government, has farmed the land revenue. Our government is so strong, so just, so wise, in comparison to native governments, that almost under any system, the country will, in a certain degree, prosper. Under the harshest tyranny, the ryots seem never to have totally relinquished the labours of husbandry: they consider themselves born to plough, and they labour in this their vacation, until their strength fails. The people in the Ceded Districts continued to cultivate, though exposed not only to the most arbitrary exactions of their own government, but also of banditti. Men might be seen holding the plough with black stumps of fingers, burnt off by the officers of their own government. Shall we then take the same advantage of this instinct, which the petty tyrants, who have for 50 years usurped the government of the country, did? Shall we exact the same high rent, which they exacted, on their principles? For they always considered it enough, if the ryots had sufficient left them, just to live and keep up their stock; they exacted every dub besides. Their wants and uncertain existence, I may say, made them careless of future advantages. Shall we continue this system, or endeavour by economy, by management, by time, to better the condition and course the ryots, into small proprietors?

We have every reason to believe, that the great Hindoo and Mahomedan empires, under which agriculture was raised to so flourishing a state, were very moderate in their exactions.

On the decline of these great empires, the petty chiefs, who usurped the sovereign power, were forced by their wants to exact as much as they possibly could, without directly exhausting the means of cultivation; and consequently agriculture declined with the great states, under which it was protected.

Rack rents have contributed more to ruin the peninsula, than all the wars and tumults which have occurred. Many countries have continued in high culture, though exposed to constant wars; and others, have become desert, in the midst of peace. The open violence of armies has done less injury to the peninsula, perhaps, than the fines, fees, exactions and contributions, which have been imposed by the tyranny, or permitted by the weakness of the state. The great empires encouraged husbandry, by a light assessment; the petty tyrants who usurped authority on their decline have discouraged, in some places ruined it, by heavy exactions. The buildings, tanks, channels, even ridges, which separated former fields, the ruined villages, general tradition, books, accounts, and shannuds, and inscriptions; all combine to give us a high idea of the former cultivation, and opulence of this peninsula.

The great Hindoo princes did not, in fact, want a very great revenue: they had no extensive establishments to keep up: their simplicity of manners required but little. The soldier were supported, by the grant of lands: the prince and nobility eat finer rice and more ghee than ploughmen. Religious ceremonies were, perhaps, the chief expense of the state; but they contributed to the pleasure and advantage of the people. A fourth, in time of need, a fifth, and even only a sixth, were the shares of the produce usually taken by the prince. The Ray Rajah of Canara was one-sixth. The people of the Ceded Districts paid more to the Bynaggar government; but those rajahs were only a kind of lord paramount pollagers, engaged in perpetual wars with the Mahomedans, who at last overthrew their government.

The wars, made it necessary to exact, and the plunders and massacres, which the Mahomedans exercised, perhaps made the body of the people willing to pay, a heavy rent, to keep out those fanatic invaders; but on the whole, I believe the land-rent was lighter, and certainly it was expended, in a manner more congenial and beneficial to the people, than our land-rent. It seems to have been this light rent, that enabled the countries to rise to such a pitch of improvement.

Does not this relative to Zemindary and Ryot war settlements.

Extract from Report of Mr. Thackeray; 4th August 1807.

One advantage has been attributed to the mootadary system, in respect to government, that I must confess I do not see; that is, that the revenue will be fixed. It may look well in the accounts, to have the same certain sum always as the demand, and may save some trouble; however, I should imagine ours to be the first government in the world, that ever considered it a material object to collect the very same sum each year, if it does consider it so. The revenue of most countries, of England for instance, fluctuates according to the exigencies of the state. Deficiencies are made up by new taxes; surplus collections are accounted for: but among all the schemes for improving the revenue, I never heard of a statesman recommending any financial measure, merely because it promised to bring the very same sum in each year. On the contrary, they in general boast of a probable increase. At all events, the revenue is made to suit the exigency. If 30 millions are wanted, they are raised. They may, perhaps, farm or fix the amount of any particular tax, because it may be expedient to dispose of that one tax, in that way; but as they have many other means of raising supplies, that signifies little.

In India, the Land is the chief source of revenue; very little else goes to supply our Indian budget. In England, the land-tax is only 1-16th of the whole revenue; here it is 1-6th of the whole revenue. The bad policy, therefore, of shutting up our only great source of supply is manifest. Although it be highly expedient, nay, absolutely necessary, to limit the demand on private estates; yet for government to bind itself down to a certain sum for the whole country, appears impolitic. As far as I can comprehend the Permanent Settlement, as hitherto introduced, government can neither ascertain, whether their subjects can pay more revenue, nor can they, without breaking through their engagements, raise more land revenue. In the Northern circars, for instance, it will be impossible to tell, 10 years hence, whether the country can bear four or five laes more, because government have transferred the earnings to the zemindars, and apparently as impossible to levy it, though the country might easily bear it, because government seem to have pledged themselves not to levy more land revenue. \*—The zemindars, at least, consider the subject in this way, and expect to engross the profits, the rent, which the natural increase of stock and population, under our mild government in those fine provinces, will produce. It would seem, that neither the state, nor the ryots, can share those advantages; the state and the ryots, those objects of attention to the indolent Hindoos and barbarous Tartars, who preceded us, and under whom India flourished, in such a way, as to astonish the world, and become proverbial for its industry, fertility, and population.

However urgent the necessities of the State may be, it would seem that we can raise no more in the shape of land revenue from the Circars. The indulgences granted then by the permanent settlement to the zemindars, must therefore be compensated for by burthens laid on the industrious subjects of the other provinces. This is a cause of inequality and hardship, and is one reason for the general extension of the Permanent Settlement. But though the mootadary system is better perhaps than a high uncertain rent; yet it seems easy to fix the demand, without recurring to that system. In whatever way the country be settled, the qualities of property, the Ashta Bhog or eight attributes, privileges and powers which are necessary to constitute the full ownership in the land, must, as much as possible, be vested in the same person. Whether the estates be large or small, will depend on circumstances. If one great ryot undertook for a whole village, he ought to have it all, unless others were injured, by being rendered dependant upon him; where two, three, or a dozen ryots, engaged for a village, they ought to have it; whenever good men offered to take land in perpetuity, they ought to have it; but there should be no restrictions, no rules calculated for official convenience, rather than for general improvement; no estates should be sold: no adventurers admitted. There seems no necessity for a hasty settlement; but the sooner the remission in those provinces, where the rent is heavy, be granted, the speedier will be the increase of stock, and the quicker will be the effects of the encouragements to industry, which the remission will produce.

WE ought to remit as much as possible, to the ryots of the Ceded Districts and other surveyed provinces; whether we consider the climate or the present assessment, rather than to the sub-alpine proprietors of Canara and Malabar. The Ryots of the Ceded Districts are a very industrious race, and are perhaps, the best men in the world, for the cultivation of the earth: they are husbandmen by cast. In Europe, if a man has four sons, two or three may become sailors, soldiers, or tradesmen: but here, they must all follow their hereditary profession of husbandry. They have continued to pay their landlord's rent, and have prospered as farmers, under the able management of collector Munro; but it requires a share of the rent to enable them to become small proprietors, and extend cultivation.

utmost.

We must therefore have recourse to other means of raising the public revenue. From a late decision, however, it would seem, that government are precluded from

raising a revenue from licences on duties, which may ultimately affect the produce of the land.



Discussions relative to  
Mootahdarry and Ryot-  
in Settlements.

Extracts from Report  
of Mr. Thackeray, 4th  
August 1807.

atmost. A remission of 10 per cent. might perhaps not make up to them, the loss which they must feel when a collector is set over them\*. It may be said, that the Ceded Districts have improved so much under the Company's government, that a remission of rent seems unnecessary; however, they might improve still more, under a management equally efficient, and under a land revenue, which should leave to the ryots, a share of the landlord's rent.

Respecting the future system to be adopted for the management of the Ceded Districts; I am heartily of opinion, that the introduction of the mootahdarry, would be prejudicial to the Ryots, and to the Company, for the reasons which have been so often stated. I think, that when the government can afford it, a remission ought to be granted to the ryots, to give them a share of the landlord's rent. A small remission would tend to make them thriving farmers; a greater remission, would tend to make them, proprietors. I think, that it must be the object of government, to nurse, them into thriving farmers, if the exigencies of the state will not allow it to constitute them proprietors: but this is not to be done, by farming the land-rent, and giving a remission to the mootahdars.

I HAVE written so long a paper on the subject; and collector Munro has discussed it in so ample and able a way, that it seems unnecessary, if not presumptuous in me, to say any thing more on the subject. I shall only observe, that the Permanent Settlement is meant to benefit the Government, and the Ryots; that in respect to the ryots, it is admitted, that it is necessary to grant them a remission, to give them an increase of stock and spirit; if not to make them comfortable. Shall we then refuse it to them, and grant it to a set of Farmers, to be created on purpose to enjoy it? In respect to Government, it is admitted, that the revenue depends on the stock and spirit of the cultivators, under any system: Shall we then encrease their stock, and excite their spirit, by a direct remission, or shall we leave them to struggle with bad seasons, under their present high rent, and give the remission to a set of Farmers, to ensure them against losses, which our own, I may say, harsh and impolitic conduct, towards the ryots, most probably occasion?

\* I consider it unnecessary to argue on the advantages of a light rent, as it regards the country; because it appears as clear as any moral conclusion can, that industry, stock, and population, must be increased by a light rent;.

The End.





